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HANDBOUND 

AT  THE 


UNIVERSITY  OF 
TORONTO  PRESS 


5'* 


THE 


Psychological  Review 


EDITED  BY 


J.  McKEEN  CATTELL 
COLUMBIA  UNIVERSITY 


J.  MARK  BALDWIN 
PRINCETON  UNIVERSITY 


WITH  THE  CO-OPERATION  OF 

ALFRED  BINET,  ECOLE  DES  HAUTES-ETUDES,  PARIS;  JOHN  DEWEY,  UNIVERSITY  OF 

CHICAGO;    H.  H.   DONALDSON,    UNIVERSITY  OF  CHICAGO;  G.  S.  FULLERTON 

UNIVERSITY  OF  PENNSYLVANIA;   WILLIAM  JAMES,  HARVARD  UNIVERSITY; 

JOSEPH  JASTROW,  UNIVERSITY  OF  WISCONSIN;    G.  T.  LADD,  YALE 

UNIVERSITY;  HUGO  MONSTERBERG,  HARVARD  UNIVERSITY; 

M.  ALLEN  STARR,  COLLEGE  OF  PHYSICIANS  AND  SURGEONS, 

NEW   YORK;  CARL  STUMPF,  UNIVERSITY,  BERLIN; 

JAMES  SULLY,  UNIVERSITY  COLLEGE,  LONDON. 


Volume  III.     1896. 


PUBLISHED  BI-MOXTHLY  BY 

THE  MACMILLAN  COMPANY, 

66  FIFTH  AVENUE,  NEW  YORK;  AND  LONDON. 
Copyright  1896  by  THE  MACMILLAN  COMPANY. 


P7 


THE  NEW  ERA  PRINTING  HOUSE, 
LANCASTER,  PA. 


CONTENTS  OF  VOLUME  III. 


ALPHABETICAL   INDICES  OF  NAMES  AND  SUBJECTS  WILL   BE  FOUND  AT  THE 
END  OF  THE  VOLUME. 

ARTICLES. 

PACK. 

Psychology  and  Physiology :  GEORGE  STUART  FULLERTON i 

Studies  from  the  Harvard  Psychological  Laboratory  (III.)  :  Com- 
municated by  HUGO  MUNSTERBERG  : — 

The  Place  of  Repetition  in  Memory:  G.  W.  SMITH 21 

Association  (II.)  :  MARY  WHITON  CALKINS 32 

The  Saturation  of  Colors:  L.  M.  SOLOMONS 50 

Fluctuations   of  Attention  (I.)  :  J.  P.  HYLAN 56 

Proceedings  of  the  Fourth  Annual  Meeting  of  the  American  Psy- 
chological Association:  E.  C.  SANFORD : 121 

Address  of  the  President :  J.  McKEEN  CATTELL 1 34 

Consciousness  and  Time  :      C.  A.  STRONG , 149 

Studies  from  the  Harvard  Psychological  Laboratory  (IV. )  :  Com- 
municated by  HUGO  MUNSTERBERG  : — 

The  Physical   Characteristics  of  Attention:    R.  MAC- 

DOUGALL 158 

Studies  from  the  Psychological  Laboratory  of  the  University  of 
Chicago : — 

(I)  Reaction     Time:      A     Study    in    Attention    and 
Habit :  JAMES  ROWLAND  ANGELL  and  ADDISON  W. 

MOORE 245 

(II)   A  Study  of    Visual  and  Aural  Memory  Processes : 

Louis  GRANT  WHITEHEAD 258 

Studies  from  Harvard  Psychological  Laboratory  (V.)  : 

The  ^Esthetics  of  Simple  Forms :   EDGAR  PIERCE 270 

A  New  Perimeter:    JAMES  E.  LOUGH 282 

The  Accuracy  of  Recollection  and  Observation :     FREDERICK  E. 

BOLTON 286 

The  Reflex  Arc  Concept  in  Psychology :    JOHN  DEWEY 357 


iv  CONTENTS. 

PAGE. 

Studies  from  the  Psychological  Laboratory  of  the  University  of 
Chicago : 

(III)  The  Organic  Effects  of  Agreeable  and  Disagree- 
able Stimuli:  JAMES  ROWLAND  ANGELL  and  SIMON 

F.   MCLENNAN 371 

(IV)  Simultaneous  Sense  Stimulations :     AMY  TANNER 
and  KATE  ANDERSON 378 

Some  Remarks  upon  Apperception :  J.  KODIS 384 

Types  of  Imagination :  RAY  H.  STETSON 398 

On  Individual  Sensibility  to  Pain:  HAROLD  GRIPPING 412 

The  Third  Year  at  the  Yale  Laboratory:  E.  W.  SCRIPTURE 416 

Studies  from  the  Psychological  Laboratory  of  the  University  of 
Iowa : 
On  the  Effects  of  Loss  of  Sleep :  G.  T.  W.  PATRICK 

and  J.  ALLEN  GILBERT 469 

Studies  from  the  Psychological  Laboratory  of  Harvard  Univer- 
sity: 

(I)    The  Relations  of  Intensity  to  Duration  of  Stimula- 
tion in  our  Sensations  of  Light :  JAMES  E.  LOUGH  418 
(II)  Normal  Motor  Automatism:  LEON  M.  SOLOMONS 

and  GERTRUDE  STEIN 492 

On  the  Conditions  of  Fatigue  in  Reading:  HAROLD  GRIPPING 

and  SHEPHERD  IVORY  FRANZ 513 

The  Accuracy  of  Observation  and  Recollection  in  School  Chil- 
dren: SHEPHERD  IVORY  FRANZ  and  HENRY  E.  HOUS- 
TON    53 1 

The   Third   International    Congress    of    Psychology:    EDWARD 

FRANKLIN  BUCHNER 589 

Richard  Avenarius :  J.  KODIS 603 

Some  Preliminary  Experiments  on  Vision  without  Inversion  of 

the  Retinal  Image :  GEORGE  M.  STRATTON 611 

Physical  and  Mental  Measurements  of  the  Students  of  Columbia 
University:  J.  McK.  CATTELL  and  LIVINGSTON  FAR- 
RAND..,  ..  618 


DISCUSSION  AND  REPORTS. 

Physical  Pain  and  Pain  Nerves:  C.  A.  STRONG 64 

Community  of  Ideas  of  Men  and  Women:  JOSEPH  JASTROW 68 

The  Functions  of  the  Rods  of  the  Retina :  C.  LADD  FRANKLIN.  . .  71 


CONTENTS.  V 

PAGE. 

Something   More   about  the  4  Prospective  Reference '  of  Mind : 

WILBUR  M.  URBAN 73 

Our  Localization  in  Space:  JAMES  H.  HYSLOP 89 

Three  Casesof  Synaesthesia :  WILFRED  LAY 92 

The  Metaphysical  Study  of  Ethics:  JOHN  DEWEY 181 

Investigation  of  Cutaneous  Sensibility :  FRIEDRICH  KIESOW 188 

Suspension  of  the  Spatial  Consciousness;   Focal  and  Marginal 

Consciousness:  C.  L.  HERRICK 191 

Natural  History  of  the  Criminal :  DR.  KURELLA 195 

Thinking,  Feeling,  Doing :  E.  W.  SCRIPTURE,  JAMES  R.  ANGELL  196 
Consciousness   and   Evolution:   GEORGE  TRUMBULL   LADD,   J. 

MARK   BALDWIN, 296 

Pain-Nerves :    HERBERT  NICHOLS 309 

The  Relation  between  Psychology  and  Logic :  GEORGE  M.  STRAT- 

TON 313 

The  Testimony  of  Heart  Disease  to  the  Sensory  Facies  of  the 

Emotions:  C.  L.  HERRICK 320 

A  Psychological  Interpretation  of  Certain  Doctrines  of  Formal 

Logic:  ALFRED  H.  LLOYD 422 

Community  of  Ideas  in  Men  and  Women :  MARY  WHITON  CAL- 
KINS, JOSEPH  JASTROW 426 

Remarks  on  Professor  Lloyd  Morgan's  Method  in  Animal  Psy- 
chology:  HIRAM  M.  STANLEY 536 

Recognition:  ARTHUR  ALLIN,  MARY  WHITON  CALKINS 542 

The  Community  of  Ideas  of  Men  and  Women :  AMY  TANNER...  548 

Psychical  Research:  WILLIAM  JAMES 649 

Psychology  and  Logic — Further  Views :  G.  H.  HOWISON 652 

The  Psycho-Sensory  Climacteric;  C.  L.  HERRICK 657 


PSYCHOLOGICAL  LITERATURE. 

Biervliet's  Elements  de  Psychologic ;    Le  Bon's  Psychologic  des 

Foules:    A.  B 97 

Telepathy,  etc.  :  W.  J 98 

The  Condition  of  Experimental  Psychology:     G.  TAWNEY 100 

Hypnotism  :  FRIEDR.  KIESOW 105 

Vision:    C.  LADD  FRANKLIN 106 

Memory:    J.  R.  ANGELL 108 

Experimental:    J.  McK.  C.,  H.  C.  WARREN,  C.  H.  JUDD no 

The  Feelings:  W.  J.,  A.  B 113 


vi  CONTENTS. 

PAGE 

The  Conscience:  JOHN  GRIER  HIBBEN 114 

Jones' Philosophy  of  Lotze:  W.  J.  SHAND 115 

Time:  S.  F.  MCLENNAN 118 

Donaldson's  The  Growth  of  the  Brain:    JAMES  J.  PUTNAM 198 

Baldwin's   Mental   Development  in    the   Child   and  the   Race: 

JOSI AH  ROYCE 2O I 

Stanley's  Evolutionary  Psychology  of  Feeling:  J.  M.  B 211 

Ethical  (Bryant's  Studies  in  Character,  Watson's  Hedonistic 

Theories):  JOHN  DEWEY 218 

Lesions  of  the  Cortical  Nerve  Cell  in  Alcoholism :  LIVINGSTON 

FARRAND  222 

Senile  Dementia :  ADOLF  MEYER  224 

Hypnotism:  FRIEDRICH  KIESOW,  GUY  TAWNEY 226 

Vision:  C.  LADD  FRANKLIN 229 

Experimental:  CHAS.  H.  JUDD,  T.  L.  BOLTON 232 

Consciousness:  H.  N.  GARDINER  235 

The  Psychology  of  Rhetoric:  BLISS  PERRY 237 

Kiilpe's  Psychology :  G.  T.  W.  PATRICK 323 

Conant's  Number  Concept :  JOHN  DEWEY 326 

Groos' Spiele  der  Thiere:  WESLEY  MILLS 329 

The  Psychology  of  Art:  H.  N.  GARDINER,  W.  R.  NEWBOLD...  331 

Fouillee's  Temperament  et  charactere :  JEAN  PHILLIPPE 335 

Heinrich's  Psychologic  in  Deutschland:  W.  G.  SMITH 327 

Miiller's  Psycho-physik  der  Gesichtsempfindungen :  CHR.  LADD 

FRANKLIN 338 

Weinmann  on  Specific  Energies :  C.  W.  HODGE 342 

Allin  on  Recognition :  MARY  WHITON  CALKINS 344 

Pathological:  FRIEDRICH  KIESOW 347 

Experimental :  E.  B.  DELABARRE,  C.  H.  JUDD,  GUY  TAWNEY.  . .  349 

Ethical:  J.  H.  TUFTS,  GUY  TAWNEY 353 

Sully's  Studies  of  Childhood :  WM.  L.  BRYAN 432 

McLellan  and  Dewey's  Psychology  of  Number:  ALEXANDER 

ZIWET 434 

Romanes'  Darwin  and  after  Darwin ;  Cope's  Factors  of  Organic 

Evolution:  J.  McKEEN  CATTELL 437 

Tyler's  Whence  and  Whither  of  Man :  WARNER  FITE 443 

Mosso'sFear:  HERBERT  NICHOLS 445 

Haddon's  Evolution  in  Art:  H.R.MARSHALL 447 

Hibbens'  Inductive  Logic :  JAMES  H.  HYSLOP 448 

Vision  and  Galvanotropism :  C.  LADD  FRANKLIN,  WILFRED  LAY  450 


CONTENTS.  vii 

FACE. 

Pathological:  H.  N.  GARDNER,  FRIEDRICH  KIESOW 454 

Experimental:  H.  C.  WARREN,  J.  P.  HYLAN 456 

Epistemology :  GUY  TAWNEY,  H.  C.  WARREN,  E.  A.  SINGER,  JR.  459 
Recent  French  Works  (T.  Lachelier,  A.  Fouille"e,  T.  Halleux, 

Ch.  Mirallie",  Fr.  Paulhan)  :  A.  BINET 551 

Eucken's  Der  Kampf  um  einen  geistigen  Lebensinhalt :  A.  C. 

ARMSTRONG,  JR 556 

Ethnology  and  Anthropology:  LIVINGSTON  FARRAND 558 

L'Anne"e  psychologique :  H.  C.  WARREN 562 

Leuba's  The  Psychology  of  Religious  Phenomena:  WILLIAM 

ROMAINE  NEWBOLD 569 

A  New  Factor  in  Evolution:  J.  McKEEN  CATTELL 571 

Vision:  C.  L.  FRANKLIN,  E.  B.  DELABARRE 573 

Localization  of  Touch :  HERBERT  NICHOLS 577 

Memory:  H.  N.  GARDINER,  W.  G.  SMITH 578 

Synopsia:  MARY  WHITON  CALKINS 581 

Psychical  Research :  J.  McKEEN  CATTELL 582 

The  Emotions:  H.  N.  GARDINER 583 

Epistemology:  C.  W.  HODGE,  H.  N.  GARDINER 584 

Titchener's  Outline  of  Psychology:  H.  C.  WARREN 662 

Rehmke's  Psychologic :  E.  A.  SINGER,  JR 666 

Halleck's  Psychology  and  Psychic  Culture :  E.  A.  KIRKPATRICK.  669 

Leibnitz,  New  Essays:  JOHN  E.  RUSSELL 671 

Ribot's  Psychologic  des  sentiments :  A.  BINET 673 

Berenson's  Florentine  Painters  of  the  Italian  Renaissance: 

GEORGE  SANTAYANA 677 

Morselli  on  Insanity:  W.  J 679 

De  Sanctis  on  Sleep  and  Dreams:  W.  J 681 

Subliminal  Consciousness :  W.  J 682 

Paulsen's  Introduction  to  Philosophy:  J.  MARK  BALDWIN 684 

Schopenhauer's  Philosophy :  WILLIAM  ROMAINE  NEWBOLD 686 

Harris  on  Moral  Evolution:  AMY  TANNER 688 

Ethics:  NORMAN  WILDE 691 

Vision:  C.  LADD  FRANKLIN,  J.  E.  LOUGH... 692 

Motor  Phenomena  of  Mental  Effort:  F.  TRACY 698 

Das  Gefiihl  und  der  Alter:  HAROLD  GRIPPING 699 

Meumann's  Psychologic  des  Zeitbewusstseins :  GUY  TAWNEY 700 

New  Books 119,239*  334>  466»  587>  7°4 

Notes 119,  239,  355,  467,  588,  704 


VOL.  III.     No.  i.  JANUARY,  1896. 


THE  PSYCHOLOGICAL  REVIEW. 


PSYCHOLOGY  AND  PHYSIOLOGY.1 

BY  PROFESSOR  GEORGE  STUART   FULLERTON, 
University  of  Pennsylvania. 

In  a  paper  which  I  read  two  years  ago  before  this  Associa- 
tion, I  endeavored  to  make  clear  the  nature  of  the  work  done 
by  the  psychologist,  and  to  set  forth  the  assumptions  upon  which 
he  must  proceed  and  the  method  he  must  employ.  I  maintained 
that  he  must  assume  the  existence  of  an  external  physical  world, 
and  the  existence  of  certain  copies  or  representatives  of  it  inti- 
mately related  to  particular  bodily  organisms.  These  transcripts 
of  the  external  world,  supplemented  by  certain  elements  not 
supposed  to  have  their  prototypes  without  (feelings  of  pleasure 
and  pain,  etc.)  are  called  minds.  I  stated  that  it  was  the  task 
of  the  psychologist,  with  the  aid  of  introspection,  observation 
and  experiment,  to  obtain  a  knowledge  of  such  minds,  and  to 
reduce  their  phenomena  to  laws.  I  held  further  that,  whether 
we  regard  mental  phenomena  as  parallel  with  nervous  processes, 
or  as  belonging  to  the  same  series  with  them  and  forming  a  part 
of  the  one  chain,  that  does  not  affect  the  fundamental  assump- 
tion of  the  psychologist,  the  assumption  of  an  external  world 
and  of  minds  which  mirror  it,  nor  does  it  affect  his  general 
method  of  procedure,  the  employment  of  introspection,  observa- 
tion and  experiment. 

These  positions  seem  to  me  to  be  commonplaces  of  psy- 
chology, and  so  generally  accepted,  explicitly  or  implicitly,  that 
they  may  be  taken  without  question.  They  appear  also  to  de- 

aRead  before  the  Philadelphia  meeting  of  the  American  Psychological  As- 
sociation, 


2  GEORGE   STUART  FULLERTON. 

fine  with  some  exactness  the  field  which  belongs  to  the  psy- 
chologist, and  to  make  possible  a  line  of  demarkation  between 
psychology  and  other  scientific  disciplines.  As,  however,  the 
sciences  differentiate  themselves  clearly  from  one  another,  and 
acquire  definiteness,  only  as  they  approach  a  high  state  of  de- 
velopment, and  as  psychology  and  the  sciences  which  lie  nearest 
to  it  must  be  admitted  to  be  still  in  their  infancy,  it  is  not  to  be 
wondered  at  that  the  question  of  boundaries  should  often  be 
mooted,  and  charges  and  countercharges  of  trespass  made  with 
some  warrant.  It  was  but  lately  that  psychology  was  scarcely 
recognized  as  a  separate  science  at  all,  being  treated  as  a  branch 
of  philosophy,  and  psychological  facts  being  served  in  a  sauce 
of  epistemological  speculations.  From  this  condition  of  affairs 
the  science  is  gradually  emerging.  The  separation  is  by  no 
means  complete  in  fact,  as  a  glance  at  many  of  our  psycholo- 
gies will  show,  but  we  may  console  ourselves  with  the  thought 
that  the  state  of  affairs  is  better  than  it  was,  and  that  human 
knowledge  is  gaining  through  the  change. 

In  our  own  day  the  living  question  is  that  of  the  relation  of 
psychology  to  physiology,  and  of  the  line  of  demarkation  between 
them.  We  hear  charges  that  the  psychologists  sometimes  oc- 
cupy themselves  in  doing  work  which  is  purely  physiological, 
and  one  who  reads  the  text-books  of  physiology  cannot  but  see 
that  the  writer  is  frequently  on  ground  not  properly  his  own. 
Where  are  we  to  draw  the  line  between  the  two  fields  ?  And  if  a 
clear  line  can  be  drawn,  how  far  is  it  desirable  that  a  division 
of  labor  should  take  place  ?  It  is  to  a  brief  discussion  of  these 
questions  that  this  paper  is  devoted. 

I  have  said  above  that  whether  we  regard  mental  phenomena 
as  parallel  with  nervous  processes,  or  as  belonging  to  the  same 
series  with  them  and  in  causal  relation  with  the  world  of  things, 
it  need  not  affect  our  view  of  the  fundamental  assumptions  of 
psychology  or  of  psychological  method.  But  in  discussing  the 
line  of  demarkation  between  psychology  and  physiology,  this 
question  of  the  nature  of  the  relation  between  mind  and  body 
may  become  an  important  one,  and  it  will  be  convenient  to  treat 
my  subject  under  two  heads  ;  that  is,  to  inquire  into  the  relations 
of  these  sciences  on  the  assumption  that  mental  states  and  bodily 


PSYCHOLOGY  AND  PHYSIOLOGY.  3 

do  not  belong  to  the  same  series,  but  are  merely  parallel  (the  so- 
called  automaton  theory)  ;  and  then  to  consider  the  effect  of  re- 
garding the  two  sets  of  phenomena  as  forming  one  causally  re- 
lated whole. 

I. 

Assuming,  then,  that  mental  states  have  no  influence  upon 
bodily,  and  that  the  so-called  .sensory-motor  arc  consists  of  an 
unbroken  chain  of  physical  processes,  what  are  the  limits  of  the 
science  of  physiology  ?  The  task  of  the  physiologist  lies  in  the 
study  of  the  functioning  of  living  bodies.  These  bodies  form  a 
part  of  the  physical  world,  a  world  complete  in  itself,  and  which 
demands  for  none  of  its  phenomena  an  explanation  drawn  from 
any  other  sphere.  To  explain  physical  actions,  however  com- 
plicated, the  physiologist  should  have  recourse  to  bodily  pro- 
cesses, which  in  turn  find  their  explanation  in  other  physical 
processes,  and  these  in  still  others,  and  so  on  without  end.  The 
rhythmic  contraction  of  a  heart,  the  fall  of  an  eyelid  stimulated 
by  an  irritation  of  the  conjunctiva,  the  unconscious  gnawing  at 
a  fingernail,  and  the  intricate  chain  of  actions  which  result  in  the 
production  of  a  work  of  art  or  a  scientific  treatise,  all  must  be 
explained  in  the  same  way,  as  one  explains  the  unfolding  of  a 
leaf  or  the  reddening  of  an  apple.  In  each  case  we  have  the 
functioning  of  a  living  body,  a  physical  thing,  and  our  causes 
and  effects  must  all  be  physical. 

This  complete  physical  explanation  of  the  functioning  of 
organisms  is,  of  course,  only  an  ideal,  and  an  ideal  which,  in 
the  present  condition  of  the  science  of  physiology,  smiles  at  us 
from  a  hopeless  distance.  Whether  it  be  the  contraction  of  a 
heart,  or  the  fall  of  an  eye-lid,  or  the  biting  of  a  finger-nail,  or 
the  penning  of  a  sentence,  the  chain  of  physical  causes  which 
bring  about  these  results  lies  hidden  in  that  darkness  which  en- 
closes the  glimmering  taper  of  our  science.  Exact  knowledge 
of  the  antecedents  of  any  bodily  movement  does  not  exist,  and 
in  its  absence  the  physiologist  is  forced  to  give  such  fragmen- 
tary explanations  as  he  can,  often  even  overstepping  the  limits 
of  his  own  science  and  using  conceptions  which  are  really  out 
of  place  in  it,  but  which  he  seems  to  be  compelled  to  use  faute 


4  GEORGE   STUART  FULLERTON. 

de  mieux.  He  has  no  right  to  speak  of  sensations,  of  feelings, 
of  ideas  ;  they  are  not  in  his  world.  The  functioning  of  a  brain, 
as  he  is  concerned  with  it,  results  in  motions  immediate  or  re- 
mote, not  in  feelings  and  thoughts ;  and  to  make  use  of  such  in 
his  reasonings  amounts  to  confessing,  either  that  he  chooses  to 
be  a  psychologist  as  well  as  a  physiologist,  or  that,  having 
found  his  own  road  impassable,  he  has  been  forced  to  continue 
his  journey  upon  that  of  his  neighbor. 

How  little  the  physiologist  is  in  a  position  to  furnish  such  an 
explanation  of  the  functioning  of  organisms  as  I  have  outlined 
above  is  impressed  upon  one  who  reads  critically  our  standard 
text-books  upon  physiology.  One  sees  that,  if  we  eliminate 
from  the  chapters  which  treat  of  the  nervous  system  the  anatom- 
ical portions  and  the  psychological  portions,  the  residue  is 
surprisingly  small.  Certainly  nowhere  do  we  find  such  a  de- 
scription of  the  antecedents  of  a  bodily  movement  as  I  have  held 
up  as  our  ideal.  Let  me  take  for  illustration  the  well  known 
work  by  Professor  Foster,  which  is  so  widely  used  as  a  text- 
book. The  learning  and  candor  of  the  author,  as  well  as  his 
caution  in  the  expression  of  opinions,  make  him,  I  think,  a  de- 
sirable representative  of  his  class.  I  shall  quote  a  few  passages 
from  various  parts  of  his  book.1 

The  necessary  limits  of  such  a  paper  as  this  force  me  to  omit 
much  that  directly  bears  upon  the  subject  under  discussion. 
The  question  is  as  to  the  exact  chain  of  physiological  events  be- 
tween a  sensory  stimulus  and  the  resultant  muscular  movements. 
We  have  to  consider  the  occurrences  in  the  nerves  and  in  the 
nervous  centres,  both  spinal  and  cerebral.  As  Dr.  Foster  begins 
with  the  motor  processes,  I  shall  consider  these  first. 

As  to  the  changes  in  a  nerve  during  the  passage  of  the  nerv- 
ous impulse  our  author  is  frank  in  his  admission  of  ignorance. 
He  regards  it  as  clear  that  the  impulse  is  something  quite  dif- 

1 1  shall  quote  from  the  sixth  London  edition.  That  the  book  may  stand  as 
a  representative  of  its  class  becomes  clear  when  one  examines  almost  any  of  the 
more  recent  works  on  the  subject;  e.  g.,  Waller's  'Introduction  to  Human 
Physiology,  (London,  1893);  Bernstein's  '  Lehrbuch  der  Physiologic'  (Stutt- 
gart, 1894)  ;  Munk's  '  Physiologic  des  Menschen  und  der  Saiigethiere'  (Berlin, 
1892) ;  or  the  '  Vergleichende  Physiologic  der  Haussaiigethiere ',  edited  by 
Ellenberger  (Benin,  1892). 


PSYCHOLOGY  AND  PHYSIOLOGY.  5 

ferent  from  the  ordinary  electric  current,  but  what  it  is  he  does 
not  venture  to  say  (Part  I,  pp.  127,   156). 

The  mechanisms  with  which  the  spinal  cord  is  provided  ap- 
pear also  to  be  mere  matter  of  conjecture.  Concerning  these 
mechanisms  Dr.  Foster  speaks  as  follows  :  "If  we  regard  the 
spinal  cord,  and  apparently  we  have  a  right  to  do  so,  as  result- 
ing from  the  fusion  of  a  series  of  segments  or  metameres,  each 
segment,  represented  by  a  pair  of  spinal  nerves,  being  a  gang- 
lionic  mass,  that  is  to  say,  a  mass  containing  nerve  cells  with 
which  nerve  fibres  are  connected,  we  should  expect  to  find  that 
the  fibres  of  a  spinal  nerve  soon  after  entering  in,  or  before  issuing 
from  the  spinal  cord,  are  connected  with  nerve  cells  lying  in  the 
neighborhood  of  the  attachment  of  the  nerve  to  the  cord.  We 
should,  we  say,  expect  to  find  this ;  but  owing  to  the  difficulty 
of  tracing  individual  nerve  fibres  through  the  tangled  mass  of 
the  substance  of  the  cord,  our  actual  knowledge  of  the  termina- 
tion of  the  fibres  of  the  posterior  root,  and  origin  of  the  fibres 
of  the  anterior  root,  is  at  present  far  from  complete "  ( III, 
876).  In  a  later  section  we  come  upon  this  passage:  "From 
these  and  similar  phenomena  we  may  infer  that  the  nervous 
network  spoken  of  above1  is,  so  to  speak,  mapped  out  into 
nervous  mechanisms  by  the  establishment  of  lines  of  greater 
or  less  resistance,  so  that  the  disturbances  in  it  generated 
by  certain  afferent  impulses  are  directed  into  certain  ef- 
ferent channels.  It  may  be  added  that  though  conspic- 
uously purposeful  movements  seem  to  need  the  concurrent 
action  of  several  segments  of  the  cord,  and  as  a  rule  the 
greater  the  length  of  the  cord  involved,  the  more  complex 
and  the  more  distinctly  purposeful  the  movement,  still 
the  movements  evoked  by  even  a  segment  of  the  cord  may 
be  purposeful  in  character;  hence  we  must  conclude  that 
every  segment  of  the  nervous  network  is  mapped  out  into 
mechanisms"  (III.,  909).  A  little  further  we  find:  "But 
if  the  spinal  cord  possesses  mechanisms  for  carrying  out 
coordinated  movements,  which  in  the  case  of  voluntary  move- 
ments are  discharged  by  nervous  impulses  descending  from 
the  brain,  we  may  infer  that  in  reflex  actions  the  same  me- 

1  i.  e.,  The  grey  matter  of  the  cord. 


6  GEORGE   STUART  FULLERTON. 

chanisms  are  brought  into  action,  though  they  are  discharged 
by  afferent  impulses  coming  along  afferent  nerves  instead  of  by 
impulses  descending  from  the  brain.  The  movements  of  reflex 
origin,  in  all  their  features,  except  their  exciting  cause,  appear 
identical  with  voluntary  movements ;  the  two  can  only  be  dis- 
tinguished from  each  other  by  -a  knowledge  of  the  exciting 
cause.  And  it  seems  unreasonable  to  suppose  that  the  spinal 
cord  should  possess  two  sets  of  mechanisms  in  all  respects 
identical,  save  that  the  one  is  discharged  by  volitional  impulses 
from  the  brain  and  the  other  by  afferent  impulses  from  afferent 
nerves  "  (III.,  910). 

We  are  then,  it  seems,  forced  to  assume  the  existence  in  the 
cord  of  various  mechanisms  for  carrying  out  movements.  What 
these  mechanisms  are  and  how  they  act  we  do  not  know.  We 
know  only  that  something  happens  in  the  cord,  not  what  hap- 
pens. 

Our  ignorance  regarding  the  structure  and  functions  of  the 
bulb  appears  to  be  also  great.  -I  shall  cite  but  two  extracts: 
"Thus  of  the  various  tracts  or  strands  of  the  spinal  cord  two 
only  are  known  definitely  and  certainly  to  pass  as  conspicuous 
unbroken  strands  through  the  bulb  to  or  from  higher  parts ; 
namely,  the  pyramidal  tract  to  the  cerebrum  and  the  cerebellar 
tract  to  the  cerebellum ;  all  or  nearly  all  the  rest  of  the  longi- 
tudinal fibres  of  the  cord  reaching  the  bulb  end,  as  far  as  we 
know  at  present,  in  some  part  or  other  of  the  bulb  ;  and  we  may 
infer  that  some  or  other  nerve  cells  of  the  bulb  serve  as  relays 
to  connect  these  fibres  of  the  cord  with  other  parts  of  the  brain  " 
(III.,  949).  "Meanwhile  enough  has  been  said  to  show  that 
the  bulb  differs  very  materially  in  structure  from  the  spinal  cord. 
The  grey  matter  of  the  bulb  is  far  more  complex  in  its  nature 
than  is  that  of  any  part  of  the  cord ;  and  the  arrangement  of  the 
several  strands  and  tracts  of  fibres  is  far  more  intricate.  The 
structural  features  on  the  whole,  perhaps,  suggest  that  the  main 
functions  of  the  bulb  are  two-fold ;  on  the  one  hand,  it  seems  fit- 
ted to  serve  as  a  head  centre  governing  the  spinal  cord,  the  vari- 
ous reins  of  which,  with 'the  exceptions  noted,  it  holds,  as  it 
were,  in  its  hands  ;  on  the  other  hand,  it  appears  no  less  adapted 
to  act  as  a  middleman  between  parts  of  the  spinal  cord  below 


PSYCHOLOGY  AND  PHYSIOLOGY.  7 

and  various  regions  of  the  brain  above.  As  we  shall  see,  experi- 
ment and  observation  give  support  to  these  suggestions  "  (95 1 ) . 
It  is  scarcely  necessary  for  me  to  add  that  the  experiment  and 
observation  referred  to  do  not  remove  the  questions  as  to  the 
functions  of  the  bulb  and  the  mechanisms  it  contains  from  the 
field  of  conjecture. 

The  section  entitled  "The  Disposition  and  Connections  of 
the  Grey  and  White  Matter  of  the  Brain  "  opens  with  the  follow- 
ing passage :  "As  we  pass  up  from  the  bulb  to  the  higher  parts 
of  the  brain,  the  differentiation  of  the  grey  matter  into  more  or 
less  separate  masses,  which  we  have  seen  begin  in  the  bulb, 
becomes  still  more  striking.  We  have  to  distinguish  a  large 
number  of  areas  or  collections  of  grey  matter  more  or  less  regu- 
lar in  form  and  more  or  less  sharply  defined  from  the  surrounding 
white  matter ;  to  such  collections  the  several  terms  corpus,  locus, 
nucleus  and  the  like  have  from  time  to  time  been  given.  These 
areas  or  collections  vary  greatly  in  size,  in  form  and  in  histo- 
logical  characters ;  they  differ  from  each  other  in  the  form,  size, 
features  and  arrangement  of  the  nerve  cells,  in  the  characters 
of  the  nervous  network  of  which  the  nerve  cells  form  a  part, 
and  especially  perhaps  in  the  extent  to  which  the  more  dis- 
tinctly grey  matter  is  traversed  and  broken  up  by  bundles  of 
white  fibres.  Guided  by  the  analogy  of  the  spinal  cord,  as  well 
as  by  the  results  of  experiments  and  observations  directed  to  the 
brain  itself,  we  are  led  to  believe  that  the  complex  functions  of 
the  brain  are  intimately  associated  with  this  grey  matter ;  and 
a  full  knowledge  of  the  working  of  the  brain  will  carry  with  it 
a  knowledge  of  the  nature  and  meaning  of  the  intricate  arrange- 
ment of  the  cerebral  grey  matter.  At  present,  however,  our 
ignorance  as  to  these  things  is  great ;  and,  though  various  theo- 
retical classifications  of  the  several  collections  of  grey  matter 
have  been  proposed,  it  will  perhaps  be  wisest  to  content  our- 
selves here  with  a  very  broad  and  simple  arrangement"  (III., 
952). 

This  modest  exordium  is  followed  by  a  number  of  frank  con- 
fessions of  ignorance  which  appear  fully  to  justify  it.  We  find 
such  statements  as :  "  Our  knowledge  of  the  finer  histological 
details  of  the  various  masses  of  grey  matter  is  at  present  too 


8  GEORGE   STUART  FULLERTON. 

imperfect  to  afford  any  basis  whatever  for  physiological  deduc- 
tions, and  it  will  be  hardly  profitable  to  dwell  upon  them" 
(1022).  "In  the  present  state  of  knowledge  it  is  impossible 
to  come  to  any  satisfactory  conclusion  concerning  the  meaning 
of  the  variety  and  arrangement  of  the  cells  and  other  constitu- 
ents of  the  cortex"  (1032).  These  two  citations  are  of  a  suffi- 
ciently sweeping  character  to  cover  the  whole  ground ;  I  shall, 
however,  allow  myself  the  space  necessary  to  present  two  some- 
what more  lengthy  extracts.  They  are  as  follows:  "In  the 
spinal  cord  we  were  able  to  divide  all  the  fibres  into  afferent  and 
efferent  respectively,  though  even  here  we  meet  with  some  diffi- 
culty. Dealing  with  the  cerebral  cortex,  which,  as  we  have  al- 
ready seen,  is  certainly  especially  concerned  in  voluntary  move- 
ments and  in  the  development  of  full  sensations,  we  may  be 
tempted  to  consider  the  fibres  connected  with  the  grey  matter 
similarly  divisible  into  motor  and  sensory ;  and  we  may  go  on 
to  suppose  that  the  fibres  joining  the  cortex  as  axis  cylinder  pro- 
cesses of  recognizable  cells  are  motor  fibres,  and  that  all  the 
other  fibres  joining  the  grey  matter  in  some  way  are  sensory 
fibres.  But  in  doing  so  we  are  going  beyond  our  tether ;  in  all 
probability  the  nervous  processes  going  on  in  the  cortex  are  far 
too  complex  to  permit  such  a  simple  classification  of  the  func- 
tions of  fibres  as  that  into  motor  and  sensory ;  and  any  attempt 
to  arrange  either  fibres  or  regions  of  the  cortex  as  simply  motor 
or  sensory  is  probably  misleading"  (1033).  "The  exact  nature 
of  the  part  played  by  the  cortex  and  the  pyramidal  tract  in 
voluntary  movements  our  present  knowledge  is  inadequate  to 
define.  When  we  pass  in  review  a  series  of  brains  from  the 
lower  to  the  higher  and  see  how  the  pyramidal  system  is,  so  to 
speak,  grafted  on  to  the  rest  of  the  brain,  when  we  observe  how 
the  increasing  differentiation  of  the  motor  cortex  runs  parallel  to 
the  increasing  possession  of  skilled  educated  movements,  we 
may  perhaps  suppose  that  '  a  short  cut '  from  the  cortex  to  the 
origins  of  the  several  motor  nerves,  such  as  is  afforded  by  the 
pyramidal  fibres,  from  the  advantages  it  offers  to  the  more 
primitive  path  from  segment  to  segment  along  the  cerebro-spinal 
axis,  has  by  natural  selection  been  developed  into  being  in  man 
the  chief  and  most  important  instrument  for  carrying  out  volun- 


PSYCHOLOGY  AND  PHYSIOLOGY.  9 

tary  movements ;  but,  we  repeat,  it  remains  even  in  its  highest 
development  a  link  in  a  chain,  and  a  knowledge  of  how  the 
whole  chain  works  is  at  present  hidden  from  us"  (1063). 

So  much  for  the  nervous  antecedents  of  movements.  The 
few  extracts  I  have  given  justify,  I  think,  my  statement  that  the 
physiologist  is  not  in  a  position  to  give  any  accurate  account  of 
the  chain  of  causes  which  led  to  the  fall  of  an  eyelid  or  the  pen- 
ning of  a  sentence.  What  happens  in  the  brain  is  unknown ; 
what  happens  in  the  lower  centres  is  also  unknown ;  the  nature 
of  the  nervous  impulse  is  still  problematic.  It  is  not  for  the 
psychologist  to  throw  stones,  and  I  lay  emphasis  upon  this 
ignorance  on  the  part  of  our  fellow-workers  in  science  only 
because  it  seems  to  me  an  important  source  of  confusion  as  to 
the  limits  of  the  science  of  physiology.  Sciences  grow  in 
defmiteness  as  they  develop,  and  the  lines  which  mark  them  out 
from  one  another  become  more  distinct.  Here  we  are  dealing 
with  something  very  vague  and  very  dim,  and  one  may  expect 
a  body  of  knowledge  so  dim  and  vague  to  have  a  misty  and 
uncertain  boundary. 

Our  author  expresses  in  various  places  a  desire  to  remain  on 
purely  physiological  ground  and  to  avoid  a  mixture  of  psychol- 
ogy in  his  discussions.  He  puts  forward  a  few  cautious  state- 
ments which  would  rather  incline  one  to  believe  that  he  sympa- 
thizes with  the  view  of  the  relation  of  nervous  processes  to  men- 
tal phenomena  assumed  to  be  true  in  this  part  of  my  paper. 
"Looking  at  the  matter,"  he  says,  "from  a  purely  physiological 
point  of  view  (the  only  one  which  has  a  right  to  be  employed 
in  these  pages),  the  real  difference  between  an  automatic  act 
and  a  voluntary  act  is  that  the  chain  of  physiological  events 
between  the  act  and  its  physiological  cause  is  in  the  one  case 
short  and  simple,  in  the  other  long  and  complex"  (III.,  1004). 
A  little  further  we  find  the  same  thought :  "  In  short,  the  more 
we  study  the  phenomena  exhibited  by  animals  possessing  a  part 
only  of  their  brain,  the  closer  we  are  pushed  to  the  conclusion 
that  no  sharp  line  can  be  drawn  between  volition  and  the  lack 
of  volition,  or  between  the  possession  and  absence  of  intelligence. 
Between  the  muscle-nerve  preparation  at  the  one  limit,  and  our 
conscious  willing  selves  at  the  other,  there  is  a  continuous  grada- 


10  GEORGE   STUART  FULLERTON. 

tion  without  a  break ;  we  cannot  fix  on  any  linear  barrier  in  the 
brain  or  in  the  general  nervous  system,  and  say,  f  beyond  this 
there  is  volition  and  intelligence,  but  up  to  this  there  is  none' " 
(III.,  1007).  And  at  the  close  of  the  discussion  of  voluntary 
movements  we  come  upon  still  another  striking  passage : 
"Lastly,  without  attempting  to  enter  into  psychological  ques- 
tions, we  may  at  least  say  that  the  birthplace  of  what  we  call 
the  '  will '  is  not  conterminous  with  the  motor  area ;  the  will 
arises  from  a  complex  series  of  events,  some  of  which  take 
place  in  other  regions  of  the  cortex,  and  probably  in  other  parts, 
of  the  brain  as  well.  With  these  parts  the  motor  area  has  ties 
concerned  not  in  the  carrying  out  of  volition,  but  in  the  genera- 
tion of  the  will.  So  that,  looking  round  on  all  sides,  it  is  obvi- 
ous, as  we  have  said,  that  the  motor  area  is  a  mere  link  in  a 
complex  chain"  (III.,  1069). 

These  passages  are,  to  be  sure,  capable  of  more  than  one 
interpretation,  and  I  shall  again  refer  to  them  later ;  but  it  is  at 
least  clear  from  them  and  from  others  that  the  author  has  de- 
sired to  avoid  unnecessary  trespass  on  psychological  ground. 
That  he  constantly  make  use,  however,  of  psychological  con- 
ceptions the  most  cursory  examination  of  his  book  makes  evi- 
dent. We  read  that  a  common  effect  of  the  arrival  at  the  central 
nervous  system  of  impulses  passing  along  afferent  nerves  is  a 
change  in  consciousness,  or  a  sensation  (III.,  850,  851)  ;  that 
the  effects  of  '  shock '  may  be  a  temporary  diminution  or  loss  of 
consciousness,  of  volition,  of  reflex  movements  and  other  nervous 
actions  (903)  ;  that  a  muscle  may  be  thrown  into  contraction 
by  the  will  (906)  ;  that  choice  may  be  determined  in  some  cases 
by  an  intelligence  (909)  ;  that  mechanisms  in  the  lumbar  cord 
may  be  brought  into  play  by  the  will  (914)  ;  that,  in  the  case 
of  a  frog  deprived  of  its  whole  brain,  the  signs  of  the  working  of 
an  intelligent  volition  are  either  wholly  absent  or  extremely  rare 
(999)  ;  that  the  operations  of  the  will  are  limited  by  the  ma- 
chinery at  its  command  (1002)  ;  that  we  may,  perhaps,  speak  of 
a  mutilated  animal  as  the  subject  of  sensations,  but  that  there 
is  no  satisfactory  evidence  that  it  possesses  either  visual  or  other 
perceptions,  or  that  the  sensations  which  it  experiences  give 
rise  to  ideas  (1006)  ;  that  in  an  ordinary  voluntary  movement 


PSYCHOLOGY  AND  PHYSIOLOGY.  II 

an  intelligent  consciousness  is  an  essential  element  (1068),  and 
that  the  will,  blundering  at  first  in  the  maze  of  the  nervous  net- 
work, gradually  establishes  easy  paths  (1069). 

These  statements  from  one  who  declares  that  in  his  pages 
things  must  be  looked  at  from  a  purely  physiological  point  of 
view,  and  who  realizes  that  the  science  of  psychology  occupies 
a  distinct  field  upon  which  it  is  not  desirable  that  he  should 
encroach,  are  very  suggestive.  May  we  not  assume  that  they 
find  their  explanation  in  the  fact  that  poverty  of  physiological 
data  forces  the  physiologist  off  his  own  ground?  A  physiolo- 
gist, like  everyone  else,  is  conscious  that  he  experiences  sensa- 
tions, has  perceptions,  reflects  and  wills.  What  actions  of  the 
brain  correspond  to  these  physiological  facts?  Dr.  Foster  has 
frankly  admitted  that  he  does  not  know.  Yet  we  must  assume 
that  there  are  nervous  occurrences  which  thus  correspond,  and 
it  is  desirable  to  mark  distinctions  between  these  hypothetical 
occurrences.  How  mark  these  distinctions?  There  appears 
to  be  no  other  way  to  do  it  than  to  abandon  physiology  and 
turn  to  psychology.  It  ought,  however,  in  the  interests  of  clear 
thinking,  to  be  distinctly  recognized  that  this  is  a  makeshift,  and 
argues  that  the  science  which  must  thus  be  pieced  out  by 
scraps  taken  from  another  one  is  in  a  very  imperfect  state  of 
development.  Such  a  makeshift  ought  not  to  be  allowed  to 
obliterate  the  line  dividing  the  two  sciences  thus  forcibly  brought 
together. 

If  the  parts  of  Dr.  Foster's  treatise  concerned  with  the  motor 
aspects  of  the  nervous  system  have  seemed  to  wander  from  the 
field  of  pure  physiology,  the  parts  concerned  with  its  sensory 
aspects  must  be  regarded  as  sinning  in  a  still  higher  degree. 
The  discussion  opens  with  a  section  entitled  "  On  the  Develop- 
ment within  the  Central  Nervous  System  of  Visual  and  of  some 
other  Sensations,"  and  this  is  followed  by  one  entitled  "On  the 
Development  of  Cutaneous  and  some  other  Sensations." 

To  the  thoughtful  reader  of  his  pages  the  author's  reasons  for 
selecting  these  psychological  titles  seems  clear.  We  are  in- 
formed that  "  in  dealing  with  sensory  effects  we  must  expect 
and  be  content  for  the  present  with  conclusions  less  definite  and 
more  uncertain  even  than  those  gained  by  the  study  of  motor 


12  GEORGE   STUART  FULLERTON. 

effects"  (III.,  1077).  We  find  that,  speaking  of  the  function- 
ing of  the  cortex  in  vision,  "  the  only  clear  and  consistent  state- 
ment which  can  be  made  with  any  confidence  is  the  broad  and 
simple  one  that  the  hind  region  of  the  cortex  is  in  some  way 
intimately  concerned  in  vision  "  (III.,  1083)  ;  and  that"  although 
the  matter  is  thus  in  many  of  its  details  at  present  outside  our 
exact  knowledge,  we  may  probably  conclude  that  in  the  com- 
plex act  of  complete  vision,  while  part,  especially  the  more  psy- 
chical part,  is  carried  out  in  the  cortex,  more  particularly  of 
the  occipital  region,  part  is  accomplished  in  the  lower  centres, 
the  tegmental  masses.  As  to  the  several  functions  of  the  three 
masses,1  we  know  almost  absolutely  nothing"  (1084).  We  learn 
that  the  olfactory  nerve  "  is  undoubtedly  the  nerve  of  smell " 
( 1085  ) ,  and  that,  "  though  the  evidence  on  the  whole  goes  to  show 
that  the  cortex  at  the  front  end  of  the  hyppocampal  gyrus  is  especi- 
ally connected  with  smell  *  *  *  *  yet  the  whole  matter  stands 
on  a  somewhat  different  footing  from  the  sense  of  sight"  (1087). 
We  learn  further  that  "  though  sensations  of  taste  enter  largely 
into  the  life  of  animals,  and  indeed  of  man  himself,  we  have  no 
satisfactory  indications  which  will  enable  us  to  connect  this 
special  sense  with  any  part  of  the  cortex"  (1088).  We  are 
told  that  "the  connections  of  the  auditory  nerve  with  the  cere- 
bral hemisphere  belong  to  the  same  category  as  those  of  other 
afferent  cranial,  and,  we  may  add,  spinal,  nerves ;  we  have  no 
very  clear  anatomical  guide  toward  any  particular  part  of  the 
cortex"  (1088)  ;  and  that  though  the  method  of  degeneration 
suggests  a  connection  with  the  cortex  of  the  temporal  lobe, 
"the  matter  needs  further  investigation"  (1089).  As  to  cuta- 
neous and  other  sensations  arising  through  impulses  along  the 
nerves  of  the  body  generally,  our  author  speaks  as  follows : 
"The  fairly  convincing  evidence  that  the  occipital  cortex  has 
special  relations  with  vision,  and  the  less  clear  evidence  that 
other  regions  have  special  relations  with  smell  and  hearing, 
suggest  that  special  parts  of  the  cortex  have  special  relations 
with  the  sensations  now  under  consideration.  But  in  the  cases 
of  the  senses  of  sight  and  smell  we  had  a  distinct  anatomical 

li.  e.,     The  lateral  corpus  geniculatum,  the  pulvinar,  and  the  anterior  cor- 
pus quadrigeminum. 


PSYCHOLOGY  AND  PHYSIOLOGY.  13 

leading  ;  and  we  have  seen  how  uncertain  is  the  evidence  where 
such  an  anatomical  leading  fails,  as  in  hearing  and  taste.  In 
the  case  of  sensations  of  the  body  at  large,  the  anatomical  lead- 
ing similarly  fails"  (1091). 

In  view  of  the  above  statements  we  cannot  regard  it  as  sur- 
prising that  the  author  comes  to  the  conclusion  that  "  it  is  diffi- 
cult to  say  anything  definite  concerning  the  transmission  of 
sensory  impulses  and  the  development  of  sensations  "  (III. ,  1 109) . 
Neither  is  it  surprising  that  he  has  chosen  psychological  titles 
for  his  discussions.  The  only  thing  which  appears  to  be  known 
with  sufficient  definiteness  to  be  named  appears  to  be  the 
sensation.  The  corresponding  nervous  process  is  covered 
with  thick  darkness — darkness  which  may  be  felt.  And  it  is 
not  surprising  that  in  a  section  of  his  work  with  the  unexception- 
able physiological  title ,  '  On  the  Time  Taken  up  by  Cerebral 
Operations,'  we  should  find  the  following  odd  mixture  of 
physiology  and  psychology :  "  The  events  taking  place  in  the 
central  stage  are  of  course  complex,  and  this  stage  may  be  sub- 
divided into  several  stages.  Without  attempting  to  enter  into 
psychological  questions,  we  may  at  least  recognize  certain  ele- 
mentary distinctions.  The  afferent  impulses  started  by  the 
stimulus,  whatever  be  their  nature,  when  they  reach  the  central 
nervous  system  undergo  changes,  and,  as  we  have  seen,  prob- 
ably complex  changes,  before  they  become  sensations;  and 
further  changes,  now  of  a  more  distinctly  psychical  character, 
are  necessary  before  the  mind  can  duly  appreciate  the  characters 
of  these  sensations  and  act  accordingly.  Then  come  the  psych- 
ical processes  through  which  these  appreciated  sensations,  or 
perceptions,  or  apperceptions,  as  they  are  sometimes  called,  de- 
termine an  act  of  volition.  Lastly,  there  are  the  executive  pro- 
cesses of  volition,  the  processes  which,  physical  to  begin  with, 
end  in  the  issue  of  coordinate  motor  impulses,  or,  in  other  words, 
start  the  distinctly  physiological  processes  of  the  efferent  stage. 
We  may  thus  speak  of  the  time  required  for  the  perception  of 
the  stimulation,  of  the  time  required  for  the  action  of  the  will, 
and  of  the  time  required  for  the  complex  psychical  processes 
which  link  these  two  together"  (III.,  1122).  We  may  admit 
that  the  author  has  not  attempted  to  enter  into  psychological 


14  GEORGE   STUART  FULLERTON. 

questions ;  we  may  even  admit  that  he  has  attempted  to  keep 
out  of  them ;  but  surely  he  has  wandered  on  to  ground  which 
the  most  liberal  use  of  language  would  not  permit  us  to  call 
physiological ;  and  we  cannot  help  raising  the  question  whether 
what  is  not  psychological  is  to  be  distinguished  from  what  is 
simply  by  the  fact  that  it  is  briefly  and  superficially  treated. 
Sensations,  perceptions,  apperceptions,  volition — are  not  these 
the  things  with  which  psychology  deals  ? 

In  his  chapters  on  the  senses  (IV.,  pp.  1—305)  Dr.  Foster 
appears  to  have  forgotten  that  he  has  resolved  to  avoid  psycho- 
logical questions.  These  chapters  cover  some  three  hundred 
pages,  and  may,  I  think,  be  fairly  described  as  a  treatise  on  the 
peripheral  sense  organs,  with  rather  full  psychological  appen- 
dices. The  eye  is  discussed  at  length,  and  from  that  one  passes 
to  visual  sensations,  visual  perceptions  and  visual  judgments. 
What  happens  between  the  retina  and  the  'hind  part  of  the 
cortex,'  and  what  happens  in  that  region  of  the  cortex,  are 
passed  over  in  silence.  The  reason  for  these  omissions  the 
previous  section  on  the  development  of  sensations  within  the 
central  nervous  system  makes  clear.  What  happens  between 
the  retina  and  the  cortex  is  not  known.  The  chapter  on  sight 
is  accordingly  necessarily  restricted  to  a  discussion  of  the  eye 
and  of  the  psychology  of  vision.  In  the  next  chapter  we 
similarly  pass  from  a  study  of  the  ear  to  auditory  sensations, 
perceptions  and  judgments.  In  the  chapter  following  that, 
we  find  a  section  on  the  olfactory  mucous  membrane  fol- 
lowed by  one  on  olfactory  sensations ;  and  one  on  the  periph- 
eral organs  of  taste  followed  by  one  on  gustatory  sensations. 
The  chapter  on  *  Cutaneous  and  Some  Other  Sensations' 
resembles  those  which  precede  it.  There  is  some  discussion  of 
peripheral  organs  and  much  psychological  material.  It  seems 
evident  to  the  thoughtful  reader  of  Dr.  Foster's  pages  that  he  is 
everywhere  forced  out  of  his  field  by  poverty  of  established 
physiological  data.  He  travels  on  a  parallel  road  because  he 
finds  his  own  impassable. 

In  the  preceding  I  have  confined  myself  to  the  examination 
of  a  single  work  on  physiology.  I  have  done  so  for  con- 
venience. The  work  is  fairly  representative  of  its  class,  and 


PSYCHOLOGY  AND   PHYSIOLOGY.  15 

I  might  have  chosen  in  its  place  any  one  of  a  considerable 
number.  The  results  of  the  examination  appear  to  me  to  make 
it  evident  that  we  are  as  yet  very  far  indeed  from  having  real- 
ized the  ideal  set  for  the  physiologist  in  the  explanation  of 
bodily  movements.  They  appear  also  to  make  it  evident  that 
the  physiologist  is  much  given  to  trespassing  on  psychological 
ground.  Far  be  it  from  me  to  imply  that  physiologists  have  no 
right  to  do  psychological  work,  or  that  some  of  them  may  not 
do  certain  kinds  of  such  work  better  than  many  psychologists. 
I  do  not  even  mean  to  maintain  that,  in  the  existing  state  of  the 
science  of  physiology,  it  may  not  be  wise  for  the  physiologist 
to  occasionally  trespass  in  the  interests  of  his  own  proper  work. 
On  this  point  I  shall  speak  further  in  a  few  moments.  What  I 
wish  to  emphasize  now  is  this :  a  completed  science  of  physi- 
ology would,  on  the  hypothesis  which  serves  as  a  basis  to  this 
part  of  my  paper,  be  wholly  independent  of  psychology,  and  a 
book  on  physiology  would  have  no  excuse  for  containing  psy- 
chology. As  it  is,  such  books  contain  a  great  deal  of  psycho- 
logical material ;  and  it  should  not  be  overlooked  that  this  is 
psychological,  and  that,  in  dealing  with  it,  the  usual  psychologi- 
cal method  must  be  followed.  It  should  never  be  assumed  that, 
because  it  is  found  in  works  professedly  concerned  with  another 
science,  it  is  anything  more  than  a  '  quatorzieme,'  invited,  nay, 
compelled  to  come  in,  to  fill  an  unwelcome  gap.  Its  presence 
in  physiological  discussions  should  not  be  allowed  to  obscure 
the  line  dividing  two  sciences,  each  of  which  has  its  appropriate 
method  of  investigation. 

II. 

In  what  precedes  I  have  rested  upon  the  assumption  that 
bodily  states  and  mental  are  not  causally  related  in  the  strict 
sense  of  the  words — that  the  two  series  are,  so  to  speak,  par- 
allel. In  other  words  I  have  assumed  the  truth  of  the  so-called 
'  automaton '  theory.  It  is  to  be  noted,  however,  that,  whatever 
may  be  the  opinion  of  the  physiologist  on  this  point,  his  language 
does  not  favor  such  a  view  of  the  relation  of  mind  and  body. 
One  who  repudiates  the  theory — and  I  think  it  is  a  bold  man 
who  will  dare  to  maintain  that  the  present  state  of  our  knowledge 


1 6  GEORGE   STUART  FULLERTON. 

justifies  us  in  holding  that  the  theory  is  proved  to  be  true  and 
must  necessarily  be  accepted — one  who  repudiates  the  theory 
may  view  the  relation  between  mind  and  body  in  either  of  two 
other  ways.  He  may  regard  mental  states  as  belonging  to  the 
physical  series  in  the  sense  that  they  are  effects  of  physical 
causes,  and  in  their  turn  causes  of  physical  effects ;  or  he  may 
regard  the  mind  as  a  something  at  least  partially  independent 
of  the  physical  series,  and,  as  it  were,  breaking  in  upon  it. 

In  either  case  the  chain  of  purely  physical  events  between 
the  peripheral  stimulus  and  the  resultant  movement  is  broken  by 
the  interpolation  of  something  of  a  different  kind.  The  sensory- 
motor  arc  is  partly  physical  and  partly  psychical.  How  does 
this  effect  our  views  as  to  the  relations  of  the  two  sciences, 
physiology  and  psychology? 

The  former  of  these  two  ways  of  viewing  the  relation  beween 
mind  and  body  is,  I  think,  most  in  harmony  with  the  language 
used  by  physiologists  generally.  Certainly,  it  is  most  in  har- 
mony with  that  used  by  Dr.  Foster,  as  the  extracts  already 
given  sufficiently  indicate.  Even  the  passages  which,  as  I  said 
above,  might  be  taken  as  indicating  that  Dr.  Foster  favored  the 
'  automaton '  theory,  may  perhaps  be  understood  as  supporting 
this  doctrine.  The  afferent  impulses  started  by  a  physical  stim- 
ulus are  supposed,  when  they  reach  the  central  nervous  sys- 
tem, to  become  sensations ;  the  will  is  said  to  arise  from  a  com- 
plex series  of  events  which  take  place  in  various  regions  of  the 
cortex  and  probably  in  other  parts  of  the  brain  as  well ;  and  we 
are  told  that  mechanisms  in  the  lumbar  cord  may  be  brought 
into  play  by  the  will.  Here  we  have,  if  we  take  the  author's 
words  as  they  stand,  a  composite  arc — physical,  psychical,  and 
physical. 

I  am  not  inclined,  however,  to  take  such  statements  too  seri- 
ously. Physiologists  do  not  appear  to  pick  their  words  very 
carefully,  nor  do  they  appear  to  have  given  much  serious 
thought  to  this  question  of  the  relation  of  mind  and  body.  It 
would  be  obviously  unfair  to  read  into  their  statements  more 
than  they  have  themselves  seen  in  them.  Nevertheless,  it  is 
worthy  of  mention  that,  even  if  their  language  is  chosen  only 
for  convenience  and  is  meant  to  be  interpreted  loosely,  it  is 


PSYCHOLOGY  AND  PHYSIOLOGY.  ij 

clearly  misleading  in  case  they  do  not  hold  to  the  view  I  am 
discussing ;  and  it  would  be  much  better  did  they  exercise  a  lit- 
tle care  in  expression.  If,  on  the  other  hand,  looseness  of 
expression  is  an  indication  of  looseness  and  vagueness  of 
thought,  it  is  highly  desirable  that  it  be  vigorously  attacked  and 
speedily  brought  to  an  end. 

But  whatever  be  the  real  opinion  of  the  physiologist  regard- 
ing the  matter,  it  remains  to  discuss  this  view  of  the  relation 
of  mind  and  body.  If  we  accept  it  we  have,  it  is  true,  from 
initial  stimulus  to  resulting  movement,  but  the  one  causal  series. 
It  is,  however,  a  series  made  up  of  two  quite  different  kinds  of 
elements.  We  have,  on  the  one  hand,  physical  changes  which 
may  be  studied,  as  are  all  physical  changes,  by  directly  objec- 
tive methods.  We  now  know  very  little  about  the  changes  in  a 
nerve  during  the  passage  of  the  nervous  impulse,  but  there  is  no 
reason  to  think  that  we  may  not  justly  expect  to  investigate  these 
changes  by  the  same  methods  as  those  employed  in  the  investi- 
gation of  physical  and  chemical  problems.  On  the  other  hand, 
we  have  also  to  reckon  with  psychical  facts,  sensations,  percep- 
tions, volitions ;  and  in  whatever  series  one  may  be  inclined  to 
place  these,  it  seems  incredible  that  one  should  expect  to  study 
them  just  as  one  would  study  the  changes  in  a  muscle  during 
contraction.  It  is  not  inconceivable  that  with  improved  appara- 
tus we  may  some  day  arrive  at  an  ocular  demonstration  of  the 
translocation  of  molecules  there  supposed  to  take  place.  But 
would  the  most  ardent  physiologist  expect  an  exhaustive  study 
of  the  brain  to  reveal  directly  sensations  of  color  or  sound,  or 
feelings  of  pleasure  or  pain?  I  am  not  now  speaking  of  mole- 
cular changes  corresponding  to  such  psychical  facts,  but  of  the 
facts  themselves.  Surely  there  is  but  one  way  of  reaching  such 
facts,  and  that  is  by  the  use  of  introspection ;  and  there  is  but 
one  method  by  which  they  may  be  studied — the  psycho- 
logical method  of  introspection,  observation  and  interpretation. 
Hence,  even  if  we  have  to  do  with  the  one  causal  series,  we 
have  two  kinds  of  facts  and  two  distinct  methods,  and  it  seems, 
on  the  whole,  convenient  that  the  work  should  be  divided  be- 
tween two  men.  We  have  abundant  evidence  that  a  given  man 
may  employ  the  one  method  very  well  and  the  other  very  badly. 


1 8  GEORGE   STUART  FULLERTON. 

On  this  view  of  the  relation  of  mind  and  body  the  physiologist 
would  not,  it  is  true,  be  wholly  independent  of  psychology ;  he 
would  be  occupied  with  series  of  occurrences  which  end  in  or 
are  initiated  by  psychical  facts,  and  he  would  be  interested  in 
these  facts  as  he  is  interested  in  the  physical  stimuli  which  give 
rise  to  nervous  impulses.  They  would,  however,  constitute  no 
part  of  his  own  proper  field  of  labor ;  and  to  give  the  total  ante- 
cedents of  a  given  bodily  movement,  the  combined  work  of  the 
physiologist  and  psychologist  would  be  needed.  It  is  hardly 
worthy  of  remark  that,  in  the  present  state  of  our  knowledge, 
the  question  as  to  the  exact  spot  in  the  sensory-motor  arc  at 
which  the  psychical  patch  is  to  be  inserted,  is  one  which  no  sen- 
sible person  will  give  himself  the  trouble  of  asking.  On  the 
wisdom  of  making  mental  states  effects  of  bodily  causes  and 
setting  them  in  the  one  series  with  these,  it  is  not  necessary  for 
me  here  to  comment. 

If  the  mind  be  regarded  as  a  something  independent  of  the 
physical  series  of  causes  and  effects,  and,  so  to  speak,  breaking 
in  upon  it,  the  case  is  much  the  same  as  in  the  above.  We 
have  a  physical  series  interrupted  at  a  given  point  by  something 
of  a  different  nature,  and  which  must  be  investigated  by  a  dif- 
ferent method.  The  physiologist  appears  to  have  a  definite 
task — the  study  of  the  physical  series ;  he  may  leave  the  ex- 
amination of  the  gap  between  its  two  parts  to  the  psychologist, 
whose  work  is  sufficiently  marked  out  from  his  own  by  the 
method  employed,  the  method  of  introspection,  observation  and 
experiment,  and  interpretation. 

So  much  for  the  theoretical  boundary  line  between  physiology 
and  psychology.  It  is,  I  think,  a  sufficiently  definite  one.  It 
is,  however,  a  line,  and  not  a  fence ;  one  may  easily  step  over 
it,  as,  indeed,  many  do  step  over  it.  The  question  naturally 
arises,  is  it  wise  to  step  over  it,  and  if  so,  when?  I  think  this 
question  may  be  answered  in  a  general  way  by  saying  that, 
when,  for  any  reason,  an  excursion  into  other  territory  will  further 
one's  progress  in  one's  own,  such  an  excursion  is  justifiable.  If 
the  physiologist  can,  through  a  study  of  psychical  phenomena, 
arrive  at  some  hint  of  their  physical  concomitants,  or,  if  you  will, 
causes,  it  seems  quite  right  that  he  should  make  use  of  such  a 


PSYCHOLOGY  AND  PHYSIOLOGY.  19 

means  to  his  end.  The  two  theories  of  color  vision  commonly 
discussed  in  books  on  physiology  very  well  illustrate  this  point. 
I  have  said  somewhere  above  that  practically  nothing  is  known 
about  the  occurrences  between  the  retina  and  the  'hind  part  of  the 
cortex'  in  the  act  of  vision.  I  might  have  added  that  compara- 
tively little  is  known  about  what  goes  on  in  the  eye  itself.  What 
has  taken  place  in  the  retina  when  one  has  become  conscious 
of  seeing  the  color  red  or  the  color  blue,  physiology  has  never 
succeeded  in  directly  demonstrating.  Both  the  Young-Helm- 
holtz  and  the  Hering  theories  are  attempts  to  guess  at  the  nature 
of  such  physical  occurrences  by  the  aid  of  knowledge  gained  in 
another  field,  the  psychological.  Such  a  mode  of  procedure 
seems  proper  enough,  but  it  is  well  to  remember  that  were  the 
science  of  physiology  more  completely  developed,  this  excursus 
into  psychology  would  be  unnecessary.  Where  such  an 
excursus  has  not  a  physiological  end  in  view,  but  is  merely 
psychological  throughout,  it  does  not  appear  to  me  justifiable. 
There  are  a  number  of  chapters  in  Dr.  Foster's  fourth  volume 
which  seem  to  be  of  this  nature.  Their  place  is  in  a  text-book 
on  psychology  and  not  one  on  physiology.  In  the  place  which 
they  actually  occupy  they  serve,  I  think,  only  to  conceal  poverty 
of  physiological  material  and  to  confuse  the  reader's  mind  as  to 
the  limits  of  the  two  sciences. 

The  above  sentences  and,  indeed,  the  whole  argument  of  this 
paper  support  the  conclusion  that,  with  increase  of  knowledge, 
the  amount  of  psychology  to  be  found  in  text-books  on  physi- 
ology will  be  a  diminishing  quantity.  This  does  not,  however, 
imply  that  psychology  will  grow  independent  of  physiology,  as 
the  latter  will  grow  independent  of  the  former.  Physics  and 
chemistry  are  independent  of  physiology,  but  it  is  not  indepen- 
dent of  them.  The  psychological  method  includes  introspec- 
tion, observation  and  experiment,  and  interpretation  of  what  is 
thus  brought  to  light.  And  the  difference  between  guessing 
roughly  at  what  is  passing  in  a  man's  mind  by  watching  the 
movements  of  his  face,  and  studying  systematically  and  min- 
utely the  human  body  with  the  same  end  in  view,  is  not  a  dif- 
ference in  kind.  The  objective  method  in  psychology  implies 
the  employment  of  physiology  in  the  search  for  psychological 


20  GEORGE   STUART  FULLERTON. 

truth  ;  and,  as  I  pointed  out  two  years  since  in  the  paper  already 
mentioned,  the  every-day  psychology  of  the  practical  man  who 
needs  to  know  something  about  what  is  passing  in  his  neigh- 
bor's mind  is,  after  all,  psychology,  and  only  differs  from  that 
of  the  scholar  in  being  less  systematic,  exact  and  reflective.  If 
a  study  of  the  cerebral  cortex  will  better  reveal  what  we  are 
seeking  to  discover  than  a  study  of  the  face,  then  by  all  means 
let  us  transfer  our  attention  to  that.  Let  us  not,  however,  grow 
so  interested  in  the  study  of  the  body  as  to  forget  that  we  are 
psychologists.  Let  us  not  take  up  physiological' work  which 
has  no  psychological  aim.  Now  and  then,  I  think,  psycholo- 
gists do  this.  When  they  do  it  I  believe  they  are  guilty  of  un- 
justifiable trespass,  and  would  probably  better  serve  the  world 
by  remaining  on  their  own  ground. 


STUDIES  FROM  THE  HARVARD  PSYCHOLOGICAL 
LABORATORY.    (III.) 

COMMUNICATED  BY  PROFESSOR  HUGO  MUNSTERBERG. 

A.     THE  PLACE  OF  REPETITION  IN  MEMORY. 

BY  W.  G.  SMITH. 
Smith   College. 

The  investigation  of  which  I  wish  to  give  a  short  account 
was  undertaken  with  the  view  of  affording  material  for  a 
further  step  in  the  experimental  analysis  of  the  processes  involved 
in  learning  and  recollection.1  Every  one  knows  that  repetition 
plays  an  important  part  in  the  process  of  acquiring  knowledge, 
but  hitherto  there  has  been  no  attempt  experimentally  to  study 
this  factor  beyond  the  experiments  of  Ebbinghaus  relating  to 
the  effect  of  repetition  on  the  duration  of  memory.  The  aim  of 
the  following  experiments  has  been  to  determine  the  extent  and 
character  of  memory  at  different  stages  of  repetition.  Series 
of  nonsense  syllables  formed  the  subject-matter  which  had  to 
be  learned ;  the  reagent  made  no  attempt  to  learn  a  series  by 
heart,  but  simply  reproduced  as  much  as  he  could  recollect 
after  he  had  repeated  it  a  certain  number  of  times. 

The  experiments  were  carried  on  in  the  Harvard  Psycho- 
logical Laboratory  with  the  kind  assistance  of  Prof.  Miinster- 
berg  in  the  spring  and  summer  of  1895.  I  am  able  to  present 
the  results  gained  from  eight  subjects.  In  some  cases  the  experi- 
ments are  not  so  numerous  as  might  be  desired ;  on  the  other 
hand,  owing  to  the  large  number  of  subjects,  any  conclusion 
which  may  be  drawn  can  hardly  be  vitiated  by  merely  individual 
peculiarities.  Only  the  initial  stage  of  the  research  can  be  pre- 
sented here,  but  as  I  have  no  immediate  prospect  of  making 
any  substantial  advance  in  the  investigation,  it  seems  best  to 
bring  forward  now  the  results  so  far  as  they  have  been  gained. 

IThis  research  may  be  regarded  as  a  continuation  of  the  work  on  memory 
which  formed  the  subject  of  an  article  in  Mind,  N.  S.,  IV.,  p.  47. 


22  W.   G.  SMITH. 

The  following  method  was  adopted  in  the  experiments. 
Series  of  syllables  were  printed  on  slips  of  paper  by  means  of 
the  typewriter  in  such  a  form  that  the  subject  could  easily  read 
what  was  printed.  In  each  series  there  were  ten  syllables  form- 
ing one  line ;  in  each  syllable  there  were  three  letters,  the 
vowel  being  in  the  middle.  Syllables  which  were  too  harsh 
in  sound,  or  which  might  suggest  too  easily  an  intelligible  word 
or  phrase  were  rejected.  No  two  successive  syllables  were 
allowed  to  have  the  same  vowel,  and  the  same  consonant  could 
recur  only  after  several  others  had  intervened.  Modified  vowels 
were  not  used,  and  consonants  whose  pronunciation  was  ambig- 
uous, e.  g.,  h,  c,  were  either  not  used  at  all,  or  were  used  only 
under  certain  conditions.  The  syllables  were  formed  and  ar- 
ranged after  a  method  similar  in  certain  respects  to  that  fol- 
lowed by  Muller  and  Schumann ;  the  object  was  to  let  chance 
rule  as  far  as  possible  in  the  formation  of  the  series.  When 
the  supply  of  new  and  unobjectionable  syllables  was  exhausted 
the  syllables  which  had  been  already  used  were  rearranged 
to  form  fresh  series. 

In  the  actual  experiments  the  slip  of  paper  bearing  the  syl- 
lables was  inserted  in  a  frame  which  was  fastened  behind  an  ob- 
long horizontal  opening  in  a  screen  made  of  black  cardboard. 
Behind  this  opening  and  before  the  slip  of  paper  was  a  shutter 
which  could  be  raised  or  lowered  at  any  moment.  The  sub- 
ject, who  sat  at  his  ease  before  the  screen,  was  required  to  read 
the  series  aloud,  one  syllable  after  another,  at  a  rate  determined 
by  a  metronome  standing  near  him.  The  rate  of  the  metro- 
nome varied  with  the  different  individuals,  that  rate  being 
chosen  for  each  reagent  which  seemed  to  be  most  convenient 
for  him.  As  a  matter  of  fact  the  two  rates  chosen  were  80  and 
100  per  minute.  Only  in  one  case  was  the  rate  changed  in  the 
course  of  the  experiments ;  this  was  done  because  the  subject 
complained  that  the  old  rate  had  become  too  slow  for  him.  The 
object  of  introducing  the  metronome  was  to  secure  that  the  sub- 
ject should,  as  far  as  possible,  give  the  same  time  and  attention 
to  each  syllable.  Where  a  series  had  to  be  repeated  several  times 
the  subject  made  a  pause  of  two  beats  each  time  he  came  to 
the  end,  and  then  began  the  repetition  again.  The  shutter  cov- 


HARVARD  PSYCHOLOGICAL  LABORATORY.  23 

ering  the  series  was  raised  only  after  the  subject  had  given  a 
signal  that  he  was  ready  and  had  accommodated  himself  to  the 
rhythm ;  before  the  experiment  began  he  was  told  whether 
one,1  few,  or  many  repetitions  were  required.  The  signal  for 
closing  was  given,  except  when  there  was  only  one  repetition, 
by  a  tap  on  the  table  which  came  in  the  pause  preceding  the 
last  repetition.  The  subjects  were  asked  to  repeat  the  series 
with  regular  attention  and  without  any  special  effort  or  strain  at 
any  point ;  the  purpose  of  the  closing  signal  was  to  secure  that 
the  value  of  the  experiment  should  not  be  lowered  by  any  acci- 
dental fluctuation  of  attention  just  before  the  close  of  the  experi- 
ment. By  these  precautions  the  disturbing  effects  of  fatigue, 
of  variations  of  attention  and  of  emotional  changes  were  to  a 
large  extent  avoided.  Where,  notwithstanding  the  precautions, 
there  occurred  a  disturbance  of  any  kind  which  seemed  to  en- 
danger the  value  of  the  result  a  new  experiment  was  made. 
Irregularities  in  the  formation  of  the  series,  or  in  the  conduct  of 
the  experiments,  were  made  a  ground  of  rejection  of  the  result 
when  the  subject  had  been  disturbed  thereby,  or  when  the 
character  of  the  irregularity  seemed  to  render  the  value  of  the 
experiment  doubtful. 

The  experiments  were  arranged  with  a  view  to  ascer- 
taining the  value  of  the  memory  at  five  stages  in  the  process 
of  learning,  the  series  being  repeated,  according  to  the  direc- 
tions of  the  experimenter,  once,  thrice,  six  times,  nine  times 
or  twelve  times.  As  far  as  possible  an  equal  number  of  ex- 
periments was  made  each  day  for  the  various  stages  of  repe- 
tition. Owing,  however,  to  various  distractions  and  also  to 
the  loss  of  time  involved  in  cross-questioning  the  subjects  in 
regard  to  their  state  of  mind  during  the  course  of  the  experi- 
ments, this  rule  could  not  always  be  carried  out.  In  no  case 
have  the  experiments  of  any  day  been  accepted  on  which  there 
was  not  at  least  one  experiment  with  each  stage.  Preliminary 
experiments  for  practice  were  made  with  each  subject  both  at 
the  beginning  of  the  investigation  and  at  the  beginning  of  each 
day's  work. 

1  The   phrase    '  one   repetition '  is  so  convenient    that    the    inaccuracy  in- 
volved in  its  use  may  be  pardoned. 


24  W.  G.  SMITH. 

The  results  of  these  experiments  are  presented  in  the  tables 
given  below.  In  the  first  Table  are  given  the  numbers  which 
represent  the  values  of  the  memory  at  each  stage  of  repetition, 
these  numbers  being  the  final  averages  gained  by  taking 
together  the  averages  of  the  eight  reagents.  The  object  of 
the  second  Table  is  to  show  the  relative  frequency  with  which 
syllables  in  the  various  parts  of  the  series  are  recollected. 
In  Table  III.,  which  is  printed  at  the  end  of  this  article,  are 
given  the  individual  averages  which  form  the  basis  of  the  values 
given  in  Table  I.  The  description  of  the  divisions  and  details 
of  Table  I.  applies  without  alteration  to  Table  III. 

The  written  records  handed  in  by  the  subjects  have  been 
analyzed  in  Tables  I.  and  III.  from  two  points  of  view,  and  the 
resulting  values  have  been  arranged  in  two  divisions.  In 
the  first  division,  on  the  left  hand  of  the  page,  the  records 
are  analyzed  from  the  point  of  view  of  the  syllable.  The 
first  column  gives  the  average  number  of  syllables  in  each  ex- 
periment, which  are  correct  both  in  their  component  letters 
and  in  the  position  assigned  to  them  by  the  subject,  while  in  the 
second  column  are  collected  the  syllables  whose  only  fault  is 
that  they  have  been  put  in  the  wrong  place.  In  the  third  and 
fourth  columns  are  given  the  incomplete  syllables,  i.  e.,  those 
which  have  dropped  a  letter  or  exchanged  one  of  their  letters 
for  a  false  one ;  in  the  third  column  appear  the  incomplete  syl- 
lables whose  place  is  correct,  while  those  whose  position  is 
wrongly  given  are  in  the  fourth.  In  the  second  division,  where 
the  different  classes  of  error  are  marked  by  Arabic  letters,  the 
syllables  are  regarded  as  made  up  of  separate  letters  ;  in  this  way 
several  points  which  could  not  well  be  brought  out  in  the  first 
division  receive  recognition.  In  column  a  is  given  the  average 
number  of  letters  which  are  omitted.  In  the  next  two  columns 
are  recorded  the  letters  which  are  rightly  recollected,  but  have 
been  put  in  a  wrong  position ;  those  under  b  have  retained  their 
position  in  complete  or  incomplete  syllables,  while  the  syllables 
themselves  have  been  wrongly  placed ;  those  under  c  have  lost 
all  trace  of  their  original  arrangement.  The  next  column,  d, 
contains  the  letters  which  have  been  reproduced  oftener  than 
they  appeared  in  the  original  series.  Column  e  is  intended  to 


HARVARD  PSYCHOLOGICAL   LABORATORY. 


give  material  for  a  further  analysis  of  the  errors  recorded  under 
£,  and  contains  the  average  number  of  vowels  in  each  experi- 
ment whose  original  arrangement  has  been  entirely  lost.  The 
average  of  all  errors  taken  together  is  given  under  m ;  the 
figures  in  this  column  have  been  gained,  not  by  adding  the 
averages  in  the  other  columns,  but  by  a  separate  summation  of 
the  errors  in  each  experiment.  Cases  of  inversion  where  the 
original  order  of  the  letters  is  simply  reversed  occurred  so 
rarely  that  the  column  which  had  been  set  apart  for  their  recep- 
tion was  left  unused  ;  errors  of  this  kind  found  a  place  in  column 
3  or  4  in  the  first  division,  and  in  column  b  in  the  second  divi- 
sion, the  mode  of  estimation  being  slightly  modified  for  them. 
Errors  due  to  insertion  of  a  wrong  letter  were  likewise  rare,  and 
appear  only  in  the  total  averages  under  m.  The  Roman  nu- 
merals in  the  first  vertical  column  represent  the  different  stages 
in  repetition. 

In  Table  II.  the  numbers  in  the  horizontal  columns  opposite 
the  Roman  numerals  give  the  percentage  of  times  that  the  syl- 
lables in  the  ten  places  in  the  series,  whether  in  complete  or 
incomplete  state,  are  reproduced  by  the  subject;  the  analysis 
takes  into  account  only  the  original  position  of  the  syllable  and 
neglects  entirely  the  place  assigned  to  it  by  the  subject.  Owing 
probably  to  the  fact  that  the  experiments  were  not  sufficiently 
numerous  to  eliminate  accidental  variations,  the  results  of  the 
analysis  regarding  the  original  position  of  the  recollected  sylla- 
bles are  somewhat  irregular  if  we  look  only  at  the  individual 
results.  The  general  tendency,  however,  is  plain  and  since 
that  tendency  is  expressed  with  sufficient  clearness  in  the  figures 
gained  by  taking  together  the  averages  of  all  the  subjects  I  have 
decided  to  present  only  the  final  averages. 

TABLE  I. 


I 

2 

3 

4 

a 

b 

c 

d 

e 

m 

I.  .  . 

2.2 

0-35 

.1 

0.6 

15.5 

2-5 

3-o 

.0 

0.7 

22.2 

III.  .  . 

2-5 

0.9 

.1 

0.9 

13.0 

4-3 

2-5 

•35 

0.6 

21.4 

VI.  .  . 

2.8 

0.9 

.1 

0.9 

11.9 

4-5 

2.6 

•5 

0-5 

20.5 

IX.  .  . 

3-4 

0.9 

.1 

0.6 

10.9 

3-95 

2.2 

•5 

0.6 

18.9 

XII.  .  . 

3-9 

0.8 

.0 

0.7 

IO.O 

3-75 

2.1 

•3 

0.6 

17-3 

26 


W.  G.  SMITH. 


TABLE  II. 


I 

2 

3 

4 

5 

6 

7 

8 

9 

10 

I.  .  . 

81 

52 

24 

16 

16 

24 

26 

26 

62 

84 

III.  .  . 

84 

67.5 

39 

38 

34 

33 

29 

44 

69 

92 

VI.  .  . 

81 

61 

42 

42 

34 

32 

46 

54 

74 

85 

IX.  .  . 

89 

67 

49 

4i 

32 

33 

48 

64 

77 

93 

XII.  .  . 

92 

58 

46 

41 

56 

57 

57 

61 

84 

9i 

It  will  be  noted  on  comparing  the  values  given  in  Table  I. 
with  those  in  Table  III.  that,  while  the  general  features  of  the  re- 
sults are  reproduced  in  Table  I.  with  great  distinctness, 
there  is  yet  among  the  different  individuals  a  considerable 
amount  of  variation.  The  values  given  by  the  subject  St.  in 
col.  m  are  opposed  to  those  of  all  the  other  subjects,  though  in  the 
case  of  two  others,  H.  and  Sn.,  the  numbers  do  not  conform 
very  closely  to  the  typical  curve.  It  is  unfortunate  that  another 
subject,  whose  memory  proved  itself  better  than  that  of  any 
other,  was  unable  to  continue  his  attendance  long  enough  to 
give  a  satisfactory  number  of  experiments.  The  three  subjects, 
H.,  Cu.  and  P.,  who  have  carried  out  the  largest  number  of  ex- 
periments, present  fairly  typical  examples  of  the  different  kinds 
of  memory ;  in  order  to  give  some  proof  of  the  trustworthiness 
of  the  average  values  assigned,  the  probable  error  of  the 
averages  in  col.  m  has  been  calculated l  and  the  figures  inserted 
to  one  place  of  decimals  under  r. 

Before  going  on  to  draw  any  conclusion  from  the  results  we 
may  note  shortly  the  limitations  of  the  research.  The  results 
obviously  can  only  be  taken  as  representative  of  the  process  of 
learning  series  of  syllables  of  a  certain  length,  repeated  aloud 
in  a  more  or  less  artificial  manner.  The  only  test  of  the  value 
of  the  memory  at  the  different  stages  lay  in  the  accuracy  with 
which  the  subject  recollected  the  syllables  immediately  after  the 
learning  was  finished.  Without  doubt  the  results  would  be  differ- 
ent if  we  allowed  some  time  to  elapse  between  learning  and  recol- 

1  In  experiments  such  as  those  of  Ebbinghaus,  as  has  been  remarked,  the 
probable  error  is  an  unsatisfactory  test,  because  while  the  number  of  repetitions 
may  become  indefinitely  large  it  can  never  fall  below  i .  Here,  on  the  other  hand, 
the  total  number  of  errors  may  be  zero,  but  it  can  never  rise  above  a  certain 
point. 


HARVARD   PSYCHOLOGICAL   LABORATORY.  2J 

lection.  Probably  in  this  case  the  errors  in  the  first  stages  would 
increase  much  faster  than  those  in  the  later  stages  of  repetition. 
Finally,  in  these  as  in  other  memory  experiments,  we  have  a  very 
mixed  result  in  which  factors,  such  as  the  memory  images  of 
sight  and  hearing,  are  inextricably  mingled  together. 

The  results  given  in  the  tables  confirm  in  general  the 
accepted  fact  of  the  efficacy  of  continued  repetition  in  impress- 
ing any  kind  of  subject-matter  on  the  memory.  That  even  with 
the  reagents  who  remember  best  its  effect  is  so  small  is  some- 
what surprising.  Probably  the  explanation  of  this  feature  is  to 
be  found  partly  in  the  artificiality  of  the  experimental  condi- 
tions ;  partly,  also,  in  the  fact  that  the  subjects  were  directed  not 
to  try  and  learn  as  much  as  possible,  but  simply  to  repeat,  with 
all  possible  regularity,  what  was  presented  to  them.  The 
advantage  of  this  rule  was  that  there  was  very  seldom  any  com- 
plaint made  of  fatigue  due  to  the  experiments.  A  comparison 
of  the  average  values  in  the  earlier  and  later  halves  of  the 
series  of  experiments  carried  out  by  the  subjects  who  have  fur- 
nished the  largest  number  of  experiments  shows  that  in  the 
majority  of  cases  there  is  a  slight  increase  in  the  value  of  the 
memory  in  the  second  half,  a  result  probably  due  to  practice. 

It  is  interesting  to  observe  a  confirmation  here  of  another 
fact  which  meets  us  in  common  life.  In  any  pursuit  or  compe- 
tition the  candidates  start  fairly  equal ;  it  is  towards  the  end  that 
they  begin  to  separate  from  each  other.  Here  we  are  met  by 
the  fact  that  on  the  whole  the  different  individuals  do  not  differ 
very  greatly  in  the  number  of  errors  which  they  commit  after 
one  repetition,  while  as  we  go  on  to  twelve  repetitions  the  differ- 
ence increases  markedly.  The  difference  between  the  best  and 
the  worst  memory  after  twelve  repetitions  is  very  much  greater 
than  after  one  repetition.  A  better  way  of  proving  the  same  fact 
consists  in  giving  the  mean  variation  of  the  final  averages 
(Table  I.  m)  at  each  stage  : — 

I.          ill.        IV.         IX.        XII. 
mv.  1.8         3.0         3.8         3.7         5.1 

The  first  repetition  is  undoubtedly  the  best ;  /.  e.,  more  is  learned 
by  it  than  by  any  other  repetition,  or,  in  fact,  by  all  the  other 
repetitions  put  together.  There  seems  to  be  a  slight  increase  in 


28  W.  G.  SMITH. 

the  value  of  a  repetition  as  we  pass  from  the  third  to  the  twelfth  ; 
this  result  shows  itself  in  cols.  I  and  m,  but  not  in  col.  a,  where 
errors  of  omission  alone  appear ;  in  fact  the  change  in  col.  a  is  in 
the  opposite  direction,  the  increase  in  the  number  of  letters 
recollected,  caused  by  the  successive  repetitions,  appearing  to 
grow  smaller  as  the  number  of  repetitions  increases. 

If  we  look  more  closely  into  the  figures  for  each  stage  we 
find  certain  regularities  which  hold  for  almost  every  subject. 
The  number  of  syllables  which  are  correctly  remembered  (col. 
i)  increases  regularly  with  the  increase  in  number  of  repeti- 
tions, while  the  total  of  errors  (col.  m)  and  also  the  errors  of 
omission  (col.  a)  decrease  as  regularly.  The  other  classes  in 
both  divisions  comprising  the  errors  of  disorder  show  values 
which  remain  pretty  constant  throughout;  i.  £.,  the  number  of 
errors,  while  remaining  absolutely  constant,  decreases  relatively 
to  the  total  number  of  syllables  and  letters  remembered.  It  is 
one  of  the  limitations  of  this  investigation  that  it  does  not  enable 
us  to  analyze  exactly  the  errors  due  to  the  various  kinds  of  con- 
fusion and  disorder  and  separate  them  from  errors  of  omission. 
To  do  this  it  would  be  necessary  to  employ  a  method  which  was 
followed  by  Bigham  in  his  research  on  memory.1  According 
to  this  method  the  subject  would  be  supplied  with  a  list  of  the 
syllables,  arranged  in  chance  order,  which  were  being  used  in 
an  experiment  and  would  be  required  to  rearrange  them  after 
the  repetitions  were  finished.  What  we  seem  to  have  in  the 
present  experiments  is  a  continual  process  of  promotion  during 
the  learning  ;  a  syllable  or  letter,  at  first  forgotten,  appears  bye  and 
bye  in  one  of  the  classes  which  represent  failure  to  remember  the 
right  order  and  then  passes  into  the  classes  of  syllables  or  letters 
correctly  remembered;  in  this  way  the  figures  representing 
errors  of  disorder  might  be  expected  to  remain  fairly  steady. 

Cases  of  inversion  of  syllables  practically  did  not  occur  at 
all ;  inversions  of  letters  and  insertion  of  false  letters  occurred 
rarely,  as  before  remarked.  What  the  precise  explanation  of 
these  facts  may  be  I  have  no  means  of  saying.  With  Ca.  and 
R.  the  figures  in  col.  3  are  much  larger  than  in  cols.  2  or  4 
at  each  stage,  while  with  H.  and  St.  the  figures  in  col. 
4  are  regularly  the  largest.  Sn.,  on  the  other  hand,  shows  the 
1  PSYCHOLOGICAL  REVIEW,  I.  pp.  34,  453. 


HARVARD  PSYCHOLOGICAL  LABORATORY.  29 

largest  numbers  in  cols.  2,  b  and  c.  Such  results  point  to  the 
need  for  purposes  of  explanation  of  a  more  exact  knowledge 
of  the  psychical  processes  of  each  individual.  Observations 
were  made  in  the  course  of  the  experiments  on  the  nature  of 
the  memory  and  its  variations  at  the  different  stages,  but  I 
have  not  been  able  to  any  great  extent  to  correlate  these  obser- 
vations with  the  numerical  values  given  in  the  tables.  The 
memory  in  every  case  seemed  to  be  of  a  mixed  character,  now 
visual,  now  auditory  and  now  motor  images  being  more  promi- 
nent. A  comparison  of  the  figures  in  cols,  c  and  e  seems 
both  interesting  and  significant.  If  consonants  retained  their 
hold  on  memory  to  the  same  extent  as  vowels  the  figures  in  the 
last  column  ought  to  range  about  a  third  of  those  in  col. 
c ;  as  a  matter  of  fact  they  range  somewhere  about  a  fourth,  the 
figures  tending  to  approach  nearer  to  a  third  in  the  later  stages. 
The  conclusion  seems  justified  that  vowels  impress  themselves 
better  on  the  memory  than  consonants.  There  was  a  tendency  in 
most  subjects  to  associate  foreign  ideas  with  the  syllables  or 
make  the  syllables  into  intelligible  phrases,  though  towards  the 
end  this  tendency  was  lessened.  With  one  individual,  Ca.,  this 
was  a  very  troublesome  feature  from  beginning  to  end,  and 
there  was  hardly  an  experiment  where  I  had  not  one  or  more 
instances  of  this  associating  tendency.  I  have  summed  up 
the  associations  made  at  each  stage  by  this  subject,  and  without 
any  great  stress  being  laid  on  the  figures  they  may  be  presented 
as  an  illustration  of  the  fact,  which  was  otherwise  confirmed, 
that  this  associative  tendency  grows  with  the  number  of  repeti- 
tions. 

I.       III.       VI.       IX.       xn. 
No.  of  Assns.         6         9         23         34         33 

It  was  decided  that  an  experiment  should  be  rejected  only 
where  connecting  associations  were  formed,  i.  e.,  associations 
which  connected  two  syllables  in  the  series  into  a  single  intel- 
ligible phrase.1  This  rule  proved  in  the  end  too  severe,  as 
the  associations  very  often  occurred  in  the  more  laborious  ex- 
periments of  the  later  stages,  and  in  the  end  it  was  decided  to  ac- 

1  Examples  :  div  nur — divine  nurture  ;  mon  sud — Monday  Sunday.  The  range 
of  these  associations  will  be  understood  when  it  is  mentioned  that  they  included 
English,  Scotch,  German,  French,  Russian,  Latin,  Greek  and  Hebrew  words. 


30  W.   G.  SMITH. 

cept  the  experiment  when  an  association  was  formed  between  the 
first  two  or  last  two  syllables  at  any  stage,  or  between  syllables  in 
any  part  of  the  series  when  the  number  of  repetitions  was 
twelve ;  in  all  these  cases  there  was  a  considerable  probability 
that  the  syllables  would  have  been  remembered  in  the  absence  of 
the  association. 

There  does  not  seem  to  be  any  definite  connection  traceable 
here  between  excellence  of  memory  and  the  mode  of  reproduc- 
tion. The  subject  with  the  best  memory  and  the  subject  with 
the  worst  both  wrote  from  the  beginning  straight  on,  the  syllables 
at  the  end  of  the  series  being  thus  written  last.  In  the  great 
majority  of  cases  the  first  two  syllables  are  reproduced  first ; 
often  the  last  two  come  next ;  this  is  specially  marked  in  the  case 
of  the  reagent  P.  However,  although  the  last  syllable  does  not 
come  first  in  the  reproduction,  it  is  in  most  cases  best  remembered. 

The  subjects  were  left  free  throughout  the  experiments  to 
introduce  a  rhythm  into  the  repetition  if  they  pleased.  In  most 
cases  there  was  a  slight  rhythm  present.  In  a  few  instances  its 
effect  is  visible  in  the  detailed  results  which  form  the  basis  of 
the  second  table ;  in  these  cases  there  is  a  greater  difference 
between  the  figures  in  the  second  and  third  and  also  the  eighth 
and  ninth  places  than  between  those  in  the  first  two  and  last  two 
places.  On  the  whole,  however,  its  effect  is  less  than  might  have 
been  expected.  It  appears  from  Table  II.  that  a  syllable  in  the 
second  half  of  a  series  has  a  somewhat  greater  chance  of  being  re- 
membered than  one  in  the  first  half ;  the  best  places  are  at  the  be- 
ginning and  the  end,  the  chance  of  being  recollected  lessening 
at  first  rapidly,  then  more  slowly  as  the  middle  of  the  series  is 
approached.  During  the  pause  of  two  beats  between  the  repe- 
titions the  subjects  waited  without  trying  to  memorize ;  in  most 
cases  their  eyes  were  fixed  inattentively  on  the  beginning  or 
end  of  the  series  which  was  being  presented.  Two  of  them 
complained  that  in  this  way  an  undue  advantage  seemed  to  be 
given  to  the  first  and  last  syllables.  One  of  the  two  adopted 
the  device  of  shutting  the  eyes  during  the  pause  ;  in  spite  of  this, 
the  first  and  last  pairs  of  syllables  are  in  this  case  specially  well 
remembered.  There  does  not  seem  any  reason  to  suppose  that 
looking  at  the  syllables  in  this  inattentive  way  has  any  very 
marked  effect  upon  the  memory. 


HARVARD  PSYCHOLOGICAL   LABORATORY. 


TABLE  III. 


I 

2 

3 

4 

a 

b 

c 

cl 

e 

m 

r 

I.  .  . 

0.7 

O.I 

i.i 

I.O 

16.9 

2.6 

5-i 

2.0 

1.4 

27.1 

o-5 

III.  .  . 

0.7 

0.5 

i-3 

i-5 

iS-3 

5-0 

4.6 

1.6 

1.4 

27.2 

0.4 

H.  21 

VI.  .  . 

I.O 

0-5 

I.O 

«-7 

14.2 

4.9 

4.6 

1.4 

I.O 

25-7 

0.4 

IX.  .  . 

1.4 

0.4 

i-3 

0.9 

H-5 

3-2 

4.8 

1.8 

i-3 

24-5 

o-5 

XII.  .  . 

1.0 

0.4 

i-7 

i-3 

13-7 

4.0 

5-3 

i.i 

1.2 

24.2 

0-5 

I.  .  . 

2.O 

o-3 

i-3 

0.4 

16.7 

1.8 

2.7 

0.6 

o-5 

21.8 

o-3 

III.  .  . 

2.6 

0.6 

i-7 

0.6 

13.2 

2.7 

2.2 

I.O 

0.4 

19.2 

o-S 

Cu.  21 

VI.  .  . 

3-2 

o-5 

i-7 

0.8 

n-3 

3-o 

2.O 

»-3 

°-3 

17.7 

0.6 

IX.  .  . 

4.6 

o-3 

1.4 

0-5 

9.2 

2.O 

i-7 

2.8 

0.4 

16.0 

0.9 

XII.  .  . 

4.9 

0.6 

i-3 

0.4 

8.1 

2-7 

1.4 

2.0 

0.4 

H-3 

0.7 

I.  .  . 

2.6 

0.2 

1.25 

o-5 

iS-3 

2.15 

2.1 

0-35 

0-5 

20.05 

0-5 

III.  .  . 

3-o 

0.9 

i.i 

0.6 

13-6 

3-5 

I.I 

0.9 

°-3 

19.2 

0.6 

P.  20 

VI.  .  . 

4.0 

0.35 

0-95 

0.65 

"•3 

2-5 

1.85 

0.7 

0-5 

16.4 

0.6 

IX.  .  . 

4-25 

0.6 

I.O 

0-5 

10.45 

2-95 

i-35 

0.8 

0-35 

15-6 

0.7 

XII.  .  . 

4-75 

0.65 

I.O 

0.25 

9.1 

2-5 

i-55 

0-55 

0.4 

13-7 

0.7 

I.  .  . 

3-3 

0.5 

I.O 

0.6 

13-8 

2.6 

2.1 

0.7 

0.7 

19-3 

III.  .  . 

3-7 

0.7 

0.9 

0.8 

11.4 

34 

1.6 

i.i 

0.4 

17.7 

Ca.  18 

VI.  .  . 

3-9 

i-3 

1.25 

0.6 

8.0 

5-3 

2.6 

1.4 

0.9 

17.0 

IX.  .  . 

4.4 

0.8 

I.O 

0.7 

7.2 

3-7 

1.8 

0.8 

0.6 

i3-7 

XII.  .  . 

6.2 

0.7 

0.8 

0.3 

6.0 

2.8 

0.7 

1.2 

o-3 

I  I.O 

I.  .  . 

2-3 

0.6 

0.6 

0.4 

17-5 

2.6 

1.8 

0.25 

0.4 

22.1 

III.  .  . 

2.4 

i.i 

0-75 

o-5 

H-5 

4.4 

2.0 

0.6 

0.4 

21.6 

L.  16 

VI.  .  . 

2-3 

0.6 

0.9 

0.8 

15-6 

3-5 

1-7 

0.6 

O.I 

21.4 

IX.  .  . 

3-5 

0.9 

0.9 

O.2 

!3-4 

3-25 

I.4 

0-3 

0.2 

17.9 

XII.  .  . 

3-i 

0.7 

0-5 

0-5 

iS-i 

2.9 

i-5 

0.25 

0.4 

19.9 

I.  .  . 

2-75 

O.2 

1.6 

0.8 

10.6 

2-3 

4.9 

3-6 

1.2 

21.9 

Of        T9 

III.  .  . 

VT 

2.25 

0.4 

1-7 

i-7 

9-5 

S-o 

4-5 

4-7 

1.2 

23-8 

O  L.     1  ~ 

V  i..   *   • 

IX.  .  . 

2.1 

1.4 

1.4 

i-3 

IO.  s[ 

9.0 

5-4 
7-i 

4-5 
4.1 

4.1 
3-9 

1'5 

i-5 

24.9 

24-75 

XII.  .  . 

2.8 

0.7 

!-3 

i-7 

9.2 

5-5 

3-9 

3-6 

1.2 

22-5 

I.  .  . 

1.4 

0.9 

0.5 

0.7 

18.5 

4-25 

1.6 

0.25 

o-3 

24.6 

III.  .  . 

1-5 

2.25 

0.25 

0.6 

i5-i 

7-9 

i-75 

O.2 

o-5 

25.1 

Sn.  12 

VI.  .  . 

1.6 

2-3 

0.4 

0.9 

13.2 

9.0 

2.1 

0.8 

0.4 

25.2 

IX.  .  . 

2.6 

2.1 

o-5 

0.4 

13.0 

7.8 

1.2 

0.25 

O.2 

22.25 

XII.  .  . 

2.25 

2.2 

0.4 

0.9 

12.7 

8-3 

i-3 

0.4 

°-3 

22-75 

I.  .  . 

2.2 

O.O 

1.4 

o-75 

14.7 

i-5 

3-75 

0.9 

0.7 

20.8 

III.  .  . 

3-75 

0.4 

1.25 

0.6 

11.7 

2.7 

1.9 

0.7 

0.4 

17.2 

R.   12 

VI.  .  . 

4-25 

o-3 

i-3 

0.6 

10.75 

2.2 

i-3 

1.5 

0.25 

15.9 

IX.  .  . 

4-3 

0.4 

1.25 

O.2 

I  I.O 

1.6 

1.8 

1.4 

0.25 

16.2 

XII.  .  . 

6.1 

O.2 

i-3 

0.4 

6.1 

i-3 

1.2 

i-3 

0-3 

9.9 

1  The  letters  in  the  first  vertical  column  represent  the  names  of  the  reagents, 
while  the  figures  give  the  total  number  of  experiments  made  at  each  stage.  It 
may  be  mentioned  that  Ca.  made  16  instead  of  18  experiments  with  stage  VI. 


32  M.    W.  CALKINS. 

B.     ASSOCIATION.     (II.) 

BY  MARY  WHITON  CALKINS. 
Wellesley  College. 

Experimental  investigation  may  best  supplement  the  purely 
introspective  study  of  the  nature  of  association  by  describing  in 
relatively  concrete  terms  the  probable  direction  of  trains  of  as- 
sociated images.  To  this  end  there  is  necessary  such  a  consid- 
eration of  the  so-called  suggestibility  of  objects  of  conscious- 
ness as  shall  answer  the  question :  what  one  of  the  numberless 
images  which  might  conceivably  follow  upon  the  present  per- 
cept or  image  will  actually  be  associated  with  it? 

Ordinary  self-observation  has  long  recognized  that  the  readily 
associated  objects  are  the  'interesting'  ones,  and  has  further 
enumerated  frequency,  recency,  vividness  or  impressiveness, 
and  primacy  (the  earliest  position  in  a  definite  series  of  events) 
as  the  factors  of  interest,  and  therefore  the  conditions  of  asso- 
ciation. A  given  object,  then,  is  likely  to  be  suggested  by  one 
with  which  it  was  frequently,  recently  or  vividly  connected,  and 
by  one  with  which  it  stood  at  the  beginning  of  a  series. 

Logically  prior  to  the  discussion  of  suggestibility  is  the 
study  of  the  suggestiveness  of  objects  of  consciousness,  that  is, 
the  consideration  of  the  question  :  what  part  of  the  present  total 
content  of  consciousness  will  be  associated  with  a  following  im- 
age? The  suggesting  object  may,  of  course,  be  of  varied  ex- 
tent. In  the  rare  cases  of  'total  redintegration,'  practically 
the  entire  present  content  is  connected,  as  a  whole,  with  what 
follows.  Far  more  often,  some  one  accentuated  part  of  the 
total  object  of  consciousness  is  the  starting  point  of  the  associa- 
tion; and  this  emphasis  of  attention  is  once  more  upon  the 
'  interesting '  part  of  the  entire  content,  that  is  upon  some  vivid, 
recent  or  repeated  object,  or  upon  one  which  has  had  the  early 
place  in  a  series.  Finally,  neither  the  total  content  of  con- 
sciousness, nor  a  single  accentuated  portion  of  that  total,  but  a 
group  of  these  single  factors  or  objects  of  consciousness  may 
form  the  starting  point  of  the  association. 

These  distinctions  may  be  summarized,  somewhat  as  follows  : 


HARVARD  PSYCHOLOGICAL  LABORATORY.  33 

I.  Contents  of  consciousness  are  *  suggestive.' 

a.  As  totals  (Total  Redintegration.) 

b.  As  complex. 

1.  Groups  of  objects  are  suggestive   (through  'constel- 
lation.') 

2.  Single  portions  are  suggestive,  through  their  interest, 
due  to 

(a)  Repetition  (Frequency.) 

(b)  Vividness. 

(c)  Recency. 

(d)  Primacy. 

II.  Objects  of  consciousness  are  « suggestible,'   through  their 
interest,  due  to 

a.  Frequency  of  connection. 

b.  Vividness     "  " 

c.  Recency      "  " 

d.  Primacy      "  " 

The  experimental  investigation  whose  results  are  here  re- 
ported concerned  itself  with  the  conditions  of  suggestibility. 
The  massed  records  of  the  first  part  of  the  study  were  published 
in  this  REVIEW,  volume  I,  pages  476  to  483.  The  figures  of 
this  earlier  summary  are  incorporated  with  those  of  the  later 
experiments  in  this  paper,  and  the  account  of  the  methods  used 
and  of  certain  of  the  conclusions  reached  is  here  in  part  repeated 
to  secure  completeness.  All  the  results  were  twice  set  down,  once 
in  the  books  kept  for  the  individual  subjects,  and  again  in  the 
books  which  contained  the  grouped  records  of  the  different  sorts 
of  experiment.  These  experimental  ledger  pages  have  been  bal- 
anced, and  all  the  figures  given  in  the  tables  represent  the  con- 
curring results  of  both  forms  of  record.  Constant  notes  were 
kept  of  subjective  experiences,  but  have  not  been  reported,  for 
none  of  them  tended  to  modify  the  conclusions  drawn  from  the 
experiments  themselves  except  where  the  occurrence  of  natural 
associations  made  it  necessary  to  reject  entirely  the  results  of 
particular  experiments. 


34  M.  W.  CALKINS. 

EXPERIMENTAL  INVESTIGATION  OF   THE  CONDITIONS  OF 
SUGGESTIBILITY. 

The  relative  significance  of  frequency,  recency,  primacy 
and  vividness,  was  studied  in  about  2,200  experiments.  This 
number  does  not  include  the  introductory  experiments  under- 
taken in  order  to  select  satisfactory  methods  nor  the  practice 
experiments  of  each  subject.  There  were  17  subjects,  no  one 
of  whom  assisted  in  more  than  275  nor  in  less  than  40  experi- 
ments ;  and  the  average  number  was  130  for  each  subject. 
Most  of  the  visual  experiments  were  repeated  with  40  members 
of  the  writer's  Wellesley  College  class,  with  an  average  of  12 
experiments  each.  The  results  coincide  very  closely  with  those 
of  the  more  extended  study  in  the  Harvard  laboratory;  they 
are  not  included  except  in  one  or  two  instances  which  will  be 
noticed.  All  the  subjects  were  entirely  or  comparatively  igno- 
rant of  the  aims  and  the  problems  of  the  investigation,  which 
was  not  discussed  until  the  conclusion  of  the  work. 

The  experiments  were  of  two  main  types,  visual  and  audi- 
tory ;  the  visual  experiments  are  divided  again  into  the  succes- 
sive and  the  simultaneous ;  finally,  all  the  experiments  may  be 
classed,  with  reference  to  their  purpose,  as  simple  or  compar- 
ative. 

I.  SIMPLE  SERIES. 
a.  i.   Successive  Arrangement.      Visual  Series. 

The  method  already  described1  was  retained  throughout, 
except  that  the  time  was  kept,  in  the  second  half  of  the  experi- 
ments, by  listening  to  the  beats  of  a  metronome,  which  rung  a 
bell  every  four  seconds ;  the  metronome  was  enclosed  in  a 
sound-proof  box,  so  that  the  subjects  were  not  disturbed  by  the 
beats,  which  reached  the  experimenter  through  a  rubber  tube. 
A  color  was  shown  during  four  seconds,  against  a  white  back- 
ground, followed  by  a  numeral,  also  exposed  four  seconds. 
Each  series  consisted  of  7,  10  or  12  such  pairs  of  quickly  suc- 
ceeding color  and  numeral,  each  presentation  lasting  only  four 

PSYCHOLOGICAL  REVIEW,  I.,  p.  477. 


HARVARD  PSYCHOLOGICAL  LABORATORY.  35 

seconds  and  each  pair  of  stimuli  separated  from  the  next  by  an 
interval  of  eight  seconds ;  at  the  close  a  test  series  was  shown, 
made  up  of  the  colors  only,  in  changed  order,  and  the  subjects 
wrote  down  whatever  numeral,  if  any,  was  suggested  by  each 
color.  The  experimenter  was  hidden  from  view  throughout. 

In  the  first  group  of  experiments,  some  one  color  appeared 
several  times  in  each  series,  once  in  an  unimportant  position 
with  any  chance  numeral,  but  also  once  or  more  in  some  empha- 
sized connection — either  repeatedly  with  the  same  numeral  (a 
'frequent'  combination),  or  at  the  very  beginning  or  very  end 
of  a  series  (cases  of  'primacy'  and  of  'recency'),  or  with  a 
numeral  of  unusual  size  or  color  (an  instance  of  'vividness'). 

The  following  are  representative  series  : 

Visual  Series,  213.      Vividness. 
First  Series  :  Vivid,  4.     Second  Series,  5. 

I.  Brown,  34;  peacock,  65;  orange,  51;   green,  792  (v)  ; 
blue,  19 ;  violet,  48  ;  green,  2?  (n)  ;  grey,  36 ;  strawberry,  87  ; 
dark  red,  54. 

II.  Blue,  grey,  dark  red,  brown,  green  (z>),  orange,  straw- 
berry, grey,  peacock. 

Visual  Series,  127.      Recency. 

I.  Peacock,  46;  blue,  38  (n)  ;  brown,  51;  grey,  74;  yel- 
low, 29  ;  blue,  52  (r) . 

II.  Grey,  blue  (r),  peacock,  yellow,  strawberry,  brown. 

The  problem  of  the  experiment  is  the  discovery  of  the  pro- 
portion of  cases  in  which  the  accentuated  color,  e.  g.,  green  (as 
in  series  213,  above),  suggests  the  numeral — here  792 — with 
which  it  was  emphatically  combined,  instead  of  suggesting  the 
other  numeral  with  which  also  it  was  shown. 

The  later  experiments,  in  the  first  place,  fully  corroborated 
the  results  already  published.  Thus  the  general  likelihood  of 
the  recall  of  numerals  in  series  of  this  character,  leaving  out  of 
consideration  all  the  emphasized  numerals,  was  26.1%  in  the 
l°ng>  35 •*%  in  tne  short  series.1  No  new  series  were  intro- 

*Cf.  for  per  cents,  of  earlier  results  (26.4%  and  35.3%)  PSYCHOLOGICAL 
REVIEW  I.,  p.  479. 


36  M.  W.  CALKINS. 

duced  with  only  two  occurences  of  the  repeated  numeral,  since 
the  per  cent,  of  recall  in  these  cases1  had  been  so  little  above 
the  normal ;  but  the  likelihood  of  associating  the  numeral  three 
times  repeated  with  a  color  was  63.7%,  while  the  normal  or 
unaccentuated  numeral  appeared  in  only  24.9%  of  the  cases.2  In 
19.2%  of  all  the  test  series,  *  both'  the  frequent  and  the  normal 
were  remembered.  This  is  easily  explained  when  the  normal 
comes  late  in  the  series,  for  the  recurrence  of  the  color,  already 
repeated,  draws  attention  to  the  following  numeral,  even  when 
that  is  not  accentuated.  To  eliminate  this  influence  of  position, 
the  place  of  the  normal  in  the  series  was  constantly  changed 
from  beginning  to  middle  and  end.  The  table  of  individual 
records  is  given  only  for  the  one-fourth  (or  3  of  12)  frequency 
series ;  it  shows  that  the  results  are  not  due  to  any  misleading 
massing  of  the  figures,  for  the  preponderance  of  frequency 
associations  appears  for  each  subject.  As  before, the  column 
headed  'Half  includes  cases  in  which  one  digit  only  was  re- 
called, and  these  are  estimated  in  calculating  the  per  cents.,  as 
half  correct. 

TABLE  I.     FREQUENCY  (3:12),  VISUAL. 

XT  Number  of         Both.  Normal  only.          Frequent  only. 

Series.  Full.  Half.  %       Full.  Half:     %       Full.  Half.      % 

B.  20  4         i  5        2 

C.  24  3        i  23  91 
Ha.             13            2                                    26 
Ns.              5  3 

Pt.  22  3  I  14          I 

Shp.  62  21 

St.  17  2  II  12 

L/-  "  3  5i 

Me.  6  3 

N.  ii  3  i  2 

E.P.  6  122 

.P.  12  I  22 


i2  3  i  5       i 

Sh.  12  3 

Si.  ii  i  i  31 

So.  12  3 

Total,       200  37        3(19.2%)   7       9  (5.7%)  84      10(44.5%) 


Jcf.  PSYCHOLOGICAL  REVIEW,  IV.,  p.  475 

2Cf.   for  per  rents,  of  earlier  results  (63.4%  and  23.3%),    PSYCHOLOGICAL 
REVIEW,  I.,  p.  149. 


HARVARD  PSYCHOLOGICAL   LABORATORY.  37 

The  greatest  difficulty  of  these  experiments  was  unquestion- 
ably in  the  study  of  vividness  as  a  condition  of  suggestibility. 
The  category  is  a  vague  and  elusive  one,  seeming  to  include  all 
those  forms  of  the  interesting  which  cannot  be  referred  to  the 
repetition,  the  recency  or  the  primacy  of  the  experience.  In 
the  main,  therefore,  the  *  vivid '  is  either  the  <  unusual/  or  it 
is  the  object  of  instinctive,  and  therefore  of  psychologically  in- 
explicable, interest. 

TABLE  II.     VIVIDNESS,  VISUAL. 

XT  Number  of          Both.  Normal  Only.  Vivid  Only. 

Series.       Full.  Half.     %        Full.  Half.      %     Full.   Half.      % 

1  13  6 

2  i  4 

2  16  3 

91  12  7 

[  I  17          2 

1  6       i 
7      8 

52  10      6 

i  ii 

12      7 

2  12 

4          ! 
I          2 
II  31 

:  i  6 

Total,      346         43        3(12.8^)25        6     (8%)ii3     47(39.4%) 

Thus,  in  close  likeness  to  the  results  of  the  former  experi- 
ments, 1  the  vividly-associated  numerals  are  remembered  in 
about  one-half  (52.2%  )1  of  the  series,  while  the  normal  as- 
sociations with  the  same  colors  are  only  one-fifth  (20.8%)  1  of 
the  entire  number.  The  lessened  strength  of  these  sorts  of 
vividness,  as  compared  with  that  of  the  three  repetitions,  is 
shown  by  the  greater  number  of  cases  in  which  neither  numeral 
is  remembered.  J.  P.,  however,  is  the  only  one  of  the  subjects 
whose  records,  only  10  in  number,  show  no  influence  at  all  of 
vividness. 

The  individual  records  in  the  experiments  on  recency 2  offer 
only  one  variation  from  the  type,  again  in  the  case  of  J.  P. 

^f.  for  earlier  results  (48%  and  20.8%)  op.  cit.,  page  481. 
2Cf.  for  earlier  results  (53.7%  and  22.2%)  op.  cit.,  page  480. 


B. 

33 

C. 

Ha. 

39 

4 

Mi. 

42 

Ns. 

47 

6 

Lg. 

10 

2 

Lh. 

35 

5 

Me. 

43 

ii 

N. 

9 

E.P. 

29 

4 

J'P* 

10 

R. 

ii 

3 

Sh. 

9 

3 

Si. 

10 

i 

So. 

ii 

i 

M.    W.   CALKINS. 


The  last  numeral  is  recalled  in  53.7 %l  of  the  possible  cases; 
the   other   numeral    associated   with   the    same    color,  only  in 

25.7  %-1 


TABLE  III.     RECENCY,  VISUAL. 


Names. 
Hy. 

if 

Me. 
Nr. 
E.P. 


Sh. 

Si. 

So. 

Mi. 

B. 

Ha. 

Ns. 


Number  of 
Series. 

4 

9 

19 

27 

18 
18 


12 
15 

1 

10 

9 
10 


Both. 
Full.  Half. 

I 
2 


Normal  Only. 
Full.  Half. 

Recent 
%      Full. 

Only. 
Half. 

I 

I 

3 

ii 

I 

I 

I 

8 

3 

I 

3 

2 

3 

9 

I 

4 

I 

3 

I 

2 

8 

I 

I 

4 

3 

3 

I 

3 

i 

3 

8 

2 

i 

i 

I 

i 

i 

2 

I 

2 

3 

I 

i 

4 

Total,          200          27      1(13.7%)    20       8  (12%)  71       18(40%) 

The  influence  of  recency  has  been  studied  also  in  the  series 
which  were  arranged  without  this  particular  purpose,  by 
recording  all  cases  in  which  the  last  numeral  was  correctly  as- 
sociated with  the  color  on  which  it  had  followed.  In  these  cases 
the  likelihood  of  recall  does  not  surpass  that  of  the  average  num- 
eral, though  the  *  recent '  color  was  shown  third  in  the  second 
half-series :  the  recall  of  the  recent  numeral  occurred  only  in 
26.4%  of  276  series.  The  swiftly  decreasing  influence  of  re- 
cency, well-known  from  such  experiments  as  those  of  Ebbinghaus 
on  memory,  is  thus  clearly  indicated :  even  the  intervention  of 
only  two  colors  between  the  last  combination  of  color  and  numeral 
and  the  reappearance  of  the  color  was  sufficient  to  annihilate 
the  effect  of  the  recency. 

Finally,  the  suggestibility  of  a  numeral  which  had  already 
appeared  at  the  very  beginning  of  a  series  was  compared  with 
that  of  another  numeral  combined  with  the  same  color  midway 
in  the  series. 


JCf.  for  earlier  results  (53.7%  and  22.2%)  of.  cit.,  page  480. 


HARVARD  PSYCHOLOGICAL  LABORATORY.  39 

TABLE  IV.     PRIMACY,  VISUAL. 

XT  Number  of          Both.  Normal  Only.          Primacy  Only. 

ies'        Series.      Full.  Half .       %      Full.  Half .       %      Full.  Half.       % 

Hy.  8  12 

Lg.  14  i 

Lh.  20  2  83  21 

Me.  19  2  2      3  62 

Mi.  2  i       i 

N.  18  i  2  62 

E.P.  20  4  33  21 

J-P-  21  315 

R.  22  I  3         I  12         I 

Sh.  17  3  23  62 

Si.  17  2  12  41 

So.  22  3         2  41  32 

Total,          200          18      2    (9.5%)  31     18    (20%)    48    12   (27%) 

The  table  shows  very  clearly  that  with  long  series,  primacy 
is  a  significant  factor  only  in  individual  cases.  Thus,  its  in- 
fluence is  very  marked  on  R.'s  associations,  and  may  be  ob- 
served in  the  records  Me.  and  Sh.  Lh.  on  the  other  hand 
associates  the  later  numeral,  that  is  the  *  normal,'  much  more 
often,  and  with  four  of  the  other  subjects  the  normal  has  a  slight 
advantage.  A  record  of  cases  was  also  kept  in  which  the 
first  of  the  series  was  remembered,  without  special  competition 
with  any  other  numeral,  but  .the  proportion  was  barely  the 
average  one  in  the  long  series ;  in  the  short  series  on  the  other 
hand  the  first  numeral  was  associated  in  more  than  two-fifths  of 
the  cases — in  43  % ,  that  is  8%  more  often  than  the  average 
numeral  and  only  8  %  less  often  than  the  recent. 

The  ineffectiveness  of  primacy  in  the  long  series  seems  at 
first  sight  to  contradict  the  testimony  of  common  experience 
and  of  experiment,1  for,  in  committing  long  series  to  memory, 
the  learner  is  certainly  very  apt  to  remember  the  first  pre- 
sentation. This  difference,  however,  is  easily  explained :  in 
memorizing  the  subject  sets  himself  to  learn  the  series  as  a 
whole,  and  he  may  not  only  accentuate  the  first  presentation, 
but  recur  to  it  while  learning  the  rest  of  the  series ;  moreover, 
when  he  repeats  the  series,  or  records  it  in  writing,  he  almost 
invariably  gives  first  the  earliest  presentation.  In  the  associa- 

1  Cf .  the  work  of  Dr.  W.  G.  Smith  on  memory. 


4°  M.  W.  CALKINS. 

tion  experiment  on  the  contrary,  the  first  presentation  was 
always  repeated  toward  the  middle  of  the  test-series,  thus  mul- 
tiplying the  chances  that  the  combination  would  be  crowded  out 
of  the  memory. 

2.  SIMULTANEOUS  ARRANGEMENT. 

These  general  results  have  been  amplified,  and  at  the  same 
time  verified,  by  introducing  series  in  which  the  connected 
color  and  numeral  were  simultaneously  shown.  This  method 
might  have  been  used  more  often,  since  the  simultaneous  combi- 
nation of  Stimuli  is  perhaps  more  common  in  ordinary  experi- 
ence than  the  successive ;  but  the  experiments  of  the  successive 
type,  in  which  the  combination  of  color  and  numeral  is  emphasized 
by  the  long  pause  between  each  pair,  were  employed  as  affording 
a  close  comparison  between  the  visual  and  the  auditory  series.  So 
far,  however,  as  these  subjects  are  concerned,  the  results  of  the 
simultaneous  series  are  so  closely  parallel  with  those  of  the  suc- 
cessive ones,  that  no  characteristic  differences  appear.  Color 
and  numeral  were  shown  side  by  side  in  an  opening  10x4  cm., 
by  slipping  them  into  double  passe-partout  frames,  made  for 
the  purpose.  Each  frame  held  a  color  and  a  numeral  sep- 
arated by  a  narrow  band  of  white.  The  intervals  of  exposure 
were  six  seconds,  and  in  a  few  series  four  seconds ;  the  pauses 
were  usually  six  seconds,  occasionally  four  seconds.  In  each 
of  the  three  most  important  simple  forms  of  the  experiment,  50 
tests  were  made.  The  average  of  recall,  leaving  out  of  account 
the  emphasized  numerals  was  25.4%  for  the  100  long  series  and 
30%  for  the  50  short  series,  thus  falling,  as  has  been  said, 
slightly  below  the  average  of  recall  in  the  successive  series. 
Moreover  the  percentage  of  emphasized  numerals  which  were 
associated  was  slightly  greater  than  in  the  successive  series, 
because  of  the  larger  number  of  cases  in  which  both  numerals 
were  recalled.  This  result,  however,  maybe  due  to  the  greater 
degree  of  practice  when  these  simultaneous  tests  were  made. 

The  number  of  experiments  is  so  small  that  the  individual 
records  are  not  given,  but  they  are  closely  parallel  to  those  of  the 
successive  series.  In  the  table  which  follows,  the  figures  for  the 
'half  correct,  which  are  small,  are  combined  with  those  of 


HARVARD  PSYCHOLOGICAL  LABORATORY.  41 

the  fully  correct,  and  the  corresponding  per  cents.,  with  those 
of  the  successive  series,  are  added  in  parenthesis. 

TABLE  V.      SIMULTANEOUS  COMBINATION. 

Nature    Number  Both.  Normal  only.     Emphasized. 

of  of         Sim.  Sue.     Sim.  Sue.        Sim.  Sue. 

Series.     Series.    No.    %  %        No.       %  %          No.      %  % 

Freq.  50  n  22%  (19%)  ij^  3%  (5-7%)  24  4§%  (44-5%) 
Viv.  50  15  30"  (12.8")  4^  9"  (8  ")  19  38"  (39.4  ") 
Rec.  50  10  21"  (13.7")  5^  n"  (12  ")  19  38"  (40.7  ") 

b.  Auditory  Series. 

All  the  varieties  of  experiment  which  have  so  far  been  de- 
scribed, except  those  in  primacy,  were  repeated  with  nonsense 
syllables  and  numerals,  as  the  association-elements,  both  pro- 
nounced to  the  subjects.  These  series  were  arranged  in  pairs 
of  a  nonsense  syllable  and  a  numeral  each,  with  four  seconds 
allowed  to  the  pronunciation  of  each  pair,  and  four  seconds  in- 
terval both  between  the  pairs  and  between  the  two  parts  of  the 
series.  One  series  will  serve  as  illustration  of  all. 

Series  33 ^b.      Vivid,  Auditory. 

I.  Zet,  24;    Kip,  62;    Tox,  96;    Wez,3i9  (v) ;     Vit,  38; 
Lup,  45  ;  Nuk,  29;    Wez,  73  (n) ;    Vab,  57;  Muv,  41. 
II.  Vit,  Kip,  Muv,  Zet,   Wez,  Nuk,  Lup,  Vab,  Tox. 

The  results  of  the  experiments  are  generally  parallel  to 
those  of  the  visual  tests,  with  certain  suggestive  variations 
which  will  be  noticed  later.  The  general  average  of  recall, 
disregarding  the  accentuated  pairs  is  shown  in 

TABLE  VI.     CORRECT   ASSOCIATIONS,  AUDITORY. 

Q     .  Number  of         Possible  Correct         Actual  Correct  Associations. 

Series.  Associations.  Full.  Half.  % 

Long.         254          2405          498   22   (25.3%) 
Short.        100         581         118  39   (23.6%) 


42 


M.    W.   CALKINS. 


TABLE  VII.     FREOJJENCY  (3:12)  AUDITORY. 


XT.,™          Number  of        Both.                         Normal  on  Ij 
Series.      Full.  Half,       %      Full.  Half  .       < 

/•.          Frequent  only. 
&      Full.  Half.       % 

Hy. 

5 

i 

I 

H 

8                         i 

3 

i 

Lh. 

12 

3                                  i 

5 

2 

Me. 

15 

9 

4 

2 

Nr. 

i                           i 

7 

2 

E.P. 

H 

5       i 

5 

2 

•) 

H 

9 

2 

3 

R. 

i5 

7 

3 

Sh. 

8                                 i 

6 

2 

Si. 

X4 

8 

3 

3 

So. 

16 

2                                                    I 

9 

3 

Total, 

150 

77  ~T(38%)    ~~+(2% 

i)     5*" 

23  (42%) 

The  position  of  the  normal  in  the  series  was  carefully  varied, 
as  in  the  visual  experiments.  The  following  table  shows,  how- 
ever, that  whatever  the  position  of  the  normal,  associations  with 
the  repeated  numeral  are  much  in  excess,  though  they  decrease 
where  the  normal  is  midway  in  the  series  so  that  the  repetition 
affects  it  also. 


TABLE  VIII.     FREOJJENCY,  AUDITORY. 


Position  Number 


of 


of 


Both. 


Normal  Only. 
Full.  Half. 


Normal.   Series.   Ful1' Half '      % 

Early.       42  n  (26  %) 

Middle.     57  26  (45-6")             3     (2.1 

Late.         51  20  2     (41     ")      i       i     (3 

150  ~57  ~2~  (38    ")  ~T  ~4~  (2 


Frequent  Only. 
Full.  Half.        % 


25  3 

10  13 

17  7 

"52"  2^~ 


(28.9") 
(40      ") 

(42      ") 


Two  methods  of  making  a  numeral  impressive  were  em- 
ployed. Sometimes,  as  in  the  example  given,  a  numeral  of 
three  digits  was  used.  At  other  times  the  emphasized  numeral 
was  read  in  a  very  loud  tone.  The  next  summary  shows  that 
both  methods  were  effective,  but  that  the  voice-stress  was  a  little 
more  impressive. 


HARVARD  PSYCHOLOGICAL  LABORATORY.  43 

TABLE  IX.     VIVID,  AUDITORY. 


Nature   Number 


of 
Vivid. 

f             iJotn. 
Series.    Full.  Half.      % 

j>orrr 
Full. 

tai  uniy. 
Half.      % 

r  i 
Full 

requent  uniy. 
.  Half.        % 

Digits. 

97 

H 

3 

05-9' 

K) 

4 

9 

(9-7%) 

26 

29 

(4I-7%) 

Loud. 

103 

22 

(21.8 

") 

6 

6 

(8.7  ») 

31 

7 

(33-4  ") 

Total, 

200 

15 

~4~ 

09    < 

*J 

10 

15 

(8.7%) 

57 

36 

(37-5%) 

Hy. 

4 

If. 

19 

2 

Lh. 

H 

2 

2 

Me. 

22 

5 

I 

Nr. 

IO 

E.P. 

12 

2 

JRP- 

23 
26 

8 
3 

I 

Sh. 

23 

7 

Si. 

20 

3 

So. 

27 

4 

The  individual  records  show  greater  variation  from  the  type 
than  the  reports  of  frequency-association. 

TABLE  X.     VIVID,  AUDITORY. 

XT  Number  of        Both.  Normal  only.  Vivid  only. 

Series.      Full.  Half.       %      Full.  Half  .       %      Full.  Half.       % 

i 

2  04 

i  62 

12  10          2 

13 

I  7          2 

i  45 

45  74 

1  68 
31  2       3 

2  83 

Total,      ^oo        "36"  ~~4(i99&)  "7^  "15"  (8.7%)  "5T7  ~36(37-5$>) 

The  influence  of  the  position  of  the  normal  shows  itself,  as 
in  the  other  series,  in  the  larger  number  of  cases  in  which 
*  both  '  are  remembered,  when  the  normal  comes  after  the  vivid 
combination. 

TABLE  XI.     VIVID,  AUDITORY. 
Position      Number          Both>  Normal  only  Vivid  only. 

Normal.  Series.  FulL  Half  '       %      FulL  Half'       %      FulL  Half'       % 

Early.  108  13  (12%)       7       4    (8%)      40     22   (46%) 

Late.  _92  2$_  ^(27   '')  _^  _ii_  (9   ")    j7_  _i£  (26   ») 

Total,  200  36       4  (19%)     10     15  (8.7%)  57     36(37-5%) 

The  records  of  the  recency  experiments  show  the  very  strik- 
ing effect  of  auditory  recency.  There  are  no  individual  varia- 
tions from  the  general  type,  and  the  number  of  cases  in  which 
the  normal  is  remembered  does  not  rise  above  one-eighth.  In 
about  half  the  records  the  *  recent  '  is  wholly  or  partially  re- 
membered in  every  case. 


44  M.  W.  CALKINS. 

TABLE  XII.     RECENCY,  AUDITORY. 

-^  Number  of        Both.  Normal  Only.         Recent  Only. 

Series.       Full.  Half.      %       Full.  Half.      %     Full.  Half.    % 

Hy.  5  5 

Lg.  9  i 

Lh.  6  51 

Me.  93  4      l 

N.  8  43 

E.  P.  10  91 

J.  P.  10  2  I  4         2 

R.  n  i                            i                           7      i 

Sh.  10  i                                                         51 

Si.  ii  2                           ii                   5      2 

So.  ii                                                                  10      i 

Total,  100  "To"  (io%)~2       2"  (3%)  "66"  T3~(7 

Auditory  experiments  to  determine  the  effectiveness  of 
primacy  were  undertaken,  but  were  soon  discontinued  because 
they  showed  from  the  beginning  the  insignificance  of  this  fac- 
tor in  long  series.  In  the  short  auditory  series,  however,  as  in 
the  visual,  the  first  position  proved  very  important :  the  first 
numeral  was  associated  in  38.4%  of  the  possible  cases,  that  is, 
in  14%  more  than  the  average  number. 

The  general  relations  of  the  auditory  to  the  visual  series  ap- 
pear in  the  next  table  in  which  only  per  cents,  are  given : 

XIII.     COMPARISON  OF  VISUAL  AND  AUDITORY  ASSOCIATIONS. 


Type  of 
Series. 

Correct 

Ass. 

Both. 

Normal. 

F,  V  or  R. 

Total 
F,  V  or  R. 

Total 
Normal. 

F.  Vis. 

26% 

19% 

6    % 

44-5% 

63-5% 

25     % 

F.  Aud. 

25" 

38" 

2       " 

42     « 

80     " 

40      " 

Viv.  Vis. 

26" 

I3" 

8     " 

39-4" 

52     « 

21        " 

Viv.  Aud. 

25" 

19" 

8.7" 

37-5  " 

56.5" 

27.7" 

Rec.  Vis. 

33  " 

14" 

12       " 

40.    " 

54    " 

26       " 

Rec.  Aud. 

23" 

10" 

3     " 

72.5" 

82.5" 

13       " 

II.  COMPARATIVE  SERIES. 

In  showing  that  frequency,  vividness,  primacy  and  recent- 
ness  are  conditions  of  association  these  experiments  have  so 
far,  of  course,  merely  substantiated  ordinary  observation.  The 
real  purpose  of  the  investigation  is  attained  only  by  a  comparison 
of  these  factors.  Already  it  has  appeared  that  the  per  cent,  of 
correct  '  frequency '  associations  is  slightly  the  largest,  and 
that  recency  is  the  principle  of  the  combination  in  the  next 
greatest  number  of  cases.  In  order,  however,  to  carry  out  the 


HARVARD  PSYCHOLOGICAL  LABORATORY.  45 

comparison  under  like  conditions,  these  principles  of  combination 
were  compared  within  the  same  series.  To  this  end,  long r  succes- 
sive '  series  were  arranged  in  which  the  significance  of  frequency 
was  contrasted  with  that  of  vividness  by  showing  a  color  three 
times  with  the  same  two-digit  numeral  (f)  and  once  with  a 
three-digit  numeral  (v)  ;  others,  in  which  the  color  three  times 
shown  with  a  numeral  (f )  appeared  also  at  the  first  of  the  series 
with  another  numeral  (p).  Short  'successive'  series  were 
formed  in  which  the  last  color  (r)  had  appeared  once  before 
with  a  three-digit  numeral  (v) ,  or  at  the  very  beginning  of  the 
series  (p),  or  twice  before  with  a  repeated  numeral  (f). 

In  the  following  summary  of  results  of  the  comparison  of  fre- 
quency and  primacy,  half  the  records  are  those  of  Wellesley  sub- 
jects. The  individual  records  are  not  given  because  they  are  few 
in  number  and  show  no  variation.  The  experiments  were  not 
continued  further  because  their  result  was  so  unmistakable  verify- 
ing the  conclusion  already  reached  by  the  study  of  primacy 
alone,  that  this  is  evidently  an  unimportant  feature  of  long  series. 

TABLE  XIV.     FREOJJENCY  AND  PRIMACY. 

Number  of  Both.  Prim.  Only  Freq.  Only 

Series.  Full.  Half.         %        Full.  Half.        %        Full.  Half.      % 

80  15       2          20%         3          2         5%       44       3     56.8% 

The  comparison  of  frequency  with  vividness  shows  far  less 
inequality,  and  yet  there  is  a  definite  excess  of  correct  associa- 
tions with  frequency.  In  half  the  cases  where  there  was  any 
association  at  all,  both  the  frequent  and  the  vivid  numeral  were 
recalled.  The  records  are  these  : 

TABLE  XV.     FREOJJENCY  AND  VIVIDNESS. 


Names"  Series. 
Hy.  7 

Lg.  13 

Lh.  23 

Me.  26 

Na.  17 

E.  P.  20 

J.  P.  1 8 

R.  23 

Sh.  1 6 

Si.  14 

So.  23_ 

Total,  200 


Both.                    Vivid 

Frequent. 

Full. 

Half.  %     Full. 

Half.  % 

Full. 

Half. 

% 

2 

2 

8 

2 

i5 

I 

3 

4 

12 

3 

6 

4 

2 

i 

I 

8 

2 

16 

I 

2 

I 

4 

7 

3 

I 

i 

2 

6 

ii 

I 

3 

4 

3 

6 

6 

I 

9 

5 

9^ 

(45-5%)  "16" 

T(9%) 

44 

27(28 

•7%) 

46  M.    W.   CALKINS. 

This  shows  a  total  of  74.2%  (28.7+45.5)  of  associations 
with  the  numeral  frequently  combined  with  the  color  presented, 
and  54.9%  (9-4-45.5)  of  associations  with  the  numeral  vividly 
combined.  Frequency,  however,  is  not  invariably  the  more 
determining  factor:  the  records  of  E.  P.,  Lh.,  and  Sh.  show 
only  a  small  difference  between  ' frequent'  and  ' vivid'  associa- 
tions, while  J.  P.  has  more  with  the  vividly  combined  numeral. 

The  greater  significance  of  frequency  of  combination  was 
brought  out  more  strongly  by  lengthening  and  filling  the  in- 
terval between  the  half-series.  After  the  pairs  of  colors  and 
numerals  had  been  shown  to  the  subjects,  short  anecdotes  or 
news-items,  of  about  one  hundred  and  fifty  words  were  rapidly 
read  aloud.  The  test  series,  of  colors  only,  was  then  shown 
and  the  subjects  tried  as  usual  to  associate  the  numerals.  The 
table  shows  that  the  per  cent,  of  association  was  a  little  lowered, 
but  that  the  per  cent,  of  frequency  associations  is  greater  than 
after  the  unfilled  interlude.  The  frequently  combined  numerals 
seem  to  be  more  tenaciously  associated.  This  method  might 
with  advantage  have  been  extended  to  the  other  experiments. 

TABLE  XVI.     FREQUENCY  AND  VIVIDNESS. 
INFLUENCE  OF  FILLED  INTERLUDE. 

Inter-        No.  of  Both.  Viv.  Only.  Freq.  Only, 

lude.         Series.     Full.    Half.     %      Full.  Half .        %       Full.   Half.        % 

Unfilled.  89  49  (55  %)  7  i  (8-4%)  l6  Jo  (23.6%) 
Filled.  in  42  (37.8  "  )  _9  _3_  (9-4  "  )  j8  17  (32.8  " ) 
Total,  200  91  (45-5")  16  4  (9  ")  44  27  (28.7") 

The  influence  of  position  in  the  series  does  not  alter  the 
general  relation  of  frequent  and  vivid  associations,  though  the 
greatest  number  of  *  frequent  associations  only '  does  occur 
where  the  vivid  numeral  is  nearest  the  beginning  of  the  first 
half-series  and  so  at  a  relative  disadvantage.  The  greatest  like- 
lihood of  remembering  'both'  occurs  when  the  vivid  is  near 
the  middle  of  the  series  so  that  it  is  influenced  by  the  repeti- 
tion and  itself  influences  the  remaining  repetitions.  All  this 
appears  in  the  following  table  : 


HARVARD  PSYCHOLOGICAL  LABORATORY. 


47 


TABLE  XVII.     FREQUENCY  AND  VIVIDNESS. 
INFLUENCE  OF  POSITION  IN  SERIES. 


Position  Number 

of  of 

Vivid.      Series. 

Early.  68 

Midway.  72 

Late.  60 
Total, 


Both 
Full.  Half. 


Vivid. 
Full.  Half. 


Freq.  Sec. 


Full.  Half, 

25      (36«7%)      7    i    C11  %)    20      9  (36%) 
42       (58.3 10      5     i    (7'6^)    I2      5  (20") 

"91"      (45-5  ")~i6  T(9     ")~44    "27(28.7") 
The  results  of  the  comparison  of  recency  with  the  other  con- 
ditions of  suggestibility  is  made  in  the  three  following  tables : 

TABLE  XVIII.     RECENCY  AND  VIVIDNESS. 


200 


Name. 

LN  UII1UCI   UJ 

Series. 

L                    JJUL11. 

Full.  Half 

Hy. 

5 

I 

9 

6 

Lh! 

26 

6 

Me. 

22 

4 

Mi. 

IO 

2 

Nh. 

10 

3 

E.P. 

24 

J.P. 

17 

3       i 

R. 

8       i 

Sh. 

II 

6 

Si. 

9 

So. 

2 

B. 

6 

Ha. 

8 

3 

Ns. 

9 

2 

Total, 

200 

~59    ~a 

Vivid  Only. 
Full.  Half.      ° 


Rec.  Only. 
Full.  Half.     % 


Name. 

>umDer  01 
Series. 

:        r>< 
Full 

B. 

6 

Ha. 

8 

2 

Lg. 

9 

6 

Lh. 

ii 

2 

Me. 

17 

7 

Mi. 

IO 

6 

Nr. 

3 

i 

Ns. 

9 

3 

E.P. 

8 

3 

J.P* 

7 

3 

R. 

IO 

7 

Sh. 

IO 

6 

Si. 

7 

So. 

IO 

_4_ 

Total, 

125 

5° 

2     (30%)    36       23(23.7%)    22 

TABLE  XIX.  RECENCY  AND  FREQUENCY. 
Both. 


9(13.2- 


Frequent  Only. 
Full.  Half.      °/ 

Recent  Only. 
'0       Full.  Half. 

2 

3 

2 

I 

I 

i 

2 

2 

i 

5 

2 

i 

3 

I 

I 

2 

2 

I 

I 

2 

2 

I 

I 

i 

I 

2 

I 

2 

2 

i 

2 

I 

3 

3  (41. 2%)  22     13(22.8^)17       4(I5-2< 


48 


M.    W.    CALKINS. 


TABLE  XX.     RECENCY  AND  PRIMACY. 


XT              Number  of       Both. 
JName.         Series.       Full.  Half.       % 

Primacy  Only.      Recent  Only. 
Full.  Half.      %      Full.  Half. 

Ha. 

4 

I 

i 

i 

Lg. 

13 

6 

I 

i 

3 

Lh. 

4 

2 

I 

Me. 

8 

2 

I 

i 

i 

2 

Mi. 

4 

I 

3 

Na. 

8 

I 

2 

i 

i 

Ns. 

3 

I 

I 

E.P 

3 

2 

J.P. 

4 

2 

I 

R. 

I3 

4 

4 

2 

I 

Sh. 

12 

2           I 

I 

3 

3 

I 

Si. 

10 

3 

I 

So. 

H 

3 

3 

i 

6 

Total, 

IOO 

25       i(25-55 

&)io 

r"r(I5-. 

5%)25 

~T(28 

The  discussion  of  these  results  will  be  facilitated  by  compar- 
ing the  per  cents,  of  the  total  number  of  the  recent  and  of  the 
contrasted  associations  in  the  different  cases : 


Rec.  and  Viv. 
Rec.  and  Freq. 
Rec.  and  Prim. 


RECENT  Assoc. 

43-2% 
56.2  " 

54     " 


CONTRASTED  Assoc.  % 

W  53-7% 
(F)64  « 
(P)4i  « 


It  appears  that  in  this  direct  competition  recency  yields  both 
to  frequency  and  to  vividness  as  a  condition  of  suggestibility. 
The  vivid  numeral  seems  even  to  suppress  the  recent,  for  in  the 
recent- vivid  series  the  recent  is  recalled  10  %  less  often  than  in 
the  series  where  the  recent  is  compared  with  an  ordinary  num- 
eral (See  Table  VI.).  On  the  other  hand,  the  effect  of  re- 
cency is  as  usual,  to  raise  the  likelihood  of  the  recall  of  the  con- 
trasted numeral,  but  not  to  the  level  of  the  frequent  associations. 

The  associations  with  the  first  numeral  of  the  series  are  de- 
cidedly less  than  those  with  the  recent,  though  far  more  numer- 
ous than  in  the  longer  series.  Individual  differences,  however, 
are  to  be  noticed  here,  and  would  doubtless  appear  more  strongly 
in  a  larger  number  of  experiments ;  they  may  also  be  observed 
in  a  few  records  of  the  other  short  series,  as  in  that  of  So.,  who 
has  few  vivid,  and  many  recent,  associations. 

From  this  mass  of  figures  a  few  conclusions  emerge  into 
prominence.  Some  of  these  have  been  already  formulated, 
but  the  more  important  ones  may  be  briefly  stated  again : 


HARVARD  PSYCHOLOGICAL  LABORATORY.  49 

In  these  experiments  frequency  has  been  the  most  constant 
condition  of  suggestibility.  The  proportion  of  the  frequent  as 
compared  with  the  normal  associations  is  one-tenth  greater  than 
that  of  the  vivid  or  of  the  recent.  When  directly  compared  with 
the  vivid  and  the  recent  the  proportion  is  still  greater,  though 
the  number  of  associations  of  the  contrasted  numeral  is  larger 
than  that  of  the  associations  with  an  ordinary  one,  because  of 
the  tendency  of  the  repetition  to  accentuate  the  compared  factor. 

This  significance  of  frequency  is  rather  surprising.  For 
though  everybody  recognizes  the  importance  of  repetition  in 
forming  associations,  we  are  yet  more  accustomed  to  *  account 
for'  these  by  referring  to  recent  or  to  impressive  combinations. 
The  possibility  that  the  prominence  of  frequency  in  our  results 
is  not  fairly  representative  of  ordinary  trains  of  association  is 
strengthened  by  the  fact  that  it  is  contrasted  with  forms  of  vivid- 
ness which  are  only  two  or  three  of  many,  and  which  do  not 
approach  the  impressiveness,  for  instance,  of  richly  emotional 
experiences.  But  this  does  not  affect  the  importance  of  fre- 
quency as  a  corrective  influence.  Granted  a  sufficient  number 
of  repetitions,  it  seems  possible  to  supplement,  if  not  actually  to 
supplant,  associations  which  have  been  formed  through  impres- 
sive or  through  recent  experiences.  Moreover,  the  trustworth- 
iness of  the  ordinary  observation,  which  relegates  frequency  to 
a  comparatively  unimportant  place  among  the  factors  of  sug- 
gestibility, may  be  seriously  questioned :  I  have  found  many 
cases,  during  experiments  in  free  association  in  which  the  sub- 
ject, asked  to  explain  the  association,  does  not  always  mention 
repetition,  even  when  it  has  obviously  occurred,  but  seems,  as 
it  were,  to  take  it  for  granted.  The  prominence  of  frequency  is 
of  course  of  grave  importance,  for  it  means  the  possibility  of 
exercising  some  control  over  the  life  of  the  imagination  and  of 
definitely  combating  harmful  or  troublesome  associations. 

None  of  our  generalized  totals,  it  must  be  added,  are  proof 
against  the  caprice  of  the  individual,  who  may  have  his  own 
favorite  type  of  association  which  resists  opposition.  So  the 
preference  of  one  of  our  subjects — So. — for  the  recent  may  be 
traced  through  almost  all  the  series,  often  in  contradiction  of 
the  general  result. 


50  L.  M.  SOLOMONS. 

C.     THE  SATURATION  OF  COLORS. 

BY  L.  M.  SOLOMONS. 

The  experiments  of  which  a  provisional  account  is  given 
here  were  the  outgrowth  of  an  effort  to  determine  whether  least 
perceptible  differences  of  color  saturation  obeyed  Weber's  law, 
and  though  they  have  branched  out  into  the  wider  field  of  the 
general  relation  of  white  and  black  to  the  colors  they  are  still 
best  presented  from  this  point  of  view. 

In  any  color  mixture  we  may  distinguish  two  kinds  of  in- 
tensity :  the  intensity  of  coloring,  and  general  light  intensity. 
For  example,  if  we  take  a  red  disk  and  compare  it  with  a  color 
wheel  containing  a  large  amount  of  white  and  a  little  red,  the 
merest  novice  at  color  judgments  will  say  that  the  red  disk  is 
the  more  intense  red,  while  the  wheel  possesses  greater  general 
light  intensity.  To  the  former  element,  the  intensity  of  colora- 
tion, we  give  the  name  saturation,  reserving  intensity  for  general 
light  intensity. 

Now,  if  in  a  color  wheel  we  increase  the  -amount  of  color, 
we  change  in  general  both  the  saturation  and  the  intensity. 
Therefore  in  determining  least  perceptible  differences  (which 
will  hereafter  be  denoted  by  the  abbreviation  L.  P.  D.)  it  is 
necessary  to  make  sure  that  we  are  not  judging  by  intensity. 
Our  first  plan  was  to  mix  the  color — red — with  a  gray  of  the 
same  intensity,  so  that  increasing  the  red  decreased  the  white, 
thus  keeping  the  intensity  constant.  These  experiments  gave 
no  very  satisfactory  results,  though  the  failure  to  obey  Weber's 
law  was  manifest.  The  reason  soon  became  clear.  When  we 
increase  the  red  we  decrease  the  white.  Now  to  assume  that 
the  saturation  increment  is  measured  by  the  increase  of  red  is 
to  assume  that  the  saturation  of  a  mixture  depends  only  on  the 
amount  of  color,  and  not  at  all  upon  the  amount  of  white.  This 
is  not  true. 

If  we  take  two  color  wheels  putting  in  one,  say  180°  red  and 
180  black,  and  in  the  other  180°  red  and  180  white,  the  former 
appears  very  much  more  saturated  than  the  latter,  though  the 
actual  amount  of  red  is  the  same.  With  such  large  differences 


HARVARD  PSYCHOLOGICAL  LABORATORY.  51 

as  in  the  above  example  the  difference  of  saturations  is  obvious 
to  anyone.  But  to  compare  two  mixtures  of  very  different  in- 
tensity with  regard  to  their  saturation,  with  any  degree  of  ac- 
curacy, seems  at  first  almost  a  hopeless  task.  But  with  a  little 
practice,  beginning  with  large  differences  and  working  down, 
the  judgment  becomes  quite  possible,  and  eventually  exceed- 
ingly accurate.  Owing  to  the  training  required  the  experi- 
ments were  made  only  by  Miss  Stein  and  the  writer.  • 

The  result  of  a  long  series  of  observations  showed  that  the 
saturation  of  a  mixture  of  color  and  white  is  entirely  independ- 
ent of  the  intensity,  and  of  the  actual  quantity  of  color,  and 
depends  only  on  the  ratio  of  the  color  to  the  white.  The  law 
is  perfectly  obeyed  within  the  limits  of  experimental  error  (a 
few  degrees) .  The  equality  point  was  always  determined  by 
the  method  of  least  observable  difference,  though  it  was  not 
long  before  the  judgment  of  the  equality  point  became  more 
accurate  than  in  most  judgments,  being  nearly  always  placed 
in  the  same  position,  for  movements  in  both  directions.  The 
colors  used  were  red  and  blue.  The  teleological  significance 
of  the  law  is  obvious.  It  enables  us  to  identify  objects  in  vary- 
ing light  intensity.  The  characteristic  of  a  colored  object  is 
the  proportion  of  the  colored  light  to  the  white  light  that  it  re- 
flects. The  actual  quantity  of  colored  light  depends  upon  the 
intensity  of  the  incident  light.  It  is  therefore  of  the  greatest 
importance  for  the  recognition  of  objects  that  the  intensity  of 
coloration  should  depend  upon  the  ratio  of  colored  light  to 
white,  and  not  upon  the  actual  quantity  of  colored  light. 

Meantime  a  series  of  measurements  of  L.  P.  D.  made  out 
the  following  facts :  For  a  constant  saturation  the  L.  P.  D.  is 
constant  measured  in  terms  of  actual  amount  of  color  added, 
that  is,  if  in  a  mixture  of  50°  white  and  50°  red  the  red  must 
be  increased  by  4°  to  give  a  L.  P.  D ;  in  a  mixture  of  100° 
red  and  100°  white,  the  red  must  also  be  increased  by  4° ;  sec- 
ondly, the  L.  P.  D.  increases  with  the  saturation.  To  find  out 
the  exact  law  of  increase  it  is  necessary  to  have  a  measure  of 
saturation. 

By  direct  observation  we  only  determine  when  two  satura- 
tions are  equal.  Now  the  law  that  they  are  equal  when  the 


52  L.  M.  SOLOMONS. 

ratios  of  the  color  to  the  white  are  equal  admits  of  more  than 
one  interpretation.  For  when  the  ratios  of  color  to  white  are 
equal  the  ratios  of  color  to  white  +  color  or  any  proportion 
thereof,  as  white  -f  y2  color,  are  also  equal.  Calling  S  the  sat- 
uration, we  have  the  general  formula  S  =  w  _^ac  satisfying  the 
law  of  equality  of  saturation  for  all  values  of  a.  We  have  seen 
that  for  constant  saturation  the  saturation  increment  for  a  L.  P. 
D.  varied  inversely  as  the  intensity  —  for  the  actual  color  incre- 
ment being  constant,  the  saturation  increment  corresponding  to 
it  will  vary  inversely  as  the  total  quantity  of  light.  Assuming 
it  to  vary  directly  as  the  saturation,  we  should  have  the  formula 

l  beins  the  intensity>  that  is»  the 


actual  increment  of  color,  Jc,  varies  directly  as  the  ratio  of 
color  to  intensity.  Since  the  result  is  independent  of  the  quan- 
tity W+ac  it  might  seem  preferable  to  give  the  law  the  simple, 
verifiable  formulation  Jc  *  -|,  and  from  a  physical  standpoint 
this  would  of  course  be  preferable.  But  psychologically  it  is 
bad  because  the  quantity  c  has  no  psychological  equivalent. 
The  psychical  fact,  intensity  of  coloration,,  depends  upon  a 
physical  ratio  ^rn:  —  ^  we  are  to  keep  to  psychical  facts  we 
must  use  the  quantities  saturation  and  intensity.  Remember- 
ing therefore  that  Jc  *  ~  is  the  best  expression  of  the  observed 
physical  fact  it  is  yet  well,  I  think,  to  retain  the  somewhat  hy- 

o 

pothetical  formula  JS  *  -^  as  more  suggestive  from  the  psycho- 
logical point  of  view. 

As  to  the  accuracy  with  which  the  law  J  c  *  T  *s  obeyed, 
many  difficulties  have  arisen  in  the  effort  to  fully  verify  it. 
Several  very  short  series  of  observations  have  obeyed  it  within 
the  limits  of  experimental  error.  In  attempting  to  get  long 
series  of  observations  it  was  found  that  owing  to  the  constant 
increase  of  skill  in  the  subject,  as  well  as  other  causes  of  varia- 
tion, the  different  parts  of  the  series  are  not  strictly  comparable. 
By  planning  the  series  with  these  facts  in  view,  however,  ac-  . 
curate  results  may  I  think  be  obtained. 

The  above  L.  P.  D.  law  contains  two  anomalies  which  re- 
quire investigation.     The  first  is  that  though  the  saturation  in- 


HARVARD  PSYCHOLOGICAL   LABORATORY.  53 

crement  varies  inversely  as  the  intensity  when  the  change  is 
produced  by  increasing  the  proportion  of  color  and  white  in  the 
wheel,  it  is  not  affected,  at  least  not  to  any  easily  observable 
extent,  by  variations  in  the  intensity  of  the  incident  light.  The 
other  is  that  if  we  adopt  the  usual  conception  of  a  L.  P.  D., 
viz.,  that  it  represents  a  simple  increment  of  sensation,  the 
L.  P.  D.  law  contradicts  the  saturation  law.  For  if  we  call  the 
sensation  of  saturation  S  and  the  physical  quantity  correspond- 
ing to  it  ( w!,a£)  s»  we  nave  tne  law  dS  =  ~  I 

By  integration  this  formula  gives  S=I  logs,  which  contra- 
dicts the  saturation  law  that  S  depends  on  s  only  and  is  inde- 
pendent of  I.  A  similar  contradiction  exists  in  the  other  form- 
ulation of  the  law. 

The  explanation  of  the  above  brings  up  two  questions.  What 
is  the  general  relation  between  intensity  and  color  quality,  and 
what  is  the  real  significance  of  a  L.  P.  D.  ? 

A  number  of  experiments  were  carried  out  in  connection 
with  the  former  problem,  most  of  which  have  no  immediate 
bearing  on  the  subject  in  hand.  I  wish  to  describe  only  one 
series,  the  results  of  which  are  important.  An  apparatus  was 
arranged,  whereby  two  color  wheels  were  placed  in  lights  of 
different  intensities.  The  arrangement  was  a  very  simple  one, 
the  wheels  being  placed  opposite  a  window  divided  into  two 
portions  by  a  vertical  board.  By  placing  a  screen  between  the 
two  wheels  perpendicular  to  their  plane  and  that  of  the  window, 
each  wheel  received  light  only  from  its  own  side  of  the  window. 
The  subject  sat  in  front  of  the  board  dividing  the  window  and 
had  both  wheels  well  in  view.  By  varying  the  size  of  the 
openings  the  light  could  be  varied  at  pleasure. 

Place  a  white  disk  in  a  weak  light,  and  a  black  and  white 
in  a  strong  light.  It  is  not  -possible,  by  varying  the  proportion 
of  black  and  white  in  the  well-lit  disk  to  get  the  two  to  look  alike. 
It  is  possible  to  get  them  of  the  same  general  light  intensity,  or 
of  the  same  shade  of  gray,  but  not  both  together.  When  the 
light  intensity  is  the  same  the  well-lit  disk  is  a  very  dark  gray 
and  the  other  a  white,  dimly  seen.  When  of  the  same  shade, 
the  well-lit  disk  is  very  much  more  intense.  It  is  the  same 
with  colors.  A  blue  disk  is  seen  distinctly  as  a  pure  blue,  even 


54  L.  M.  SOLOMONS. 

when  the  light  is  so  feeble  as  to  make  it  scarcely  visible,  while 
a  blue  and  black  disk  appears  a  dark  navy  blue,  no  matter  how 
strong  the  light.  There  is  much  individual  difference  here. 
A  white  disk  in  weak  light  appeared  much  more  like  a  gray  to 
Miss  Stein  than  to  me,  but  in  no  way  could  either  of  us  get 
equality  between  the  strong  and  weak  light  wheels.  It  should 
perhaps  be  stated  that  these  experiments  were  first  carried  out 
with  the  object  of  really  securing  such  an  equality,  and  our  in- 
ability to  do  so  was  a  serious  inconvenience ;  so  that  the  result 
was  anything  but  desired  by  us.  We  made  every  effort  to  see 
the  disks  alike. 

If,  however,  we  look  at  the  disks  through  black  tubes,  held 
to  the  eye  so  as  to  shut  out  everything  else  from  the  field  of 
view,  there  is  no  trouble  about  perfect  equality.  The  white 
disk  in  dim  light  looks  gray,  the  blue,  navy  blue,  etc. 

The  conclusions  are  obvious.  Intensity  as  such  does  not 
affect  color  quality  at  all.  It  remains  a  separate  and  distinct 
element  in  every  color  presentation.  Blackness  cannot  be  re- 
garded as  the  inverse  of  intensity,  nor  as  a  sensational  element 
at  all.  For  it  depends  not  upon  the  character  of  the  light  com- 
ing from  the  given  body,  but  upon  its  relation  to  the  immediate 
field  of  view.  It  must  be  regarded  as  an  element  added  to 
every  presentation  by  some  reflex  process,  and  giving  the  rela- 
tion of  the  object  to  its  immediate  field  of  view — or  to  the  inci- 
dent light.  It  is  not  a  mere  question  of  comparison  with  other 
objects,  for  in  all  the  above  experiments  there  were  two  objects 
seen,  yet  the  most  intense  disk  was  also  the  blackest.  Nor  was 
it  simply  a  question  of  seeing  objects  '  as  we  know  them  to  be,' 
instead  of  as  they  appear.  For  in  our  efforts  to  obtain  equality 
all  sorts  of  variations  were  made  in  the  proportion  of  black  and 
white  and  color  in  the  two  disks,  of  which  the  subject  was  un- 
aware ;  yet  it  was  not  possible  to  get  equality  as  long  as  the 
two  disks  were  seen  in  different  backgrounds.  The  teleological 
significance  of  the  law  is  obvious.  It  makes  blackness  a  <  body 
property,'  independent  of  the  intensity  of  the  illumination. 

This  compels  us  to  adopt  a  four-fold,  instead  of  the  usual 
three-fold,  representations  of  colored  objects.  They  can  vary  in 
four  independent  ways  :  I.  color  quality,  or  tone  ;  2.  saturation  ; 


HARVARD  PSYCHOLOGICAL  LABORATORY.  55 

3.  intensity;  4.  blackness.  Anyone  of  these  may  be  made  to 
vary  while  the  others  remain  constant.  This  is  a  purely  psy- 
chological classification  of  course,  giving  the  different  sub- 
jective effects  which  a  colored  object  produces.  That  color 
quality  may  vary,  the  other  elements  remaining  constant,  is 
clear  theoretically,  though  to  actually  compare  the  saturation  of 
different  colors  is  difficult.  Saturation  may  be  made  to  vary 
independently  by  simply  changing  the  proportion  of  color  to 
white,  while  keeping  the  sum  of  their  intensities  constant. 
Intensity  by  simply  increasing  the  incident  light,  and  black- 
ness by  increasing  the  incident  light  and  at  the  same  time 
decreasing  the  amount  of  color  and  white  in  the  disk  so  as  to 
keep  the  intensity  constant,  while  its  relation  to  the  intensity  of 
the  field  changes.  When  the  saturation  of  any  color  becomes 
zero  we  call  it  a  gray,  and  grays  may  vary  in  intensity  and 
blackness.  The  above  four  elements,  and  no  fewer,  completely 
describe  any  color  combination.  White  is  not  given  explicitly, 
but  saturation  and  intensity  together  determine  the  amount  of 
white,  if  whiteness  is  different  from  intensity,  so  that  the  above 
formulation  is  entirely  independent  of  all  special  color  theories. 
The  general  result  of  all  this,  it  will  be  noticed,  is  to  accentuate 
the  subjective  aspect  of  color  theory. 

We  can  now  understand  the  law  of  L.  P.  D.  of  saturation. 
Consider  for  a  moment  the  process  of  making  a  judgment  of 
saturation.  Suppose  we  have  one  disk  of  40°  red  and  20° 
white,  and  another  120°  red  and  60°  white.  The  only  differ- 
ence between  them  is  in  blackness  and  intensity.  The  inten- 
sity, however,  is  easily  abstracted  from.  It  does  not  'fuse' 
into  the  general  presentation  but  remains  as  a  fairly  distinct 
element.  The  black,  however,  is  an  organic  part  of  the  per- 
cept bound  up  with  the  rest.  The  process  of  perceiving  the 
two  disks  to  be  equal  is  abstracting  from  the  black  element. 
Once  able  to  separate  that,  and  they  are  seen  equal.  The 
training  required  for  judging  saturation  is  simply  the  training 
in  isolating  the  black  element  in  a  color  presentation.  Our  ex- 
perience amply  confirms  this  theoretical  deduction.  This  has 
actually  been  the  difficulty  encountered  in  making  judgments, 
and  our  records  are  full  of  such  notes  as  '  judgment  uncertain 


56  L.  M.  SOLOMONS. 

on  account  of  inability  to  separate  black' — notes  taken,  it 
should  be  stated  long  before  their  theoretical  significance  was 
suspected. 

It  is  clear  now  why  the  L.  P.  D.  varies  inversely  as  the 
quantity  of  color  and  white  in  the  disk,  but  not  as  the  intensity 
of  the  incident  light.  Changing  the  intensity  in  the  first  way 
changes  the  blackness,  while  changing  it  in  the  second  way 
does  not.  The  law  should  really  be  stated  J  S  *  SB  where  B 
is  blackness.  If  we  regard  the  L.  P.  D.  as  measuring  prima- 
rily the  ease  or  difficulty  of  a  judgment,  then  we  can  understand 
why  it  varies  directly  as  the  amount  of  black.  The  process 
of  isolating  the  black  becomes  the  more  difficult  as  the  amount 
of  black  becomes  greater — as  the  black  becomes  a  more  promi- 
nent feature  of  the  presentation.  The  ordinary  conception  of  a 
L.  P.  D.  leads  to  a  contradiction  in  the  case  of  saturation  be- 
cause we  have  not  here  the  simple  case  of  comparing  two  quan- 
tities ;  but  there  is  another  process  to  be  gone  through  in  addition 
to  the  primary  judgment — the  isolation  of  the  black.  It  is 
necessary  therefore  to  go  back  to  the  primary  significance  of  a 
L.  P.  D.  in  order  to  properly  understand  the  law. 

We  have  begun  a  series  of  experiments  on  the  effect  of  tir- 
ing on  saturation.  The  results  are  very  encouraging,  but  as 
yet  too  few  to  permit  of  much  theorizing.  On  tiring  with  white, 
the  saturation  of  a  color  is  increased  by  a  constant  proportion  of 
its  value  for  the  same  time  of  tiring.  The  increase  seems  to  be 
proportional  to  the  time  of  tiring  for  the  times  tried — 5  to  15 
seconds — but  the  experiments  have  not  gone  far  enough  yet  to 
give  more  than  provisional  results. 


D.     FLUCTUATIONS  OF  THE  ATTENTION  (I.). 

BY  J.  B.  HYLAN. 

The  facts  of  the  oscillation  of  feeble  impressions  are  still 
under  discussion.  The  alternate  increase  and  decrease  of  weak 
sensations  may  be  of  peripheral  or  of  central  origin ;  the  peri- 
pheral sources  may  be  nervous  or  muscular,  the  central  process 
may  go  on  in  the  cortical  end  apparatus  of  the  sensory  nerves  or 


HARVARD  PSYCHOLOGICAL   LABORATORY.  57 

in  that  psycho-physical  system  which  we  call  attention.  It  is  clear 
that  only  in  the  last  of  these  four  cases  is  the  fluctuation  really 
fluctuation  of  the  attention,  the  name  usually  given  to  the 
phenomenon.  There  is  no  doubt  but  that  the  discussion  has  so 
far  been  based  on  a  rather  small  number  of  facts ;  it  was  the 
purpose  of  my  investigation  to  secure  more  experimental  results 
which  might  throw  light  on  the  question.  I  used  optical, 
tactual  and  thermal  stimuli.  The  subjects  were  Messrs.  Singer, 
Hooper,  Gehring,  Logan,  Rice,  Hart,  J.  Pierce,  Miss  Stein, 
Miss  Shipman,  Miss  Miles  and  the  writer.  The  fluctua- 
tions were  registered  by  small  finger  movements  of  the  subjects 
and  measured  in  fifths  of  a  second. 

We  began  for  practice  with  the  grey  circle  of  Masson's  disc. 
The  results  were  as  usual ;  the  fluctuations  are  irregular,  but 
the  average  of  the  periods  during  which  the  circle  is  seen  and 
the  average  of  the  time  during  which  it  is  not  seen  balance  each 
-other  for  most  of  the  subjects.  There  was  no  conscious  strain 
upon  the  eyes ;  to  the  one  observer  the  disc  seemed  to  move  to 
and  from  the  eyes  and  the  eyes  seemed  to  fail  rather  than  the 
circle  to  disappear.  Our  new  experiments  were  made  with  dark 
grey  spots  as  a  background  instead  of  the  circle  and  the  first 
question  was  as  to  how  the  oscillations  vary  if  several  spots  are 
in  the  field  of  vision. 

A  square  of  black  cardboard  had  in  the  center  a  dark  gray 
spot  2  mm.  across,  and  both  10  cm.  above  and  10  cm.  below 
this  were  other  similar  spots.  The  subject  was  placed  at  a  dis- 
tance of  about  1 20  cm.  from  the  square,  at  which  distance  the 
two  outer  spots  were  just  visible.  The  line  of  vision  was  directed 
to  the  middle  spot,  which  never  disappeared,  and  the  fluctuations 
of  the  two  others  were  registered  independently  of  each  other. 
Each  subject  received  at  first  some  training  in  the  attentive  ob- 
servation of  the  indirect  field  of  vision.  In  the  first  group  of 
experiments  the  fluctuations  of  the  upper  or  of  the  lower  spot  alone 
were  examined  and  no  attention  was  given  to  the  other.  The 
result  was  that  the  oscillations  of  the  spot  below  the  center  were 
slower  than  those  of  the  spot  above,  and  the  periods  of  appear- 
ance show  a  clear  preponderance  over  the  periods  of  disappear- 
ance for  the  lower  spot,  while  they  balance  each  other  for  the 


5§  /.  B.  HYLAN. 

upper  spot.  With  three  subjects  the  lower  spot  would  disappear 
and  then  come  back  immediately.  In  the  second  group  the 
attention  was  divided  between  the  upper  and  lower  spots  without 
any  intentional  fluctuation  between  them.  While  in  the  first 
group  the  fluctuation  of  the  lower  spot  was  slower,  here  the 
periods  of  fluctuation  for  both  spots  coincide ;  for  instance,  with 
one  observer,  Hr.,  the  periods  were  :  "  Both  seen  7  sec.,  both  un- 
seen 3,  both  seen  7,  both  unseen  i,  both  seen  2,  both  unseen  5, 
both  seen  3,  both  unseen  3,  both  seen  4,  both  unseen  7."  But 
there  is  also  here  a  difference  between  the  upper  and  the  lower 
spot ;  the  lower  tends  to  remain  longer  in  view.  The  entire 
oscillation  is  equally  long  for  both,  but  the  proportion  between 
the  seen  and  the  unseen  part  is  often  different ;  the  lower  often 
disappears  later  and  appears  earlier  ;  the  time  difference  is  mostly 
too  short  to  be  registered.  No  difference  as  to  the  duration  of 
the  disappearance  of  the  spots  was  discovered  whether  one  or 
two  eyes  were  used,  but  some  subjects  noticed  a  tendency  to  see 
the  fluctuations  of  the  two  spots  somewhat  independently  of  each 
other  when  one  eye  only  was  used.  In  the  next  group  one  gray 
spot  10  cm.  to  the  right  and  one  10  cm.  to  the  left  of  the  center 
were  added  to  those  above  and  below.  The  constant  result  was 
that  the  fluctuations  become  more  independent ;  the  four  points 
might  disappear  together,  but  often  some  are  visible  and  others 
invisible.  The  upper  spot  always  disappeared  first,  then  the 
lower  and  then  the  horizontal  ones ;  the  time  of  disappearance 
is  in  the  same  order,  being  longest  for  the  upper.  If  one  eye 
only  was  used,  the  time  of  disappearance  in  general  increases,, 
the  upper  spot  often  dropping  out  altogether ;  the  right  and  left 
spots  fluctuate  more  readily  with  one  eye  than  with  two. 

Going  back  to  the  two  spots,  only  one  above  and  one  below 
the  center,  we  studied  the  influence  of  an  intentional  variation 
of  attention.  The  object  was  to  fix  the  eyes  continually  on  the 
center,  but  to  direct  the  attention  alternately  to  the  one  or  the 
other  spot  seen  in  indirect  vision.  With  some  practice  all  learned 
to  alter  the  attention  without  moving  the  eyes.  As  the  attention 
changed,  some  had  a  feeling  of  muscular  movement  in  the  head. 
When  the  attention  changed,  some  (Sr.,  J.  P.,  H.,  M.)  usually 
noticed  that  the  spot  grew  gradually  brighter  for  some  seconds,, 


HARVARD  PSYCHOLOGICAL  LABORATORY.  59 

but  with  others  it  grew  dimmer  or  remained  unchanged.  With 
all  the  observers  the  spot  to  which  the  attention  was  changed 
disappeared  from  vision  after  a  short  time,  while  the  object  from 
which  the  attention  shifted  often  remained  bright  and  with  some 
(R.,  G.,  P.)  it  grew  even  brighter  when  the  change  took  place. 
If  the  one  spot  disappears  from  view  in  spite  of  the  subject's 
special  effort  to  see  it,  and  the  other  grows  brighter  when  the 
attention  is  consciously  diminished,  we  have  probably  no  right 
to  call  the  oscillations  of  intensity  fluctuations  of  attention. 

It  is  a  question  whether,  perhaps,  the  muscles  directing  the 
movement  of  the  eye  might  become  fatigued,  so  that  a  drooping 
of  the  eye  would  bring  a  fresh  part  of  the  retina  in  range  after 
the  spot  had  disappeared.  This  suggested  the  following  experi- 
ment. A  heavy  black  cross  was  placed  upon  a  white  back- 
ground, with  a  small  gray  spot  beneath  it.  After  the  cross  had 
been  looked  at  a  moment,  an  after-image  was  seen  on  any  part 
of  the  background  to  which  the  eyes  were  turned.  The  subject 
fixed  his  eyes  upon  the  center  of  the  black  cross,  marked  by  a 
small  gray  spot.  If  the  drooping  of  the  eye  causes  the  dis- 
appearance or  reappearance,  it  is  evident  that  an  after-image  of 
the  cross  will  extend  over  the  outlines  of  the  figure  in  the  direc- 
tion of  the  movement.  The  results  were  uniform  for  all  sub- 
jects. It  was  observed  that  while  the  eyes  remained  fixed,  and 
the  attention  wandered  to  different  parts  of  the  cross,  the 
luminous  after-image  would  shift  a  little  towards  the  part  to 
which  the  attention  was  directed,  though  no  conscious  change 
of  the  eye's  position  took  place.  After  looking  at  the  cross  for 
a  little  time,  the  after-image  seemed  to  be  placed  behind  the  cross 
and  to  be.;j#en  all  around  it.  The  gray  spot  fluctuated,  though 
the  afterimage  did  not  shift  with  the  fluctuations.  Sometimes 
the  fluctuations  took  place  when  the  after-image  was  shifting  or 
had  slightly  shifted,  but  oftener  when  the  after-image  was  con- 
centric with  the  cross.  This  seems  to  show  that  there  is  no 
relation  between  the  fluctuations  of  the  gray  spot  and  uncon- 
scious movements  of  the  eye.  The  results  of  experiments  with 
regard  to  the  inner  muscles  of  the  eye  were  not  quite  so  uniform. 
One  spot  was  fixed  on  a  vertical  glass  plate,  the  other  spot  on  a 
card  50  cm.  behind  it ;  if  the  eyes  accommodate  for  one,  it  is 


o  /.  B.  HYLAN. 

distinctly  seen,  while  the  other  is  blurred.  The  results  show 
that  with  all  subjects  there  is  a  tendency  to  alternate  between  the 
accommodation  for  the  nearer  and  the  farther  spot,  but  with 
most  subjects  this  fluctuation  is  much  slower  than  the  oscillation 
of  one  spot  alone,  and  especially  the  oscillation  of  the  spot  on 
the  cardboard  was  often  observed  without  corresponding  variation 
in  the  distinctness  of  the  spot  on  the  glass ;  the  one  might  be 
visible  while  the  other  was  distinct,  and  might  become  invisible 
while  the  other  was  blurred.  The  oscillation  seems  consequently 
to  be  independent  of  the  ciliary  muscles,  a  conclusion  which 
earlier  experiments  had  already  suggested,  and  which  results 
also  from  our  experiments  with  four  spots  which  were  in  the 
same  plane,  and  did  not  necessarily  disappear  together. 

The  second  research  had  to  do  with  touch  and  temperature. 
As  here  the  same  object  gives  at  the  same  place  both  a  touch 
sensation  and  a  cold  sensation,  their  fluctuation  and  their  rela- 
tions must  be  suggestive  for  the  understanding  of  the  process. 
To  the  beam  of  a  balance  weighing  two-tenths  of  a  gram  was 
attached  a  metal  tube  for  studying  cold  and  hot  spots.  The 
tube  allowed  a  current  of  water  supplied  by  rubber  tubing  to 
pass  continually  through  it,  thus  keeping  the  temperature  con- 
stant. The  point  of  the  tube  applied  to  the  skin  was  about  i 
mm.  in  diameter.  Light  flexible  tubing  was  used  which  allowed 
the  balance  to  move  freely.  The  temperature  of  the  water  both 
before  and  after  passing  through  the  tubing  was  taken  and  the 
average  used  for  the  temperature  of  the  point.  The  water  was 
carried  through  the  tube  on  the  principle  of  a  siphon.  The  re- 
moval of  weights  from  the  opposite  pan  of  the  balance  gives  a 
known  pressure  of  the  point  upon  the  subject's  hand.  As  the 
hands  could  not  be  moved,  the  signals  were  given  by  spoken 
words  which  the  experimenter  registered,  the  time  lost  by  the 
reaction  being  of  no  importance  compared  with  the  long  periods 
in  question. 

In  passing  the  cold  point  over  the  hand,  all  the  subjects 
found  three  distinct  effects  according  to  the  location  of  the  point. 
Some  spots  were  entirely  insensible  to  cold.  Passing  from  that 
a  moderately  cold  spot  would  often  appear  from  which  the  sen- 
sation would  be  dull  and  not  definitely  located  beneath  the  point. 


HARVARD  PSYCHOLOGICAL  LABORATORY.  61 

Next  would  come  a  cold  spot  from  which  the  sensation  would 
be  intense  and  definitely  located  beneath  the  point.  After  a 
long  application  of  the  cold  point  for  several  minutes  the  cold 
sensation  often  spreads  around  the  point  of  application  and  some- 
times streams  up  and  down  the  hand  and  arm.  Sometimes  the 
cold  sensation  is  located  after  a  few  minutes  at  a  distance  of  2 
to  3  cm.  from  the  point,  usually  coming  back  after  a  time.  To 
the  measurements  of  fluctuations  that  follow,  acute  cold  spots 
only  were  taken,  which  were  marked  and  tested  as  cold  spots 
on  several  days.  The  back  of  the  hand  or  wrist  was  always 
used. 

It  was  first  found  that  a  less  pressure  of  a  cold  object  was 
necessary  to  give  a  cold  sensation  than  a  touch  sensation.  With 
ice  water  of  2— 3°C.  the  cold  sensation  came  out  strongly  under 
a  pressure  of  0.2  gr.,  while  a  touch  sensation  was  not  perceived 
unless  the  pressure  was  0.5  gr.,  for  several  subjects  0.8—1.0  gr. 
In  the  first  group  we  studied  cold  sensation  only,  using  water  of 
2°C.  with  a  pressure  of  0.2  gr. ;  none  of  the  subjects  had  any 
touch  sensations.  With  two  subjects  no  fluctuations  were  ob- 
served, as  the  cold  sensation  after  its  final  disappearance  did  not 
return  for  five  minutes  or  longer.  The  others  felt  the  oscilla- 
tions distinctly,  for  instance  :  Nr.  cold  sensation  unfelt  34  sec., 
felt  20  sec.,  unfelt  23,  felt  18.4,  unfelt  15,  felt  7,  unfelt  8.6, 
felt  17,  unfelt  29.2,  felt  22.4,  unfelt  6,  felt  u  ;  on  another  day 
with  Hn.  unfelt  46  sec.,  felt  30,  unfelt  9,  felt  14,  unfelt  30,  felt 
24,  unfelt  6.5,  felt  22.4,  unfelt  7.5,  felt  13.5.  With  some  sub- 
jects the  fluctuations  were  quicker,  for  instance :  Ht.  unfelt  9 
sec.,  felt  3,  unfelt  2,  felt  4.5,  unfelt  4,  felt  25,  unfelt  50,  felt  9, 
unfelt  2,  felt  6,  etc.  The  sensations  of  cold  are  much  stronger 
when  the  point  is  first  applied  than  afterwards.  The  feeling 
grows  gradually  less,  often  changing  into  a  dull  ache  before  dis- 
appearing. When  it  appears  again  it  is  mostly  less  intense  than 
at  first,  though  it  sometimes  gradually  increases  again  to  a  high 
degree  of  intensity.  As  a  rule  there  is  a  gradual  decrease  of 
intensity  as  the  sensations  successively  return.  The  times  dur- 
ing which  the  cold  is  not  felt  are  not  the  only  fluctuations ;  very 
often  while  the  cold  is  being  felt,  it  fluctuates  in  its  intensity. 

When  the  pressure  was  as  much  as  i  gr.  all  the  subjects  felt 


62  j.  B.  HYLAN. 

a  tactual  sensation  in  addition  to  the  temperature  sensation,  and 
with  all  subjects  the  two  fluctuated  independently.  While  with 
the  higher  pressure  some  of  the  subjects  got  no  continuous 
fluctuation,  as  the  sensation  did  not  return  after  the  first  or 
second  disappearance ;  here  there  was  practically  no  limit  to 
each  series.  A  typical  series  would  be :  2°C.  i  gr.  pressure. 
At  first  cold  and  touch  then  after  45  sec.  cold  disappears  while 
touch  remains,  23  sec.  later  cold  appears  again,  42  sec.  later 
cold  disappears,  20  later  cold  appears,  21  later  cold  disappears, 
54  later  touch  also  disappears,  81  later  cold  appears  again,  59 
later  touch  appears  again,  106  later  cold  disappears,  15  later 
touch  disappears,  etc.  A  prolonged  series  may  be  character- 
ized by  the  following  case  (a=appears,  d=disappears,  t= 
touch,  c=cold)  :  Hn.  2°C.  i  gr.  pressure,  c.  t. — 7  sec.  d  :  c. 
— 5  sec.  a  :  c. — 6  sec.  d  :  c. — 42  sec.  a  :  c. — 13  sec.  d  :  c. — 64 
sec.  d  :  t. — 17  sec.  a  :  c. — n  sec.  a :  t. — 7.5  sec.  d  :  c. —  9  sec. 
d:  t. — 8.5  sec.  a:  t. — 21.5  sec.  a.  c. — 2.5  sec.  d:  t. — 6  sec.  d: 
c. — 2  sec.  a:  t. — 14  sec.  d:  t. — 2.5  sec.  a:  c. — 22.5  sec.  d:  c. 
i  sec.  a:  t. — 7  sec.  a:  c. — n  sec.  d:  c. — 2.5  sec.  d:  t. — 6  sec. 
a:  c. — 15  sec.  d:  c. — 61.5  sec.  a:  t. — 8  sec.  d:  t. — 31.5  sec. 
a:  c. — 2  sec.  a:  t. — 6.5  sec.  d:  c. — 27.5  sec.  a:  c. — 12  sec.  d: 
c. — 19  sec.  a  :  c. — 5  sec.  d  :  t. — i  sec.  d  :  c. — 15.5  sec.  a  :  t. 

The  same  experiments  were  made  with  a  pressure  of  3  gr. 
and  of  5  gr.  The  general  type  of  the  results  was  the  same, 
but  a  curve  representing  the  average  of  all  subjects,  and  separa- 
ting the  touch  fluctuations  from  the  cold  fluctuations,  shows 
distinctly  that  the  periods  of  disappearance  for  the  touch  sensa- 
tion increase  with  increasing  pressure.  The  stronger  the 
pressure,  the  greater  the  tendency  of  the  pauses  to  exceed  the 
periods  of  sensation.  This  is  contrary  to  the  results  with  light 
and,  as  we  shall  see,  also  contrary  to  the  results  with  temperature. 
It  may  be  explained,  perhaps,  by  the  fact  that  an  unusual  pressure 
keeps  the  blood  away  from  the  place  of  contact  and  brings  on 
numbness,  but  it  is  difficult  to  see  why  that  numbness  disappears 
again.  The  two  kinds  of  fluctuations  tend  unmistakably  to  be 
independent  of  each  other,  but  a  constant  law  of  the  disappear- 
ance and  reappearance  cannot  be  formulated,  as  the  fluctuation 
of  the  temperature  sensation  especially  seems  dependent  upon  a 


HARVARD  PSYCHOLOGICAL   LABORATORY.  63 

great  variety  of  conditions.  The  central  psychophysical  control 
of  the  peripheral  blood  supply  seems  an  important  factor  among 
others.  The  position  of  the  hand  and  the  temperature  of  the 
room  was  of  course  kept  as  constant  as  possible. 

In  the  next  group  of  experiments  the  pressure  remained  un- 
varied, always  2  gr.,  but  the  temperature  changed  between  2° 
C.  and  18°  C.,  producing,  therefore,  cold  sensation  of  different 
intensity,  but  the  sensations,  at  least  at  first,  were  always  of  cold. 
The  individual  results  show  great  differences  and  irregularities, 
but  the  average  of  all  experiments  with  all  subjects  shows  a  dis- 
tinct tendency  for  the  intervals  without  sensation  to  become  longer 
as  the  temperature  rises.  In  general  with  2°  C.  the  duration  of 
the  sensations  and  of  the  pauses  are  nearly  equal.  With  10—12° 
C.  the  pauses  are  more  than  twice  as  long,  and  with  18°  C.  three 
to  four  times  as  long  as  the  period  of  sensation.  In  some  experi- 
ments, however,  the  temperature  seemed  to  have  no  influence 
at  all  on  the  length  of  the  fluctuations.  It  might  be  asked  whether 
the  cold  sensations  did  not  interfere  with  the  touch  sensation,  so 
as  to  produce  an  abnormal  result.  Experiments  were  made, 
therefore,  with  the  temperature  of  the  water  too  high  to  give  a 
cold  sensation  or  in  spots  which  are  not  sensitive  to  cold,  but 
nothing  in  the  results  indicated  that  the  cold  tended  to  interfere 
with  the  fluctuations  of  the  touch  sensation. 

In  experiments  to  be  described  later  two  tubes  were  used, 
suspended  from  the  beam  of  the  balance,  giving  two  cold  sensa- 
tions and  two  touch  sensations  at  the  same  time,  or  cold  and  hot 
sensations  together. 


DISCUSSION  AND  REPORTS. 


PHYSICAL  PAIN  AND  PAIN  NERVES. 

My  article  in  the  July  number  of  this  Review  on  '  The  Psychology 
of  Pain'  has  had  the  good  fortune  to  elicit  discussion  from  Dr.  Nichols 
in  the  September  number  and  from  Dr.  Marshall  in  the  November 
number,  and  I  trust  I  may  now  be  permitted  to  say  a  few  words  in 
reply  to  their  criticisms. 

My  thanks  are  due  to  Dr.  Nichols  for  making  it  plain  that  the  con- 
ditions known  as  analgesia  and  hyperthermalgesia  may  be  explained 
on  a  different  hypothesis  from  that  advocated  in  my  article ;  on  the 
hypothesis,  namely,  that  the  skin  possesses,  in  addition  to  the  ordinary 
nerves  of  touch  and  temperature,  three  distinct  sets  of  pain  nerves, 
one  for  tactile  pains,  another  for  heat  pains,  and  a  third  for  cold  pains. 
Dr.  Nichols  is  better  acquainted  than  I  with  the  literature  of  the  sub- 
ject, and  will  know  whether  the  hypothesis  of  pain  nerves  commonly 
takes  this  form.  The  hypothesis  I  had  in  mind  was  that  of  a  single 
set  of  pain  nerves,  excitable  indifferently  by  all  kinds  of  painful  stim- 
uli ;  and  I  think  it  will  be  admitted  that  the  fact  that  tactile  pains  and 
temperature  pains  may  be  exaggerated  or  lost  independently  has  the 
appearance  of  disposing  of  this  hypothesis.  At  least  I  find  a  careful 
physiologist  like  Foster  arguing  without  hesitation  that,  where  sensa- 
tions are  lost  independently,  the  impulses  must  proceed  by  separate 
paths.  On  this  principle,  the  alternate  loss  of  tactile  pains  and  tem- 
perature pains  would  oblige  us  to  choose  between  three  sets  of  pain 
nerves  and  no  pain  nerves  at  all.  I  am  gratified  to  gather  from  Dr. 
Nichols'  remarks  that  he  agrees  with  me  on  this  point,  and  frankly 
assumes  not  one  but  three  sets  of  cutaneous  pain  fibres. 

As  between  this  modified  view  and  the  '  shunt  theory '  of  Wundt, 
it  seems  to  me  that  the  arguments  are  not  so  clearly  in  favor  of  the 
former  as  Dr.  Nichols  would  have  us  suppose.  In  the  first  place,  the 
occurrence  of  pains  unconnected  with  tactile  and  temperature  sensa- 
tions is  just  as  explicable  on  the  Wundtian  theory  as  on  that  of  Dr. 

64 


DISCUSSION  AND  REPORTS.  65 

Nichols.  In  pathological  cases  the  path  of  the  moderate  impulses  is 
presumably  blocked  by  lesion ;  in  normal  cases  these  impulses  may 
reach  the  brain,  but  be  lost  in  the  tumult  of  the  excessive  impulses : 
in  neither  case  could  they  produce  their  usual  effect  in  consciousness. 

But  Dr.  Nichols  objects  to  Wundt's  theory  on  the  ground  of  "  its 
demand  for  a  much  more  complicated  and  duplex  arrangement  of  our 
sensory  nervous  systems — cranial  as  well  as  cord — than  present  anat- 
omy gives  any  suggestion  of."  This  is  a  most  unfortunate  objection 
in  the  mouth  of  Dr.  Nichols,  since  it  applies  with  even  greater  force 
to  his  own  theory.  The  two  theories  agree  in  assuming  six  distinct 
or  partially  distinct  paths  in  the  cord — for  touch,  heat,  cold,  tactile 
pains,  heat  pains,  and  cold  pains — the  partial  anaesthesias  not  being  ex- 
plicable as  due  to  blocking  on  the  assumption  of  any  smaller  number. 
But  on  the  Wundtian  theory  the  three  pain  paths  may  be  partially  dis- 
tinct without  being  distinct  throughout ;  the  grey  matter  may  form  a 
common  path  for  pain  impulses,  and  the  different  kinds  be  distinct 
only  at  their  entrance  points ;  while  on  Dr.  Nichols'  theory  they  must 
be  distinct  throughout.  So  that  in  the  most  unfavorable  case  the 
Wundtian  theory  assumes  no  greater  complexity  in  the  cord ;  whereas 
the  theory  of  Dr.  Nichols  assumes  double  the  complexity  in  the  peri- 
pheral nerves. 

When  therefore  Dr.  Nichols  speaks  of  his  own  as  '  a  very  simple 
theory,'  it  is  evident  that  the  word  'simple'  is  to  be  taken  in  the 
sense  of  'comprehensible,'  not  in  that  of  'economical.'  That  Nature 
should  have  provided  for  our  protection  against  injury  by  equipping 
us  with  a  special  set  of  pain  nerves  seemed  plausible  enough ;  but  if 
it  should  turn  out  that  she  has  supplied  us  with  three  such  sets  (not  to 
mention  special  nerves  for  muscular  pains,  colics,  toothaches,  etc.), 
the  discovery  would  be  calculated  to  enlarge  somewhat  our  notions  of 
her  beneficence.  Meanwhile  I  see  nothing  in  the  facts  to  compel  our 
assent  to  so  prodigal  an  hypothesis. 

Mr.  Marshall,  not  alive  to  the  advantages  of  the  Wundtian  theory, 
had  explained  analgesia  and  the  '  lateness  of  pain '  as  due  to  the  re- 
tarding or  blocking  of  the  impulses  of  a  fourth  cutaneous  sense,  ad- 
ditional to  those  of  touch,  heat  and  cold.  I  pointed  out  that  on  this 
theory  the  affective  coloring  of  touch,  heat  and  cold  can  never 
amount  to  positive  pain,  and  that  in  a  painful  burn  the  pain  and  the 
heat  must  be  called  forth  by  different  nerve  fibres.  To  this  deduction 
Mr.  Marshall  demurs,  suggesting  that  the  anaesthesia  and  analgesia  of 
his  '  cutting-pricking  sense '  may  be  accompanied  by  analgesia  with- 
out anaesthesia  of  the  other  three  senses.  I  reply  that  this  rather 


66  PHYSICAL   PAIN  AND  PAIN  NERVES. 

arbitrary  suggestion  deprives  the  fourth  sense  of  the  theoretical  value 
which  was  Mr.  Marshall's  original  ground  for  assuming  it.  If  the 
three  other  senses  have,  to  use  his  own  phrase,  any  '  pain-giving  ca- 
pacities'  at  all,  then  abolition  of  the  fourth  sense  will  not  explain 
analgesia,  and  the  introduction  of  such  a  sense  is  an  unnecessary  com- 
plication of  the  problem.  But,  as  I  have  already  said,  the  fact  that 
tactile  and  temperature  pains  may  be  separately  lost  seems  to  disprove 
the  view  that  pain  is  the  exclusive  function  of  a  fourth  sense. 

Turning  now  to  the  introspective  question,  Mr.  Marshall  thinks 
that  many  of  my  objections  to  the  '  aspect  theory '  do  not  touch  the 
'  quale  theory'  which  he  advocates.  The  'quale  theory,'  as  I  under- 
stand him,  recognizes  no  such  duality  within  the  mental  state  as  would 
justify  our  speaking  of  two  aspects.  The  hedonic  coloring  is  a  mere 
attribute,  or  dimension,  of  the  tactile  or  temperature  sensation  (I  hope 
I  give  his  idea  correctly),  not  a  new  content  additional  thereto.  And 
yet,  in  discussing  the  '  lateness  of  pain,'  Mr.  Marshall  does  not  hesi- 
tate to  speak  of  '  a  certain  sensation  other  than  the  pain  to  which 
this  pain  belongs'  (Pain,  Pleasure  and  ^Esthetics,  p.  18).  So  that 
even  on  Mr.  Marshall's  view  the  relation  is  not  such  as  to  forbid  our 
inquiring  :  ( i )  whether  the  conjunction  of  the  pleasure  or  pain  with  the 
sensation  or  other  cognitive  element  is  a  necessary  one,  in  such  wise 
that  we  can  never  have  sensations  uncolored  by  pleasure  or  pain,  and 
never  have  pure  pains,  that  is,  pains  unattached  to  sensations  or  other 
cognitive  elements ;  (2)  whether  the  pleasure  or  pain  is  rightly  con- 
ceived as  an  attribute  of  the  sensation,  analogous  to  intensity.  The 
affirmative  answer  to  the  first  question  is  what  I  have  called  the  '  aspect 
theory;'  the  affirmative  answer  to  the  second  question  is  the  theory 
of  feeling-tone.  Now  Mr.  Marshall  holds  that  pleasure  or  pain  is  an 
attribute  like  intensity.  He  also  holds  that  we  never  have  pure  pains. 
And  he  repeatedly  asserts  that  either  pleasure  or  pain  '  must  .  .  .  be- 
long to  every  element  of  consciousness '  (Pain,  Pleasure  and  ^Esthetics, 
pp.  3,  45,  47)  ;  though  this  does  not  prevent  his  admitting  that  'there 
are  cases  where  it  must  be  supposed  that  neither  pleasure  nor  pain 
exists'  (PsvcH.  REV.,  Nov.  1895,  p.  597).  Mr.  Marshall  thus  sub- 
scribes to  the  theory  of  feeling-tone,  and  if  he  escapes  being  a  thor- 
ough-going subscriber  to  the  aspect  theory,  it  is  only  by  inconsistency 
and  self-contradiction.  I  therefore  cannot  help  thinking  that,  so  far 
as  my  arguments  against  these  theories  have  cogency  at  all,  they  are 
equally  destructive  of  his  4  quale  theory.' 

Whether  we  ever  have  indifferent  sensations  and  pure  pains  is,  of 
course,  a  question  of  fact.  But,  granting  that  we  do,  the  gist  of  my 


DISCUSSION  AND  REPORTS.  6f 

argument  was,  that  an  attribute  which  may  modify  its  subject  but  need 
not,  and  which  may  exist  by  itself  and  in  that  case  has  an  intensity 
of  its  own,  is  not  an  attribute,  but  a  separate  sensation.  Now  the  ex- 
istence of  indifferent  sensations  Mr.  Marshall  inconsistently  admits. 
And  his  explanation  of  pure  pains — of  the  fact  that  "  in  cases  of  ex- 
treme pain  we  usually  fail  to  distinguish  the  forms  of  sensibility  to 
which  the  pain  is  attached  " — is  in  my  opinion  so  artificial  as  practically 
to  surrender  the  case.  This  fact  he  explains  as  a  phenomenon  of  at- 
tention. He  says  that,  just  as  an  experimental  psychologist  may  be- 
come so  absorbed  in  attending  to  the  intensity  of  a  sensation  as  to 
lose  appreciation  of  its  quality,  so  in  this  case  we  fail  to  distinguish 
the  sensations  because  our  attention  is  wrapped  up  in  the  pain.  I 
should  reply  by  denying  that  the  experimental  psychologist  can  per- 
form any  such  feat.  If  it  is  a  real  intensity  to  which  he  is  attending, 
and  not  a  mere  thought  about  intensity — if,  for  instance,  he  is  trying 
to  decide  which  is  the  louder  of  two  tones — surely  he  must  keep  the 
qualities  sensationally  present  in  order  to  do  so,  as  much  as  if  he  were 
deciding  as  to  the  comparative  length  of  two  lines.  Whereas  no 
amount  of  introspective  search  on  the  part  of  the  sufferer  from  tooth- 
ache suffices  to  discover  a  sensational  quality  connected  with  the  pain. 
If  the  predominance  of  the  pain  were  a  phenomenon  of  attention,  we 
ought  to  be  able  to  turn  our  attention  from  the  pain  to  the  accompany- 
ing sensational  quality,  which  we  are  not.  This  quality  simply  is  not 
there — 'we  only  feel  the  pain,'  says  Professor  James.  But,  if  so, 
the  pain  is  not  an  attribute,  but  a  substantive  content,  a  sensation. 

But,  even  admitting  all  this,  Mr.  Marshall  would  still  object  to  call- 
ing pain  a  sensation,  on  the  ground  that  it  answers  to  no  special  form 
of  stimulus  in  the  environment.  I  reply  that  neither  do  hunger, 
thirst,  nausea,  and  fatigue,  yet  we  classify  them  as  sensations.  The 
attempt  to  analyze  these  states  into  '  cognitive  elements '  on  the  one 
side  and  pain  on  the  other  seems  to  me  most  futile  and  absurd.  But, 
though  themselves  simple,  they  usually  call  forth  an  emotional  reaction 
in  the  shape  of  a  feeling  of  displeasure,  in  virtue  of  which  we  say,  for 
example,  that  hunger  is  unpleasant.  And  I  hold  that  what  is  true  of 
these  organic  sensations  is  also  true  of  pain.  The  proposition  that 
pain  is  unpleasant  is  no  more  a  tautology  than  the  proposition  that  hun- 
ger is  unpleasant.  These  are  not,  in  other  words,  analytic  judgments, 
but  synthetic  ones.  I  am  gratified  to  find  my  own  introspection  on 
this  point  confirmed  by  so  high  an  authority  as  Professor  James,  who 
says  in  a  recent  article,  speaking  of  localized  bodily  pain:  "I  think 
that  even  here  a  distinction  needs  to  be  made  between  the  primary 


68          COMMUNITY  OF  IDEAS   OF  MEN  AND    WOMEN. 

consciousness  of  the  pain's  intrinsic  quality,  and  the  consciousness 
of  its  degree  of  intoler ability,  which  is  a  secondary  affair,  seemingly 
connected  with  reflex  organic  irradiations"  (PsvcH.  REV.,  Sept.  1894, 
p.  523,  note).  This  puts  the  whole  matter  in  a  nutshell.  The  total 
experience  of  extreme  pain,  which  on  the  traditional  theory  could  only 
be  classed  as  a  c  feeling,'  something  neither  a  cognition  nor  a  volition, 
now  falls  apart  into  a  sensation  on  the  one  hand  and  an  emotional  re- 
action on  the  other.  And  this  explains  how  slight  pains  may  some- 
times be  interesting  and  almost  pleasant,  and  how  bad  tastes  and 
odors  may  be  excessively  unpleasant  without  being  in  the  proper  sense 
painful.  The  separation  of  physical  pain  from  displeasure,  in  short, 
though  it  may  seem  at  first  sight  '  a  bold  assumption,'  will,  I  think, 
be  found  both  a  necessary  and  a  fruitful  one. 

C.  A.  STRONG. 


COMMUNITY  OF  IDEAS  OF  MEN  AND  WOMEN. 

I  was  pleased  to  learn  by  the  July  number  of  the  PSYCHOLOGICAL 
REVIEW  that  my  experiments  upon  mental  community  had  been  re- 
peated at  Wellesley  College ;  but  before  reading  far  in  the  report  of 
the  experiments,  my  pleasure  was  changed  to  regret  by  finding  that 
the  method  of  experimentation  and  of  computation  had  been  diverged 
from  in  essential  points.  It  did  not  surprise  me,  therefore,  that  the 
results  reached  were  in  part  different  from  those  published  by  me.  I 
think  it  can  be  readily  shown,  however,  that  the  Wellesley  results  do 
in  no  serious  way  tend  to  invalidate  those  reached  upon  Wisconsin  stu- 
dents ;  arid  that  on  the  one  hand  in  the  Wellesley  report  the  contradic- 
tion between  the  two  is  exaggerated,  and  on  the  other  the  reflections 
made  upon  results  reached  by  such  statistical  methods  at  Wisconsin  or 
elsewhere  are  unwarranted. 

The  first  of  the  two  points  at  issue  relates  to  the  ratio  of  different 
words  found  amongst  lists  of  natural  associations  prepared  by  groups 
of  men  and  women  students.  The  lists  each  contain  one  hundred 
words.  I  had  found  in  50  such  lists  prepared  by  students  at  the  Uni- 
versity of  Wisconsin,  only  2024  different  words ;  among  25  men's  lists, 
1375  different  words;  among  25  women's  lists,  1123  different  words; 
or  in  percentages,  40.5  %,  55.0  %,  44.9  %.  At  Wellesley,  although 
25  lists  prepared  by  women  students  were  available,  only  15  (why  this 
was  done  is  not  told)  were  used  in  the  computation ;  and  because  in 
these  15  lists  as  many  as  1 103  different  words  are  found,  the  results  are 
supposed  to  antagonize  those  published  by  me.  But  the  most  essen- 


DISCUSSION  AND  REPORTS.  69 

tial  requisite  for  the  fairness  of  such  a  comparison  has  been  neglected, 
namely,  that  the  number  of  lists  in  the  two  cases  shall  be  the  same.  I 
had  taken  special  pains  to  call  attention  to  this  point  in  a  footnote  in 
my  first  article  (New  Review,  Dec.,  1891,  p.  562),  where  it  is  distinctly 
stated  that  the  ratio  of  repetition  depends  upon  the  number  of  per- 
sons writing  the  lists  as  well  as  upon  other  factors ;  and  again,  in  my 
second  article  in  an  experiment  involving  a  different  kind  of  word 
association  (Educational  Review,  December  1891,  footnote  to  p.  448), 
I  had  shown  the  general  course  of  the  law  connecting  frequency  of 
repetition  with  the  number  of  contributors  to  the  word  associations. 
Indeed,  the  mere  fact  that  as  given  above  the  percentage  of  different 
words  for  100  students  is  40.5 ;  while  that  for  the  groups  of  50  stu- 
dents composing  the  same  100  it  is  55.0  %  and  44.9  %  respectively, 
is  a  sufficiently  obvious  indication  of  the  phenomenon  in  question.  It 
is  therefore  entirely  to  be  expected  that  the  number  of  different  words  in 
the  15  Wellesley  lists  will  be  relatively  larger  than  in  either  of  the  25 
Wisconsin  lists.  The  law  above  referred  to  demands  this.  A  fair  com- 
parison must  be  between  two  sets  of  15  lists  each  from  Wellesley  and 
Wisconsin,  or  sets  of  25  each  from  the  two  colleges.  But,  further,  I 
do  not  hesitate  to  predict  that  even  on  the  basis  of  such  a  comparison  the 
Wellesley  words  will  be  found  to  show  a  smaller  degree  of  commu- 
nity than  the  Wisconsin  lists,  and  that  because,  as  I  shall  attempt  to  show 
presently,  the  words  written  at  Wellesley  seem  to  be  less  natural  and 
unreflective  than  those  written  at  Wisconsin ;  and,  as  indicated  in  the 
note  to  my  first  article,  the  ratio  of  repetition  depends,  too,  upon  the 
character  of  the  task.  I  had  shown,  for  instance,  that  the  repetition 
of  words  is  greatest  amongst  the  first  words  of  each  list,  where  the  as- 
sociations are  most  spontaneous  and  natural. 

The  second  point  at  issue  relates  to  the  manner  of  distribution  of 
the  words  written  by  the  students,  into  twenty-five  different  classes  as 
indicative  of  the  relative  prominence  of  these  categories  in  the  mascu- 
line and  in  the  feminine  mind.  The  strong  preference  of  the  femi- 
nine mind  for  certain  concrete  and  familiar  classes  of  words,  in  par- 
ticular for  articles  of  dress,  interior  furnishings,  foods,  etc.,  anoT  the 
absence  of  abstract  words,  which  appeared  in  the  Wisconsin  lists, 
entirely  fail  to  appear  in  the  Wellesley  lists.  The  clue  to  this  differ- 
ence is  to  be  found  in  the  manner  in  which  the  lists  were  prepared. 
The  lists  which  I  used  were  written  as  rapidly  as  possible,  and  by 
each  student  at  his  or  her  own  home,  under  as  natural  surroundings  as 
possible.  The  Wellesley  process  is  thus  described  :  "That  the  thought 
process  might  be  as  free  as  possible,  no  restriction  was  made.  The 


70          COMMUNITY  OF  IDEAS    OF  MEN  AND    WOMEN. 

students  were  not  even  asked,  as  in  the  case  of  Dr.  Jastrow's  class,  to 
write  as  rapidly  as  possible,  but  this  difference  in  the  method  cannot 
possibly  be  supposed  to  account  for  the  wide  difference  in  results." 
Here  I  must  beg  to  differ;  I  am  of  the  opinion  that  it  does  very 
largely  account  for  the  difference  in  the  results  and  I  am  glad  to  be 
able  to  strengthen  my  opinion  by  that  of  Mr.  Havelock  Ellis,  who  in 
his  work  on  ''Man  and  Woman"  (pp.  166—170),  extensively  cites  my 
results.  In  a  card  to  the  Editor  of  this  REVIEW  he  wrote  as  follows  : 
"  In  the  July  Psychological  Review  I  noticed  a  record  of  experi- 
ments supposed  to  invalidate  Jastrow's  on  community  of  ideas.  I 
am  sorry  it  has  not  been  pointed  out  that  they  do  nothing  of  the  kind. 
It  is  essential  that  the  words  should  be  written  as  rapidly  as  possible 
(the  italics  are  Mr.  Ellis's) .  In  this  case  ample  time  was  given  for 
conscious  or  unconscious  selection.  The  results  showed  a  difference 
which  might  largely  have  been  foretold."  The  large  number  of  ab- 
stract words  is  one  of  many  indications  of  the  unconscious  selection 
going  on  in  the  Wellesley  lists,  and  one  list  alone  contained  fifty  ab- 
stract terms.  I  lay  especial  stress  in  the  comparison  of  masculine  and 
feminine  mental  traits  upon  securing  as  natural  a  material  as  possible, 
and  the  writing  as  rapidly  as  possible  is  a  help  toward  this  result.  I 
remember  that  in  writing  my  first  paper  I  hesitated  between  using 
only  the  first  fifty  or  the  entire  one  hundred  words  of  each  list,  feel- 
ing that  the  first  half,  when  the  words  were  natural  and  spontaneous, 
was  in  many  respects  the  more  typical.  In  brief,  then,  I  regard  the 
Wellesley  lists  as  more  reflective,  less  spontaneous  than  my  own  and 
the  differences  between  us  as  in  large  measure  due  to  this  difference  in 
method. 

It  remains  to  add  (i)  that  as  above  indicated  the  proportion  of 
different  words  will  be  larger  when  the  words  are  unduly  of  the  re- 
mote and  abstract  kind,  so  that  the  difference  in  method  in  the  two 
results  also  goes  to  account  for  the  higher  percentage  of  different 
words  in  the  Wellesley  lists,  and  (2)  that  as  I  have  indicated  elsewhere 
(Educational  Review,  December  1891),  it  is  only  in  the  unrestricted 
spontaneous  kinds  of  association  that  I  found  community  of  ideas 
greater  in  women  than  in  men,  and  further  that  in  dealing  with  such 
small  groups  as  fifteen  or  twenty-five  persons  large  room  must  be 
allowed  for  accidental  variation.  (See  PSYCHOLOGICAL  REVIEW,  Vol. 
I.,  No.  2,  pp.  152-158). 

I,  therefore,  see  in  the  Wellesley  attempt  to  corroborate  my  results 
nothing  that  markedly  conflicts  with  the  conclusions  I  drew  from  my 
own  experiments,  and  furthermore  I  find  in  them  a  positive  contribu- 


DISCUSSION  AND  REPORTS.  71 

tion  in  that  they  show  that  a  difference  in  methods  of  experimentation 
and  in  the  treatment  of  material  will  bring  about  definite  and  predictable 
differences  in  the  results  reached ;  and  that  they  thus  emphasize  the 
value  and  reliability  of  the  statistical  method,  when  efficiently  ap- 
plied, in  the  study  of  mental  phenomena. 

JOSEPH  JASTROW. 
MADISON,  Wis.,  October  14,  1895. l 


THE  FUNCTIONS  OF  THE  RODS  OF  THE  RETINA. 

v.  Kries  has  written  a  long  article  (Zeitschr.  f.  Psych.,  IX.,  81- 
1 23)  in  which  he  sets  forth  the  reasons  for  considering  that  the  rods 
are  the  seat  of  the  faint-light  sensation  (which  is  the  name  by  which 
I  have  designated  the  sensation  of  gray  which  remains  after  colors  are 
no  longer  distinguishable),  of  the  peripheral  sensation,  and  of  the 
sensation  of  the  totally  color-blind.  His  argument  is  extremely  effec- 
tive, and  ought  to  carry  conviction  to  every  one  who  studies  it  thor- 
oughly. I  confess  that  I  am  somewhat  surprised  at  his  constantly 
referring  to  this  idea  as  his  hypothesis,  and  as  the  '  just  developed ' 
hypothesis.  I  had  supposed  that  it  was  a  fundamental  part  of  my 
theory  of  light-sensation ;  and  I  am  the  more  surprised  at  this  because 
v.  Kries  expressly  says  in  one  place  :  "It  may  here  be  mentioned  that 
the  assumption  according  to  which  the  rods  are  capable  only  of  the 
production  of  the  colorless  sensation  is  found  in  the  theory  which  has 
been  developed  by  Chr.  Ladd-Franklin."  Apparently  it  is  because 
he  is  unable  to  adopt  my  theory  (nor  even  to  understand  it,  he  says) 
that  he  considers  it  proper  to  ignore  the  fact  that  the  hypothesis  in  re- 
gard to  the  function  of  the  rods  is  not  now  put  forward,  with  any 
strong  evidence  in  its  favor,  for  the  first  time.  (Max  Schultze 
already  in  1866  suggested  this  as  the  function  of  the  rods,  on  the  ground 
that  many  night-seeing  animals  have  rods  only,  or  chiefly,  in  the  ret- 
ina.) 

As  regards  v.  Kries'  criticism  of  my  theory,  I  have  two  remarks 
to  make.  In  the  first  place,  the  assumption  which  he  considers  so 
objectionable  a  feature,  and  which  he  finds  it  impossible  to  form  any 
conception  of — the  assumption,  namely,  uthat  the  atoms  of  the  outer 
layer  have  become  separated  into  three  groups  at  right  angles  to  each 
other,"  is  not  an  essential  part  of  the  theory — is,  in  fact,  merely  a 
mode  of  expression  adopted  for  the  purpose  of  giving  the  molecules 

1 1  must  explain  that  the  delay  in  the  appearance  of  the  above  rejoinder  is 
due  to  a  long  illness  and  resulting  accumulations  of  duties. 


72  FUNCTIONS   OF   THE  RODS   OF  THE  RETINA. 

conceived  of  a  certain  degree  of  symmetry.  All  that  is  essential  in 
the  idea  is  that  a  photochemical  substance  which  in  the  rods  goes  to 
pieces  all  at  once  under  the  influence  of  light  of  any  kind  has  been  so 
modified  in  the  cones  that  it  can  go  to  pieces  in  three  different  stages, 
under  the  influence  respectively  of  three  different  groups  of  wave- 
length. Merely  to  give  a  resting-place  to  the  imagination,  I  make  a 
diagrammatic  representation  of  two  molecules,  of  a  just  sufficient  de- 
gree of  complexity  to  answer  this  purpose,  in  this  way,  for  instance : 


G.  At  . 


The  real  molecules  (if  such  exist)  are,  of  course,  of  very  different 
appearance  from  this,  and  of  immensely  greater  complexity.  My 
hypothesis  that  the  vibrations  which  are  going  on  in  the  outer  por- 
tions of  the  molecule  are  so  timed  as  to  cause  the  molecule  to  be  dis- 
integrated by  ether  vibrations  of  the  velocity  of  the  visible  portion  of 
the  spectrum,  but  not  by  those  which  are  either  more  rapid  or  less 
rapid,  is  at  the  same  time  an  hypothesis  to  account  for  selective  chemical 
dissociation  in  organic  substances  in  general.  It  is  far  from  being  re- 
mote from  current  physiological  or  chemical  speculation.  Jensen,  in 
a  late  number  of  PJiuger's  Archiv  (LXII.,  172-201)  makes  use  of  it 
to  account  for  the  extraordinary  fact  that,  in  animals  so  low  down  as 
the  foraminifera,  a  state  of  contractory  excitation  is  caused  by  the  cut 
off  pseudopodia  of  a  different  individual,  while  the  pseudopodia  of  the 
same  individual,  though  cut  off  in  exactly  the  same  way,  produce  no  effect 
whatever;  he  makes  the  suggestion,  since  no  morphological  ground 
can  be  assigned  for  this  difference,  that  an  explanation  must  be  sought 
in  the  idea,  first  made  use  of  by  Pfliiger  in  his  memorable  paper  of 
1875,  that  every  portion  of  living  matter  is  a  system  of  countless  little 
differently  tuned  harps,  and  that  non-synchronous  ly  vibrating  portions 
of  protoplasm  act  destructively  upon  one  another  when  brought  into 
contiguity.  The  origin  of  the  idea  in  my  own  mind  dates  from  the 
reading  of  a  paper  by  Ebbinghaus. 

My  second  remark  is  this  :  The  very  difficulty  which  my  theory 
was  gotten  up  to  meet  (given  a  separate  grey  process  and  complemen- 
tary, not  antagonistic,  colors)  has  not  apparently  occurred  to  v. 
Kries  as  being  a  difficulty  at  all,  and  hence  it  is  not  surprising  that  he 
does  not  feel  the  necessity  for  my  assumption.  He  says  that  in  lay- 


DISCUSSION  AND  REPORTS.  73 

ing  down  a  definite  relation  between  the  monochromatic  and  the 
trichromatic  elements,  I  give  up  the  advantage  which  should  be  gained 
by  separating  them.  But  is  there  not  a  tremendously  definite  relation 
between  the  sensations  in  question  ?  The  grey  sensation  due  to  the 
decomposition  in  the  rods  is  absolutely  indistinguishable  in  quality 
from  the  grey  sensation  due  to  the  decomposition  in  the  cones.  What 
could  be  more  natural  then — more  indispensable  in  fact — than  to  give 
this  remarkable  resemblance  a  physical  basis  in  the  theory  ?  Nor  can 
I  see  that  anything  whatever  is  lost  by  so  doing.  Far  from  my  not 
having  '  remarked '  the  connection  between  my  assumptions  and  the 
Purkinje  phenomenon,  I  had  already  suggested  an  explanation  of  that 
phenomenon  in  my  paper  in  Mind,  Vol.  III.,  N.  S.,  p.  103  (which 
v.  Kries  seems  to  have  overlooked)  and  have  since  pointed  out  the  in- 
evitableness  of  this  explanation  in  the  light  of  the  more  recently  added 
facts. 

Prof.  v.  Kries  attributes  importance  to  the  observation  of  Ebbing- 
haus  and  myself  that  a  grey  made  of  red  and  green  is  a  very  different 
thing  from  a  grey  made  of  blue  and  yellow,  and  considers  that  Hering 
himself  must  admit  that  it  is  thoroughly  destructive  of  his  theory,  so 
soon  as  Hering  shall  have  convinced  himself  of  the  correctness  of  the 
observation,  v.  Kries  himself  finds  it  extremely  easy  of  confirmation. 

C.  LADD  FRANKLIN. 


SOMETHING   MORE   ABOUT   THE    'PROSPECTIVE 
REFERENCE'  OF   MIND. 

In  the  last  number  of  this  REVIEW  (November,  1895),  Prof. 
Baldwin  handled  the  problem  of  the  completeness  and  satisfactoriness 
of  the  purely  scientific  answer  as  to  the  nature  of  the  functions  of 
knowledge.  After  showing  the  impossibility  inherent  in  the  very 
nature  of  the  scientific  historical  categories  of  their  saying  the  last 
word  about  any  organized  developing  real,  he  applies  the  argument, 
a  fortiori,  to  those  developing  reals  which  we  call  the  functions  of 
consciousness.  Any  thing  of  organization  is  only  known  by  its 
activities,  and  my  present  conception  of  it  is  of  the  sum  of  its  known 
activities  up  to  the  present  moment.  This  is  the  scientific  or  his- 
torical view  of  a  thing,  or  to  use  Prof.  Baldwin's  term,  the  'retro- 
spective reference '  of  mind.  Under  this  view  we  can  determine  the 
'how,'  the  manner  of  the  development  of  a  given  thing;  but  does 
this  give  us  the  right  to  consider  its  past  history  the  whole  reality,  the 
'what'  of  the  object  of  our  study?  Assuredly  not,  for  we  are 


74  THE  ^PROSPECTIVE  REFERENCE*    OF  MIND. 

immediately  confronted  with  a  new  series  of  activities,  which  could 
not  be  predicted  and  which  may  change  our  entire  conception  of  the 
thing.  Thus  was  reached,  by  an  elaboration  of  this  idea,  a  theory 
which  makes  an  element  of  teleology  necessary  to  the  worth  of  the 
historical  fragments  themselves.  It  is  seen  that  the  mind  works 
equally  under  the  category  of  description  or  retrospective  reference, 
and  teleology  or  prospective  reference,  if  it  wishes  to  conceive  the 
4  what,'  the  reality,  of  a  thing.  One  must  remain  a  positivist,  con- 
cern himself  alone  with  the  '  how '  and  give  up  the  problem  of  the 
4  what/  if  he  denies  the  validity  of  the  prospective  way  of  looking  at 
things ;  at  least  so  should  he  do,  if  he  would  be  consistent.  And  this 
is  especially  true  of  the  functions  of  mind,  which  to  know  aright  im- 
plies not  only  an  understanding  of  their  historical  evolution,  or  of 
their  present  epistemological  meaning,  but  likewise  of  the  ideal  end 
toward  which  they  point. 

But  says  the  Naturalist :  All  this  is  true  enough  psychologically  ; 
yet  this  very  prospective  way  of  looking  at  things,  on  account  of  the 
possession  of  which  you  are  dissatisfied  with  the  historical  categories, 
can  be  shown  to  have  been  naturally  evolved,  and,  proud  as  it  is, 
must  owe  its  existence  to  the  very  past  which  it  claims  to  transcend. 

44  If  the  mind  has  developed  under  constant  stimulus  from  the  exter- 
nal world,  and  if  its  progress  consists  essentially  in  a  more  and 
more  adequate  representation  in  consciousness  of  relations  already  ex- 
isting in  the  external  world,  then  it  follows  that  these  internal  repre- 
sentations can  never  do  more  than  reflect  the  historical  events  of  ex- 
perience." How  then  can  there  be  any  phase  of  reality  not  subject  to 
plain  statement  in  terms  of  natural  law  ?  This  is,  however,  but  a  new 
attempt  to  state  the  whole  nature  of  a  still  active  developing  real  in 
terms  of  its  past,  in  this  case  the  category  of  teleology  itself.  But  the 
error  rises  likewise  from  a  second  and  more  subtle  cause,  namely,  the 
failure  to  recognize  the  real  relation  between  the  historical  categories 
and  teleology,  as  it  is  deeply  rooted  in  the  psychology  of  knowledge. 

This  relation  we  may  state,  at  least  tentatively,  in  the  following  way  : 
What  we  call  the  category  of  teleology  is  simply  an  induction  from, 
or  a  statement  in  historical  terms  of,  just  those  elements  in  each  of  the 
historical  categories  that  escape  our  description.  Or,  better,  it  is  an 
attempt  so  to  describe  these  prospective  indescribable  elements.  This 
may  seem  to  be  so  many  words,  or,  if  to  be  understood,  to  be  a  direct 
violation  of  our  principle  which  says  that  the  prospective  reference 
must  not  be  put  into  historical  terms.  But  let  us  explain.  In  our 
study  of  the  4wliat'  of  mind,  its  4  behavior  generalized,'  we  find  one 


DISCUSSION  AND  REPORTS.  75 

peculiarity  about  its  activity,  that  is  not  open  to  observation  as  in  the 
case  of  other  organized  developing  things.  It  is  true  that  every  grow- 
ing, moving  organism  will  have  much  more  to  tell  us  of  its  nature 
years  hence ;  but  while,  as  we  have  seen,  this  may  then  throw  our 
past  reckoning  out  of  count,  at  present  it  tells  us  nothing  of  the  future. 
It  is  nothing  more  than  a  *  vague  pressure  toward  the  infinite.'  But 
in  the  activities  of  mind  we  think  there  is  something  more.  They 
have,  as  it  were,  taken  us  into  confidence  and  revealed  to  us  their 
hopes  for  the  perfect,  the  highest,  the  absolute.  Each  historical  cate- 
gory, as  expressed  in  the  judgments  of  time,  space,  causality,  etc., 
contains,  we  shall  attempt  to  show,  a  4  strain  of  prospective  refer- 
ence,' which  is  the  very  life-blood  of  its  function.  Spencer  recog- 
nizes this  infinite  reference  of  the  categories,  but  fails  to  make  use  of 
its  implications  for  his  theory  of  knowledge,  seeing  in  it  only  an  ar- 
gument for  his  metaphysical  assumption  of  an  unknowable  but  ab- 
solute ground.  We  may  very  properly  ask  why  do  these  categories 
look  toward  an  absolute,  of  which  we  know  nothing ;  why,  if  they  have 
nothing  but  the  phenomenal  in  themselves,  do  they  look  for  that  with 
which  they  have  no  kinship  ?  Extend  these  modes  of  thought  to  in- 
finity, and  unless  there  be  something  of  the  absolute  in  their  consti- 
tution, the  journey  will  have  failed  to  bring  them  there.  As  a  matter 
of  fact  this  infinite  prospective  reference  has  not  only  a  meaning  for  meta- 
physics, but  for  the  very  psychology  of  knowledge  itself ;  it  is  the  mov- 
ing principle  of  the  categories,  the  constitutive  element  in  their  activity. 
To  discover  this  we  must  analyze  a  little  more  minutely  the  psy- 
chological character  of  the  'infinite  prospective  reference.'  The  Old 
Psychology1  placed  among  the  fundamental  intuitions  of  mind,  as 
fulfilling  in  inductive  search  the  criteria  of  universality  and  necessity, 
the  two  categories  of  teleology  and  the  infinite.  In  a  general 
way,  this  seems  to  be  true  to  the  facts  of  psychology ;  but  their  close 
relation  to  each  other  and  to  the  other  categories  of  mind  is  not  indi- 
cated. From  a  psychological  point  of  view  the  intuitions  of  the  infin- 
ite and  of  teleology  are  really  one  and  the  same,  or  rather  have  their 
roots  in  the  same  psychological  principle.  The  intuition  of  the  infin- 
ite possible  future  is  simply  the  prospective  reference  in  its  'first 
intention'  devoid  of  reflection  or  application  to  the  explanation  of 
particular  phenomena.  The  idea  of  telos  or  end  is  understood,  how- 
ever, when  the  vague,  infinite  reference  of  mind  is  reflected  upon  in 
connection  with  the  application  of  the  retrospective  categories  to  the 
explanation  of  the  particular  phenomena  of  the  world  series. 

1James  McCosh,  for  instance. 


76  THE   '-PROSPECTIVE  REFERENCE'    OF  MIND. 

This  makes  clearer  the  conception  already  brought  forward  that 
the  teleological  principle  in  mind  is  simply  the  prospective  reference 
of  all  the  historical  categories,  brought  under  one  descriptive  term. 
For  when  we  apply  any  one  of  the  descriptive  categories  like  time  or 
causation  to  particular  phenomena,  this  vague  infinite  reference  com- 
pels us  to  look  forward  as  well  as  backward,  and  as  we  are  then  deal- 
ing with  particular  phenomena  or  representations,  the  end  or  telos  of 
this  infinite  reference  must  likewise  be  of  the  nature  of  a  representa- 
tion, if  it  is  to  explain  the  representations,  and  thus  is  the  element  of 
ideality  or  teleology  introduced.  Against  the  objection,  already  sug- 
gested, to  thus  characterizing  the  general  prospective  reference,  or 
teleology,  as  the  prospective  reference  of  all  the  historical  categories, 
put  under  one  general  term,  the  answer  can  be  made  that  such  a  de- 
scription is  only  symbolic  ;  for  we  are  simply  describing  it  negatively, 
as  that  part  of  the  retrospective  categories  that  forever  escapes  descrip- 
tion in  their  own  terms,  in  terms  of  natural  law. 

It  now  remains  for  us  to  make  good,  by  psychological  analysis  of 
the  retrospective  categories,  the  claim  that  each  contains  this  strain  of 
4  prospective  reference.'  For  then  we  shall  have  shown  that  teleology 
is  a  constitutive  element  in  each,  and,  in  the  second  place,  secured  a 
new  point  of  view  from  which  to  consider  the  problem  of  knowledge. 

That  we  may  not  take  our  categories  at  random — and  also  for  an- 
other reason  which  will  appear  later — in  prosecuting  this  research,  let 
us  make  use  of  the  schematism  of  Schopenhauer's  '  Vierfache  Wurzel.' 
Following  the  static  analysis  of  Kant,  he  proceeds  to  analyze  the  laws 
of  Vorstellen — that  narrow  knife-edge  of  representations  that  lies  be- 
tween the  two  halves  of  the  universe,  subject  and  object — into  four 
distinct  classes,  each  of  which  has  its  own  category  and  is  ruled  by  a 
particular  application  of  the  'Law  of  Ground.'  Beginning,  then, 
with  the  most  mechanical  of  the  categories,  those  of  the  second  class, 
Space  and  Time  (and  for  the  reason  that  they  are  so  mechanical,  we 
shall  find  them  the  least  propitious  for  our  search) ,  let  us  see  if  they  do 
not  contain  also  a  strain  of  prospective  reference. 

The  space  of  our  study,  it  must  be  remembered,  is  not  the  space  of 
geometry,  of  the  so-called  pure  intuition,  from  whatever  source  that 
may  come,  but  of  the  empirical  intuition  involved  in  our  intu- 
ition of  the  external  world  as  it  may  be  shown  to  be  historically 
evolved — in  short,  psychological  space.  For  it  is  only  this  space 
which  is  a  category  of  description,  of  history.  Here,  it  is  true,  as 
well  as  in  the  sphere  of  geometry,  the  law  of  ground  is  simply  the 
law  of  place,  which  says  that  any  point  determines  as  ground  the  po- 


DISCUSSION  AND  REPORTS.  77 

sition  of  every  other  point.  But  when  this  law  of  ground  is  applied 
geometrically  it  is  essentially  a  retrospective,  reflective,  point  of  view, 
and  is  discernible  only  by  reflectively  impressing  upon  the  empirical 
vision  the  laws  of  an  abstract  geometrical  space.  It  is  a  necessity, 
which,  just  like  logical  necessity,  is  of  the  second  intention ;  the  law 
of  the  simple  space  intuition,  as  of  all  intuition  of  reality,  is  simply,  as 
Paulsen  has  shown,  an  aesthetic  '  Zusammenhang'  or  harmony.1 

Now  what  is  the  nature  of  this  primary  empirical  space  intuition, 
which  we  hold  in  common  with  lower  forms  of  the  animal  world? 
Its  chief  characteristic  is  that  it  is  subjective  and  psychological.  It  is 
an  intuition,  an  outreaching  from  a  particular  4here.'  It  becomes 
such  by  the  very  fact  that  it  has  the  4here.'  Space  without  the 
1  here'  is  objective  and  geometrical.  As  empirical  intuition  it  may 
be  studied  from  two  points  of  view,  that  of  natural  history,  and,  sec- 
ondly, that  of  its  meaning  for  the  intuiting  consciousness.  As  his- 
torically evolved,  as  seen  under  the  aspect  of  natural  causation,  there 
is  no  reason  for  doubting  that  the  empirical  space  consciousness  is,  as 
Spencer  claims,  but  a  more  complex  expression  of  the  primitive 
adjustments  of  rudimentary  organisms  to  environment.  The  only 
thing  to  be  avoided  is  the  tendency  to  become  metaphysical,  to  leave 
the  outer  world  of  adjustments  and  find  a  metaphysical  explanation 
for  space  in  time  or  still  lower  in  sensation.  But  the  historical  side  is 
not  the  whole  of  the  category.  This  gives  its  past.  It  has  also,  as  we 
have  seen,  its  epistemological  present  with  its  sharply  defined  '  law 
of  ground '  for  dealing  reflectively  with  the  details  of  the  intuition.  It 
has  also,  finally,  a  future  reference,  a  teleological  meaning  for  the 
'  here,'  from  which  the  spatialization  goes  out.  If  genetically,  we 
must  construe  the  space  intuition  as  a  growing  complex  of  adjustments 
to  environment,  we  surely  cannot  say,  a  priori,  that  its  development 
is  complete.  As  a  matter  of  fact,  the  synthesis  is  constantly  growing 
and  including  new  elements  in  its  grasp.  To  be  sure,  the  geometrical 
law  of  ground  always  does  remain  ruling,  as  a  matter  of  history. 
But  the  reason  we  can  say  that  things  are  necessarily  in  certain  rela- 
tions of  place  is  simply  because  our  historical  experience  of  space 
has  been  such  as  to  make  this  law  of  ground  always  applicable. 
But  space  as  a  function  is  nothing  more  than  a  growing  grasp  of  the 
manifold  of  experience,  and  its  only  principle  from  the  point  of  view 
of  its  prospective  reference  is  a  certain  esthetic  harmony  of  place. 

1 '  Einleitung  in  die  Philosophic,'  p.  229.  Man  kann  es  nicht  stark 
genug  betonen :  Notwendigkeit  ist  im  logiken  Denken,  aber  nicht  in  der 
Natur;  alle  Naturgemassigkeit  ist  spontane  Zusammenhang  aller  Teile. 


7  THE  '•PROSPECTIVE  REFERENCED    OF  MIND. 

This  teleological  harmony — the  ruling  motive  of  the  activity  of 
space  intuition — has  come  about  on  the  following  wise.  Or,  rather, 
one  should  not  say  come  about,  but  made  its  appearance  to  conscious- 
ness. In  the  primitive  animal  the  motive  to  the  rudimentary  adjust- 
ment to  environment  was  an  external  one,  the  pressing  of  sensational 
environment  upon  him  and  thus  the  necessity  of  getting  into  harmony 
with  it.  In  the  spiritual  human  consciousness,  however,  the  motive 
to  spatialization  with  the  extension  of  the  category  is  the  harmoniza- 
tion of  all  representations  of  a  spatial  nature,  no  matter  by  what 
means  they  have  entered  consciousness,  in  one  all-inclusive  ken.  To 
this  end  it  works  not  alone  through  sight  and  touch,  which  are  the  his- 
torical media  of  the  intuition,  but  by  the  imaginative  use  of  the 
mathematical  symbols.  Can  it  be  said  that  the  planets  are  not  in  my 
space  because  I  have  not  measured  their  distances  with  the  naked  eye, 
and  can  only  express  their  relations  in  the  borrowed  symbols  of  num- 
bers ?  If  so,  then  the  house  across  the  river,  which  I  see  from  my 
window,  is  not  in  my  space.  For  it  is  quite  sure  that  geometrically 
its  relation  to  the  river  is  quite  different  from  that  which  it  holds  in 
my  perspective. 

It  becomes,  then,  mere  foolishness  to  attempt  to  take  all  of  the 
teleology  out  of  the  dynamic  space  intuition,  to  separate  it  from  its 
empirical  content,  and  subject  it  as  a  dead,  statical  res  completa,  to 
analysis ;  for  contradictions  immediately  develop  themselves,  such  as  all 
keen  critical  thinkers  from  Zeno  to  Bradley  have  had  no  difficulty  in 
bringing  against  its  reality.  The  reality  of  space  exists,  however,  for 
the  intuiting  subject,  before  whom  lies  the  spacial  ideal,  uncon- 
scious, perhaps,  of  finding  in  the  composition  of  all  the  representations 
that  have  entered  his  spacial  consciousness,  a  place  for  each  in  har- 
mony with  the  great  whole.  Its  ideal,  its  striving,  is  ever  to  overcome 
the  limitations  of  the  individual  'here,'  and  bring  all  reality  that  is 
external,  the  limitless  world  of  a  limitless  space,  into  the  ken  of  the 
knowing  subject. 

In  the  category  of  time  the  prospective  reference  is  still  more 
clearly  shown.  Here  again  we  must  distinguish  between  the  time  of 
mathematics  and  that  of  the  empirical  intuition  with  its  'now;'  for 
only  as  it  is  related  to  this  empirical  '  now'  is  time  the  form  of  inner 
experience.  This  gives  it  the  psychological  character  of  an  intuition, 
just  as  did  the  'here'  in  the  case  of  space.  Succession  is  its  law,  to 
be  sure,  but  as  pure  succession,  independent  of  the  '  now'  of  the  in- 
tuition, it  offers  to  reflection  the  same  sort  of  difficulties  as  did  space. 
Its  nature  refuses  to  be  completely  stated  in  retrospective  terms; 


DISCUSSION  AND  REPORTS.  79 

Bradley's  criticism  shows  here  likewise  that,  taken  as  a  res  completa, 
abstracted  from  its  content  and  from  the  dynamic  synthesis  which  is 
its  nature,  succession  immediately  develops  intellectual  contradictions. 
If  the  '  now '  is  but  a  point  in  the  succession,  and  through  its  media- 
tion one  attempts  to  understand  the  connection  of  the  past  with  the 
future,  the  'now'  will  itself  break  up  into  atomistic  and  mutually 
repelling  moments,  so  that  the  series  will  fall  into  contradiction. 
The  reality  of  time  consists,  however,  in  the  fact  that  it  goes  out  as  a 
dynamic  synthesis  from  a  'now;'  and  the  latter,  instead  of  being  a 
point  of  connection  between  the  past  and  future  of  a  series,  is  in  real- 
ity the  measure  of  our  grasp  upon  the  changing  content  of  conscious- 
ness. The  reason  that  the  present  can  be  a  bridge  between  the  past 
and  the  future  is  simply  that  in  a  vague  indefinite  sense  it  already  feels 
the  future.  Historically,  time,  like  space,  was  evolved  through  the 
reaction  of  primitive  sensibility  upon  a  manifold  of  sensations  and  was 
simply  the  successful  attempt  to  hold  them  in  its  grasp.  But  the  mo- 
tive of  time  is  now  no  longer  one  of  sensation ;  it  has  to  do  with  the 
harmonious  grouping  of  all  the  contents  of  consciousness,  no  matter  by 
what  means  they  have  entered.  Not  all  are  equally  definitely  placed,  for 
the  law  here  is  not  one  of  simple  succession,  but  rather  an  aesthetic  princi- 
ple of  temporal  subordination  according  as  they  have  meaning  for  the 
'  now.'  This  now  is  continually  prospective  and  is  ever  looking  for- 
ward to  the  wider  complex  which  it  will  grasp  in  the  hand  of  the 
future  '  now.'  And  as  the  category  of  time  develops  genetically,  the 
'  specious  present,'  by  its  growing  richness  of  meaning,  marks  what 
of  the  flowing  stream  the  individual  has  been  able  to  synthesize,  and 
again  points  to  an  intuition  of  things  which  shall  grasp  all  in  a  time- 
less 'now.'1 

We  now  seek  to  discover  the  prospective  reference  in  the 
two  important  retrospective  categories  of  science;  namely,  Causa- 
tion and  Identity,  or  (lest  Identity  have  a  too  metaphysical 
sound)  the  '  Same  and  the  Different,'  according  to  Mr.  Spencer's 
terminology.  Causation,  the  typical  category  of  the  Understand- 
ing, is,  as  an  intuition,  dependent  upon  time  and  space  relations; 
but,  when  considered  intellectually,  it  is  an  attempt  to  account  ration- 
ally for  change  in  space  and  time.  But  if  we  take  the  temporal  re- 
lations existing  between  A  and  B,  and  try  analytically  to  discover  a 
real  bond  between  them,  we  find,  as  Bradley  points  out,  the  same 
difficulties  that  appeared  in  the  case  of  space  and  time,  in  fact,  in  rela- 
tions of  any  kind.  The  A  and  B  will  persist  in  falling  apart,  for 

1  Prof.  A.  T.  Ormond  '  Basal  Concepts  in  Philosophy.'     Chapter  on  Time. 


8o  THE  ^PROSPECTIVE  REFERENCE'    OF  MIND. 

every  attempt  to  introduce  a  mediating  term  ends  in  further  disremp- 
tion.  But  that  this  is  so,  follows  from  a  static  and  analytical  view  of 
what  is  a  dynamic  intuition  of  the  subject — from  a  strange  oblivion  to 
the  prospective  element  in  this,  as  in  all  intuitions.  Lotze,  equally 
well,  saw  the  difficulties  that  gather  around  the  causal  relation  when 
it  is  analyzed  statically  into  its  merely  spatial  and  temporal  condi- 
tions. For  once  analyzed,  the  space  and  time  as  well  as  the  causal 
idea  itself  are  then  seen  only  under  the  retrospective  point  of  view. 
For  consider,  that  the  judgment  of  causation  is  primarily  not  due  to  a 
definite  knowledge  of  the  space  and  time  relations.  These  are  only 
analyzed  after  the  intuition  has  taken  place,  in  order  to  give  analy- 
tical grounds  for  the  intuitive  judgment.  In  order  to  explain  the 
causal  judgment  itself  and,  indeed,  in  order  to  make  it  consistent  and 
rational  when  analyzed  into  its  grounds,  the  element  of  teleology  or 
organization  must  be  recognized  in  it.  Says  Lotze  in  his  Metaphysic  : 
"The  natures  of  things  that  act  on  each  other,  the  inner  states  in  which, 
for  the  moment,  they  happen  to  be,  and  the  exact  relations  which  ex- 
ist between  them,  all  constitute  the  complete  ground  or  reason  from 
which  the  resulting  effect  issues.  Thus  the  consequence  is  contained 
in  the  reason."  This  is,  of  course,  only  discoverable,  however,  analy- 
tically in  retrospective  thinking.  But,  he  continues,  there  is  resident 
in  the  notion  of  causation,  "the  idea  of  some  one  plan,  which  is  the 
complex  of  reality,  which  only  once  completes  itself  and  nowhere 
hovers  as  a  universal  law  over  an  indefinite  number  of  instances,  and 
which  assigns  to  each  state  of  facts  that  consequence  which  be- 
longs to  it  as  a  further  step  in  the  realization  of  the  one  history."  l 
This  is  the  essential  prospective  reference  of  the.  category.  It  is  this 
persuasion  that  in  the  harmony  of  the  whole  there  is  a  necessary  place 
for  every  experience  of  nature  in  relation  to  the  others,  that  compels 
us  to  order  the  particulars  under  this  rubric  of  causal  relations.  As 
an  intuition  this  category  presents  to  us  a  union  of  the  prospective  ele- 
ments of  both  time  and  space,  so  that  it  seeks  a  harmony  which  in- 
cludes in  its  plan  both  relations  of  place  and  of  succession.  As  a  mat- 
ter of  fact  we  do  tacitly  assume  such  a  state  of  affairs,  for  every  time 
we  make  an  hypothesis,  under  the  guidance  of  which  we  seek  to  dis- 
cover causal  relations,  we  rest  upon  the  teleological  element  in  our 
causal  notion,  which  says  to  us  that  the  particular  facts  must  mean 
something  like  this  hypothesis. 

In  regard  to  the  typical  category  of  the  Reason,  Identity,  or,  in  its 
empirical  expression,  the  '  same  and  the  different,'  only  a  few  words 

1  Metaphjsic,  p.  107. 


DISCUSSION  AND  REPORTS.  8 1 

are  necessary.  Natural  science  has  very  properly  followed  Hume  in 
saying  that  in  the  sphere  of  perception,  4  first  intention,' there  is  no 
such  thing  as  identity,  but  only  close  resemblance ;  and  he  is  likewise 
perfectly  justified  in  saying  that  these  empirical  judgments,  historically 
considered,  may  be  all  reduced  to  habit  and  custom.  But  that  ideal 
identity,  which  lies  at  the  root  of  our  judgments,  the  ideal  which  is  so 
strong  that  we  are  always  compelled  to  say  that  particulars  are  the 
same,  although  our  experience  afterwards  (when  we  historically  and 
analytically  investigate  the  grounds  for  the  judgment)  invariably 
shows  us  that  we  were  mistaken  and  had  to  do  only  with  close  resem- 
blances— this  side  of  the  judgment  requires  other  explanation  than 
that  of  history,  of  custom  or  habit.  It  is  really  none  other  than  the 
prospective  reference  to  be  found  in  this  category;  absolute  iden- 
tity is  the  distant  ideal  to  which  in  its  empirical  expression  the  judg- 
ment never  attains.  Like  a  will-o'-the-wisp,  it  always  escapes  us, 
and,  when  we  come  up  to  our  actual  judgments  and  historically  exam- 
ine them  they  are  seen  to  be  concerned  alone  with  close  resem- 
blances. But  the  genetic  development  of  this  category  in  an  indi- 
vidual consciousness  shows  a  closer  and  closer  approximation  to  the 
'norm'  or  ideal,  showing  that  it  does  function  as  a  regulation  ele- 
ment in  experience. 

To  attempt  to  show  this  prospective  element  in  the  sphere  of  ethics 
or  in  the  will  would  be  gratuitous,  for  motive,  end,  is  the  peculiar  law 
of  activity  in  this  sphere.  All  empirical  expressions  of  the  will  can  be 
understood  only  under  the  law  of  motivation.  Whatever  be  its  historical 
origin,  the  existence  of  a  prospective  '  must '  in  this  sphere  is  never 
denied ;  it  is  in  the  historical  categories  that  the  problem  of  the  prospec- 
tive reference  lies,  for  here,  so  it  is  thought,  '  is,'  actuality,  expresses  all. 

So  much  for  the  psychological  analysis  of  the  categories  them- 
selves, by  means  of  which  we  were  to  discover  in  their  very  constitu- 
tion a  strain  of  prospective  reference — not  only  an  infinite  reference 
which  points  vaguely  to  an  absolute  ground,  but  their  very  life- 
blood,  the  withdrawal  of  which  causes  them  to  fall  into  pieces,  giv- 
ing us  only  appearance  and  illusion. 

This  is  not  so  very  different  from  the  Platonic  doctrine  that  all 
knowledge  is  only  a  remembrance,  long  since  held  for  philosophical 
poesy.  That  doctrine  is,  however,  but  a  symbolic  way  of  expressing 
a  fact  that  cannot  fail  to  impress  the  mind  that  ponders  the  problem 
of  knowledge.  Is  the  present,  individual  knowing  consciousness  sim- 
ply a  spider  at  the  end  of  a  thread  of  its  own  spinning ;  or  is  there  an 
instinct  which  determines  the  point  to  which  that  thread  shall  reach,  a 


82  THE   '-PROSPECTIVE  REFERENCE*    OF  MIND. 

vital  living  connection  with  the  consciousness  that  lies  in  the  future 
time  as  well  as  with  that  of  the  historic  past  ?  How  else  shall  I  ex- 
press those  prospective  judgments  that  do  not  seem  to  implicate  will 
but  only  memory  ?  The  past  alone  does  not  explain  them,  '  nervous 
habit '  and  '  social  custom '  express  only  one  side  of  the  truth.  Para- 
doxical and  vague  as  the  terms  may  seem,  the  prospective  element  in 
our  knowledge  functions  can  best  be  described  as  a  future  forward 
memory  which,  equally  with  the  past,  governs  the  activity  of  the  present. 
This  becomes  still  more  clear  if  these  categories  be  united 
under  some  more  ultimate  one.  It  is  in  the  basal  category  of 
sufficient  reason,  which  has  its  peculiar  law  in  each  of  these  retrospec- 
tive categories,  that  the  prospective  reference  is  most  clearly  marked. 
On  its  historical  side,  as  an  evolved  psychological  principle,  it  is  ex- 
plainable in  terms  of  'nervous  habit'  and  'accommodation;'  it  is  the 
simple  psychological  principle  of  interest,  with  reactions  made  defi- 
nite by  habit.  As  an  epistemological  principle  it  is  also  seen  under 
historic  categories,  for  the  law  of  ground  in  these  different  spheres  of 
space  and  time,  causality  or  the  understanding,  identity  as  typical  of 
the  reason,  and  motivation  in  the  case  of  the  will,  is  only  discoverable 
when  these  judgments  have  taken  their  place  as  states  in  the  historical, 
psychological  series.  For  the  descriptive  terms  of  universality  and 
necessity  by  which  we  test  them  are  only  discoverable  in  an  inductive 
study  of  the  static  consciousness  as  instanced  in  the  case  of  both  Kant 
and  the  Natural  Realists.  In  the  case  both  of  history  and  analysis  we 
look  upon  them  as  definite  formulas  or  laws  and  by  that  very 
fact  are  compelled  to  put  them  under  retrospective  categories. 
But  the  principle  of  sufficient  reason,  as  well  as  the  particular  cate- 
gories in  which  it  finds  application,  has  a  third  and  more  ultimate 
side.  As  such  it  is  simply  the  dynamic  impulse  to  knowledge  which 
presses  on  to  further  and  more  complete  synthesis  of  mental  content, 
using  the  categories  as  its  instruments ;  it  is  prospective  always ;  its 
grounds  only  coming  into  conscious  recognition  when  the  judgments 
are  viewed  historically.  But  now  arises  a  most  important  question. 
If  historically  Sufficient  Reason  is  nothing  more  than  nervous  habit,  if 
its  epistemological  grounds  are  likewise  purely  retrospective,  what  can 
be  said  of  its  prospective  reference,  except  that  it  is  a  blind  forward 
impulse  ?  Of  what  value  is  it  to  have  shown  the  individual  categories 
to  be  prospective  in  their  nature,  if  the  active  principle  which  gets 
them  in  motion  cannot  be  defined  more  definitely  than  that  it  is  an 
impulse  to  know  ?  Have  we  not  gotten  back  again  to  the  '  vague  in- 
finite' reference,  into  which  we  attempted  to  infuse  an  element  of 


DISCUSSION  AND  REPORTS.  83 

teleology?  The  strength  of  this  criticism  cannot  be  well  overrated, 
and  at  first  it  may  seem  that,  in  having  escaped  the  relativity  that  arises 
out  of  the  natural  history  view  of  Spencer,  we  have  fallen  into  the  pes- 
simistic fatalism  of  Schopenhauer.  For  this  is  none  other  than  the 
position  of  this  famous  Kantian.  Epistemologically  the  categories  are 
absolutely  valid  in  their  own  spheres,  for  phenomena,  but  they  are 
simply  necessary  unchangeable  mirrors  through  which  the  otherwise 
blind  Will  looks  upon  itself.  But  all  movement  is  in  Will ;  therefore 
no  teleology  to  knowledge,  for  Will  is  blind.  What  difference  for 
knowledge  whether  the  principle  that  has  brought  its  categories  into 
being  is  one  of  blind  force,  operating  under  the  law  of  natural  selec- 
tion, or  a  blind  irrational  evil,  with  no  meaning  in  its  movements? 

Now,  it  cannot  be  denied  that  from  one  point  of  view  there  is  an 
element  of  blind  fatalism  in  the  psychological  principle  of  Sufficient 
Reason.  The  act  of  judgment  itself,  which  is  the  expression  of  the 
subjective  impulse  called  Sufficient  Reason,  is  really  a  leap  into  the 
dark,  in  its  first  movement.1  Its  synthesis  of  elements  is  always  pro- 
spective, and  it  is  only  in  the  light  of  this  synthesis,  largely  aesthetic, 
that  the  grounds  arise  upon  which  we  develop  our  reasons  for  the 
same.  But  by  this  time  the  judgment  has  already  become  an  event 
of  history.  So  that  the  synthetic  act  itself  is  always  without  con- 
scious grounds,  always  remains  mysterious  and  illusive,  making  its 
necessity  something  almost  fatalistic. 

This  is,  undoubtedly,  a  true  picture  of  the  simple  psychological  im- 
pulse to  knowledge,  objectively  considered.  There  is,  however,  a 
subjective  concomitant,  a  reflex,  so  to  speak,  in  the  case  of  every  judg- 
ment, which  is  so  uniform  in  its  meaning  that  it  cannot  fail  to  suggest 
a  teleology  to  the  forward  movement  of  the  psychological  impulse 
itself.  I  refer  to  the  element  of  necessity  or  belief  with  which  we 
are  compelled  to  pronounce  a  positive  or  negative  judgment  on  any 
complex  of  form  and  content.  In  the  sphere  of  '  first  intention,'  of 
sensation  and  perception,  this  is  pure  psychological  necessity,  or,  in 
Prof.  Baldwin's  terms,  '  reality  feeling.'  In  the  sphere  of  reflective 
judgment  it  becomes  grounded  or  logical  necessity,  and  its  correspond- 
ing descriptive  expression  is  belief.  Now,  it  is  important  for  our 
purpose  that  we  see  that  there  really  exists  no  essential  distinction  be- 
tween the  absoluteness  of  these  two  necessities.  Whatever  may  be 

1  Kant  has  the  same  idea  of  the  Judgment  (Kritik  der  reinen  Vernunft,  Ed. 
1781,  p.  78)  :"  Die  Synthesis  uberhaupt  ist  die  blosse  Wirkung  der  Einbildungs- 
kraft,  einer  blinden,  obgleich  unentbehrlichen  Funcktion  der  Seele,  ohne  die 
wir  uberall  gar  keine  Erkentniss  haben  wiirden,  der  wir  uns  aber  selten  nur 
einmal  bewusst  sind." 


04  THE  ' PROSPECTIVE  REFERENCE'  OF  MIND. 

the  difference  in  their  knowledge-content,  as  functions  they  are  one 
and  the  same.  In  one  the  grounds  are  in  the  elements  of  the  percept ; 
in  the  other  they  lie  in  the  conceptual  relations  of  the  elements  in  the 
judgment ;  but  in  each  case  it  is  a  necessary  response  to  a  complex  of 
form  and  content,  and  the  response  itself,  as  long  as  it  remains  undis- 
turbed by  any  new  elements  of  content,  is  absolute.  Sigwart  recog- 
nizes this  in  his  doctrine  of  the  necessity  of  all  judgments ;  although 
the  grounds  in  one  may  be  psychological,  while  in  another  logical. 
Likewise  Newman,  in  his  '  Grammar  of  Assent,'  argues  keenly  for 
the  essential  likeness  of  both  kinds  of  assent,  although  '  inferences  * 
may  afterward  enhance  the  value  of  the  belief  for  the  logical  under- 
standing. This  is  belief  in  all  its  aspects,  when  viewed  as  a  psycho- 
logical function.  But  is  not  this  also  as  fatal  and  irrational  as  Suffi- 
cient Reason  as  a  psychological  impulse?  Yes,  viewed  alone  as  a 
function  it  is. 

Yet  forces  in  the  psychological  sphere  are  as  dark  and  in- 
explicable as  in  the  physical.  It  is  only  as  a  bond  connecting  the 
concept  of  the  movements  of  the  earth  and  its  surrounding  planets  that 
Gravitation  has  any  meaning.  As  a  pure  force  it  is  absolutely  without 
any  content  for  thought — must  be  relegated  to  the  limbo  of  fantastic 
powers  of  enchantment  and  wilful  activity.  In  the  same  way  the 
pure  reflex  function  of  belief  has  no  meaning  in  our  study  of  con- 
sciousness, unless  it  be  a  bond  between  two  elements  of  content  that 
are  ideal.  Thus  to  say  that  belief  is  the  reflex  movement  of  con- 
sciousness upon  any  complex  of  form  and  content  describes  it  psycho- 
logically ;  but  it  is  only  when  we  conceive  it  as  a  bond  between  the 
knowing  self  and  its  complexes  of  content  that  it  has  any  but  a  de- 
scriptive meaning  for  us. 

As  a  matter  of  fact,  belief  is  essentially  an  act  of  appropriation  to 
the  subject,  of  that  which  Sufficient  Reason,  as  an  impulse  to  knowl- 
edge, has  brought  before  the  bar  of  consciousness.  Belief  is, 
above  all,  self-reference.  This  self-reference  of  belief  is  always 
manifest  to  one  who  is  not  prejudiced  in  favor  of  a  sensational  phil- 
osophy, and  it  is  not  without  meaning  that  both  Hume  and  Spencer 
find  difficulty  in  giving  even  a  satisfactory  psychological  explanation 
of  belief.  Now  my  final  aim  is  simply  this  :  to  show  that  the  continual 
self -reference  of  belief  is  the  bond  which  unites  the  movement  of 
Sufficient  Reason,  otherwise  irrational,  to  a  developing  self,  whose 
ideal  is  the  end  toward  which  the  impulse  to  knowledge,  in  Suffi- 
cient Reason,  is  blindly  moving,  and  that  this  teleology  is  what 
gives  meaning  10  the  prospective  reference  of  the  categories,  which 


DISCUSSION  AND  REPORTS.  85 

this  teleology  has  generated.  The  psychological  forces  of  Suf- 
cient  Reason  and  Belief  are  blind  only  as  forces  abstracted  from 
the  ideal  self-content  to  which  they  relate. 

But  to  make  good  this  claim,  this  self-reference  must  be  analytic- 
ally shown  to  be  psychologically  true — from  the  lowest  form  of  judg- 
ment to  the  highest.  First  in  the  reality-feeling  that  accompanies  sen- 
sation and  perception ;  here  we  must  not  fall  into  the  error  of  the  in- 
tellectual Idealist,  who  commits  the  '  psychologist's  fallacy '  of  mak- 
ing every  feeling  explicitly  for  a  knowing  self.  Yet  we  must  believe 
that  the  self-reference  is  at  least  implicit,  else  how  (on  the  side  of 
knowledge)  could  sensations  ever  be  held  together  long  enough  for 
comparison  and  for  the  emergence  of  relations.  The  sensation  is  not 
first  of  all  for  a  self,  consciously,  but  it  points  vaguely  to  a  self  for  whom 
it  will  become  explicit  later  on  in  perception.  As  a  matter  of  fact, 
recent  studies  in  genetic  psychology1  point  out  that,  in  the  development 
of  the  category  of  personality  in  the  child,  there  are  at  first  certain 
personality  suggestions,  very  vague,  to  be  sure,  but  nevertheless  pres- 
ent, in  the  touch  sensations  that  the  infant  receives  in  its  earliest  days. 
Already,  in  mere  feeling,  he  learns  to  distinguish  the  personal 
in  his  external  surroundings,  and  this  reacts  upon  this  budding  no- 
tion of  the  self.  As  we  pass  from  one  higher  synthesis  to  another, 
the  self-reference  becomes  more  marked.  Time  connects  in  a  series 
the  vanishing  experiences,  and  by  the  mechanism  of  memory  affords 
the  possibility  of  an  empirical  self,  which  in  turn  by  that  constant  in- 
crease of  its  grasp,  points  to  a  self  which  shall  see  all  things  sub  spe- 
cie ceternitatis.  Space  brings  with  it  the  external  world,  both  per- 
sonal and  impersonal ;  and  by  setting  this  over  against  the  subject  he  fur- 
ther intensifies  the  self  notion.  With  the  advent  of  the  category  of 
causation  comes  a  fuller  notion  of  the  self,  for  here  energy  is  inter- 
preted in  terms  of  the  activity  of  the  self  as  revealed  in  the  acts  of  will. 
The  growth  from  the  perception  of  close  resemblances  to  the  judgment 
of  identity  again  brings  the  identical  self  into  view  as  the  norm  and 
source  of  the  judgment.  The  self  in  these  last  categories  always 
reacts  in  the  form  of  belief,  and  all  these  relations  thus  believed  in  are 
taken  up  and  unified  by  the  knowledge  of  a  self  as  the  source  from 
which  they  depend  and  the  end  for  which  they  have  meaning.  So 
much  Kant  saw,  from  a  purely  statical  and  analytical  point  of  view. 
Whatever  may  be  the  metaphysical  worth  of  the  category  of  the  self, 
it  is  at  least  the  conceptual  source  of  unity  for  all  the  other  categor- 
ies of  consciousness. 

1  Professor  Baldwin's  '  Mental  Development  in  the  Child  and  the  Race.' 


86 


THE  ^PROSPECTIVE  REFERENCE*    OF  MIND. 


There  are  thus  discoverable  two  important  lines  of  'prospective 
reference :'  a  main  line  in  the  development  of  the  self-notion,  and  a 
number  of  independent  forward  references  in  the  particular  categories 
themselves — a  constitutive  element  in  their  growth.  Each  of  these 
lower  categories  is  in  turn  connected  by  the  self-reference  of  belief  to 
the  category  of  the  self  as  the  developing  motif  of  the  whole  move- 
ment of  Sufficient  Reason.  The  following  diagram  will  show  this 
more  clearly: 


^ 

1 

1 

' 

3 

1  \ 

/ 

X 

n\ 

/B 

t 

> 

/       \ 

,*&  B\ 

'                                   \ 

'X                   Xv 

The  x's  are  the  four  principal  retrospective  categories,  each  with 
its  prospective  reference.  The  o  is  the  category  of  the  self,  with  its 
forward  reference  always  in  advance  of  the  others.  And  by  the  bonds 
of  Belief,  the  B's,  each  category  is  involved,  in  each  of  its  activities 
or  judgments,  in  the  movement  of  the  self,  which  is  the  richest  cate- 
gory of  consciousness  and  can  then  be  used  to  interpret  the  others. 

But  suppose  we  seek  for  this  unifying  and  explaining  self  as  some- 
thing among  the  complexes  of  content  of  which  it  is  the  ground  and 
end.  We  shall  then  be  looking  for  that  which  is  the  prospective 
reference  of  all  the  categories — all  the  syntheses  of  consciousness — 
among  states  of  mind  that  have  already  taken  their  place  in  the  his- 
torical empirical  series.  Our  self,  which  seemed  so  much  en  evi- 
dence as  it  functioned  ideally,  has  now  withdrawn  its  support  from 
the  mechanical  or  retrospective  categories,  or,  to  employ  a  better  fig- 
ure, has  fallen  into-  lifeless  dust  among  their  atomic  and  disintegrated 
materials.  But  the  self  is  just  that  point  which  can  never  be  past, 
and  for  that  reason  can  never  be  treated  historically  or  found  phe- 
nomenally. Just  because  it  is  the  prospective  reference  of  the  em- 
perical  self,  by  which  the  latter  is  to  be  explained,  does  it  refuse  to  be 


DISCUSSION  AND  REPORTS.  87 

contained  within  those  empirical  limits.  As  Bradley  argues,  en- 
deavoring to  reduce  the  self  like  the  other  categories  to  illusion,  psy- 
chologically (or  under  historic  categories)  the  identity  of  the  self  or 
ego  cannot  be  determined ;  for  it  must  then  be  put  somewhere  within 
the  temporal  series  and  suffer  the  fate  of  time  in  his  critical  hands. 
But  for  that  reason  shall  we  call  it  illusion !  If  so  we  are  reducing  to 
illusion  that  which  a  study  of  the  development  of  consciousness  has 
shown  to  be  the  one  element  which  has  saved  the  whole  movement 
from  irrationality  and  confusion. 

What  then  is  the  self  ?  How  is  it  to  be  construed  in  this  connec- 
tion ?  It  is  the  empirical  states,  but  more.  As  far  as  the  retrospective 
categories  can  take  hold  of  it  is  this  the  self.  Nor  is  alone  the  un- 
mediated  intuition  of  the  will  the  essential  self,  as  Schopenhauer 
claims,^  for  this  cannot  explain  the  teleological  function  of  the  self  in 
consciousness.  Such  an  intuition  has  no  ideal  element  whatever.  It 
is  pure  present  or  past  and  can  only  be  stated  in  terms  of  experi- 
enced acts  of  that  will.  This  intuition,  however,  is  a  part  of  my 
self-consciousness,  in  that  it  gives  me  my  notion  of  self  as  active 
and  forceful.  There  is  yet  a  third  element  of  prospective  or  ideal 
significance  which,  just  because  it  is  prospective,  will  almost  escape 
all  statement  in  descriptive  terms.  It  is  that  aesthetic  harmony  of  our 
conscious  states  which  we  project  as  an  ideal,  that  confidence  (which 
is  such  a  ground-motif  of  self-conscious  life)  that  every  element  of 
consciousness  has  a  meaning  for  the  general  harmony.  This  may, 
perhaps,  be  better  suggested  by  a  figure.  The  detail  of  the  landscape 
before  me  is  made  up  of  rocks,  trees,  etc.  As  such,  when  I  come  up 
to  them  and  subject  them  to  study  under  the  categories  of  description, 
they  lose  all  the  meaning  that  lay  in  the  grouping  of  the  perspective. 
The  very  value  of  the  perspective  is  the  aesthetic  unity  in  which 
it  reduces  mere  detail  to  its  place  in  the  whole.  The  same  way  of 
looking  at  things  may  be  applied  to  consciousness.  There  is  an  ele- 
ment in  the  self  whose  very  value  lies  in  the  aesthetic  reduction  of  the 
indefiniteness  which  pervades  the  detail.  This  real  psychological  char- 
acteristic of  consciousness  can  never  be  stated  in  descriptive  terms,  for 
as  soon  as  we  approach  the  scene  with  the  instruments  of  science  we 
have  nothing  but  gross,  crass  details  bound  by  nothing  but  mechanical 
laws.  The  prospective  side  of  the  self  always  escapes  description, 
although  for  that  reason  it  is  no  less  an  important  psychological  char- 
acteristic. Though  rejoicing  in  the  freedom  from  the  thraldom  of  a 
metaphysical  conception  of  the  self  as  substance,  he  who  fails  to  see 

1Vierfache  Wurzel,  end  of  paragraph  42. 


88  THE   'PROSPECTIVE  REFERENCE'    OF  MIND. 

nothing  more  in  self-consciousness  than  an  aggregate  of  empirical 
states,  or  an  unmediated  intuition  of  a  feeling  called  will,  is  not  yet 
entirely  free  from  the  chains  of  the  '  stuff'  idea. 

With  the  preceding  discussion  before  our  eyes,  there  seems  now 
some  hope,  if  not  of  correcting  the  faults,  at  least  of  understanding  the 
•weakness  of  some  current  epistemological  ideas.  At  the  present  day  the 
static  analysis  of  Kant  has  been  extended  in  three  important  direc- 
tions, each  of  these  movements  being  animated  by  the  important  mo- 
dern conceptions  of  the  flux  of  things.  To  view  knowledge  as  an 
activity,  and,  above  all,  as  a  development,  to  infuse  into  the  rigidity 
of  the  intellectual  categories  the  life  and  movement  which  appears 
in  the  volitional  sphere — this  has  been  the  motif  since  the  Kantian 
disremption  of  the  Pure  from  the  Practical  Reason.  Historically  the 
idealistic  movement  came  first  with  a  thought-evolution,  in  which  the 
categories  are  the  steps  of  a  development,  with  the  '  Idea '  as  its 
goal.  The  Evolution  Theory  in  the  hands  of  science,  which  knows  no 
permanent  or  static  forms  in  any  of  its  spheres,  makes  of  the  absolute 
functions  of  Kant  evolved  products  of  the  interaction  of  a  primary 
sensibility  with  its  environment.  Like  the  fauna  and  flora  of  the 
biological  world,  they  have  taken  their  place  historically  according  to 
natural  law,  and  therefore  get  their  whole  meaning  from  the  nature 
out  of  which  they  spring.  Any  forward  movement  is  vague,  and  in- 
finite in  its  possibilities.  The  Schopenhauerian  conception  which 
puts  the  whole  movement  of  knowledge  in  the  hands  of  a  blind  Will, 
and  conceives  the  categories  as  complete  existences,  is  but  a  purely 
metaphysical  restoration  of  the  breach  between  the  Reason  and  the 
Will. 

This  is,  however,  the  fault  with  all  these  theories :  the  movement 
is  externally  and  metaphysically  explained.  It  is  not  grounded  in  a 
psychological  analysis  of  the  knowledge  factors  themselves  and  of  the 
self  in  its  relation  to  knowledge.  In  the  case  of  the  Idealists  the 
actual  empirical  development  of  knowledge  is  reduced  to  a  mere  con- 
ceptual relation  of  ideas,  and,  to  the  extent  that  the  psychological  roots 
of  the  concept  are  not  known,  is  unpsychological.  The  Natural  Sci- 
ence view,  in  so  far  as  it  finds  the  origin  of  the  knowledge  processes  in 
the  interaction  of  subject  and  object,  of  sensibility  and  environment, 
and  by  this  seeks  to  explain  them,  is  also  metaphysical,  either  naively 
dualistic  or  somewhat  materialistic  in  its  monism.  The  third  union 
of  Will  and  Knowledge  by  Schopenhauer,  is,  of  course,  purely  meta- 
physical. 

If  then  the  ontological  teleology  of  Hegel  is  untenable,  there  is  left 


DISCUSSION  AND  REPORTS.  89 

either  the  pure  relativity  of  Spencer,  or  the  absolutely  blind  unteleo- 
logical  movement  of  the  Schopenhauerian  Will. 

There  is  every  motive  then  to  look  for  a  teleological,  prospective 
reference  of  mind,  as  a  constitutive  element  in  the  retrospective  cate- 
gories themselves  which  the  Kantian  critique  had  looked  upon  as 
static  and  unchangeable  :  above  all  to  give  it  a  psychological  basis,  for 
the  metaphysical  application  will  not  be  far  in  the  rear. 

Though  the  preceding  study  may  not  have  been  in  any  way  of  the 
nature  of  a  supply  to  this  demand,  it  yet  affords  grounds,  we  are  con- 
vinced, for  a  somewhat  more  emphatic  repetition  of  the  poetical  but 
keenly  intuitive  protest  of  Emerson  against  the  Kantian  description  of 
Intellect  and  Will :  ' '  Our  intellections  are  mainly  prospective.  The 
immortality  of  man  is  as  legitimately  preached  from  the  intellect  as 
from  the  moral  volitions.  Every  intellection  is  mainly  prospective ; 
its  present  value  is  its  least."1 

JENA.  WILBUR  M.   URBAN. 

OUR  LOCALIZATION  IN  SPACE. 

The  title  to  these  notes  may  appear  misleading,  but  I  know  of  no 
•other  to  describe  the  phenomena  which  I  wish  to  illustrate  by  an  inter- 
esting experience  that  occured  to  me  about  a  year  ago  and  that  I  have 
narrated  to  my  classes  for  suitable  purposes.  Perhaps  it  will  be  inter- 
esting to  others. 

Only  twice  in  my  life  have  I  awakened  in  dream  and  at  the  same 
time  had  the  dream  images  continue  for  a  short  period  so  as  to  watch 
them  as  apparently  real  objects.  The  first  one  was  a  dream  of  a 
mountain  scene  in  a  valley  with  a  lake  and  summer  hotels  on  its  shore. 
I  watched  the  view  for  perhaps  a  full  minute  with  my  eyes  still  closed, 
but  conscious  of  being  awake  and  lying  in  bed.  The  disappearance 
of  the  scene  was  marked  by  the  visible  occurrence  of  small  clefts  or 
openings  in  the  rocks  nearest  where  I  appeared  to  be  standing.  The 
scene  was  perfectly  vivid  and  real,  an  exact  representation  of  what 
such  a  scene  would  be,  if  I  were  actually  looking  at  a  landscape,  pro- 
jected outside  of  me.  The  eject  of  reality  and  actual  space  relations, 
perspective,  color  and  all  were  as  distinct  as  when  walking  in  the 
fields  or  the  streets.  But  this  is  not  the  characteristic  which  I  wish  to 
describe  or  illustrate.  I  have  probably  only  narrated  what  is  a  com- 
mon experience  with  others  who  have  awakened  in  a  dream  and 
watched  it,  though  it  may,  nevertheless,  be  interesting  to  note  the  fact 

1  Essay  on  '  Intellect.' 


90  OUR  LOCALIZATION  IN  SPACE. 

that  sensory  action  without  its  appropriate  stimulus  is  as  definite  and 
complete  as  either  in  reality  or  in  halucinations.  The  fact,  however, 
to  which  I  call  special  attention  in  it  is  that  I  cannot  recall  or  did  not 
have  the  peculiar  feature  of  the  second  dream  to  be  narrated,  which 
resembled  the  first  in  its  main  characteristics ;  that  is,  the  visual  reality 
and  projection  of  the  apparent  object. 

I  dreamed  that  I  was  in  my  old  bed-room  where  I  slept  when  I  was 
a  child.  It  was  oblong  in  shape  and  I  recognized  it,  my  view  of  it 
appearing  as  it  would  if  I  were  lying  on  the  bed.  I  awakened  in  the 
midst  of  the  dream  and  keeping  my  eyes  shut  (there  being  no  reason 
to  open  them  as  no  darkness  appeared,  though  where  I  was  actually 
sleeping  it  was  quite  dark) ,  I  noticed  paper  on  the  walls,  a  kind  I 
had  never  seen  in  my  recollection.  Now  there  never  had  been  any 
paper  on  the  room  represented  in  the  bed-room  of  my  childhood,  and 
observing  it  in  the  dream  image  I  felt  some  surprise,  because  I  knew 
that  my  bed-room  had  never  had  paper  of  any  kind.  This  discrepancy 
at  once  convinced  me  that  I  must  be  wrong  about  the  room,  the 
moment  I  compared  what  I  saw  with  what  I  remembered,  a  compari- 
son which  did  not  suggest  itself  during  sleep.  The  discrepancy  had 
no  effect.  But,  strangest  of  all,  the  moment  that  I  saw  the  discre- 
pancy and  saw  that  I  was  not  in  the  room  as  I  had  known  it,  I  be- 
came confused  as  to  where  I  was.  I  noted  the  resemblance  in  shape 
to  my  old  bed-room,  and  tried  to  recognize  where  I  was  and  though 
wide  awake  I  could  not  think  of  myself  as  in  my  apartment  in  New 
York.  I  had  not  the  slightest  conception  where  I  was.  I  could  only 
see  the  walls  and  wall  paper  of  my  old  bed-room.  After  the  lapse  of 
about  a  minute  the  paper  and  walls  vanished  quite  suddenly,  though  a 
general  mass  of  Eigenlicht  remained,  and  I  at  once  recognized  that  I 
was  in  bed  in  my  apartment.  I  then  opened  my  eyes.  It  is  remark- 
able that  the  tactual  sensations  did  not  avail  to  localize  me,  but  they  did 
not.  I  felt  myself  lying  down,  but  I  could  not  obtain  the  least  concep- 
tion of  where  I  was  until  the  vision  of  the  wall  paper  and  walls  dis- 
appeared, when  I  could  recall  to  the  visual  imagination  and  memory 
the  shape  of  the  room  and  position  in  it  in  which  I  was  actually 
sleeping.  Had  it  not  been  for  the  discrepancy  between  what  I  saw 
and  my  memory  of  my  old  room  at  home,  I  might  have  still  imagined 
that  I  was  there.  But  I  knew  from  the  wall  paper  that  this  could  not 
be,  and  I  was  puzzled  to  know  where  I  was  until  the  visual  image 
began  to  break  up  and  vanish,  when  I  at  once  pictured  to  my  mind 
where  I  was  in  reality. 

Now,    the   question  is,  was   my  localization   conditioned  upon  a 


DISCUSSION  AND  REPORTS.  91 

memory  image  in  the  visual  center  which  could  not  be  found  until  the 
real  image  vanished  ?  Of  course  the  identification,  when  it  did  come, 
represented  my  past  experience  with  my  bed-room  in  the  apartment, 
and  the  assumption  that  I  was  where  I  had  gone  to  sleep  the  evening 
before,  but  this  had  no  effect  until  the  visual  image  of  my  old  room  at 
home  vanished.  Nor  did  the  tactual  sensations  to  which  I  consciously 
deferred  help  me  in  the  slightest  degree  to  determine  where  I  was.  It 
all  seemed  to  hinge  on  the  representation  in  the  visual  memory  of  the 
room  in  the  apartment  after  the  real  image  of  the  old  room  at  home 
had  disappeared.  Unfortunately  I  am  not  able  to  corroborate  the  sup- 
position involved  in  the  above  question  by  any  recollection  of  actually 
localizing  myself  in  bed  in  the  first  dream  which  I  have  narrated.  I 
only  recall  the  fact  that  I  was  awake  looking  apparently  at  a  beautiful 
landscape  of  mountain  scenery,  and  that  I  was  much  interested  in  the 
nature  of  the  phenomenon.  But  I  am  not  certain  that  I  knew  I  was 
lying  in  bed.  This  may  have  been  after  the  image  began  to  disap- 
pear. I  do  remember  that  I  was  lying  on  my  stomach,  but  I  do  not 
recall  that  I  was  conscious  of  this  fact  before  the  picture  vanished. 
Hence  I  can  get  in  it  no  confirmation  of  the  possibility  that  the  locali- 
zation depended  upon  a  visual  representation  of  my  room  as  it  was  in 
the  memory  continuum  of  experience.  Moreover,  objection  might  be 
made  to  such  a  supposition  from  the  fact  that  the  possibility  of  mem- 
ory representation  conditioned  the  consciousness  of  the  discrepancy 
between  what  I  saw  and  what  I  recalled  of  my  old  room  at  home. 
Hence  it  seems  all  the  more  puzzling  to  note  the  fact  that  tactual  sen- 
sations did  not  tell  me  where  I  was  and  that  the  localization  did  not 
occur  until  the  visual  memory  became  active. 

But  I  had  a  waking  experience  which  at  least  seems  to  confirm  the 
supposition,  though  it  may  not  be  conclusive.  I  was  riding  in  the  cars 
of  the  New  York  Elevated  Railway  and  had  reached  the  Thirty-third 
street  station.  Just  as  the  train  left  it  I  noticed  across  on  the  south 
side  of  Broadway  the  sign  of  a  store  for  the  Microbe  Killer.  I  said 
to  myself,  "Well,  this  store  has  moved;  it  used  to  be  around  the 
corner  of  the  next  street  north"  (Thirty-fourth  street) .  I  fully  expected 
to  see  it  where  it  had  been  as  the  train  moved.  I  looked  up  and  saw  a 
church  (Dr.  Taylor's)  on  the  north  corner  of  Thirty-fourth  and  Broad- 
way, and  I  said  to  myself,  "No,  this  cannot  be;  there  was  no  church 
near  where  I  had  seen  the  Microbe  Killer  store."  But  I  was  not  pos- 
itively convinced  of  the  error  until  I  could  see  up  the  street  as  we 
crossed  it.  I  felt  puzzled  for  a  few  moments  to  know  where  I  had 
seen  the  store.  All  at  once  there  emerged  in  my  memory  a  visual  rep- 


92  THREE   CASES   OF  SYN^ESTHESIA. 

resentation  of  Broad  and  Arch  streets,  in  Philadelphia,  where  I  had 
seen  a  store  at  which  the  Microbe  Killer  was  sold,  the  store  being  on 
that  side  of  the  street  where  it  would  have  been  in  New  York  on 
Thirty-fourth  street,  if  I  had  been  correct  in  my  first  impression. 
Now  the  interest  of  the  case  lies,  not  merely  in  its  being  an  ordinary 
case  of  redintegration  (was  there  any  association  between  the  words 
Broad  street  and  Broadway  ?) ,  but  in  the  fact  that  the  space  relations  in 
the  false  and  the  true  recollections  were  the  same  and  that  my  illusion 
about  the  store  was  not  discoverable  until  I  formed  a  visual  representa- 
tion in  memory  of  what  I  had  seen  in  Philadelphia  and  could  compare 
it  with  the  knowledge  or  consciousness  of  any  actual  place  in  New 
York. 

But  I  will  not  urge  the  case  as  proving  anything.  I  narrate  it  here 
with  the  dreams  only  to  encourage  observations  of  others  in  the  same 
direction.  I  do  not  know  that  such  a  phenomenon  as  is  narrated  in  my 
second  dream  and  the  waking  state  following  it  is  at  all  common. 
I  should  like  to  know  whether  others  have  had  a  like  experience.  It 
is  of  special  interest  as  suggesting  how  little  tactual  sensations  have  to 
do  with  space  perception  and  localization  in  it  except  as  tactual  experi- 
ence is  conceived  in  terms  of  visual  space.  Not  that  I  mean  to  imply 
that  we  cannot  obtain  any  notion  of  space  whatever  by  tactual  and 
muscular  sensations,  but  that  in  this  case  at  least  they  seemed  to  have 
no  power  whatever  to  determine  it.  I  certainly  find  in  my  own  case  no 
reason  to  accept  the  Berkeleian  doctrine  of  space  and  our  localization 
in  it,  and  this  wholly  apart  from  the  dream  experience  just  narrated. 
In  this  case,  however,  the  localization  was  definitely  related  to  the 
visual  representation  of  my  place  of  living.  The  only  question  that 
remains  is  to  know  whether  such  a  phenomenon  occurs  often  enough 
in  the  experience  of  others  to  give  it  anything  more  than  individual 
significance  and  interest.  JAMES  H.  HYSLOP. 

COLUMBIA  COLLEGE. 


THREE  CASES  OF  S 

The  subjects  of  this  report  are  three  sisters,  D,  C  and  K,  aged  re- 
spectively 9,  10  and  12.  Their  father  and  mother  are  good  visualizers, 
the  father  having  definite  number  forms.  There  are  also  two  younger 
brothers  one  of  whom,  aged  about  5,  visualises  his  alphabet  so  vividly 
as  to  be  able  to  read  it  off  backwards  with  unexpected  rapidity.  His 
alphabet  form  is  traced  to  the  perpendicular  series  from  which  he 


DISCUSSION  AND  REPORTS. 


93 


learned  his  letters.  No  such  early  association  can  be  discovered  in 
the  case  of  the  three  sisters,  though  they  too  have  elaborate  forms  for 
numbers,  months,  days  of  the  week  and  the  alphabet.  They  are  not 
musical. 

D  sees  the  letters  black  on  a  background  of  indefinite  color,  but  as 
if  they  were  behind  the  patches  of  the  color  to  which  the  letters  cor- 
respond. The  color  is  seen  only  when  she  thinks  the  words  separately, 
not  when  she  reads  them  or  hears  them  spoken  connectedly  in  a  sen- 
tence. The  position  of  the  word  and  color  is  close  to  the  eyes  or  in 
the  head. 

C  sees  the  words  from  a  foot  to  a  yard  away.  Sounds  and  smells 
are  yellow  to  her  except  thunder,  which  is  black ;  but  the  color  is  very 
dim  and  she  herself  is  somewhat  uncertain  about  it. 

To  K  the  colors  are  '  far  away,'  but  seem  to  come  nearer  when 
closely  attended  to.  Her  brightest  words  are  the  yellow  ones. 

All  three  have  had  these  pseudo-sensations  as  long  as  they  can  re- 
member, but  their  peculiarity  was  not  noticed  until  about  a  year  ago. 
They  have  not  influenced  one  another  in  the  coloring  of  letters  or 
words,  as  they  have  been  observed  always  to  disagree  about  the  same 
letters  in  the  same  way. 

Subjoined  is  a  table  giving  in  the  children's  own  language  the 
colors,  if  any,  of  all  the  letters  of  the  alphabet,  days,  months,  certain 
proper  names,  certain  common  nouns  selected  for  their  phonetic  or 
orthographical  peculiarities  and  certain  numbers.  Roman  numerals 
are  colored  after  the  letters  (I,  V,  L,  C,  etc.)  composing  them. 


D 


K 


L 

M 

N 

O* 

P 

s- 

s 

T* 
U 


white 

reddish  brown 

white 

blackish  blue 

white 

bluish  white 

white 

white 

blue  and  white 

white 

green 

white 

blue 

greenish  yellow 

brown 

brownish 

black 

reddish 

green 

brown 

grey 

brown  or  green 

brown  or  black 

red 

black 

black 

yellow 

red 

brown 

dull  red 

crimson 

black 

white 

yellow 

white 

yellow 

blackish  red 

red 

bluish  black 

red 

brown 

light  brown 

white 

white 

white 

black 

white 

black 

yellow 

white 

yellowish 

pink 

blue  or  as  initial  red 

red 

white 

yellow 

very  light  yellow 

black 

black 

black 

yellow 

greenish  white 

yellow 

94 


THREE   CASES    OF  SYN^STHESIA. 


V 

w 

blue 
brownish 

white 
green 

grey 
blue  black 

X 

no  color 

yellow 

brown 

Y 

yellowish  black 

black 

yellow 

Z 

black 

yellow  or  white 

brown 

& 

yellow 

black 

no  color 

i 

black 

black 

white 

2 

white 

brown 

blue 

3 

red 

white 

brown 

4 

blackish  or  no  color 

black 

red 

yellow 

green 

bluish  white 

6 

black 

red  and  white 

red 

7 

black 

black 

light  yellow 

8 

brown 

green  and  white 

bright  yellow 

9 

black 

brown 

crimson 

10 

white 

i  black,  o  white 

black 

ii 

yellow 

black 

dark 

12 

white 

black  and  brown 

darker  than  n 

13 

red 

black  and  white 

brown 

*4 

no  color 

and  so  on  to  20 

red 

15 

yellow 

white 

16 

white 

red,  duller  than  14 

17 

black 

yellow 

18 

yellow 

yellow 

19 

black 

crimson 

20 

white 

brown  and  white 

/"dull   white,    like 
\            steel" 

3° 

red 

white 

brown 

4° 

no  color 

black  and  white 

red 

£ 

yellow 
black 

and  so  on  to  90 

like  20 
duller  red  than  40 

70 

red 

yellow 

80 

white 

yellow 

90 

no  color 

dark  red  99  red 

100* 

white 

white 

white 

200 

white 

brown  and  white 

white  like  20 

300 

red 

white 

3  brown  oo  no  color 

400 

no  color 

black  and  white 

red  +  no  color 

500 

yellow 

green  and  white 

white 

IOOO 

blackish  white 

greenish  or  white 

no  color 

2OOO 

white 

brown  and  white 

no  color 

347 

red 

3  white  47  black 

f  3  brown  4  red  7 
1           yellow 

896 

red 

f  8  green  9  brown  6 
t           white 

i    8  yellow  9  crimson 
6  red 

Dorothy  * 

white 

white 

white 

Quincy 

yellow 

white 

yellow 

Grinnell 

green  -4-  red 

brownish  green 

greenish  brown 

Charlotte 

white  -f  bluish 

red 

bluish  black 

Katharine 

red 

black 

white 

Laurence 

vellow 

white 

reddish  brown 

Robert  * 

"  red 

red 

red 

Morgan 

blackish  white 

red 

blue  and  black 

Maria 

yellow 

red 

f  M  light  I  red  rest 
\        indistinct 

Isabel 

/  Is  brown  ;  a  white  ;  bel 
\                yellow 

yellowish 

I  yellow,  rest  yellow- 
ish brown 

John 

reddish 

brown 

black 

Sally* 

white 

yellowish  white 

white 

Stephen 

brownish 

yellow 

brown 

Spencer 

no  color 

/  Spen  vellow;  cer 
\           white 

brown 

DISCUSSION  AND  RE  FOR  TS. 


95 


Hilda 

Madeleine 

Louise 

Mary 

Edith 

hurt 

pert 

smell 

spell 

stop 

break 

try 

house  * 

Caesar 

fairy 

how 

few 

straight 

trait 

rate 

ate 

at 

hat 

that 

handy 

hand 

and 

an 


yellowish 

whitish  yellow 

yellow 

white 

yellow 

brown 

black 

always  yellow 

all  colors 
st  black  op  white 
brown 
black 
brown 
white 

white 

white 
black 

black  sometimes  white 

black 

red 

yellowish  black 
written,  A  white,   T 

black 
black  and  white 


black  and  white 


eight 

ate 

bow  (—bough) 

bow  (—bo) 

Monday 

Tuesday 

Wednesday 

Thursday 

Friday 

Saturday 

Sunday 

Jan. 

Feb. 

Mar. 

April 

May 

June 

July 

Aug. 

Sept. 

Oct. 

Nov. 

Dec. 


black  and  green 

white 
black  and  white 

white 
white  and  green 

white 

blackish  yellow 
blue  and  white 

white 

white 
red 

black 

dark  orange 

black  and  white 

light  red 

white 
light  yellow 

red 
black 
green 

yellowish  white 

white 

dark  red 

darker  red 

hay  color 

black  and  white 

black  and  white 

red 
white 


and 


brown 

dark  red 

black  and  white 

red, sometimes  white 

white 

brownish  red 

green  [red] 

yellow 

yellow 

yellow 

black  and  white 
black 
brown 
white 

f  white  with  black 
\  spots 

brown 

red 

yellow 
black 

RA  red  TE  black 
doesn't  know 

black  or  no  color 
brown 
black 

brown 

brown 
green 
brown 

red  sometimes  brown 

greenish  white 

doesn't  know 

white 

white 

pink 

f    red  with  yellow 
\  stripes 

green 
black  and  brown 

black 

green  and  white 
color  of  the  sun 
green  and  black 

darker 

red  and  white 

red  and  white 

pink 

yellow 

yellow 

yellow  and  black 

yellow  and  black 

white  and  black 

red  and  white 

white  and  red 


red 

not  distinct 

red  like  Hilda 

like  Maria 

white 

dull  brown 

purplish  black  R  red 

brown 

brown 

lighter  brown 
no  color 

blue 

dull  red 

C  and  A  white 

yellow,  R  red 

red 

yellow  brownish  red 

doesn't  know;  yellow 

no  color 

R  red 
no  color 

no  color 

H  red,  rest  no  color 
f   T's  have  black 
\        back  ground 

red  (dull) 

red  (dull) 

no  color 

no  color 

no  color 

yellow 

no  color 

no  color 

no  color 

blackish  blue 

yellowish  black 

blackish  blue 

dark  brownish  black 

greenish 

brown 

very  light  yellow 

reddish  brown 

brown 

red 

red 

white 

red 

red 

yellow 
brownish  yellow 

grey 

no  color 

white 

WILFRID  LAY. 


COLUMBIA  COLLEGE. 


PSYCHOLOGICAL  LITERATURE. 


GENERAL. 

Elements  de  psychologic  humaine,  cours  professe"  a  I'universite"  de 
Gand.  T.  T.  VAN  BIERVLIET  Gand,  Lepper.  1895.  8°.  Pp.  317 
and  34  fig. 

This  is  an  elementary  treatise  on  psychology  intended  especially  for 
students  studying  for  the  B.  A.  degree,  who  as  a  rule  lack  physiological 
and  anatomical  knowledge.  A  large  part  of  the  book,  almost  half 
of  it,  is  taken  up  with  descriptions  of  the  nervous  system  and  of  the 
organs  of  sense  and  movement,  descriptions  which  are  to  be  found  in 
every  physiology.  The  entire  work  is  imbued  with  the  physiologi- 
cal spirit,  as  may  be  gathered  by  observing  the  clear  and  precise  lan- 
guage of  the  author,  whose  metaphors  and  similies  are  almost  always 
borrowed  from  the  natural  sciences.  It  is  evident  that  the  author  is 
not  in  the  unhappy  position  of  some  of  his  contemporaries  who  hav- 
ing received  a  special  literary  education  forget  this  when  they  begin 
to  write.  It  is  worthy  of  note  that  the  physiological  tendencies  of  the 
author  do  not  lead  him  to  materialism.  He  urges,  on  the  contrary, 
that  mental  processes  are  entirely  distinct  from  cerebral  and  do 
not  correspond  to  anything  material,  that  judgment  and  reason  are 
not  functions  of  the  brain  but  faculties  of  an  immaterial  soul,  and  that 
the  immateriality  of  the  soul  does  not  require  proof,  as  it  is  practically 
doubted  by  no  one. 

A  third  characteristic  of  this  book  is  the  complete  absence  of  ex- 
perimental psychology.  Researches  on  reaction-times  are  only  noted 
in  the  appendix.  This  omission,  which  is  apparently  intentional,  is 
surprising,  as  the  author  is  the  director  of  a  psychological  laboratory ; 
and  for  this  reason  M.  Biervliet's  book  cannot  be  considered  as  repre- 
sentative of  the  actual  state  of  psychology. 

The  general  plan  of  the  work  may  now  be  indicated.  After  an 
introduction  on  the  human  body  in  which  the  author  studies  cells,  tis- 
sues, and  more  especially  the  circulatory,  respiratory,  muscular  and 

96 


PSYCHOLOGICAL  LITERATURE.  97 

nervous  systems,  including  the  latest  views  of  Cajal  and  of  Golgi,  we 
have  the  first  part  covering  the  physiology  of  conscious  phenomena.  It 
includes  sensations  and  movements,  but  scarcely  anything  else,  being 
merely  a  repetition  of  what  may  be  found  in  general  treatises  on  physi- 
ology. The  second  part  on  the  psychology  of  conscious  phenomena 
contains  definitions  of  ideas,  judgment,  reason  and  will,  including  a 
defense  of  the  doctrine  of  the  immateriality  of  the  mind  and  of  free 
will.  The  third  part  on  the  psychophysiology  of  conscious  phe- 
nomena includes  imagination,  memory,  motor  expression,  character, 
personality  and  measurement  of  reaction-time.  In  speaking  of  mem- 
ory the  author  develops  interesting  though  somewhat  theoretical  ideas 
on  the  mechanism  of  recognition  and  on  localization. 

In  spite  of  some  drawbacks  the  book  is  certainly  the  best  elemen- 
tary treatise  on  psychology  in  the  French  language. 

Psychologic  des  Foules.     G.   Le.  BON.     Paris,  Alcan.      1895.     Pp. 

200. 

We  have  here  a  book  that  treats  a  subject  with  which  the  psycholo- 
gical laboratories  scarcely  concern  themselves.  The  reading  of  such  a 
work  cannot  but  be  salutary  for  the  professional  psychologist,  if  only 
to  teach  him  that  there  is  more  in  mental  life  than  reaction-times. 
The  author  studies  the  4  crowd,'  understanding  by  this  word,  which 
he  uses  in  a  wide  sense,  a  number  of  individuals  who  think  and  feel 
in  the  same  way,  but  who  are  not  necessarily  collected  together  in 
one  place.  Thus  he  introduces  into  his  book  a  study  of  the  curious 
popular  movement  produced  in  France  by  General  Boulanger  a 
few  years  ago.  Two  principal  conclusions  are  drawn:  ist.  That 
the  importance  of  '  crowds'  is  growing  daily  and  will  continue  to  be 
a  factor  of  increasing  importance  in  the  future.  2d.  That  the 
*  crowd '  is  of  low  intelligence,  without  reflection,  reasoning  or  mod- 
eration, a  prey  to  all  extreme  emotions,  good  or  bad,  incapable  of  self- 
guidance  and  without  the  power  to  construct  or  to  originate.  How  in 
the  face  of  these  results  an  optimistic  conclusion  and  a  faith  auguring 
well  for  the  political  future  can  be  drawn  we  do  not  understand. 

A.  B. 


9§  TELEPATHY,   ETC. 

TELEPATHY,  ETC. 

Ueber  umjoillkiirliches  Fliistern,  eine  kritische  und  experimentelle 

Untersuchung  der  sogenannten  Gedankenubertragung.     F.  C. 

C.  HANSEN  UND  ALFRED  LEHMAN.     Philosophische  Studien,  XI. 

4.  pp.  471-530, 

In  the  S.  P.  R.  Proceedings,  VI.,  128,  is  a  series  of  experiments 
by  Prof,  and  Mrs.  Sidgwick  on  the  transference  of  numbers  from  the 
mind  of  Mr.  Smith  to  two  young  men  hypnotized  by  him.  The  num- 
bers were  bi-digital,  running  from  10  to  90,  drawn  from  a  bag  and 
silently  looked  at  by  Mr.  S.  The  subjects  named  whatever  numbers 
they  saw  appear  in  their  mental  field  of  vision.  There  were  1,356 
trials,  with  the  result  that  any  digit  'seen'  or  'named'  by  the  subject 
invariably  corresponded  much  more  often  to  the  digit  *  drawn '  than  to 
any  other  digit.  In  table  I.,  for  example,  in  a  series  of  354  trials,  both 
digits  were  named  rightly  79  times  instead  of  the  '  probable '  number 
of  four  or  five  times.  Some  cause  was  evidently  at  work  inclining 
the  subjects  to  guess  right.  The  Sidgwicks  think  that  this  cause 
cannot  have  been  vocal  indications  given  by  Smith  and  hyperassthe- 
tically  heard  by  the  subjects,  because  if  the  latter  had  been  guided  by 
sound  their  mistakes  would  have  shown  the  effect  of  sound  as  well  as 
their  successes ;  that  is,  the  numbers  named  wrongly  by  them  would 
have  also  tended  to  resemble  in  sound  the  numbers  actually  drawn 
from  the  bag,  which  the  Sidgwicks  try  to  show  by  a  comparative 
table  was  not  the  case. 

The  Danish  writers  subject  this  opinion  to  a  careful  criticism. 
Repeating  the  experiment  with  two  hemispherical  mirrors,  90  cm.  wide, 
opposite  each  other,  the  head  of  the  agent  being  in  the  focus  of  one, 
and  that  of  the  percipient  in  the  focus  of  the  other,  they  found  that  the 
numbers  could  be  heard  by  the  percipient,  and  consequently  named 
rightly ;  when  the  agent  inwardly  articulated  them,  even  the  bystanders 
could  hear  nothing  and  the  agent's  lips  were  tightly  closed.  They  also 
found  certain  parts  of  the  room  within  which  the  sound  of  a  grain  of 
shot  dropping  on  a  plate  could  be  heard,  whereas  it  could  not  be  heard 
from  other  places.  The  percipient,  if  in  such  a  favored  place,  might 
of  course  catch  a  vocal  indication  to  which  bystanders  would  be  deaf. 
Subjecting  the  whole  number  of  '  guesses,'  right  and  wrong,  to  a  labori- 
ous phonic  analysis,  they  prove  moreover  that  the  mistakes  made  by 
the  English  subjects,  mistakes  whose  nature,  according  to  the  Sidg- 
wicks, was  such  as  to  exclude  their  being  due  to  imperfect  hearing, 
showed  a  striking  analogy  to  those  made  by  themselves,  which  posi- 


PSYCHOLOGICAL  LITERATURE.  99 

lively  'were  due  to  imperfect  hearing.  In  the  English  observations, 
namely,  the  numbers  oftenest  substituted  for  each  other  were  those 
whose  common  phonetic  elements  were  the  same  that  caused  the  most 
frequent  confusions  of  hearing  in  Messrs.  H.  and  L.  The  Sidgwicks' 
opinion  is,  therefore,  Messrs.  H.  and  L.  conclude,  superficial  and  hasty, 
and  hyperaesthesia  of  hearing  remains  4,000  times  more  probable  than 
any  other  assignable  cause,  of  the  amount  of  '  thought-transference ' 
recorded  in  their  experiments.  The  authors  point  also  to  the  facility 
with  which,  in  diagram-guessing,  figures  may  be  considered  '  right ' 
which  really  represent  quite  different  objects  from  those  meant  by  the 
agent,  if  only  the  two  objects  have  analogous  elements.  The  paper  is 
a  genuinely  scientific  contribution  to  the  elucidation  of  so-called 
thought-transference  phenomena,  and  contrasts  most  agreeably  with 
the  random  abuse  to  which  their  recorders  are  accustomed. 

Telepathic  Dreams  Experimentally  Induced.     G.  B.  ERMACORA. 
Proceedings  of   the  Society  for   Psychical   Research.     Vol.  xi. 

Pp-  235-3o8- 

This  is  a  startling  experimental  record  of  a  new  genus  of  thought 
transference.  The  personages  are  :  Dr.  Ermacora ;  the  Signora  Maria,  a 
young  woman  with  trances  and  automatic  writing  in  which  she  mani- 
fests a  secondary  personality  alleging  itself  to  be  a  spirit  named 
Elvira;  Angelina,  Maria's  cousin,  a  child  in  her  fifth  year;  and, 
finally,  the  Signora  Annetta,  Maria's  mother.  The  two  ladies  and 
the  child  live  together  at  Padua,  and  Dr.  Ermacora  is  a  familiar  visi- 
tor at  the  house.  A  certain  spontaneous  dream  of  Angelina's,  in 
which  she  seemed  to  see  the  so-called  Elvira,  led  Dr.  E.  to  try 
systematically  whether  he  could  determine  Angelina's  dreams  by 
ordering  'Elvira'  to  appear  to  her  in  sleep  and  make  her  dream 
according  to  his  prescription.  The  experiments  made  were  seventy 
in  number  and  almost  every  one  succeeded.  Dr.  Ermacora,  for  rea- 
sons that  he  does  not  give,  was  unable  to  isolate  Angelina  from  the  two 
ladies,  so  the  physical  possibility  was  not  precluded  of  Siga.  Maria  tell- 
ing the  child  every  night,  after  the  details  of  the  dream  had  been  dicta- 
ted in  the  evening,  what  she  must  report  next  morning.  He  considers 
it  morally  impossible,  however,  that  the  ladies  should  wilfully  play  a 
trick  on  him ;  and  believing  that  Signora  Maria,  if  she  coached  Ange- 
lina at  all,  could  only  do  so  whilst  herself  asleep,  he  habitually  locked 
and  sealed  Angelina  into  a  separate  room,  and  got  Signora  Annetta 
to  sleep  with  Signora  Maria,  so  as  to  detect  any  possible  somnambu- 
lism. This  nevertheless  was  not  reported.  He  moreover  prescribed 


100  EXPERIMENTAL   PSYCHOLOGY. 

dreams,  the  nature  of  whose  details  was  incommunicable  verbally, 
such  as  dreams  of  persons  shown  in  photograph  to  Maria-Elvira,  and 
afterwards  identified  in  photograph  by  the  child  as  having  been 
seen  in  dreams ;  or  dreams  of  instruments  pictured  in  manufacturers' 
catalogues,  and  similarly  discriminated  in  Maria's  absence  by  the 
child  from  amongst  other  figures  of  instruments  that  contained 
the  same  mechanical  elements  and  would  have  had  to  be  described  in 
the  same  words.  The  child's  accounts  also  made  it  clear  that  the 
suggestion,  whatever  it  was,  must  have  been  in  optical,  and  not  in 
verbal  terms ;  for  she  often  gave  circumstances  of  the  dream  in  words 
of  her  own  limited  experience  that  differed  from  the  names  used  in 
prescribing  the  dream — 'dog'  for  lamb,  e.  g.  (she  had  never  seen  a 
lamb);  chail'  for  snow;  4 dark  place  down  stairs'  for  cellar  (she 
had  never  been  in  a  cellar);  'tramway'  for  ship  (the  steamboats  at 
Venice  which  was  the  child's  home  are  known  as  tramways)  etc. 

Dr.  E's  conclusion  is  that  there  was  communication  between  the 
subliminal  selves  of  Angelina  and  Maria.  It  is  clear,  in  spite  of  the 
precautions  taken,  that  much  of  the  evidence  hinges  on  the  honesty  of 
Siga.  Maria  and  her  mother,  which  Dr.  Ermacora  says  it  is  impossi- 
ble for  him  to  doubt.  I,  knowing  Dr.  E.  personally,  and  having 
been  present  at  one  of  his  experiments,  do  not  doubt  his  honesty. 
He  is  a  trained  physicist,  author  of  a  thick  book  on  electricity,  and  pos- 
sesses an  unusual  experience  of  '  psychic '  phenomena,  and  a  shrewd 
mind  in  comparing  hypotheses.  The  editors  do  not  doubt  my  honesty, 
or  they  will  not  print  this  report.  But  the  facts  are  so  unprecedented 
that  the  whole  chain  of  honesties  will  seem  a  weak  one,  and  the  4  rig- 
orously scientific '  mind  will  exercise  its  natural  privilege,  and  doubt- 
less promptly  and  authoritatively  dismiss  the  narrative  as  '  rot.' 

W.  J. 


The  Present   Condition  of  Experimental  Psychology,  its  Methods 

and  its  Problems.  VICTOR  HENRI.  Woprosi  Philosophic. 
The  author  reviews  the  rapid  development  of  the  science,  closing 
the  paragraph  with  the  assertion  that  psychology  is  passing  through  a 
transition  stage  at  present,  in  which  the  school  of  Fechner  and  Wundt 
is  disappearing  and  new  school  takes  its  place.  The  first  experi- 
mental psychologists  arose  in  opposition  to  the  old  metaphysical  psy- 
chology, sought  to  place  the  science  on  a  similar  basis  with  the 
natural  sciences,  and  therefore  abandoned  the  use  of  self-observation, 
applied  physical  and  mathematical  laws  to  psychic  facts,  and  empha- 


PSYCHOLOGICAL  LITERATURE.  IOI 

sized  the  external  conditions  of  psychic  life.  The  result  was  auto- 
matic methods  and  results  which  include  much  hypothesis,  illustrated 
in  Weber's  experiments  in  skin-sensations  where  *  one  point '  or  *  two 
points '  were  the  only  answers  requested  or  allowed  to  the  experimen- 
ter's subject.  The  Psycho-Physic  of  Fechner  made  the  matter  worse, 
and  experiments  similar  to  Weber's  in  automatic  character  were  car- 
ried out  in  the  laboratories  of  Wundt  and  others.  In  1868  Bonder's 
reaction-time  experiments  opened  up  a  new  field  for  the  application 
of  these  methods  destitute  of  self-observation — a  field  which  was  rap- 
idly investigated  in  a  manner  prolific  of  results.  The  difference  be- 
tween sensory  and  motor  reactions,  discovered  by  Ludwig  Lange,  can 
never  be  explained,  says  the  author,  until  the  method  of  self-observa- 
tion is  again  resorted  to.  Following  these  experiments  came  others 
concerning  the  time-sense,  the  general  sense,  contrast,  after-images, 
abnormalities,  etc.,  all  carried  out  without  self-observation.  These 
experiments  were  chiefly  conducted  in  Germany  and  America,  where 
the  first  laboratory  was  founded  in  1883,  by  pupils  of  Fechner  and 
Wundt.  In  France  and  England  the  writings  of  Comte,  Hume,  Mill, 
Spencer,  Bain  and  Darwin  laid  the  foundation  for  psychology  which 
in  these  lands  did  not  come  to  such  sharp  opposition  to  the  old  meta- 
physical conceptions  and  never  neglected  self-observation  nor  ceased  to 
employ  it.  The  aim  in  these  countries  was,  through  experiments, 
to  establish  constancy  in  outer  conditions  and  so  to  secure  a  control 
for  self -observation.  Attention  was  chiefly  directed,  not  to  theories  of 
sensation  and  psychometry  as  in  Germany,  but  to  the  higher  psychic 
functions ;  for  example,  the  works  of  Spencer,  Bain,  Galton,  Sully, 
Charcot,  Ribot,  Binet  and  James.  In  France  attention  was  mostly 
given  to  pathological  states,  and  in  America  to  the  practical  applica- 
tion of  psychological  results  in  the  field  of  pedagogics.  Thus  we  see, 
writes  the  author,  how  a  German  school  whose  chief  representatives 
are  Fechner  and  Wundt  has  developed  side  by  side  with  a  French- 
English  school  whose  chief  representatives  are  Galton,  James,  Binet 
and  Ribot.  The  former  seeks  exactness  in  the  measurement  of  the 
simplest  processes,  investigates  small  details  and  neglects  self-observa- 
tion ;  the  latter  investigates  the  complex  processes,  gives  attention  to 
self-observation,  and  studies  psychic  phenomena  as  they  appear  in 
reality. 

The  author  seems  to  have  confused  experimental  psychology  with 
psychology  as  a  general  discipline,  forgetting  that  the  writings  of  Prof. 
Wundt,  and  his  pupils  are  by  no  means  confined  to  the  experimental 
branch  of  the  subject.  The  fact  that  he  is  the  representative  of  a  con- 


102  EXPERIMENTAL  PSYCHOLOGY. 

ception  of  the  will  which  some  have  designated  metaphysical  is 
enough  to  establish  for  him  a  relation  to  general  psychology.  It  is 
not  true  that  his  work  has  been  confined  to  the  4  measurement  of  the 
simplest  processes  to  little  things  and  details.'  On  the  other  hand, 
how  can  the  author  classify  such  writers  as  Spencer,  Comte  and  Mill 
as  experimental  psychologists,  or  even  founders  of  experimental  psy- 
chology ?  The  two  volumes  of  Spencer's  Principles  of  Psychology  do 
not  contain  a  single  psychological  experiment,  properly  so  called.  The 
same  is,  in  general,  true  of  Comte,  Bain  and  Sully.  The  author  finds 
that  in  this  French-English  school  alone,  self-observance  has  been 
used  and  given  its  due  importance.  But  looking  at  the  works  of  the 
authors  cited,  what  is  the  fact?  The  relative  importance  of  self- 
observance  and  experiment  in  psychology  is  seldom,  if  ever,  discussed. 
The  System  of  Logic  of  J.  S.  Mill  emphasizes  the  importance  of  ex- 
periment in  all  empirical  sciences,  but  aside  from  this,  what  is  there  ? 
Experimental  psychology  has  been  comparatively  little  pursued  in 
England.  Comte  denied  the  possibility  of  direct  self-observation  and 
with  it  the  possibility  of  such  a  science  as  psychology.  Locke  and 
Hume  can  be  classed  as  experimental  psychologists  as  well  as  Mill, 
Comte,  Bain,  Sully  or  Spencer. 

Furthermore,  the  author  somewhat  misrepresents  the  psychological 
work  done  in  America,  in  speaking  of  it  as  a  practical  application  of 
psychological  results  to  pedagogics.  He  seems  to  forget  that  Prof. 
James,  whom  he  classes  with  the  French-English  school  is  an  Ameri- 
can, that  the  latest  and  most  adequate  discussion  of  the  philogenesis 
and  ontogenesis  of  mind  is  from  the  pen  of  Prof.  Baldwin,  and  that 
Ladd  has  probably  done  more  work  in  physiological  and  experimental 
psychology  than  any  other  English  writer. 

The  author's  representation  of  the  German  4  school  of  Fechner 
and  Wundt,'  as  omitting  all  self-observation  in  their  methods,  is  surely 
inaccurate,  to  say  the  least.  Space  cannot  be  taken  to  quote  from  the 
many  utterances  of  Wundt  in  the  Theorie  der  Sinneswahrnehmung, 
in  the  Grundziige,  in  the  Menschen  und  Thierseele,  and  in  the  Philo- 
sophische  Studien,  all  mentioning  experiment  as  a  help,  a  means 
of  regulating  and  controling  self-observation.  Looking  alone  at  the 
experiments  which  are  conducted  in  Prof.  Wundt's  Institute,  as  well 
as  at  those  proposed  but  rejected,  it  is  clear  that  the  primal  requisite 
to  successful  experimentation  is,  to  his  mind,  that  all  the  conditions  of 
the  state  or  process  to  be  investigated  be  subject  to  the  control  of  the 
observer,  so  that  the  experimenter  is  not  left  to  choose  any  one  of  a 
number  of  unknown  processes  in  forming  his  judgment,  thus  introduc- 


PSYCHOLOGICAL   LITERATURE.  103 

ing  an  equal  number  of  unknown  variable  factors  into  the  results. 
Just  in  this  requisite,  that  the  method  of  self  observation  be  known,  lies 
the  limitation  of  experimental  psychology.  In  Prof.  Wundt's  words, 
4  only  those  psychic  phenomena  can  be  influenced  through  experiment 
which  are  open  to  direct  physical  influence.'  *  *  *  *  Every  psycho- 
logical is  therefore  at  the  same  time  a  physiological  experiment,  just 
as  there  are  physical  processes  corresponding  to  the  psychic  processes 
of  sensation,  representation  and  will."1  The  object  of  Prof.  Wundt 
has  never  been,  as  is  here  represented,  merely  to  minimize  the  impor- 
tance and  the  actual  use  of  self  observation ;  but  rather  to  control  and 
systematize  it.  A  psychology  totally  devoid  of  self-observation  is  im- 
possible. The  author  has  exaggerated  some  features  of  experiments 
in  Wundt's  Institute  and  made  it  appear  that  the  value  of  self-observa- 
tion is  here  unrecognized  and  its  necessity  denied.  Probably  no 
method  other  than  Wundt's,  or  one  in  all  essentials  similar  to  his, 
could  have  been  adopted  in  investigating  the  phenomena  which  he 
has  investigated. 

At  best  the  author's  division  of  psychologists  on  the  basis  of  the 
principle  of  self-observation  is  not  a  happy  one.  Would  not  some 
such  division  as  the  following  be  better :  I.  Psychology  of  the  nature 
and  relations  of  the  functions  of  adult  consciousness,  including  (i) 
general  psychology  of  individuals,  psychometry,  psycho-physic,  physi- 
ological psychology,  etc.,  and  (2)  psychology  of  races  and  crowds; 
and  II.  Psychology  of  the  development  of  consciousness,  (i)  in  the 
race  and  (2)  in  the  child? 

The  author  divides  methods  on  the  basis  of  the  steps  involved,  and 
not  on  the  basis  of  the  nature  of  the  objects  investigated,  into  eight 
classes.  ( i )  Experiments  where  one  stimulus  is  given  and  the  experi- 
menter simply  reports  what  he  experiences.  Such  are  all  threshold 
determinations,  experiments  concerning  the  clearness  of  perception, 
the  analysis  of  musical  cords  into  single  tones,  elementary  experiments 
in  aesthetic  pleasures,  the  localization  of  tones  and  localization  in  gen- 
eral, etc.  (2)  Two  stimuli  are  given,  either  simultaneously  or  suc- 
cessively, for  comparison,  as  in  experiments  concerning  the  sensibility 
to  difference  (Unterschiedsemfindlichkeit) ,  etc.  (3)  Several  stimuli 
are  given  and  the  experimenter  is  asked  to  choose  one  possessing  a  cer- 
tain characteristic.  (4)  The  experimenter  has  a  certain  movement  to 
make,  either  as  he  chooses  or  as  directed,  to  a  given  stimulus — psycho- 
metry and  muscular-contraction  experiments.  (5)  A  copy  is  given 
and  the  experimenter  repeats  or  imitates  it,  or  seeks  another  which 

1Menschen  und  Thierseele  (1892),  pp.  u,  12. 


104  EXPERIMENTAL  PSYCHOLOGY. 

stands  in  a  given  relation  to  it,  as  in  memory  drawings,  and  the  locali- 
zation of  a  stimulated  spot  of  skin.  (6)  A  series  of  objects  given  to 
be  arranged  in  a  certain  order. 

These  six  classes  embrace  all  the  psychological  experiments  which 
are  possible.  Two  others  which  are  properly  physiological  are  con" 
ducted  by  means  of  psychological  observations.  (7)  Reflex  and 
voluntary  movements  which  follow  certain  stimuli.  (8)  Pure  self- 
observation,  where,  e.  g.,  one  requests  an  author  to  describe  his 
methods  of  work 

The  author  next  discusses  the  method  of  gathering  together  an- 
swers and  working  out  the  results.  The  experiment  is  always  influ- 
enced by  factors  dependent  upon  the  observer,  upon  the  experimenter, 
or  upon  accidents.  Each  such  factor  is  to  be  investigated  together 
with  their  relations  of  mutual  interdependence,  and  they  thus  furnish 
principles  for  the  gathering  together  of  results.  In  skin  experiment, 
e.  g.,  the  strength  of  the  stimulus,  the  strength  of  the  sensation,  the 
character  of  the  sensation,  the  concentration  of  attention,  the  knowl- 
edge and  previous  experience  of  the  observer,  etc.,  are  all  to  be  con- 
sidered. Each  factor  in  turn  is  to  be  altered  while  the  others  remain 
constant.  As  a  matter  of  fact,  the  others  do  not  remain  unchanged 
from  one  experiment  to  another.  Habit,  adaptation,  weariness,  vari- 
ations of  attention,  etc.,  make  it  impossible  to  retain  them  all  un- 
changed ;  and  this  makes  it  necessary  that  the  observer  alter  his  plan 
and  method  somewhat  with  each  new  experiment,  and  exercise  the 
utmost  possible  care  and  foresight.  After  each  experiment  any 
unusual  experiences  or  side-factors  should  be  described  ;  but  questions 
must  not  be  asked  in  a  fixed  order  or  number,  as  this  leads  the  experi- 
menter to  devote  his  attention  to  these  side  phenomena  and  thus  pre- 
vent the  normal  progress  of  the  experiments. 

In  the  choice  of  experimenters  it  should  be  remembered  that  some 
have  prejudices  either  as  to  the  experiments  or  the  method  ;  some  soon 
form  a  theory  as  to  the  problem  investigated  and  answer  according  to 
their  theory ;  and  very  many  are  curious  to  know  results  and  accord- 
ingly ask  questions  in  regard  to  them.  Among  the  general  conditions 
are  to  be  mentioned  variations  of  the  attention,  adaptation  through 
exercise  and  practice,  knowledge  of  the  object  and  of  the  method,  the 
mood  of  the  experimenter,  sleep,  hypnotism  and  many  others. 

The  problems  of  experimental  psychology  are  represented  as  (i) 
to  describe  psychic  phenomena  as  accurately  and  completely  as  pos- 
sible under  different  conditions,  (2)  their  relations  of  interdependence, 
(3)  their  influence  on  each  other,  and  (4)  their  relation  to  outer  pro- 


PSYCHOLOGICAL  LITERATURE.  105 

cesses.  One  may  investigate  these  problems  (i)  in  respect  to  those 
processes  which  are  common  to  all  men;  (2)  among  processes  which 
are  shared  only  by  particular  classes  of  human  beings,  children,  the 
abnormal,  the  extremely  aged,  etc. ;  (3)  with  regard  to  the  individual 
differences  of  men  in  their  psychic  processes.  The  first  group  of  the 
last  classification  embraces  the  whole  of  general  psychology ;  the  last 
two,  individual  psychology.  G.  TAWNKY. 

LEIPZIG. 


Der  Hypnotismus.  Seine  psycho-physiologische,  medicinische, 
strafrechtliche  Bedeutung  und  seine  Behandlung.  AUGUST 
FOREL.  3.  verbesserte  Auflage  mit  Annotationen  von  Dr.  O.  Vogt. 
Stuttgart,  Verl.  v.  Ferdinand  Enke.  1895. 

In  the  new  and  enlarged  edition  of  the  work  of  this  well-known 
author  special  reference  must  be  made  to  the  annotations  written  by 
Dr.  Oscar  Vogt,  of  Leipzig,  a  pupil  of  Forel's,  in  which  he — an  ad- 
herent like  Forel  of  the  so-called  association  psychology — endeavors 
to  explain  the  effects  of  suggestion  as  arising  from  the  brain  mechan- 
ism. It  is,  doubtless,  well  known  that  to  Prof.  Forel  are  due  in  a 
great  measure  the  scientific  diffusion  and  increased  recognition  of  the 
suggestion  theory  in  Germany,  as  well  as  the  destruction  of  the  Charcot 
theory.  Since  he  first  became  interested  in  the  subject  through  Bern- 
heim,  he  has  fought  with  indefatigable  zeal  on  the  side  of  the  school 
of  Nancy.  This  work,  written  in  the  same  spirit,  forces  the  convic- 
tion upon  the  reader  that  the  author  is  sure  of  himself  and  that 
entire  recognition  of  his  point  of  view  is  no  longer  far  distant. 
The  great  value  of  the  book  lies  in  its  practical  usefulness.  The 
author  understands  how  to  initiate  the  beginner  in  the  clearest  and 
most  intelligible  way  in  the  practical  management  of  all  branches  of 
the  theory  of  suggestion  with  reference  at  the  same  time  to  all  related 
literature.  There  can  be  no  doubt  but  that  this  new  edition  of  his 
work  will  win  new  friends  for  both  author  and  subject  far  beyond  the 
bounds  of  his  native  country.  Besides  the  practical  introduction  to 
the  subject  itself,  the  author  presents  a  theory  of  consciousness  on 
which  he  lays  great  stress,  rightly  holding  a  psychological  comprehen- 
sion of  hypnotism  indispensable  to  the  successful  execution  of  hypnotic 
experiments.  Forel  holds  monistic  views.  Conciousness  is  to  him 
only  '  the  subjective  form  of  appearance  of  the  activity  of  the  nerves,' 
or  '  the  inner  reflection  of  a  part  of  the  activity  of  our  cerebrum.' 
"Living  nerve-substance,  nerve-activity  and  consciousness  are  only 


106  VISION. 

three  forms  of  appearance  of  the  same  thing  in  relation  to  us,  analyti- 
cally abstracted  by  us  and  in  no  way  differing  from  each  other.  Sub- 
jectivism, power  and  matter  are  in  essence  the  same  and  appear  on 
earth  in  their  most  perfect  and  complicated  form  as  cerebrum  and  the 
soul  of  man."  Without  entering  fully  into  these  questions,  I  may 
remark  respecting  the  theory  of  consciousness  and  the  psychological 
deductions  of  the  work  that,  holding  other  fundamental  views,  I  can- 
not agree  in  all  particulars  with  the  explanations  and  consequences 
either  of  Forel  or  of  Vogt,  notwithstanding  that  to  the  latter  I  owe 
personal  thanks  for  some  enlightenment  as  to  the  nature  of  hypnotism. 
In  conclusion  I  refer  the  reader  to  Wundt's  'Hypnotismus  and  Sugges- 
tion,' a  work,  I  may  here  add,  described  by  Dr.  O.  Vogt  also  in  his 
latest  publication  (Zeitschrift  fur  Hypnotismus,  etc.,  Ill,  Juli-Sept.- 
Heft.)  as  of  the  highest  importance. 

LEIPZIG.  FRIEDR.  KIESOW. 

VISION. 

Die  Arten  des  Sehpurpurs  in  der  Wirbelthierreihe.  ELSE  KOTT- 
GEN  und  DR.  GEORG  ABELSDORFF.  Sitzungsber.  der  Akad.  d. 
Wissensch.  zu  Berlin,  25.  Juli,  1895. 

It  is  known  that  there  is  more  than  one  form  of  the  visual  purple, 
but  Kiihne  was  not  able  to  determine  whether  the  different  forms  con- 
sist of  two  definite  types  or  whether  there  are  intermediate  stages. 
Miss  Kottgen  and  Dr.  Abelsdorff  now  show  that  the  former  is  the 
case.  They  examined  specimens  of  all  the  classes  of  vertebrates — 
sixteen  species  in  all — and  they  find  very  close  coincidence  in  the  ab- 
sorption curve  of  the  fishes,  on  the  one  hand  (of  which  eight  different 
kinds  were  examined),  and  of  all  the  other  vertebrates,  including  man, 
on  the  other  hand ;  for  the  other  vertebrates  the  maximum  absorption 
is  at  500  ftp,  and  for  the  fishes  at  540  ^/,  more  in  the  yellow  green, 
corresponding  to  the  fact  that  is  more  bluish  in  appearance.  The 
fact  that  there  is  no  visual  purple  in  the  rodless  retinas  of  most  rep- 
tiles they  confirmed  in  the  case  of  the  turtle — even  a  concentrated 
solution  of  sixteen  retinas,  extracted  with  the  greatest  care  in  red 
light,  gave  no  trace  of  it.  The  reptiles  which  have  rods,  the  chame- 
leon, the  crocodile  and  the  boa,  they  did  not  examine  on  account  of 
the  costliness  of  the  material.  [The  reviewer  does  not  find  that  the 
absorption  spectrum  of  sea  water  has  been  determined.  It  would  be 
interesting  if  it  should  turn  out  that  the  agent  for  absorption  in  the 
eye  of  fishes  is  adapted  to  the  light  to  be  absorbed  in  deep  water, 
which  is  the  fish's  darkness.] 


PSYCHOLOGICAL  LITERATURE.  107 

Sur  la  theorie  de  la  vision  des  couleurs.    DUFOUR.    Congres  intern. 

de  m^decine.     Rome.      1894. 

This  paper  deserves  mention  as  one  more  instance  of  the  apparent 
impossibility  of  bringing  about  a  widespread  knowledge  of  facts  of 
color-vision  which  ought  by  this  time  to  be  the  property  of  everyone, 
at  least,  who  writes  upon  the  subject.  Dufour  had  several  cases  of 
total  color-blindness,  and  by  experiments  in  the  sorting  of  colored 
wools  in  accordance  with  their  brightness,  and  by  unquantitative  esti- 
mations of  the  brightness  of  the  different  parts  of  the  spectrum,  he 
conies  to  the  conclusion  that  the  brightness'  maximum  for  the  totally 
color-blind  lies  in  the  green.  But  it  has  already  been  shown  by  Her- 
ing  and  Hillebrand,  and  by  Konig  and  Dieterici,  by  means  of  the  most 
accurate  measurements,  not  only  that  the  maximum  is  in  the  green, 
but  that  it  is  at  a  definite  wave-length  in  the  green.  The  author  then 
maintains  that  upon  the  theory  of  Hering,  according  to  which  only  the 
sensations  of  black  and  white  and  their  mixtures  remain  in  cases  of 
total  color-blindness,  it  is  impossible  to  explain  why  the  maximum 
should  fall  in  the  green ;  he  does  not  say,  however,  why  we  should 
find  it  any  more  easy  to  explain  its  falling  in  any  other  part  of  the 
spectrum.  The  fact  in  question  is,  according  to  Dufour,  readily  ex- 
plained upon  the  theory  of  Helmholtz,  with  the  aid  of  the  assumption 
that  what  the  individuals  in  question  see  is  really  green  and  not  grey. 
In  saying  this  the  writer  merely  shows  that  he  is  unaware  that  we  all 
have  this  same  colorless  scale  of  sensation  in  a  faint  illumination,  and 
in  the  periphery  of  the  eye  at  all  illuminations,  and  that  its  curve  of 
distribution  through  the  spectrum  is  coincident  with  that  of  the  color- 
blind. It  would,  therefore,  be  impossible  to  suppose  that  the  sen- 
sation of  the  totally  color-blind  is  green,  even  if  it  were  not  for  the 
fact  that  we  have  cases  of  monocular  total  color-blindness,  in  which  it 
is  known  to  be  grey;  and  Helmholtz  himself  had,  in  fact,  long  ago 
virtually  given  up  this  position.  It  is  far  more  important  that  who- 
ever argues  the  intricate  question  of  color-vision  should  argue  within 
the  bounds  of  easily  accessible  facts,  and  also  of  elementary  principles 
of  logic,  than  that  the  theories  of  Hering  or  of  Helmholtz,  inadequate 
as  they  are,  should  be  disproved  in  the  briefest  possible  time. 

As  this  was  the  only  contribution  to  color  theory  made  by  the  Con- 
gress at  Rome,  and  as  it  was  received  without  discussion,  apparently, 
it  would  not  seem  to  indicate  a  very  great  interest  on  the  part  of  phy- 
sicians in  color  sensations  or  in  their  theoretical  handling. 

£tude  sur  les  Cones  et  les  bdtonnets  dans  la  region  de  la  fovea 
centralis  de  la  retine  chez  Fhomme  W.  KOSTER  (Utrecht) .  Arch. 
d'Ophtalm.  V.  428-437.  July,  1895. 


108  MEMORY. 

Koster  has  considered  it  to  be  desirable,  before  finishing  his  study 
of  the  Purkinje  phenomenon,  to  re-examine  the  retina  carefully  with  the 
purpose  of  determining  the  exact  extent  of  the  coneless  region  about  the 
fovea;  this  has  been  done  hitherto  only  incidentally,  as  it  is  only 
since  controversy  has  arisen  as  to  whether  the  rods  alone  are  the  seat 
of  the  Purkinje  phenomenon  or  not,  that  the  subject  has  been  of  so 
much  importance.  Koster  had  only  a  small  amount  of  very  good  ma- 
terial, but  the  material  is  so  difficult  to  get  (it  is  useless  to  examine  an 
eye  so  late  as  two  hours  after  death)  that  he  publishes  his  method  at 
once  in  order  that  others  may  be  spared  the  loss  of  time  involved  in 
tentative  experimenting.  His  conclusions,  based  upon  four  cases, 
are  as  follows : 

Region  in  which  the  cones  dominate  (diam.) 8  mm. 

Region  in  which  there  are  no  cones  at  all 5  mm. 

Bed  of  the  fovea .2  mm. 

Dimmer  gives  1.4  to  2  mm  as  the  diameter  of  the  fovea,  but  he 
counts  from  the  beginning  of  the  declivity.  Koster  reserves  discus- 
sion of  this  result  until  a  later  occasion. 

Die   Cardinalpunkte  des  Auges  fur  Verschiedenfarbiges  Licht. 
W.  EINTHOVEN.     Pfliiger's  Archiv.,  LXI.      1895. 

The  effect  of  dispersion  upon  the  cardinal  points  of  the  eye  has 
not  been  calculated  except  in  the  case  of  the  focal  points,  and  in  that 
case  only  for  Listing's  reduced  eye  with  one  refracting  surface.  In 
view  of  recent  discussion  by  Schapringer,  Konig  and  others,  Einthoven 
has  found  it  desirable  to  carry  out  the  entire  calculation  for  the  actual 
eye.  Of  chief  importance  for  the  phenomena  of  color  diffusion  in  the 
eye  is  the  position  of  the  second  nodal  point  and  of  the  second  focal 
point.  He  finds  that  the  former  is  for  blue  rays  3^  in  front  of  its 
position  for  yellow  rays,  a  difference  so  small  that  it  can  be  neglected 
in  cases  where  a  relative  change  of  position  of  differently  colored  ret- 
inal images  is  to  be  investigated.  The  distance  between  the  focal 
points  for  blue  light  and  for  red  light  is  .248  mm.,  as  against  .193  for 
the  reduced  eye. 

C.  LADD  FRANKLIN. 

BALTIMORE,  MD. 

MEMORY. 

On  Memory  and  the  Specific  Energies  of  the  Nervous   System. 
PROFESSOR  EWALD    HERING.     Eng.   trans.     *     *     *     Chicago 
Open  Court  Publishing  Company.      1895.     Pp.  50. 
This  is  a  good  translation  of  two  brief  essays,  the  first  being  a 


PSYCHOLOGICAL  LITERATURE.  109 

popular  address  delivered  in  1870  before  the  Imperial  Academy  at 
Vienna.  Like  all  of  Hering's  work,  it  is  vigorous  and  suggestive,  and 
will  prove  especially  so  to  lay  readers.  To  those  at  all  closely  in 
touch  with  contemporary  psychology  it  will  possess  little  interest  be- 
yond that  which  always  attaches  to  a  clear  statement  of  any  doctrine, 
for  most  of  its  contents  concern  matters  which  are  to-day  psychologi- 
cal commonplace.  The  general  thesis  is  the  dependence  of  repro- 
ductive mental  processes,  both  sensory  and  motor,  upon  the  retention 
in  protoplasmic  structures,  such  as  the  nervous  system,  of  modifica- 
tions occasioned  by  previous  experiences.  The  important  distinction 
between  the  mere  reproduction,  or  representation,  of  mental  states  and 
the  reproductions  of  true  memory — in  Prof.  James'  sense,  for  instance, 
involving  the  conscious  recognition  that  the  reproduced  fact  has  been 
a  part  of  one's  own  past  experience  at  a  definite  time — is  never  al- 
luded to.  The  point,  so  often  misty  in  other  writers,  is  clearly  made, 
that  unconscious  memory  ( ?)  and  unconscious  mental  ( ?)  processes 
are  simply  tantamount  to  neural  activities  of  such  character  and  inten- 
sity as  do  not  awaken  their  counterparts  in  consciousness.  In  the 
broad  sense  all  organic  structures  manifest  a  kind  of  memory,  in  so 
far  as  they  retain  the  modifications  of  past  experience.  The  more  per- 
manent among  these  modifications  occurring  in  the  nervous  system  are 
transmitted  from  generation  to  generation,  emerging  in  the  new-born 
individual  as  instinctive  acts — a  statement  which  may  require  to  be 
edited  anew  in  the  light  of  Weismann's  work. 

In  the  second  essay,  which  is  much  less  clearly  written,  the  prob- 
lem of  the  specific  energies  of  the  nerves  is  discussed  more  or  less  in 
the  light  of  the  foregoing  doctrine.  The  author  apparently  posits 
ultimate  and  specific  differences  of  function  as  properties  of  proto- 
plasm, which  differences  are  called  out,  developed,  and  at  length 
firmly  embedded  in  the  growing  nervous  system  through  the  agency 
of  repeated  stimulations  of  similar  character.  The  manifold  views  of 
other  writers  upon  this  topic  gain  no  notice,  and  some  of  the  state- 
ments made  are  flatly  contradictory  of  the  widely-credited  work  of 
other  scientists — for  instance,  Goldscheider's  work  on  temperature 
sensations.  Still,  it  is  all  very  entertaining,  and  we  venture  to  hope 
the  translator  will  see  fit  to  render  accessible  to  English  readers  Her- 
ing's much  more  important  work  upon  the  color  sense. 

UNIVERSITY  OF  CHICAGO.  JAMES  R.  ANGELL. 


HO  EXPERIMENTAL. 


EXPERIMENTAL. 

Observations  comparatives  sur  la  reconnaissance,  la  discrimina- 
tion et  I 'association.  B.  BOURDON.  Revue  philosophique, 
XX.  154-185.  August,  1895. 

As  the  title  indicates  M.  Bourdon  proposed  to  investigate  the  inter- 
relations of  recognition,  discrimination  and  association,  but  the  result 
is  rather  three  minor  studies. 

(1)  Recognition.     Series  of  words,  or  letters,  were  read  aloud 
in  which  one  of  the  words  occurring  near  the  beginning  of  the  series 
was  repeated  later  on,  and  the  number  of  times  its  occurrence  was 
recognized  was  determined.     Thus,  for  example,  in  a  series  in  which 
the  word  restaurant  was  the  fifth  of  the  series  and  again  the  twenty- 
second  it  was  recognized  60  times  in  65   trials.     The  word  was  of 
course  more  likely  to  be  recognized  if  first  in  the  series  or  if  the  inter- 
vening words  were  few.     Words  were  more  likely  to  be  recognized 
than  letters,  and  dissyllables  than  monosyllables.     A  word  is  more 
likely  to  be  recognized  if  interesting,  and  thus  the  method  may  be 
used  to  determine  what  ideas  are  of  most  interest.     It  would  seem  that 
those  concerned  with  eating  and  drinking  attract  the  attention  most 
forcibly. 

(2)  Discrimination.     Three  series  of  printed  letters  were  used — 
one  a  passage  from  a  book,  one  of  letters  1.75   mm.  high  not  mak- 
ing words  and  one  of  letters  1.25  mm.  high  not  making  words,  and 
the  observer  was  required  to  mark  as  many  letters  of  a  given  sort  as 
he  could  in  four  minutes.     Thus  for  example  in  four  minutes  1,693 
letters  were  read,  and  216  of  the  223  a's  were  marked.     When  it  was 
necessary  to  mark  six  different  letters  503  letters  were  read  and  255  of 
those  273  occurring  were  marked.     The  size  of  the  letters  did  not  make 
any  evident   difference.     M.  Bourdon  concludes  that  the    letters  not 
marked  take  up  about  one-tenth  as  much  time  as  those  marked.     He 
notes  the  interesting  fact  that  most  observers  can  mark  all  the  a's  in  a 
list  more  quickly  than  they  can  discriminate  all  the  letters,  and  attrib- 
utes this  to  the  circumstance  that  in  discriminating  the  letters  there  is 
with  most  observers  a  tendency  to  articulate  them.     This,  however,  is 
probably  not  the  correct  explanation.     The  present  writer  has  found 
that  observers  can  discriminate  and  articulate  about  six  letters  per  sec. 
when  the  letters  make  words,  and  about  three  letters  per  sec.  when 
they  do  not  make  words.     The  rate  is  limited  by  the  time  of  discrimi- 
nation, not  by  the  time  of  articulation,  which  is  reflex  and  overlaps  the 
discrimination  of  the  following  letters.     Observers  can  mark  100  A's 


PSYCHOLOGICAL  LITERATURE.  Ill 

on  a  list  of  500  letters  at  the  rate  of  about  one  per  sec.,  in  which  case 
they  must  cursorily  discriminate  about  four  letters  per  sec.  in  addition 
to  the  A's.  This  cursory  discrimination  consists  in  seeing  that  a  letter 
is  not  A,  which  is  easier  than  seeing  what  letter  it  is.  In  making  the 
experiment  the  A's  seem  to  stand  out  from  an  undiscriminated  complex. 
In  reading  proof  one  can  often  see  an  inaccurately  printed  word  by 
glancing  at  a  page,  and  one  can  see  that  the  word  is  incorrect  before 
one  recognizes  the  nature  of  the  error. 

(3)  Association.  M.  Bourdon  collected  verbal  associations  on  the 
familiar  lines  of  exhibiting  words  and  letting  the  observer  write  down 
the  suggested  words.  He  classifies  the  results  according  to  the  per- 
centages of  nouns,  verbs  and  adjectives  suggested,  which  would 
scarcely  seem  to  be  as  satisfactory  as  the  classifications  used  in  similar 
experiments  by  others.  M.  Bourdon  concludes  that  students  of  letters 
show  greater  versatility,  and  students  of  science  greater  stability,  in 
their  associations. 

It  will  be  seen  that  M.  Bourdon's  experiments  are  of  interest,  but 
they  were  not  conducted  nor  are  they  described  in  accordance  with 
what  the  present  writer  regards  as  the  best  scientific  method.  Basing 
new  work  on  work  already  accomplished,  and  giving  such  statement 
of  results  as  may  be  the  basis  of  further  work,  is  the  method  that 
advances  science.  J.  McK.  C. 

De  ly influence  de  la  perception  visuelle  des  corps  sur  leur  poids 
apparent.  TH.  FLOURNOY.  L'Anne"e  psychologique,  1894.  L, 
198-208. 

Although  psychologists  generally  agree  in  discarding  innervation 
sensations,  says  M.  Flournoy,  yet  the  immediate  knowledge  of  the 
outgo  of  energy  in  voluntary  effort  seems  so  directly  evident  to  con- 
sciousness, that  there  is  a  call  for  some  thorough  and  crucial  demon- 
stration of  its  fallacy,  apart  from  pathological  cases.  For  this  pur- 
pose the  writer  selected  ten  objects  of  different  sizes,  but  exactly  the 
same  weight  (112  grams);  the  largest  was  a  wooden  box  of  2,100 
cu.  cm.  content,  the  smallest  a  metal  case  of  10  cu.  cm.  filled  with 
lead.  The  subjects  (50  in  number,  in  the  first  set  of  experiments) 
were  asked  to  arrange  the  objects  in  order  of  weight.  The  wooden  box 
was  judged  lightest  by  84%  ;  the  next  largest  article  was  given  second 
place  by  50%  ;  and  throughout  the  series  the  average  judgment  made 
the  object  heavier  as  it  decreased  in  size,  the  metal  case  being  placed 
last  by  90%.  The  individual  variations  show,  however,  that  habitual 
associations  also  affect  the  judgment  of  certain  objects. 


112  EXPERIMENTAL. 

To  eliminate  any  possible  effect  from  the  area  of  skin  touched, 
M.  Flournoy  devised  a  second  set  of  tests,  in  which  the  weights  were 
lifted  only  by  means  of  a  string  and  ring.  Out  of  31  persons,  29 
placed  the  box  first  (i.  <?.,  as  lightest),  and  30  placed  the  metal  case 
last.  These  results  directly  contradict  those  reported  by  Charpentier, 
in  the  Arch,  de  Physiologic  (1891,  p.  127).  On  closing  the  eyes,  the 
difference  disappeared. 

Of  44  persons  asked  to  state  the  weight  of  the  objects,  the  average 
made  the  (supposed)  heaviest  253  g.  and  the  lightest  52  g.  The  diver- 
gence was  greater  in  women  than  in  men,  and  in  literary  men  than  in 
scientists.  Of  30  asked  to  assign  the  relative  weight,  the  average 
made  the  (supposed)  heaviest  5.2  times  the  weight  of  the  lightest; 
but  when  asked  to  add  weights  to  the  lightest  till  it  equalled  the  heavi- 
est, the  average  result  was  a  mere  doubling  of  its  weight. 

The  illusion  persists  even  after  its  illusory  character  is  known ;  it 
is  present  in  'persons  of  every  age.  It  is  shown  to  be  due  to  the 
volume  of  the  object,  rather  than  the  area  of  contact.  Finally,  it  is  a 
direct  argument  against  the  innervation  feelings,  which  ought  to  cor- 
rect or  even  over-balance  such  an  error  of  judgment.  As  an  impor- 
tant datum  bearing  on  the  subject,  I  should  suggest  to  M.  Flournoy 
that  he  examine  the  case  of  postal  clerks,  who  are  commonly  supposed 
to  be  able  to  detect  slight  differences  of  weight  by  mere  lifting. 

PRINCETON.  H.  C.  WARREN. 

Recherches  graphiques  sur  la  musique.    A.  BINET  ET  J.  COURTIER. 

Revue  Scientifique,  6  Juillet,  1895. 

MM.  Binet  and  Courtier  have  devised  an  apparatus  for  recording 
the  normal  movements  of  piano  players  which  promises  results  valu- 
able to  both  music  and  psychology.  It  consists  of  a  rubber  tube  six 
millimeters  in  diameter  running  along  directly  under  the  keys  and 
connected  at  both  ends  with  an  elastic  drum  which  carries  the  record- 
ing style.  The  tracing  is  taken,  as  usual,  on  smoked  paper.  Errors  that 
might  arise  from  inertia  of  the  apparatus  are  avoided  by  inserting  in 
the  tube  a  diaphragm  with  capillary  opening.  When  a  key  is  struck 
the  style  is  deflected  in  such  a  way  that  the  height  of  the  deflection  is 
proportional  to  the  force  of  the  pressure;  the  length  of  the  deflection 
records  the  time;  and  finally  the  form  of  the  curve  gives  a  detailed 
account  of  the  manner  in  which  the  movement  was  carried  out.  The 
whole  apparatus  is  out  of  the  player's  sight  and  the  tube  is  so  adjusted 
that  it  does  not  increase  appreciably  the  resistance  of  the  keys,  thus 
insuring  entirely  normal  movements. 


PSYCHOLOGICAL  LITERATURE.  113 

A  number  of  interesting  results  are  described,  showing  that  irregu- 
larities which  escape  even  trained  ears  are  plainly  seen  in  the  curves 
and  that  the  differences  which  distinguish  good  execution  from  poor 
are  easily  studied. 

A  series  of  experiments  made  with  this  apparatus  will  be  reported 
in  the  next  number  of  l'Anne"e  psycho logique.  C.  H.  JUDD. 

LEIPZIG. 

THE  FEELINGS. 

Review  of  A.  Lekmann's  Work,  '  Die  Hauptgesetze  des  Mensch- 
lichen  Gefuhlslebens.'  TH.  LIPPS.  Gottingsehen  gelehrten  An- 
zeigen,  1894,  Nr.  2,  pp.  85-117. 

A  strongly  written  attack  on  the  '  Lange- James '  theory  of  emo- 
tion, Lipps  maintaining  that  the  primary  psychological  phenomenon 
in  feeling  is  always  the  disturbance  produced  by  the  stimulus  upon  the 
Subject's  system  of  ideas.  The  consequent  bodily  alterations  hardly 
contribute  at  all  to  the  emotion  properly  so-called,  since  the  sensations 
which  they  yield  are  easily  distinguished  therefrom,  as  when  Lipps 
himself  is  so  '  touched '  with  sympathetic  happiness  in  reading  of 
romantic  situations  that  he  gets  a  distinctly  painful  constriction  of  the 
throat,  which  not  only  does  not  constitute,  but  positively  conflicts  with 
his  emotional  happiness.  Moreover,  if  feelings  were  made  of  sensa- 
tions, how  could  a  c  self '  arise  ?  A  certain  group  of  sensations  makes 
my  body,  because  it  is  tied  to  feelings  and  strivings.  These  latter  are 
the  immediate  /,  and  render  mine  whatever  sensational  content  they 
go  with,  rendering  alien  whatever  sensational  content  they  separate 
from.  They  cannot  themselves  be  sensational  content.  W.  J. 

Les  emotions :  Etude  psycho-physiologique.  Lange.  Trad.  Francaise 

de  G.  DUMAS.     Paris,  Alcan.     1895.     Pp.  198. 

A  few  words  only  are  needed  to  anounce  the  French  translation  of 
this  well-known  book  for  the  theory  of  emotions,  which  it  elaborates, 
is  at  present  causing  much  discussion  among  psychologists.  It  is, 
however,  interesting  to  note  that  the  principal  argument  by  which 
Lange  seeks  to  prove  that  the  emotions  are  the  result  of  vasomotor 
changes  is  that  it  is  incontestable  that  many  emotions  have  a  purely 
physical  cause ;  for  example,  the  exhilaration  due  to  wine,  the  excite- 
ment and  anger  produced  by  certain  drugs  and  the  various  emo- 
tions which  in  many  diseases  accompany  abnormal  conditions  of  the 
body.  It  would  seem  that  the  critics  of  the  new  theory  of  Lange 
and  of  James  have  not  taken  sufficient  account  of  this  argument. 

A.  B. 


H4        THE   CONSCIENCE,    ITS  NATURE  AND   ORIGIN. 

The  Conscience,  Its  Nature  and  Origin.     WILLIAM  W.  CARLILE. 

International  Journal  of  Ethics,  October,  1895.     Pp.  63-77. 

This  article  is  in  the  main  a  protest  against  the  view  of  Herbert 
Spencer  that  it  is  the  experience  of  rewards  and  punishments  accorded 
in  this  world  during  many  generations  to  right  and  wrong  action  re- 
spectively that  has  evolved  the  conception  of  duty.  Such  a  view  pos- 
tulates a  psychological  hypothesis  of  transformations  that  follow  the 
analogy  of  chemistry,  i.  e.,  a  metamorphosis  from  pleasure  and  pain 
elements  into  ethical  ideas  of  justice,  the  right,  the  true,  etc.,  which 
we  cannot  expect  to  understand.  Such  hypotheses,  transcending  the 
understanding,  lead  to  paradoxes  and  absurdities,  and  rule  out  the 
reductio  ad  impossibile  in  mental  science,  where  a  refutation  of  a  false 
induction  may  be  attained  by  a  simple  appeal  to  fact.  In  psychology, 
it  is  impossible  to  appeal  to  a  fact,  to  an  ethical  sentiment,  for  instance, 
in  the  same  way  as  appeal  may  be  made  to  the  physical  phenomena 
evidenced  by  the  senses;  nevertheless,  appeal  may  be  made  to  the 
circumstances  which  occasion  the  sentiment  in  question.  Thus  an 
objective  reference  may  be  made  indirectly.  And  this  is  analogous  to 
the  operation  of  mechanical  forces,  that  is,  where  the  cause  is  seen 
in  the  effect,  and  not  an  obscure  metamorphosis  akin  to  chemical 
changes.  Causation  in  the  sphere  of  ethical  phenomena  must  be  in- 
telligible. It  will  not  do,  therefore,  to  derive  a  sense  of  justice,  either 
directly  or  indirectly,  from  fear  of  punishment. 

How,  then,  can  a  law  enforce  itself  without  hint  of  penalty  ?  The 
answer  may  be  suggested  by  two  acknowledged  psychological 
phenomena.  One  is  that  a  representation  in  the  mind  of  the  act  con- 
templated always  precedes  the  actual  volition  and  consequent  realiza- 
tion of  the  volition  in  conduct.  And  the  second  is  that  the  concep- 
tion of  ourselves  is  moulded  on  the  conception  of  others.  A  judg- 
ment of  self  is  the  reflected  judgment  of  others.  Therefore  when  we 
are  tempted  to  a  mean  or  wrong  act  it  must  first  appear  before  our 
minds  as  a  presentation  that  may  be  rendered  actual  in  conduct,  and, 
moreover,  it  is  represented  sub  specie  alius.  The  contemplated  act 
arouses  resentment  against  any  who  would  commit,  or  whom  we 
think  of  at  the  moment  as  committing  it,  but  wholly  in  an  impersonal 
way ;  then  we  transfer  the  resentment  to  ourselves  considered  as  com- 
mitting it.  This  transfer  makes  the  act  personal.  The  consequent 
feeling  of  disapprobation  has  arisen  through  a  direct  line  of  causation, 
after  a  mechanical  and  not  a  chemical  analogy.  This  transfer  of  re- 
sentment accounts  for  the  prohibitive  aspect  of  conscience ;  its  posi- 
tive aspect  as  an  incentive  to  all  virtue  is  accounted  for  by  a  like 


PSYCHOLOGICAL  LITERATURE.  115 

transfer  of  gratitude.  This  view  is,  therefore,  superior  to  the  Kantian 
view  which  accounts  only  for  a  negative  virtue.  This  view  is  illus- 
trated in  the  ethical  grandeur  of  Hellenism,  which  the  author  thinks 
has  been  unfairly  disparaged  by  Matthew  Arnold. 

I  am,  on  the  whole,  in  sympathy  with  the  writer's  main  contention 
that  fear  of  punishment,  however  developed,  and  through  increasingly 
complex  associations,  be  they  ever  so  many,  can  never  be  transformed 
through  a  psychological  metamorphosis  into  a  sense  of  honor,  or  of  jus- 
tice, or  a  regard  of  duty  for  duty's  sake  alone.  Yet  I  feel  that  he  can 
not  summarily  rule  out  all  explanations  of  psychological  phenomena, 
which  are  of  the  chemical  rather  than  the  mechanical  type ;  for  in- 
stance, the  relation  of  the  purely  physiological  to  the  psychological 
phenomena  can  not  be  explained  by  transformations  of  the  mechanical 
kind,  where  the  cause  is  seen  in  the  effect.  Moreover,  the  compari- 
son between  self  and  others  and  the  consequent  transfer  of  the  feeling 
of  resentment  or  of  approbation  does  not  wholly  account  for  the  rise  of 
the  moral  sentiments.  We  might  ask,  whence  the  original  feeling  of 
resentment  in  an  impersonal  way  concerning  the  acts  of  others  ?  And 
in  the  transfer  to  self  there  seems  to  me  to  be  a  supplementary  com- 
parison overlooked  by  Mr.  Carlile,  namely,  the  comparison  between 
the  possible  self,  conceived  as  agent  of  the  contemplated  act,  and  the 
ideal  self,  of  which  the  act  in  question  would  be  unworthy.  There 
is,  moreover,  a  tendency  on  the  part  of  the  writer  to  identify  the  true 
and  the  right,  where,  for  instance,  he  says  that  '  Ought '  is  the  for- 
mula of  deduction  in  speculative  truth  as  well  as  in  ethics.  The 
ethical  '  ought,'  however,  has  a  deeper  significance  and  produces 
peculiar  psychological  effects,  as  the  consequent  emotions  attendant 
upon  its  presence  in  the  mind,  and  depending  upon  the  will's  response 
to  its  behests.  The  true  may  cause  but  the  minimum  of  emotional 
functioning,  and  may  deliver  no  command  to  the  will ;  the  right,  how- 
ever, speaks  always  with  authority,  stirring  emotional  depths,  and  re- 
sulting in  conduct  accordingly. 

JOHN  GRIER  HIBBEN. 

PRINCETON  UNIVERSITY. 


The   Philosophy   of  Lotze  —  Doctrine   of   Thought.     H.   JONES. 

New  York.     Macmillan  &  Co.     1895.     Pp.  vm.  +  375. 
This  volume,  the  first  of  two  on  the  philosophy  of  Lotze — the  sec- 
ond will  deal  with  his  metaphysics — is  a  criticism  from  the  Neo-He- 
gelian   standpoint   of    the   Lotzean   Epistemology   contained   in   the 


Ii6  -THE   PHILOSOPHY  OF  LOTZE. 

Logic.  In  brief,  it  attempts  to  show  that  the  Lotzean  view,  by  its 
inherent  contradictions,  refutes  itself,  and  thereby  demonstrates  more 
clearly  the  validity  of  a  Hegelian  position.  The  author's  English  is 
fresh  and  vigorous,  and  usually  clear ;  but  at  times  his  desire  to  be 
lucid,  especially  in  expounding  Lotze,  leads  him  into  needless  and 
oftentimes  wearisome  repetitions. 

The  first  chapter  outlines  Lotze's  general  position  in  philosophy. 
He  is  critical  rather  than  constructive ;  in  fact,  says  Jones,  he  has  no  real 
system.  He  attempts  a  via  media,  avoiding  on  one  side  the  limita- 
tions of  the  merely  scientific  view,  and  on  the  other  the  extreme  pan- 
logismus  of  Hegel.  '  The  main  endeavor  of  his  life  was  to  refute ' 
the  Hegelian  identification  of  knowledge  and  reality  (p.  34).  He 
also  undertook  to  vindicate  the  unrecognized  claims  of  feeling.  The 
resemblance  between  Kant  and  Lotze  that  each  bases  his  metaphysics 
upon  ethics  is  emphasized  and  made  the  premise  for  the  very  doubtful 
conclusion  that  'those  who  really  know  Kant  have  little  need  of 
Lotze'  (p.  17).  Now  since,  reasons  Jones,  Lotze's  extreme  diver- 
gence in  his  Metaphysics  from  Hegel  is  based  logically  upon  his 
divergence  from  the  latter  in  his  view  of  thought,  it  follows  that  the 
refutation  of  the  Lotzean  Epistemology  will  involve  the  complete 
destruction  of  his  Metaphysics.  The  remainder  of  the  book  is  the 
attempted  refutation. 

The  essence  of  Ch.  II.  is  an  elaboration  of  the  three  following 
'  limitations '  of  thought  made  by  Lotze  :  i .  Thought  is  not  reality,  nor 
is  reality  thought ;  knowledge  by  its  very  nature  is  subjective.  This 
is  not  scepticism,  says  Lotze,  for  thought  should  not  claim  to  be 
things,  but  only  to  be  valid  of  them.  2.  Not  only  is  thought  simply 
an  activity  of  the  soul,  it  further  is  only  a  part  of  the  soul's  activity. 
Feeling  and  conation  are  equally  coordinate,  incommensurable  ulti- 
mates.  Lotze  argues  (Jones  disagreeing)  that  since  to  the  feelings, 
we  owe  our  impulses  towards,  and  our  ideals  of,  the  True  and  the 
Good,  and  hence  the  data  for  our  judgments  of  worth,  a  philosophy 
of  the  feelings  is  more  important  than  a  philosophy  of  mere  thought. 
3.  A  third  '  limitation'  is  the  assignment  of  thought  to  only  the  higher 
(formal)  intellectual  functions. 

Ch.  III.,  IV.,  V.,  and  VI.,  deal  with  the  third  'limitation,'  aim- 
ing to  show  that  '  thought  shorn  of  its  pretensions '  is  nugatory.  Ch. 
III.  treats  of  Perception  and  Conception.  Lotze  defines  the  function 
of  thought  as  making  coherent  the  ideas  given  by  associative  con- 
sciousness as  merely  coincident.  Jones  points  out  that  Lotze  leaves 
it  ambiguous  whether  thought  discovers  the  coherence  or  produces  it. 


PSYCHOLOGICAL  LITERATURE.  117 

He  evidently  misinterprets  Lotze's  position,  representing  him  (p.  105) 
as  holding  that  we  first  know  a  subjective  state,  which  thought  then 
objectifies.  On  the  contrary,  one  of  Lotze's  firmest  convictions  is  that 
the  first  mental  act  involves  no  knowledge  whatever. 

Viewing  thought  as  formal,  Lotze  soon  recognizes  that  conception 
cannot  furnish  necessary  coherence  among  coincident  phenomena,  and 
so  passes  to  Judgment  (Ch.  IV.).  But  beginning  with  the  categor- 
ical, and  passing  successively  through  the  Conditional  and  Disjunctive, 
he  fails  to  find  the  necessary  coherence.  Nor  is  he  more  successful 
in  Inference  (Ch.  V.).  Subsumptive  Inference  in  its  three  forms, 
Syllogism,  Induction  and  Analogy,  cannot  produce  coherence.  "These 
processes,  if  synthetic,  appear  invalid,  and  if  valid,  they  seem  tauto- 
logical." Inference  by  Substitution  can  give  us  coherence,  but  only 
of  abstract  quantity  and  not  of  real  phenomena.  Inference  by  Pro- 
portion possesses  a  similar  weakness.  Classification  by  type  fails  be- 
cause it  is  not  concerned  with  the  real  world  of  change.  Finally, 
Systematic  Explanation  can  give  coherence,  only  provided  the  whole 
system  is  known,  but  since  this  is  impossible,  this  method  also  is  in- 
adequate. 

In  Ch.  VI.,  Jones  argues  that  thought  as  formal  cannot  perform 
even  the  function  assigned  it  by  Lotze.  The  argument  does  not  seem 
conclusive.  He  says:  "We  have  to  condemn  either  Lotze's  view  of 
thought  as  formal,  or  all  knowledge  as  uncertain,  except  mathe- 
matics." (p.  257.)  A  few  pages  further  he  admits  the  uncertainty  of 
all  knowledge.  "Scientific  systems,  including  mathematics  itself,  will 
remain  hypothetical,  and  the  truth  they  contain  will  rest  upon  unver- 
ified assumptions."  (p.  266.) 

Ch.  VII.  and  VIII.  deal  with  the  first  and  second  limitations  of 
thought  advanced  by  Lotze  in  Book  III.  Part  of  Ch.  VII.  is  devoted 
to  an  exposition  of  the  first  limitation,  criticism  being  reserved  for  Ch. 
VIII.  The  rest  of  the  chapter  treats  of  the  second  limitation,  being  a 
criticism  of  Lotze's  view  of  feeling.  Lotze  regards  feeling  as  the  test 
of  the  ultimate  principles  of  knowledge.  Jones  demurs.  The  very 
fact  that  Lotze  regards  these  principles  as  needing  scrutiny  proves  that 
the  test  is  really  logical,  viz.,  the  coherence  of  elements  in  a  system. 
Again,  he  attacks  Lotze's  view  that  our  belief  in  a  real  world  is  based 
on  feeling,  not  thought,  because  feeling  is  the  source  of  our  judgments 
of  value.  But,  says  Jones,  it  is  absurd  to  speak  of  judgments  of  any 
kind  without  thought.  Lotze  confuses  feeling  with  the  knowledge  of 
objects  as  worthful  that  accompanies  the  feeling  (p.  298).  This  criti- 
cism seems  irrelevant.  Lotze  did  not  mean  that  a  judgment  of  worth 


Il8  TIME  AND    THE  SUCCESSION  OF  EVENTS. 

could  be  made  without  thought,  but  that  feeling  supplies  the  content 
or  data  (moral  emotions,  etc.),  which  thought  can  never  furnish. 

In  Ch.  VIII.  on  The  Principle  of  Reality  in  Thought  and  its  Pro- 
cesses, one  is  surprised  to  find  the  easy  manner  in  which  Jones  dis- 
poses of  Lotze's  basal  position  that  4  Thought  is  valid  of  reality.'  It 
is  not  'worthy  of  serious  discussion'  (p.  333,  note).  The  ignoring 
of  this  point  materially  strengthens  the  criticisms  upon  Lotze. 

The  value  of  the  work,  as  a  whole,  lies  chiefly  in  the  many  admir- 
ably clear  expositions  of  Lotzean  theory,  its  criticisms  and  the  ambi- 
guity of  several  of  the  terms  used  constituting  its  chief  weakness. 

W.  J.   SHAW. 

WESLEYAN  UNIVERSITY. 


Time  and  the  Succession  of  Events.  J.  L.  MC!NTYRE.   Mind,  July, 
1895.     Pp.  334. 

Mr.  Mclntyre  in  general  criticizes  the  Kantian  doctrine  and  ex- 
pounds Lotze. 

The  modern  problem  is — '  Does  time  belong  to  the  ultimatey 
real'  ?  If  it  is  only  an  appearance  for  us,  ultimate  reality  becomes  in- 
comprehensible, whether  it  be  called  the  '  unknowable '  of  Spencer  or 
the  4  harmonious  experience'  of  Bradley.  If  it  belongs  to  the  Real, 
we  must  show  in  what  sense  it  can  be  predicated. 

Our  criterion  must  come  from  experience.  Merely  logical  criteria, 
as  Bradley's  4  self  contradiction '  too  plainly  shows,  are  purely  formal 
and  tell  us  nothing.  For  him  there  can  be  no  positive  statement.  Any 
such  would  involve  unity  and  diversity.  We  are  reduced  to  a  barren 
identity. 

Leibnitz  denied  the  absolute  reality  of  time,  but  admitted  a  real 
succession  of  events.  Kant  held  that  time  was  an  a  priori  form. 
Lotze  took  up  the  argument  where  Kant  left  off  and  showed,  that 
while  empty  time  is  a  mental  abstraction,  the  appearance  of  change 
involves  change  in  the  Real.  A  concrete  succession  of  events  must 
be  admitted  in  the  real.  Every  event  is  an  act,  every  act  is  the  act  of 
a  subject,  not  it,  but  expressed  in  it.  The  succession  of  events  im- 
plies the  immanent  action  of  an  absolute  subject.  As  unity  it  is  above 
time  and  incomprehensible.  But  the  subject  can  only  be  a  unity  in 
expressing  itself  in  the  diverse  succession  of  events.  These  are  in- 
separable aspects  of  the  real.  Past  and  future  are  alike  constructions  : 
The  permanent  changing  present  alone  is  the  real.  An  adequate  con- 
ception of  this  '  present '  is  difficult  to  form. 

S.  F.  MCLENNAN. 


NEW  BOOKS.  119 

NEW  BOOKS. 

Der   Kampf    um   einen    Geistigen    Lebensinhalt  .      R.    EUCKEN. 


Leipzig,  Veit.      1895.     Pp.  viii  +  4OO.     7.50  M. 
Die  Moderne  Physiologische  Psychologic  in  Deutschland,  mit  Be- 

sonderer  Beriichsichtigung  des  Problems  der  Aufmerksamkeit. 

W.  HEINRICH.     Zurich,  Speidel.      1895.     Pp.  iv+2O5.     40  M. 
Psicologia  per  le  Scuole.    G.  SERGI.     2d  ed.,  revised.     Milano,  Du- 

molard.      1895.     Pp.  vii-f  227. 
Mental  Development  in   the    Child  and  the  Race.     Methods  and 

Processes.     J.  MARK  BALDWN.     2d  ed.,  corrected.     New  York 

and  London,  Macmillan  &  Co.      J895.     Pp.  xvi  +  496.     $2.60. 
Johnson's  Universal  Cyclopedia.  New  edition,  Vols.  V-VTII.  New 

York,  Johnson  Co.      1895. 
The    Conception  of   God.     J.  ROYCE.     Address  before  the    Philo- 

sophical Union  of  the  University  of  California.     With  comments 

by  S.  E.  MEZES,  J.  LE  CONTE  and  G.  H.  HOWISON.     Berkeley, 

California,  Executive  Council  of  the  Union.    1895.  Pp.  84.  50  cts. 
Mental  Physiology.     T.  B.  HYSLOP.     London,  J.  &  A.  Churchill. 

1895.     Pp.  viii+539. 
Sur  le  mecanisme  du  sommeil.     L.   ERRERA.     Bruxelles,   Hayez. 

i895. 

Histoire   de   la   philosophic    atomistique.     LEOPOLD  MABILLEAU. 

Paris,  Alcan.      1895.     Pp.  vii  +  5^o. 

Etude  sur  le  temps  et  Vespace.     LECHALAS.     Paris,  Alcan.     1895. 
Le  psychisme  experimental.    A.  ERNY.    Paris.   Flammariom.    1895. 
Theorie  de  I'dme.     ALAUX.     Paris,  Alcan.      1895. 
The  Psychic  Development  of  Young  Animals.     WESLEY  MILLS. 

Montreal.     1895. 
Geschichte   der   neueren    Philosophic,   iter    Bd.     Aus  ddnischen 

iibersetzt.     REISSLAND,  Leipzig.      1895. 


NOTES. 

•  THE  Archivfur  system.  Philosophic  (Heft  4,  Bd.  L,  Oct.,  1895) 
publishes  a  '  Bibliographic  der  philosophischen  Litteratur  des  Jahres 
1894*  comprising  1298  titles,  together  with  a  '  Namenregister '  to  the 
same.  It  gives  no  arrangement  of  titles,  either  alphabetical  or  other, 
under  the  different  sections,  but,  on  the  other  hand,  the  headings  are 
frequent  and  the  classification  detailed.  There  is  no  section  devoted 
to  'Neurology.'  'Biology'  has  n  titles,  and  ' Physio logisches 
Grundlagen'  (under  'Psychologic'),  35. 


120  .      NOTES. 

THE  first  number  of  a  new  journal  called  Zeitschrift  fur  imman- 
ente  Philosophic  has  appeared.  It  is  edited  by  M.  R.  Kauffmann, 
with  the  cooperation  of  W.  Schappe  and  R.  v.  Schubert-Soldern,  all 
of  whom  have  articles  in  the  first  number.  (Berlin,  Salinger,  quar- 
terly, 9  M.  per  volume.)  The  editor  states  the  object  of  the  journal 
as  follows:  "Noch  Moglichkeit  alle  Anhanger  der  Grundprincipien 
des  idealestischen  Monismus  und  diesem  verwandten  Auffassungen  in 
gemeinsamer  Thatigkeit  zu  vereinigen."  It  has  no  literature  or  other 
auxilliary  sections. 

IN  May  of  the  present  year  the  Universities  of  St.  Petersburg, 
Moscow  and  Kieff  replied  to  an  inquiry  from  the  Minister  of  Educa- 
tion unanimously  favoring  the  establishment  of  laboratories  of  psy- 
chology in  all  of  these  universities.  A  committee  of  eight  professors 
from  the  University  of  Kieff  has  petitioned  for  about  $3,000  for  the 
establishment  of  a  laboratory  of  psychology,  and  a  yearly  appropria- 
tion of  $300. 

A  LABORATORY  of  experimental  psychology  has  been  fitted  up  at 
the  University  of  Kansas  under  the  charge  of  Olin  Templin,  professor 
of  philosophy. 

KANT'S  manuscripts,  belonging  to  the  University  of  Dorpat,  have 
been  placed  by  the  Russian  Government  at  the  disposal  of  the  Berlin 
Academy  of  Sciences,  which  is  preparing  to  issue  a  complete  edition 
of  the  philosopher's  works. 

PROFESSOR  E.  HERING,  who  succeeds  Ludwig  at  Leipzig,  offers 
lectures  on  the  'Physiology  of  Sensations  and  Movements.' 

DR.  HERBERT  NICHOLS,  formerly  instructor  in  psychology  in 
Harvard  University,  has  been  appointed  lecturer  in  psychology  in 
Johns  Hopkins  University. 

DR.  EDGAR  PIERCE  has  been  appointed  instructor  in  psychology 
in  the  University  of  Michigan. 

DR.  C.  VON  TWARDOWSKY,  privatdocent  in  the  University  of 
Vienna,  has  been  elected  assistant  professor  in  philosophy  in  the  Uni- 
versity of  Lemburg. 

DR.  JOHANNES  GAD,  of  Berlin,  has  accepted  a  call  to  the  chair  of 
physiology  in  the  University  of  Prague,  vacated  by  Professor  Hering. 


MSS.  intended  for  publication  in  THE  PSYCHOLOGICAL  REVIEW 
or  in  the  MONOGRAPH  SUPPLEMENTS,  and  books,  etc.,  intended  for  re- 
view during  the  year  1896  should  be  sent  to  Prof.  J.  McKeen  Cattell, 
Garrison-on-Hudson,  N.  Y. 


VOL.  III.     No,  2.  MARCH,  1896. 


THE  PSYCHOLOGICAL  REVIEW. 


PROCEEDINGS    OF  THE  FOURTH  ANNUAL  MEET- 
ING OF  THE  AMERICAN  PSYCHOLOGICAL 
ASSOCIATION,  1895. 

REPORT  OF  THE  SECRETARY  AND  TREASURER  FOR  1895. 

The  fourth  annual  meeting  of  the  American  Psychological 
Association  was  held  at  the  University  of  Pennsylvania,  De- 
cember 27  and  28,  1895,  that  place  having  been  selected  with 
reference  to  the  simultaneous  meetings  of  the  American  So- 
ciety of  Naturalists  and  other  affiliated  societies.  There  were 
present  the  following  members  :  Baldwin,  Cattell,  Chrysostom, 
Farrand,  Fullerton,  Gardiner,  Griffin,  Hyslop,  James,  Ladd, 
MacDonald,  Marshall,  Miller,  Mills,  Newbold,  Nichols,  Patrick, 
Sanford,  Seth,  Shaw,  Strong,  Warren  and  Witmer — twenty- 
three  in  all.  Morning  and  afternoon  sessions  were  held  on 
both  days,  President  J.  McKeen  Cattell  presiding.  Abstracts 
of  the  papers  presented  so  far  as  they  have  been  received  by 
the  Secretary  are  appended. 

At  the  regular  business  meeting  and  in  the  intervals  of  the 
regular  program,  the  following  business  was  transacted.  Elec- 
tion of  officers  for  the  ensuing  year :  President,  Prof.  George 
S.  Fullerton ;  Secretary  and  Treasurer,  Dr.  Livingston  Far- 
rand ;  Members  of  the  Council,  Profs.  E.  H.  Griffin  and  E.  C. 
Sanford.  Elected  to  membership  on  nomination  of  the  Council : 
Dr.  H.  Austin  Aikins,  Western  Reserve  University ;  Dr.  C.  H. 
Bliss,  University  of  the  City  of  New  York ;  Dr.  Franz  Boas, 
Museum  of  Natural  History,  New  York;  Prof.  E.  D.  Cope, 
University  of  Pennsylvania;  Prof.  J.  E.  Creighton,  Cornell 
University ;  Prof.  Warner  Fite,  Williams  College ;  Mr.  J.  E. 


122  FOURTH  ANNUAL   MEETING. 

Lough,  Harvard  University;  Prof.  C.  S.  Minot,  Harvard 
Medical  School ;  Dr.  E.  A.  Singer,  Harvard  University ;  Dr. 
W.  G.  Smith,  Smith  College ;  Dr.  Norman  Wilde,  Columbia 
University. 

On  motion  of  Professor  Baldwin,  the  Association  voted  that 
a  committee  of  five,  including  the  President  of  the  Association, 
be  appointed  to  consider  the  feasibility  of  cooperation  among 
the  various  psychological  laboratories  in  the  collection  of  men- 
tal and  physical  statistics,  the  committee  to  report  at  the  next 
regular  meeting  of  the  Association.  The  following  members 
were  later  appointed  on  this  committee  :  Baldwin,  Jastrow,  San- 
ford,  Witmer  and  Cattell  (chairman).  The  question  of  the 
formation  of  a  philosophical  society  or  a  philosophical  section 
within  the  present  Association  was,  after  a  brief  discussion,  re- 
ferred to  the  Council  with  full  power  to  act.  It  was  voted  that 
members  attending  the  International  Psychological  Congress  in 
Munich,  in  1896,  be  empowered  to  act  as  delegates  of  the  Asso- 
ciation, when  qualified  by  notice  given  by  them  to  the  Secretary 
of  the  Association.  A  vote  of  thanks  for  the  hospitality  shown 
by  the  University  of  Pennsylvania  and  the  local  committee  of 
arrangements  was  unanimously  passed.  The  time  and  place  of 
meeting  were,  by  vote,  referred  to  the  incoming  President  to  be 
fixed  by  him  in  conference  with  the  presidents  of  the  Society 
of  Naturalists  and  other  societies  meeting  simultaneously. 

REPORT    OF    THE    TREASURER: 

Receipts: 

From  retiring  Treasurer  (Prof.  J.  McKeen  Cattell)  ..$127  17 

Dues 180  oo 

Sale  of  Proceedings 50 


$307  67 
Expenditures : 

Printing  $13  60 

Postage , 7  15 

Stationery I   73 

Expressage 90 

$23  38 
Balance  on  hand $284  29 


AMERICAN  PSYCHOLOGICAL  ASSOCIATION.  123 

Of  this  amount  $100.00  is  on  deposit  in  the  Mechanic's  Sav- 
ings Bank,  Worcester,  Mass.,  and  $158.00  in  the  Worcester 
Institution  of  Savings.  These  deposits  have  drawn  interest  to 
an  estimated  amount  of  $7.00. 

Audited  by  the  Council  and  found  correct. 

E.  C.  SANFORD. 
Secretary  and  Treasurer,  1894-95. 

ABSTRACTS    OF    PAPERS. 

(1)  Address   of  the  President.     By  PROF.  J.  McKEEN  CAT- 
TELL,  Columbia  University. 

The  address  reviewed  the  history  and  recent  progress  of 
psychology  and  the  part  played  in  its  development  by  experi- 
ment and  measurement.  Psychology  is  by  no  means  a  new 
science,  but  its  growth  during  the  last  few  years  has  been  rapid, 
and  it  now  rivals  the  other  leading  sciences  in  productiveness  of 
research  and  publication  and  in  academic  position.  Science  is 
either  genetic  or  quantitative,  and  psychology  is  advancing  in 
both  directions.  The  problems  that  can  be  treated  in  the  labora- 
tory were  reviewed,  and  it  was  claimed  that  these  have  added 
directly  and  indirectly  new  subject-matter  and  methods,  have 
set  a  higher  standard  of  accuracy  and  objectivity,  have  made 
some  part  of  the  subject  an  applied  science  with  useful  appli- 
cations, and  have  enlarged  the  field  and  improved  the  methods 
of  teaching  psychology.  In  conclusion,  the  relations  of  psy- 
chology to  the  other  sciences  and  to  philosophy  were  reviewed, 
and  their  interdependence  was  emphasized. 

[This  address  is  printed  in  the  present  number  of  THE 
PSYCHOLOGICAL  REVIEW.] 

(2)  Psychology  and  Physiology.     By  PROF.  GEORGE  S.  FUL- 
LERTON,  University  of  Pennsylvania. 

This  paper  was  in  a  sense  a  sequel  to  the  paper  read  two 
years  before,  entitled  'The  Psychological  Standpoint.'  It  at- 
tempted to  draw  the  line  between  two  sciences  which  touch  each 
other  closely,  and  was  divided  into  two  parts.  The  first  part 


124  FOURTH  ANNUAL   MEETING. 

assumed  the  *  automaton'  theory  of  mind  to  be  the  true  one, 
/.  e?.,  the  theory  that  mental  states  form  no  part  of  the  sensory- 
motor  arc,  but  are,  so  to  speak,  parallel  with  neural  changes. 
The  second  part  assumed  ideas  to  be  either  a  part  of  the  chain 
of  causes  resulting  in  bodily  motions  or  a  something  standing 
outside  of  that  chain  and,  as  it  were,  breaking  in  upon  it.  The 
author  expressed  no  opinion  as  to  the  truth  of  any  one  of  these 
theories,  but  merely  inquired  where  the  line  dividing  psychology 
from  physiology  should  be  drawn  in  any  case.  He  examined 
at  length  a  standard  work  on  physiology,  that  of  Professor 
Foster,  and  showed  that  dearth  of  established  physiological  data 
forced  the  author  constantly  to  abandon  his  own  field  and  take 
to  psychology.  In  general,  he  maintained  the  thesis  that  psy- 
chology is  sufficiently  marked  out  from  other  sciences  by  the 
method  it  must  employ,  the  method  of  introspection,  observation 
and  experiment,  and  interpretation ;  and  he  deprecated  the  in- 
troduction into  text-books  on  physiology  of  psychological  material 
as  tending  to  conceal  lack  of  physiological  knowledge  and  to 
lead  to  confusion  as  to  the  boundaries  of  the  two  sciences.  [The 
paper  appeared  in  the  January  number  of  THE  PSYCHOLOGICAL 
REVIEW,  1896.] 

(3)  Series  of  Physical  and  Mental  Tests  on  the   Students  of 
Columbia    College.     By  DR.  LIVINGSTON  FARRAND,    Co- 
lumbia University. 

The  tests  described  are  made  on  the  undergraduates  of  the 
College  at  entrance  and  repeated  on  the  same  students  at  the 
end  of  their  Sophomore  and  Senior  years. 

The  object  of  the  tests  is  to  obtain  a  record  for  comparative 
purposes  of  certain  mental  and  physical  characteristics  of  the 
students  at  different  times  during  a  period  of  rather  active  in- 
tellectual growth  and  at  the  same  time  to  furnish  material  for  a 
statistical  study  of  the  particular  points  examined.  Stress  is 
laid  to  a  certain  extent  upon  the  more  purely  mental  inquiries, 
such  as  memory,  rate  of  perception  and  motor  response,  accu- 
racy of  perception,  color  vision,  etc.,  but  enough  physical  tests 
are  included  to  afford  a  comparison  between  bodily  and  mental 
development,  if  any  relation  between  the  two  exists. 


AMERICAN  PSYCHOLOGICAL  ASSOCIATION. 


I25 


(4)  Neuro-Social  Data.     By  DR.  ARTHUR  MACDONALD,  Bu- 
reau of  Education,  Washington. 

TABULAR   STATEMENT   GIVING    QUANTITATIVE   MEASUREMENTS    OF   SENSIBILITY 
IN  PERSONS   OF   DIFFERENT   AGES   AND   DIFFERENT  CLASSES   OF   SOCIETY. 


1 

» 

1 

til 

Is 

m* 

a 

O 

*Zn  ^  rt  S 

1 

i? 

H*| 

II 

•V 

i 

1 

o 

1 

Ilil 

|§1 

|e|| 

1. 

1 

•d 

sly 

fell 

till 

H 

ca  3 

| 

i 

ials 

§o| 

B  *  S 

Nil 

0 

< 

<5 

<4 

«d 

r.wr. 

l.wr. 

r.wr. 

l.wr. 

right. 

left. 

I 

2 

3 

4 

5 

6 

7 

8 

mm. 

mm. 

cent. 

cent. 

kilos. 

kilos. 

I 

Women  (highly  edu- 

cated)   

23 

av.  38 

17.3 

16.2 

2°.  I 

1°  7 

I  2C3 

1.22A.CT. 

II 

Young     Women 

L  V   •    ^W 

•*•/••> 

' 

' 

**"\  \»« 

mus.) 

(wealthy  classes).. 

II 

un.30 

13-6 

12.4 

4.6 

4.4 

2.9 

2.4  (hand.) 

III 

Young  Men  (wealthy 

classes) 

IO 

4  i     <9Q 

12  4. 

12.7 

4.4. 

3.7 

4..7 

4.2       " 

IV 

Boston,  Army  of  ?... 

35 

av.28 

*? 

/ 
15-6 

T 

j  i 

T    / 

9-5 

9-5       " 

V 

Washington    School 

VI 

Children  (boys)... 
Washington    School 

526 

6-18 

16.3 

15-5 

3-9 

3-8 

Children  (girls)... 

55  1 

6-18 

14.8 

13-8 

4-5 

3-9 

VII 

Boys   (parents  well- 

to-do)  

205 

6-18 

16.2 

15.2 

4.0 

3-9 

VIII 

Boys  (parents  poor).. 

119 

6-18 

16.6 

15-9 

4.0 

3-7 

IX 

Girls  (parents  well- 

to-do) 

183 

6-18 

T  A    t 

T  i  r 

i  r\ 

•3    C 

X 

XI 

Girls  (parents  poor).. 

i<JO 

133 

318 

6-18 
6-14 

14.9 
J5'7 

13-8 
14.0 

3-9 

3-6 

XII 

Boys,  aft.    "    

208 

17.2 

16.3 

A!C 

4.2 

XIII 

Girls,  bef.  "    

1  86 

6-12 

x  ^  tm 

1*8 

3.8 

XIV 

Girls,  aft.    "    

362 

13-18 

1C    I 

IA'O 

1*3 

4.O 

XV 

Col.  Chil.,  boys  

y*** 

33 

6-19 

13.9 

13-5 

2.0 

T  w 

XVI 

".       girls  

58 

6-16 

15.2 

14.1 

2-5 

2.4 

The  tests  for  temperature  discrimination  were  made  with 
Eulenberg's  thermaesthesiometer ;  those  for  pain  with  the  au- 
thor's own  algometer  applied  to  the  temporal  muscle.  All  the 
psychical  conditions  were  made  as  uniform  as  possible,  es- 
pecially with  the  children.  Should  these  results  be  confirmed 
by  experiments  on  larger  numbers  of  individuals,  the  following 
statements  would  be  probable  : 

Middle-aged  women  of  the  educated  classes  are  much  less 


126  FOURTH  ANNUAL   MEETING. 

acute  in  the  sense  of  locality  on  the  wrist,  but  much  more  acute 
to  heat  than  young  women  of  the  wealthy  classes  (Nos.  I.  and 
II.,  columns  2,  3,  4,  5,  6). 

Young  men  of  the  wealthy  classes  are  much  more  sensitive 
to  locality  and  pain  than  the  men  in  the  Boston  Army  of  the  Un- 
employed (Nos.  III.  and  IV.,  columns  3,  4,  7,  8). 

Young  women  of  the  wealthy  classes  are  much  less  sensi- 
tive to  locality  and  heat,  but  much  more  sensitive  to  pain  than 
young  men  of  the  wealthy  classes  (Nos.  II.,  III.,  columns  3,  4, 
5,  6,  7,  8).  As  to  pain,  it  is  true  in  general  that  women  are 
more  sensitive  than  men,  as  shown  in  a  former  investigation. 
But  as  remarked  then,  it  does  not  necessarily  follow  that  women 
cannot  endure  more  pain  than  men. 

Boys  are  more  sensitive  to  locality  and  heat  before  puberty 
than  after.  Girls  are  more  sensitive  to  locality  before  puberty, 
but  their  sensibility  to  heat  is  about  the  same  before  and  after 
puberty  (Nos.  XL — XIV.,  columns  3,  4,  5,  6). 

Colored  boys  are  more  sensitive  to  locality  and  heat  than 
white  boys.  Colored  girls  are  less  sensitive  to  locality,  but  more 
sensitive  to  heat  than  white  girls  (Nos.  VI.,  and  XVI.,  columns 
3,  4,  5,  6).  Colored  boys  are  more  sensitive  to  locality  and 
heat  than  colored  girls  (Nos.  XV.  and  XVI.,  columns  3,  4,  5,  6). 

The  left  wrist  is  more  sensitive  to  locality,  heat  and  pain 
than  the  right  wrist;  only  one  exception.  (No.  III.,  columns 
3,4)- 

(5)  An  Experimental  Investigation  of  the  Processes  of  Idea- 
tion.     By  MR.  OLIVER  CORNMAN.     Introduced  by  PROF. 

LlGHTNER    WlTMER. 

(6)  On  Direct  Control  of  the  Retinal  Light.      An   informal 
Communication    by  PROF.  GEORGE  T.  LADD,  Yale  Uni- 
versity. 

After  a  few  explanatory  remarks  Prof.  Ladd  presented  the 
following  syllabus  of  experiments  on  the  phenomena  in  question 
which  he  illustrated  by  reading  extracts  from  one  of  the  detailed 
reports  secured  by  one  of  his  experimenters. 


AMERICAN  PSYCHOLOGICAL  ASSOCIATION.  127 

VOLUNTARY  CONTROL  OF  THE  EIGENLICHT. 

Be  seated  in  a  quiet  room,  with  the  face  turned  away  from 
the  direct  light,  and  shut  the  eyes  long  enough  to  let  the  after- 
images fade  away  before  beginning  the  experiment. 

In  a  preliminary  way,  note  the  presence  of  the  '  Eigenlicht,' 
and  record  your  opinion  as  to  its  (i)  color,  (2)  persistence  and 
(3)  shape  or  distribution. 

If  successful  in  this,  try  the  following  : 

EXPERIMENT  I. — By  persistent  and  attentive  willing,  ar- 
range the  color-mass  of  the  *  Eigenlicht '  into  the  shape  of  a 

cross  composed  of  two  equal  bars  at  right  angles,  thus  : 

Record  your  experience  in  regard  to  (i)  the  time  it  took  to 
produce  the  cross,  (2)  how  long  it  could  be  retained,  (3)  modifi- 
cations of  shape,  if  any,  (4)  color,  and  (5)  effect  of  fatigue. 

If  successful  in  the  above,  try  the  following  : 

EXPERIMENT  II. — Produce,  as  in  Exp.  I.  (i)  a  circle,  (2) 
two  concentric  circles,  and  (3)  a  triangle. 

Record  results  in  full. 

EXPERIMENT  III. — Try  to  produce  the  circle  successively  in 
the  colors  red,  green  and  violet.  Note  your  power  to  control 
the  color  by  will. 

EXPERIMENT  IV. — Try  to  project  the  image  of  the  circle  in 
each  of  the  above  three  colors  separately  on  a  blank  sheet  of 
white  paper,  and  note  what  you  see. 

Try  Exp.  I.  twice  a  day  for  ten  successive  days  (morning 
and  evening),  and  record  date,  time  of  the  day,  and  duration 
of  the  experiment. 

(7)    Consciousness   and    Time.     BY    PROF.    C.    A.    STRONG, 

University  of  Chicago. 

The  paper  presented  objections  to  the  account  of  the  rela- 
tions between  consciousness  and  present  time  given  by  Professor 
James  in  his  Presidential  Address  at  the  Princeton  meeting  (De- 
cember, 1894),  and  suggested  an  alternative  account. 

Professor  James  held  that  the  present  instant  is  a  mere  boun- 
dary line  between  the  past  and  the  future ;  that  both  the  time 


128  FOURTH  ANNUAL  MEETING. 

consciousness  is  in  and  the  time  consciousness  is  of  must  be 
durations  or  intervals,  and  that  consciousness  must  therefore  in- 
clude within  its  span  those  portions  of  the  past  and  of  the  future 
which  lie  nearest  to  the  present  instant.  Hence  the  view  that 
" there  is  literally  no  such  datum"  as  that  of  present  time,  and 
that  "past  and  future  are  already  parts  of  the  least  experience 
that  can  really  be."  Hence,  also,  the  need  of  assuming,  in  ad- 
dition to  the  simultaneous  unity  of  consciousness  implied  in  the 
perception  of  likeness  or  difference,  a  successive  unity,  as  im- 
plied in  the  perception  of  passing  time. 

In  opposition  to  this  account  it  was  urged  that,  since  the 
present  instant  is  a  mere  boundary  line,  an  interval  or  duration 
may  be  considered  abstractly ',  from  the  point  of  view  of  that  in- 
stant, and  it  will  then  appear  to  consist  of  a  portion  of  the  past 
plus  a  portion  of  the  future ;  but  that,  if  we  wish  to  consider  it 
concretely,  and  in  the  way  it  actually  happened,  we  must  con- 
ceive it  as  a  line  of  successive  presents,  as  an  onward  progress 
from  an  earlier  present  to  a  later  present.  Though  present 
time  is  a  point,  it  is  not  a  resting,  but  a  moving  point,  and  it  is 
this  character  of  motion  which  affords  the  room  consciousness 
needs  in  order  to  exist.  Though  change  is  thus  a  character  of 
present  time  and  of  consciousness  which  is  in  it,  consciousness 
may  be  in  present  time  without  being  aware  of  change ;  for 
change,  when  real,  is  always  infinitesimal,  an  invisible  feature 
of  the  histology  of  consciousness. 

The  consciousness  of  the  succession  of  two  feelings  cannot 
arise  simultaneously  with  the  first,  nor  midway  between  the  two, 
but  only  when  their  succession  is  an  accomplished  fact.  This 
consciousness  is  thus  in  its  nature  retrospective,  and  the  relation 
is  perceived  between  images  existing  in  consciousness  simulta- 
neously. The  consciousness  of  succession  therefore  implies 
only  a  simultaneous  unity  of  consciousness,  the  same  unity  im- 
plied in  the  consciousness  of  likeness  or  difference ;  not  a  suc- 
cessive unity,  which  is  a  monstrosity,  a  contradiction  in  terms. 
Knowledge  even  of  the  nearest  past  is  representative,  not  intui- 
tive, and  involves  no  self-transcendence  except  that  involved  in 
ordinary  memory. 

[This  paper  appears  in  THE  PSYCHOLOGICAL  REVIEW  for 
March,  1896.] 


AMERICAN  PSYCHOLOGICAL  ASSOCIATION.  129 

(8)  Some   Conditions  of   Will  Development.      By  BROTHER 
CHRYSOSTOM,  Manhattan  College. 

The  conditions  of  Will  Development  naturally  fall  under  two 
heads :  intrinsic,  or  such  as  are  part  and  parcel  of  the  volun- 
tary agent ;  and  extrinsic,  or  such  as  act  upon  him  from  with- 
out. The  first  of  the  intrinsic  conditions  is  the  nature  of  the 
will  itself,  which,  according  to  the  testimony  of  consciousness, 
is  indetermined  at  least  in  the  means  which  it  employs  to  attain 
a  given  end.  The  objection  against  such  testimony  raised  in 
the  name  of  Double  Consciousness  does  not  hold,  for  it  is  based 
upon  a  confusion  of  the  idea  of  the  ego  with  the  ego,  or  self, 
the  former,  however,  varying  with  the  normal  or  pathological 
state  of  the  subject.  A  succeeding  state  of  consciousness  cannot 
result  from  an  antecedent  state,  since  the  latter  has  already  passed 
away.  Hence  a  unity  of  subject  must  be  granted ;  but,  since  it  is 
variously  affected,  its  phenomena  are  many.  The  subject  is  there- 
fore, really  distinct  from  its  phenomena,  the  ego  from  its  idea. 

The  will  is,  however,  determined  to  a  certain  degree  by  ac- 
quired habit  or  disposition  and  by  intellect.  Indirectly,  heredity 
exercises  a  marked  influence  over  it.  The  law  of  heredity  ap- 
plies with  special  force  to  the  exercise  of  external  sense  and  of 
imagination.  Its  influence  is  modified  by  environment,  and 
this,  in  turn,  is  partly  subject  to  will.  Herein  lies  the  great  op- 
portunity of  teacher  and  pupil,  the  former  aiding  the  latter  to 
build  up  a  manly  and  well-balanced  character,  and  both  utilizing 
for  this  end  the  occasions  presented  by  the  events  of  daily  life. 

(9)  A  Psychological  Interpretation  of  the  Rules  of  Definition  in 
Logic.     By  PROF.  ALFRED  H.  LLOYD,  University  of  Michi- 
gan. 

This  paper,  though  in  the  hands  of  the  Secretary,  was 
omitted  for  lack  of  time. 

(10)  Discussion  on   Consciousness  and  Evolution.     By  PROFS. 
WILLIAM  JAMES,  E.  D.  COPE,  J.  MARK  BALDWIN,  CHARLES 
S.  MINOT  AND  GEORGE  T.  LADD. 

[It  is  hoped  that  this  discussion  may  be  printed  in  full  at 
some  later  time.] 


130  FOURTH  ANNUAL   MEETING 

(u)  An  Experiment  on  the  Effects  of  the  Loss  of  Sleep.     By 

PROF.  G.  T.  W.  PATRICK,  University  of  Iowa. 

The  patient,  a  healthy  young  man  of  28,  accustomed  to 
regular  sound  sleep  of  eight  hours,  abstained  wholly  from  sleep 
for  ninety  hours,  having  watchers  all  the  time.  At  intervals  of 
six  hours  tests  were  made  upon  him  in  respect  to  pulse,  temper- 
ature, weight,  steadiness,  discrimination-time,  simple  reaction- 
time,  discrimination  of  taste  and  smell  sensations,  sharpness  of 
vision,  lower  and  upper  threshold  of  pain,  strength  of  grip  and 
pull  with  dynamometer,  memory  and  attention,  time  of  adding 
columns  of  figures,  discriminative  sensibility  of  the  skin,  muscle 
sense,  motor  ability,  fatigue,  pulse  after  fatigue,  measurement 
and  analysis  of  urine.  At  the  end  of  ninety  hours  the  subject 
was  allowed  to  sleep.  He  slept  soundly  ten  and  a  half  hours 
and  awoke  wholly  refreshed.  He  made  up  altogether  but  25  % 
of  the  sleep  lost. 

The  result  of  the  various  tests  and  their  comparison  with 
normal  condition  will  be  published  in  full  later.  Persistent 
hallucinations  of  sight  were  one  marked  result  of  the  sleep  fast. 
Pulse,  reaction-time  and  muscular  strength  decreased.  The 
weight  of  the  subject,  sharpness  of  vision,  and  discriminative 
sensibility  for  taste  and  for  sound  increased. 

During  the  ten  and-a-half  hours'  heavy  sleep  which  followed 
the  experiment,  the  subject  was  awakened  every  hour  for  the 
purpose  for  ascertaining  the  depth  of  sleep  and  constructing  an 
*  absolute'  sleep  curve  to  compare  with  the  normal  sleep  curve. 
The  subject  was  awakened  by  an  electric  current  passing 
through  the  leg,  the  strength  of  current  necessary  being  taken 
as  a  measure  of  the  depth  of  sleep.  The  deepest  sleep  was 
found  at  the  end  of  the  second  hour,  next  the  first  hour,  then 
the  third  hour,  decreasing  then  rapidly  till  waking. 

(12)  Further  Researches  on  the  Psychic  Development  of  Young 
Animals  and  its  Physical  Correlation.  By  PROF.  WESLEY 
MILLS,  McGill  University. 

The  author  announced  that  he  had  made  investigations  on 
several  other  animals,  viz :  The  Mongrel  Dog,  the  Cat,  the 
Rabbit,  the  Guinea  Pig,  and  on  Birds.  The  subjects  had  been 


AMERICAN  PSYCHOLOGICAL  ASSOCIATION.  131 

treated  as  in  his  first  contribution,  on  The  Pure-Bred  Dogs,  and 
the  papers  embodying  the  facts,  etc.,  were  now  in  the  press. 
As  the  handling  of  the  subject  in  its  present  form  involved  an 
enormous  mass  of  details  he  would  not  attempt  more  than  the 
mere  announcement  of  his  work  now,  but  hoped  to  read  a  gen- 
eralized account  of  the  whole  at  the  next  meeting. 

(13)  Variations  in  the  Patellar  Reflex  as  an  Aid  to  the  Mental 
Analysis.     By  PROF.   LIGHTNER   WITMER,   University  of 
Pennsylvania. 

(14)  Experiments    on    Induced   Hallucinations.       By   PROF. 
JAMES  H.  HYSLOP,  Columbia  University. 

The  experiments  reported  in  this  paper  were  undertaken  at 
my  suggestion  by  a  lady  acquaintance  whose  experiences  in 
early  life  suggested  the  possibility  that  looking  into  a  crystal 
would  induce  hallucinations.  She  herself  was  doubtful  about 
the  undertaking  and  disbelieved  in  its  possibility.  The  trial, 
however,  showed  that  they  would  occur  very  easily,  and  twenty- 
three  of  them  were  recorded  and  described  as  having  some  in- 
terest. Some  of  them  appeared  to  be  located  on  the  surface 
and  some  to  originate  from  the  center  of  the  crystal.  Some 
were  clearly  reproductions  of  past  experiences  or  scenes  modi- 
fied by  association  or  the  addition  of  materials  not  in  the  orig- 
inal experience.  One  especially  seemed  to  show  association 
between  two  possible  experiences  of  a  different  type,  but  with- 
out any  element  of  recognition.  All  of  them  exhibited  imagery 
which  illustrated  the  constructive  action  of  dreams,  and 
emerged  as  capriciously  and  as  independent  of  the  present 
mental  state  as  dreams. 

The  two  cases  in  which  coincidental  features  were  afterward 
discovered  represented  nothing  of  an  objective  value  in  this  re- 
spect and  deserved  mention  only  as  subjective  facts  which  oc- 
cultists might  confuse  with  objective  evidence.  In  other  re- 
spects their  value  could  only  be  to  show  the  existence  of  an 
influence  by  the  crystal  to  produce,  under  proper  conditions, 
genuine  hallucinations  and  to  show  the  capricious  character  of 
the  effects.  (This  paper  will  appear  in  full  in  the  Proceedings 
of  the  Society  for  Psychical  Research.} 


I32  FOURTH  ANNUAL  MEETING. 

(15)    Cases  of  Dream  Reasoning.     By  PROF.  W.  ROMAINE 

NEWBOLD,  University  of  Pennsylvania. 

Prof.  Newbold  reported  three  cases  of  what  is  loosely  called 
dream  reasoning.  The  first  occurred  in  the  experience  of  Dr. 
W.  A.  Lamberton,  Professor  of  Greek  in  the  University  of  Penn- 
sylvania. In  the  spring  of  1870  he  worked  for  several  weeks 
upon  the  problem :  Given  an  ellipse,  to  find  the  locus  of  the 
foot  of  the  perpendicular  let  fall  from  either  focus  upon  a  tan- 
gent to  this  ellipse  at  any  point.  Finding  all  attempts  at  an 
analytical  solution  fail,  he  gave  it  over,  intending  to  return  to 
it  when  his  thoughts  had  got  out  of  the  rut  in  which  they  had 
been  running.  About  a  week  later  upon  awaking  one  morning 
he  saw  projected  upon  a  blackboard  in  his  bedroom  a  complete 
figure  containing  not  only  the  lines  given  by  the  problems,  but 
also  a  number  of  auxiliary  lines,  thus  giving  at  a  glance  a  geo- 
metrical solution  of  it.  The  case  presents  two  special  points 
of  interest. 

In  the  first  place,  it  proves  the  existence  of  complex  pro- 
cesses corresponding  to  those  of  ordinary  reasoning,  but  existing 
apart  from  the  personal  consciousness.  It  is  impossible  to  de- 
termine whether  these  processes  took  place  during  sleep  or  sub- 
consciously in  waking  life.  Second,  the  sensory  externalization 
of  the  solution  is  a  most  curious  feature.  Professor  Lamberton 
is  a  very  poor  visualizer  and  has  never  in  his  life  had  any  other 
hallucination. 

The  other  two  cases  reported  were  experiences  of  Dr.  H.  V. 
Hilprecht,  Professor  of  Assyriology  in  the  University  of  Penn- 
sylvania. When  a  student  under  Professor  Delitsch  he  dreamed 
that  the  real  meaning  of  the  name  Nebuchadnezzar  was  *  Nebu 
protect  my  boundary,'  deriving  the  element  'kudurru'  from 
the,  at  that  time,  little  known  verb  <  kadaru,'  to  enclose.  This 
explanation  has  been  universallv  accepted.  This  easily  expli- 
cable case  is  of  interest  chiefly  in  view  of  a  later  and  more  re- 
markable dream. 

In  March  of  1893  Dr.  Hilprecht  dreamed  that  an  Assyrian 
priest  appeared  to  him  and  informed  him  that  two  fragments 
which  he  had  been  in  vain  endeavoring  to  decipher  belonged 
together  and  were  portions  of  a  votive  tablet  erected  by  King 


AMERICAN  PSYCHOLOGICAL  ASSOCIATION.  133 

Kurigalzu.  This  was  found  to  be  true.  Other  details  in  the 
dream  could  be  neither  verified  or  disproved.  No  information 
was  given  in  this  dream  which  could  not  have  been  reached  by 
normal  processes  of  reasoning,  but  its  dramatic  form  makes  it 
most  interesting.  We  are  compelled  to  suppose  that  the  two 
items  of  information — namely,  that  the  fragments  were  parts 
of  one  original  and  that  that  original  was  a  votive  tablet — were 
reached  by  normal  associative  processes  and  that  the  old  priest 
and  other  dramatic  details  were  afterwards  thrown  about  the 
conceptual  elements  as  one  drapes  a  gown  on  a  lay-figure. 
This  would  involve  the  assumption  of  a  translocation  of  the  time 
series  ;  the  conclusion  must  have  been  first  given  and  the  dream 
must  have  been  constructed,  as  it  were,  backwards.  For  such 
time  hallucinations  in  dreams  there  is  considerable  independent 
evidence. 


ADDRESS  OF  THE  PRESIDENT  BEFORE  THE 

AMERICAN  PSYCHOLOGICAL 

ASSOCIATION,  1895. 

PROFESSOR  J.  Me  KEEN    CATTELL, 
Columbia   University. 

In  the  struggle  for  existence  that  obtains  among  the  sciences 
psychology  is  continually  gaining  ground.  We  bear  witness  to 
the  fact  meeting  here  on  terms  of  equality  with  the  other  natural 
sciences.  This  Association  demonstrates  the  organic  unity  of 
psychology,  while  the  wide  range  of  our  individual  interests 
proves  our  adjustment  to  a  complex  environment. 

While  our  confidence  in  the  future  of  psychology  rests  on  a 
knowledge  of  its  intrinsic  vitality,  we  are  able  for  the  convincing 
of  others  to  offer  the  brute  argument  of  material  success.  The 
academic  growth  of  psychology  in  America  during  the  past  few 
years  is  almost  without  precedent.  The  work  begun  by  James 
at  Harvard,  Ladd  at  Yale,  and  Hall  at  Johns  Hopkins  not  more 
than  about  fifteen  years  ago  has  become  an  important  factor  in 
our  universities.  Psychology  is  a  required  subject  in  the  under- 
graduate curriculum  wherever  studies  are  required,  and  among 
university  courses  psychology  now  rivals  the  other  leading  sci- 
ences in  the  number  of  students  attracted  and  in  the  amount  of 
original  work  accomplished. 

In  addition  to  the  objective  test  of  university  recognition  we 
may  regard  productiveness  in  publication.  There  are  in  Amer- 
ica three  journals  of  general  science,  in  all  of  which  psychology 
is  treated  as  are  the  other  sciences,  and  there  are  special  journals 
as  follows :  mathematics,  3  ;  astronomy,  3 ;  physics,  i ;  chem- 
istry, 2  ;  geology,  2  ;  botany,  2  ;  zoology,  i  ;  physiology,  o ; 
psychology,  2.  A  comparison  of  these  journals  will  not  dis- 
credit those  devoted  to  psychology ;  and  it  should  be  noted  that 
we  have  in  addition  to  these  at  least  two  journals  of  philosophy 
and  two  journals  of  education  in  which  psychology  occupies  a 
134 


ADDRESS   OF   THE  PRESIDENT.  135 

prominent  place.  It  would  be  difficult  to  select  by  an  objective 
criterion  the  most  important  books  published  in  America  during 
the  past  ten  years,  but  if  we  may  regard  the  judgment  of  for- 
eign nations  as  the  most  probable  verdict  of  posterity,  the  books 
written  by  members  of  this  Association  will  stand  well  to  the 
front  among  American  contributions  to  science. 

We  must  admit  that  the  rapid  growth  of  psychology  in 
America  has  been  due  to  conditions  of  the  soil  as  well  as  to  vi- 
tality of  the  germ.  The  more  complete  absorption  of  the  col- 
lege president  by  executive  work  has  made  necessary  the  trans- 
ferring of  his  former  prerogative  of  teacher  of  philosophy  to 
the  special  student,  while  the  development  of  the  university 
with  elective  courses  has  permitted  the  easy  introduction  of  a 
new  study. 

It  follows  that  a  comparison  of  the  progress  of  psychology  in 
America  with  its  progress  in  other  countries  is  less  flattering  to 
our  amour-propre  as  psychologists  than  to  our  patriotism.  Still 
Germany  maintains  its  prestige  in  psychology,  and  psychology 
maintains  its  prestige  in  Germany.  Psychological  courses  are 
an  increasingly  large  part  of  the  philosophical  courses,  and  the 
laboratories  of  psychology  are  being  acknowledged  as  equal  in 
rank  to  those  in  other  sciences.  There  are  two  excellent  jour- 
nals of  psychology,  one  of  which  is  attracting  part  of  the  best 
work  formerly  published  in  physiological  and  physical  journals. 
In  France  the  Annee  -psychologique  bears  witness  to  much  re- 
cent work  in  experimental  psychology,  while  interest  in  social, 
individual  and  pathological  psychology  is  unabated.  In  Eng- 
land the  traditional  psychology  is  being  enriched  by  absorption 
of  the  most  important  foreign  work,  while  new  contributions 
are  offered  on  the  side  of  philosophy  and  on  the  side  of  the  bio- 
logical and  the  medical  sciences.  In  Russia,  in  Scandinavia 
and  in  Italy  professorships  and  laboratories  are  being  estab- 
lished. 

While  the  recent  progress  of  our  science  has  been  great,  we 
do  not  admit  that  psychology  is  a  new  science.  It  is  not  a 
*  sport,'  not  even  a  fortuitous  variation.  If  science  is  to  date 
from  the  year  of  '  the  master  of  those  who  know,'  then  we  may 
take  pride  in  the  beginnings  of  psychology  whose  foundations 


136  /.  Me  KEEN  CATTELL. 

were  more  securely  laid  by  Aristotle  than  those  of  any  other 
science.  Like  the  little  boy  answering  the  first  question  of  the 
Catechism  we  may  say  '  *  God  made  one  foot  big  and  I  growed 
the  rest."  But  with  our  superior  knowledge  of  embryology  we 
may  further  believe  that  we  did  not  start  even  as  an  infant  of  the 
size  of  the  famous  one  in  *  Midshipman  Easy,'  but  began  our 
inarticulate  growth  long  before  *  mewing  and  puking '  we  came 
hither. 

Even  the  '  new  psychology'  began  at  the  beginning,  and  de- 
veloped -pari passu  with  the  other  sciences.  Take,  for  example, 
a  subject,  not  of  leading  importance,  but  typical  of  the  problems 
studied  in  our  laboratories — after-images.  We  have  in  after- 
images a  case  where  we  investigate  the  relations  of  the  change 
in  consciousness  to  the  physical  stimulus  on  the  one  hand  and 
to  the  bodily  organism  on  the  other,  where  we  make  experi- 
ments and  measurements  on  phenomena  known  to  us  only  on 
the  side  of  the  individual  consciousness,  a  case  where  we  may 
hope  for  useful  applications  in  education,  in  medicine,  etc. 
We  have  in  after-images  phenomena  related  to  and  throwing 
light  on  a  large  range  of  mental  activity — imagery,  memory, 
hallucinations,  space-perception,  etc.,  and  even  of  interest 
(see,  for  example,  what  Royce  has  to  say  in  Vol.  III.  of  the 
Philosophical  Review)  in  their  bearing  on  epistemology  and 
metaphysics.  Now  after-images,  phenomena  thus  typical  of 
modern  experimental  psychology,  were  described  by  Aristotle 
with  such  exactness  that  we  may  feel  sure  that  he  himself  made 
experiments  upon  them,  whereas  he  refers  to  them  as  though 
they  were  familiar  to  his  readers.  Experiments  upon  after- 
images have  been  made  by  men  eminent  in  widely  separated  fields 
of  mental  activity — by  Augustine,  Newton,  Buff  on,  the  elder 
Darwin,  Goethe  and  many  more — long  before  the  date  usually 
assigned  to  the  development  of  psychology  as  an  experimental 
science.  I  have  perhaps  selected  a  favorable  example,  but  I 
think  there  are  but  few  subjects  now  in  course  of  investigation 
in  our  laboratories  whose  origin  and  gradual  development  could 
not  be  traced  a  long  way  back. 

I  may  mention  parenthetically  that  the  earliest  explicit  for- 
mulation of  the  problems  of  experimental  psychology,  as  I 


ADDRESS   OF   THE  PRESIDENT.  137 

understand  them,  is  to  be  found  not  in  Lotze,  nor  in  Fechner, 
nor  in  Wundt,  but  in  the  most  visionary  and  poetic  of  poets,  him- 
self a  problem  in  heredity,  character  and  intellect  far  beyond 
the  reach  of  our  psychology.  Shelley  wrote1  about  eighty  years 
ago: 

"A  scale  might  be  formed,  graduated  according  to  the  degrees  of  a  com- 
bined scale  of  intensity,  duration,  connexion,  periods  of  recurrence,  and  utility, 
which  would  be  the  standard,  according  to  which  all  ideas  might  be  measured, 
and  an  uninterrupted  chain  of  nicely  shadowed  distinctions  would  be  observed, 
from  the  faintest  impression  on  the  senses,  to  the  most  distinct  combination  of 
those  impressions ;  from  the  simplest  of  those  combinations,  to  that  mass  of 
knowledge  which,  including  our  own  nature,  constitutes  what  we  call  the  uni- 
verse." 

While  psychology  traces  its  descent  through  a  long  and  no- 
ble line,  we  need  not  hesitate  to  mark  a  natural,  but  at  the  same 
time  a  notable,  development  under  our  own  eyes  and  hands. 
A  little  while  ago  the  psychologist  might  still  say  with  Brown- 
ing's Cleon: 

"And  I  have  written  three  books  on  the  soul, 
Proving  absurd  all  written  hitherto, 
And  putting  us  to  ignorance  again." 

But  we  are  past  the  time  for  systems  of  psychology ;  now 
handbooks  of  psychology  are  prepared.  We  have,  like  the 
other  sciences,  a  small  area  lighted  by  ascertained  fact  and  ac- 
cepted theory,  outside  this  is  the  penumbra,  and  beyond  is  dark- 
ness through  which  none  of  us  pretends  to  see.  We,  indeed, 
estimate  differently  the  importance  of  different  departments  and 
the  hopefulness  of  different  lines  of  research,  but  in  this  respect 
we  only  exhibit  the  human  nature  in  whose  study  we  are  en- 
gaged. The  student  of  mechanics  proposes  to  account  for  all 
physical  phenomena  by  Newton's  laws,  the  student  of  electricity 
by  electric  vibrations,  etc.  An  eminent  chemist  recently  re- 
marked that  chemistry  is  evidently  the  basis  of  psychology. 

It  is,  however,  possible  that  we  over-emphasize  the  differ- 
ences that  do  exist.  Certainly  there  is  no  member  of  this  Asso- 
ciation who  believes  that  science  should  be  a  tohu-ivabohu  of 
facts,  nor  any  who  believes  that  reasonable  theories  can  be  de- 

1  Shelley's  Works,  Forman's  Edition,  VI.,  285.  Speculations  on  Metaphysics. 


138  /.  Me  KEEN  CAT  TELL. 

vised  without  regard  to  facts.  Probably  none  of  us  would  claim 
that  he  could  draw  a  straight  line  and  say  :  *  *  on  this  side  is  sci- 
ence, on  that  side  is  philosophy."  Possibly  none  would  say  :  "these 
observations  have  no  scientific  validity,  because  they  rest  on  in- 
trospection," or  "  these  determinations  have  no  psychological  in- 
terest, because  they  are  mere  measurements."  Rather  we  all 
join  in  the  admirable  words  of  our  President  at  the  New  York 
meeting : 

"  Let  us  all  always  be  just ;  nay,  let  us  be  something  more  than  merely  just ; 
let  us  be  generous.  And  let  our  generosity  include  all  workmen  of  all  times, 
with  their  works,  from  Aristotle's  De  Anima  to  the  latest  thesis  by  the  youngest 
aspirant  for  the  degree  of  Doctor  of  Philosophy." 

While  science  advances  along  many  paths,  there  are  certain 
highways  most  traveled  and  most  direct.  What  these  are  in 
psychology  at  the  present  time  the  analogy  of  the  other 
sciences  may  perhaps  indicate.  We  cannot,  I  think,  doubt, 
but  that  modern  science  is  either  quantitative  or  genetic.  I  say 
'  either '  because  there  is  at  present  a  partial  divorce  between  the 
physical  sciences  in  which  the  relative  permanence  of  the 
phenomena  makes  the  quantitative  point  of  view  easy  and  the 
genetic  difficult,  and  the  biological  sciences  in  which  the  con- 
verse conditions  obtain.  This  divorce  is,  however,  due  rather  to 
our  ignorance  than  to  our  knowledge.  In  the  progress  of  science 
the  physical  sciences  will  become  increasingly  genetic  and 
the  biological  sciences  increasingly  quantitative.  Astronomy 
learned  the  laws  of  Kepler  before  it  learned  the  nebular  hypo- 
thesis. The  physicist  could  not  find  in  the  star-dust  the  prob- 
lems of  modern  physics  and  chemistry.  There  is  variation  and 
survival  in  the  inorganic  as  well  as  in  the  organic  world.  The 
biologist  in  turn  should  no  longer  rest  content  with  describing 
the  genesis  of  species  and  of  individuals,  but  should  measure 
variations  and  changes,  and  determine  causal  relations  by  the 
methods  of  exact  science. 

It  would  seem  likely  that  methods  prevailing  in  the  other 
sciences  should  also  hold  in  psychology,  more  especially  as  we 
must  admit  that  most  of  these  sciences  have  passed  through  the 
stage  in  which  psychology  now  is — or  until  recently  was — and 
have  reached  a  clearer  self-consciousness.  But  we  do  not  need 


ADDRESS   OF   THE  PRESIDENT.  139 

to  depend  exclusively  on  the  often  delusive  argument  from  an- 
alogy. Recent  work  in  psychology  speaks  with  sufficient  em- 
phasis in  favor  of  tracing  the  genesis  and  the  degeneration  of 
mental  states  on  the  one  hand,  and  their  quantitative  definition 
on  the  other. 

I  think  we  may  claim  without  undue  self-assertion  that  the 
most  important  contributions  to  genetic  psychology  made  during 
the  past  year  have  come  from  members  of  this  Association. 
Baldwin  has  treated  with  an  elaboration  hitherto  unequalled, 
the  mental  development  of  the  child  and  of  the  race ;  Stanley 
has  studied  the  evolutionary  psychology  of  feeling ;  and  Royce 
has  analysed  the  genesis  of  the  contents  of  the  individual  con- 
sciousness in  its  dependence  on  social  environment  and  evolution 
with  great  acuteness.  While  much  of  the  definite  outcome  is 
still  sub  judice,  there  is  none  to  question  the  validity  of  the  ge- 
netic method. 

When  we  turn  to  the  quantitative  method  in  psychology  we 
find,  I  fear,  more  difference  of  opinion.  We  have,  indeed,  our 
many  laboratories,  all  of  which  are  at  least  silent  witnesses  in 
its  favor.  But  several  of  our  leading  members  have  expressed, 
at  the  meetings  of  this  Association  and  in  their  published  writ- 
ings, doubts  as  to  the  validity,  or  at  all  events  as  to  the  value,  of 
mental  measurements. 

Now  it  is  easy  to  adopt  a  skeptical  point  of  view  in  such  a 
matter.  By  the  nature  of  things  men  of  science  and  students 
of  philosophy  are  quit  of  the  enthusiasm  of  the  proselytizer  and 
reformer.  The  every-day  up-hill  work  of  the  laboratory  is 
scarcely  more  stimulating  than  the  routine  of  the  factory  or  of 
the  farm.  Each,  as  Clough's  Dipsychus  tells  us, 

"Must  slave,  a  meager  coral-worm 
To  build  beneath  the  tide  with  excrement 
What  one  day  will  be  island,  or  be  reef, 
And  will  feed  men,  or  wreck  them." 

But  this  skeptical  point  of  view  can  be  applied  with  equal 
success  and  equal  futility  to  any  science,  or  to  the  conduct  of 
daily  life.  We  may,  if  we  see  fit,  wonder  why  anybody  does 
anything.  By  common  consent  the  discovery  of  argon  in  the 
atmosphere  was  the  most  important  scientific  advance  of  the 


140  /.    Me  KEEN  CATTELL. 

past  year,  but  it  has  not  as  yet  been  found  that  argon  is  of  any 
practical  use,  and,  so  far  from  helping  us  to  understand  the  uni- 
verse, this  substance  but  adds  to  its  apparent  complexity.  Why 
not  let  the  last  decimal  be,  and  enjoy  the  air  in  the  springtime — or 
devise  means  to  keep  out  of  it  if  one  happen  to  live  near  Boston  ? 

Miinsterberg  has  written  :  "  Die  Messung  ist  niemals  Selbst- 
zweck  in  der  Psychologic,  eben  dadurch  unterscheidet  sie  sich 
von  der  Physik."  Now  it  seems  to  me,  on  the  contrary,  that 
measurements  have  just  the  same  place  in  psychology  as  in  the 
material  sciences,  except  in  so  far  as  they  have  not  been  as 
yet  so  successfully  prosecuted.  The  immediate  end  of  science, 
whether  physical  or  mental,  is  to  describe  the  world — it  may  be 
added,  and  to  explain  it,  though  if  we  had  a  complete  and  uni- 
fied description,  it  is  not  clear  what  would  be  left  to  explain. 
We  wish  to  describe  the  world,  partly  because  our  knowledge 
can  be  applied  in  useful  ways,  and  partly  because  the  effort  sat- 
isfies mental  needs,  as  do  art  and  religion.  Measurements  in 
the  physical  sciences  are  in  a  way  means  to  the  ends  mentioned, 
but  in  so  far  as  a  description  of  the  world  is  an  end  in  itself, 
measurements  are  a  part  of  this  description,  and  by  far  the  most 
exact,  general  and  economical  method  of  description  hitherto 
devised. 

It  may  be  that  in  psychology  the  field  for  quantitative  defi- 
nition is  more  limited  than  in  the  case  of  the  physical  sciences. 
The  lack  of  many  or  wide-reaching  numerical  formulas  ex- 
pressing mental  relations  may  be  due  not  so  much  to  the  recent- 
ness  of  our  attempts  to  discover  these  as  to  the  nature  of  the 
subject-matter  with  which  we  are  dealing.  Indeed  it  is  evident 
that  as  a  mere  matter  of  definition  we  have  to  a  large  extent 
limited  the  physical  sciences  to  a  quantitative  treatment  of  time, 
space  and  energy,  relegating  qualitative  differences  to  con- 
sciousness. But  it  is  also  true  that  the  quantitative  point  of  view 
in  physical  science  has  only  gradually  and  but  recently  emerged 
from  a  chaos  of  animistic  and  teleological  conceptions.  The 
unitary  point  of  view  developed  by  physical  science  is  truly  a 
matter  for  marvel.  The  awe  inspired  in  the  great  mystic  of 
rationalism  by  the  starry  heavens  and  the  moral  law  may  well 
pervade  the  student  of  physics  in  the  presence  of  the  unforeseen 
grandeur  and  simplicity  of  his  own  handiwork. 


ADDRESS   OF   THE  PRESIDENT.  141 

It  is,  indeed,  true  that  measurements  give  as  yet  only  a  par- 
tial description  even  of  the  physical  world,  and  the  progress  of 
science  may  make  this  less  rather  than  more  adequate.  The 
ether,  elastic  and  solid  as  it  is  supposed  to  be,  seems  on  the 
point  of  breaking  under  the  load  laid  upon  it.  Atoms  are 
stumbling  blocks,  however  small  we  may  assume  them.  Lud- 
wig,  chiefly  instrumental  in  establishing  for  a  while  a  mechani- 
cal theory  of  living  tissues,  lived  long  enough  to  witness  the 
emergence  of  a  neo-vitalism.  Indeed  Ludwig  himself,  on  being 
asked  why  he  did  not  prepare  a  new  edition  of  his  Physiology 
said,  "  Such  a  work  must  be  written  by  a  young  man ;  an  old 
man  is  too  well  aware  of  his  ignorance."  We  are  as  the  earth 
in  the  Hebrew  cosmogony,  when  the  light  had  been  separated 
from  the  darkness,  but  the  sun  had  not  yet  been  set  in  the  firm- 
ament. 

Both  the  success  and  the  failure  of  material  science  may  en- 
courage the  experimental  psychologist.  He  may  hope  to  ac- 
complish much  by  measurements,  even  though  he  may  foresee 
that  he  will  not  accomplish  everything.  Whether  he  be  en- 
trusted with  one  talent  or  with  many,  he  can  serve  in  better  ways 
than  in  standing  and  waiting. 

This  commingling  of  hopeful  endeavor  and  hopeless  limita- 
tion drawn  from  the  analogy  of  physical  science  may  be  more 
directly  deduced  from  the  work  hitherto  accomplished  in  the 
psychological  laboratory.  This  has  indeed  been  called  trivial 
and  pedantic,  and  has  been  wounded  even  in  the  house  of  its 
friends.  Statistics,  averages  and  probable  errors  seem  re- 
mote from  the  complex  fulness  of  human  nature.  There  seems 
imminent  danger  from  a  neo-scholasticism  with  measurements 
in  the  place  of  definitions. 

Now  when  it  is  said  that  nothing  has  been  done  beyond 
measuring  time,  intensity,  and  complexity  of  sensations,  move- 
ments and  mental  processes,  the  reply  may  readily  be  made 
that  nothing  further  can  be  desired.  Physical  science  meas- 
ures only  time,  space  and  energy.  If  psychology  can  do  as 
much  it  has  the  same  abundance  of  individual  problems ;  if  it 
need  do  no  more  it  has  the  same  great  simplicity  as  its  goal. 

The  use  of  averages  and  probable  errors  in  psychology  is 


142  /.   Me  KEEN  CATTELL. 

not  pedantic,  except  when  attempted  by  those  not  acquainted 
with  their  meaning.  The  probable  error  tells  us  just  how  many 
experiments  we  ought  to  make  and  just  what  reliance  may  be 
placed  upon  them.  The  theory  of  probabilities,  enabling  us  to 
measure  both  our  knowledge  and  our  ignorance,  is  one  of  the 
great  achievements  of  the  human  intellect,  and  is  equally  applica- 
ble in  sciences  attaining  varying  degrees  of  exactness.  It  was, 
indeed,  pedantic  for  Helmholtz  to  give  the  velocity  of  the  ner- 
vous impulse  as  37.4927  m.  per  second,  when  the  average  ve- 
locity and  the  individual  variations  are  not  known  within  tens  of 
meters.  But  it  is  exactly  an  application  of  probable  errors  that 
would  prevent  such  pedantry,  and  if  the  greatest  of  physicists 
has  on  occasion  indulged  in  it,  we  need  not  too  severely  blame 
the  student  preparing  his  doctor's  thesis  for  carrying  his  aver- 
age a  decimal  beyond  what  is  warranted  by  the  theory  of  prob- 
abilities. 

In  some  cases  a  very  considerable  degree  of  accuracy  is  at- 
tainable and  necessary  in  psycho-physical  measurements.  Thus 
doubling  the  intensity  of  the  stimulus  shortens  the  reaction-time 
about  o.ooi  sec.,  and  if  we  wish  to  determine  the  relation  be- 
tween intensity  of  stimulus  and  duration  of  reaction  we  must 
measure  to  the  ten-thousandth  of  a  second,  and  the  averages 
and  probable  errors  show  that  such  a  degree  of  accuracy  is  at- 
tainable. The  apparatus  used  for  the  purpose  in  the  psycho- 
logical laboratory  of  Columbia  College  has  this  year  been  bor- 
rowed by  professors  in  the  physical  department  to  measure  the 
rate  of  fall  of  bodies  in  liquids,  and  it  has  resulted  that  the  con- 
stancy of  the  physical  motions  is  less  than  that  of  the  psycho- 
physical  processes. 

Such  problems — the  correlations  of  quantities — are  those  ul- 
timate in  exact  science,  and  in  so  far  as  they  can  be  undertaken 
in  psychology  it  becomes  an  exact  science.  It  may  be  said 
that  in  the  example  given  we  are  concerned  with  the  nervous 
system  rather  than  with  consciousness.  But  even  if  this  be  ex- 
clusively the  case  it  may  be  urged  that  a  dynamics  of  the  ner- 
vous system  is  essential  to  a  final  psychology.  Further,  the 
correlations  of  quantities  may  be  investigated  in  cases  in  which 
we  know  the  changes  in  consciousness,  but  are  completely  ig- 


ADDRESS   OF   THE  PRESIDENT.  143 

norant  of  the  neural  processes  which  may  accompany  them. 
Thus  we  all  are  familiar  with  the  many  investigations  on  the 
discrimination  of  differences  in  intensity.  There  is  room  for 
various  interpretations  of  the  meaning  of  a  just  noticeable  dif- 
ference, but  by  definition  differences  in  sensation  are  equal  if 
they  be  equally  perceptible.  We  can  find  when  differences 
are  equally  perceptible  by  determining  the  percentage  of  times 
in  which  they  are  in  fact  correctly  perceived.  But  we  can  ap- 
proach the  problem  from  a  new  point  of  view,  first  defined,  I 
believe,  at  the  New  York  meeting  of  this  Association,  involving 
the  correlation  of  mental  magnitudes. 

If  differences  be  equally  perceptible  it  takes  equal  times  to 
discriminate  them,  and  the  less  the  difference  in  sensation  the 
greater  the  time  required.  By  measuring  the  time  of  discrimi- 
nation it  is  possible  to  determine  differences  in  the  intensity  of 
sensation.  We  can  thus  investigate  the  relation  of  the  intensity 
of  stimulus  to  the  accuracy  of  discrimination  (Weber's  law),  and 
can  even  use  the  method  for  the  comparison  of  disparate  sensa- 
tions. We  may  find  that  the  difference  between  red  and  blu 
is  equal,  say,  to  the  difference  between  sensations  due  to  lights 
from  10  and  1,000  candles,  or  even  that  the  difference  between 
the  tones  C  and  c  is  equal  to  the  difference  between  certain  vis- 
ual sensations. 

The  appeal  made  to  different  minds  by  such  problems  as 
part  of  a  worthy  description  of  the  world  must  of  necessity  vary 
with  the  individual  mind.  Our  goals  in  religion,  art,  philoso- 
phy and  science  are  not  only  wide  apart,  but  they  also  shift 
even  as  we  run.  Our  science  and  our  philosophy  are  but  as  a 
doll  in  the  arms  of  a  little  girl,  who  does  not  know  what  it 
means  nor  what  the  years  will  bring. 

I  think,  however,  that  conclusive  testimony  may  be  ad- 
vanced to  prove  that  psychological  experiment  has  had  and  will 
have  both  practical  applications  and  an  important  share  in  psy- 
chology as  a  whole,  whether  regard  be  had  to  its  individual  de- 
velopment or  to  its  relations  with  the  other  sciences. 

Professor  Burdon  Sanderson,  in  his  presidential  address  be- 
fore the  Ipswich  meeting  of  the  British  Association,  said  that  he 
was  not  aware  of  any  useful  application  of  experimental  psy- 


1 44  /•   Me  KEEN  C ATT  ELL. 

chology,  and  Professor  Morley,  president  of  the  American  Asso- 
ciation, said,  at  the  recent  Springfield  meeting,  "  science  cannot 
change  human  natures  or  the  social  order."  These  selected 
representatives  of  science  in  England  and  America,  however, 
both  hold  that  science  has  an  adequate  end  in  the  satisfaction  of 
intellectual  curiosity.  On  the  other  hand  Franklin,  the  father 
of  American  science,  speaks  of  new  discoveries  as  important 
only  because  they  tend  ' '  to  extend  the  power  of  man  over  mat- 
ter, avert  or  diminish  the  evils  he  is  subject  to,  or  augment  the 
number  of  his  enjoyments."  Franklin's  point  of  view  may  be 
regarded  as  materialistic,  but  science  for  the  sake  of  science  is 
in  turn  in  danger  of  dillitanteism. 

We  may  be  glad  that  experimental  psychology  has  practical 
applications  in  spite  of  quasi-official  dicta  to  the  contrary.  In 
the  United  States  more  than  one  hundred  and  fifty  million  dol- 
lars, collected  by  enforced  taxation,  is  spent  annually  on  public 
schools  in  the  attempt  to  *  change  human  natures.'  President 
Eliot  says  that  nothing  is  accomplished  in  these  schools  except 
the  training  of  the  memory,  and  his  colleague,  our  retiring 
president,  tells  us  that  the  memory  cannot  be  trained.1  Surely 
in  education,  which  extends  from  birth  to  death,  we  can  learn 
by  experiments  on  the  senses  and  the  mind  what  may  be  done 
to  fit  the  individual  to  his  environment.  It  should  not  be  for- 
gotten that  we  not  only  hold  the  clay  in  our  hands  to  mold  for 
honor  or  dishonor,  but  we  also  have  the  ultimate  decision  as  to 
what  material  we  shall  use.  The  physicist  can  turn  his  pig 
iron  into  steel,  and  so  can  we  ours ;  but  he  cannot  alter  the 
quantities  of  gold  and  iron  in  his  world,  whereas  we  can  in  ours. 
Our  responsibility  is,  indeed,  very  great.  By  one  psycho- 
logical experiment  we  injure  the  eysight  of  our  children  in  the 
schools,  and  by  another  psychological  experiment  we  discover 
the  defect  and  fit  glasses  to  correct  it.  It  seems  to  me  certain 
that  experimental  psychology  has  wide-reaching  practical  ap- 
plications, not  only  in  education,  but  also  in  medicine,  in  the 
fine  arts,  in  political  economy  and,  indeed,  in  the  whole  con- 
duct of  life. 

lAs  Professor  James  said  at  the  meeting,  he  only  holds  that  native  reten- 
tiveness  is  unchangeable.  It  was  not,  of  course,  intended  in  this  paradox  to 
adequately  represent  the  views  of  President  Eliot  and  Professor  James. 


ADDRESS    OF   THE  PRESIDENT.  145 

It  also  seems  evident  that  experimental  psychology  has  re- 
cently become  an  important  factor  in  the  development  of  psy- 
chology as  a  whole,  both  by  its  actual  contributions  and  by  the 
changes  in  method  to  which  it  has  given  rise.  The  psycho- 
physical  camel  will  never  be  able  to  exclude  the  psychological 
Arab  from  his  tent,  but  it  must  be  welcomed,  or  at  least  toler- 
ated. A  comparison  of  modern  text-books  of  psychology,  such 
as  those  by  James,  Ladd,  Baldwin,  and  Dewey,  with  older 
works  bears  irrefutable  witness  to  the  introduction  of  the  results 
of  physiological  and  psychological  experiment.  I  shall  under- 
take the  argumentum  ad  hominem  in  the  case  of  James,  who 
said  at  our  last  meeting  that  "curious  phenomena  of  the  disso- 
ciation of  consciousness  *  *  *  throw  more  new  light  on 
human  nature  than  the  work  of  all  psycho-physical  laboratories 
put  together."  On  taking  down  James'  Psychology — which  has 
breathed  the  breath  of  life  into  the  dust  of  psychology — and  turn- 
ing at  random  to  the  even  hundred  pages,  I  find  that  the  first  is 
entirely  taken  up  with  the  measurement  of  the  temperature  of 
the  brain  in  relation  to  thought ;  the  second  is  on  continuity  of 
consciousness  with  time  measurements ;  the  third  a  description 
of  the  bodily  movements  giving  the  consciousness  of  self ;  the 
fourth  on  the  relation  of  the  two  hemispheres  of  the  brain  and  of 
bodily  movements  to  self-consciousness  ;  the  fifth  on  the  relative 
intensity  of  sensations  and  images  ;  the  sixth  on  the  association  of 
ideas ;  the  seventh  on  observations  and  experiments  on  the  mis- 
taken interpretation  of  sense-stimuli ;  the  eighth  on  the  relation 
of  movements  of  the  eyes  to  the  perception  of  space ;  the  ninth 
on  the  factors  distinguishing  the  perception  of  reality ;  the  tenth 
on  instinctive  actions  ;  the  eleventh  on  muscular  sensations  ;  the 
twelfth  on  hypnotic  suggestion.  These  topics  illustrate  very 
fairly  the  field  covered  by  modern  psychology.  They  nearly 
all  rest  upon  psycho-physical  observations  and  experiments,  and 
in  cases  where  observations  predominate  it  is  evident  that  they 
will  soon  be  superseded  by  actual  experiments  from  our  labora- 
tories yielding  quantitative  results. 

Even  in  directions  where  experiment  has  not  yet  offered  con- 
siderable contributions,  it  has  performed  an  important  service  in 
setting  a  standard  of  carefulness  and  objectivity.  It  may  also  be 


146  /.  Me  KEEN  CATTELL. 

urged  that  experiment  serves  as  a  stimulus  and  starting  point  lor 
thought.  Thus  Wundt  states  that  his  theory  of  the  development 
of  the  will  and  of  its  relation  to  *  apperception '  had  its  origin  in 
observations  made  during  the  course  of  experiments  on  the  re- 
action-time. It  requires  peculiar  genius  to  sit  down  at  a  desk 
and  write  out  observations  and  theories  that  are  new  and  true ; 
they  are  more  likely  to  occur  during  actual  work  of  some  sort. 
Further,  there  are  many  who  can  carry  out  experiments  in  the 
laboratory  who  are  incapable  of  constructive  work.  The  data 
obtained  by  them  may  be  seen  by  others  in  their  larger  relations. 
The  generalizations  of  a  Newton  must  be  based  upon  the  obser- 
vations of  a  Flamsteed. 

The  introduction  of  experiment  has  also  made  the  teaching 
of  psychology  easier  and  more  useful.  Laboratory  work  by 
students  is  by  common  consent  an  important  part  of  their  train- 
ing. Whether  the  experiments  be  in  chemistry  or  in  psychology 
may  not  greatly  matter.  In  the  chemical  laboratory,  when  the 
course  is  intended  for  liberal  training,  the  experiments  are 
meant  to  educate  the  senses  and  the  mind,  rather  than  to  give 
information  concerning  metals  and  acids.  When  the  object  of 
an  experiment  is  not  to  learn  what  happens  when  two  solutions 
are  mixed,  but  to  teach  the  student  to  observe  what  happens,  we 
may  perhaps  claim  that  a  psychological  experiment  has  been 
undertaken.  Whether  experiments  directed  to  the  senses  and 
the  mind  would  serve  better  or  worse  than  others  for  the  pur- 
pose in  view,  or  whether  it  is  practicable  to  introduce  a  new 
study  into  the  preparatory  school  or  the  early  college  years,  are 
matters  that  can  themselves  only  be  settled  by  experiment.  It 
is,  however,  certain  that  such  preliminary  work,  or,  lacking  it, 
some  experiments  introduced  into  the  course  in  psychology  com- 
monly offered  and  even  required  in  the  junior  year,  would 
enable  the  average  student  to  follow  this  course  with  greater  in- 
terest and  intelligence,  so  that  he  would  be  less  likely  to  regard 
it  as : 

"A  tale 

Told  by  an  idiot,  full  of  sound  and  fury, 

Signifying  nothing." 

I  venture   to   maintain   that  the  introduction  of  experiment 


ADDRESS   OF  THE  PRESIDENT.  147 

and  measurement  into  psychology  has  added  directly  and  indi- 
rectly new  subject-matter  and  methods,  has  set  a  higher  stand- 
ard of  accuracy  and  objectivity,  has  made  some  part  of  the 
subject  an  applied  science  with  useful  applications,  and  has 
enlarged  the  field  and  improved  the  methods  of  teaching 
psychology.  In  conclusion  I  wish  to  urge  that  experiment  in 
psychology  has  made  its  relations  with  the  other  sciences  more 
intimate  and  productive  of  common  good. 

In  courses  in  physics,  for  example,  certain  psychological 
subjects,  vision,  hearing,  etc.,  have  always  been  included.  The 
treatment  has  of  necessity  been  inadequate,  and  the  student,  if 
not  the  teacher,  may  have  left  the  subject  with  confused 
notions,  e.  g.9  as  to  the  distinction  between  light  as  a  mode  of 
motion  and  color  as  sensation.  Or  it  may  be  incidentally  stated 
that  color,  pitch  and  warmth  are  *  subjective,'  while  matter  in 
motion  is  alone  *  real.'  Now  the  treatment  of  certain  subjects 
in  common  with  physics  has  set  for  the  psychologist  a  higher 
scientific  standard,  whereas  it  may  be  hoped  that  the  physicist 
has  learned  that  processes  of  perception  and  thought  are  part  of 
the  real  world  which  science  as  a  whole  must  take  into  account. 

In  physiology  the  treatment  of  certain  subjects  in  common 
must  ultimately  result  in  mutual  benefit.  Our  host  Fullerton 
showed  this  morning  how  largely  the  physiology  of  the  nervous 
system  leaves  its  proper  field  for  that  of  psychology.  The 
physiologist  must  face  the  problem  as  to  whether  consciousness 
shall  be  assumed  in  causal  interaction  with  the  nervous  system. 
It  may  not  matter  greatly  to  us  whether  cerebral  functions  are 
located  here  or  there,  but  it  would  be  a  survival  or  an  atavism 
to  hold  that  we  can  fully  treat  processes  of  perception,  ideation, 
feeling  or  will  without  regard  to  sense  organs,  movements, 
paths  of  conduction  and  nervous  centers,  or  even  apart  from 
metabolism  and  circulation  of  the  blood. 

In  general  biology,  whose  great  problem  is  the  develop- 
ment of  life,  zoology-botany  and  psychology  cannot  advance 
excepting  hand  in  hand.  Darwin  did  not  hesitate  to  use  con- 
sciousness as  a  vera  causa  in  the  preservation  of  species,  and 
Cope,  now  presiding  over  our  sister  society,  urges  that  it  is  a 
preeminent  cause  in  their  origin.  Sensations,  movements,  in- 


148  /.    McKEEN   CATTELL. 

stincts  and  habits  are  prominent  in  any  theory  of  the  evolution 
of  species,  and  they  must  be  treated  in  common  by  physical 
zoology  and  psychology.  The  importance  of  these  problems  is 
borne  witness  to  by  the  fact  that  we  have  selected  them  for 
special  discussion  to-morrow  morning.  For  many  the  leading 
interest  in  organic  evolution  is  in  its  application  to  social  evolu- 
tion, and  it  is  scarcely  necessary  to  mention  the  relation  of  psy- 
chology to  sociology,  which  science  is  indeed  simply  collective 
psychology. 

Psychology  has  long  been  and  properly  remains  the  gate- 
way to  architectonic  philosophy.  It  may  be  that  experiment 
cannot  answer  the  final  questions  of  philosophy,  but  the  world- 
view  of  each  of  us  depends  increasingly  on  what  the  natural 
and  exact  sciences  contribute  to  it.  The  white  light  of  philos- 
ophy can  only  result  from  the  proper  commingling  of  the  colors 
of  the  sciences.  Systems  of  philosophy,  elaborated  prior  to  the 
development  of  modern  science  or  without  regard  to  this,  may 
receive  our  admiration  as  poetry,  but  they  cannot  claim  our  ad- 
herence as  truth.  To  allot  to  science  those  subjects  concerning 
which  we  have  knowledge,  and  to  reserve  for  philosophy  those 
questions  concerning  which  we  know  nothing,  is  evidently  sub- 
versive of  philosophy.  Epistemology,  ethics,  logic  and  aesthe- 
tics are  regarded  as  philosophic  disciplines,  but  they  rest  in- 
creasingly on  psychology.  Epistemology  depends  on  the 
psychology  of  perception  and  may  be  nothing  else.  Works  on 
ethics,  logic  and  aesthetics  take  increasing  account  of  psycholog- 
ical facts ;  indeed,  as  our  knowledge  increases,  the  distinction 
between  a  normative  and  a  descriptive  science  becomes  some- 
what tenuous.  The  twilight  of  philosophy  can  be  changed  to 
its  dawn  only  by  the  light  of  science,  and  psychology  can  con- 
tribute more  light  than  any  other  science. 


CONSCIOUSNESS  AND  TIME.1 

BY  C.  A.  STRONG, 
Columbia   University. 

The  question  to  which  I  invite  your  attention  is  this  :  What 
is  present  time,  and  what  is  the  relation  of  consciousness  to 
present  time?  The  answer  that  naturally  occurs  to  one  is,  that 
consciousness  is  in  present  time,  that  present  time  is  -present 
time,  not  past  or  future,  and  that  there  is  an  end  of  the  matter. 
The  answer  given  by  Professor  James  in  his  Presidential  Ad- 
dress a  year  ago,  which  is  the  answer  of  Shadworth  Hodgson, 
is  a  very  different  one ;  and  as  this  answer  seems  to  me  unsatis- 
factory, I  should  like,  with  your  permission,  to  present  my  ob- 
jections to  it  and  my  reasons  for  preferring  the  natural  answer.2 

According  to  Professor  James,  there  is  "literally  no  such 
datum"  as  that  of  present  time.  The  present  is  merely  a  boun- 
dary-line between  the  past  and  the  future,  and  is  not  itself  ex- 
tended or  capable  of  containing  anything  real.  The  only  real 
datum,  the  only  thing  that  is  ever  really  present  to  us,  is  a  short 
bit  of  duration,  an  interval  of  time,  extending  a  little  way  back 
and  a  little  way  forward  from  the  present  instant.  Or,  rather, 
the  datum  is  the  feeling  that  occupies  this  interval  and  has  this 
duration.  And  there  is  a  minimum  duration  which  the  feeling 
must  have  in  order  to  exist  at  all.  Such  a  minimal  feeling, 
when  reflectively  examined,  is  found  to  consist  of  two  sub-feel- 
ings, one  earlier  and  the  other  later,  and  the  feeling  of  their 
succession.  Thus  the  simplest  feeling  we  can  have  already 
includes  the  consciousness  of  change,  of  passing  time.  The 
boundary-line  which  separates  the  two  sub-feelings  is  the  pres- 

JRead  before  the  American  Psychological  Association  at  Philadelphia,  De- 
cember, 1895. 

2  Prof.  James's  address  appeared  in  the  PSYCH.  REV.  for  March,  1895, 
pp.  105  ff ;  see  esp.  pp.  111-113.  Mr.  Hodgson's  statement  is  found  in  his  Phil- 
osophy of  Reflection  I.,  pp.  248  ff.  The  view  criticised  is  also  held  by  Fouille*e, 
Psychologic  des  Idees-Forces,  II.,  pp.  81  ff. 

149 


150  C.   A.    STRONG. 

ent  instant,  and  with  reference  to  it  the  one  appears  as  past  and 
the  other  as  future.  Thus  past  and  future  are  "  already  parts  of 
the  least  experience  that  can  really  be." 

But  the  consciousness  of  change,  of  passing  time,  is  a  rela- 
tional state,  and  therefore  necessarily  unitary.  Just  as  the 
consciousness  of  the  difference  of  two  things  requires  that  they 
should  both  be  present  to  a  unitary  state  which  knows  them  and 
their  difference,  so  the  consciousness  of  succession  requires  that 
the  earlier  and  the  later  state  should  both  be  present  to  a  single 
thought.  And  as  the  consciousness  of  likeness  or  difference  im- 
plies a  simultaneous  unity  of  consciousness,  a  unity  running,  so 
to  speak,  across  the  stream,  so  the  consciousness  of  change,  of 
passing  time,  implies  a  successive  unity  of  consciousness,  a  unity 
running  a  short  distance  up  and  down  the  stream.  Such  a  suc- 
cessive unity  is,  to  be  sure,  a  mysterious  thing  ;  for  the  knowing 
state  has  to  reach  out  beyond  itself,  and  intuitively  know  together 
things  that  do  not  exist  together.  Yet  such  self-transcendence, 
such  "  presence  in  absence"  we  must  nevertheless  assume,  if  the 
relation  of  consciousness  to  time  is  to  be  made  intelligible  at  all. 

In  presenting  my  objections  to  this  account  of  the  matter,  I 
must  point  out,  to  begin  with,  that  there  are  two  distinct  rela- 
tions here  involved :  the  relation  of  consciousness  to  the  time  in 
which  it  exists,  and  its  relation  to  the  time  of  which  it  is  aware. 
I  shall  take  for  granted  that  consciousness  does  as  a  matter  of 
fact  exist  in  time,  and  shall  inquire  first  as  to  the  characters  of 
the  time  in  which  it  exists. 

The  present  instant,  as  a  mere  boundary-line,  is  too  small 
for  consciousness  to  exist  in :  this,  I  think,  is  Professor  James's 
doctrine.  It  must  be  freely  admitted  that  the  present  instant  is 
a  mere  boundary-line,  and  that  consciousness,  in  order  to  exist 
at  all,  must  have  duration.  But  the  consequence  which  is  sup- 
posed to  follow  from  this — namely,  that  consciousness,  driven 
out  of  the  present,  can  find  room  for  itself  only  in  a  little  bit 
of  the  past  plus  a  little  bit  of  the  future — does  not  really  fol- 
low from  it  at  all. 

This  might  appear,  for  one  thing,  from  the  consideration 
that  the  past  means  that  which  once  was  present,  and  the  future 
that  which  will  be  present ;  that  the  reality  of  the  past  and  the 


CONSCIOUSNESS  AND    TIME.  151 

future  is  thus  derivative  from  the  reality  of  the  present ;  and 
that  to  deny  the  reality  of  the  present  is  therefore  to  knock  the 
bottom  out  of  reality  altogether.  But  it  might  be  contended 
that  this  applies  only  to  the  *  specious  present. ' 

That  the  consequence  does  not  really  follow,  appears  when 
we  consider  that  the  conception  of  an  extended  present  involves 
the  same  false  abstraction  as  the  conception  it  is  intended  to 
replace.  The  two  sub-feelings  AB  are  supposed  to  be  given 
at  once,  A  being  known  as  past  and  B  as  future.  But  this 
state  of  things  exists,  not  for  any  finite  length  of  time,  but 
only  for  an  indivisible  instant,  only  at  the  instant  x.  Only  at 
that  instant  is  it  true  that  A  is  entirely  past  and  B  entirely  fu- 
ture. But  it  is  in  just  such  an  instant  that  nothing  can  be  real. 
When  we  look  at  the  feelings  AB  from  the  point  of  view  of 
this  instant,  we  are  conceiving  the  flight  of  time  as  arrested, 
and  therefore  considering  the  feelings  in  abstraction  from  real 
time.  If  we  are  to  find  room  for  consciousness,  we  must  aban- 
don the  point  of  view  of  any  single  instant,  and  take  up  the 
innumerable  points  of  view  of  the  duration  itself.  We  must 
remind  ourselves  that  the  feeling  A  has  been  present  and  the 
feeling  B  will  be  present;  in  other  words,  we  must  consider 
A  and  B  as  feelings  that  become  successively  present;  or, 
rather,  we  must  consider  these  feelings  as  parts  of  a  stream  of 
consciousness  every  instant  of  which  becomes  successively 
present.  Only  by  substituting  the  point  of  view  of  the  interval 
ivy  for  that  of  the  instant  #,  and  only  by  considering  this  inter- 
val, not  as  a  bit  of  the  past  plus  a  bit  of  the  future,  but  as 
a  line  of  successive  -presents,  shall  we  succeed  in  considering 
the  feelings  concretely,  and  in  the  way  they  actually  happened. 

By  adopting  a  sort  of  algebraic  statement  the  case  may  be 
presented  in  its  essence.  Such  a  stream  of  consciousness,  such 
a  line  of  successive  presents,  may  be  conceived  as  composed  of 
n  parts,  and  these  parts  will  always  be  successive,  thus  :  i,  2,  3 

n-2,  n-i,  n.  However  great  the  value  assigned  to  », 

the  parts  will  always  be  successive.  It  is  evident  that  from  these 
essential  relations  there  is  in  the  nature  of  the  case  no  escape. 
No  fraction  of  a  second  can  possibly  be  taken  so  small  that  all 
of  its  parts  will  be  given  at  once.  Succession,  in  other  words,  is 


152  C.  A.    STRONG. 

spun  out  infinitely  fine,  and  the  only  thing  that  can  be  given 
at  once  is  an  indivisible  instant. 

Here  doubtless  some  hearer  says  to  himself  that  I  have 
given  away  my  case.  I  have  sharpened  the  succession  down 
to  a  point,  and  in  so  doing  have  left  no  room  for  consciousness. 
I  reply  that  this  objection  rests  on  the  very  same  false  abstrac- 
tion against  which  I  have  been  protesting.  For  what  sort  of  a 
point  is  it  which  we  now  have  left?  It  is  no  longer  a  resting 
point,  but  a  moving  point ;  it  is  the  onward  motion  of  a  point 
from  an  earlier  instant  to  a  later  one ;  and  what  is  such  onward 
motion  but  actual  duration  ?  The  resting  point  was  a  mere  ab- 
straction ;  it  left  out  the  motion,  the  onward  passage,  the  fugi- 
tive quality,  which  is  the  essence  of  time,  without  which  it  would 
not  be  time  at  all ;  and  since  time  itself  was  left  out,  there  was 
naturally  no  room  for  consciousness.  But  the  moving  point  is 
only  another  name  for  actual  duration,  and  in  present  time, 
when  so  conceived,  consciousness  finds  all  the  room  it  needs.  In 
order  adequately  to  conceive  present  time,  we  must  combine  the 
two  conceptions  of  movement  and  a  point.  The  conception  of 
movement  is  necessary  in  order  to  render  time's  flight,  its  fugi- 
tive quality.  The  conception  of  a  point  is  necessary  in  order  to 
render  its  infinite  successiveness. 

But  here,  again,  some  hearer  doubtless  says  to  himself  that  I 
have  given  away  my  case  in  another  direction.  In  modifying 
the  conception  of  present  time  from  that  of  a  resting  to  that  of 
a  moving  point,  I  have  virtually  admitted  that  change  is  directly 
given.  And,  if  change,  then  the  terminus  a  quo  and  the  ter- 
minus ad  quern,  the  two  sub-feelings  and  their  succession,  the 
immediate  past  and  the  immediate  future.  I  may  reply  by  ask- 
ing the  objector  to  consider  what  sort  of  change  it  is  which  he 
here  assumes,  and  what  sort  of  change  it  is  which  is  actually 
given.  The  change  which  he  assumes  is  a  finite  change,  the 
transition  from  feeling  A  to  feeling  B,  these  two  feelings  not 
being  real  at  the  same  time.  The  change  actually  given  is  an 
infinitesimal  change,  the  onward  passage  in  the  act  of  occur- 
ring— that  onward  passage  in  virtue  of  which  we  say  that 
time  is  infinitely  successive,  that  the  succession  is  spun  out 
infinitely  fine.  The  fact  is,  that  the  succession  is  spun  out 


CONSCIOUSNESS  AND    TIME.  153 

very  much  too  fine  to  be  visible  to  the  naked  eye  of  con- 
sciousness. The  succession,  in  other  words,  enters  into  the 
tissue  of  consciousness,  histologically  speaking,  but  is  not  an 
obvious  feature  of  its  gross  anatomy.  Consciousness  is  in 
its  nature  a  sort  of  change,  conscious  states  are  nothing  if 
not  events,  but  this  is  an  account  of  what  consciousness  is, 
not  an  account  of  what  we  are  conscious  of.  A  sudden,  brief 
pain  is  in  its  nature  an  event,  a  change,  but  what  we  are  con- 
scious of  is  not  the  change,  but  the  pain.  A  changing  con- 
sciousness, in  short,  is  not  the  same  thing  as  a  consciousness  of 
change. 

I  hope  I  have  now  met  the  nearest-lying  objections,  and  made 
it  clear  that  present  time,  when  rightly  conceived,  furnishes  all 
the  room  that  consciousness  needs.  Reality,  as  we  know  it, 
may  in  fact  be  said  to  be  nothing  but  one  ever-changing  present. 
So  far  is  it  from  being  true  that  "past  and  future  are  already 
parts  of  the  least  experience  that  can  really  be,  "  and  that  there 
is  "literally  no  such  datum"  as  that  of  the  present,  that  I  think 
we  may  rather  say  that  there  is  literally  no  other  conceivable 
datum,  and  that  the  present  is  the  only  time  that  ever  was,  or  is, 
or  shall  be. 

I  pass  now  to  the  second  of  the  two  relations,  that  between 
consciousness  and  the  time  of  which  it  is  aware.  This  relation 
may  be  disposed  of  briefly.  Though  consciousness  exists  only 
in  the  present,  and  the  present  is  a  moving  boundary-line,  yet  it 
must  be  admitted  that  the  time  of  which  we  seem  to  be  directly 
aware  is  not  a  mere  boundary-line,  but  an  actual  interval,  an  in- 
terval the  parts  of  which  are  given  not  successively,  but  all  at 
once.  And  this  is  true,  in  spite  of  the  fact  that  the  consciousness 
of  this  interval  exists  only  in  the  moving  boundary-line.  Just 
as,  in  external  perception,  what  is  really  given  is  only  a  subjec- 
tive state,  yet  what  we  are  for  practical  purposes  aware  of  is  a 
real  world  of  space ;  so,  in  our  consciousness  of  time,  what  is 
really  given  is  only  the  moving  boundary-line,  but  what  we  are 
for  practical  purposes  aware  of  is,  say,  the  last  half-second,  the 
*  specious  present. ' 

The  first  point  that  requires  to  be  settled  is  the  temporal  re- 
lation between  the  knowing  state  and  the  *  specious  present 


154  c-   A-    STRONG. 

which  it  knows.  When,  with  reference  to  the  *  specious  present/ 
does  this  knowing  state  exist?  We  have  all  along  assumed 
that  it,  as  well  as  other  states  of  consciousness,  truly  exists  in 
time.  The  view  that  the  consciousness  of  time  is  itself  timeless 
is  a  Hegelism  which  I  should  be  loth  to  attribute  to  Professor 
James.  When,  then,  does  it  exist? 

Professor  James's  view  seems  to  be  that  it  exists  midway  be- 
tween the  two  sub-feelings,  in  some  sort  after  the  first  of  them  and 
before  the  second.  At  least  it  is  only  from  this  position  that  the 
knowing  state  would  have  the  right  to  regard  the  first  sub-feeling 
as  past  and  the  second  as  future.  But  has  this  state  such  clair- 
voyant power  as  to  be  able  to  foresee  what  the  second  sub-feel- 
ing will  be,  before  this  sub-feeling  has  actually  appeared  on  the 
scene,  or  even  to  foresee  that  there  will  be  a  second  sub-feeling 
at  all?  A  direct  intuition  of  the  past  seems  marvelous  enough, 
without  assuming  a  direct  intuition  of  the  future.  I  know  Pro- 
fessor James  will  reply  that  I  am  reading  a  separate  individual- 
ity into  the  sub-feelings  which  does  not  exist  in  his  account. 
My  answer  is,  that  such  a  separate  individuality  is  inevitable,  if 
the  sub-feelings  are  truly  to  exist  in  time.  If  one  sub-feeling 
follows  the  other  in  time,  a  knowing  state  that  coexists  with 
the  first  will  have  no  inkling  of  the  second,  and  no  inkling  of 
their  succession.  If  the  knowing  state  exists  midway  between 
the  two,  it  will  still  have  no  inkling  of  the  second  sub-feeling 
or  of  their  succession.  Only  when  the  second  sub-feeling  has 
appeared  can  there  be  a  knowledge  of  the  two  sub-feelings 
and  their  succession.  Only  when  the  succession  is  an  ac- 
complished fact  can  a  consciousness  of  that  fact  arise.  In 
other  words,  the  actual  succession  must  precede  the  knowledge 
of  the  succession.  When  the  knowledge  arises,  the  feelings  that 
succeeded  each  other  are  past  and  gone.  But,  if  so,  this  knowl- 
edge is  in  its  nature  retrospective.  The  succession  is  not  per- 
ceived between  the  feelings  A  and  B  as  they  occur,  but  between 
the  images  a  and  b  which  they  leave  behind.  And  psychologists 
have  long  been  discussing  the  '  temporal  marks, '  discernible  in 
these  images,  which  prompt  the  mind  to  perceive  between  them 
the  relation  of  succession. 

This  view  of  the  case  is  so  generally  accepted,  and  Profes- 


CONSCIOUSNESS  AND    TIME.  155 

sor  James  himself  has  given  so  lucid  an  account  of  it  in  his 
chapter  on  Time,  that  I  am  at  a  loss  to  understand  his  now  fall- 
ing back  into  a  radically  inconsistent  view.  I  can  only  attrib- 
ute his  lapse  to  the  confusion,  already  referred  to,  between  the 
finite  succession  of  the  feelings  A  and  B>  and  the  infinitesimal 
succession  which  enters  into  the  tissue  of  each. 

Dr.  Ward,  in  his  Britannica  article,  aptly  expresses  the  view 
here  defended,  the  view  that  a  succession  of  ideas  is  not  an  idea 
of  succession,  by  comparing  the  actual  stream  of  consciousness 
to  a  horizontal  line,  and  the  consciousness  of  time  to  a  vertical 
line  erected  upon  it.  We  are  aware  of  time,  he  says,  not 
through  the  feelings  A  and  B  in  the  horizontal  line,  but  through 
the  images  a  and  b  in  the  vertical.  Our  knowledge  of  time 
thus  involves  a  perspective  effect,  similar  to  that  by  which  we 
perceive  the  third  dimension  of  space.  "We  are  aware  of 
time,"  he  insists,  "  only  through  the  time-perspective."1 

The  lapse  of  time  is,  therefore,  not  directly  experienced, 
but  constructed  after  the  event.  The  time  we  are  directly 
conscious  of  is  not  the  real  time  that  elapsed.  The  succession 
of  our  feelings  is  a  fact  external  to  the  feelings  themselves.  If 
it  were  not  for  memory,  we  should  never  have  any  conscious- 
ness of  succession  at  all,  any  more  than  of  past  time.  And  this 
is  true,  because  succession  is  essentially  a  relation  between  past 
and  present,  or  between  an  earlier  and  a  later  past.  We  never 
lift  ourselves  up  out  of  the  stream  of  time  and  view  it  as  a 
stream  except  representatively,  except  through  memory.  To 
wish  to  apprehend  succession,  or  change,  or  the  lapse  of  time 
directly,  and  not  through  memory,  is  as  foolish  as  to  wish  to 
apprehend  the  past  directly,  and  not  through  memory. 

But  now,  if  this  account  of  the  case  is  correct,  it  seems  to  me 
that  the  fiction  of  an  intuitive  knowledge  of  the  immediate  past 
and  future  falls  to  the  ground  of  itself.  Later  states  can  have 
no  direct  and  intuitive  dealings  with  earlier  states,  for  the  sim- 
ple reason  that  the  two  do  not  exist  at  once.  When  the  earlier 
state  is  present  the  later  state  is  non-existent,  and  when  the 
later  state  appears  the  earlier  one  is  non-existent.  Our  appar- 
ently direct  consciousness  of  the  immediate  past  is  an  illusion, 

1Encycl.  Brit.,  gth  ed.,  art.  « Psychology,'  pp.  64-5. 


156  C.   A.    STRONG. 

of  the  same  character  as  that  which  leads  us  to  attribute  extra- 
mental  reality  to  material  objects.  To  take  this  illusion  seri- 
ously is  to  be  guilty  of  a  sort  of  naive  realism  in  the  field  of 
time. 

The  impossibility  of  such  a  direct  consciousness  of  past  time 
appears,  further,  from  the  consequences  to  which  it  should  lead  if 
true.  If  we  can  be  directly  conscious  of  a  feeling  that  occurred 
half  a  second  ago,  in  spite  of  the  fact  that  the  feeling  is  now 
past  and  gone,  why  not  also  of  a  feeling  that  occurred  a  whole 
second  ago,  or  a  minute  ago,  or  an  hour,  or  a  day,  or  a  week? 
The  consciousness  would  be  in  no  wise  more  miraculous.  Why 
cannot  we  be  directly  conscious  of  any  past  experience,  no  matter 
how  remote  ?  But,  if  such  consciousness  is  not  to  be  thought  of, 
then  for  the  same  reason  the  direct  consciousness  of  half  a  second 
ago  is  not  to  be  thought  of.  Our  consciousness  of  even  the 
nearest  past  must  be  ideal,  not  actual ;  representative,  not  intuitive. 

But  again,  if  this  is  true,  the  successive  unity  of  conscious- 
ness falls  to  the  ground  likewise.  "  In  reality,"  says  Dr.  Ward, 
"  pasts  present  and  future  are  differences  of  time,  but  in  presen- 
tation all  that  corresponds  to  these  differences  is  in  conscious- 
ness simultaneously."  But,  if  so,  there  is  no  need  of  a  succes- 
sive unity  of  consciousness  to  account  for  the  consciousness  of 
succession.  Earlier  and  later  states  cannot  be  bound  up  into  a 
successive  unity,  because  they  do  not  exist  together,  and  because 
they  are  past  and  gone  when  the  perception  of  succession  arises. 
When  this  perception  arises,  the  relation  is  perceived  between 
images  existing  in  consciousness  simultaneously.  It  there- 
fore implies  only  a  simultaneous  unity  of  consciousness,  the 
same  unity  that  is  implied  in  the  perception  of  likeness  or  dif- 
ference ;  not  a  successive  unity,  which,  to  tell  the  truth,  is  a 
monstrosity,  a  contradiction  in  terms.  Successive  states  of  con- 
sciousness are  not  one  with  each  other,  but  continuous  with  each 
other ;  we  may  speak  of  a  continuity,  but  not  of  a  unity.  The 
only  unity  is  the  unity  of  that  which  is  in  consciousness  at  once. 

A  word,  in  closing,  in  regard  to  the  broader  issues  involved 
in  this  discussion.  The  legitimate  and  necessary  reaction  from 
the  psychological  atomism  of  Hume  and  his  school  has  led  to  the 
recognition  of  relational  states,  of  the  unity  of  consciousness,  of 


CONSCIOUSNESS  AND    TIME.  157 

*  mental  synthesis.'  This  reaction  was  a  necessary  and  legiti- 
mate one ;  these  were  features  of  consciousness  which  the  Eng- 
lish school  overlooked :  but  it  would  ill  become  us,  in  interpret- 
ing them,  to  fail  to  imitate  that  sobriety  and  economy  of  thought 
which  has  always  been  characteristic  of  the  English  school. 
No  psychologist  has  done  more  to  illustrate  and  commend 
these  qualities  than  Professor  James.  There  is  no  one  to  whom 
we  are  so  accustomed  to  look  for  plain,  honest,  intelligible 
psychology,  and  no  one  to  whom  we  so  seldom  look  for  it  in 
vain.  We  have  not  looked  for  it  altogether  in  vain  in  this  very 
matter.  There  is  one  mystification,  the  most  insidious  and  fatal 
in  this  subject,  from  which  Professor  James's  account  is  signally 
free.  I  mean  the  conception  of  *  mental  synthesis '  as  involving 
an  agent,  who  finds  feelings  apart  and  puts  them  together  into  a 
unity.  When  we  turn  from  this  mystification  to  the  facts  of 
consciousness,  all  that  we  find  really  given  is  the  essential  unity 
of  the  relational  state  itself.  We  enjoy  these  states  when  they 
arise  ;  they  constitute  an  increment  to  our  intellectual  being  ;  we 
may  even  put  ourselves  in  the  way  of  getting  them.  But  may 
Heaven  preserve  us  from  the  arrogance  of  supposing  that  it  is 
we  who  create  them.  We  no  more  create  them  than  we  create 
the  sensations  which  form  their  terms.  We  do  not  create  them, 
but  are  them.  And  may  Heaven  preserve  us,  not  less,  from 
supposing  that,  being  them,  we  may  nevertheless  transcend 
them  and  hold  direct  converse  with  feelings  that  are  past  and 
gone.  Our  knowledge  of  the  past  involves  self-transcendence, 
but  the  self-transcendence  is  representative,  it  is  ideal.  A  self- 
transcendence  that  is  other  than  ideal  is  neither  plain,  honest, 
intelligible  psychology,  nor  plain,  honest,  intelligible  meta- 
physics. 


STUDIES  FROM  THE  HARVARD  PSYCHOLOGICAL 
LABORATORY.  (IV.) 

COMMUNICATED  BY  HUGO  MUNSTERBERG. 

THE  PHYSICAL  CHARACTERISTICS  OF  ATTENTION. 

BY  R.  MACDOUGALL. 

The  researches  here  to  be  reported  upon  were  concerned 
with  the  phenomena  of  functional  disturbance  which  accompany 
various  forms  and  degrees  of  perceptual  and  reflective  attention. 

The  subject  was  seated  in  a  comfortable  position  with  body 
relaxed  and  eyes  closed,  beside  a  table  upon  which  the  instru- 
ments were  placed.  The  conductor  of  the  experiments,  who 
gave  the  signals  and  applied  the  stimuli,  stood  at  his  back,  by 
which  arrangement  undesired  knowledge  of  the  nature  of  the 
stimulus  or  other  matter  of  technique  was  avoided. 

Records  were  taken  of  the  character  of  the  breathing,  of  the 
changes  in  pulse  form  and  blood  supply  in  the  left  forearm  and 
of  the  alterations  in  muscle  tension  in  the  fingers  of  the  right 
hand. 

Upon  the  subject's  breast  was  fastened  a  Marey  tambour 
pneumograph,  held  in  position  by  tapes  passing  over  the 
shoulders  and  around  the  body  under  the  arms.  To  the  stem 
of  its  bulb  was  attached  a  rubber  tube  connecting  with  the 
chamber  of  a  pneumatic  registering  pen,  whose  point  traced  the 
curve  of  respiration  upon  the  surface  of  a  horizontally  revolving 
drum  covered  with  smoked  paper.  During  the  later  experi- 
ments a  second  pneumograph  was  added  which  recorded  the 
character  of  the  diaphragmatic  respiration. 

The  features  of  the  pulse  and  of  blood  distribution  were  re- 
corded in  one  composite  tracing  given  by  an  air  plethysmo- 
graph.  This  consisted  of  a  glass  cylinder  fifty  centimeters 
long  and  ten  in  diameter,  open  at  one  end  and  at  the  other  drawn 
to  a  neck,  in  which  a  cork,  having  a  glass  tube  passing  through 
158 


HARVARD  PSYCHOLOGICAL   LABORATORY.  159 

it,  was  tightly  fitted.  Around  the  open  end  of  the  cylinder  was 
stretched  a  rubber  band  twelve  centimeters  wide,  which  was 
cemented  to  the  glass  and  formed  an  air-tight  bandage  upon  the 
subject's  arm  when  inserted  in  the  cylinder.  This  cylinder  was 
suspended  by  cords  from  the  ceiling  at  such  a  height  that  the 
subject's  arm,  when  inserted  in  it,  might  be  in  an  easy  position 
as  he  sat  in  the  chair.  This  long  radius  from  the  point  of  sup- 
port gave  great  flexibility  in  yielding  to  slight  motor  reactions 
on  the  part  of  the  subject,  those  which  normally  occurred  in 
the  course  of  the  experiment — as  observation  proved — having 
no  appreciable  effect  upon  the  character  of  the  pulse  and  vol- 
ume curve.  When  the  arm,  as  far  as  the  elbow,  had  been 
placed  in  the  glass  chamber,  the  plethysmograph  was  con- 
nected by  means  of  a  rubber  tube  attached  to  that  passing 
through  the  cork  in  its  neck,  with  a  registering  pen  similar  to 
that  used  in  recording  the  respiration. 

The  muscles  selected  for  observation  were  those  of  the 
index  finger  of  the  right  hand,  which,  during  the  early  experi- 
ments, was  placed  in  the  holder  of  a  Delabarre  muscle  recorder, 
and  afterwards  in  an  adaptation  of  this  instrument,  by  which 
the  direct  extensile  and  contractile  changes  without  the  lateral 
movements  were  recorded.  The  right  forearm  rested  upon  a 
stand  drawn  up  beside  the  subject,  the  wrist  being  supported  by 
a  cushion,  the  hand  turned  laterally,  and  the  index  finger, 
slightly  flexed  and  free  from  interference  or  support  by  the 
others,  inserted  as  far  as  the  first  joint  in  the  muscle  recorder. 

The  giving  of  the  signals  and  the  application  of  and  relief 
from  the  various  stimuli  were  recorded  by  the  momentary  de- 
flections of  a  registering  pen  operated  by  pressure  upon  a  rub- 
ber bulb  held  in  the  hand  of  the  conductor  of  the  experiment. 
There  were  thus  traced  upon  the  one  drum  at  the  same  time 
five  curves,  two  registering  the  respiration,  a  third  the  pulse 
and  blood  distribution,  the  fourth  the  muscle  changes,  and  the 
fifth  the  giving  of  signals  and  application  of  the  stimuli.  The 
five  points  of  the  registering  pens  were  aligned  upon  the  face  of 
the  cylinder  with  each  other  and  with  the  time  recorder,  so  that 
being  under  the  control  of  the  operator,  there  was  possible  an 
exact  knowledge  of  the  correspondence  between  the  phases  of 


l6o  /?.  MacDOUGALL. 

application,  relief,  etc.,  and  the  changes  of  the  function  re- 
corders. The  smoked  paper  records  were  subsequently  fixed 
by  dipping  in  an  alcoholic  solution  of  gum  sandarac.  The  trac- 
ings were  read  with  the  aid  of  triangles  and  millimeter  scales  by 
reference  to  base  lines  parallel  to  the  direction  of  rotation  of  the 
drum.  Full  notes  were  taken  of  each  experiment,  its  condi- 
tions and  the  experience  of  the  subject  during  its  course. 

FUNCTIONAL  CHANGES  DURING  PERCEPTUAL  ATTENTION. 

The  subject  sat  in  an  easy  position,  with  eyes  closed  and  in- 
struments adjusted.  A  period  of  thirty  seconds  was  allowed  to 
elapse  during  which  he  remained  quiet,  avoiding  all  movement 
and  mental  effort.  At  the  close  of  this  period  a  watch  was 
opened  and  brought  forwards  to  the  subject's  ear,  until  it  was 
just  possible  for  him,  with  considerable  effort,  to  follow  its  tick- 
ing. To  this  faint,  rhythmical  sound  his  close  voluntary  atten- 
tion was  given  during  a  second  period  of  thirty  seconds ;  and  a 
third  of  similar  length,  in  which  the  effects  of  relief  and  the  re- 
turn of  functioning  towards  the  normal  type  could  be  observed, 
closed  the  experiment.  Silence  was  maintained  through  the 
three  periods.  At  the  close  of  each  experiment  the  subject  de- 
scribed his  mental  experiences,  the  degree,  constancy,  and  me- 
chanism of  his  attention,  disturbances,  and  the  like,  so  that  the 
quality  of  the  subjective  condition  represented  by  the  record  was 
known  in  each  case.  The  following  figures  exhibit  the  char- 
acter of  the  respiration  during  perceptual  attention. 

AVERAGE  LENGTH  OF  THE  RESPIRATORY  PHASES. 

i.  Normal. 

Inspiration.  Insp.  Pause.  Expiration.  Exp.  Pause. 

A          .68  sees.  .33  sees.  i.oS  sees.  1.51  sees. 

B           .75     "  .47     "  1.41     "  1.16     " 

C         1.35     "  1.08     "  2.59     "  2.55     " 

D         i. 21     "  .11      "  1.08     "  1.93     " 

E           .77     "  .24     "  1.03     "  1.34     " 

F         1.31     "  .27     "  2.07     "  1.71     " 

G           .95     "  .32     "  1.31     "  1.14 


HARVARD  PSYCHOLOGICAL  LABORATORY. 


161 


Total  Respiration 

Depth. 

Total  Resp. 

Depth. 

A 

3.59  sees. 

14  mm. 

E 

3.38  sees. 

17     mm. 

B 

3.81      » 

ii      " 

F 

5-35     " 

24       « 

C 

7-45     " 

36     " 

G 

3.62     " 

27       « 

D 

4-34     " 

40     " 

2.  During"  Attention. 


Inspiration. 

Insp.  Pause. 

Expiration. 

Exp.  Pause. 

A 

.83  sees. 

.87  sees. 

1.45  sees. 

1.25  sees. 

B 

•73    " 

•39     " 

1.38     » 

•93     " 

C 

1.  12       " 

•45     " 

2.70     " 

i.  08     <4 

D 

•74    " 

.11     " 

i  .08     " 

1.38     " 

E 

.69    " 

.36     « 

1.42     " 

1.76     u 

F 

i-34     " 

.22       " 

2.02       4t 

2.09     " 

G 

.69     " 

•57    " 

•94     " 

1.05     " 

Total  Resp. 

Depth. 

Total  Resp. 

Depth. 

A 

4.41  sees. 

.19  mm. 

E     4.27  sees. 

.24  mm. 

B 

3-43     " 

.15      « 

F     5-58     " 

.22       «* 

C 

5.81     " 

.13      " 

G    3.28     •< 

.15       <4 

D 

W     " 

.28     " 

The  characteristic  changes  accompanying  attention  to  per- 
ceptual objects,  as  shown  by  these  figures,  are  : 

(1)  A  tendency  to  reduce  the    length  of    the   inspiration. 
The  respiration  of  sleep  and  of  low  mental  activity  in  general 
has  been  found  to  be  characterized  by  its  long  inspiration  and 
short  expiration.     As  the  mental  excitement   rises   the  latter 
component  increases,   the  former  decreases.     The  same  ten- 
dency appears  here  as  attention  succeeds  inattention.     In  five 
subjects  the  decrease  is  an  absolute  one,  sometimes  of  marked 
extent — e.  g-.,  1.21  to  .74  sees.;  in  the  remaining  cases,  (A) 
and  (F),  though  the  figures  show  an  absolute  increase,  a  com- 
parison of   the  durations  for  the  full  respiration  [3.59 — 4.41 
sees.;  5.35 — 5.58  sees.]  reveals  the  fact  that  there  has  been 
at  the  same  time  a  relative  decrease. 

(2)  There  is  a  general  increase  in  the  relative  length  of  the 
expiration.     In  four  subjects  this  increase  is  also  positive ;  in 
the  fifth,  in  which  an  absolute  decrease  appears,  there  is  at  the 
same  time  a  relative  increase  in  length  (1.41-3.81  sees. ;  1.38- 


I 62  /?.  MacDOUGALL. 

3.43  sees).  The  sixth  and  seventh  do  not  conform  to  this  type. 
The  time-relation  of  inspiration  and  expiration  is  characteristic 
of  the  state  of  mental  activity.  Respiration  during  sleep  is 
marked  by  relatively  slow  inspiration  and  rapid  expiration.  In 
drowsiness  and  after  a  full  meal  the  same  predominance  of  the 
inspiration  is  noticeable.  With  the  increase  of  cerebral  excite- 
ment the  inspiration  grows  rapid,  direct  and  strong,  the  expira- 
tion slow  and  interrupted.  The  extreme  forms  are  seen  in  the 
sudden  inspiratory  sob  of  weeping,  followed  by  the  prolonged 
expiration,  broken  by  repeated  suspensions  of  the  breath ;  or  in 
the  similarly  swift  influx  of  air  in  laughter  with  its  subsequent 
series  of  alternate  suspensions  and  expulsions.  Both  the  strong 
inspiration  and  the  retardation  of  contraction  during  expiration 
point  to  an  increased  expenditure  of  energy  as  compared  with 
the  phenomena  of  sleep,  where  the  innervation  is  sufficient  only 
to  inflate  the  lungs  slowly,  and  where  the  contraction  of  the 
chest  at  its  close  is  not  interfered  with  by  the  contraction  of  the 
voluntary  muscles. 

(3)  There  is  a  general  increase  in  the  rapidity  of  the  res- 
piration.    This    is   also  a  characteristic  of  heightened  mental 
activity.     The  exceptions  to  it  are  noted  under  section  (4) . 

(4)  When  the  respiration  decreases  in  rapidity  the  retarda- 
tion is  due  not  to  a  proportional  increase  in  time  of  all  the  com- 
ponent phases,  preserving  the  normal  type,  but  to  an  abnormal 
suspension  of  the  breath  with  the  lungs  inflated  [A.  .33 — .87  sees. ; 
E.  .24 — .36  sees.],  to  a  prolongation  of  the  expiration  [A.  1.06 
— 1.45  sees. ;  E.  1.03 — 1.42  sees.],  or  to  an  exaggeration  of  the 
respiratory  pause  [F  1.71 — 2.00  sees.],  all  of  these  indicating 
an  inference  with  the  regular  periodic  innervation  of  the  organic 
muscles. 

(5)  There  is  a  moderate  tendency  to  superficiality  of  respi- 
ration.    This  is  extremely  marked  in  the  case  of  three  subjects. 
In  three  others  it  altogether  fails  to  appear.     Two  of  these  are 
characterized  also  by  slow  respiration  and  retardation  of  the 
respiration. 

(6)  In  general,  the  attitude  of  attention  is  characterized  by 
disturbance  of  function.     Every  departure  from  the  normal  type 
is  significant  as  indicative  of  an  interference  with  the  automatic 


HARVARD  PSYCHOLOGICAL  LABORATORY.  163 

character  of  the  respiration.  The  breathing  during  attention  is 
marked  by  just  such  wide  and  frequent  but  irregular  fluctua- 
tions. This  will  be  made  more  apparent  by  the  following  table 
of  the  comparative  variations  in  time  and  depth  during  the 
normal  and  experimental  periods. 


Normal. 

Attention. 

Time. 

Depth. 

Time. 

Depth. 

A 

i.Oi  sees. 

13  min. 

3.15  sees. 

17  min 

B 

.67     « 

35     " 

I.OI        " 

45     " 

C 

•45     " 

6     " 

•56      " 

7    " 

D 

1.05     " 

5     " 

2.80     " 

36    " 

E 

.82    " 

9     " 

2.68     " 

25    «« 

F 

•73    " 

8     " 

1.16     u 

5     4t 

G 

i.o«;     " 

10       " 

'•75     4t 

18     '4 

The  changes  in  variability  are  more  readily  appreciable  than 
those  in  average  character.  The  variation  in  the  length  of  in- 
dividual respirations  has  increased  to  more  than  double  the  nor- 
mal. This  increase  in  variability  is  uniform ;  each  individual 
record  of  every  subject  shows  it.  There  is  a  similar  increase 
in  the  extent  of  the  variation  in  depth,  amounting  in  extreme 
cases  to  seven  times  the  normal,  and  failing  to  appear  only  in  a 
single  case,  where  the  variations  in  normal  and  attention  phases 
are  as  six  to  five. 

CHARACTERISTICS  OF  THE  PULSE  AND  VOLUME  CURVES. 

As  throughout  the  whole  series  of  experiments  the  plethys- 
mographic  and  sphygmographic  records  unite  in  one  volumet- 
ric curve,  an  exact  analysis  of  their  separate  character  is  fre- 
quently impossible,  the  change  in  strength  of  heart  contraction 
and  the  secondary  features  of  the  pulse  wave  being  obscured 
by  simultaneous  changes  in  the  volume  curve.  A  number  of 
significant  features,  are,  however,  definitely  determinable. 
There  is,  without  exception,  an  immediate  increase  in  the 
rapidity  of  the  rhythm  at  the  beginning  of  the  attention  period, 
succeeded  by  a  more  gradual  and  enduring  decline.  This  slow- 
ing usually  continues  until  a  point  below  that  of  the  preliminary 
period  is  reached,  when  there  is  again  a  gradual  increase 


164  R.  MacDOUGALL. 

towards  the  normal.  The  following  table  shows  the  extent  and 
duration  of  the  changes  for  the  various  subjects  concerned.  The 
figures  give  the  averages  for  successive  periods  of  twelve 
seconds  each. 

Normal.  Attention. 

A  72.5  per  minute.  72.5  per  minute.  70.0  per  minute. 

A  87.0    "  "  90.5           "         "  80.0  "  " 

A  72.5    "  "  77.5          "         "  75.0  « 

A  80.0    "  "  82.5  "         "  80.0  "  " 

B  75.0    "  "  82.5  "         "  77.5  "  " 

C  62.5    "  "  67.5  "         "  65.0  "  " 

C  62.5    "  "  65.0  "         "  55.0  "  " 

D  95.0    "  "  102.5  "         "  92.5  "  " 

The  maximum  increase  is  reached  within  the  first  ten  seconds 
in  the  case  of  all  subjects  ;  and  the  whole  acceleration  is  usually 
confined  to  a  period  of  twenty-five  seconds.  In  some  cases  the 
decline  is  more  gradual  and  reaches  the  normal  only  towards 
the  close  of  the  experiment.  With  the  greater  number  the  re- 
tardation is  more  rapid  and  passes  beyond  the  normal,  in  some 
cases  to  a  greater  extent  than  the  primary  acceleration  rose 
above  it. 

There  is,  in  the  case  of  most  subjects,  an  increase  in  the  in- 
terference of  the  respiratory  period  with  the  volume  curve, 
which  tends  to  obscure  the  character  of  the  pulse-beats.  So  far 
as  has  been  observed,  the  effect  of  attention  upon  the  strength  of 
heart  contraction  is  variable.  With  three  of  the  subjects  there 
is  a  reduction  in  the  extent  of  the  stroke,  independently  of  the 
variations  in  the  volume  curve  or  the  respiratory  changes.  In 
subject  D  there  is  an  increase,  together  with  a  marked  irregu- 
larity, in  extent,  and  in  a  similar  inconstancy  in  the  rhythm  of 
successive  beats.  This  perhaps  marks,  in  one  of  D's  tempera- 
ment, the  presence  of  a  rather  strong  emotional  element  due  to 
nervous  excitement. 

Simultaneously  with  the  primary  acceleration  of  the  pulse 
occurs  a  rapid  and  extensive  fall  in  volume,  reaching  a  mini- 
mum at  the  end  of  a  period  varying  from  six  to  ten  seconds, 
followed  either  by  a  gradual  and  more  continuous  rise  towards 


HARVARD  PSYCHOLOGICAL   LABORATORY.  165 

the  normal  line,  or  by  a  series  of  subsidiary  waves,  finally  ap- 
proximating to  that  which  characterized  the  preliminary  period. 
These  wave-like  and  frequently  rhythmical  changes  of  volume 
find  an  apt  interpretation  in  the  hypothesis  of  fluctuation,  each 
pulse  of  close  and  accentuated  attention  being  followed  by  a 
period  of  distraction  and  relaxation ;  and  the  prevalent  subsi- 
dence of  the  waves  in  the  latter  part  of  the  experiment  may  in- 
dicate the  gradual  failing  of  attention  through  fatigue. 

The  effect  of  attention  upon  the  interference  of  the  respira- 
tory period  is  variable  and  obscure.  In  some  cases  the  rhyth- 
mical increase  and  diminution  of  volume  is  reinforced,  even 
when  the  respiration  grows  more  superficial ;  in  others  there  is 
a  reduction  in  the  interference,  especially  if  the  breathing  be- 
comes more  shallow.  In  others  again  no  definable  alteration 
in  character  appears. 

MUSCLE  CHANGES  IN  PERCEPTUAL  ATTENTION. 

These  are  typical  and  uniform.  The  changes  consist,  in 
general,  of  an  exhibition  of  movement  and  tendency  to  relaxa- 
tion of  the  muscles,  indicating  a  lowering  in  the  static  tonicity 
of  the  muscular  system.  In  the  preliminary  period  the  finger 
record  is  usually  effected  by  the  respiration,  a  slight  extension 
of  the  arm  accompanying  each  inspiratory  elevation  of  the 
chest,  and  being  followed  by  a  corresponding  contraction  dur- 
ing expiration.  These  changes  are  uniformly  reduced  and  fre- 
quently obliterated  during  the  period  of  attention,  though  the 
respiration  suffer  no  diminution  in  depth.  The  preliminary 
period  is  usually  marked  by  a  constant  subsultus  tendinorum  as 
well  as  by  more  massive  spasmodic  contractions  and  expansions 
of  the  muscles.  These  are  reduced  and  frequently  disappear 
during  the  attention  period.  The  tendency  to  relaxation  does 
not  always  appear  as  a  positive  extension  of  the  finger.  In 
some  experiments  the  finger  will  be  found  to  remain  stationary 
during  attention ;  in  some  others  a  continued  or  intermittent 
contraction  is  manifested.  But  in  every  such  case  there  is  a 
relative  relaxation.  Where  the  preliminary  period  shows  a 
tendency  to  contract — if  strong,  it  continues,  but  in  reduced 


1 66  /?.  MacDOUGALL. 

degree, — if  slight,  it  disappears  or  is  replaced  by  moderate  ex- 
tension. Where  the  preliminary  period  shows  no  change,  the 
passage  to  attention  is  marked  by  extension,  slight  in  some 
cases,  great  in  others ;  and  where  the  first  period  is  character- 
ized by  continuous  extension  it  is  immediately  and  strongly  re- 
inforced at  the  beginning  of  the  experimental  stage.  These 
expansions  and  contractions  during  the  earlier  period  are  prob- 
ably due  to  the  fact  of  insufficient  time  having  been  allowed 
for  the  muscles  to  reach  a  state  of  equilibrium.  But  the  effect 
of  the  passage  to  attention  is  seen  as  clearly  in  the  altered  di- 
rection of  the  curve  as  it  is  when  the  preliminary  period  is 
marked  by  rest. 

A  negative  illustration  of  the  muscular  changes  accompany- 
ing attention  appears  at  the  close  of  the  period  when  the  tremors, 
irregularity  in  contraction  and  expansion,  respiratory  influence, 
and  general  tendency  to  contraction  again  set  in. 

FUNCTIONAL  CHANGES  DURING  ATTENTION   WITH  A  STRONG 
SENSORY  ELEMENT. 

In  the  preceding  series  the  object  of  attention  was  a  neutral 
one ;  there  was  nothing  in  the  ticking  of  the  watch  which  was 
per  se  interesting.  The  attention  was  wholly  secondary  and 
voluntary ;  the  subject  deliberately  abstracted  from  all  other  ob- 
jects and  focused  his  attention  upon  this  dull,  monotonously-re- 
peated sound. 

There  will  evidently  be  a  new  element  introduced  into  the 
mental  complex  if  a  stimulus  be  selected  which  besides  the  de- 
rived interest  of  voluntary  attention,  comes  to  the  subject  with  a 
distinct  of  its  own,  one  which  by  its  unusual  or  pronounced 
sensory  character  arouses  a  certain  emotional  element  and  fixes 
the  attention  by  its  own  power.  Such  a  combination  of  volun- 
tary and  involuntary  attention  elements  was  sought  by  trac- 
ing upon  the  subject's  cheek  with  the  tip  of  a  pencil  a  series 
of  geometrical  figures  which  the  subject  endeavored  to  discrimi- 
nate and  recognize  by  the  sense  of  touch  alone.  The  stimulus 
was  novel ;  it  involved  a  continuous  sense  stimulation  apart  from 
the  volition  of  the  subject ;  and  with  all  the  persons  concerned 


HARVARD   PSYCHOLOGICAL   LABORATORY. 


167 


in  the  experiments  it  seized  and  held  the  passive  attention  as 
simple  touch  sensation,  apart  from  the  character  of  the  lines 
drawn.  There  was  required  in  addition  a  close  and  constant  ef- 
fort to  recognize  the  various  forms  which  were  one  after  an- 
other inscribed  upon  the  skin.  These  experiments  were  con- 
ducted with  five  subjects  with  the  following  results : 


AVERAGE  DURATION  OF  THE  PHASES  OF  RESPIRATION. 

/.  Normal. 


Inspiration. 

Insp.  Pause. 

Expiration. 

Exp.  Pause. 

A 

.76  sees. 

.22  sees. 

.58  sees. 

i.  2  2  sees. 

B 

1.27      " 

.31      " 

1.40      " 

1.46     " 

C 

.56     " 

.17     » 

1.03      « 

1.17     " 

D 

1.08      " 

.27      " 

.72      « 

.72     " 

E 

.63      " 

.22       " 

.58      " 

.58  " 

Total  Resp. 

Depth. 

Total  Resp. 

Depth. 

A 

2.78  sees. 

25  mm.          D.  — 

2.79  sees. 

25  mm. 

B 

4-45     " 

37     «           E.— 

2.01        " 

20       " 

C 

2.93     " 

25      u 

2.  During  Attention. 


Inspiration. 

Insp.  Pause. 

Expiration. 

Exp.  Pause. 

A 

.49  sees. 

.36  sees. 

.85  sees. 

1.  1  1  sees. 

B 

1.14     " 

.36     " 

1.48     « 

1.90     " 

C 

•47    " 

.56     " 

i-34    " 

.83     " 

D 

•94     " 

.18     " 

•94     " 

.85     « 

E 

•49     " 

•54     " 

1.39     « 

1.  12       " 

Total  Resp. 

Depth. 

Total  Resp. 

Depth. 

A 

2.81  sees. 

13  mm.          D.  — 

3.91  sees. 

20  mm. 

B 

4.91      " 

30     "             E.  — 

2.50     " 

20       " 

C 

3.16     " 

'3       »> 

The  comparative  changes  here  are  of  the  same  type  as  those 
which  were  found  to  characterize  the  passage  from  rest  to 
purely  voluntary  attention ;  but  they  are  more  constant  and  of 
greater  extent. 

There  is  first  a  reduction  in  the  relative  length  of  the  inspi- 
ration, and  an  increase  in  that  of  the  expiration.  But  in  both 


1 68  R.  MacDOUGALL* 

these  components  the  change  is  more  invariable  than  in  the 
preceding  series  and  of  greater  extent.  In  the  present  form  of 
attention  it  is  throughout  positive  as  well  as  relative ;  the  extent 
of  the  reduction,  also,  is  greater  in  the  present  series  than  in  the 
earlier  one.  In  the  case  of  the  expiration,  again,  there  is  a 
more  constant  increase  in  duration,  every  subject  showing  both 
a  relative  and  a  positive  increase,  and  this  increase  is  of  greater 
extent  than  in  voluntary  attention. 

There  is  in  every  case  a  decrease  in  the  rapidity  of  the 
rhythm.  In  all  cases  but  one — E.  2.01—3.50 — this  increase  is 
relatively  slight.  Voluntary  attention,  on  the  other  hand,  was 
characterized  by  an  increase  in  the  rapidity  of  the  respiration. 

The  changes  in  the  respiratory  pauses  are  variable ;  in  some 
objects  the  averages  show  an  increase,  in  others  a  decrease  ap- 
pears. These  figures  are  among  the  least  significant  of  the 
record.  What  characterizes  the  curves  of  this  composite  atten- 
tion is  essentially  departure  from  type,  disturbance  of  function, 
which  a  system  of  averages  may  as  readily  tend  to  obliterate  as 
to  preserve.  This  feature  of  the  breathing  during  attention  ap- 
pears more  plainly  by  a  comparison  of  the  extent  of  the  varia- 
tions in  respiration  during  the  contrasted  periods. 


Normal. 

Attention. 

Time. 

Depth. 

Time. 

Depth. 

A 

i.io  sees. 

10  mm. 

3.40  sees. 

22  mm. 

B 

.62     " 

4     « 

2.92     " 

20       " 

C 

•45     " 

2       " 

•57    " 

6     " 

D 

.22       " 

3     " 

•45     " 

4     " 

E 

•45     " 

4     u 

2.90    " 

9     " 

The  increase  of  variation  both  in  the  rapidity  of  the  rhythm 
and  in  the  extent  of  inflation  of  the  period  of  attention  over 
that  of  the  preliminary  period  is  evident.  These  fluctuations 
will  also  be  found  greater  than  those  which  accompanied  vol- 
untary attention.  There  is  at  the  same  time  a  uniform  reduc- 
tion of  considerable  extent  in  the  depth  of  the  breathing.  The 
same  general  tendency  is  present  also  in  the  previous  form  of 
attention,  but  is  found  lacking  with  three  of  the  subjects. 


HARVARD  PSYCHOLOGICAL  LABORATORY.  169 

PULSE  AND  VOLUME  CHANGES. 

Few  changes  in  the  character  of  the  pulse  are  to  be  ob- 
served in  these  records.  The  apparent  strength  of  stroke  re- 
mains unaltered  during  the  two  periods.  Slight  irregularities 
in  the  interval  between  successive  strokes  appear  in  one  or  two 
instances,  and  with  one  subject  there  is  a  slight  reduction  in  the 
strength  of  the  stroke.  In  the  rate  of  the  pulse  beats,  before 
and  after  the  beginning  of  the  experiment,  and  at  successive 
periods  during  its  continuance,  a  new  set  of  changes  is  met 
with  varying  from  the  normal  of  the  preliminary  period  in  a  di- 
rection opposite  to  those  which  appeared  in  the  previous  series. 
With  all  the  subjects  who  took  part,  the  tracing  of  the  figures 
upon  the  cheek  is  accompanied  by  a  retardation  in  the  rate  of 
the  pulse,  usually  immediate,  but  in  some  instances  delayed  for 
several  seconds,  followed  by  an  increase  again  towards  the  nor- 
mal. In  some  cases  the  diminishing  retardation  continued 
throughout  the  period  of  stimulation ;  in  others  an  acceleration 
beyond  the  rate  of  the  preliminary  stage  was  reached ;  in  one 
record  a  secondary  wave  of  retardation  appears.  These  changes 
are  independent  of  the  fluctuations  which  occur  in  the  volume 
curve.  They  are  altogether  unexpected ;  the  addition  of  the 
sensory  stimulus,  bringing  with  it  a  certain  emotional  tinge, 
might  lead  one  to  expect  an  increase  of  the  acceleration  which 
was  found  in  the  previous  series  instead  of  the  retardation 
which  actually  obtains. 

MUSCLE  CHANGES. 

The  same  muscle  changes  appear  here  which  characterize 
the  earlier  form  of  attention.  In  all  six  subjects  there  is  an  al- 
teration in  the  direction  of  the  curve  at  the  beginning  of  the  at- 
tention period.  These  changes  do  not  always  present  a  posi- 
tive relaxation  of  the  hand.  In  those  instances  in  which  a 
gradual  contraction  continues  throughout  the  previous  period, 
the  new  direction  appears  as  a  diminution  in  the  rate  of  contrac- 
tion. When  the  contraction  is  slight  the  subsequent  curve 
shows  either  a  state  of  equilibrium,  or  a  faint  expansion.  When 
a  previous  tendency  to  expansion  exists  it  is  appreciably  rein- 
forced from  the  beginning  of  the  new  attitude  onward. 


1 70  R.  MacDOUGALL. 

There  is,  also,  in  the  preceding  experiments  a  tendency  to 
inhibition  of  movements  manifested  in  the  absence  of  slight  irreg- 
ularities in  the  curve,  and  the  dampening  of  the  subsultus 
tendinorum.  The  respiratory  period  is  less  marked  during  at- 
tention than  in  the  preliminary  period,  occasionally  disappear- 
ing. These  muscle  changes  are  not  invariably  present,  and 
different  records  fail  to  show  any  change  of  condition  in  the 
passage  from  inattention  to  stimulated  attention. 

FUNCTIONAL    CHANGES   DURING   RECALL   OF   PAST  EVENTS. 

The  preceding  experiments  were  concerned  with  objects  of 
perceptual  attention;  the  present  and  succeeding  sections  ab- 
stract from  objects  of  sense,  and  have  to  do  with  reflection  and 
more  purely  intellectual  processes. 

The  method  of  conducting  the  experiments  was  simple. 
The  subject  sat  as  before  with  closed  eyes,  the  instruments  ad- 
justed upon  his  body.  After  a  preliminary  period  of  inactivity, 
he  was  required  to  recall  various  groups  of  objects,  such  as  the 
instruments  which  he  had  seen  in  a  certain  case,  the  substance 
of  a  late  lecture,  the  experiences  of  a  particular  day  in  the  past, 
and  the  like.  At  the  close  a  final  period  of  rest  was  given ; 
and  at  the  end  of  each  experiment  the  observer  made  full  notes 
of  his  subjective  experiences. 

In  recall  the  changes  in  the  character  of  the  respiration  are 
of  the  same  general  type  as  those  found  present  in  perceptual 
attention,  but  are  more  variable  in  direction,  of  slightly  less  ex- 
tent, and  present  more  individual  variations.  The  quantitative 
relation  of  the  phases  is  shown  in  the  following  tables : 


i.  Normal. 

Inspiration. 

Insp.  Pause. 

Expiration. 

Ex.  Pause. 

A 

.76  sees. 

.22  sees. 

i.  37  sees. 

1.35  sees. 

B 

.72      " 

.67     " 

1-57     " 

1.30     " 

C 

.76      " 

.36     " 

1.37     « 

.90     " 

D 

1.  12       " 

.36     « 

1.17     " 

.40     " 

E 

1.26       " 

.76     " 

2.92     " 

.63      « 

Total  Resp. 

Depth. 

Total  Resp. 

Depth. 

A 

3.70  sees. 

29  mm.     D.  — 

3.05  sees. 

52  mm. 

B 

4.26     " 

23     "       E.— 

5-57     " 

37    " 

C 

3-39     " 

30     " 

HARVARD  PSYCHOLOGICAL   LABORATORY. 


2.  Recall. 

Inspiration. 

Insp.  Pause. 

Expiration. 

Exp.  Pause. 

A 

.49  sees. 

.27  sees. 

1.  08  sees. 

1.03  sec. 

B 

•54    " 

.18      " 

i.  80     " 

.81      " 

C 

.30     " 

•54     " 

1.03     " 

i-35     " 

D 

.63     « 

.40     « 

1.26     " 

•54     " 

E 

.94     « 

.63     « 

1.71      " 

.63     « 

Total  Resp. 

Depth. 

Total  Resp. 

Depth. 

A 

2.87  sees. 

22  mm.     D 

2.83  sees. 

37  mm. 

B 

3-33     " 

32      «        E 

3.91      « 

24     « 

C 

3-23     " 

13      " 

Variations  in  Respiration. 
Normal. 


Recall. 


Time. 

Depth. 

Time. 

Depth. 

A 

•45  secs- 

6  mm. 

.90  sees. 

19  mm 

B 

!-35     " 

4    « 

•45    " 

9    " 

C 

•45     " 

4    " 

.70    4t 

9    " 

D 

.90    " 

10      " 

.22      " 

6    " 

E 

i  ^  ^    k* 

4    " 

.70      " 

9    " 

The  general  increase  in  irregularity  of  depth  is  evident  here. 
The  extent  of  this  increase  is  magnified  when  it  is  remembered 
that  there  is  at  the  same  time  a  reduction  in  the  average  depth 
of  respiration.  It  is  probable  that  this  irregularity  is  chiefly  a 
physiologically  originated  phenomenon.  The  rapid  superficial 
breathing  which  accompanies  continued  effort  to  recall,  affords 
insufficient  aeration  of  the  blood ;  the  series  is  broken  in  up- 
on here  and  there  by  one  or  two  fuller  respirations  stimulated 
by  incipient  asphyxiation.  In  some  cases,  however,  an  irreg- 
ularity appears  which  is  more  closely  related  to  the  con- 
sciousness aspect  of  the  experience. 

The  simple  effort  involved  in  all  recall  is  expressed  in  the 
quickened  shallow  breathing,  which  increases  in  rapidity  and 
superficiality  with  the  difficulty  involved  in  the  process.  The 
change  here  is  rather  in  the  direction  of  increased  uniformity 
than  of  variation  from  it.  When  the  objects  of  recall  are  not 
neutral,  such  as  remembering  a  series  of  numbers  or  the  in- 
struments in  a  certain  case,  but  are  colored  with  a  strong  emo- 


172  JR.  MacDOUGALL. 

tional  element ;  wide  irregularities  in  the  character  of  the  indi- 
vidual respiration  are  presented,  similar  to  those  which  appear 
under  strong  sensory  stimuli.  The  subject  is,  in  a  less  intense 
degree,  living  over  again  the  experiences  which  he  is  endeavor- 
ing to  recall,  and  the  disturbance  of  function  which  accom- 
panied their  original  occurrence  is  partially  reestablished  here. 

There  are  therefore  two  elements  in  recall  to  be  kept  sepa- 
rate, as  affecting  the  character  of  the  bodily  functions  :  (i)  the 
effect  of  attention,  the  simple  intellectual  effort  requisite  to  the 
recall  of  indifferent  objects ;  (2)  the  effect  of  personal  relation 
to  the  objects  of  recall. 

The  character  of  the  functional  change  varies  from  indi- 
vidual to  individual.  In  some  cases,  instead  of  the  superficial 
respiration  which  characterizes  most  subjects,  there  is  found  a 
rapid,  regular  but  more  profound  respiration  than  in  the  nor- 
mal. With  other  subjects  there  is  a  great  reduction  in  depth, 
the  breathing  at  times  being  almost  suspended. 

While  the  degree  of  functional  disturbance  varies  from  sub- 
ject to  subject,  within  the  individual  record  the  variation  in- 
creases with  the  effort  requisite  for  recall.  A  sense  of  ease  and 
freedom  is  accompanied  by  slight  variation  from  the  normal ; 
with  increasing  difficulty  the  deflection  of  the  curves  becomes 
greater  and  greater.  This  is  seen  most  clearly  in  those  cases 
in  which  the  emotional  element  is  got  rid  of,  and  the  changes 
are  wholly  due  to  the  intellectual  effort  involved.  This  condi- 
tion is  approximated  to  in  the  following  series,  in  which  the 
subject  was  required  to  perform  certain  arithmetical  calculations 
of  varying  complexity. 

At  present  we  may  say  that  the  effort  to  recall  a  series  of 
past  events  is  accompanied  by  a  rapid  superficial  breathing, 
marked  by  a  swift  short  inspiration  and  an  interrupted  and  pro- 
longed expiration ;  that  with  the  decrease  in  depth  there  is  a 
greater  irregularity  in  the  duration  of  successive  respirations,  in 
the  depth  of  the  breathing,  and  in  the  time  relations  of  the  com- 
ponent phases  of  the  individual  respirations ;  and  that  as  the 
process  of  recall  becomes  more  difficult  and  involves  greater 
effort  the  extent  of  the  variation  from  the  normal  increases. 

Also,  that  while  simple  recall  of  indifferent  objects  is  ac- 


HARVARD  PSYCHOLOGICAL   LABORATORY.  173 

companied  by  a  quick  slight  breathing  which  may  be  more  uni- 
form than  the  normal,  the  recall  of  things  which  involve  a 
strong  emotional  element  is  characterized  by  irregularity  of 
rate,  depth  and  form,  the  nature  and  extent  of  the  irregularities 
depending  upon  the  emotional  character  of  the  objects  recalled. 
The  average  rapidity  of  the  respiration  is  likewise  without  ex- 
ception increased ;  and  there  is  an  absence  of  the  suspensions 
with  full  or  deflated  lungs,  or  in  the  midst  of  expiration,  which 
frequently  characterized  the  former  mental  attitude. 


CHARACTERISTICS  OF  THE  PULSE  AND  VOLUME  CURVES. 

The  type  of  change  here  seems  to  vary.  The  pulse-beat 
is  in  some  cases  at  first  increased,  then  slowly  reduced  to  the 
normal  towards  the  close  of  the  experiment.  With  others  there 
is  an  immediate  slowing  of  the  pulse  rate  gradually  accelera- 
ting towards  the  normal  again.  These  two  types  of  change  are 
present  in  the  same  individual  at  different  times.  In  all  cases 
in  which  an  immediate  increase  in  rate  appears  the  process  of 
recall  was  attended  with  difficulty.  In  those  marked  by  a  fall 
it  was  either  easy  or  no  mention  was  made  of  effort.  The  pulse 
rate  frequently  presents  the  form  of  a  series  of  waves,  alter- 
nately rising  above  and  falling  below  the  normal  of  the  prelimi- 
nary period.  It  is  possible  that  these  may  indicate  a  series  of 
fluctuations  in  the  intensity  of  the  attention  and  of  the  effort  to 
recall. 

In  almost  all  cases  the  pulse  stroke  is  shortened  during  re- 
call. Frequently  this  change  is  immediate  and  definite,  in  some 
cases  the  reduction  amounting  to  one-third  or  even  one-half  of 
the  previous  extent  of  stroke.  There  is  usually  with  this  a 
simultaneous  reduction  in  the  depth  of  the  breathing,  which,  as 
a  purely  physiological  phenomenon,  is  accompanied  by  such  a 
reduction  in  the  pulse  stroke,  but  the  change  under  these  condi- 
tions is  concomitant  with  a  rapid  rise  in  volume,  and  the  re- 
duction in  pulse  stroke  is  proportional  to  the  extent  of  the  vol- 
ume increase.  In  the  case  of  recall,  however,  the  reduction  is 
accompanied  by  a  decrease  in  arterial  tension,  marked  by  a  fall 
more  or  less  rapid  and  extensive  in  the  volume  curve.  It  also 


174  /?.  MacDOUGALL. 

occurs  when  the  respiration  is  increased  in  depth  instead  of  be- 
coming more  superficial. 

The  form  of  the  pulse  wave  also  undergoes  alteration.  The 
preliminary  period  is  characterized  by  a  full  strong  stroke,  fol- 
lowed by  an  immediate  and  sharp  fall  towards  the  dicrotic  crest, 
making  an  acute  apex ;  in  the  period  of  recall  the  shorter  stroke 
is  succeeded  by  a  slow  delayed  subsidence,  the  tracer  dragging 
on  towards  the  next  stroke  before  a  decided  fall  takes  place  giv- 
ing a  blunted  form  to  the  arterial  wave. 

The  volume  curve  shows  less  tendency  to  typical  forms  of 
change  than  in  the  previous  experiments.  There  is  usually  an 
immediate  fall  in  volume  at  the  beginning  of  the  period,  con- 
tinuing from  five  to  ten  seconds,  and  followed  by  a  more  gradual 
rise,  the  two  phases  being  repeated  several  times  during  the 
course  of  the  period,  usually  with  a  decrease  in  the  width  of  the 
variation  towards  the  end. 

These  wide  fluctuations  in  the  volume  curve  during  recall 
are  the  most  constant  factors  which  appear.  Since  the  transi- 
tion from  the  previous  diffused  mental  state  to  the  concentration 
of  attention  in  recall  is  typically  marked  by  a  fall  of  greater  or 
less  extent  in  the  arm  volume,  the  occurrence  of  these  repeated 
waves  suggests  a  fluctuation  in  the  degree  of  effort  made,  the  at- 
tention coming  and  going  in  pulses. 

The  interference  of  the  respiratory  period  increases  dur- 
ing recall.  In  normal  cases  its  influence  increases  and 
diminishes  with  the  depth  of  the  respiration ;  suspension  of  the 
breath  causes  it  to  disappear.  Here,  on  the  contrary,  it  grows 
more  pronounced  even  when  the  breathing  simultaneously  grows 
more  superficial. 

As  relief  there  is  a  slowing  of  the  respiratory  rhythm,  an 
increase  in  the  depth  of  the  breathing  and  of  the  duration  of  the 
inspiration  with  a  relative  reduction  in  that  of  the  expiration,  an 
increase  in  the  extent  of  the  pulse  stroke,  a  slowing  of  the 
pulse  rhythm  and  a  rise  in  the  volume  of  the  arm. 

MUSCLE  CHANGES  DURING  RECALL. 

The  changes  here  are  similar  to  those  found  present  in  the 
earlier  series  on  perceptual  attention.  The  transition  from  the 


HARVARD  PSYCHOLOGICAL  LABORATORY. 


'75 


preliminary  effortless  state  to  that  of  strenuous  recall  is  marked 
by  a  change  in  the  direction  of  the  muscle  curve.  This  is  mani- 
fested as  before  in  a  reduction  in  the  degree  of  contraction,  a 
disappearance  of  it,  or  a  substitution  of  expansion,  in  cases  in 
which  a  contraction  appears  in  the  preliminary  period,  and  a 
reinforcement  of  the  tendency  of  expansion  where  such  already 
existed.  This  change  in  the  direction  of  the  curve  is  very  uni- 
form. There  is  also  a  reduction  in  the  greater  irregularities 
which  usually  characterize  the  normal  curve,  and  a  disappear- 
ance or  dampening  of  the  subsultus  tendinorum.  The  essential 
features  of  this  curve,  then,  are  a  tendency  to  a  relaxed  condition 
of  the  muscles,  and  an  absence  of  muscular  excitement,  marked 
by  a  quiet  even  curve  without  massive  changes  or  tremors. 

FUNCTIONAL  CHANGES  DURING  CALCULATION. 
The  method  of  experimentation  here  is  varied  only  by  the 
substitution  of  a  new  form  of  stimulation.  The  subject  was 
required  to  perform  certain  arithmetical  calculations  instead  of 
recalling  a  series  of  past  events.  We  may  therefore  proceed 
immediately  to  a  consideration  of  the  particular  changes  in  func- 
tion which  present  themselves. 


A 
B 
C 
D 
E 

A 
B 
C 


A 
B 
C 
D 

E 


Inspiration 

.72  sees. 

.76      " 

.67      " 
1.26      " 

.67      " 

Total  Resp. 
3.68  sees. 

3-43      " 
3-59     " 

Inspiration. 
.49  sees. 

.22  " 
.67  " 
.58  " 

•45     " 


/.  Normal. 

Insp.  Pause. 

Expiration. 

.22  sees. 

i  .39  sees. 

.31      « 

1.24     " 

.40     " 

1.17     " 

(i 

1.89     " 

•49     " 

.85      « 

Depth. 

Total  Resp. 

29  mm.          D.  — 

5.13  sees. 

34     «           E.- 

3.12      " 

20       " 

2.   Calculation 

Insp.  Pause. 

Expiration. 

.22  sees. 

1.  1  2  sees. 

.31      « 

1.  12       " 

.22       " 

1.26      u 

.13       " 

1.62      " 

•45     " 

.85      4t 

Exp.  Pause. 
.35  sees. 
.12  " 

•35  " 
.98  " 
.11  " 

Depth. 
81  mm. 


Exp.  Pause. 
.90  sees. 
.36  " 

•37     " 
1.89     " 

.85     " 


176  R.  MacDOUGALL. 


Total  Resp. 

Depth. 

Total  Resp. 

Depth. 

+  A 

2.63  sees. 

22  mm. 

D.— 

4.22  sees. 

61  mm. 

B 

2.01        " 

13      " 

E.— 

2.60     " 

12         « 

C 

2.51        " 

25      " 

There  appears  here,  as  in  the  previous  experiments,  an  in- 
crease in  the  rapidity  of  the  respiratory  rhythm ;  but  while  in 
both  series  there  is  a  reduction  in  the  rate  of  the  respiration,  in 
the  former  the  relation  of  the  component  phases  was  signifi- 
cantly altered,  while  here  there  is  little  variation  from  the  tpye 
of  normal  unstimulated  respiration.  In  one  component,  how- 
ever, there  is  a  great  change,  the  respiratory  pause  is  invariably 
shortened,  usually  to  a  great  extent.  In  normal  breathing  it  is 
frequently  accentuated,  the  expiration  being  followed  by  a  dis- 
tinct period  of  quiescence  before  the  succeeding  inspiration. 
During  calculation  this  pause  is  either  lessened  or  altogether 
disappears  ;  inspiration  follows  expiration  with  scarcely  a  break. 
This  feature  is  significant.  Exaggerated  pauses  are  character- 
istic of  one  attitude  of  mind,  diminished  pauses  of  a  typically 
different  state.  In  any  sudden  surprise  the  breath  remains  sus- 
pended, inhibited  sometimes  for  several  moments,  till  the  shock 
passes  by.  The  same  suspension  appears  in  more  exaggerated 
forms  in  fear  and  terror.  In  close  attention — in  the  effort  to 
catch  a  faint  sound,  for  example — it  is  also  a  characteristic 
feature.  These  states  of  mind  are  marked  by  a  general  inhi- 
bition of  function  which  extends  to  temporary  cessation  of  the 
respiratory  process,  until  the  oppression  of  the  lungs  finds  re- 
lief in  renewed  respiration.  In  all  work — expenditure  of  ef- 
fort— on  the  other  hand,  there  is  an  increase  of  functional  ac- 
tivity. The  heart  beats  faster  and  stronger,  the  respiration 
grows  deeper  and  more  rapid,  and  the  glandular  secretions  of 
the  skin  become  more  copious  during  muscular  exertion.  And 
the  same  change,  in  greater  or  less  degree,  accompanies  in- 
creased intellectual  activity.  In  exciting  emotions  the  respira- 
tion is  deep  and  rapid  with  lungs  inflated,  inspiration  and  expi- 
ration succeeding  each  other  without  pause. 

In  more  purely  intellectual  activity,  the  breathing,  which  is 
usually  more  superficial  as  well  as  more  rapid,  is  marked  by  an 


HARVARD  PSYCHOLOGICAL  LABORATORY.  iff 

almost  complete  obliteration  of  the  respiratory  pause.  This 
rapid,  equable  and  slightly  superficial  respiration  may  be  con- 
ducive to  a  more  constant  supply  of  blood  to  the  brain,  the  sud- 
den and  great  expansion  of  the  lungs  in  deep  respiration  caus- 
ing too  great  a  fluctuation  in  the  quantity  supplied  to  its  vascular 
tissues  for  continuous  cerebral  activity. 

The  uniformity  of  respiration  during  calculation  will  further 
appear  from  the  following  table  of  variations  during  the  two 
periods : 

Normal.  Calculation. 

Time.  Depth.  Time.  Depth. 

A  .22  sees.  4  mm.  .66  sees.  19  mm. 

B  1. 10     "  17     "  .90     "  20     " 

C  .70    "  7    "  .22    "  5    " 

D  1. 10     "  12     "  .70     "  30     " 

E  .90     "  4     "  .70     "  6     " 

The  variation  in  depth  is  usually  greater  in  the  more  highly 
stimulated  conditions.  This  is  probably  due  to  two  different 
causes.  These  are,  first,  the  physiological  one  of  periodically 
increased  innervation  from  incipient  asphyxiation,  the  more 
superficial  respiration  being  insufficient  for  the  needs  of  the  sys- 
tem ;  and,  second,  the  psychological  one  of  fluctuation  in  the 
intensity  of  the  effort  required  in  calculation  periods  of  close  at- 
tention with  rapid,  regular,  superficial  respiration  alternating 
with  periods  of  relaxation  indicated  by  the  fuller  breathing  of 
relief.  In  some  cases  no  such  rhythmical  series  appears,  the 
respiration  growing  continually  more  superficial  as  the  calcula- 
tion proceeds.  This  may  indicate  a  continued  attention  with 
increasing  effect,  as  both  the  shallowness  of  breathing  and 
diminution  of  volume  are  found  to  bear  close  relation  to  the  dif- 
ficulty of  reckoning  involved  in  the  problems  given. 

PULSE  VOLUME  CURVES. 

The  beginning  of  calculation  is  in  all  cases  accompanied  by 
an  acceleration  of  the  pulse  rate,  sometimes  of  great  extent,  and 
continuing  throughout  the  larger  part  of  the  period.  The  form 
of  this  acceleration  varies  greatly  from  individual  to  individual 
and  from  record  to  record. 


178  /?.  MacDOUGALL, 

The  rise  is  sometimes  immediate  and  rapid,  succeeded  either  by 
a  similarly  sudden  fall  or  by  a  sustained  increase  in  rate.  Some- 
times the  acceleration  is  slow,  maintained  during  a  considerable 
period,  and  falling  again  gradually  towards  the  normal.  In 
some  cases  the  rise  is  developed  for  several  seconds  after  calcu- 
lation begins.  The  return  to  the  normal  is  usually  reached 
within  a  minute's  calculation.  In  some  cases  the  acceleration 
dies  away  before  one-half  the  time  of  calculation  has  expired. 
At  relief  a  fall  below  the  normal  appears  with  occasionally  a 
secondary  wave  of  acceleration.  The  following  figures  give 
the  average  rate  before  calculation  and  for  successive  periods 
of  twelve  seconds  during  calculation  : 

Preliminary  Period.  During  Calculation. 

A  62.5  seconds.  67.5;  80.0;  85.0  sees. 

B  72.5       «  72.5;  74.5;  75.0     « 

C  77.5       «  77.5;  82.5;  85.0     « 

"  75-o      "  82.5;  75.0; " 

D  57.5       "  65.0;  62.5;  62.5     " 

"  65.5       "  70.0;  75.0;  75.0     " 

E  60.0       "  65.0;  67.5;  65.0     " 

"  75-°      "  77-55  80.0;  75.0    " 

F  50.0      "  55-°;  60.0;  60.0     " 


An  almost  constant  feature  of  the  pulse  during  calculation  is 
the  reduction  in  height  of  stroke.  This  may  be  due  either  to  a 
weaker  ventricular  contraction  or  to  an  increase  in  the  arterial 
tension.  The  latter  condition  accompanies  any  voluntary  re- 
duction in  depth  or  complete  suspension  of  the  respiration.  The 
volumetric  curve  shows  an  immediate  increase  in  curve  volume, 
due  to  congestion  of  the  blood  in  the  smaller  veins  and  arteries, 
and  a  reduction  in  the  height  of  pulse  wave — which  may  finally 
become  obliterated — due  to  the  continued  increase  in  arterial 
tension.  If  then  the  respiration  uniformly  becomes  more  super- 
ficial during  calculation,  such  a  reduction  of  the  pulse  wave  is 
to  be  expected ;  it  becomes  a  secondary  phenomenon,  and,  ex- 
cept as  depending  upon  the  primary  change  in  respiration,  is 
relatively  insignificant. 

But  in  these  records  it  appears  independently  of  the  respira- 


HARVARD  PSYCHOLOGICAL  LABORATORY.  179 

tory  changes,  occurring  when  the  respiration  is  increased  in 
depth  as  well  as  when  there  is  no  appreciable  variation  in  it. 
Compare  it  again  with  the  concomitant  changes  in  the  volume 
curve.  This  is  found  to  alter  as  the  character  of  the  respiration 
changes,  and  as  the  volume  changes  the  form  of  the  pulse  also 
undergoes  alteration.  But  the  changes  which  appear  during 
calculation  seem  to  be  independent  of  the  changes  in  the  vol- 
ume curve  as  well.  A  reduction  in  the  height  of  the  pulse 
wave  is  the  physiological  concomitant  of  increased  arterial 
distension ;  but  here  it  occurs  simultaneously  with  its  fall  in  arm- 
volume  which  normally  marks  the  increased  mental  activity 
during  calculation.  It  is  present  when  there  is  no  appreciable 
change  in  arm- volume,  and  it  persists  both  in  the  rising  and 
falling  of  the  curve.  The  reduction  of  the  pulse  wave,  there- 
fore, since  it  appears  even  with  increased  respiration  and  a  fall- 
ing volume  curve,  both  of  which  should  tend  to  reinforce  it, 
is  a  direct  effect  of  the  central  change  obtaining  during  calcula- 
tion. 

The  volume  changes  are  analogous  to  those  of  the  preceding 
series.  Decrease  is  more  or  less  rapid  and  extensive,  continuing 
for  a  variable  period,  and  followed  either  by  a  continuous, 
gradual  rise,  or  by  a  series  of  wave-like  fluctuations  in  volume. 

MUSCLE  CURVE. 

The  changes  in  the  muscle  curve  are  usually  of  slight  ex- 
tent and  identical  in  type  with  those  described  in  the  preceding 
experiments  upon  recall.  They  are  not  invariable  in  direction 
nor  so  constant  as  in  recall  and  perceptual  attention.  Occa- 
sionally there  is  an  increase  in  the  tremor  of  the  muscles,  occa- 
sionally also  a  greater  irregularity  in  the  form  of  the  curve 
during  calculation  than  in  the  preliminary  period ;  and  in  one 
or  two  instances  a  slight  tendency  to  contraction  appears,  or  a 
previously  existing  contraction  is  reinforced. 

In  general,  however,  these  changes  are  the  same  as  in  those 
of  recall.  Contraction  and  muscle  tension  are  replaced  by 
relaxation  and  extension  of  the  fingers.  This  is  shown  also  in 
the  contraction  which  frequently  appears  again  at  the  close  of 
the  period,  the  static  muscle  tension  recovering  its  normal  tone 


i8o 


R.  MacDOUGALL. 


as  soon  as  attention  is  drawn  from  the  process  of  calculation. 
With  this  relaxation  goes  a  diminution  of  muscular  tremor  and 
a  reduction  in  the  irregularities  of  the  curve.  This  relaxed 
condition  during  close  mental  effort  indicates  a  reduction  in  the 
degree  of  reflex  stimulation  throughout  the  organism,  and 
inferentially  a  greater  efficiency  to  the  central  nervous  dis- 
charges. Tension  represents  expenditure  of  energy ;  there  is  a 
continual  drainage  of  nervous  force  to  the  peripheral  system 
when  this  is  in  a  state  of  activity,  and  the  lowering  of  this  ex- 
penditure— which  characterizes  the  types  of  activity  here  in- 
vestigated— leaves  free  a  wider  margin  of  available  energy  for 
the  central  activity. 


DISCUSSION   AND   REPORTS. 

THE  METAPHYSICAL  METHOD  IN  ETHICS.1 

In  his  preface  Mr.  D'Arcy  defines  his  essential  point  of  view  and 
aim.  It  is  to  give  briefly  '  an  account  as  well  of  the  metaphysical 
basis  as  of  the  ethical  superstructure '  of  conduct.  Referring  to  Mr. 
Muirhead's  Elements,  Mr.  Mackenzie's  Manual,  and  my  own  Outlines 
of  Ethics,  he  says  of  them  that  their  ethical  contents  is  much  the  same 
as  that  of  his  own  work,  4  but  all  three  build  without  a  foundation.' 
This  foundation  he  takes  to  be  Green's  method  and  main  results  as 
reached  in  his  Prolegomena  to  Ethics,2  and  he  proposes  to  do  in  small 
space  what  Green  did  in  a  more  extended  way. 

It  should  also  be  noted  that  Mr.  D'Arcy  declares  his  inability  "to 
accept  in  its  entirety  the  Hegelian8  conception  of  the  spiritual  prin- 
ciple as  presented "  by  Green.  And  as  matter  of  fact,  Mr.  D'Arcy 
accepts  the  doctrine  of  Green  only  up  to  a  certain  point,  and  then 
supplements  it  by  quite  other  considerations,  derived,  as  a  rule,  from 
the  real  or  supposed  needs  of  man's  religious  consciousness,  and  some- 
times from  *  common  sense.' 

It  is  this  effort,  then,  of  Mr.  D'Arcy  to  give  the  metaphysical 

1A  short  Study  of  Ethics.  D'Arcy.  London  and  New  York,  Macmillan 
&  Co.,  1895-6. 

2  As  silence  is  supposed  to  give  consent,  it  may  not  be  impertinent  for  me  to 
say  that  while  I  have  always  recognized  my  own  great  indebtedness  to  Green, 
yet  his  metaphysical  method  seems  to  me  far  from  affording  any  adequate  basis 
for  ethical  doctrine;  on  the  contrary,  all  the  serious  weaknesses  in  Green's 
specifically  ethical  discussions  seem  to  me  to  flow  from  his  metaphysical 
assumptions. 

3 Mr.  D'Arcy  seems  to  accept  in  toto>  as  does  Professor  James  Seth,  Professor 
Andrew  Seth's  identification  of  Green's  doctrine  with  Hegel's.  I  never  have  been 
able  to  see  any  basis  for  this  identification.  Hegel  protests  continuously  and 
consistently  against  the  Kanto-Fichtean  ethics,  and  Green's  standpoint  is  essen- 
tially the  latter.  The  logic  of  the  identification  of  Hegel  and  Green  seems  to 
be:  Each  is  'unsound'  as  to  the  relation  of  the  human  and  divine  self,  and, 
therefore,  both  teach  the  same  doctrine. 

181 


182  THE  METAPHYSICAL  METHOD  IN  ETHICS. 

foundations  of  ethical  theory,  which,  affording  the  distinctive  feature  of 
his  book,  calls  for  especial  attention. 

The  primary  condition  of  all  experience  is  the  relation  of  the  sub- 
ject and  object.  The  subject  eludes  our  grasp,  when  approached  by 
itself.  The  not-self  or  object  is  divided  into  an  inner  and  an  outer 
region,  the  former  including  sensations,  emotions,  thoughts,  etc. ;  the 
latter  contains  all  the  things  we  know  in  the  world  around  us.  The 
inner  experiences,  of  course,  presuppose  the  thinking  subject.  The 
following  course  of  reasoning  shows  that  the  outer  region  is  also  de- 
pendent. Every  thing  is  constituted  by  relations.  The  world  of 
things  in  space  and  time  is  simply  a  vast  complex  of  relations.  But  it 
is  4of  the  very  nature  of  a  relation  to  have  no  existence,  no  meaning, 
except  for  a  thinker.'  A  relation  is  a  "unifying  of  the  manifold,  and 
is,  therefore,  an  impossibility  apart  from  a  subject,  which  can  pass 
from  one  member  of  the  relation  to  the  other,  and  combine  both  in  a 
single  apprehension."  Hence  "  things  exist  only  so  far  as  they  are  due 
to  the  synthetic  activity  of  the  knowing  subject."  Morever,  since  the 
thing  is  always  constituted  by  relations  to  everything  else  in  the  uni- 
verse, it  is  really  a  '  cosmic  object,'  so  that  the  self  is  the  unifying  prin- 
ciple in  the  whole  cosmos  of  experience. 

The  self  is  thus  a  unifying  principle,  and  it  is  also  the  ultimate 
principle  of  unity.  It  is  not  simply  the  correlative  of  object,  for  it  can 
make  itself  its  own  object,  being  self-conscious.  It  is  a  real  unit,  not 
a  logical  principle  of  a  unity. 

So  far  the  language  and  the  method  remind  us  of  Green,  al- 
though Green,  I  think,  would  hesitate  at  this  extraordinary  identifi- 
cation of  the  self  with  subject  apart  from  object,  and  at  the  ruling 
out  from  the  self  of  all  sensations,  emotions  and  thoughts.  As  the 
method  is  nominally  derived  from  the  Kantian,  it  is  perhaps  worth 
while  to  note  that  Kant  urged  not  only  the  necessity  of  the  synthetic 
activity  of  the  subject,  but  equally  urged  that  the  subject  could  be 
conscious  of  itself  and  of  its  unity  only  through  its  synthetic  activ- 
ity upon  the  manifold.  But  Mr.  D'Arcy  knows  a  better  way  than 
that.  This  theory  might  lead  to  the  doctrine  of  the  correlativity  of 
the  subject  and  the  cosmos  of  experience — which  appears  to  be  an 
objectionable  doctrine,  leading  to  Pantheism  —  and  consequently 
having  affirmed  the  synthetic  activity  of  the  self  in  the  constitution 
of  the  objective  world,  Mr.  D'Arcy  affirms  that  since  it  is  self-con- 
scious, it  can  also  abstract  itself  wholly  from  the  world  which  it 
constitutes.  As  Mr.  D'Arcy  simply  affirms  this  as  given  in  the  fact 
of  self-consciousness,  wholly  apart  from  any  examination  of  the  na- 


DISCUSSION  AND  REPORTS.  183 

ture  or  method  of  self-consciousness,  I  can  only  affirm  from  my 
standpoint  that  this  way  of  giving  'foundations'  for  ethics  seems 
to  require  more  foundations  for  itself  than  it  succeeds  in  supplying. 

Were  the  doctrine  of  the  correlativity  of  subject  and  world  af- 
firmed, the  self  would  obviously  secure  a  certain  universality ;  it 
would  not  be  a  merely  particular  self,  if  its  essential  being  were 
found  in  the  constituting  of  an  objective  world.  But  since  Mr. 
D'Arcy  holds  that  the  subject  exists  in  essential  distinction  from 
this  constitutive  work,  and  engages  in  it  as  it  were  only  as  by  play,  or 
as  supererogation,  the  problem  comes  up :  What  sort  of  existence 
does  the  constituted  world  have?  Is  the  universe  a  private  posses- 
sion of  my  own?  Are  we  not  committed  to  the  doctrine  of  subjective 
idealism  ?  Mr.  D'Arcy  implies,  this  would  be  the  result  if  it  were  in- 
tended "to  identify  the  cosmos  of  the  individual  experience  with 
Nature.  Nature  must  be  accepted  as  a  great  fact,  a  mighty  uni- 
verse." Having  thus  secured  from  the  simple  'common  sense*  af- 
firmation (see  p.  1 8)  a  world  independent  of  the  subject's  conscious- 
ness, Mr.  D'Arcy  has  also  obtained  a  basis  for  the  affirmation  of  an 
eternal  self,  free  from  all  the  pantheistic  leanings  of  Green's  doctrine. 
Since  our  world  of  natural  things  depends  upon  our  synthetic  ac- 
tivity, then  surely  this  big  world  of  Nature  depends  upon  its  consti- 
tuting spirit — God. 

I  am  forced  to  stop  once  more  in  my  exposition  to  raise  the  ques- 
tion :  What  founds  these  foundations  ?  Upon  Green's  doctrine — no 
matter  what  objections  may  be  brought  upon  other  grounds — there  is 
one  self  and  universe.  There  is  no  question  of  subjective  idealism,  be- 
cause the  subject  is  defined  by  reference  to  the  permanent  and  objec- 
tive work  of  constituting  a  universe ;  the  particular  individual  know- 
ing is  a  process  of  reproducing  the  eternal  constitutive  action.  But 
this  seems  to  Mr.  D'Arcy  pantheistic,  and  for  reasons  which  he  has 
not  explained  to  the  reader  (save  as  indicated  in  deference  to  the 
opinions  of  Professor  Seth  and  Mr.  Balfour)  pantheistic  implications 
are  to  be  avoided  at  all  hazards,  including  those  of  logic.  Hence 
this  sudden  break  into  a  cosmos  of  my  experience,  and  another  big- 
ger cosmos,  with  two  spirits,  the  individual  for  my  cosmos,  God  for 
the  big  one.  Two  questions  can  hardly  be  kept  back.  If  we  accept, 
because  we  cannot  help  believing  it,  the  existence  of  this  larger  cos- 
mos, it  must  also  be  remarked  that  common  sense  equally  denies  the 
dependence  of  our  cosmos  upon  our  subjective  activity.  Common 
sense  is  not  particularly  alarmed  about  the  existence  of  the  sun, 
moon  and  stars  in  the  big  cosmos,  but  objects  with  great  vigor  to 


184  THE  METAPHYSICAL  METHOD  IN  ETHICS. 

making  the  sun,  moon  and  stars  which  are  individually  known  de- 
pendent upon  our  individual  thinking  power.  I  doubt  very  much  if 
Mr.  D'Arcy  can  satisfy  the  realist  by  handing  over  to  him  a  world, 
however  big,  which  is  unknown,  while  allowing  the  subjective  idealist 
complete  proprietary  rights  in  the  cosmos  of  individual  experience. 

But  it  may  be  said  this  is  quite  unfair  to  Mr.  D'Arcy.  Does  he 
not  say  that  the  u  cosmos  of  experience  must  be  recognized  as  iden- 
tical with  a  part  of  the  great  cosmos  of  Nature  ? "  This  brings  me 
to  my  second  question :  Why  then  is  not  the  individual  self -identi- 
cal with  God  so  far  as  the  identity  of  worlds  goes?  How,  indeed, 
do  we  know  there  is  a  bigger  unknown  world,  save  as  a  projection, 
an  extension,  out  of  our  present  experience?  Is  it  our  'own'  self,1 
or  is  it  the  absolute  spirit  which  really  constitutes  our  cosmos  ?  If 
the  former,  how  shall  we  account  for  its  coincidence  with  the  cosmos 
of  the  absolute  subject,  and  for  the  continuity  between  the  two,  as 
the  individual  cosmos  extends  itself  ?  How  shall  we  account  for  this 
remarkable  capacity  on  the  part  of  a  uniquely  individual  self  to  con- 
struct a  world  having  its  own  objectivity  and  relative  permanence? 
But  if  the  latter,  then  the  whole  theory  of  the  ultimate  and  irreducible 
distinction  of  the  two  selves  breaks  down. 

This  same  method,  viz  :  the  following  of  the  Kantian  analysis  of 
knowledge  up  to  a  certain  point  and  then  the  contradiction  of  its  logi- 
cal conclusion  in  the  interests  of  religion  and  common  sense — appears 
in  the  discussion  of  volition  and  of  the  common  good.  Will  is 
treated  as  self-determination,  and  as  indeed,  only  the  more  explicit 
recognition  of  the  constitutive  process  found  in  all  knowledge. 
* '  Every  act  of  self-determination,  every  volition,  is  a  determination, 
not  simply  of  one  thing,  but  of  the  whole  cosmos  of  experience. 
Self-determination  must  be  world-determination."  This  principle  of 
determination  recognized  from  the  standpoint  of  the  whole  is  free- 
dom ;  while  necessity  is  the  principle  of  the  articulation  of  the  parts. 
They  are  thus  correlative  and  imply  each  other,  instead  of  being 
contradictory.  That  is  to  say,  each  fact  or  event  taken  as  particular  is 
necessitated ;  but  that  it  is  determined  at  all  and  determined  in  relation 
to  other  facts  is  due  to  an  act  of  self-determination  on  the  part  of  the 
subject.  (P.  29;  pp.  39  and  49  also.) 

1  Nothing  could  exceed  Mr.  D'Arcy's  conviction  of  the  '  ultimateness '  of  the 
individual  self.  "  Self  is  for  every  man  unique  and  ultimate.  The  identification 
of  the  self  in  every  man  with  God  in  /olves  the  identification  of  all  human  selves. 
But  since  each  self  is  for  itself  unique  and  ultimate,  this  identification  amounts 
to  a  denial  of  the  essential  nature  of  selfhood."  P.  46. 


DISCUSSION  AND  REPORTS.  185 

Why  the  self  and  the  world  should  not  be  correlatives,  while  self 
determination  and  world-determination,  freedom  and  necessity,  are 
correlatives,  Mr.  D'Arcy  does  not  explain.  It  is  difficult  to  see  why 
one  principle  should  hold  for  thought  and  another  for  volition ;  or  why, 
if  one  is  objected  to  on  the  ground  of  pantheistic  tendencies,  the  other 
is  not  equally 'dangerous.'  The  pressure  to  make  self-determination 
and  world-determination  correlatives  is  obvious.  Without  this  cor 
relativity,  self-determination  would  occur  in  a  purely  transcendental, 
and,  so  far  as  we  are  concerned,  empty  region ;  will  would  have  no- 
thing to  say  or  to  do  with  the  details  of  conduct.  But  the  demand  for 
correlativity  on  the  side  of  knowledge  is  certainly  none  the  less  real 
altho'  not  quite  as  obvious.  What  the  self-consciousness  is  which  is 
found  neither  in  consciousness  of  objects,  nor  yet  in  sensations,  thoughts 
or  emotions,  Mr.  D'Arcy  does  not  explain,  and  we  have  only  his  word 
for  it  that  it  is  not  formal  and  empty. 

The  contradiction  is  still  more  glaring  when  we  deal  with  the 
question  of  the  End  or  Good.  Mr.  D'Arcy  having  settled  that  the 
subject  is  purely  individual — for  it  must  not  get  too  closely  implicated 
with  the  divine  self  for  fear  of  pantheism — is  quite  consistent  in  hold- 
ing that  the  end  of  self  is  egoistic.  "  Will  is  by  nature  egoistic 

No  other  individual  can  stand  on  a  level  with  the  self Reason  is 

essentially  anti-social Self,  unless  mastered  by  some  superior 

principle,  must  wage  unceasing  war  against  all  who  would  pretend  to 
equal  authority."  (Pp«  58,  59  j  the  same  doctrine  also  on  p.  124  and 
p.  147.)  Hence  every  moral  system  independent  of  religious  ideas 
breaks  down.  It  cannot  explain  why  a  man  should  love  his  neighbor 
as  himself;  it  cannot  justify  the  idea  of  a  common  good.1  On  the 
same  line  of  thought,  Mr.  D'Arcy  questions  whether  society  is  really 
an  organic  whole,  since  the  individual  is  so  very  individual,  and  refers 
to  it  as  an  'amorphous  mass  of  tissue'  (p.  73). 2 

1  Mr.  D'Arcy  seems  a  little  hard  on  the  individual  self.     In  the  first  place,  it 
must  be  purely  individual  and  unique,  since  otherwise  it  will  get  mixed  up  in  a 
most  pantheistic  fashion  with  God  and  other  selves.     On  religious  grounds,  in 
other  words,  it  is  quite  shut  up  in  itself.     Then  the  interests  of  religion  being 
duly  secured,  the  self  is  gravely  rebuked  for  its  self-centred  and  self-seeking  na- 
ture, and  assured  to  be  greatly  in  need  of  the  assistance  of  religion  to  give  it  an 
end  common  with  that  of  others.     It  is  a  little  hard,  I  repeat,  to  refuse  and  to 
demand  at  the  same  time  participation  with  other  selves  to  the  individual  self, 
and  both  in  the  name  of  religion. 

2  Mr.  D'Arcy  nevertheless  holds  that  there  is  no  other  idea  save  that  of  or- 
ganic unity,  which  can  be  applied  to  society,  and  yet  that  the  truth  is  not  fully 
represented  in  that  idea  (p.  74). 


186  THE  METAPHYSICAL  METHOD  IN  ETHICS. 

But  on  the  other  side,  religion  is  going  to  help  out  the  egoistic  nar- 
ture  of  the  self.  We  cannot  stop  short,  after  all,  with  the  unity  of 
the  self.  In  this  case  "  God  himself  would  be  simply  one  unit  in  a 
multitude  and  isolated  from  his  creatures.  But  it  is  impossible  to 
end  in  a  disconnected  multitude."  The  mind  is  forced  to  suppose 
some  principle  of  unity  deeper  than  the  unity  of  self-consciousness. 
There  is  in  God  a  transcendent  principle  by  which  he  forms  the  ulti- 
mate bond  of  union  among  the  multitude  of  persons.  The  fact  of  the 
union  of  spirits  must  be  assumed  as' the  ultimate  basis  of  all  coher- 
ence, speculative  and  practical.  (Pp.  47-8.)  Hence  the  common 
good  for  all  persons.  "All  persons  are  naturally  exclusive  (i.  e., 
they  limit  one  another),  yet  are  they  one  in  God.  Hence  the  good 
for  the  whole  is  the  good  for  every  separate  member.  The  true  good 
for  every  man  is  a  common  good  and  an  absolute  good."  (P.  102, 
see  also  p.  124.)  Man  and  God  have  a  common  end.  The  end  of 
conduct  is  identified  with  the  end  of  the  universe  (p.  126). 

We  have  precisely  the  contradiction  here  between  the  isolated, 
egoistic  end  of  the  self,  and  the  common  end  of  the  self  through  its 
transcendental  union  with  others  in  God  that  we  met  before  as  re- 
gards the  constitutive  action  of  self  in  our  cosmos,  and  of  God  in  the 
cosmos,  except  that  here  it  is  most  explicitly  recognized  that  We 
must  not  exclude  the  working  of  the  divine  end  from  the  constitu- 
tion of  the  human  end.  Mr.  D'Arcy  might,  indeed,  attempt  to  bridge 
the  gulf  by  holding  that  the  natural  self  is  wholly  given  to  evil ;  and 
that  only  by  supernatural  grace,  initiated  wholly  from  without,  does 
the  natural  self  come  to  such  social  ends ;  but  there  are  no  traces 
of  any  such  doctrine  in  him.  He  seems  to  hold  that  in  the  moral  life 
as  such  there  is  the  immanence  of  the  common  end  through  the  union 
of  all  selves  in  God.  Were  it  not  that  the  contradiction  obviously 
escaped  Mr.  D'Arcy  himself,  I  should  think  it  wholly  unnecessary 
to  point  it  out.  As  it  is,  I  must  be  pardoned  for  saying  that  if  there 
is  one  self,  named  the  divine  self,  in  which  all  selves  are  united  in 
a  common  end  which  is  also  the  goal  of  the  evolution  of  the  universe, 
then  the  doctrine  regarding  the  isolated,  exclusive  character  of  each 
individual  self  must  be  radically  modified.  It  certainly  is  not  legiti- 
mate to  insist  on  the  purely  individual  character  of  the  self  from 
one  point  of  view ;  and  then,  when  different  considerations  are  in  view, 
insist  upon  the  community  of  selves.  That  the  two  ends  of  the  con- 
tradiction are  both  set  up  in  the  name  of  religion  does  not  make  it  any 
the.  less  a  contradiction ;  although  it  may  make  one  suspicious  of  the 
particular  type  of  religion  represented. 


DISCUSSION  AND  REPORTS.  187 

Thus  far  the  tendency  of  our  examination  has  been  to  make  us 
question  whether  Mr.  D'Arcy's  metaphysical  foundations  do  not  of 
themselves  require  more  grounding  than  any  ordinary  ethical  theory 
is  likely  to  call  for.  I  shall  take  space  for  just  one  application  of  his 
metaphysical  to  his  ethical  doctrine,  seen  in  the  question  of  the  end, 
with  a  view  to  determining  whether  the  ethical  superstructure  stands 
any  the  more  firmly  for  the  foundation  put  under  it. 

The  ultimate  end  is  the  idea  of  a  social  universe  in  which  every 
person's  capabilities  shall  receive  their  full  realization,  and  in  which 
every  person's  realization  shall  contribute  to  every  other  person's 
realization.  It  is  impossible,  however,  to  give  any  further  definition 
of  the  ultimate  end,  because  it  is  impossible  to  know  what  are  the 
possibilities  of  selfhood  (pp.  104-5).  Whence  it  is  a  fair  inference 
that  the  end  though  not  formal  in  itself  is  purely  formal  for  us. 
"It  must  be  granted  at  once  that  the  Ideal  End,  or  Ultimate  Good, 
is  relative  to  a  set  of  circumstances  at  present  non-existent1  (p.  107)." 

Mr.  D'Arcy  then  goes  on  to  deal  with  the  proximate  end,  this 
ultimate  end  being  obviously  useless  for  the  immediate  guidance  of 
conduct.  4  Every  collocation  of  circumstances  has  its  best.'  '  The 
good  is  perfectly  individualized.'  '  It  is  no  rigid  standard.'  '  Its 
unit  is  the  concrete  act.'  (Pp«  108,  112  Passim.}  In  other  words, 
the  real  end  is  always  the  content  of  some  special  act,  performed 
with  its  own  space  and  time  considerations  involved  in  it.  This 
strikes  me  personally  as  excellent  ethical  doctrine;  but  what  de- 
mand is  there  then  for  the  ultimate  goal  furnished  by  metaphysics  ? 
How  does  that  give  foundation  in  any  sense  for  the  concrete  ideals 
with  which  man  is  actually  concerned  ?  Mr.  D'Arcy  gives  two  an- 
swers, or  two  perhaps  reducible  to  one :  the  thought  of  the  far  away 
goal  helps  us  to  read  the  special  instance ;  and  we  judge  by  the  ten- 
dency of  the  proximate  to  realize  the  ultimate  end. 

As  to  the  first  answer,  it  is  of  great  advantage  to  the  individual  to 
be  aware  of  what  he  is  really  about  in  a  special  case,  and  any  prin- 
ciple, however  formal  and  abstract,  which  aids  him  in  doing  this  is 
justified  thereby.  But  it  is  not  the  remote  goal,  but  simply  a  larger 
view  of  the  present,  which  thus  helps  one.  It  is  the  reference  of  an 
act  to  the  present  society  which  it  maintains  or  furthers  that  helps  one 

1To  which  Mr.  D'Arcy  adds,  "  But  this  is  a  defect  attaching  to  every  ideal" — 
yes,  to  every  ideal  metaphysically  established,  but  to  no  ideal  psychologically, 
or  socially,  determined,  because  in  the  latter  case  the  ideal  always  is  a  certain 
set  of  present  circumstances  viewed  in  certain  new  relations  and  therefore  no 
more  requiring  reference  to  some  ultimate  goal  of  the  universe  as  a  whole  than 
does  a  scientific  discovery  or  an  industrial  invention. 


1 88  THE  METAPHYSICAL   METHOD   IN  ETHICS. 

see  its  true  content ;  not  its  reference  to  a  society  distant  an  infinite 
length  of  time.  So  far  is  the  conception  of  a  perfectly  realized  com- 
munity at  the  extreme  goal  of  progress  from  helping  us  read  the  pres- 
ent that,  on  the  contrary,  we  can  only  read,  or  put  any  meaning  into, 
that  conception  by  reference  to  the  present.  As  to  the  other  answer, 
that  the  present  may  be  conceived  as  means,  it  simply  removes  all  value 
from  the  present.  If  the  present  exists  simply  as  one  stage  in  bringing 
about  an  infinitely  remote  goal,  it  presents  no  imperative  claims  and 
affords  no  ends.  Such  a  doctrine  simply  denies  the  doctrine  that  every 
collocation  of  circumstances  has  its  own  best.  It  makes  rainbow  chasing 
the  essence  of  the  doctrine  of  moral  ideas.  For  my  own  part,  I  believe 
that  an  ethical  doctrine  with  less  '  foundations '  under  it  is  likely  to  go 
farther  and  last  longer. 

In  discussing  Mr.  D'Arcy's  book  from  this  one  standpoint  of  the 
relation  of  his  metaphysical  to  his  ethical  theory,  great  injustice 
would  be  done  Mr.  D'Arcy  if  I  failed  to  recognize  his  own  acuteness, 
subtlety  and  frequent  suggestiveness.  No  one  can  read  the  book 
without  stimulation.  Mr.  D'Arcy's  personal  attitude  and  method  as 
distinct  from  that  of  his  philosophic  position,  is  straightforward  and 
ingenuous.  But  the  use  of  religious  presuppositions  to  direct  philo- 
sophic doctrine,  first  this  way,  then  that,  seems  to  me  essentially  disin- 
genuous. Let  us  either  explicitly  hold  that  philosophy  has  no  distinct 
right  to  be,  but  is  always  a  form  of  theological  apologetics ;  or  let  us 
give  it  the  same  intellectual  freedom  that  we  now  yield  to  mathematics 
and  mechanics.  Let  us  not,  even  unconsciously,  give  philosophy  the 
appearance,  without  the  substance,  of  an  independent  position.  More 
specifically,  the  results  of  Mr.  D'Arcy's  investigations  seem  to  me  to 
give  at  least  a  negative  support  to  the  hypothesis  that  what  ethical 
theory  now  needs  is  an  adequate  psychological  and  social  method,  not 
metaphysical  one. 

JOHN  DEWEY. 
UNIVERSITY  OF  CHICAGO. 


INVESTIGATION   OF  CUTANEOUS   SENSIBILITY. 

In  spite  of  the  recent  increase  of  our  knowledge  of  that  most  gen- 
eral of  our  senses — cutaneous  sensibility — the  experiments  hitherto 
made  leave  one  difficulty  only  partially  solved.  This  difficulty  is, 
in  the  first  instance,  of  a  technical  nature,  but  it  occasions  secondary 


DISCUSSION  AND  REPORTS.  189 

disadvantages  which  in  experiment  prove  greater  or  lesser  sources  of 
error.  It  consists  in  the  accurate  determining  of  the  pressure-value 
to  be  produced  on  the  portion  of  the  skin  under  investigation.  The 
importance  of  this  factor  in  the  investigation  of  cutaneous  sensibility 
needs  no  further  comment,  for  it  is  well  known  that  the  increased  pres- 
sure, consequent  on  the  deeper  penetration  of  the  instrument  used, 
causes  a  larger  area  of  skin  to  be  affected.  The  aesthesiometers  hitherto 
invented  for  the  determination  of  degrees  of  pressure  have  not  quite 
overcome  this  difficulty,  for  though  serving  to  determine  the  pressure- 
value  on  portions  of  the  body  in  a  horizontal  position,  their  applica- 
tion becomes  difficult  or  impossible  as  soon  as  parts  not  adapting 
themselves  to  this  easy  posture  are  to  be  investigated ;  and  in  any  case 
the  abnormal  attitudes  exercise  a  disturbing  influence  on  the  results  of 
the  experiment.  I  should  like  therefore  to  direct  attention  to  a  method 
of  investigating  cutaneous  sensibility,  which,  originating  in  physiolog- 
ical research,  may  become  of  importance  in  psychology.  Prof,  von 
Frey,  of  Leipzig,  has  described  this  method  in  Berichte  der  mathe- 
mathisch-physischen  Classe  der  Konigl.  Sachsischen  Gesellschaft 
der  Wissenschaften  zu  Leipzig  of  July  2d,  December  3d,  1894,  and 
March  4th,  1895.  It  was  a  happy  thought  of  the  author  to  make  use 
of  the  maximum  stimulus-value  of  a  hair  of  a  certain  length,  this  value 
being  determined  by  the  weight  which  the  hair  in  curving  just  lifts  on  a 
pair  of  scales.  For  the  different  degrees  of  stimulation  von  Frey  makes 
use  of  hairs  of  various  sizes,  bristles,  horse-hair,  beard-hair,  women's 
hair,  children's  hair,  cocoon-threads  and  glass-threads,  also  of  similar 
hairs  of  different  lengths.  None  of  the  stimulus  hairs  mentioned  ex- 
ceeds a  length  of  40  cm.  Each  single  hair  is  stuck,  by  means  of 
elastic  glue,  to  a  little  wooden  rod  8  cm.  in  length  and  perpendicular 
to  its  axis.  The  little  rod  serves  as  a  handle  during  the  experiments. 
Having  already  written  a  detailed  account  of  von  Frey's  interesting 
experiments  for  the  Zeitschrift  fur  Psychologic  und  Physiologie 
der  Sinnesorgane,  to  which  I  refer  the  reader,  I  need  here  only 
mention  that  von  Frey  designates  the  maximum  value  of  a  stimulus 
hair  measured  by  the  scales  as  its  'force'  (Kraft),  that  the  'pressure' 
(Druck)  to  be  determined  by  the  hair  is  obtained  through  the  division 
of  the  primary  value  by  the  microscopically-measured  transverse  sec- 
tion of  the  hair  and  that,  according  to  von  Frey's  investigations, 
sense-points  differing  in  quality  and  in  liminal  value,  are  to  be  found 
on  the  surface  of  the  skin.  These,  designated  by  von  Frey  as  pressure 
and  pain  points,  represent  a  different  liminal  value  on  the  different 
parts  of  the  skin. 


190       INVESTIGATION  OF  CUTANEOUS  SENSIBILITY. 

Having  frequently  worked  with  von  Frey,  subsequent  developments 
of  the  researches  are  known  to  me  and  I  may,  therefore,  add  that 
careful  study  of  the  deformation-phenomena  produced  by  pressure  has 
caused  him,  with  respect  to  the  pressure-points,  to  alter  the  above  men- 
tioned designation  of  the  value  reduced  to  unity.  The  pressure  is  no 
longer  determined  by  the  quotient  s^-  but  by  the  quotient  radiusfo0rfcseurface. 
The  progress  made  in  consequence  of  these  experiments  of  von  Frey 
is,  I  think,  not  only  in  the  proving  of  difference  in  quality  and  inten- 
sity of  the  various  points  of  the  skin,  but  also  in  the  possibility  of  ob- 
taining exact  liminal  values,  and  psychological  science  in  its  investi- 
gations must,  I  think,  take  all  these  factors  into  account.  These 
thoughts  have  occupied  me  since  my  first  acquaintance  with  von  Frey's 
work,  and  the  subject,  it  seems  to  me,  is  worthy  of  further  discussion. 
How  far  we  must  take  into  consideration,  however,  in  psychological 
questions,  the  relative  values  given  by  von  Frey  or  those  absolute 
values  designated  by  him  as  'force'  will  depend  on  the  individual 
cases  with  which  the  investigation  has  to  deal,  and  according  as  one 
is  able  in  each  individual  case  to  preserve  one  or  the  other  component 
constant.  But  it  is  clear  that  the  simplicity  of  the  method  permits  of 
the  performance  of  exact  quantitative  measuring  experiments  on  all 
parts  of  the  body  as  soon  as  a  series  of  stimulus  hairs  has  been  determ- 
ined on  the  chemical  scales.  It  is  also  clear  that,  taking  this  principle 
as  a  basis,  it  would  be  easy  to  construct  a  simple,  satisfactory  aesthesi- 
ometer.  This  idea,  in  the  interest  of  my  own  science  in  the  first  place 
I  communicated  to  Prof,  von  Frey,  who,  after  having  developed  it, 
has  had  two  sorts  of  aesthesiometers  constructed  by  the  mechanician 
Zimmermann,  of  Leipzig.  These  deserve  further  notice  on  account  of 
their  practical  usefulness.  One  is  more  adapted  for  clinical  purposes, 
and  will  doubtless  be  of  great  service  in  the  investigation  of  patholog- 
ical cases.  It  consists  of  a  small  tube  of  about  5  mm.  in  diameter 
and  about  10  cm.  in  length,  in  which  a  metal  rod,  graduated  in  milli- 
meters, may  be  moved  up  and  down.  The  stimulus  hair  is  fixed  to 
the  free  end  of  this  rod  with  elastic  glue,  as  already  mentioned. 
According  as  the  rod,  with  affixed  stimulus  hair,  is  moved  into  the 
tube,  the  hair  is  shortened  and  its  pressure  value  immediately  altered, 
the  latter,  of  course,  increasing  with  the  shortening  of  the  hair.  If 
the  hair  has  been  measured  on  the  crater  according  to  its  different 
lengths,  the  pressure  value  may  be  read  on  the  graduated  rod,  since 
the  transverse  section  remains  constant.  The  second  aesthesiometer 
by  von  Frey  it,  constructed  on  the  principle  of  earlier  instruments. 
It  differs  from  these  only  in  having  yielding  stimulus  hairs  accurately 


DISCUSSION  AND  REPORTS.  191 

gauged  instead  of  hard  points.  Each  hair  is  fastened  into  a  capsule, 
which  moves  easily  up  and  down  a  metal  rod.  The  distance  of  the 
ends  of  the  two  stimulus  hairs  may  thus  be  varied  at  will  according  to 
the  experiment  to  be  undertaken.  The  whole  is  fastened  to  a  handle. 
It  is  needless  to  say  that  this  instrument  may  be  used  with  great  ease 
in  the  investigation  of  every  part  of  the  body  without  necessitating 
any  abnormal  position,  and  I  am  not,  I  think,  going  too  far  in  repeat- 
ing that  by  von  Frey's  stimulus  hair  method  former  difficulties  are 
surmounted. 

The  interest  aroused  of  late  in  the  investigation  of  skin  sensation 
gives  me  hope  that  this  short  notice  may  direct  attention  to  this 
method,  the  application  of  which  will  certainly  not  be  fruitless.  The 
arrangement  of  the  stimulus  hairs  occasions  some  difficulty  at  first, 
but  this  is  soon  overcome  by  practice  and  more  than  compensated  for 
by  subsequent  success.  Von  Frey's  method  has  proven  of  great  value 
in  the  treatment  of  diseases  of  the  eye  as  also  is  other  pathological 
cases. 

I  may  add  to  the  foregoing  that  when  one  wishes  to  mark  certain 
skin-points  for  continued  investigation  10  %  nitrate  of  silver  may  be 
applied  to  the  skin  by  means  of  a  capillary  tube  the  walls  of  which 
must  not  be  too  thin.  Injury  to  the  nervous  end-organs  can  in  this 
way  scarcely  be  apprehended.  This  is  as  a  rule  von  Frey's  method  of 
marking  skin-points  under  examination.  I  often  make  use  of  a  watery 
solution  of  methyloiolet  which,  as  I  have  elsewhere  mentioned  (Wundt. 
Philos.  Studien,  Bd.  up.  137),  dyes  living  tissues  well  and  lastingly. 

In  conclusion  I  may  remark  that  Prof  von  Frey  intends  to  publish 
an  account  of  his  further  investigations  in  the  course  of  the  year. 

FRIEDRICH  KIESOW. 
LEIPZIG. 


SUSPENSION  OF  THE  SPATIAL  CONSCIOUSNESS. 

A  recent  note  in  this  journal  by  Professor  Hyslop  on  our  localiza- 
tion in  space  induces  me  to  record  a  somewhat  similar  but  even  more 
pronounced  case  of  suspension  of  the  power  of  localization.  It  is  to 
be  noted  that  the  dream  which  in  Dr.  Hyslop's  cases  '  switched  out ' 
the  ordinary  date  of  localization  was,  unlike  most  dreams,  accom- 
panied by,  perhaps  caused  by,  hallucinations  of  vision,  such  as  I  have 
described  in  a  recent  number  of  the  Journal  of  Comparative  Neurology. 
The  theory  which  seems  to  have  been  in  the  narrator's  mind  is  that  the 
existing  mental  picture  forcibly  displaced  the  memory  image  of  the 


I93      SUSPENSION?  OF  THE  SPATIAL  CONSCIOUSNESS. 

actual  place  occupied.  The  tactile  and  other  sensations  were  not  ade- 
quate to  displace  the  vivid  hallucinatory  image.  The  question  in  this 
connection  which  seems  of  greatest  interest  is  whether  the  mind,  in  its 
waking  state,  must  (or  at  least  always  does)  orientate  itself,  whether 
correctly  or  incorrectly.  Everyone  knows  by  unpleasant  experience 
that  the  tendency  to  extend  this  orientation  to  correspond  with  the 
limits  of  our  field  of  space-conception  is  very  strong  and,  once  formed, 
the  orientation  is  exasperatingly  persistent.  I  had  suffered  from  the 
inconvenience  of  being  '  turned  round '  in  unfamiliar  places  for  many 
years  until  a  simple  expedient  permanently  rid  me  of  the  habit.  The 
remedy  consisted  in  charging  the  mind  to  suspend  judgment  of  direc- 
tion until  an  intelligent  one  could  be  formed.  After  a  short  struggle 
this  habit  was  formed  and,  although  mistakes  have  occurred,  they  have 
been  due  in  every  case  to  imperfect  or  incorrect  data  and  I  have  never 
been  '  turned  round '  since. 

But  the  instance  which  it  is  desired  to  record  seems  to  show  that 
the  mind  may  be  for  a  considerable  time  completely  unorientated  in 
both  time  and  space.  The  experience  referred  to  has  occurred  to  me  no 
more  than  three  times  and  the  period  has  in  two  cases  been  quite  short, 
while  in  another  the  time  was  long  enough  to  provide  for  a  careful 
study  of  the  state.  It  was  some  months  after  a  return  from  a  resi- 
dence in  Berlin  lasting  several  months.  Meanwhile  the  home  had 
been  removed  from  Cincinnati  to  Granville.  Yet  there  had  been  a 
long  period  of  quiet  routine  at  the  new  home,  and  the  unsettled  feeling 
which  an  ocean  journey  always  produces  had  long  since  worn  off.  I 
had  been  for  some  time  studying  dreams  and  had  acquired  the  habit  of 
collecting  my  thoughts  and  attentively  observing  states  following  the 
awakening.  Under  these  circumstances  I  awoke  near  midnight  from  a 
quiet  sleep  without  any  dream  content  being  immanent.  The  room  was 
absolutely  dark  and  quiet.  I  lay  at  ease  and  it  dawned  upon  me  that 
I  had  no  notion  of  where  I  was.  I  turned  over  in  my  mind  the  vari- 
ous sleeping  apartments  in  which  I  had  slept.  Was  this  the  state 
room  of  a  steamer?  Evidently  not,  for  there  was  neither  noise  nor 
jar.  Was  it  one  of  the  three  bed  rooms  I  recalled  in  Cincinnati,  or 
was  it  perhaps  in  Berlin?  I  could  not  tell.  What  had  I  been  doing 
the  day  before  ?  I  had  not  the  faintest  idea.  The  events  of  one  pe- 
riod of  the  past  seemed  as  vivid  and  t  present '  as  those  of  any  other. 
For  some  reason  the  sequence  of  events  seemed  gone,  though  many 
isolated  occurrences  were  clearly  recalled.  I  lay  some  time  waiting 
for  the  appearance  of  some  associated  chain,  but  none  emerged.  A 
momentary  fear  that  I  had  been  smitten  with  blindness  was  relieved 


DISCUSSION  AND  REPORTS.  193 

by  a  faint  glimmer  from  the  window.  I  then  made  several  slight 
movements  but  could  still  get  no  idea  of  the  shape  of  the  room  or  of  the 
position  of  objects  in  it.  The  necessary  link  was  at  last  afforded  by  a 
movement  on  the  part  of  my  companion  and  a  few  tactile  coordina- 
tions without  the  aid  of  vision.  The  state  impressed  me  like  that  of  a 
disembodied  mind,  but  there  seems  to  have  been  no  special  vascular 
stasis  at  the  periphery,  though  it  is,  of  course,  probable  that  some  cir- 
culatory changes  had  occurred  in  the  brain.  Tactile  sensations  were 
as  usual.  It  thus  is  evident  that  the  mind  may  operate  in  an  appar- 
ently normal  way  with  full  consciousness  and  yet  the  correlation  of 
vestiges  necessary  to  localization  be  wholly  suppressed,  though  other 
spatial  reproductions  are  unimpaired.  It  is  also  seen  that  the  orienta- 
tion does  not  depend  on  vision  or  any  one  sense,  though  visual  ele- 
ments predominate  when  the  orientation  is  at  last  affected.  As  I 
have  said,  this  is  not  an  isolated  case,  though  in  the  other  instances 
some  sense  impression  has  completed  the  spatial  rapport  before  the 
state  could  be  calmly  observed. 

DENISON  UNIVERSITY.  C.  L.  HERRICK. 


FOCAL  AND  MARGINAL  CONSCIOUSNESS. 

There  seems  to  exist  among  a  large  number  of  recent  psychological 
writers  a  strange  confusion  of  ideas  respecting  one  of  the  simplest  and 
yet  most  fundamental  distinctions  in  the  science.  I  mean  that  be- 
tween sense  content  and  sensation  (not  the  content  of  the  sensation, 
which  is  a  very  different  thing) . 

The  content  of  sense  at  any  given  time  is  the  sum  of  the  affectations  of 
the  lower  or  primary  aesthesodic  centres.  In  the  visual  sphere,  for  ex- 
ample, it  is  the  totality  of  the  immediate  central  reactions  correspond- 
ing to  the  retinal  excitations.  We  may  think  of  them  as  distributed 
in  the  homologous  parts  of  the  tectum,  but  it  is  probable  that  we  should 
add  the  effects  of  certain  optic  reflexes  with  their  sesthesodic  reactions, 
and  not  improbable  that  it  will  be  necessary  to  include  modifications 
or  accretions  due  to  changes  in  the  cortical  visual  area ;  however  this 
may  be,  there  is  as  yet  no  sensation — only  sense  content.  Besides 
the  contents  of  the  higher  senses  there  is  the  whole  aesthesodic  contin- 
gent from  the  cord,  many  of  whose  elements  never  are  brought  into 
consciousness  except  under  exceptional  conditions.  Some  of  them 
are  perhaps  incompetent  to  enter  sensation  at  all,  except  as  a  quale 
of  some  other  sensation,  because  they  have  no  localizable  *  tag  '  suit- 


194  FOCAL  AND  MARGINAL    CONSCIOUSNESS. 

ing  them  to  independent  recognition  or  isolation.  These  are,  how- 
ever, just  as  really  part  of  the  sense  content  as  are  colors  or  pains. 

Now  it  is  evident  to  ordinary  experience  that,  in  many  cases  at 
least,  the  '  sensing'  of  a  sense  content  is  an  act,  not  an  occurrence. 
We  fix  a  certain  element;  it  is  immaterial  how  we  were  impelled  to 
the  fixation  of  that  particular  element,  the  act  is  an  expression  of  our 
spontaneity — a  reaction  of  the  subject.  Many  considerations  justify  us 
in  supposing  that  an  act  of  consciousness  involves,  on  its  neurological 
side,  a  reaction  between  the  aBsthesodic  and  the  kinesodic  system  of  the 
cortex.  Only  so  can  the  intimate  connection  between  perception  and 
various  forms  of  innervation  be  explained.  Here  is  an  attractive 
field  which  it  is  not  possible  to  enter  now.  Probably  most  psychol- 
ogists will  agree  that  consciousness  is  an  act,  not  a  state,  and  that  it  is 
a  pivotal  act  which  takes  place  in  the  very  focus  of  our  being. 

The  unity  of  consciousness  may  be  interpreted  to  mean  that  con- 
sciousness is  only  possible  when  the  aesthesodic  and  kinesodic  currents 
affect  the  equilibrium  of  the  entire  mechanism  of  consciousness.  It 
seems  possible  to  conceive  of  the  situation  as  an  instance  of  most  com- 
plicated equilibrium  where  each  element  of  the  conscious  mechanism 
contributes  its  tension  to  the  balance  of  the  whole.  However  this 
tension  is  affected,  a  conscious  state  may  follow.  It  will  be  under- 
stood that  on  a  purely  dynamic  theory  there  is  no  question  of  spatial 
unity,  only  of  a  common  form  of  action. 

Letting  this  crudely-expressed  concept  serve  for  present  purposes, 
we  are  prepared  to  consider  what  takes  place  when  any  given  content 
of  sense  is  presented  to  the  mechanism  of  consciousness.  If  it  is  a 
given  color,  for  example,  then  the  balance  is  disturbed  in  a  certain 
characteristic  way  at  the  moment  it  is  admitted.  We  perceive  a 
color.  If,  instead  of  the  color,  a  retinal  picture  of  great  complexity, 
say  a  landscape,  is  presented,  the  equilibrium  is  disturbed  in  a  differ- 
ent way,  though  one  which  produces  an  instantaneous  impression  of 
as  truly  a  simple  sort  as  the  other.  It  differs  from  the  former  in  that 
this  one  is  followed  by  the  after-shower  of  innumerable  vestigeal  im- 
pressions from  the  optic  and  other  associated  areas  which,  each  in 
turn,  affect  the  equilibrium  of  the  mechanism  of  consciousness.  We 
insist  that  there  must  be  in  this  ultimate  mechanism  of  consciousness 
an  absolute  succession.  A  wave  of  consciousness  in  the  sense  in 
which  it  is  postulated  by  James,  and  especially  by  Morgan,  is  incon- 
sistent with  any  conceivable  means  of  bringing  sense  impressions  to 
consciousness.  There  are,  it  is  true,  in  the  sense  content  of  vision 
audition  and  tactile  sense,  distinct  apparatuses  for  producing  focal  and 


DISCUSSION  AND  REPORTS.  195 

marginal  impressions.  These  are  associated  with  localization  and  are 
most  important  in  their  bearing  on  the  development  of  ideas  of  space, 
but  the  difference  between  them  is  one  of  degree  or  kind,  not  of  order  or 
succession,  and  would  afford  the  same  result  whether  reported  cotem- 
poraneously  or  successively.  Just,  then,  as  the  various  intensities  of 
sense  impressions  afford  a  basis  for  focal  and  marginal  sense  contents, 
so  a  perspective  of  vestiges  may  be  presented  to  consciousness,  but  we 
believe  it  a  false  use  of  analogy  to  claim  that  there  are  in  cotem- 
porary  consciousness  both  focal  and  marginal  elements. 

We  do  not  conceive  that  consciousness  is  bound  by  the  same  limi- 
itations  as  its  intermediary  mechanism,  nor  that  it  is  proper  to  apply  to 
it  the  predicates  of  succession  or  of  time,  but,  in  as  much  as  we  are 
concerned  with  the  intermediary  mechanism,  the  distinctions  here  in- 
sisted on  seem  to  us  important.1 

C.  L  HERRICK. 

DKNISON  UNIVERSITY. 


NATURAL  HISTORY  OF  THE  CRIMINAL. 

Permit  me  to  remark,  with  reference  to  Dr.  Hume's  review  of  my 
Naturgeschichte  des  Verbrechers  (p.  408,  Vol.  II.  of  the  REVIEW), 
that  its  author  seems  not  to  possess  sufficient  knowledge  of  the  Ger- 
man language  to  do  full  justice  to  a  German  author.  Only  on  this 
supposition  can  I  explain  his  remark  that  I  *  have  not  only  a  very 
slight  acquaintance  with  general  psychology, '  but  that  in  my  book 
*  there  are  references  of  contempt  for  those  branches  of  study. '  This 
latter  judgment  is  absolutely  erroneous ;  as  to  that,  I  refer  only  to  the 
great  number  of  books,  on  general  psychology  and  psychology  of 
ethics,  which  I  have  translated  from  the  originals  of  H.  Hoffding,  C. 
Lange,  H.  Ellis,  C.  Lombroso,  E.  Ferri,  and  others.  Before  expres- 
sing his  feeling  of  deep  disappointment  with  my  chapter  on  c  Crim- 
inal Psychology,'  Dr.  Hume  might  have  made  reference  to  the  pref- 
ace, where  I  said,  that  I  have  been  constrained  to  give  only  a  short 
sketch  of  the  fundamental  problems  of  '  Criminal  Psychology, '  hop- 
ing to  publish  later  my  researches  on  murderers,  vagabonds  and 
cheaters. 

Dr.  Hume's  imperfect  knowledge  reveals  itself  best  in  the  manner 
in  which  he  translates  the  title  of  the  book  :  Science  of  the  Criminal. 

1The  view  that  the  higher  orders  of  physical  coordination  are  especially 
provided  for  in  the  cortex  of  the  frontal  lobes  has  received  experimental  support 
through  the  researches  of  Bainchi.  See  Brain  :  IV.,  1895. 


196  THINKING,   FEELING,   DOING. 

I  have  not  the  least  idea  of  writing  on  the  '  Science  of  the  Criminal.' 
At  the  best  it  is  possible  to-day  to  give  only  the  outlines  of  a  'Natural 
History  of  the  Criminal,'  and  this  is  the  title  of  my  book. 

BRIEG.  DR.   KURELLA. 


THINKING,   FEELING,   DOING. 

A  review  of  my  book  in  the  last  volume  of  THE  PSYCHOLOGICAL 
REVIEW  has  come  to  my  notice.  It  contains  some  statements  that  are 
quite  misleading.  I  will  pass  over  the  injustice  done  to  a  book  when 
its  material  and  its  form  are  criticised  according  to  a  standard  with 
which  it  has  absolutely  no  relation ;  it  is  a  cheap  and  frequent  method 
of  exhibiting  a  young  critic's  superiority  to  judge  a  popular  book  as  if 
it  were  intended  to  be  a  scientific  treatise  for  the  strictest  specialists.  I 
am,  however,  entitled  to  protest  against  the  attempt  to  make  it  appear 
that  my  book  is  merely  an  adaptation  of  Wundt  without  proper  credit. 
Your  reviewer,  for  example,  complains  that,  after  stating  that  I  am 
about  to  quote  a  few  pages  from  Wundt,  I  put  quotation  marks  around 
a  couple  paragraphs  only.  To  any  careful  reader  the  text  shows  quite 
clearly  that  whereas  the  material  is  quoted  from  Wundt,  there  are 
minor  changes  and  condensations  in  expression  such  as  to  render 
quotation  marks  not  allowable  except  where  used.  At  any  rate,  when 
an  author  expressly  states  that  he  is  about  to  quote  a  few  pages,  it  is 
but  fair  to  take  him  at  his  word,  whether  he  uses  quotation  marks  or 
not.  The  critic  again  speaks  of  other  quotations  from  Wundt  with- 
out reference.  These  reduce  to  two  paragraphs  of  pure  matter  of  fact 
which  were  taken  from  Wundt,  but  which  were  scarcely  entitled  to  a 
reference,  as  they  consisted  of  the  merest  every  day  matters  with  no 
original  thought.  If  the  reader  will  only  turn  to  the  book  itself  he 
will  find  that  I  have  given  to  Wundt  and  his  books  about  all  the 
credit  a  man  can  give. 

Finally,  the  worst  injustice  of  this  attempt  to  make  it  appear  that 
not  enough  credit  is  given  to  the  master  lies  in  the  disregard  of 
facts  like  the  following :  The  preface  speaks  of  Wundt  as  *  the 
greatest  of  psychologists ; '  the  first  chapter  quotes  him  repeatedly ; 
two  other  chapters  contain  special  quotations ;  to  the  necessary  rule  of 
1  no  references '  an  exception  was  made  in  favor  of  Wundt's  Vorles- 
ungen;  the  only  footnote  reference  allowed  in  the  book  calls  particu- 
lar attention  to  a  translation  of  Wundt ;  and  finally  the  last  chapter 
contains  a  biography  of  Wundt  with  a  bibliography  of  his  works  and 


DISCUSSION  AND  REPORTS.  197 

the  brightest  tribute  to  his  genius  that  the  author  could  think  of.  It 
seems  to  me  that  I  could  hardly  have  done  more  to  express  the  obliga- 
tions of  my  book  and  myself  to  him.  In  fact,  I  intended  to  make  the 
book  a  popular  tribute  to  his  genius  and  an  acknowledgment  of  my 
obligations  to  him.  I  am  happy  to  say  that  the  tribute  has  been  ac- 
cepted with  the  kindest  expressions  from  the  master,  and  I  sincerely 
trust  that  the  large  sale  of  the  book  has  carried  the  news  of  his  fame 
into  nearly  every  American  household. 

E.  W.  SCRIPTURE. 

This  acknowledgment  to  Wundt  is  both  timely  and  honorable. 
The  reviewer  must  have  been  very  stupid,  as  well  as  young  and  supe- 
rior, for  apparently  he  failed  to  make  intelligible  the  most  important  part 
of  his  criticism.  Messrs.  Creighton  and  Titchener  are  the  gentlemen 
to  whom  above  all  others  explanations  and  apologies  are  due.  But 
their  names  do  not  appear  here.  Possibly  they  will  feel,  however, 
that  Dr.  Scripture's  explanation  is  sufficiently  luminous  and  inclusive 
to  be  satisfactory  without  any  definite  mention  of  them.  And  any- 
way, forbearance  will  be  a  necessary  virtue.  For  the  book  by  taking 
icfuge  in  'nearly  every  American  household'  has  obviously  outrun 
all  possbility  of  successful  pursuit. 

JAMES  R.  ANGELL. 


PSYCHOLOGICAL  LITERATURE. 

The  Growth  of  the  Brain :  A.  Study  of  the  Nervous  System  in 
Relation  to  Educatian.  By  H.  H.  DONALDSON,  London, 
Walter  Scott.  New  York,  Charles  Scribner's  Sons.  Pp.  365. 

This  book  has  been  written  with  such  complete  appreciation  of 
the  requirements  of  the  best  scientific  method,  and  the  author  has 
shown  such  untiring  patience  in  collecting  and  analyzing  all  the  facts 
which  could  be  made  useful,  that  he  deserves  to  have  ascribed  to  him 
that  besoin  de  la  verite  which  Louis  speaks  of  as  a  so  much  rarer  gift 
than  the  taste  for  scientific  investigation,  with  which  so  many  set  out 
on  their  work.  The  only  real  criticism  which  we  have  to  make  is 
that  the  range  of  subjects  is  so  great  that  the  reader,  unless  well  versed 
in  the  literature  of  neurology  and  anthropology,  must  find  his  progress 
slow  and  laborious.  The  style  is  clear,  but  the  statements  are,  neces- 
sarily, concise  and  condensed.  The  very  richness  in  data  which  makes 
the  book  so  valuable,  also  makes  it  one  of  which  it  is  difficult  to  give 
any  adequate  sketch  within  the  short  space  of  a  review.  As  giving 
an  idea  of  the  wealth  of  material  utilized,  it  may  be  noted  that  no  less 
than  sixty-four  tables  of  figures  are  reproduced  and  studied. 

How  may  we  best  hope  so  to  modify  the  nervous  systems  of  indi- 
viduals and  races  that  the  work  which  they  do  will  be  more  and  more 
effective?  This  is  the  question  for  which  Dr.  Donaldson  would  be 
glad  to  find  an  answer,  but  he  recognizes,  more  clearly  than  do  the 
eager  parents,  teachers  and  physicians  to  whom  the  same  problem 
presents  itself,  that  before  we  can  approach  the  solution  we  must 
learn  to  know  under  what  laws  the  development  of  the  nervous 
system  normally  goes  on  and  what  the  conditions  are  that  make  the 
brain  a  better  organ,  independently  of  education. 

Neither  the  brilliant  achievements  of  formal  education  nor  the  prog- 
ress that  civilized  races  have  made  in  their  pursuit  of  knowledge  are 
a  sufficient  warrant  that  a  superior  and  better  type  of  brain  is  being 
created.  ''Knowledge  comes,  for  the  hindrances  to  knowledge  are 
in  a  large  measure  from  without,  but  wisdom,  as  heretofore,  continues 
to  linger,  and  still  to  occupy  its  place  as  the  rare  performance  of  the 
balanced  brain." 
198 


PSYCHOLOGICAL   LITERATURE.  199 

The  first  chapter  contains  a  concise  statement  of  the  best  biological 
researches  in  the  study  of  growth.  The  whole  of  this  is  important, 
especially  so  is  the  reminder  that,  in  the  human  nervous  system  at 
least,  the  production  of  new  cells  ceases  some  time  before  birth,  and 
that  the  rate  of  growth,  which,  after  birth,  depends  on  the  increase  in 
size  of  cells,  diminishes  rapidly  from  birth  onward  (Minot  and 
others).  But  though  no  new  cells  are  formed  after  birth,  the  capacity 
for  physiological  development  is  not  quite  so  fatally  restricted  as  one 
might  imagine,  since  there  is  always  a  reserve  of  nerve  elements 
which  do  not,  in  the  first  instance,  fully  develop,  but  remain  capable, 
to  a  certain  extent,  of  subsequent  change. 

The  life  of  any  individual  is  practically  a  process  of  adaptation  to 
surroundings,  and  this  is  marked  at  every  point  by  a  specialization  of 
function,  which  leads  eventually,  when  the  power  or  adaptation  be- 
comes less,  to  impairment  of  coordinated  activity  and  finally  to  death. 
It  is  not  improbable  that  a  law  of  this  sort  governs  the  life  not  only  of 
individuals,  but  of  species. 

The  special  study  of  the  growth  of  the  brain  is  introduced  by  a 
brief  but  excellent  analysis  of  the  observations  through  which  the 
laws  of  growth  of  the  body  as  a  whole  have  been  ascertained,  and 
then  the  relative  growth  of  the  different  parts  of  the  body  is  studied, 
with  constant  comparison  of  males  and  females.  The  writer's  search- 
ing review  of  the  various  researches  upon  the  weight  of  the  brain  and 
spinal  cord  at  different  ages,  in  the  different  sexes,  and  as  related  to 
size  of  the  body  and  to  intellectual  eminence,  will  long  be  consulted  as 
an  impartial  statement  of  the  case,  although,  as  he  says,  it  is  plain 
that  the  facts  * '  contribute  mainly  to  a  healthy  scepticism  concerning 
the  current  interpretations  of  brain  weight."  It  is  impossible  to  judge 
by  the  scales  alone  about  the  intellectual  capacity  of  a  given  person, 
or  even  whether  he  was  healthy,  criminal  or  insane.  Where  the 
weight  falls  below  a  certain  minimal  point,  indeed,  we  are  justified  in 
assuming  a  defective  mind,  but  here  questions  of  structure  come  in 
which  the  author  next  proceeds  to  study. 

It  has  already  been  pointed  out  that  growth  consists  partly  of  cell 
multiplication,  partly  of  an  increase  in  the  size  of  the  cells.  A  care- 
ful estimate  shows  that  at  the  end  of  the  first  twelve  weeks  of  foetal 
life  the  volume  of  the  nervous  system  is  about  2.25  cm.  cm.  By  this 
time  the  number  of  nerve  elements,  or  neuroblasts,  has  pretty  much 
reached  its  limit,  which  is  somewhere  near  three  thousand  million. 
The  volume  of  the  adult  nervous  system  may  be  estimated  as  1005  cm. 
cm.,  and,  therefore,  the  average  increase  of  size  of  each  neuroblast  is 


200  THE  GROWTH  OF  THE  BRAIN. 

nearly  five  hundred  times,  though  in  fact  the  increase  in  the  case  of 
of  many  of  them  is  many  times  as  great  as  this. 

"The  determination  of  the  number  of  neuroblasts  occurs  so  early 
in  the  history  of  the  individual,  and  under  such  uniform  conditions, 
-that  it  is  very  difficult  to  regard  the  environment  as  possessed  of  much 
power  to  cause  variation  in  this  respect,  and  for  this  reason,  among 
members  of  the  same  race  a  high  degree  of  constancy  in  this  character 
is  to  be  anticipated.  The  influence  of  the  surrounding  conditions  be- 
comes much  more  effective  during  the  later  stages  of  development 
that  accompany  the  enlargements  of  the  elements  already  formed,  and 
it  is  during  this  period  that  adaptive  modifications  may  occur."  (p. 
162.) 

In  the  next  chapter  the  following  significant  questions  are  asked 
and  provisionally  answered : 

"i.  By  what  means  does  the  brain  of  the  new-born  attain  the 
weight  found  in  the  adult,  and  decrease  again  during  old  age?" 

The  greatest  factor  in  both  the  increase  and  the  decrease  is  the 
gain  and  loss  affecting  the  medullary  substance  which  surrounds  the 
processes  of  the  nerve  cell. 

44 2.  Why  do  tall  persons  have  heavier  brains?" 

This  is  probably  due  to  increase  in  the  size  of  the  nervous  and  non- 
nervous  elements  arising  from  the  greater  cranial  space  allotted  them 
for  growth. 

44  3.  What  significance  is  to  be  attatched  to  the  fact  that  the  brain- 
weight  is  different  in  different  races  ?"  The  provisional  picture  to  be 
formed  of  the  brains  belonging  to  those  races  least  capable  mentally 
is  that  of  one  in  which  the  number  of  cell  elements  is  approximately 
similar  to  that  in  the  most  capable  races;  but  many  of  these  elements 
being  but  partially  developed,  the  organization  of  the  brain  is  less  per- 
fect, though  the  size  is  not  thereby  greatly  reduced. 

44  4.  What  significance  is  to  be  attached  to  the  difference  in  brain 
weight  existing  between  men  and  women?"  (and  found,  strangely 
enough,  even  among  the  defective  classes.) 

This  difference  must  depend  on  the  fact  that  the  structural  ele- 
ments in  the  encephalon  of  the  female  are  smaller  than  those  in  the 
male,  and  it  is  probable  that,  other  things  being  equal,  the  larger  cells 
have  more  stored  up  energy  and  permit  of  more  complete  organiza- 
tion. 

The  writer  then  gives  a  summary  of  the  architecture  and  structure 
of  the  brain  and  cord  which  is  full  of  interest.  It  hardly  admits  of 
analysis  in  a  short  review.  In  the  course  of  it  he  refers  to  his  own 
careful  investigation  of  the  brain  of  Laura  Bridgman. 


PSYCHOLOGICAL  LITERATURE.  2OI 

The  chapters  of  most  interest  to  the  educator  are  those  in  which 
the  physiological  rhythms  which  characterize  the  nervous  functions  are 
dwelt  upon  at  some  length ;  then  those  which  deal  with  fatigue  and 
old  age.  The  two  final  chapters  are  devoted  to  the  study  of  education 
and  to  the  statement  of  the  '  wider  view.'  These  deserve  to  be  read 
in  detail,  and  the  reviewer  will  think  his  task  sufficiently  well  per- 
formed if  he  has  indicated  on  how  wide  a  basis  of  positive  data  Dr. 
Donaldson's  moderate  but  interesting  practical  conclusions  are  built 
up.  JAMES  J.  PUTNAM. 

HARVARD  MEDICAL  SCHOOL. 

Mental  Development  in  the  Child  and  the  Race:  Methods  and 
Processes.  JAMES  MARK  BALDWIN.  New  York,  Macmillan  & 
Co.  1895.  (2d  edition,  1895.)  Pp.  xvi+496. 

Professor  Baldwin's  most  recent  book  has  already  received  much 
attention,  and  hardly  needs  introduction  to  the  readers  of  this  REVIEW. 
The  volume  is  founded  upon  essays  previously  published ;  but  in  its 
wholeness  it  is  an  essentially  new  piece  of  work,  which  constitutes, 
so  far,  its  author's  most  mature  and  original  contribution  to  his  sci- 
ence. It  contains  an  uncommon  union  of  decidedly  special,  em- 
pirical observations  with  comparatively  recondite  and  very  far-reach- 
ing evolutionary  speculations.  The  present  reviewer,  as  himself  pro- 
fessionally disposed  to  the  speculative,  may  very  properly  give  his  at- 
tention mainly  to  the  latter  aspect  of  the  book,  although  well  recog- 
nizing the  high  merits  of  the  other  aspect. 

In  its  literary  character  this  work,  always  as  to  all  the  details  of 
the  exposition  pleasantly  and  stimulatingly  written,  is  still  in  some  of 
its  most  important  features  disappointingly  obscure.  Professor  Bald- 
win's habit  of  referring  to  coming  chapters  for  the  explanation  of  the 
points  that  his  present  argument  leaves  unelucidated  is  too  insistent, 
and  has  caused  perplexity  to  more  readers  than  one.  Perhaps  an  au- 
thor who  deals  especially  with  the  phenomena  of  'accommodation* 
may  be  doing  well  to  enable  the  reader  to  make  numerous  subjective 
observations  of  the  accommodation  process  while  getting  used  to  a 
novel  and  complex  train  of  thought ;  but  has  not  Professor  Baldwin 
gone  in  this  respect  too  far  ?  To  be  sure  he  can  be,  and  often  is,  so 
clear,  especially  as  to  the  single  sentence,  illustration  or  argumenta- 
tive point,  that  we  are  often  most  of  all  baffled  in  trying  to  make  out 
why  it  is  that  just  the  connected  whole,  the  unity,  the  total  bearing  of 
his  reasoning,  long  escapes  our  close  attention.  Yet  the  result,  when 
we  get  it,  repays  a  good  deal  of  trouble. 


202  MENTAL  DEVELOPMENT. 

How  does  an  organism  come  to  make  novel  adjustments  ?  How 
can  new  habits  of  a  useful  kind  get  formed?  How  can  mind  grow? 
What  is  the  basis  for  the  organization  of  experience,  viewed  as  novel 
experience?  In  fine,  how  is  'accommodation'  to  be  psychologically 
and  biologically  explained,  in  the  individual* and  in  the  race?  Here  is 
the  central  problem  about  which  Professor  Baldwin's  evolutionary 
speculations  are  grouped.  Of  old  the  organization  of  experience,  as 
studied  by  the  psychologists  who  followed  in  Locke's  footsteps,  and 
who  developed  the  association  psychology,  meant  primarily  the  group- 
ing of  the  impressions  and  ideas,  or  of  the  Herbartian  Vorstellungen, 
viewed  as  data  received,  retained  and  associated.  That  the  experience 
of  the  mind  influences  conduct  was  regarded  as  a  matter  of  relatively  sec- 
ondary import  in  the  study  of  mental  growth.  But  nowadays  the 
psychologist  is  dissatisfied  with  confining  his  attention  to  these  mental 
data,  in  so  far  as  they  merely  come  to  the  mind.  One  observes  that 
the  experience  of  a  live  creature  is  useful  to  the  possessor  only  in  so 
far  as  this  experience  influences  the  movements,  organizes  the  conduct, 
calls  forth  or  adapts  the  adjustments  of  the  creature  itself ;  and  since 
Spencer's  Psychology  the  problem  of  the  organization  of  mental  ex- 
perience has  been  inseparable  from  the  evolutionary  problem  regarding 
the  acquisition  of  serviceable  motor  habits  upon  the  basis  of  sensory 
stimulations.  Every  evolutionary  psychologist  attempts  more  or  less 
elaborately  and  explicitly  to  trace  the  beginnings  and  the  growth  of 
mentally  significant  adaptations,  and  to  correlate  what  we  know  of 
mental  processes  with  such  adaptations.  In  this  field  the  well-known 
hypotheses  relate,  on  the  one  hand,  to  the  influence  of  natural  selection 
upon  the  evolution  of  mentally  significant  capacities  for  motor  adjust- 
ment, and,  on  the  other  hand,  to  the  variously  interpreted  relations  of 
pleasurable  and  painful  stimulation  to  the  modification  of  motor  pro- 
cessses. 

Professor  Baldwin's  contribution  to  this  discussion  may  be  briefly 
indicated,  but  cannot  be  quite  fairly  developed  within  the  present 
limits.  After  devoting  considerable  attention  (p.  180  sqq.)  to  an  ar- 
gument showing  that  the  experience  of  the  pleasurable  or  painful  re- 
sults of  movements  once  made  cannot  be  relied  upon  as  a  factor  suffi- 
cient to  explain  the  way  whereby  an  organism  not  already  provided 
with  useful  motor  adjustments  may  acquire  such  adjustments,  Pro- 
fessor Baldwin  proceeds  henceforth,  in  his  speculations,  upon  the 
postulate  that,  in  order  to  explain  the  origin  of  specific  accommoda- 
tions, i.  e.,  of  definitely  useful  motor  adjustments,  "a  theory  of  adap- 
tation must  have  reference  to  the  repetition  of  stimulations,  funda- 


PSYCHOLOGICAL   LITERATURE.  203 

mentally,  not  of  movements"  (p.  451).  One  must  suppose,  namely, 
that,  in  advance  of  all  definite  habits  of  motor  adjustment,  and  in  the 
absence  of  inherited  tendencies  to  definite  acts,  a  virgin  organism  (if 
we  may  use  the  phrase) — one  standing  at  the  outset  of  the  evolution- 
ary process — possesses  just  one,  highly  generalized,  but  essentially 
plastic  motor  tendency,  whose  origin  (p.  203  et  passim)  one  must 
refer  to  natural  selection.  This  is  the  twofold  tendency  to  expand  in 
the  presence  of  stimulations  which  exalt,  and  to  contract  in  the  pres- 
ence of  those  stimuli  which  depress  vitality.  That  such  simple  reac- 
tions to  the  presence  of  light,  of  food  and  of  injurious  objects  exist  and 
are  universal  amongst  organisms  of  even  the  lowliest  type  is  well 
known.  The  present  theory  supposes  that  the  stimulations  which 
cause  expansion  are  pleasurable,  and  that  those  which  cause  contrac- 
tion are  painful.  But  now  the  expansion  tendency  is  the  representa- 
tive of  a  vital  'excess,'  an  overflow  of  energy.  From  its  nature  it 
tends  to  lead  the  organism  in  question  nearer  to  the  source  of  the 
advantageous  stimulation,  and  hereby  it  tends  to  produce  a  '  repeti- 
tion' of  this  stimulation,  which  again  results  in  further  excess,  and  in 
more  movements  of  the  same  sort.  This  tendency  to  move  so 
as  to  secure  a  repetition  of  the  favorable  stimulus  involves,  however, 
at  every  step,  by  reason  of  the  very  excess  which  is  essential  to  the 
process,  relatively  novel  movements.  If  these  new  movements,  in 
so  far  as  painful  accidents  do  not  check  their  appearance,  tend  to 
get  fixed,  as  they  do,  in  the  form  of  habits,  the  organism,  wherever  it 
is  exposed,  thereafter,  to  new  stimuli,  will  now  be  no  longer  virgin. 
For,  in  addition  to  its  original  and  generalized  tendency  to  expansion 
and  contraction,  it  will  henceforth  have  definite  tendencies  to  certain 
movements.  The  nature  of  these  movements,  in  view  of  their  origin, 
and  in  view  of  the  fact  that  all  pain-giving  or  even  useless  accidental 
accompaniments  of  the  excess  process  have  tended  to  be  excised  by  the 
original  tendencies  to  draw  back  from  the  painful,  and  to  emphasize 
the  pleasurable  stimuli,  will  be  such  that  the  newly  acquired  move- 
ments will  be  apt  to  repeat  stimuli  of  a  certain  type.  Henceforth 
the  now  trained  organism  will  more  and  more  tend  to  this  type  of 
4  circular  reaction,'  moving  in  the  presence  of  certain  types  of  stimuli 
so  as  to  repeat  or  to  enforce  them ;  moving  in  the  presence  of  other 
stimuli  (viz.  painful  stimuli)  so  as  to  avoid  repeating  them.  Upon 
this  '  circular '  type  of  reaction,  as  Professor  Baldwin  ingeniously  in- 
sists, the  remainder  of  the  process  of  mental  evolution  is  founded. 
This  is  the  type  to  which,  as  readers  of  Professor  Baldwin's  remark- 
able paper  in  Mind  and  readers  of  this  REVIEW  well  know,  our 


204  MENTAL  DEVELOPMENT. 

author  applies  the  general  name  imitation.  Every  new  type  of  imita- 
tive or  circular  reaction  once  thus  acquired  becomes  a  basis  for  further 
modification  or  adaptation  through  the  influence  of  new  stimulations, 
whose  effectiveness,  in  all  pleasurable  cases,  will  be  ensured  through 
the  very  existence  of  the  repetition  tendency  itself.  On  high  levels 
the  circular  reaction  appears  as  the  act  of  attention,  whereby  the  effect 
of  a  given  stimulation  is,  through  repetition,  so  heightened  as  to  en- 
sure its  effectiveness  in  causing  accommodations.  "  In  general"  (p. 
179)  "the  law  of  excess  may  be  stated,"  says  Professor  Baldwin, 
"somewhat  as  follows:  The  accommodation  of  an  organism  to  a 
new  situation  is  secured,  apart  from  happy  accidents,  by  the  continued 
or  repeated  action  of  that  stimulation,  and  this  repetition  is  secured, 
not  by  the  selection  beforehand  of  this  stimulation,  nor  by  its  fortuitous 
occurrence  alone,  but  by  the  proximate  reinstatement  of  it  by  a  dis- 
charge of  the  energies  of  the  organism,  concentrated  as  far  as  may  be 
for  the  excessive  stimulation  of  the  organs  most  nearly  fitted  by  former 
habit  to  get  this  stimulation  again."  Granted  the  repetition,  and  the 
accompanying  excess,  then  the  organism  gets  adapted  '  by  chance  ad- 
justments occurring  among  excessive  diffused  movements'  (p.  198)  ; 
since  the  process  of  repetition  tends  to  favor  these  movements,  so  that 
ere  long  they  become  habits. 

A  crucial  case  for  this  theory  of  the  acquisition  of  new  fashions  of 
movement  is  furnished  by  the  phenomena  which  (p.  373)  first  at- 
tracted our  author's  personal  attention  to  the  considerations  that  now 
have  taken  form  in  his  theory.  These  are  the  phenomena  of  the  rise 
of  volition  in  the  child.  Volition,  our  author  insists,  is  a  phenome- 
non, at  the  outset,  of  'persistent  imitation,'  of  the  'try-try-again'  ten- 
dency of  the  child.  In  so  far  as  an  organism  inherits  tendencies 
which  early,  under  the  influence  of  pleasure-pain  experiences,  get 
welded,  without  deliberation,  into  even  complex  movements,  such  as 
are  involved  in  holding  the  head  erect  (p.  390),  Professor  Baldwin 
does  not  consider  these  cases  of  volition.  The  acts  that  thus  early  get 
established  may,  by  reason  of  the  generally  imitative  character  which 
all  the  organic  responses  to  the  environment  must  possess,  appear,  in 
children,  as  simple  imitations.  But  these  simple  imitations,  acts 
which,  without  deliberation,  tend  to  reproduce  given  stimuli,  are  not 
yet  voluntary.  On  the  other  hand,  in  the  case  of  the  '  persistent  imita- 
tions,' the  child  has  a  model  before  it,  and  is  first  stimulated  by  this 
model  to  an  act  of  more  or  less  inaccurate  involuntary  imitation. 
Hereupon,  however,  the  child  is  dissatisfied  with  the  presented  con- 
trast that  now  appears  between  its  model  and  this  imperfect  imitation. 


PSYCHOLOGICAL  LITERATURE.  205 

The  dissatisfaction  gets  expressed  in  an  intensely  attentive  tendency 
to  watch  the  objective  model,  and  to  repeat  with  variations  the  imita- 
tive act.  The  resulting  process  of  trial  and  error  may  be  a  very  ex- 
tended one,  the  attention  to  this  process  may  be  long  repeated,  until 
at  last  the  imitation  comes  to  resemble  the  model  enough  to  satisfy  the 
child.  This  process  constitutes,  in  Professor  Baldwin's  account,  the 
first  appearance  of  true  volition,  since  here  is  an  ideal,  long  attentively 
held  before  consciousness,  and  the  gradual  and  persistent  adjustment 
of  means  to  ends. 

These  being,  according  to  our  author,  the  observed  facts,  it 
remains  still  to  indicate  the  theory  of  the  process  of  persistent  imi- 
tation. Why  this  strained  attention,  this  long  pursuit  of  the  ideal, 
and  why — here  is,  of  course,  the  more  difficult  question — why  and 
how  does  this  process  of  persistent  variation  of  the  first  response  to  the 
model  gradually  tend  to  the  establishment  of  acts  which  actually  re- 
peat the  model  more  closely  than  the  first  act  did  ? 

Professor  Baldwin's  theory  as  to  this  matter  is  best  stated  on  page 
453 :  "In  persistent  imitation  the  first  reaction  is  not  repeated. 
Hence  we  must  suppose  the  development  of  a  function  of  coordination 
by  which  the  two  regions  excited  by  the  original  suggestion  and  the 
reaction  Jirst  made  coalesce  in  a  common  more  'voluminous  and  in- 
tense stimulation  of  the  motor  centre.  A  movement  is  thus  pro- 
duced which,  by  reason  of  its  greater  mass  and  diffusion,  includes 
more  of  the  elements  of  the  movement  seen  and  copied.  This  is 
again  reported  by  eye  or  ear,  giving  a  new  excitement,  which  is  again 
coordinated  with  the  original  stimulation,  and  with  the  after-effects  of 
the  earlier  imitations.  The  result  is  yet  another  motor  stimulation  or 
effort  of  still  greater  mass  and  diffusion,  which  includes  yet  more  ele- 
ments of  the  *  copy.'  And  so  on,  until  simply  by  its  increased  mass, 
including  the  motor  excitement  of  attention  itself,  by  the  greater 
range  and  variety  of  the  motor  elements  thus  enervated,  in  short,  by 
the  excess  discharge  the  <  copy '  is  completely  reproduced.  This,  it  is 
evident,  is  just  the  principle  of  '  excess,'  and  it  is  very  easy  to  find  in 
it  the  origin  of  the  attention.  The  attention  is  the  mental  function 
corresponding  to  the  habitual  motor  coordination  of  the  processes  of 
heightened  or  'excess'  discharge." 

In  this  conception,  it  will  be  noted,  the  general  theory  of  excess,  as 
stated  above,  is  applied  to  the  special  case  of  volition,  by  the  hypoth- 
esis that  the  being  who  possesses  the  power  to  acquire  voluntary  skill 
differs  from  beings  lower  in  the  scale  by  the  presence,  in  his  case,  of 
centers  of  coordination  where  the  continuation  of  the  stimulus  that 


206  MENTAL  DEVELOPMENT. 

produced  the  primary  or  simple  imitation  meets,  later,  with  the  result- 
ing stimulus  due  to  the  perception  of  the  imperfect  copy.  The  result 
of  this  meeting  is  a  new  and  more  intense  motor  stimulation,  invol- 
ving at  once  attention  and  diffused  new  motor  processes.  That  some 
of  these  new  motor  processes  result  in  agreement  with  '  more  ele- 
ments '  of  the  model  is  due  simply  to  the  fact  that  they  are  more 
numerous  and  diffuse  than  were  the  motor  processes  of  the  first  imita- 
tion. And  volition  is  now  present,  just  because  volition  involves  an 
element  of  persistent  anticipation  of  a  complex  act  that,  when  it  conies, 
is  to  realize  an  ideal. 

The  natural  question  arises  here,  as  in  Professor  Baldwin's  other 
discussions  of  the  results  of  the  excess  process,  why  it  is  that,  when  the 
successful  imitation  at  last  results  from  this  process  of  excessive  stim- 
ulation, the  unnecessary  or  unfitting  portions  of  the  motor  excess  fall 
away.  While  the  child  is  learning,  in  this  persistent  imitation,  the 
essence  of  the  process,  according  to  the  theory,  is  that  the  stimulation 
of  the  '  coordination-center, '  through  the  combined  sensory  effects  of 
the  model  and  of  the  resulting  imperfect  efforts  to  imitate  it,  leads  to 
excessively  diffuse  movements,  some  of  which,  by  virtue  of  the  mere 
diffusion,  tend  to  produce  results  agreeing  with  the  model.  But  since 
many  of  these  diffuse  movements  of  excess  (such  as  kicking,  tongue- 
movements,  and  the  like  incidents  of  the  strain  of  learning)  do  not 
tend  to  make  successful  copies  of  the  model,  why  do  they  later  disap- 
pear and  leave  the  successful  imitative  deed  to  become  a  settled  hab- 
itual acquisition? 

Professor  Baldwin's  response  to  this  question  is  (p.  445,  cf.  p.  377) 
that  "When  muscular  effort  thus  succeeds,  by  the  simple  fact  of  in- 
creased mass  and  diffusion  of  reaction,  the  useless  elements  fall  away 
because  they  have  no  emphasis."  Or,  as  p.  377  states  the  case,  'the 
useless  elements  fall  away  because  they  are  useless.'  It  seems  plain 
that  considerations  equally  undeveloped  govern  our  author  wherever 
he  speaks  of  that  elimination  of  the  useless  or  unadaptive  elements  of 
the  excess-discharge  which  all  grades  of  the  process  of  accommodation, 
from  the  lowest  up,  appear  to  involve.  Surely  the  very  nature  of  the 
excess-discharge,  in  advance  of  definite  adaptation,  must  be  that  it  gen- 
erally involves  useless  reactions  quite  as  probably  as  useful  reactions. 
The  only  apparent  exception  to  this  would  be  furnished  by  the  prim- 
itive expansion  movements  noticed  above.  They,  it  may  be  said, 
inevitably  involve  a  tendency  to  reinforce  their  stimulation,  and  to  con- 
tinue its  presence,  because  the  expanded  organism  will,  as  such,  offer 
more  surface  to  the  source  of  stimulation.  But  as  soon  as  one  passes 


PSYCHOLOGICAL  LITERATURE.  207 

from  this  primitive  state  to  the  case  of  an  organism  having  activities 
already  complex,  adaptation  through  the  chance  results  of  excess  will 
apparently  occur  only  in  connection  with  the  initiation  of  many  una 
daptive  movements,  which  will  need  to  be  eliminated  whenever  the 
accommodation  can  become  perfect.  If  one  writhes  or  kicks  in  learn 
ing  to  draw,  a  positive  theory  is  needed  to  account  for  the  rapidity 
with  which  these  unnecessary  movements  fall  away  after  the  occur- 
rence of  the  successful  imitation ;  or,  even  before  that  occurrence,  since 
one  must  take  theoretical  account  of  the  further  fact  that  such  excess- 
movements  generally  oppose  the  attainment  of  an  accurate  imitation, 
and  must,  therefore,  in  part,  be  eliminated  before  the  first  accurate 
imitation  can  occur. 

Of  course  the  elimination  of  painful  and  of  positively  unsatisfac- 
tory movement  is  used  by  Professor  Baldwin  as  a  coordinate  factor  in 
this  process  of  the  reduction  of  the  excess  to  its  due  form  (see  p.  143). 
But  this  does  not  of  itself  explain  the  inhibition  of  such  useless  ele- 
ments of  the  excess  as  are  not  directly  felt  to  be  in  themselves  unsatis- 
factory. Yet  such  elements  might  be  not  only  present,  but  actually 
injurious  to  the  imitation.  An  awkward  man  tries  fo  acquire  a  new 
imitative  art.  He  reacts  to  his  model,  and  then  observes  the  inade- 
quacy of  his  first  imitation.  The  perception  of  the  incongruity  excites 
his  coordinating  centers.  The  result  is  a  new  set  of  efforts,  which 
may  involve  numerous  excess-movements.  Of  these  some  will  of 
themselves  tend  'to  include  more  elements'  of  the  model.  But  some 
of  them,  perhaps  most  of  them,  will  not  only  be  superfluous,  but  will 
also  actually  stand  in  the  way  of  the  accomplishment  of  the  desired 
aim.  For,  if  the  model  is  at  once  complex  and  definite,  inhibition  of 
the  unnecessary  will  be  an  essential  part,  and,  in  most  cases,  a  prelim- 
inary, of  the  first  success.  The  immediate  result  will  so  far  be  that  in- 
creased effort,  in  advance  of  inhibition,  will  mean  failure.  The  4  more 
elements '  of  the  right  sort  will  be  so  mixed  with  '  more  elements ' 
which  lead  astray,  that  the  total  results  will  perhaps  be  no  gain  in  ac- 
curacy. Now,  if  the  awkward  man  can  himself  analyze  his  act  and 
discover  that  the  inhibition  of  certain  superfluous  elements  would  en- 
sure success,  then,  but  only  then,  will  these  superfluous  acts  become,  by 
association,  disagreeable  to  him,  as  hindering  his  ideal,  and  meaning 
failure.  Thereupon  the  elimination  of  these  elements  will  become 
easy  to  him.  But  surely  a  learner  who  can  analyze  the  source  of  his 
own  failure  has  already  come  to  stand  high,  through  previous  suc- 
cess, in  the  imitative  art.  On  the  other  hand,  the  really  awkward  man 
may  easily  be  sensitive  enough  to  be  dissatisfied  with  his  failure,  and 


208  MENTAL  DEVELOPMENT. 

yet  may  be  unable  to  analyze  the  cause  of  his  failure.  He  makes,  in 
one  act  of  persistent  imitation,  superfluous  efforts  and  useful  efforts. 
Who  is  to  tell  him  which  of  his  efforts  are  the  superfluous  ones? 
What  influence  is,  in  advance  of  success,  to  overcome,  to  inhibit,  the 
hindering  elements  of  the  excess-process  ?  Their  own  disagreeableness 
as  hindering  elements.  But  it  is  for  him,  unless  he  is  already  skillful 
enough  to  analyze,  only  the  total  result  whose  failure  is  disagreeable. 
The  superfluous  parts,  by  themselves,  cannot  appear  to  him,  sepa- 
rately, disagreeable  enough  to  get  inhibited,  unless  some  preestab- 
lished  harmony  makes  them  so.  The  awkward  man  will  try  and  try 
again,  with  excess  and  failure  constantly  attendant  upon  his  efforts. 
The  more  he  strains,  the  more  superfluous  efforts  will  he  make,  until 
the  whole  process  ceases  in  painful  exhaustion.  Here  there  will  be 
no  necessary  tendency  of  excess  to  secure  ultimate  success. 

Now  this  is  no  merely  imaginary  case.  This  is  the  process  of 
failure  in  many  instances  of  industrious  awkwardness.  This  is  what 
happens  when  we  think  vainly  over  our  problems,  and  yet  get  no  re- 
sult. This  is  what  happens  to  the  socially  awkward,  who  attempt 
social  enterprises  only  to  get  more  and  more  lost  in  the  chaos  of  their 
own  excessive  efforts.  This  in  particular  is  what  happens  in  our  per- 
sonal relations  to  the  people  with  whom,  despite  our  best  efforts,  we 
*  cannot  get  on.'  In  trying  to  conform  to  their  ways  we  attempt 
useless  acts  of  conciliation,  make  ineffective  chance  remarks,  compli- 
cate our  relations  through  unnecessary  explanations,  and  yet  can 
never  quite  find  out  what  it  is  that  makes  us  go  wrong.  The  excess 
reactions  then,  as  such,  need  not  involve  useful  plus  merely  super- 
fluous reactions  that  will  not  positively  hinder  success.  The  excess  re- 
actions may,  and  often  do,  involve  a  union,  that  is  for  the  striving 
learner  unanalyzable,  of  useful  and  of  positively  hindering  acts.  The 
question  here  is  what  magic  in  advance  of  success  is  to  ensure  the 
inhibition  of  the  elements  of  hindrance  thus  involved  in  the  excess  dis- 
charged ? 

But  does  one  reply,  with  Professor  Baldwin,  that  actual  observation 
of  the  child's  imitative  successes  shows,  first  the  excess  reactions,  and 
then  the  inhibition  of  the  superfluous  elements  ?  Hereupon  one  can 
but  retort  that  the  very  problem  of  the  acquisition  of  new  habits  is : 
How  do  these  inhibitions  of  the  superfluous  elements  take  place? 
Does  one  say  :  Success  is  sometimes  possible  ?  The  obvious  retort  is, 
What  particular  factor  leads  to  success  when  the  latter  does  occur? 
To  this  problem,  so  far  as  the  present  reviewer  can  see,  Professor 
Baldwin  has  given  very  scant  attention.  Yet,  unless  this  problem  is 


PSYCHOLOGICAL  LITERATURE.  209 

definitely  faced  and  solved,  an  appeal  to  the  facts  of  excess,  interest- 
ing as  it  is,  must  prove  wholely  inadequate  to  show  how  definite  new 
habits  can  get  formed.  For,  as  a  fact,  whoever  learns  a  new  habit, 
either  by  persistent  imitation,  or  by  some  less  intelligent  process, 
learns  more  numerous  inhibitions  than  he  does  positive  adjustments. 
This  appears  to  be  true  low  down  in  the  animal  scale  as  well  as 
higher  up,  and  the  difficulty  developed  in  the  foregoing  is  one  of  a 
very  general  application.  If  excess  is  the  beginning  of  novel  adjust- 
ment, selection  amongst  the  elements  of  the  excessive  reactions  to  in- 
teresting stimuli  involves  much  more  than  the  merely  superior  empha- 
sis given  to  certain  of  these  reactions  by  their  pleasure-giving  charac- 
ter, or  even  by  their  success  as  imitative  reactions.  Nor  is  the  princi- 
ple that  the  painful  elements  of  the  excess  get  eliminated  by  reason  of 
their  painfulness  a  sufficient  account  of  how  the  needed  inhibitions  oc- 
cur. For  there  remain  to  be  accounted  for  the  vast  number  of  super- 
fluous reactions  which  are  not  directly  painful,  but  which  are  indi- 
rectly opposed  to  the  definiteness  and  success  of  the  new  habit.  The 
animal  acquiring  a  novel  skill  in  watching  for  prey  must  learn  to  sup- 
press numerous  signs  of  excitement  which  will  indirectly  hinder  the 
success  of  its  quest.  How  shall  the  principle  of  excess  and  selection 
work  here  ?  The  excitement-phenomena  will  belong  to  the  excess- 
wave.  Whence  will  come  the  selection?  From  the  animal's  own 
intelligent  observation  of  the  hindrances  that  result  from  these  super- 
fluous acts  ?  But  it  is  the  origin  of  just  such  intelligence  that  we  are 
here  tracing.  No  intelligence  of  this  grade  can  exist  unless  definite 
successes  have  already  given  the  animal  a  criterion  for  judging  its  own 
failures.  The  imitative  animal  must  learn,  and  does  learn,  to  be 
silent  and  hide  when  the  others  do  so,  to  stand  still  and  watch  when 
the  others  do  so,  and  in  countless  other  ways  to  imitate  inhibitory 
deeds  and  attitudes.  But  in  the  case  of  the  imitation  of  inhibitions, 
how  is  the  excess,  merely  as  such,  to  contain  '  more  and  more '  ele- 
ments that  gradually  conform  to  a  model  whose  very  essence  is  that 
its  outward  appearance  involves  a  suppression  of  elements,  the  nega- 
tive fact  of  the  absense  of  certain  groups  of  deeds.  On  the  other  hand, 
to  explain  all  these  inhibitions  as  due  to  the  experience  of  the  painful 
results  of  the  acts  suppressed  is  simply  to  abandon  the  region  where 
a  theory  of  imitation  ought  to  have  most  scope,  viz :  the  region  of 
the  imitation  of  inhibitions,  or  of  acts  in  so  far  as  they  involve  inhibi- 
tions. For,  as  pointed  out,  every  complex  positive  act  involves  more 
inhibitions  than  it  does  positive  activities. 

Now,  it  is  indeed  true  that  Professor  Baldwin  has  given  some  at- 


210  MENTAL  DEVELOPMENT. 

tention  to  the  conditions  of  inhibition  and  of  selective  self  control. 
But  so  far  as  the  present  reviewer  is  able  to  understand  the  very  sum- 
mary observations  upon  p.  473,  our  author  appears  to  regard  the  prob- 
lem of  inhibition  as  altogether  a  secondary  one.  On  p.  456  we  do 
indeed  find  stated,  as  in  several  other  passages,  the  4  problem  of  se- 
lection,' with  some  indication  that  the  excess-function  needs  a  selec- 
tive accompaniment  over  and  above  the  ones  upon  which  our  author 
lays  most  stress.  And,  as  Professor  Baldwin  here  adds:  "Inatten- 
tion we  have,  undoubtedly,  the  one  selective  function  of  conscious- 
ness." One  expects  to  find,  accordingly,  in  the  subsequent  discussion 
of  attention  a  genetic  explanation  of  the  obviously  inhibitory  charac- 
ter which  forms  so  large  an  aspect  of  every  attentive  process.  But 
what  one  finds  is  a  valuable  development  of  the  doctrine  of  the  posi- 
tive motor  elements  of  attention.  At  the  end  comes  the  passage  of  p. 
473:  uThe  theory  of  motor  development  now  worked  out  throws 
much  light  also  on  the  whole  vexed  question  of  muscular  control — 
the  regulation  of  movement  in  amount  and  direction,  and  its  suppres- 
sion, etc."  There  follow  two  or  three  sentences  regarding  the  positive 
aspect  of  control,  and  then  the  words :  "And  negative  control  or  inhi- 
bition represents,  in  general,  the  limitations  which  old  organic  ways 
of  action  impose  upon  our  ways ;  the  new  must  conform,  if  possible, 
to  old  organic  'copy.'"  Surely,  this  means,  if  anything,  that  the 
presence  of  inhibition,  at  least  where  the  latter  is  not  a  direct  case 
of  the  results  of  painful  stimulation,  is  due  to  the  influence  of  old 
imitative  functions  already  set  in  the  organism.  The  present  review- 
er's difficulty  is,  however,  that  some  sort  of  inhibitory  process,  not 
wholly  due  to  directly  painful  stimulation,  must  be  posited  in  order 
that  the  first  important  selections  from  any  excess  reactions  should 
take  place;  that  Professor  Baldwin's  discussion  everywhere  silently 
presupposes  the  presence  of  just  such  an  inhibitory  aspect  of  the  whole 
selective  process;  that  the  dropping  of  the  superfluous  reactions, 
merely  because  they  are  not  emphasized  by  success,  is  wholly  insuffi- 
cient to  explain  the  actual  selection  upon  which  all  new  adaptation 
depends ;  that,  as  every  teacher  knows,  some  dropping  of  the  superflu- 
ous is,  in  general,  a  necessary  preliminary  to  success  in  novel  adapta- 
tions ;  and  that,  therefore,  in  the  absence  of  any  teacher  to  do  the  in- 
hibiting, the  organism  itself  must  contain  the  conditions  for  such  inhi- 
bition of  the  superfluous ;  and  that,  in  fine,  without  such  primary  in- 
hibition, no  theory  of  excess  reactions  can  possibly  explain  the 
acquisition  of  definite  new  habits. 

To  conclude,  then,  the  theory  of  the  origin  of  imitation  will  be,  in 


PSYCHOLOGICAL  LITERATURE.  211 

the  present  reviewer's  opinion,  whenever  it  comes,  a  theory  of  the 
origin  of  inhibition  quite  as  much  as  a  theory  of  excess  functions. 
The  presence  and  importance  of  the  latter,  the  excess  functions,  Pro- 
fessor Baldwin  has,  indeed  done  well  to  recognize ;  but  the  theory  as 
he  leaves  it  is  essentially  incomplete,  for  the  lack  of  any  genuine  ex- 
planation of  the  selective  process  everywhere  presupposed  by  the  whole 
discussion.  Despite  this  essential  gap  in  this  theory,  the  volume  be- 
fore us  is  so  full  of  ingenious  observation  and  of  courageous  specula- 
tion, as  to  leave  no  enlightened  reader  in  doubt  of  its  author's  power 
both  to  see  and  to  think,  and  doubtless,  ere  long,  to  lead  us  further 
into  the  world  where  he  has  already  done  such  admirable  work. 
Agreeing  fully,  as  the  present  writer  does,  with  the  prominence 
given  in  this  book  to  the  value  of  imitation  for  the  whole  of  the 
higher  mental  processes,  rejoiced  as  Prof.  Baldwin's  reviewer  is  to  find 
in  many  pages  doctrines  as  to  the  psychology  both  of  imitation  itself, 
and  of  the  intelligence  generally  which  he  would  have  been  glad,  in- 
deed, to  have  been  able  to  express  himself,  one  can  only  regret,  in 
closing,  that  the  foregoing  comments  have  often  been  as  negative  as 
they  have  been.  But  it  is  by  temporary  disagreement  that  our  com- 
mon interests  often  find  themselves  in  the  end  best  furthered. 

HARVARD  UNIVERSITY.  JOSIAH  ROYCE. 


Studies  in  the  Evolutionary  Psychology  of  Feeling.  HIRAM  M. 
STANLEY.  London,  Sonnenschein ;  New  York,  Macmillan. 
1895.  Pp.  VIII+392.  $2.25  net. 

Mr.  Stanley's  book  is,  in  my  opinion,  an  interesting  and  important 
contribution  to  genetic  psychology.  It  takes  up  the  Spencerian  for- 
mulation of  the  problem  of  mental  development — the  interpretation  of 
the  functions  of  the  individual  consciousness  in  the  light  of  race-utility 
— and  attempts  to  throw  light  on  this  question  by  the  introspective 
method.  As  far  as  such  a  problem  can  be  approached  by  such  a 
method,  Mr.  Stanley  approaches  it ;  but  he  cannot,  I  think,  discover 
in  the  adult  mind  a  science  of  mental  embryology.  With  this  essen- 
tial limitation  of  method — a  limitation  which  is  not  accidental,  but 
which  Mr.  Stanley  defends — his  results  are  rich  in  suggestiveness,  and 
mark  the  author  as  entitled  to  a  high  place  among  contemporary  au- 
thors in  developmental  psychology.  This  the  more  because  his  re- 
sults are  peculiarly  his  own,  as  his  method  necessarily  makes  them. 
With  this  general  appreciation  of  the  book,  which  I  do  not  intend  the 
criticisms  which  follow  in  any  way  to  impair,  I  may  set  out  a  few 


212          EVOLUTIONARY  PSYCHOLOGY  OF  FEELING. 

points  of  the  more  essential  results  which  the  author  reaches,  and 
speak  to  them  from  my  own  point  of  view. 

Mr.  Stanley  makes  pain-consciousness  primitive — what  he  calls 
'pure  pain.'  It  is  accommodation  agent  through  the  'will-effort' 
which  it  leads  the  animal  to  make  in  order  to  rid  itself  of  the  pain. 
Pleasure  consciousness  is  a  later  state  arising  between  want-pain  and 
excess-pain.  The  derivative  character  of  pleasure  is  argued  at  some 
length,  but  with  arguments  of  an  introspective  character ;  although 
here  as  elsewhere  Mr.  Stanley  deserts  his  method  by  appealing  to  the 
child  consciousness  and  hints  at  biological  facts.  I  think  that  all  the 
points  made  can  be  met  by  facts  from  biology  and  child-psychology ; 
but  this  is  not  necessary,  since  Mr.  Stanley  says  in  another  place  (28)  in 
answer  to  points  made  by  Mr.  Marshall  that  he  is  not  concerned  to 
maintain  this  thesis  and  is  quite  willing  to  believe  that  pleasure  and 
pain  are  equally  primitive.  This  is  generous,  certainly,  but  it  shows 
the  essential  weakness  of  the  author's  method.  The  point  at  issue 
here,  I  venture  to  think,  is  one  of  the  most  fundamental  in  all  the 
theory  of  development.  A  number  of  Mr.  Stanley's  own  later  doc- 
trines rest  upon  the  probable  truth  of  the  claim  that  pain  alone  is 
primitive  accommodation  agent.  And  the  admission  made  here  that 
it  is  not,  weakens  the  ground  theory  of  the  book  all  the  way  through. 

The  second  element  of  Mr.  Stanley's  conception  of  the  fundamen- 
tal reaction,  i.  e.,  'will-effort,'  finds  no  analysis  or  discussion  that  I 
can  see  anywhere  in  the  work.  It  seems  to  be  assumed  along  with 
pain  as  an  ultimate  characteristic  of  mental  life.  But  even  then  we 
ought  to  have  some  notion  of  how  it  works  to  bring  about  the  adapta- 
tions of  the  organism.  This  great  defect  is  what  I  referred  to  above 
in  defining  Mr.  Stanley's  problem  as  the  problem  of  race  development. 
The  parallel  question  of  individual  development — the  ontogenetic 
question — seems  not  to  have  occurred  to  him.  And  yet,  is  not  that 
just  the  question  for  which  the  introspective  method  is  available? 
Here  it  seems  to  me  Mr.  Stanley  shows  a  little  want  of  touch  with  the 
discussions  of  current  psychology — a  sort  of  personal  isolation,  as  it 
were.  Why  does  he  not  bring  in  some  reference  to  the  recent  discus- 
sions of  motor  phenomena,  kinaesthetic  doctrines  of  voluntary  action, 
reduction  of  will-effort  to  a  sensational  basis,  etc.  Surely  these  the- 
ories are  the  most  formidable  opposites  to  the  vague  postulate  of  will- 
effort,  which  he  fails  even  to  define.  The  resource  of  child-psychol- 
ogy? which  Mr.  Stanley  ranks  next  in  importance  to  simple  introspec- 
tion, should  g;.ve  him  an  inkling  of  the  need  of  settling  this  great 
problem.  Spencer  saw  the  necessity  for  a  theory  of  the  individual's 


PSYCHOLOGICAL   LITERATURE.  213 

adaptations — the  more,  perhaps,  because  of  his  Lamarckism  in  the 
doctrine  of  heredity;  but  there,  in  heredity,  is  another  question  the 
importance  of  which  Mr.  Stanley  seems  not  to  have  appreciated.  I  do 
not  mean  these  things  as  criticisms  of  a  positive  kind,  in  the  face  of 
Mr.  Stanley's  modest  assurance  that  the  book  is  only  a  series  of  stud- 
ies. But  yet  when  he  uses  phrases  equivalent  to  4  will-effort'  so 
freely,  it  can  not  fail  to  occur  to  the  reader  that  it  is  a  bridge  of  thin 
ice  over  these  yawning  caverns. 

Again  I  think  Mr.  Stanley's  free — I  almost  said  indiscriminate — use 
of  the  principle  of  '  variations  with  natural  selection '  leads  to  little  new 
truth.  Cognition  is  a  variation  (6173)  under  which  sensation,  percep- 
tion, memory,  etc.,  are  all  variations.  Attention,  self-sense,  and  so  on 
everywhere — all  are  variations.  And  then  Mr.  Stanley  seems  to 
think,  that  his  problem  is  solved  when  he  has  pointed  out  some  intro- 
spective or  speculative  utility  which,  in  the  mind  of  the  psychologist, 
should  justify  this  or  that  variation — after  the  fact.  This  gives  a  set 
of  small  unimportant  problems  which  each  one  can  settle  for  himself, 
as  he  thinks  the  facts  i  most  likely'  were.  But  it  is  as  if  the  biologist 
should  say :  The  law  of  variations  with  utility  solves  the  question  of 
life ;  and  for  this  organ  or  that,  its  utility  assumed,  its  use  was  prob- 
ably this  or  that.  The  biologist,  on  the  contrary,  goes  to  pa- 
leontology and  morphology,  and  those  are  the  fields  where  the  real 
facts  are  found  to  justify  the  theory  of  evolution.  The  psychologist 
has  his  paleontology  in  the  animals  around  him  and  his  morphology 
in  the  nursery.  And  while,  of  course,  we  have  immeasurable  difficul- 
ties to  deal  with,  yet  the  real  emphasis  is  thus  thrown  on  the  problem 
of  individual  or  ontogenetic  development,  where  the  actual  utilities  may 
be  seen  in  operation.  It  is  not  a  mere  question  of  surmise  as  to  this 
utility  or  that.  I  do  not  insist  on  this  here  because  it  is  a  matter  of  per- 
sonal conviction  which  I  have  recently  urged  at  length  in  my  book  on 
Mental  Development.  The  principle  of  circular  reaction  which  I 
became  convinced  was  of  the  first  importance  in  the  development  of 
the  individual  development  seemed  applicable  then  in  race  develop- 
ment as  well.  Whatever  may  be  thought  of  such  a  particular  sort  of 
formulation,  I  am  yet  more  than  ever  convinced,  by  this  able  book  of 
Mr.  Stanley's,  that  no  mere  introspective  or  descriptive  surmises  about 
race-utilities  can  take  the  place  of  some  such  principle  of  unity  arrived 
at  first  by  way  of  the  ontogenetic  problem. 

This  point  of  criticism  holds,  in  my  view,  all  the  way  through  the 
book.  The  chapter  on  the  'self-feeling'  is  full  of  keen  verbal  distinc- 
tions, most  of  them  true  to  introspection  as  matters  of  description, 


214  E VOL UTIONA RY  PS YCHOL OGY  OF  FEELING. 

most  of  them  requiring  a  general  appeal  to  the  law  of  variations,  and 
many  of  them  important  for  general  psychology.  But  Mr.  Stanley 
draws  inferences  for  race-development  on  such  grounds ;  and  whether 
we  agree  with  him  or  not  depends  largely  upon  whether  we  follow 
his  distinctions  and  accept  his  definitions — and  then  what  is  the  out- 
come ?  Why  this :  that  so,  and  so,  was  probably  the  utility  which  the 
animal  found  in  becoming  self-conscious  !  But  let  us  once  turn  to  the 
field  of  morphology,  the  nursery,  and  enquire  into  the  actual  condi- 
tions under  which  the  sense  of  personality  arises,  and  I  think  one  of 
the  two  most  compelling  and  conspicuous  factors  in  the  whole  group  of 
phenomena,  is  just  a  factor  which  introspection  has  not  revealed  to  Mr. 
Stanley  at  all — though  even  by  that  method  I  think  he  should  have 
got  glimpses  of  it — the  fact,  namely,  that  the  sense  of  self — using  the 
term  in  Mr.  Stanley's  sense  'as  a  reflection  of  experience  upon  itself 
— '  by  which  the  individual  becomes  aware  of  its  own  activities  as  its 
own*  (254) — comes  by  way  of  the  progressive  social  consciousness. 
And  if  this  be  true  would  not  the  variation  in  the  race  series  which 
the  self-sense  supposes  (254)  involve  this  differentia  as  well  as  that 
deduced  from  the  direct  interpretation  of  the  private  pleasures  and 
pains  of  the  organism  ?  And  so  be  a  much  later  thing  than  his  introspec- 
tion suggests?  This  I  do  not  mean  to  argue;  but  only  to  say  that  in 
the  one  case  we  are  in  the  domain  of  live  concrete  facts,  sufficiently  ob- 
jective to  have  positive  verification ;  and  moreover  we  are  at  a  stage  of 
the  individual's  development  at  which  the  elementary  facts  which  we 
want  to  observe  are  likely  to  be  found.  To  speak  again  of  my  per- 
sonal views,  I  find  with  Professor  Royce  that  the  sense  of  self  may 
be  treated  with  some  degree  of  explaining  force  by  the  principle  of 
'circular'  or  'imitative'  reaction,  drawn  from  ontogenetic  observa- 
tions. 

The  chapter  on  attention  is,  from  the  point  of  view  of  the  criticism 
made  above,  the  most  inadequate  in  the  book.  Mr.  Stanley  makes 
attention  the  great  vehicle  of  '  will-effort ; '  thus  throwing  it  in  any  case, 
I  suppose,  on  the  active  side,  the  motor  side,  in  the  process  of  develop- 
ment. But  as  for  '  will-effort,'  so  a  fortiori  for  attention,  we  must 
ask  :  how  does  it  work  ?  What  apparatus  does  it  use  ?  How  does  it 
effect  organic  or  ideal  accommodation  ?  To  these  and  the  almost  in- 
numerable questions  besides  which  come  irresistibly  up  when  one 
thinks  of  the  attention  genetically,  Mr.  Stanley  has  no  answer,  be- 
cause he  does  not  ask  them.  Certainly  the  bare  .phrase  'will-effort,' 
with  its  equivalents,  is  not  at  all  illuminating. 

I  have  left  for  the  last  the  treatment  of  the  Emotions,  in  many  re- 


PSYCHOLOGICAL  LITERATURE.  215 

spects  the  most  interesting  and  valuable  parts  of  the  book.  This  is  so, 
I  think,  because  in  this  field  there  are  many  introspective  distinctions 
to  be  made,  and  also  because  the  expressive  characteristics  of  the 
grosser  emotional  qualities  are  so  well  differentiated  objectively  as  to 
suggest  interesting  race  utilities.  Fear  and  anger  are  treated  in  detail 
with  subtlety  and  profit.  Fear  is  primitive  emotion,  and  emotion  is 
fundamentally  '  pain  at  pain.'  This  formula  means  that  emotional  pain 
is  due  to  revival  of  painful  object  with  consciousness  that  it  is  painful 
(67) ,  (98) .  This  latter  element  is  essential  and  constitutes  the  difference 
between  emotion-pain  and  pure-pain.  In  this  discussion  Mr.  Stanley 
lays  all  the  emphasis  on  pain,  none  on  pleasure,  except  to  point  out 
the  contrast  of  the  two  qualities  of  emotion.  The  duality  here,  I  sup- 
pose, is  possible  because  emotion  as  revival-state  does  not  occur  until 
after  pure-pain  has  differentiated  itself  into  pain  and  pleasure  states. 
And  yet  the  organic  evidence,  to  my  mind,  points  the  other  way, 
namely,  to  the  conclusion  that  the  contrast  of  pleasurable  with  painful 
emotions  points  to  the  original  presence  of  a  distinction  between 
pleasure  and  pain.  Furthermore,  I  do  not  think  that  Mr.  Stanley 
makes  out  his  point  that  emotion-pain  is  'pain  at  pain.'  The  consid- 
eration of  the  evolution  of  emotional  attitudes  in  recent  discussion  has 
tended  to  show  that  less  rather  than  more  stress  is  to  be  laid  upon  the 
representative  element  in  emotion ;  and  more  on  the  reflex  element. 
The  pain  of  emotion  is  largely  immediate  pain  due  to  function  of  an 
hereditary  kind.  And  even  when  the  emotion  is  one  learned  by  the 
animal  in  his  own  experience  I  think  the  pain  of  it  is  rather  pain  from 
the  incipient  revival  of  the  reflex  consequences  of  the  cognition  than 
from  the  cognition  of  '  pain-quality '  in  the  object.  So  of  pleasure,  in 
emotion.  As  far  as  there  is  a  new  pain  or  pleasure  of  revival,  it  comes 
from  direct  accommodation  to  present  experience  of  object.  Of 
course,  in  our  high  reflective  lives  we  have  plenty  of  'pain  at  pain.' 
But  Mr.  Stanley  commits  the  psychologist's  fallacy,  I  think,  in  reading 
the  complex  formula  of  '  pain  at  pain '  down  into  the  genetic  origins 
of  emotion  states.  It  seems  to  me  that  the  postulate  of  simple  revival 
pain,  either  of  direct  stimulation  or  of  a  reflex  kind,  would  do  greater 
credit  to  the  principle  of  natural  selection  and  is  altogether  '  most 
likely.'  The  same  considerations  also  apply  to  emotion-pleasure ;  we 
would  have  to  have  a  formula  calling  for  pleasure  at  pleasure.  Why 
not  say  that  the  revival  of  cognition  pleasure  is  not  always  necessary 
when  the  object  is  revived,  but  that  the  object-revival  tends  directly  to 
stimulate  the  same  pleasure  that  the  cognition  did  ? l 

*Mr.  Stanley  admits  a  direct  lack-pain  (pain  of  unreality,  or  non-presence) 


2 1 6  E  VOL UTIONAR  Y  PS YCHOL OGY  OF  FEELING. 

This  requirement  is  so  real,  however,  that  it  determines  Mr.  Stan- 
ley's account  of  desire.  He  argues  for  the  old  hedonistic  view, 
coming  now  to  lay  all  the  emphasis  on  pleasure  (i93f).  The  avoid- 
ance of  pain  is,  in  the  realm  of  desire,  always  the  pursuit  ot 
pleasure. 

The  complexity  that  this  gives  may  be  pointed  out.  When  a  man 
desires  to  avoid  a  painful  thing,  what  he  does  is  this :  he  pictures  the 
thing,  the  painfulness  of  the  thing,  has  4  pain  from  the  pain '  of  the 
thing,  pictures  pleasure  from  the  removal  of  the  '  pain  from  the  pain'  of 
the  thing  (or  would  it  be  the  pleasure  of  the  removal  simply  of  the  pain 
of  the  thing?  The  former,  I  think),  and,  finally,  has  'pleasure  from 
the  pleasure'  of  the  pictured  removal  of  the  'pain  from  the  pain.' 
This,  to  me,  is  the  outcome,  in  sober  truth,  of  the  hedonistic  theory  when 
complicated  by  Mr.  Stanley's  theory  of  « pain  from  pain'  and  '  pleasure 
from  pleasure.' 2  And  we  must  add  to  this  the  fact,  as  Mr.  Stanley  says, 
that  the  desire  itself  is  painful.  To  take  a  concrete  case.  Suppose  a 
child  crying  at  the  prospect  of  a  cold  bath  and  pleading  to  be  let  off. 
Does  he  picture  the  bath  in  revival,  the  pain  of  former  baths  also  in  re- 
vival, get  pain  from  this  pain,  picture  pleasure  from  the  removal  of  this 
pain  from  the  presented  or  revived  pain,  and  then  get  sense  of  pleasure 
from  this  pleasure,  to  prompt  his  desire  ? — this  last  being  the  end  which 
justifies  the  hedonistic  postulate?  Surely  all  this,  or  anything  like  it, 
is  not  there.  The  child  has  revived  symbols  of  the  bath-act,  and  reflex 
and  associated  pain  states  with  them ;  these  latter  revive  the  associated 
shunning  movement  and  speech  tendencies,  etc.,  and  the  consciousness 
of  these  latter  is  the  desire.  The  end  is  the  symbolic  bath-act,  pure 
and  simple;  that  fills  the  child's  consciousness  up  so  full  and  its  he- 
donic  quality  (not  recognized  mainly  but  refelt)  is  so  utterly  unbear- 
able that  he  bursts  out  in  the  associated  movements — in  this  case  move- 
ments indicating  negative,  so  to  speak,  rather  than  positive,  desire. 

In  this  difference  from  Mr.  Stanley  I  have  no  intention  of  minimiz- 
ing the  factors  involved  nor  of  discounting  the  real  complexity  of  these 
higher  evolutionary  products.  It  is  possible — or,  as  Mr.  Stanley  says 
so  often  from  his  introspective  points  of  view,  it  may  be  '  most  likely ' 
— that  the  process  of  genetic  acquisition  of  desire  has  been  more  com- 
plex than  the  simple  scheme  which  I  have  indicated.  But  we  all 

in  lower  organisms.  Why  should  there  not  be  a  direct  lack-pain  at  the  higher 
representation  level — pain  of  unreality  of  object  without  cognition  of  '  pleasura- 
bleness'  of  the  lacking  object? 

2This  on  the  view  that  desire  is  emotion  (193);  and  I  have  not  introduced 
certain  other  elements  included  in  Mr.  Stanley's  scheme  of  eight  factors  (208). 


PSYCHOLOGICAL   LITERATURE.  217 

recognize  the  abbreviating  processes  of  evolution  and  expect  the  lapsing 
of  links  which  a  chronological  order  would  seem  to  require ;  and,  on 
the  whole,  it  seems  much  simpler  to  make  the  original  tendencies  of 
action  terminate  on  objects,  clinging  to  the  functional  or  *  index '  view 
of  pleasure-pain,  and  then  to  keep  this  object-consciousness  forward 
all  the  way  up  the  genetic  scale.  Then  in  the  interpretation  of  the 
higher  consciousness  one  may  accept  the  outcome  of  the  overwhelm- 
ing current  of  criticism  of  hedonism.  Certainly  it  is  something  to 
avoid  the  remarkable  shifting  of  emphasis  from  pain  in  the  original 
and  lower  stages,  to  pleasure  in  the  higher,  to  which  Mr.  Stanley  has 
to  resort. 

There  are  many  interesting  topics  in  the  book  on  which  it  would 
be  profitable  to  dwell ;  but  I  may  only  cite  summarily  certain  special 
teachings  of  Mr.  Stanley  which  are  confirmatory  or  corrective  of  views 
of  others,  and  important :  i .  Pain  is  declared  to  be  '  purely  moni- 
tory (14)' ;  this  I  think  contradicts  Mr.  Stanley's  own  view  that  pain  is 
the  direct  stimulant  to  'will-effort;'  for  if  the  latter,  then  the  pain  must 
be,  as  the  author  seems  to  teach  elsewhere,  index  of  benefit-from- stim- 
ulus, which  is  actual,  not  prospective  only.  It  has  a  '  monitory ' 
meaning  also,  of  course.  2.  The  emphasis  of  the  fact  that  all  mental 
development  is  an  achievement,  'never  a  given.'  Everything  is  achieved 
by  struggle,  action,  effort  (23,  29,  et  al.).  3.  Confusion  arises  from 
the  use  of  the  word  'feeling'  in  three  senses:  namely,  as  equal  to 
'  consciousness,'  as  'pure'  pleasure  and  pain,  and  as  qualitative  emo- 
tion. 4.  Confusing  use  of  the  expression  '  quantity  of  consciousness ' 
to  mean  area  or  Umfang  (55).  5.  Very  interesting  theory  of  the 
phylogenetic  origin  and  value  of  '  unreality-feeling'  (85) .  It  is  directly 
confirmed  in  the  life  of  the  infant,  as  I  have  argued  elsewhere.  6. 
Unhappy  use  of  the  word  '  representation '  to  include  recognition  (86) . 
7.  Mr.  Stanley  makes  the  animal's  going-out  reactions — /.  £.,  for  food, 
etc. — a  late  accomplishment,  dependent  on  representation  with  recog- 
nition of  object  as  pleasure-giving.  Why  is  this  necessary  when  the 
opposite — i.  e.,  the  struggle  away  from  the  pain-giving  object — is  or- 
ganic and  primitive  ?  The  argument  for  the  latter  from  natural  selec- 
tion will  secure  as  well  an  immediate  reaction  for  pleasure-giving 
stimulations.  I  have  used  the  same  argument  for  the  primitive  char- 
acter of  both  sorts  of  reaction  (Mental  Development,  p.  i73f).  8. 
Mr.  Stanley  follows  Spencer  in  making  the  utility  of  touch  lie  largely 
in  the  '  circular  reaction'  function  which  it  exemplifies  (193).  Why 
does  not  natural  selection  secure  this  state  of  things  more  primitively, 
so  that  it  is  true  earlier  that  'the  edible  is  no  longer  fortuitously  hit 


21 8  THE  CELL  IN  ALCOHOLISM. 

upon?'  9.  The  doctrine  that  all  attention  is  volitional  and  that  all  in- 
tensity quality  in  sensation  is  in  its  origin  volitionally  achieved,  would 
be  much  better  expressed  by  maintaining  the  current  distinction  be- 
tween 'reflex'  and  voluntary  attention,  and  then  adopting  some  gen- 
eral term  like  the  current '  motor-process '  to  express  the  active  process 
of  '  achieving '  all  the  way  through  (228) .  The  confusions  into  which 
Wundt  has  fallen  in  his  doctrines  of  attention  by  this  same  procedure 
might  be  a  warning  against  calling  the  struggle  of  the  amoeba  away 
from  pain-conditions  'volitional.'  10.  Object  and  subject-cognition  are 
'  coincident  in  their  origin'  (252)  ;  and  since  sensation  is  cognition,  all 
sensation  involves  self-sense.  Mr.  Stanley  here  seems  to  confuse 
pleasure  and  pain  values  with  sense  of  their  value  for  a  self.  He  is 
led  into  it  by  his  doctrine  (criticised  above)  that  pleasure-pain  is  rep- 
resented as  conscious  end.  1 1 .  The  insistance  that  emotion  is  geneti- 
cally stimulant  to  useful  activities  and  riot  result  of  them  is  justified 
(360)  ;  but  only  on  Mr.  Stanley's  view  that  emotion  is  intrinsically 
pleasure-pain.  I  can  not  see  any  way  to  avoid  this  claim  that  pleas- 
ure-pain-feeling is  the  dynamogenic  factor  all  the  way  through.  12. 
Interesting  discussion  of  play  (364ff) . 

I  have  no  space  to  speak  of  the  author's  interesting  chapters  on  ^Es- 
thetic and  Ethical  Emotion.  J.  M.  B. 


ETHICAL. 

Studies  in  Character.     S.  BRYANT.     New  York,  Macmillan,   1894. 

($1.50.) 
Hedonistic  Theories  from  Antippus  to  Spencer.     JOHN  WATSON. 

New  York,  Macmillan,  1895.      ($1.75.) 

Mrs.  Bryant's  Essays  are  grouped  under  the  heads  '  Ethical '  and 
'  Educational.'  None  the  less  there  is  a  decided  unity  of  method  and 
point  of  view  running  through  all  of  them.  The  ethical  essays  earn- 
educational  implications  throughout,  and  it  is  the  ethical  side  of  ed- 
ucation which  commands  Mrs.  Bryant's  attention.  It  is  to  be  hoped 
that  the  book  will  attain  a  wide  reading  in  the  educational  commu- 
nity. It  is  a  book  that  does  not  shock  one's  intellectual  self-respect, 
which  is  more  than  can  be  said  of  many  professedly  pedagogical 
treatises ;  and  it  utilizes  in  an  unobtrusive,  but  none  the  less  effective, 
way  very  much  that  is  best  in  current  ethical  and  psychological 
writings.  Mrs.  Bryant  is  at  home  in  what  is  being  said  and  discov- 
ered in  the  vital  places  of  current  discussions — another  mark  of  emi- 


PSYCHOLOGICAL   LITERATURE.  219 

nent  distinction  from  much  of  what  passes  as  pedagogical  contribu- 
tions. Systematic  in  outer  form,  being  a  collection  of  essays,  the 
book  is  not ;  systematic  in  unity  of  conception  and  method  the  book 
is,  much  more  so  than  many  more  pretentious  treatises. 

In  dealing  with  such  topics  as  'My  Duty  to  thy  Neighbor,' 
'Friendship,'  'Soundness  of  Intellect,'  etc.,  one  perhaps  could  be 
brilliant  only  at  the  expense  of  sanity,  and  original  only  by  leaning 
towards  eccentricity,  and  the  originality  of  sincerity  (which,  as  Mrs. 
Bryant  quotes  Carlyle  is  the  real  originality) ,  Mrs.  Bryant  possesses. 
However  this  may  be,  there  is  a  tendency  at  times  to  fall  into  a 
certain  explicitness  of  classification  and  definition  that  makes  long 
continued  reading  an  impossibility.  A  few  pages  are  suggestive; 
two  or  three  chapters  of  it  load  one  with  the  feeling  of  assisting 
in  the  laying  out  of  the  corpse  of  the  moral  universe.  As  Professor 
James  has  remarked  about  too  much  descriptive  psychology  there 
are  many  things  which  it  is  highly  interesting  to  experience,  but  a 
little  tedious  to  be  reminded  of  in  too  much  detail  and  with  too  ex- 
plicit a  touch  after  we  have  been  through  them.  Perhaps  only  Aris- 
totle at  his  best,  and  the  French  moral  essayists  with  their  capacity  for 
unexpected  epigram  and  their  ability  to  flash  upon  the  reader  the  ironi- 
cal reverse  of  their  own  definitions,  have  ever  been  at  home  in  this  re- 
gion or  moral  description. 

As  to  the  implied  ethical  doctrine  of  the  book,  it  is  upon  the 
whole,  the  idealistic  interpretation  of  the  conception  of  self-realiza- 
tion, vitalized  for  educational  purposes  with  considerable  concrete 
psychology  regarding  the  motor  tendencies  of  ideas  and  concrete  in- 
sight into  individual  temperaments  and  types.  I  cannot  forbear 
from  pointing  out  that  while  in  her  ethical  doctrine  Mrs.  Bryant 
conceives  the  '  ideal '  to  be  perfection  located  at  a  remote  goal ;  for 
practical  purposes,  she,  like  all  other  perfectionists,  gets  down  to 
approximate  ideal,  which  is  the  right  functioning  of  present  powers, 
or  the  relating  of  conditions  of  a  present  situation.  The  same  con- 
tradiction occurs  when  Mrs.  Bryant  is  getting  at  ideals  from  a  psycho- 
logical standpoint.  The  theory  implied  in  practice  is  so  certain  to  be 
more  adequate  than  theory  set  up  as  theory  of  practice. 

There  appears  to  me  also  to  be  a  regrettable  tendency  in  Mrs. 
Bryant  to  over-emphasize  the  personal  or  immediate,  direct  side  of 
conduct — devotion  to  persons,  whether  one's  self  or  somebody  else, 
instead  of  devotion  to  work,  to  action  and  to  persons,  whether  one's 
self  or  others,  indirectly  through  their  implications  in  activity.  But 
so  far  as  there  is  any  concensus  of  ethical  doctrine  on  this  point,  I 


"220  ETHICAL. 

suppose  it  is  with  Mrs.  Bryant  rather  than  with  the  reviewer ;  and,  as 
the  point  is  too  big  for  discussion  in  a  review,  the  matter  must  go  as 
a  personal  regret  and  dissent.  All  this  direct  moral  devotion  to  per- 
sons, I  believe  can  end  only  in  useless  complications,  weariness  of 
flesh  and  spirit  and  contradictions  between  our  aspirations  and  our  ac- 
complishments, both  in  theory  and  in  practice. 

Professor  Watson  publishes  his  criticism  of  hedonism  4  as  a  need- 
ful supplement  to  the  ethical  part  of  his  [my]  Outlines  of  Philos- 
ophy.* His  method  of  criticism  is,  as  indicated  in  his  title,  historic. 
It  is  historical  types,  rather  than  actual  historic  continuity,  how- 
ever, which  Mr.  Watson  deals  with;  his  authors  being  Aristippus, 
Epicurus,  Hobbes,  Locke,  Hume,  Bentham,  John  Stuart  Mill  and 
Spencer;  about  one-fourth  of  the  book  being  devoted  to  the  last 
named. 

After  discussing  the  influence  of  the  Sophists,  Aristippus  is  con- 
sidered as  the  type  of  naive  and,  in  one  sense,  the  only  consistent 
hedonism — the  seizure  of  the  pleasure  of  the  present  moment.  Pro- 
fessor Watson  points  out  a  psychological  contradiction  contained  in 
the  idea  of  seeking  momentary  pleasure ;  seeking  for  pleasure  intro- 
duces struggle  and  pain ;  pleasure  as  pleasure  comes  and  is  enjoyed 
without  being  sought.  The  doctrine  is  also  shown  to  involve  an  es- 
sential misreading  of  human  nature,  ignoring  the  simple  fact  of  ex- 
perience that  men  seek  active  ends  in  which  undoubtedly  they  antic- 
ipate and  find  pleasure,  rather  than  pleasure  as  such.  Epicurus 
enlarges  and,  in  an  objective  sense,  rationalizes  the  momentary, 
transitive  end  of  Aristippus  in  introducing  the  idea  of  the  greatest 
pleasure  on  the  whole  as  an  end ;  but  as  Professor  Watson  points  out, 
at  the  expense  of  hedonism,  virtually  substituting  a  state  of  content- 
ment for  the  ideal  of  pleasure ;  and  contentment,  in  turn,  involves  its 
own  peculiar  self-contradiction,  since  to  make  the  attainment  of  indi- 
vidual contentment  the  ideal  is  to  throw  everything  back  upon  indi- 
vidual temperament,  and  thus  deify  lawlessness.  Hobbes  generalizes 
the  hedonistic  conception  still  further ;  Aristippus  simply  ignored  the 
state ;  Epicurus  was  for  getting  along  with  it  with  the  least  possible 
trouble;  Hobbes  will  turn  the  whole  social  organization  into  a  means 
of  bringing  pleasure  to  the  individual.1 

1  While  I  hesitate  to  differ  from  Prof.  Watson  on  a  historical  point,  this  state- 
ment as  regards  Hobbes  seems  doubtful.  Perhaps  Hobbes  ought  in  logical  con- 
sistency to  have  taken  this  view ;  but  as  matter  of  fact  he  seems  to  me  to  throw 
all  the  emphasis  on  the  substitution  of  the  end  of  the  sovereign  for  that  of  the 
individual ;  and  his  whole  political  reasoning  to  be  a  back-handed  way  of  saying 


PSYCHOLOGICAL  LITERATURE.  221 

Locke  represents  a  consistent  inconsistency — a  philosophy  of 
compromise.  His  intentions  are  good;  his  performance  poor.  He 
intends  to  assert  freedom,  but  he  holds  that  the  strongest  uneasiness 
determines  the  will,  and  uneasiness  is  simply  the  desire  for  the 
pleasure  that  is  strongest.  He  intends  to  uphold  the  objectivity  of 
moral  distinctions,  and  defines  the  good  as  that  which  is  conform- 
able to  law ;  but  when  he  states  how  law  lays  hold  on  the  individual 
he  falls  back  on  the  pleasures  got  by  obedience  and  the  pains  suf- 
fered through  disobedience.  Hume  is  as  uncompromising  as  Locke 
the  reverse.  Pleasure  is  the  sole  motive,  and  reason  can  never  be  a 
motive;  its  sole  office  is  to  serve  the  feelings.  With  Hume  the 
hedonistic  logic  may  be  said  to  have  become  explicit  and  self-con- 
scious. The  self  being  only  a  bundle  of  feelings,  there  is  naught  but 
feeling  to  seek  or  avoid,  or  by  which  to  seek  or  avoid. 

With  Hume  the  logical  evolution  of  hedonism  ceases ;  since  him 
we  have  only  recurrences  to  earlier  types,  or  else  its  ennobling 
through  the  introduction  of  ideas  non-hedonistic  in  character.  Bent- 
ham  in  a  way  went  back  to  Hobbes,  only  with  great  practical  interest 
in  social  reform  which  lead  him  to  introduce  elements  irreconcilable 
with  hedonism,  while  Stuart  Mill  can  be  made  consistent  only  by  in- 
interpreting  his  practical  views  from  the  standpoint  of  an  idealistic 
theory.  The  examination  of  Mr.  Spencer  takes  up  his  ethical  doc- 
trine both  in  its  hedonistic  psychology,  its  evolutionary  aspects  and 
the  relation  of  one  of  these  to  the  other,  with  a  view  to  showing 
that  Mr.  Spencer's  general  formula  of  evolution  throws  no  light  on 
moral  conduct ;  that  his  psychology  destroys  the  reality  of  obligation, 
and  does  not  justify  the  transition  from  egoism  to  altruism ;  while  the 
idea  of  a  completed  life  and  completed  society  held  up  as  the  goal 
from  the  side  of  evolution  have  no  special  coherence  with  the  ideal  of 
pleasure  set  up  on  the  analytic  side. 

Philosophic  exposition  is  at  its  best  as  to  style  in  this  book  of  Pro- 
fessor Watson's.  I  could  with  difficulty  name  another  book  which 
might  at  once  command  so  thoroughly  the  respect  of  the  specialist 
and  receive  comprehension  by  the  layman  as  does  this  lucid,  direct 
piece  of  exposition  and  criticism.  It  may  be  of  service  to  teachers  of 
ethics  to  point  out  that  the  expositions  of  the  various  authors,  mainly 

that  since  men  live  in  society  they  must  regard  the  social  end  before  the  indi- 
vidual end ;  and  that  */ they  lived  in  a  state  of  nature,  while  each  might  then  fol- 
low his  own  selfish  end,  yet  such  a  state  would  be  self-contradictory.  In  other 
words,  Hobbes'  psychology  and  his  sociology  contradict  each  other  flagrantly, 
instead  of  the  latter  being  an  instrument  as  regards  the  former. 


222  LESIONS  OF  THE  CORTICAL  NERVE  CELL. 

in  the  authors'  own  words,  are  well  proportioned,  condensed  and  ac- 
curate, and,  in  some  cases,  the  best  available  substitutes  for  a  perusal 
of  the  original  texts,  and  in  all  cases  a  helpful  accompaniment  of  such 
perusal. 

The  book  seems  to  me  to  close  the  case,  on  the  polemic  side,  as 
regards  hedonism.  Undoubtedly  we  shall  go  on  having  arguments 
both  for  and  against  hedonism,  but  the  interest  seems  about  done 
with.  The  rise  of  a  new  psychological  method  and  of  a  new  sociolo- 
gical point  of  view  and  body  of  facts  have  presented  new  problems 
and  shifted  the  focus  of  attention.  These  indirect  influences  have 
probably  done  quite  as  much  as  more  direct  criticism  in  making  hed- 
onism a  played-out  standpoint.  Just  because  Prof.  Watson's  book 
has  accomplished  its  task  so  thoroughly,  one  lays  it  down  with  a  feel- 
ing of  what  has  not  been  accomplished,  and  of  what  constitutes  the 
next  task — the  discussion  of  hedonism  from  the  historic  standpoint, 
in  the  evolutionary  sense.  We  do  not  need  longer  to  contend  with 
hedonism  as  a  present  foe,  and  consequently  we  want  to  comprehend 
it  more  thoroughly  as  a  manifestation — comprehend  it  not  in  terms  of 
itself,  but  in  terms  of  the  social  and  intellectual  conditions  which  have 
given  birth  to  it,  to  see  what  it  really  means  when  so  interpreted. 
From  the  historic  evolutionary  standpoint,  there  has  been  the  same 
inner  necessity,  in  the  logic  of  growth,  for  the  appearance  of  these 
hedonistic  systems  as  there  has  been  for  that  of  any  transcended  animal 
or  political  form  of  life.  What  is  that  inner  necessity  ? 

JOHN  DEWEY. 


LESIONS  OF  THE  CORTICAL  NERVE  CELL  IN 
ALCOHOLISM. 

Exper intent elle  Untersuchungen  uber  die  Verdnderungen  der 
Ganglienzellen  bei  der  acuten  Alcoholvergiftung.  HEINRICH 
DEHIO,  Centralbl.  fur  Nervenheilk.  u.  Psychiat.  V.  113-118. 
Studies  on  the  Lesions  produced  by  the  Action  of  certain  Poisons 
on  the  Cortical  Nerve  Cell.  I.  Alcohol.  HENRY  J.  BERKLEY. 
Brain,  LXXII.  473-496. 

The  two  articles  above  mentioned  have  made  an  attack  upon  one 
of  the  least  worked  fields  of  nervous  pathology  opened  up  by  the  ad- 
vance of  the  last  few  years  in  the  methods  of  preparing  and  staining 


PSYCHOLOGICAL  LITERATURE.  223 

nerve  tissue.  The  results  hardly  admit  comparison,  for  while  both 
observers  used  rabbits  for  their  experiments,  and  to  a  certain  extent 
the  same  method  of  preparation  of  sections,  Dr.  Dehio's  subjects  were 
all  those  of  extremely  acute  alcoholism,  the  animals  having  died 
within  1-36  hours  after  the  first  administration  of  the  poison,  while 
Dr.  Berkley's  had  been  treated  for  a  much  longer  time  (from  five  to 
twelve  months),  so  that  the  alcoholism  had  become  more  or  less 
chronic.  What  is  also  to  be  regretted  for  comparative  purposes  is 
that  the  German  observer  confined  himself  to  one  method  of  staining 
(Nissl's  methylene  blue),  and  his  observations  to  Purkinje's  cells  in 
the  cerebellum,  while  Dr.  Berkley  apparently  made  no  observations 
on  these  cells  with  that  method,  though  he  employed  the  Nissl  stain 
on  cells  of  the  hemispherical  cortex. 

Dehio's  rabbits  were  treated  in  most  cases  with  subcutaneous  injec- 
tions of  40  per  cent,  alcohol,  the  first  injection  being  from  7-10  ccm. 
and  the  resulting  intoxication  kept  up  by  injections  of  5  ccm.  when- 
ever the  animal  showed  signs  of  recovery.  According  to  the  time  of 
intoxication  before  death  resulted  the  total  amount  of  alcohol  admin- 
istered varied  from  20  to  25  ccm.  To  be  brief,  there  were  no  changes 
noted  in  Purkinje's  cells  in  cases  where  the  ante-mortem  intoxication 
had  been  very  short.  When  that  was  longer  he  found  that,  instead  of 
the  normal  finely  meshed  network  of  the  cell  body,  the  stained  sub- 
stance showed  granules  irregularly  distributed,  but  of  fairly  uniform 
size,  while  the  unstained  substance  had  taken  on  a  light  bluish  tone. 
The  cell  changes  in  some  cases  involved  the  whole  cell,  in  others  only 
a  part,  while  the  fine  granule  rows  of  the  processes  appeared  always 
unaffected.  The  nucleii  were  unaltered.  Even  in  extensive  changes 
by  no  means  all  of  the  ganglion  cells  were  affected ;  there  were  often 
whole  rows  of  entirely  normal  cells,  while  between  them  lay  singly  or 
in  groups  the  pathologically  changed. 

Dr.  Berkley's  experiments  were  much  more  complete  and  syste- 
matic and  had  what  would  seem  the  additional  advantage  for  the  in- 
vestigation of  the  comparatively  long  period  of  alcoholism  before 
death.  The  methods  of  staining  which  he  used  were  both  the  Nissl 
and  a  modified  Golgi-Cajal. 

His  results  showed,  besides  certain  vascular  changes,  modifications 
of  nerve  cells,  as  follows :  By  the  Nissl  method  the  nucleoli  of  many 
of  the  cortical  cells  appeared  roughened  and  uneven,  and  in  many 
cases  enlarged  and  surrounded  by  a  granular  appearance.  By  the 
method  of  silver  impregnation  the  principal  lesions  were  distinct  dim- 
inution in  size  of  a  great  majority  of  all  the  cortical  cells,  certain 


224  SENILE  DEMENTIA. 

swellings  in  the  dendritic  processes  with  roughening  of  some  of  the 
processes  and  sometimes  of  the  cell  bodies.  All  the  layers  of  cortical 
cells  seemed  to  partake  of  the  degeneration  to  some  extent.  Owing 
to  the  small  proportion  of  cells  that  are  stained  at  any  one  time  by  the 
silver  method,  it  was  impossible  to  determine  even  approximately  the 
proportion  of  normal  to  abnormal  cells. 

In  the  cerebellum  Purkinje's  cells  showed  distinct  degenerations, 
but,  as  already  remarked,  the  difference  of  method  does  not  allow 
comparison  between  Berkley's  preparations  and  those  of  Dehio. 
Dr.  Berkley  promises  a  subsequent  paper  upon  the  lesions  in  chronic 
alcoholism  in  the  human  subject  which  will  be  awaited  with  interest. 

LIVINGSTON  FARRAND. 
COLUMBIA  COLLEGE. 

SENILE  DEMENTIA. 

Ueber  Dementia  Senilis.  Inauguraldissertation,  von  JEAN  NOETZLJ, 
med.  pract.  Aus  der  psychiatrischen  Klinik  des  Herrn  Prof. 
Forel  in  Zurich. 

Dr.  Noetzli  submits  70  cases  of  senile  dementia  to  a  clinical  and 
pathological  analysis.  Only  those  patients  were  selected  who  died 
between  January  i,  1880,  and  December  31,  1891,  and  in  whom  an 
autopsy  was  made.  The  dissection  of  the  brain  was  made  by  Prof. 
Forel  himself  in  most  cases,  which  secures  a  very  welcome  uniformity 
of  the  material  for  comparison.  The  method  used  is  Meynert's. 

N.  makes  first  a  rough  classification  based  on  the  pathological 
findings.  While  the  changes  in  the  brain  are  purely  degenerative  and 
always  accompanied  by  arteriosclerosis,  in  one  class  the  patients  die 
with  a  uniform  degeneration  of  the  brain  without  focal  lesions ;  in  the 
other  classes  there  are  moreover  circumscribed  lesions  of  a  thrombotic 
or  haemorrhagic  nature.  This  second  group  is  again  subdivided  into  : 

A.  Cases  of  Senile  Dementia,  the  focal  lesions  of  which  are  symp- 
tomatically  completely  latent,  or  in  which  focal  symptoms  appear  in 
the  course  of  the  disease  or  towards  the  end. 

B.  Cases  of  Senile  Dementia  which  set  in  with  apoplexies  or  other 
focal  symptoms. 

Clinically,  the  cases  with  focal  lesions  are  marked  with  rapidly 
progressing  dementia  and  transitory  melancholy  or  maniacal  periods  of 
excitement,  while  typical  senile  melancholia  and  senile  4  mania  perse- 
cutoria'  belong  almost  exclusively  to  the  group  without  focal  lesions. 

Etiologically,  N.  states  with  Forel  that  the  heredity  of  a  disposition 
to  atheroma  of  the  blood  vessels  may  be  more  important  than  a  her- 


PSYCHOLOGICAL  LITERATURE.  22$ 

edity  of  mental  diseases  (Fiirstner) ,  but  that  the  quiet  forms  of  Senile 
Dementia  seen  in  the  poorhouses  or  asylums  for  old  people  would  be 
cases  without  disposition  to  (positive)  insanity,  whereas  those  predis- 
posed to  insanity  will  show  the  symptoms  of  senile  mania  and  senile 
4  mania  persecutoria.'  This  is,  however,  not  proven,  because  no  spe- 
cial attention  is  given  to  the  question  in  the  records.  Changes  in  the 
material  life  of  the  patients,  especially  physical  infirmity  and  dis- 
eases, are  very  prominent  elements,  not  only  where  they  lead  to  senile 
hypochondria ;  psychical  influences  play  decidedly  a  part  in  many  of 
those  predisposed  to  insanity,  contrary  to  the  view  of  Fiirstner,  who 
states  that  as  a  rule  the  victim  of  senile  dementia  is  dull  towards  psy- 
chical impressions.  Further,  Forel  makes  a  special  group  of  Dementia 
alcoholico-senilis,  which  seems  to  be  very  frequent  in  Switzerland. 

Symptomatology  :  i  Senile '  psychoses  are,  as  a  rule,  distinguished 
by  a  prodromal  stage,  with  loss  of  memory,  change  in  character,  and 
slight  intellectual  and  ethical  defects. 

Senile  mania  lacks  the  breadth  of  ideation,  the  acuteness  of  judg- 
ment, the  wit  and  the  flight  of  ideas  of  typical  mania;  it  is  rather 
loquacity  with  senseless,  impulsive  actions  and  confusion  especially  as 
to  time  and  place.  Emotions  are  superficial. 

Senile  melancholia :  In  his  cases,  N.  finds  no  delusions  of  self- 
belittlement  (on  account  of  the  weakness  of  ethical  and  moral  pro- 
cesses) ;  anxiety  and  fear  are  apt  to  cause  raptus  and  unexpected  at- 
tempts at  suicide ;  hypochondriacal  symptoms  are  prominent. 

Senile  '  mania  persecutoria '  or  Verf olgungswahnsinn  are  very  of- 
ten based  on  hallucinations  and  most  marked  at  night ;  these  are,  how- 
ever, primordial  deliria  of  persecution. 

The  alcoholico-senile  Dementia  shows  strong  manifestations  of 
chronic  alcoholism  ;  its  outset  is  relatively  premature  ;  at  a  very  early 
stage  the  patients  commit  suddenly  impulsive  acts  on  their  relations ; 
hallucinations  are  frequent  and  characteristic  for  alcoholism,  but  the 
dementia  modifies  the  whole  symptom  complex  of  alcoholism. 

The  70  cases  are  classified  as  follows ; 

I.   Senile  psychoses  without  focal  lesions 40 

(a)  Senile  mania 6 

(b)  Senile  melancholia 10 

(c)  Senile  4  mania  persecutoria ' 4 

(d)  Senile  hypochondria I 

(e)  Dementia  alcoholico-senilis  6 

(f)  Typical  simple  senile  dementia  13 

II.  Senile  psychoses  with  focal  lesions  30 


226  HYPNOTISM. 

A.  Cases  of  senile  dementia  with  focal  lesions,  which  were  latent 
or  secondary — 15  : 

(a)  Senile  mania — 

(b)  Senile  melancholia 3 

(c)  Senile  mania  persecutoria 2 

(d)  Dementia  alcoholico-senilis  I 

(e)  Typical  senile  dementia 9 

B.  Cases  of  senile  dementia  setting  in  with  apoplexies  or  with 
other  focal  symptoms — 15  : 

(a)  Senile  mania I 

(b)  Senile  mania  persecutoria 2 

(c)  Dementia  alcoholico-senilis  2 

(d)  Typical  senile  dementia ...10 

The  very  important  study  of  the  brain  weights  cannot  be  given  in 
detail  here.  The  chief  results  are  that  the  decrease  of  weight  aver- 
ages 200  grammes,  the  average  weight  in  men  being  1,190,  in  women 
1,065  grammes.  The  brain  mantle  loses  most  in  weight,  but,  con- 
trary to  the  view  of  Meynert,  the  loss  is  not  greater  in  the  frontal  lobe 
than  in  the  occipital  or  temporal  lobe.  ADOLF  MEYER. 

WORCESTER,  MASS. 


HYPNOTISM. 

Ueber    Schlaf,    Hypnose    und    Somnambulismus .      MAX    HIRSCH. 

Deutsche  med.  Wochenschrift.  5  Sept.  1895. 
The  above  essay  offers,  according  to  the  author,  a  partial  solution 
of  the  question  whether  hypnotic  and  normal  sleep  are  identical,  or 
whether  these  two  conditions  must  be  considered  as  differing  from 
each  other.  In  his  manual  'Suggestion  und  Hypnose'  (Leipzig, 
1893)  the  author  expresses  himself  of  the  latter  opinion;  hypnosis  he 
here  considers  merely  as  a  sleep  illusion.  Influenced  by  new  obser- 
vations, he  now  announces  a  modification  of  this  view.  He  could  ob- 
serve that  10  per  cent,  of  all  persons  hypnotized  by  him  fell  at  the  first 
attempt  into  the  deepest  state  of  hypnosis,  which  term  the  author  ap- 
plies to  that  condition  in  which  all  hypnotic  phenomena  may  easily  be 
produced  and  with  which  loss  of  memory  is  always  connected.  The 
author  further  observed  that  the  same  persons  likewise  show  a  certain 
peculiarity  with  respect  to  their  normal  sleep.  They  can  fall  asleep 
when  and  where  they  wish.  Rapport  is  also  present  in  these  persons 
during  sleep.  As  the  sleep  of  these  persons  completely  resembles  the 


PSYCHOLOGICAL  LITERATURE.  227 

condition  of  hypnosis,  the  author  designates  it  as  'somnambulic 
sleep,'  but  he  leaves  it  undecided  whether  this  sleep  is  or  is  not  a  patho- 
logical condition,  although  in  a  number  of  people  of  neuropathic  ten- 
dency it  represents  a  species  of  sleep.  Those  somnambulists,  how- 
ever, in  whom  the  representations  during  sleep  develop  into  actions 
are  designated  as  undoubtedly  pathological.  Although  Hirsch  still 
maintains  the  opinion  that  hypnosis  is  in  general  a  sleep  illusion,  he 
designates,  on  the  other  hand,  the  hypnosis  and  sleep  of  somnambulists 
as  identical.  "  Hypnosis  is  in  them  somnambulic  sleep."  The  author 
explains  these  phenomena  as  arising  from  the  different  degrees  of 
attention.  In  normal  sleep  the  attention  is,  in  his  opinion,  diffused 
over  all  centers  of  represention ;  in  this  condition  it  is  incapable  of 
concentration ;  in  somnambulic  sleep,  on  the  contrary,  the  attention 
retains  the  power  of  diverting  itself  to  single  representations.  Thus 
the  attention  of  these  persons  need  only  be  diverted  towards  the 
representation  of  sleep  in  order  to  cause  them  at  once  to  fall  asleep. 

I  should  like  in  this  place  to  make  mention  of  the  investigations  by 
which  Dr.  Oscar  Vogt  has  endeavored  to  decide  the  present  question, 
and  which  he  will  shortly  publish  in  the  '  Zeitschrift  fur  Hypno- 
tismus,  etc,'  edited  by  him.  So  far  as  I  am  acquainted  with  these 
interesting  researches  I  am  enabled  to  communicate  the  following 
facts.  In  comparing  the  graphically  fixed  attendant  phenomena  of 
hypnotic  and  normal  sleep  Dr.  Vogt  comes  to  the  conclusion  that 
there  are  here  many  individual  differences,  but  that  these  attendant  phe- 
nomena are  identical  in  one  and  the  same  individual.  Vogt  further 
states  that  in  all  normal  sleep  there  is  a  certain  stage  which  admits  of 
rapport  as  in  hypnosis  and  that,  if  this  moment  is  not  missed  during 
the  falling  asleep  of  a  person,  he  may  be  treated  precisely  as  a  hyp- 
notized subject.  Vogt  adheres  therefore  to  the  school  of  Nancy  and 
maintains,  contrary  to  the  view  taken  by  M.  Hirsch,  the  complete 
identity  of  natural  and  so-called  hypnotic  sleep. 

LEIPZIG.  FRIEDRICH  KIESOW. 

Criminelle    hypnotische     Suggestionen.     DR.     A.     A.    LIEBAULT. 

Zeitschrift  fur  Hypnotismus.  Bd.  III.  Hefte  7,  8,  9. 
The  author  advocates  the  possibility  of  hypnotic  and  post- hypnotic 
criminal  suggestions  by  presenting  facts  of  history,  analogies  between 
sleeping  and  waking  states,  and  incidents  of  his  own  experience. 
Dr.  Durand  de  Gros,  who  wrote  ' Electro-dynamisme  vital'  (1855), 
believed  himself  able  to  transform  moral  character  and  wrote  to  the 
Spanish  Court  for  permission  to  operate  on  Manuel  Blanco,  who, 


228  HYPNOTISM. 

under  the  conviction  that  he  was  a  wolf,  killed  six  men  and  actually 
ate  parts  of  the  bodies.  The  middle  ages  produced  numerous  cases 
of  this  kind  under  the  name  4  Warwolfe.'  They  are  men  who  reflect 
upon  and  admire  one  action  or  type  of  action  till  they  finally  merge 
their  own  personalities  into  a  submission  to  it  from  which  neither  re- 
flection nor  volition  can  free  them.  A  lunatic  who  believed  himself  a 
general  and  dressed  in  uniform  might  just  as  well  have  been  a  War- 
wolf.  A  little  girl  of  nine  or  ten  years  was  freed  by  hypnotic  sittings 
from  the  illusion  that  she  was  a  dog  and  from  habits  of  lying  by  the 
door,  barking  at  visitors,  running  on  all  fours.  Later  the  girl's 
grandmother  asked  the  author  to  free  the  girl's  father  from  a  low 
passion  for  his  child.  Still  later  a  neighbor's  daughter  reported  to 
her  parents  that  the  man  had  misconducted  himself  toward  her.  He 
was  imprisoned  for  life.  Author  believes  the  father  had  already  sug- 
gested to  his  own  child  that  she  was  a  pup. 

Fixing  the  attention  on  the  key-note  of  hypnotism,  sleep,  the  fixed 
idea  of  rest,  why  may  not  one  become  subject  to  personal  influences 
as  completely  as  in  cases  of  fascination  where  persons  are  often 
brought  to  violate  conviction  and  habitual  sentiment?  Certain  signs 
of  sleep  in  waking  state  are  physiological  and  pathological  hallucina- 
tions, impulsive  actions,  fixed  ideas,  as  that  one  cannot  swallow  some- 
thing bitter,  etc.  Signs  of  wakefulness  in  sleep  are  writing  poems, 
solving  problems,  recognition  of  approaching  danger,  consciousness 
of  the  passing  of  time,  recognizing  the  stopping  of  a  clock,  etc. 
From  4  per  cent,  to  5  per  cent,  of  subjects  have  by  the  author  been 
brought  to  perform  what  would  have  been  terrible  crimes  had  they 
been  real.  Automatic  sleep-suggestions  have  led  to  crimes  in  waking 
state  in  three  cases.  Author  mentions  Jacques  Clement,  who  be- 
lieved an  angel  commanded  him,  in  sleep,  to  murder  the  King  of 
France ;  also  of  Friedrich  Staaps,  who  attempted  the  murder  of  Na- 
poleon I.,  because  convinced  of  a  divine  commission  to  do  so.  Li6- 
geois  and  the  author  saw  a  subject  choose  a  suggested  watch  instead  of 
his  real  one  for  his  own,  proving  that  suggestion  is  real. 

The  author  asserts  that  anyone  in  artificial  sleep  can  be  brought  to 
perform  any  crime  in  which  he  is  able  to  participate  without  waking 
in  dreams.  The  author  holds  that  only  somnambulists — 'and  they 
are  but  few,  as  one  sees ' — are  capable  of  carrying  out  these  crimes. 
Those  who  fail  to  get  criminal  suggestions  carried  out  choose  subjects 
without  premeditation.  The  author  relates  the  case  of  somnambulist 
N.  Dr.  X.  and  the  author  suggested  to  N.,  in  artificial  sleep,  that  he 
would  visit  Herrn  F.  at  his  home  on  the  next  morning  at  1 1  130,  and 


PSYCHOLOGICAL  LITERATURE.  229 

in  leaving  the  house  would  conceal  two  statuettes  near  the  door  under 
his  mantle ;  after  two  days  N.  would  regret  his  theft  and  return  the 
pieces  of  art.  Dr.  X.  repeated  to  N. :  "and  you  will  steal,  do  you 
hear?  You  will  steal!"  Later  Herr  F.  related  the  event  as  having 
been  caried  out  in  every  particular.  Later  still,  N.  was  imprisoned  for 
stealing  an  overcoat.  On  his  person  was  found  a  note-book  recording 
many  small  thefts,  such  as  visiting  cards.  The  author  felt  himself 
possibly  to  blame.  Much  later  when  N.,  who  was  at  the  time  of  the 
theft  17  or  18,  had  grown  (N.'s  father  forbade  it  sooner)  the  author 
again  hypnotized  N.,  and  learned  that  at  the  same  time  when  the  boy 
committed  the  theft  which  ended  in  imprisonment,  Dr.  X.  had  met 
him  on  the  street,  lead  him  into  a  cafe\  hypnotized  and  commanded 
him  to  steal  4  little  things,'  such  as  watches,  gloves,  money  cases  and 
probably  visiting  cards.  GUY  TAWNEY. 

LEIPZIG. 


VISION. 

Note    on  the   Analysis    of  Contrast- Colors  by  Viewing,   through 

a  reflecting  tube,  a  Series  of  grey  disks  or  rings,  on  colored 

surfaces.     A.  M.  MAYER.     Am.  Jour,  of  Science.      (4)  I.,  38- 

40.     1895. 

Article  (  Vision)  in  Johnson's  Universal  Cyclopedia.    W.LECoNTE 

STEVENS. 
Untersuchungen  zur  Lehre  vom  Farbensinn.    W.  KOSTER.    Arch. 

f.  Ophth.     41  (4)  1-20. 
Theorie  de  la  Coleur.     W.  NICATI.     Arch.   d'Ophtal.     XL,  1-44. 

1895. 

From  the  fact  that  a  dark  grey  background  is  most  effective  when 
yellow  contrast-color  is  to  be  produced,  and  a  light  grey  when  the 
color  to  be  produced  is  green,  Professor  Mayer  argued  that  a  yel- 
low-green contrast-color  would  change  its  tone  with  a  change  in  the 
intensity  of  the  background.  He  found  this  to  be  the  case.  Bits  of 
violet  paper  were  placed  on  thirteen  different  shades  of  grey ;  on  the 
four  lightest,  the  contrast-color  was  a  greenish  yellow ;  on  the  fifth, 
it  was  equally  yellow  and  green ;  and  on  the  darker  papers  it  became 
greener  and  greener  until  at  last  it  was  a  green  almost  devoid  of  yel- 
low. But  Professor  Mayer  considers  that  this  may  be  due  to  the  fact, 
noticed  by  Professor  Rood,  that  some  colors  regularly  change  their 
tone  on  being  mixed  with  larger  and  larger  amounts  of  black. 


230  VISION. 

Professor  Stevens  has  given  what  must  be  considered  as  an  admi- 
rably clear  account  of  the  principal  phenomena  of  vision,  when  regard 
is  had  to  the  small  space  into  which  it  had  to  be  condensed.  He  makes 
short  work  of  the  bugbear  of  the  inverted  image,  and  he  shows  that 
the  contest  between  the  empirical  and  the  nativistic  school  loses  its  im- 
portance in  the  light  of  evolution.  Attention  is  given  to  some  of  the 
new  facts  of  color- vision ;  but  it  is  an  inadvertence  to  say  that  the 
cones  are  sensitive  to  variations  of  color  chiefly.  The  correct  state- 
ment would  be  that  only  the  cones  are  sensitive  to  variations  of  color ; 
they  must  be  extremely  sensitive  to  variations  of  intensity  in  white 
light  as  well, — otherwise  the  fovea  would  not  be  the  place  with  which 
we  make  out  the  minutest  variations  of  line  and  shade  in  an  intricate 
drawing.  If  the  cones  only  give  color,  they  do  not  give  color  only. 
Every  new  and  adequate  theory  of  vision  must  make  provision  for  this 
fact ;  but,  strange  to  say,  it  has  been  overlooked  by  no  mean  author- 
ities. 

I  must  protest  also  against  saying  that  the  physicists  are  satisfied 
with  Helmholtz's  theory  of  vision,  with  the  implication  that  that  is  a 
fact  of  critical  importance.  The  physicists  have  nothing  to  do  with  a 
theory  as  to  what  goes  on  in  the  retina  and  in  the  brain — that  is  be- 
yond their  province.  It  would  be  as  much  to  the  point  if  the  chem- 
ists were  to  announce  that  they  were  perfectly  satisfied  with  the  cor- 
puscular theory  of  light.  As  matter  of  fact,  the  objections  to  the  theory 
of  Helmholtz  are  exclusively  objections  from  the  side  of  sensation ;  as 
far  as  the  physics  of  the  question  is  concerned,  there  is  nothing  in  the 
theory  that  anyone  could  take  exception  to.  And  when  it  is  a  matter 
of  discussing  light  as  a  sensation,  we  do  not  so  much  say  that  the 
physicists  are  not  in  the  habit  of  thinking  about  their  sensations,  pure 
and  simple,  as  that  they  are  not  in  the  habit  of  reading  up  the  discus- 
sion that  is  going  on  regarding  sensation.  Professor  Cattell  has  said 
he  best  word  that  has  been  said  about  the  Helmholtz  theory  when  he 
said  that  it  is  both  pre-evolutionary  and  pre-psycho  logical ;  the  argu- 
ments that  hold  good  against  it  are  not  only  arguments  that  appeal 
with  especial  force  to  the  physiologist  and  the  psychologist,  but  they 
are  arguments  that  have  been  debated  in  Pfliiger's  Archivs  and  the 
Zeitschrift  fur  Psychologie  u.  Physiologic  der  Sinnesorgane  and 
other  journals  of  that  kind,  which  the  physicists,  overwhelmed  as  they 
are  by  their  own  journals,  have  no  time  to  read.  Even  the  critical 
facts,  of  late  discovery,  do  not  always  reach  them.  Captain  Abney,  in 
his  last  book  on  Color  Vision,  says  of  a  certain  man,  who  had  no  vari- 
ation of  sensation  throughout  the  entire  spectrum,  that  it  has  been 


PSYCHOLOGICAL  LITERATURE.  231 

'proved'  that  he  sees  green  only.  Now  if  a  man  has  no  other  light  sen- 
sation with  which  to  compare  his  one  sensation,  it  is  absolutely  impos- 
sible for  us  ever  to  find  out  what  that  one  sensation  is,  unless  by  way 
of  deduction  from  a  theory  which  is  taken  as  proved.  But,  fortunately 
for  such  cases  as  this,  there  have  been  instances  of  monocular  total 
color-blindness,  and  from  them  it  is  known  that  the  single  sensation  is 
a  colorless  sensation.  Moreover,  we  have  ourselves  this  monotone 
sensation  in  the  periphery  and  throughout  the  retina  in  a  faint  light, 
and  one  must  have  a  very  strong  preconceived  affection  for  a  theory  to 
regard  this  sensation  as  green,  though  this,  too,  is  a  feat  that  has  been 
accomplished.  I  have  been  told  that  there  is  one  important  university 
in  this  country  in  which  the  theories  of  Helmholtz  and  Hering  have 
both  been  definitely  given  up,  and  particularly  in  the  physical  depart- 
ment. 

Koster  explains  the  fact  that  the  fovea  lags  behind  the  periphery 
in  sensitiveness  to  faint  light  by  the  fact  that  it  is  generally,  on  account 
of  its  position  with  respect  to  pupil  and  lens,  more  brightly  lighted 
up,  and  hence,  if  I  understand  him,  in  a  condition  of  greater  exhaus- 
tion. He  forgets  that  in  a  faint  light  also  the  fovea  has  the  same  ad- 
vantage of  position,  and  that  the  superiority  of  the  periphery  is  on  this 
account  greater  than  a  simple  measurement  gives  evidence  of.  For 
Koster's  eyes  the  difference  would  seem  to  be  very  slight ;  if  this  is  so 
his  eyes  differ  most  remarkably  from  those  of  other  observers  who  have 
measured  the  phenomenon.  He  uses  the  term  periphery  without  any 
indication  as  to  what  part  of  it  he  is  comparing  with  the  fovea.  The 
maximum  sensitiveness  is  about  35°  away  from  the  fovea,  and  it  is- 
true  that  at  distances  remote  from  this  the  superiority  is  not  extremely 
great,  but  at  this  distance  it  is,  for  most  eyes,  as  four  to  one,  which  is 
hardly  to  be  called  slight.  He  seems  to  have  made  no  measurements. 

Koster  finds  the  Piirkinje  phenomenon  to  persist,  under  certain 
conditions,  in  the  fovea  itself ;  this  does  not,  however,  disprove  the 
belief  that  the  visual  purple  is  the  principal  factor  in  the  adaptation 
which  the  rods  undergo.  The  cones  have  a  means  of  adaptation 
of  their  own  in  the  varying  length  of  their  myoids  under  light  and 
shade  (Angelucci,  van  Genderen  Stort),  and  also  in  the  moving  out 
and  in  of  the  pigment  grains.  This  might  also  account  for  a  supe- 
riority of  the  edge  of  the  fovea  over  its  centre,  which  Koster  detects. 
That  the  adapted  eye  sees  colors  less  well  than  the  unadapted,  Koster 
finds  not  to  be  the  case.  This  agrees  with  my  own  observations ;  I 
found,  in  fact,  that  there  is  a  distinct  adaptation  for  color,  though 
nothing  like  so  much  as  for  light,  in  the  middle  periphery. 


232  EXPERIMENTAL. 

Nicati  uses  the  term  color  for  the  entire  sensation  produced  by  light, 
as  painters  speak  of  the  color,  sometimes,  of  a  picture  in  black  and 
white.  By  protochroism  he  means  grey  vision ;  by  metachroism, 
partial  color  blindness  ;  and  by  pleochroism,  normal  vision.  He  gives 
a  theory  which,  he  says,  will  seem  at  once  to  be  plausible,  and  which 
will  be  confirmed  by  all  the  considerations  which  he  will  have  men- 
tioned at  the  end.  In  the  rods  and  cones,  he  says,  there  is  no  differ- 
entiation such  as  could  give  rise  to  three  colors,  but  in  the  central 
terminations  of  the  bipolar  cells,  as  described  by  Ramon  Y.  Cajal,  we 
have  just  the  separation  into  three  layers,  which  we  are  in  search  of 
as  a  basis  for  a  three-color  theory.  The  chemical  effect  of  light  on 
the  photopsine  (the  visual  purple)  is  to  disengage  electricity ;  the  dif- 
ferent threads  of  the  bi-polar  cells  have  different  electric  resistance, 
and  thus  the  electricity  is  conducted,  according  to  its  varying  degrees 
of  strength,  by  one  or  another  of  the  sets  of  threads  to  the  several 
layers  of  their  terminal  expansions.  (But  is  not  this  a  little  like  making 
a  big  door  for  a  cat  and  a  little  door  for  a  kitten  ?  What  prevents  the 
strong  current  from  going  also  through  the  path  which  is  fitted  to  con- 
duct the  weak  current  ?)  The  synoptoblasts  are  the  large  ganglia  be- 
low the  bi-polar  cells,  and  their  function  is  to  restore  equilibrium,  af- 
ter red  has  been  seen,  by  sending  down  a  discharge  which  results  in 
green.  C.  LADD  FRANKLIN. 


EXPERIMENTAL. 

Ueber  den  Einfluss  von  Gesichts-Associationen  auf  die  Raum- 
tvahrnehmungen  der  Haut.  Miss  M.  F.  WASHBURN.  Phil- 
osophische  Studien.  Bd.  xi.  (1895),  pp.  190-225. 
The  development  of  tactual  space  is  undoubtedly  influenced  by 
vision  and,  though  the  assertion  of  this  article  that  the  fact  has  entirely 
escaped  the  notice  of  previous  investigators,  with  the  one  exception  of 
Weber,  who  mentions  it  only  in  a  negative  way,  called  for  a  correc- 
tion in  a  note  by  the  editor,  yet  a  series  of  experiments  such  as  Miss 
Washburn  has  made  serves  to  emphasize  an  important  truth.  Results 
obtained  from  subjects  who  visualized  but  little,  from  others  who  are 
able  at  will  to  abstract  from  their  otherwise  vivid  visual  images,  and 
finally  from  one  blind  subject  are  compared  with  normal  results  in 
which  the  images  immediately  arising  when  the  skin  is  touched  are 
allowed  to  play  their  usual  part.  In  this  way  it  is  shown  that 
Camerer's  subjects  in  his  experiments  on  the  method  of  equivalents 


PSYCHOLOGICAL   LITERATURE.  233 

used  visual  images  as  a  means  of  estimating  the  lengths  of  the  two 
distances  and  that  his  results  are  to  be  interpreted  in  the  light  of  this 
hypothesis.  The  well-known  observations  that  the  threshold  on  the 
extremities  is  shorter  in  the  transverse  than  in  the  longitudinal  axis  is 
corroborated  only  in  the  case  of  good  visualizers.  For  poor  visual- 
izers  the  difference  does  not  appear,  and  for  the  blind  subject  the 
ordinary  relation  was  completely  reversed.  These  observations  are 
to  be  explained  on  the  ground  that  the  narrower,  transverse  axis  is 
more  easily  and  clearly  visualized.  The  rapid  lowering  of  the 
threshold  through  training,  as  reported  by  Volkmann,  does  not  appear 
when  the  influence  of  vision  is  eliminated.  The  author  thinks  the 
fact  that  the  earlier  investigations  were  carried  out  with  open  eyes 
accounts  for  the  reduction  of  the  threshold.  The  judgment  of  direc- 
tion of  continuous  stimuli  or  of  the  relative  direction  of  two  points 
from  one  another  is  dependent  to  a  large  extent  on  visual  images  as 
shown  by  the  fact  that  this  judgment  is  most  accurate  in  the  care  of 
good  visualizers.  In  making  these  experiments  the  facts  were  noted 
that,  in  general,  two  points  can  be  distinguished  before  their  relative 
direction  is  correctly  perceived  and  that  the  direction  of  continuous 
stimuli  is  judged  better  than  that  of  an  equal  extent  lying  between 
the  two  points  of  the  aesthaBsiometer.  CHAS.  H.  JUDD. 

LEIPZIG. 

On  the  Development  of  Visual  Perception  and  Attention.  HAROLD 
GRIPPING,  Ph.  D.  American  Journal  of  Psychology,  Vol.  VII., 
227-236.  Jan.,  1896. 

Several  series  of  letters  were  exposed  through  an  opening  in  a 
screen  before  a  group  of  persons.  In  the  first  experiment  six  letters 
arranged  so  as  to  avoid  suggesting  words  as  much  as  possible  were  ex- 
posed at  a  time  for  -fa  second  and  for  ten  successive  times.  The  in- 
tervals between  the  several  exposures  and  the  warning  signals  were 
varied  and  the  observers  were  without  knowledge  when  they  might 
expect  the  signal.  The  observers  were  examined  in  groups  of  ten  to 
thirty,  representing  all  ages  from  seven  to  twenty  years.  The  observ- 
ers fixed  their  attention  upon  the  opening  in  the  screen  until  the  warning 
signal  was  given,  and  after  the  exposure  they  wrote  down  the  letters 
which  they  thought  they  saw.  Tables  are  given  showing  the  results 
arranged  according  to  age  and  grade  in  school.  From  these  u  it  is  evi- 
dent that  the  extensive  threshold,  or  ability  to  receive  and  retain  a  num- 
ber of  simultaneous  retinal  impressions,  is  a  function  of  individual 
growth,  reaching  its  maximum  only  when  the  observer  is  fully  devel- 


234  EXPERIMENTAL. 

oped."  "  Practice  increases  the  extensive  threshold  *  *  *"  "The 
tendency  to  guess  seems  to  decrease  with  maturity."  The  intellectual 
capacity  as  judged  by  the  teachers  was  compared  with  these  results. 
The  brightest  pupils  showed  the  highest  averages,  with  some  notable 
expeptions.  Those  pupils  who  marked  high  in  attention  generally  ex- 
celled others.  The  girls  showed  no  superiority  over  the  boys.  Better 
results  were  obtained  when  the  exposure  followed  the  warning  signal 
by  a  long  interval.  Children  may  experience  abnormal  fatigue  "with- 
out any  marked  effect  upon  the  accuracy  of  perception."  In  recalling 
the  letters  we  "  see  the  given  stimuli  as  a  unit  and  then  analyze  this 
unit  into  its  components."  When  only  one  letter  was  exposed  the 
older  pupils  again  excelled  the  younger ;  the  results  were  respectively 
seven  errors  in  230  observations  and  twenty-eight  errors  in  160  obser- 
vations. When  six  colors  were  used  in  the  place  of  the  six  letters  the 
results  were  apparently  the  same.  When  the  exposure  was  made  for 
a  full  second,  there  was  a  greater  percentage  of  correct  answers,  the 
older  pupils  showing  the  higher  percentages.  "The  extensive  thresh- 
old does  not  measure  the  number  of  objects  that  can  be  simultane- 
ously grasped  by  consciousness;"  it  u  may  depend  upon  the  reproduc- 
tive processes,  and  the  analysis  of  the  memory  image,"  and  "to  some 
extent  upon  the  attention."  The  '  capacity  for  attention'  is  to  be  dis- 
tinguished from  the  powers  of  the  attention. 

The  paper  has  great  significance  for  psychology  and  for  the  practi- 
cal teacher  who  has  to  do  with  the  marking  and  promotion  of  pupils. 
The  results  are  conclusive  against  the  absolute  value  of  a  system  of 
examinations.  It  is  well  to  bear  in  mind  in  regard  to  the  extensive 
threshold  increasing  with  age  that  in  our  schools  a  process  of  selection 
is  going  on  all  the  time.  Many  of  the  poorer  pupils  drop  out  before 
they  reach  the  higher  grades  and  the  dull  pupils  are  frequently  cases 
of  slow  development ;  they  show  their  brightness  at  a  later  period. 
The  personal  element  enters  into  a  teacher's  estimation  of  pupils  and 
this  may  explain  some  exceptions.  In  the  last  experiment  we  are  not 
told  whether  different  series  of  letters  were  used,  or  whether  other  pupils 
were  experimented  upon.  Unconscious  memory  in  the  one  case  and 
practice  in  the  other  may  play  some  part,  as  I  have  found  in  some 
of  my  experiments,  to  which  the  author  refers  in  a  note. 

T.  L.  BOLTON. 


PSYCHOLOGICAL   LITERATURE.  235 


CONSCIOUSNESS. 

Zur  Kritik  des  Seelenbegriffs :  einige  Bemerkungen  beim  Stu- 
dium  der  Wundt  schen  Psychologic.  ALLEN  VANNERUS.  Ar- 
chiv  fiir  System.  Philosophic,  Bd.  I.  Heft  3,360-400.  1895. 
Wundt  rightly  maintains,  says  his  critic,  that  the  subject  of  psychol- 
ogy, from  the  psychological  point  of  view,  exists  in  the  activity  of  the 
psychical  process  and  not  as  a  substance  lying  back  of  it.  But  his  op- 
position to  the  theory  of  a  substantial  soul  rests  on  a  restricted  concep- 
tion of  substance,  which  need  denote  no  more  than  the  real  ground  for 
determinations  not  absolutely  independent  or  be  more  than  an  ab- 
stractly conceived  factor  in  a  continuously  changing  whole.  And  his 
denial  of  the  applicability  of  the  conception  to  inner  reality  on  the  ground 
that  the  latter  is  reality  at  first  hand,  and  therefore  not  constituted  by  a 
category  which  is  its  own  product,  rests  on  a  mistake  as  to  the  facts. 
For  only  an  actual  content  of  consciousness  is  directly  intuited, 
whereas  other  aspects  of  psychical  reality,  the  fusion  of  sensations, 
for  instance,  can  only  be  inferred.  Wundt's  emphasis  of  the  process 
in  mental  life  seriously  threatens  its  real  unity.  But  change  without 
permanence  is  impossible.  It  is  psychologically  impossible  because 
the  relating  activities  of  consciousness  presuppose  at  least  a  relatively 
permanent  subject,  and  because,  without  some  constancy  in  the  subject, 
not  only  would  all  mental  states  eventually  pass  into  nothingness,  but, 
except  by  a  miracle,  no  mental  state  could  ever  arise.  Logically, 
again,  all  activity  implies  a  constant  factor;  otherwise  reality  is  'a 
hideous  mystery  of  limitless  possibilities.'  Finally,  the  theory  of 
parallelism  requires  an  original  psychical  reality  as  the  subject  of  the 
development  of  consciousness  and  the  basis  of  its  various  modes.  This 
original  psychic  basis  of  mental  life  is  constant,  not  as  a  substance  'lying 
back'  of  experience,  but  in  the  sense  that  it  is  self-identical  in  its  dif- 
ferent functions.  Wundt,  however,  makes  the  unity  of  the  mental 
life  consist  in  the  connection  of  the  psychical  events  themselves.  But 
if  these  events  are  not  functions  of  the  same  subject,  how  is  such  con- 
nection possible  ?  We  must  postulate  their  creation  ex  nihilo  and  as- 
sume as  many  egos  as  states  of  consciousness.  The  truth  about  the 
soul  is  that  it  is  a  living,  organic  unity.  The  psychical  life  is  a  single 
undivided  whole  and  itself  the  real  unitary  subject.  This  concrete 
living  self  consists  in  given  ideas,  feelings  and  volitions  and  the  activity 
by  which  these  functions  are  conditioned ;  the  whole,  however,  is  uni- 
fied by  a  factor  which  in  itself  is  the  abstract  ego  and  from  the  empiri- 


236  CONSCIOUSNESS. 

cal  point  of  view  one  side  of  that  psychophysical  substance  in  which 
Wundt  finds  the  substrate  and  basis  of  the  soul's  unity. 

Wundt's  reply  to  this  argumentation  in  the  current  number  of  the 
1  Philosophische  Studien*  (XII.,  37  ff.)  is  to  the  effect  that  his  critic 
has  not  sufficiently  grasped  the  distinction  between  physical  science 
and  psychology,  according  to  which  the  latter  is  science  of  experience 
as  immediately  given,  whereas  the  standpoint  of  the  former  requires 
it  to  deal  with  objects  constructed  by  thought.  Consequently  a 
physical  hypothesis  is  tested  by  its  utility,  a  psychological  by  fact,  and 
the  fact  is  that  no  other  unity  is  found  or  required  in  the  psychical  life 
except  that  which  exists  in  the  connection  of  its  processes.  This  is 
singularly  unsympathetic  and  avoids  the  real  issue.  The  real  question 
is,  Is  there  discoverable,  whether  by  direct  inspection  or  by  reflection, 
in  the  movement  of  our  subjective  experience,  any  constant  factor  ?  Is 
the  psychical  life  like  a  stream  which  simply  flows  on  or  is  it  a  pro- 
cess of  self-development?  Sameness  without  change  is  asserted  by 
nobody ;  change  with  the  sense  of  sameness  is  a  fact.  Is  the  same- 
ness predicated  really  there  ?  That  is  the  real  question,  as  James  puts 
it.  Theories  of  '  actuality '  and  4  substantiality '  are  altogether  subor- 
dinate, mere  names.  And  the  question  is  not  to  be  set  aside  by  the 
arbitrary  distinction  of  hypothesis  of  fact  and  hypothesis  of  utility  nor 
referred  for  answer  to  such  irrelevant  illustrations  as  Kant's  elastic 
balls,  which,  if  they  were  conscious,  would  be  obliged  to  suppose,  as 
we  are,  that  they  themselves  were  the  subjects  of  experiences  referred 
to  the  past  but  appropriated  by  the  present  self,  whose  identity  with 
the  past  self  would  be,  if  illusion,  then  a  necessary  illusion. 

H.  N.  GARDINER. 

Le  Moi  des  Mourants.     V.  EGGER.     Revue  Philosophique,  XLL, 

26-38.     Jan.  1896. 

Many  persons  who  have  survived  an  accident  that  seemed  to  be 
fatal  report  that  at  the  time  their  whole  past  life  came  up  before  them. 
This  experience,  which  is  not,  however,  to  be  taken  literally,  M.  Egger 
is  disposed  to  connect,  not  with  pathological  exaltations  of  memory  in 
epileptics,  etc.,  but  with  quite  normal  phenomena.  Noticing  that 
children  apparently  do  not  have  the  experience,  he  refers  to  the  aggre- 
gation of  memories  with  which  the  ego  is  continually  being  consti- 
tuted from  youth  to  age,  and  which  is  particularly  marked  in  the  aged, 
and  the  fact  that  the  civilized  adult  about  to  die  and  capable  of  reflec- 
tion normally  realizes  his  personality  in  a  form  vivid  and  significant. 
But  with  regard  to  their  experiences  we  want  more  evidence.  The 


PSYCHOLOGICAL  LITERATURE.  2tf 

author  therefore   suggests  a  systematic  enquiry  among  persons  who 
have  faced  what  seemed  to  them  certain  death. 

Arrested  Mentation.  G.  FERRERO.  The  Monist,  Vol.  6,  60-75. 
October,  1895. 

It  is  a  natural  law  of  '  unconscious  *  reasoning,  that  is,  reasoning 
not  consciously  guided  by  the  ideals  of  strict  logic  (Aristotle  and 
Mill),  that  it  stops  short  in  its  explanation  of  phenomena  with  what  is 
revealed  directly  to  the  senses  and  neglects  factors  which  can  only  be 
discovered  by  reflection  and  comparison.  This  species  of  '  arrested 
mentation'  explains  various  popular  errors  and  suggests  the  possibility 
of  a  new  science,  positive  logic,  the  study  of  the  laws  of  human  reason 
according  to  age,  intellectual  development  and  the  state  of  civilization. 
Another  more  radical  species  involves  the  abolition  of  all  observation. 
This  is  a  priori  reasoning.  Mentation  is  here  arrested  because  the  de- 
ductive method  merely  draws  a  conclusion  from  a  premise  and  conse- 
quently involves  far  fewer  mental  elements  and  less  effort  than  the  in- 
ductive. 

In  his  grasp  of  the  facts  and  the  psychology  of  the  so-called  deduc- 
tive method,  historically  considered,  as  well  as  in  his  general  appre- 
ciation of  logical  process,  the  author  seems  to  furnish  a  good  illustra- 
tion of  his  subject. 

SMITH  COLLEGE.  H.  N.  GARDINER. 


THE  PSYCHOLOGY  OF  RHETORIC. 

Figures  of  Rhetoric :  A  Psychological  Study.  GERTRUDE  BUCK. 
No.  I.  of  Contributions  to  Rhetorical  Theory.  Edited  by  F.  N. 
SCOTT.  University  of  Michigan.  1895. 

This  monograph  endeavors  to  state  in  psychological  terms  the  pro- 
cess by  which  rhetorical  figures  come  into  being.  While  a  concept  is 
seen  to  be  the  verification  of  two  or  more  percepts,  which  verification, 
when  complete,  is  expressed  in  language  by  a  name,  there  are  obviously 
sentences  that  express  implicit  rather  than  explicit  relationships. 
These  sentences,  representing  an  incomplete  verification,  are  '  figura- 
tive.' 'Radical'  figures  occur  when  the  verifying  relation  between 
the  two  objects  has  not  yet  been  constructed  in  the  mind  of  the  speaker 
or  writer;  'poetical'  figures  when  the  relation  is  at  last  partially  ex- 
plicit in  his  consciousness.  The  ordinary  classifications  of  rhetorical 
figures  could  be  simplified  by  making  merely  two  groups ;  those  in 


238  THE  PSYCHOLOGY  OF  RHETORIC. 

which  stress  is  laid  respectively  upon  the  stages  of  verification 
and  of  discrimination.  This  theory  that  a  figure  of  speech  is  an 
organized  complex  of  mental  activities  whose  implicit  verifying  prin- 
ciple comes  to  be  more  or  less  explicit  in  the  mind  of  the  reader  or 
hearer,  is  then  applied  to  the  problem  of  the  nature  of  the  pleasurable 
effect  arising  from  the  use  of  figurative  language,  and  to  the  question 
of  humor,  the  writer  contending  that  the  perception  of  the  ludicrous 
and  the  recognition  of  a  figure  of  speech  are  processes  essentially  one. 
A  carefully  compiled  bibliography  of  figures  is  appended. 

The  ^Esthetics  of  Words.  L.  A.  SHERMAN.  The  Northwestern 
Journal  of  Education.  Sept.,  Oct.,  Nov.,  Dec.,  1895. 
Professor  Sherman's  series  of  articles  is  thus  far  devoted  to  the 
exposition,  largely  by  graphical  methods,  of  the  varying  '  values '  of 
words  for  artistic  purposes.  Words  are  signs  of  emotion  as  well  as 
signs  of  ideas,  and  their  emotional  meaning  cannot  be  told  by  logical 
definition.  As  a  preparation  for  the  study  of  poetry,  pupils  should  be 
taught  to  distinguish  between  conceptual  words,  which  occupy  the 
mind  more  with  knowing  than  with  feeling,  and  experiential  words,  in 
which  knowing  is  merged  in  feeling.  These  emotional  and  suggestive 
words,  depending  for  their  power  upon  reminiscences  or  sometimes 
upon  anticipated  experiences,  stand  thus  in  the  closest  relation  to 
things.  The  aesthetics  of  things  depends  on  the  types  or  ideals  of 
ultimate  truth  or  beauty  which  they  evolve  or  evince.  Ideas,  and 
words  as  the  signs  of  ideas,  satisfy  us  in  proportion  to  their  power  to 
fulfil  our  types.  Those  words  only  should  be  called  '  poetic '  which 
stand  for  things  absolute  in  their  truth  or  beauty.  Professor  Sherman's 
theory  of  types  will  not  be  acceptable  to  all,  but  readers  of  his  Ana- 
lytics of  Liter  aturevr\\\  welcome  the  interesting  and  acute  discussion 
contained  in  these  articles.  BLISS  PERRY. 

PRINCETOX. 


NEW  BOOKS.  239 


NEW   BOOKS. 

Child  and  Childhood  in  Folk  Thought.  ALEXANDER  FRANCIS 
CHAMBERLAIN.  New  York  and  London,  Macmillan  &  Co. 
1896.  Pp.  x+464.  $3.00. 

The  Number  Concept — Its  Origin  and  Development.  LEVI  LEO- 
NARD CONANT.  New  York  and  London,  Macmillan  &  Co, 
1896.  Pp.  vi+2i8.  $2.00. 

La  theorie  platonicienne  des  sciences.  ELIE  HALEVY.  Paris,  Alcan. 
Pp.  xl+378. 

Die  Spiele  der  Thiere.  KARL  GROOS.  Jena,  Gustav  Fischer. 
1896.  Pp.  ix+359.  M.  6. 

Manueli  di  Semijotica  delle  Malattie  mentali.  E.  MORSELLI. 
Vol.  II.  Esame  psicologico  degli  alienati.  With  77  illustra- 
tions and  13  tables.  Milan,  Vallardi.  1895.  Pp.  xviii+852. 

L.  15- 

/  Sogni  e  il  Sonno  nelV  Isterismo  e  nella  Epilessia.    S.  DE  SANCTIS. 

Rome,  Societa  Editrice  Dante  Alighieri.     1896.    Pp.  216.    L.  2. 
The  Theory  of  Social  Forces.     S.  N.  PATTEN.     Supp.  to  Annals 

of  the  Amer.  Acad.  of  Polit.  and  Social  Science.     Philadelphia, 

Amer.  Acad.      1896.     Pp.  151. 
Evolution  in  Art.     A.   C.  HADDON.     London,  Walter  Scott;  New 

York,  Scribners.     1895.     Pp.  xviii+364.     $1.25. 
Studies  in  Childhood.     JAMES  SULLY.     New  York,  D.  Appleton  & 

Co.      1896.     Pp.  viii+527. 
Die  Hauptpunkte  der  Ifum'schen  Erkenntnislehre.     ERNST  PETZ- 

HOLTZ.     Berlin,  Gustav  Schade.      1895.     Pp.  44. 
Die  Erkenntnisstheorien  bei  Leibniz  und  Kant.     LOTHAR  VOLZ. 

Rostock,  Universitats-Buchdruckerei.      J895.     Pp.  7°« 
Movement.     E.  J.  MAREY.     New  York,  D.  Appleton  &  Co.      1895. 

Pp.  xv+322.     $1.75. 
Die  Lehre  von  den  spezifischen  Sinnesenergien.     R.  WEINMANN. 

Hamburg  and  Leipzig,  Voss.     1895.     Pp.  96.     M.  2.50. 


NOTES. 

THE  THIRD  INTERNATIONAL  CONGRESS  OF  PSYCHOLOGY. 
The  opening  of  the  Congress  will  take  place  on  the  morning  of 
August  4th,  1896,  in  the  great  '  Aula'  of  the  Royal  University. 


240  NOTES. 

All  psychologists  and  all  educated  persons  who  desire  to  further 
the  progress  of  psychology  and  to  foster  personal  relations  among  the 
students  of  psychology  in  different  nations  are  invited  to  take  part  in 
the  meetings  of  the  Congress.  Women  will  have  the  same  rights  as 
men. 

Those  who  propose  (i)  to  offer  papers  or  addresses  or  (2)  gener- 
ally to  take  part  in  the  Congress  are  requested  to  fill  up  the  accompa- 
nying forms  and  to  send  them  to  the  Secretary  before  the  beginning 
of  the  Congress. 

The  subscription  to  be  paid  by  those  desiring  to  take  part  in  the 
Congress  is  15  M.  On  receipt  of  this  sum  a  card  will  be  sent  to  every 
member  entitling  him  to  attend  all  the  meetings  and  to  receive  the 
Journal,  Tageblatt,  issued  daily  (with  a  register  of  the  members)  and 
one  copy  of  the  Report  of  the  Congress.  The  card  also  admits  to  all 
festivities  arranged  in  connection  with  the  Congress  and  all  special 
privileges  granted  to  its  members. 

The  Tageblatt,  which  will  appear  in  four  numbers,  will  serve  to 
register  the  guests  and  contain  information  as  to  accommodation,  the 
programme  of  the  papers  and  addresses  and  social  arrangements,  the 
list  of  members  and  a  short  notice  of  the  places  of  interest  in  Munich. 

The  languages  used  at  the  Congress  may  be  German,  French,  Eng- 
lish and  Italian. 

The  Congress  will  perform  its  work  in  general  and  sectional  meet- 
ings. The  division  of  the  sections  will  be  arranged  according  to  the 
papers  and  addresses  which  may  be  offered.  The  meetings  take  place 
at  the  Royal  University. 

The  length  of  the  papers  or  addresses  of  the  sectional  meetings  is 
limited  to  20  minutes.  It  is  hoped  that  any  member  who  takes  part  in 
the  discussion  will,  to  insure  a  correct  report  of  his  speech,  give  the 
chief  points  of  it  (on  a  form  which  will  be  provided)  either  during  or 
at  the  close  of  the  meeting. 

Any  psychologist  who  offers  a  paper  or  address  is  requested  to 
send  to  the  Secretary  before  the  beginning  of  the  Congress  a  short 
written  abstract  of  its  contents.  These  abstracts  will  be  printed  and 
distributed  amongst  the  audience,  so  that  the  different  languages  used 
at  the  Congress  may  be  better  understood. 

Those  members  of  the  local  committee  who  are  mentioned  in  the 
programme  below  will  all  give  information  as  to  their  respective  de- 
partments of  work  and  also  in  connection  with  the  inspection  of  scien 
tific  institutes  and  demonstrations. 

The  Congress  will  meet  in  Sections  as  follows : 


NOTES.  241 

/.  Psychophysiology. — Prof.  Riidinger,  Prof.  Graetz,  Privatdo- 
cent  Dr.  Cremer  will  give  all  information  concerning  this  part  of  the 
programme. 

a.  Anatomy  and  Physiology  of  the  brain  and  of  the  sense-organs 
(somatic  basis  of  psychical  life). 

Development  of  nerve-centres ;  theory  of  localization  and  of  neu- 
rons, paths  of  association  and  structure  of  the  brain. 

Psychical  functions  of  the  central  parts ;  reflexes,  automatism,  in- 
nervation,  specific  energies. 

b.  Psychophysics.     Connection  between   physical   and  psychical 
processes ;  psychophysical  methods ;  the  law  of  Fechner.     Physiology 
of  the  senses  (muscular  and  cutaneous  sensibility,  audition,  light-per- 
ception, audition  colored)  ;  psychical  effects  of  certain  agents  (medi- 
cines).    Reaction-times.     Measurement  of  vegetative  reactions   (in- 
spiration, pulse,  muscle-fatigue). 

77.  Psychology  of  the  Normal  Individual. — Prof.  Lipps,-  Privat- 
docent  Dr.  Cornelius,  Dr.  Weinmann  will  give  all  information  con- 
cerning this  part  of  the  programme. 

Scope,  methods  and  resources  of  Psychology.  Observation  and 
experiment.  Psychology  of  sensations.  Sensation  and  idea,  memory 
and  reproduction.  Laws  of  association,  fusion  of  ideas.  Conscious- 
ness and  unconsciousness,  attention,  habit,  expectation,  exercise. 
Perception  of  space  (by  sight,  by  touch,  by  the  other  senses)  ;  con- 
sciousness of  depth-dimension,  optical  illusions.  Perception  of  time. 

Theory  of  Knowledge.  Imagination.  Theory  of  feeling.  Feel- 
ing and  sensation.  Sensuous,  aesthetic,  ethical  and  logical  feeling. 
Emotions.  Laws  of  feeling. — Theory  of  will.  Feeling  of  willing 
and  voluntary  action.  Expressive  moments.  Facts  of  ethics. — Self- 
consciousness.  Development  of  personality.  Individual  differences. 

Hypnotism,  theory  of  suggestion,  normal  sleep,  dreams. — 
Psychical  automatism. — Suggestion  in  relation  to  paedagogics  and 
criminality ;  paedagogical  psychology. 

777.  Psychopatholog-y.—Proi.  Dr.  Grashey,  Dr.  Frhr.  v.  Schrenck- 
Notzing,  Edm. Parish  will  give  all  information  on  this  part  of  the 
programme. 

Heredity  in  Psychopathology ;  Statistics. — Can  acquired  qualities 
be  transferred  by  inheritance? — Psychical  relations  (somatic  and 
psychic  heredity) ,  phenomena  of  degeneration,  psychopathic  inferiority 
(insane  temperament) . — Genius  and  degeneration ;  moral  and  social 
importance  of  heredity. 

Psychology  in  relation  to  criminality  and  jurisprudence. 


242  NOTES. 

Psychopathology  of  the  sexual  sensations. 

Functional  nerve  disease  (hysteria  and  epilepsy) . 

Alternating  consciousness;  psychical  infection;  the  pathological 
side  of  hypnotism ;  pathological  states  of  sleep. 

Psychotherapy  and  suggestive  treatment. 

Cognate  phenomena ;  mental  suggestion,  telepathy,  transposition 
of  senses ;  international  statistics  of  hallucinations. 

Hallucinations  and  illusions ;  imperative  ideas,  aphasia  and  similar 
pathological  phenomena. 

IV.  Comparative  Psychology. — Prof.  Dr.  Ranke,  Dr.  G.  Hirth, 
Dr.  Fogt  will  give  all  information  in  this  department. 

Moral  statistics. 

The  psychical  life  of  the  child. 

The  psychical  functions  of  animals. 

Ethnographical  and  anthropological  psychology. 

Comparative  psychology  of  languages ;  graphology. 

Prof.  Dr.  Lipps,  Georgenstrasse  i8/1?  is  Committee  of  Reception, 
and  Dr.  Frhr.  von  Schrenck-Notzing,  prakt.  Arzt,  Max  Josephstr.  2/lf 
is  General  Secretary. 

The  International  Committee  of  Organization  is  as  follows ; 

President:  Prof.  Dr.  Stumpf,  member  of  the  "Akademie  der 
Wissenschaf ten,"  Berlin  W.,  Niirnbergerstrasse  14;  Vice-President : 
Prof.  Dr.  Lipps,  Miinchen,  Georgenstrasse  i8/j.  General  Secretary: 
Dr.  Frhr.  von  Schrenck-Notzing,  prakt.  Arzt,  Miinchen,  Max-Joseph- 
strasse  2/r  Members  of  the  committee  :  Prof.  Bain,  Aberdeen,  Scot- 
land. Prof.  Baldwin,  Princeton  University,  New  Jersey,  U.  S.  A. 
Prof.  Bernheim,  Nancy,  h6pital  civil,  France.  Prof.  Delboeuf,  Brus- 
sels, Belgium.  Prof.  H.  H.  Donaldson,  Chicago,  111.,  U.  S.  A. 
Prof.  Ebbinghaus,  Breslau,  Germany.  Prof.  Ferrier,  Cavendish 
Square,  34,  London  W.,  England.  Prof.  G.  S.  Fullerton,  116 
Spruce  street,  Philadelphia,  Pa.,  U.  S.  A.  Prof.  Stanley  Hall,  Clark 
University,  Worcester,  Mass.,  U.  S.  A.  Prof.  Hitzig,  Halle,  Ger- 
many. Prof.  James,  Cambridge,  Mass.,  95  Irving  street,  U.  S.  A. 
Prof.  Lehmann,  Kopenhagen,  Hagelsgade  7,  Denmark.  Prof.  Lie"- 
geois,  Nancy,  France.  Prof.  Lightner  Witmer,  University  of  Penn- 
sylvania, Philadelphia,  Pa.,  U.  S.  A.  Prof.  Mendelssohn,  Peters- 
burg, Moika  81,  Russia.  Prof,  von  Monakow,  Zurich,  Stadelhoferstr 
10,  Switzerland.  Prof.  Morselli,  Genova,  via  Assarotti  46,  Italia. 
Mr.  F.  W.  H.  Myers,  Deckhampton  House,  Cambridge,  England. 
Dr.  Newbold,  University  of  Pennsylvania,  Philadelphia,  Pa.,  U.  S.  A. 
Prof.  Preyer,  Villa  Panorama,  Wiesbaden,  Germany.  Prof.  Richet, 


NOTES.  243 

rue  de  I'Universite"  15,  Paris,  France.  Prof.  Schafer,  University  Col- 
lege, Gower  street,  W.  C.  London,  England.  Prof.  Sidgwick, 
Newnham  College,  Cambridge,  England.  Prof.  Sully,  Hampstead, 
N.  W.,  East  Heath  Road,  London,  England.  Dr.  Ward,  Selwyn 
Gardens,  Cambridge,  England. 

THE  Annee  Psychologique  for  1895  will  contain,  in  addition  to 
analyses  of  psychological  literature,  and  the  Bibliography  for  1895, 
prepared  by  Dr.  Farrand  and  Prof.  Warren  for  this  REVIEW,  the  fol- 
lowing original  articles : 

i.  Ribot,  Les  caracteres  anormaux  et  morbides.  2.  Binet  et 
Courtier,  Etude  des  vasomoteurs  dans  leur  rapport  avec  Petat  intellec- 
tuel,  des  emotions,  etc.  3.  Bourdon,  Experiences  sur  les  associations 
d'ide"es.  4.  Flournoy,  Temps  de  lecture  et  d'oubli.  5.  Biervliet, 
Illusions  de  poids.  6.  Forel,  L'instinct  des  fourmis.  7.  Nilliez,  La 
me" moire  des  chiffres.  8.  Henri,  La  localisation  des  sensations  du 
toucher.  9.  Binet,  La  peur  chez  les  enfants.  10.  Binet  et  Courtier, 
Recherches  graphiques  sur  la  musique.  n.  Binet  et  Courtier,  Ap- 
pareils  nouveaux  pour  la  methode  graphique.  12.  Passy,  Revue 
gene" rale  sur  les  sensations  olf actives.  13.  Henri,  Revue  ge"nerale  sur 
1'erreur  probable.  14.  Henri,  Revue  gene" rale  sur  la  mesure  de  la 
sensibilite  tactile.  15.  Binet  et  Henri,  Revue  g6n£rale  sur  la  psychol- 
ogic individuelle.  16.  Azoulay,  Revue  g£nerale  sur  les  conclusions 
psychologique  des  derniers  travaux  sur  la  structure  du  systeme  nerveux. 
17.  Binet,  Revue  ge"nerale  sur  les  experiences  de  plethysmographie. 

DR.  JAMES  WARD,  of  Cambridge,  England,  writes  a  private  note  to 
one  of  the  editors  (apropos  of  a  reference  to  him  in  a  book  review) , 
which  has  a  certain  historical  interest  as  well  as  the  purely  personal 
one.  He  says :  "In  your  excellent  Review  (Nov.,  1895,  p.  608)  I  am 
charged  with  '  virulence '  and  '  acridity '  in  criticizing  the  4  new  psy- 
chology.' The  words  seem  to  me  to  be  unfair  and  ill-chosen.  It  is 
odd  that  I  who  did  my  level  best  to  get  a  psychophysical  laboratory 
started  here  before  there  was  a  single  such  laboratory  in  existence — 
unless  Wundt's  then  private  laboratory  is  to  count — should  be  counted 
the  enemy  of  pyschophysics.  The  very  first  thing  I  ever  wrote  was  a 
monograph  on  the  Relation  of  Physiology  to  Psychology,  and  before 
1880  I  had  spent  two  years  in  physiological  laboratories.  What  I  ob- 
ject to  is  psychophysics  by  men  who  are  not  psychologists." 

THE  psychological  department  of  Cornell  University  has  moved  to 
Morrill  Hall,  where  it  is  said  to  have  nine  rooms  and  4,000  square 
feet  of  floor  space.  The  Psychological  Laboratory  of  the  University 


244  NOTES. 

of  Nebraska  has  been  moved  into  the  first  floor  of  the  new  library 
building  and  occupies  a  series  of  five  rooms  with  a  floor  space  of  3,000 
square  feet.  In  the  new  biological  buildings  which  the  University  of 
Chicago  will  erect  with  a  part  of  the  $1,000,000  given  by  Miss  Culver, 
ample  provision  will  be  made  for  the  Psychological  Laboratory.  In 
the  new  Schemerhorn  Hall  of  Natural  Sciences  to  be  erected  for 
Columbia  University  at  a  cost  of  about  $400,000,  more  than  one- tenth 
of  the  building  is  allotted  to  psychology. 

DR.  C.  A.  STRONG,  associate  professor  of  psychology  in  the  Uni- 
versity of  Chicago,  has  been  elected  lecturer  on  Psychology  in 
Columbia  University. 

H.  C.  WARREN,  M.  A.,  has  been  appointed  assistant  professor  of 
Experimental  Psychology  in  Princeton  University. 

LEOPOLD  Voss,  Hamburg  and  Leipzig,  has  begun  the  publication 
of  a  new  Archiv  called  Kantstudien,  edited  by  Dr.  Hans  Vaihinger, 
of  the  University  of  Halle,  with  the  cooperation  of  E.  Adickes,  E.  Bou- 
troux,  Edw.  Caird,  C.  Cantoni,  J.  E.  Creighton,  W.  Dilthey,  B.  Erd- 
mann,  K.  Fischer,  M.  Heinze,  R.  Reicke,  A.  Riehl  and  W.  Windel- 
band.  The  journal  will  treat  not  only  Kant's  contributions  to  philos- 
ophy, but  also  the  general  development  of  modern  philosophy  in  its 
relations  to  Kant.  Contributions  (which  may  be  in  English)  are 
invited  by  the  editor. 

A  NEW  Russian  journal,  a  Review  of  Psychiatry,  Neurology  and 
Experimental  Psychology,  edited  by  Dr.  Bekhteret,  will  hereafter  be 
published  monthly. 


VOL.  III.    No.  3.  MAY,  1896. 


THE  PSYCHOLOGICAL  REVIEW. 


STUDIES   FROM  THE    PSYCHOLOGICAL  LABORA- 
TORY OF  THE  UNIVERSITY  OF  CHICAGO. 

I.  REACTION-TIME  :    A   STUDY   IN  ATTENTION  AND  HABIT. 

BY  JAMES  ROWLAND  ANGELL  AND  ADDISON  W.  MOORE. 
ASSISTED  BY  J.  J.  JEGI. 

It  is  not  without  grounds  that  experimentation  upon  reaction- 
time  has  been  called  the  Lieblingsgegenstand  of  experimental 
psychology.  The  facts  appear  so  simple  and  the  interpretation 
so  illusive  that  ingenuity  has  seemed  piqued  anew  each  time 
the  matter  has  been  opened.  The  fact  has  had  its  interest  re- 
cently augmented  by  Prof essor  James  Mark  Baldwin's  challenge 
of  the  results  and  explanations  which  have  hitherto  passed  cur- 
rent stamped  with  the  mark  of  the  justly  revered  Leipzig  school. 
It  must  often  have  occurred  to  many  readers  following  the  Leip- 
zig explanation  of  the  alleged  fact  that  the  time  of  the  so- 
called  *  motor  form '  of  reaction  is  faster  than  the  *  sensory ' 
to  ask,  why  a  brain-reflex  should  be  established  in  the  former 
case  and  not  in  the  latter,  or  why,  if  established,  it  should  be  so 
much  less  effective  in  reducing  the  time  consumed  by  the  re- 
action ;  why  occasionally,  despite  the  assertion  that  such  per- 
sons did  not  possess  the  necessary  Anlage  and  so  could  not  be 
regarded,  some  persons  proved  unable  to  make  any  distinction 
whatever  in  the  forms  or  even  showed  faster  time  in  the  sensory 
attitude.  The  fact  that  these  and  other  questions  were  left 
open  by  the  Wundtian  explanations  appeared  to  leave  room  for 
further  investigations. 

We  set  out  with  the  general  conception  that  from  the  evi- 


246          JAMES  R.  ANGELL  AND  ADDISON  W.  MOORE. 

dence  already  in  hand  it  was  to  be  anticipated  that  each  indi- 
vidual mind  would,  from  influences  already  surrounding  its 
growth,  show  itself  possessed  of  certain  coordinations  which 
were  customarily  employed  in  the  everyday  business  of  life,  and 
that  these  coordinations  would  afford  pathways  peculiarly  per- 
vious to  rapid  nervous  discharges,  *'.  £.,  they  would  form  paths 
of  least  resistance ;  whereas  certain  other  coordinations  would 
be  either  wholly  lacking  or  much  less  practiced  and  much  more 
difficult  of  employment,  yielding  when  actually  pressed  into 
service  much  slower  results.  Working  under  this  general  con- 
ception we  had  reached  results  in  our  experimentation  very 
similar  to  those  of  Professor  Baldwin,  and  we  were  just  ready 
to  publish  when  his  very  notable  article  upon  the  subject  ap- 
peared in  this  REVIEW  of  May,  '95,  showing  essentially  the  same 
results  as  we  had  reached.  Not  only  had  Professor  Baldwin  an- 
ticipated our  results  up  to  that  time ;  he  had  also  anticipated  al- 
most completely  our  mode  of  procedure.  This  full  acknowl- 
edgment of  his  priority  is  due  him  on  every  score.  Although 
our  time  results  have  continued  to  confirm  those  of  Professor 
Baldwin,  yet  as  the  investigation  proceeded  a  standpoint  of  inter- 
pretation emerged,  differing  in  some  essential  respects  as  much 
from  Professor  Baldwin's  as  from  that  of  the  Wundtian  school. 
On  the  other  hand,  the  interpretation  here  given  on  the  basis 
of  the  interrelation  of  habit  and  attention  seems  to  us  to  combine 
and  reconcile  some  of  the  principal  contentions  of  both  sides  of 
the  *  type '  discussion.1  The  explanation  we  have  attempted 
is  *  dynamo-genetic '  rather  than  static  as  most  interpretations 
appear  to  us  very  largely  to  have  been. 

The  experiments  were  begun  in  March,  1895,  and  have  con- 
tinued, with  a  two  months'  summer  intermission,  up  to  the  pres- 
ent time.  While  some  differentiations  have  been  made,  both  in 
the  stimulus  and  the  mode  of  response,  the  results  of  these  are 
submitted  not  so  much  to  establish  the  characteristics  of  these 
differentiations  themselves  as  to  furnish  cumulative  evidence  of 

xThe  entire  discussion  referred  to  includes  an  article  by  Prof.  Titchener,  of 
Cornell  University,  on  '  Simple  Reactions,'  Mind,  N.  S.,  IV.,  74-81,  Prof.  Bald- 
win's report  in  this  REVIEW,  May,  1895,  a  criticism  of  the  report  by  Prof.  Titch- 
ener in  Mind,  IV.,  506-514,  and  Prof.  Baldwin's  rejoinder,  Mind,  January,  1896. 


CHICAGO  PSYCHOLOGICAL  LABORATORY.  247 

the  general  nature  of  the  reaction,  and  perhaps  point  the  way  for 
more  detailed  research  in  the  future. 

The  reagents  of  this  series  were  the  persons  whose  names 
appear  at  the  head  of  the  report.  J.,  as  indicated  by  the 
smaller  number  of  his  reactions  in  some  of  the  series,  came  into 
the  work  recently ;  A.  had  taken  part  in  no  reactions  for  sev- 
eral years ;  M.  and  J.  were  entirely  unpracticed. 

The  time  was  taken  with  the  Hipp  chronoscope.  The 
clock  was  tested  at  each  hour's  work,  and  frequently  twice  dur- 
ing the  hour,  by  a  falling  screen  whose  time  was  taken  from  a 
1,000  V.  Konig  fork.  The  variable  error  of  the  machine  for 
the  whole  series  was  .0004  sec. 

We  may  hope  to  escape  the  recriminations  generally  hurled 
at  all  users  of  the  Hipp  chronoscope,  inasmuch  as  the  signifi- 
cance of  the  figures  rests  but  little  upon  their  time  values.  As 
will  appear,  the  essential  question  is  whether  certain  groups  of 
reaction-time  approach  or  recede  from  each  other.  As  a  mat- 
ter of  fact,  however,  the  accuracy  of  our  instrument  permits 
much  more  stringent  conclusions.  But  this  is  all  we  are  im- 
mediately concerned  in. 

The  experiments  include  responses  by  the  hand,  foot,  and 
lips,  to  auditory  and  visual  stimulations  in  both  *  sensory '  and 
*  motor'  forms.  In  the  auditory  series  a  large  number  of  the 
hand  and  foot  reactions  were  further  differentiated  into  those 
made  in  the  light  and  those  taken  in  the  dark.  The  auditory 
stimulation  was  given  in  most  of  the  series  through  a  telephone. 
The  visual  stimulation  was  the  movement,  from  a  stationary 
position,  of  a  black  screen  with  a  white  center. 

The  hand  responses  were  given  by  pressing  downward  with 
the  first  finger  of  the  right  hand.  The  foot  reactions  were 
made  by  downward  pressure  of  the  toe  of  the  right  foot,  the 
foot  being  supported  under  the  instep  to  prevent  fatigue  and 
complicating  strain.  The  lip  responses  were  given  with  a 
special  key,  the  reaction  being  made  by  parting  the  lips. 

Most  of  the  visual  series  were  not  begun  until  after  the  audi- 
tory series  were  completed,  and  in  the  latter  most  of  the  lip  and 
foot  reactions  were  taken  after  the  hand  series  had  been  fin- 
ished. As  the  modes  of  response  were  the  same  in  both  the 


248          JAMES  R.  ANGELL  AND  ADDISON  W.  MOORE. 

auditory  and  the  visual  series  the  reactions  in  the  latter 
had  the  benefit  of  the  practice  secured  in  the  former.  This 
observation  is  of  importance  in  considerations  where  the  effects 
of  practice  are  to  be  taken  into  account.  It  also  accounts,  in 
some  measure,  for  the  time  of  the  visual  series  being  faster  than 
is  usually  reported.  Indeed,  if  the  mean  variation  had  not  in 
many  of  these  cases  remained  so  small,  suspicion  must  surely 
have  arisen  as  to  whether  the  conditions  desired  were  really 
being  attained,  but  with  small  variations  (6  to  15%)  and  clear 
distinctions  in  the  sensory  and  motor  forms,  the  figures  ap- 
pear trustworthy.  Since  the  hand  responses  to  sound  were 
taken  first,  far  outnumber  the  others,  and  were  distributed  over 
a  much  longer  period  of  time,  they  are  of  most  value  in  show- 
ing the  development  under  practice. 

While  the  reactions  were  not  all  taken  at  the  same  hour  of 
day,  each  period  of  work  was  divided  between  the  sensory  and 
motor  forms.  So  that,  throughout  the  course  as  a  whole,  each 
sensory  reaction  is  balanced  by  a  motor  under  parallel  condi- 
tions. The  number  of  reactions  taken  under  each  mode  of  re- 
sponse, hand,  foot  and  lips,  was  about  equally  distributed 
between  the  sensory  and  motor  series.  Beside  the  differen- 
tiations above  mentioned,  several  minor  ones,  such  as  alter- 
ations in  the  intensity  and  location  of  the  stimuli,  changes  in 
position  of  body,  response  with  the  left  instead  of  the  right 
hand,  etc.,  were  made  in  the  course  of  the  work.  These  vari- 
ations, to  which  reference  will  be  made  later,  simply  served  to 
emphasize  the  importance  of  habit  as  a  factor  in  attention. 

EFFECTS  OF  LIGHT  AND  DARKNESS. 

Most  of  the  reactions  in  the  light  were  taken  with  the  eyes 
resting  upon  the  responding  organ,  save  of  course  in  the  case 
of  reactions  to  visual  stimulus.  In  its  external  aspects  this  form 
of  reaction  corresponds  to  what  Prof.  Baldwin  calls  the  *  visual 
motor,'  as  distinguished  from  the  ' kinaesthetic  motor'  reaction. 
In  the  latter  attention  is  focussed  upon  the  thought  of  the  move- 
ment, the  responding  organ  not  being  seen.  He  further  says  : 

1PSYCHOL.  REV.  II.,  pp.  26l  ff. 


CHICAGO  PSYCHOLOGICAL  LABORATORY.  249 

"  In  subjects  of  the  motor  type  the  *  kinsesthetic  motor*  is  shorter 
— the  *  visual  motor'  time  approximating  the  sensory  reaction 
time."  Taking  Prof.  Baldwin's  definition  of  *  kinsesthetic 
motor'  in  terms  of  attention,  as  that  form  in  which  the  attention 
is  occupied  with  'the  thought  of  the  movement,'  we  found  the 
same  results  for  it,  viz.  :  that  in  reagents  of  the  *  motor  type* 
it  was  the  fastest  form.  But  the  external  conditions  of  this  loca- 
tion of  attention  we  found  just  the  reverse  of  those  stated  by  Prof. 
Baldwin.  Both  A.  and  J.  found  that  the  attention  could  be  more 
completely  centered  in  the  reacting  organ  when  the  latter  was 
visible.  When  blindfolded  or  in  a  dark  room,  there  was  a  ten- 
dency toward  the  sensory  form ;  and  the  time  of  the  reaction 
was  between  that  of  the  motor  in  the  light,  and  the  sensory. 
A.'s  and  J.'s  sensory  form  was  also  retarded  in  the  dark.  M.'s 
sensory  form  was  faster  in  the  dark.  But  the  motor  was  slower 
and  tended  very  strongly  to  pass  over  into  the  sensory. 

EFFECTS  OF  PRACTICE. 

At  the  outset  of  the  course,  it  was  found  in  the  hand  reac- 
tions to  sound  that  A.  and  J.  returned  the  faster  time  for  the  mo- 
tor reactions,  and  M.  for  the  sensory.  The  first  attempts  to 
react  in  both  ways  showed  in  all  the  reagents — especially  in  the 
cases  of  M.  and  J.,  who  were  entirely  unpracticed,  very  little 
difference,  save  an  occasional  big  jump  or  total  failure  to  react. 
This  taken  with  the  testimony  of  introspection  showed  that  most 
of  the  reactions  still  came  in  the  habitual  way,  the  other  form 
of  reaction  not  yet  having  emerged.  Then,  as  the  new  form 
began  vaguely  to  define  itself,  there  arose  a  large  time  differ- 
ence between  the  two  series,  and  a  large  mean  variation  in  the 
series  of  the  new  form.  At  this  stage,  in  the  attempts  at  the  new 
coordination,  in  spite  of  the  reagent's  best  effort,  attention  fre- 
quently jumped  back  into  the  habitual  form.  With  further 
practice,  however,  the  confusion  began  to  disappear,  the  new 
form  coming  out  clear,  with  its  time  and  mean  variation  dimin- 
ishing. Meanwhile  the  time  of  the  old  form  also  kept  diminish- 
ing, but  did  not  make  such  rapid  progress  in  reduction  as  did 
the  new  one.  This  continued  until,  at  the  close  of  some  of  the 


250          JAMES  R.  ANGELL  AND  ADD  IS  ON  W.  MOORE. 

series,  the  difference  between  the  two  forms  was  inside  the  mean 
variation  for  each  series  with  perhaps  a  slight  final  balance  in 
favor  of  the  motor  as  the  faster  time.  Thus  both  A.  and  M., 
who  had  the  longer  practice  in  the  auditory-hand  series,  and 
who  started  in  the  one  motor,  the  other  sensory,  came  out  at 
the  same  point,  relative  to  the  two  series,  i.  e.9  both  were  a  little 
faster  in  the  motor  form.  J.,  who  came  into  the  work  recently, 
does  not  show  this  outcome  so  clearly,  though  in  some  of  his 
series  the  approach  of  the  two  times  is  clearly  marked.  Mean- 
while the  decreasing  time  and  continued  approximation  of  the 
times  of  the  two  series  were  accompanied  in  each  series  by  an 
ever  increasing  degree  of  reflexness.  At  this  stage  any  extra- 
ordinary effort  to  concentrate  on  either  form  resulted  in  a  con- 
fused and  lengthened  reaction. 

To  sum  up  the  steps  in  the  development,  we  have  (i^  differ- 
ent habitual  forms  of  attention  at  the  outset ;  (2)  a  period  of  con- 
fusion and  wide  time  difference  in  evolving  the  new  form ;  (3) 
a  subsequent  reduction  of  absolute  time  and  mean  variations  in 
both  forms ;  (4)  an  approximation  of  the  time  values  of  the  two 
forms ;  with  (5)  a  final  possibly  shorter  time  for  the  motor  form. 
In  short,  to  generalize  these  steps,  the  conclusion,  to  which  the 
whole  series  points,  is  that  continued  practice  in  the  two  modes 
of  coordination  with  a  constant  stimulus,  under  constant  condi- 
tions, results  in  two  highly  reflexive  forms,  not  of  widely  differ- 
ent, but  of  about  equal  times  values.  This  result  receives  further 
confirmation  from  Professor  Baldwin's  report  of  his  own  case1  in 
which  he  says  his  reactions  "  have  only  changed  in  that  the  dis- 
tinction between  the  sensory  and  motor  time  is  less  marked  than 
it  used  to  be,  and  this  I  explain  as  probably  due  to  habit  and 
practice,  as  my  theory  again  seems  at  least  not  to  contradict." 

On  the  whole,  the  outcome  seems  to  agree  with  some  of  the 
results  on  both  sides  of  the  *  type '  discussion.  It  indicates  with 
Professor  Baldwin's  results  that  "the  ground  of  origin  of  types 
is  to  be  found  in  education,  which  must  necessarily  apply  to 
single  functions ;"  that,  as  so  defined,  in  the  sensory  'type'  the 
sensory  form  of  the  reaction  may  be  shorter  than  the  motor  even 
after  the  latter  has  clearly  emerged  in  consciousness.  That 

1  Mind,  January,  '96,  pp.  85  ff. 


CHICAGO  PSYCHOLOGICAL  LABORATORY. 


251 


continued  practice  does  not  tend  to  widen  the  time  difference  at 
first  manifest  between  the  two  forms,  but  on  the  contrary.  On 
the  other  hand,  it  finds  that  when  both  forms  have  reached  a 
high  degree  of  reflexness,  the  motor  form  is  probably  somewhat 
faster,  though  not  to  the  extent  reported  in  the  Leipzig  results. 
The  following  table  shows  the  effects  of  practice  in  the  time 
differences  between  the  first  and  last  thirds  of  each  sensory  and 
motor  series.  In  all,  except  the  hand  series  of  A.  and  M.,  the 

TABLE  SHOWING  THE  RESULTS  OF  PRACTICE. 


1 

o 

1 

Ear. 

1 
O 

1 

Focus  of  Atten. 

REAGENTS. 

A 

M 

J 

No. 

Time  in  c. 

No. 

Time  in  a. 

No. 

Time  in  o. 

First 
Third. 

Last 
Third. 

First 
Third. 

Last 
Third. 

First 
Third. 

Last 
Third. 

Hand 

Sen. 
Mot. 

560 
540 

195 
149 

133 
127 

420 
380 

163 
178 

132 

134 

160 
165 

185 
169 

173 
159 

Foot 

Sen. 
Mot. 

145 
155 

182 
159 

168 
150 

220 
230 

138 
145 

133 
134 

125 
H5 

218 
204 

208 
196 

Lips 

Sen. 
Mot. 

130 

120 

132 
125 

122 

116 

125 
125 

117 

112 

108 
106 

160 
140 

169 
157 

155 
146 

Eye. 

Hand 

Sen. 
Mot. 

IOO 
IOO 

206 
193 

173 
150 

IOO 
IOO 

153 
I76 

125 
130 

IOO 
IOO 

180 
193 

173 
165 

Foot 
Lips 

Sen. 
Mot. 

IOO 
IOO 

218 
170 

170 
151 

no 

115 

160 
153 

153 
148 

125 
125 

229 
199 

183 
175 

Sen. 
Mot. 

130 

120 

141 
133 

135 
127 

125 
125 

144 
136 

138 
133 

IOO 
IOO 

m 

179 
165 

number  of  reactions  is  very  inadequate  to  show  anything  like 
the  full  effects  of  practice.  But  even  in  the  shorter  series  the 
drift  is  clearly  indicated.  In  addition  to  the  general  results  al- 
ready pointed  out,  it  further  appears  from  the  table,  that  for  all 
three  reagents,  the  ear-lip  coordination  is  the  fastest ;  also  that 
there  is  less  difference  between  the  sensory  and  motor  reactions 
at  the  outset  of  this  series  than  at  the  beginning  of  the  others. 
For  A.  and  J.,  the  reactions  at  the  beginning  of  the  eye-foot 
series,  are  the  longest  on  the  record,  and  show  also  the  widest 


252          JAMES  R.  ANGELL  AND  ADDISON  W.  MOORE. 

difference  between  the  sensory  and  motor  forms.  A.  shows  at 
the  beginning  of  all  the  series  the  faster  time  in  the  motor  form  ; 
M.'s  reactions  are  quite  divided  between  the  two  forms  showing 
the  faster  time  in  the  sensory  form  in  both  hand  series,  and  in 
the  auditory-foot  series,  but  is  faster  in  the  motor  form  for  both 
lip  series,  and  for  the  eye-foot  series.  J.  is  motor  throughout 
except  in  the  eye-hand  series.  A  series  of  auditory  and  visual 
memory  tests  with  nonsense  syllables  showed  A.  and  J.  quicker 
in  the  visual,  and  M.  slightly  faster  in  the  auditory  form. 

INTERPRETATION.1 

Taking  the  simple  reaction  as  the  type  of  voluntary  action 
in  general,  and  voluntary  action  as  action  under  the  direction  of 
attention,  it  seemed  that  the  key  to  any  explanation  adequate 
to  all  the  facts,  the  individual  peculiarities  and  the  effects  of 
practice,  must  be  found  in  the  functions  of  attention  and  habit 
in  their  relations  to  each  other. 

Not  to  go  into  too  great  detail,  the  process  of  attention  in  its 
essential  outlines  in,  say,  the  auditory-hand  reaction,  appears 
something  as  follows :  As  the  reagent  receives  his  instruc- 
tions for  the  reaction,  he  formulates  in  imagination  what  he  is 
going  to  do.  This  formulation,  the  getting  in  mind  what  he 
is  to  do,  is  his  attention  to  the  act.  Whatever  may  be  the 
detail  of  imagery  involved  in  this  formulation,  it  involves  pri- 
marily the  coordination  of  two  groups  of  incoming  sensations, 
one  from  the  ear,  the  other  from  the  hand,  started  by  the  opera- 
tor's descriptions.  From  this,  two  distinctions  may  be  drawn  : 
(i)  As  related  to  the  act  of  attention,  these  two  sensation  groups 
are  its  stimuli ;  and  each  group  is  as  much  stimulus  as  the  other 
— the  sensations  from  the  hand  as  much  as  those  from  the  ear. 
The  *  reaction '  as  meaning  the  whole  act  to  be  performed  is  not 
the  mere  response  of  the  hand  to  the  ear,  but  the  act  of  atten- 
tion in  coordinating  the  incoming  stimuli  from  both  the  hand  and 
the  ear.  Concerning  the  '  sensory-motor '  distinction  it  follows 
that,  since  the  stimulus,  *'.  £.,  the  material  for  the  act,  lies  in 

1  Under  this  head  we  are  indebted  to  Professors  Dewey  and  G.  H.  Mead,  for 
suggestions  without  which  the  following  interpretation  would  not  have  been 
reached. 


CHICAGO  PSYCHOLOGICAL  LABORATORY.  253 

these  incoming  currents  from  both  hand  and  ear,  as  related  to  the 
whole  act,  both  *  forms'  may  be  regarded  as  equally  *  sensory'  or 
equally  *  motor.'  (2)  In  relation  to  each  other  inside  the  act  of 
attention,  most  discussions  of  the  subject  appear  to  make  the 
ear  process  merely  a  stimulus  to  which  the  hand  adjustment  is 
merely  a  response.  But  the  question  arises,  What  holds  the 
ear  to  its  work  ?  Why  does  the  reagent  maintain  his  listening 
attitude  ?  It  may  be  replied  that  it  is  *  because  he  is  told  to.'  But 
he  is  not  told  to  listen  any  more  than  he  is  told  to  move  his  hand. 
If  the  telling  suffices  in  one  case  it  should  in  the  other.  More- 
over, he  is  not  merely  to  listen,  or  even  to  listen  just  for  the  click, 
but  to  listen  for  the  click  as  a  -pressure  signal.  It  is  this  char- 
acter of  the  click  as  a  signal  for  pressure  that  keeps  up  the  in- 
terest in  it  and  the  attention  to  it.  (We  are  assuming  here,  of 
course,  a  case  of  sensory  attention.)  The  hand  therefore  is 
stimulus  as  well  as  response  to  the  ear,  and  the  latter  is  response 
as  well  as  stimulus  to  the  hand.  Each  is  both  stimulus  and  re- 
sponse to  the  other.  The  distinction  of  stimulus  and  response 
is  therefore  not  one  of  content,  the  stimulus  being  identified 
with  the  ear,  the  response  with  the  hand,  but  one  of  function, 
and  both  offices  belong  equally  to  each  organ.  The  reason 
the  movement  of  the  hand  is  so  often  treated  as  the  mere  re- 
sponse to  the  ear  as  its  mere  stimulus  appears  to  be  that  the 
whole  act,  or  *  reaction,'  is  identified  with  the  movement  of  the 
hand.  But  the  entire  act  is  the  act  of  attention  in  coordinating 
the  two  groups  of  stimuli  coming  from  both  hand  and  ear.  To 
be  sure,  in  the  act  of  coordination  there  is,  as  we  have  seen,  the 
interaction  of  the  two  elements  as  stimulus  and  response  each  to 
the  other.  But  it  must  be  kept  in  mind  that  this  latter 
is  a  distinction  falling  inside  the  act,  not  between  the  hand  move- 
ment considered  as  the  act,  and  the  sound  considered  as  its  ex- 
ternal stimulus  or  '  cause.'  In  a  word,  the  reagent  reacts  as 
much  with  his  ear  as  he  does  with  his  hand. 

With  the  reaction  now  interpreted  as  essentially  constituted 
by  the  act  of  coordinating  ti\z  ear-hand  activities;  with  the  dis- 
tinction of  *  stimulus '  and  '  response '  interpreted  as  wholly  func- 
tional, falling  inside  the  act,  the  question  still  remains, — why, 
in  the  act  of  coordination,  is  attention  occupied  more  imme- 


254          JAMES  R.  ANGELL  AND  ADDISON  W.  MOORE. 

diately  with  one  of  these  processes  than  with  the  other?  This 
question,  again,  does  not  ask  whether  the  attention  shall  be  given 
to  the  sound  or  to  the  movement  as  such,  but  where  in  the  total 
ear-hand  process  the  focus  of  attention  shall  fall.  This  point, 
wherever  it  is,  must  be  determined  not  by  the  solicitation  of  the 
point  in  itself  considered,  but  by  the  demands  of  the  -whole  act 
of  coordination.  Whether  the  attention  be  'in  the  hand'  or 
*  in  the  ear,'  it  is  '  there '  in  order  to  bring  off  successfully  the 
ear-hand  adjustment. 

But  why  is  it  'in'  one  or  the  other?  This  leads  to  the  con- 
sideration of  another  function  or  rather  another  phase  of  the 
function  of  attention,  namely,  its  function  as  the  adjuster,  the 
mediator,  of  the  tension  between  habitually  established  coordi- 
nations and  new  conditions  under  which  they  have  to  express 
themselves.  An  habitual  process,  such,  e.  g. ,  as  walking,  comes 
into  consciousness  as,  i.  e.,  under  attention,  only  when  some  new 
set  of  conditions,  some  obstacle,  arises,  adjustment  to  which  lies 
outside  the  scope  of  the  habit.  Then  only  so  much  of  the 
process  comes  into  consciousness  as  needs  readjustment  to  the 
new  conditions.  Habit  is  still  left  to  do  all  it  can,  and  in 
every  voluntary  act  there  is  always  something  left  for  it  to  do. 
No  matter  with  how  minute  a  portion  of  a  process  attention  may 
be  occupied,  it  always  will  be  found  giving  direction  to  a  group, 
no  matter  how  small,  of  already  coordinated  activities.  Any 
attempt,  therefore,  to  leave  habit  out  of  the  account  in  volun- 
tary action  makes  such  action  impossible.  It  would  be  affirm- 
ing a  process  of  adjustment  with  nothing  to  adjust.  If  atten- 
tion, as  such,  then,  is  the  process  of  mediating  the  tension 
between  habit  and  new  conditions,  its  focus  must  be  where  this 
tension  is  strongest,  *'.  e.,  where  habit  is  least  able  to  cope  with 
the  situation.  The  position  of  this  point  will  depend  upon  the 
extent  to  which  the  different  parts  of  the  whole  ear-hand  process 
can  be  left  to  habit.  If  the  ear  element  of  the  process,  that 
is,  the  sound,  be  unfamiliar  and  the  movement  of  the  hand  be 
familiar,  the  point  of  tension  will  fall  *  in  the  ear '  and  vice 
versa.  With  the  sound  and  movement  both  familiar  or  both  un- 
familiar, the  balance  between  them  will  be  determined  by  edu- 
cation, inherited  structure,  etc.  Let  it  be  noted  again,  that  in 


CHICAGO  PSYCHOLOGICAL  LABORATORY.  255 

leaving  one  phase  more  than  the  other  to  habit,  the  former  is 
not  left  out  of  the  act,  nor  out  of  the  process  of  attention.  In 
attention  to  the  sound,  the  movement  of  the  hand  is  present  in 
the  character  of  the  sound  as  a  pressure  signal ;  and  in  atten- 
tion to  the  movement,  the  sound  is  present  in  the  very  fact  of 
its  being  a  movement  in  response  to  the  sound. 

Concerning  the  process  of  *  shifting '  the  attention  and  the 
accompanying  time  variations  it  follows  from  the  very  nature  of 
attention  that  it  is  only  from  an  external  point  of  view,  the  point 
of  view  of  an  observer,  that  we  can  speak  of  « shifting '  the 
attention  in  the  same  act.  For  the  reagent  a  '  shift '  of  atten- 
tion is  a  change  in  his  act ;  it  means  a  different  process  of  co- 
ordination. For  him,  therefore,  the  sensory  and  motor  forms 
of  attention  are  not  '  two  forms  '  of  attention  for  the  same  act ; 
they  are  essentially  two  different  acts  ;  and  the  time  question  for 
him  is,  which  of  the  two  acts  is  the  shorter.  Regarding  the 
act,  however,  in  an  objective  way,  we  should  expect  the  time  of 
the  reaction  to  be  shortest  when  the  attention  is  upon  that  part 
of  the  process  which  is  least  habitual,  or  in  which  habit  en- 
counters the  most  new  conditions.  When  one  who  reacts  spon- 
taneously to  sound  in  the  sensory  way  attempts  to  transfer  his 
attention  to  the  hand,  two  things  are  involved:  (i)  leaving  the 
ear  adjustment  for  habit  to  take  care  of;  (2)  a  breaking  up,  in 
attending  to  the  hand  process,  of  an  already  efficiently  estab- 
lished coordination.  This  means  that  for  the  performance  of 
the  *  act,'  regarded  objectively,  unnecessary  work  is  being 
done.  The  focus  of  the  attention  upon  the  more  habitual  phase 
of  the  process  means  its  resolution  into  elements.  Now  the 
moment  these  elements  are  called  out  as  unit  groups,  they  bring 
with  them  their  own  train  of  associated  groups,  all  of  which 
have  to  be  inhibited.  This  increased  and,  from  the  objective 
view  of  the  act,  unnecessary  complication,  means,  of  course, 
an  increase  in  time  and  mean  variation,  and  accounts  for  the 
exceedingly  *  artificial '  feeling  that  accompanies  the  effort.1 

JHere  it  may  be  remarked  that  if  the  statement  of  attention  as  the  act  of 
coordinating  activities  more  or  less  habitual  be  correct,  Professor  Baldwin  is 
entitled  to  say  not  only  that  focusing  attention  upon  the  more  habitual  phase  of 
the  act  '  may '  but  that  it  must  retard  the  act. 


256          JAMES  R.  ANGELL  AND  ADD  IS  ON  W.  MOORE. 

Indeed,  whether  the  attempt  succeeds  at  all,  depends  upon 
the  extent  to  which  the  ear  adjustment  can  be  left  to  habit.  If 
the  sound  be  very  strange  the  reagent  finds  he  cannot  attend  to 
the  hand  until,  as  he  says  he  'gets  used'  to  the  sound,  and 
this  *  getting  used '  to  the  sound  is,  of  course,  the  ear  adjust- 
ment becoming  habitual. 

This  explains  why  at  the  outset  of  the  series  M.'s  reactions 
were  all  made  in  the  sensory  form.  As  the  ear  phase,  however, 
grows  more  and  more  reflex  the  breaking  up  of  the  hand  pro- 
cess becomes  possible  and  the  motor  form  of  attention  emerges. 
A  precisely  parallel  process  takes  place  in  the  development  of 
the  sensory  form  for  a  reagent  spontaneously  motor.  Under 
practice  the  new  form  continues,  of  course,  to  grow  more  and 
more  reflex,  and  its  time  and  mean  variation  steadily  decrease. 
In  the  case  of  M.,  for  whom  the  new  form  was  the  motor,  its 
time  kept  diminishing  in  the  hand  series  until,  at  the  close,  it 
was  a  few  sigma  faster  than  the  sensory.  A  similar  develop- 
ment occurred  in  J.'s  visual  hand  series.  The  sensory  was  faster 
at  the  beginning,  the  motor  at  the  close.  In  all  the  series 
where  the  motor  was  faster  at  the  beginning,  it  still  remained 
so  at  the  close,  though  not  by  nearly  so  large  a  margin  as  re- 
ported in  the  Leipzig  tables.  In  saying  that  continued  practice 
on  both  these  forms  rendered  them  *  more  reflex,'  we  mean  that 
when  at  the  close  the  reactions  were  made  in  the  fastest  time  it 
was  with  a  much  less  amount  of  tension,  and  consequently  less 
attention,  than  at  first.  Any  extraordinary  attempt,  at  this 
stage,  to  concentrate  upon  either  form  resulted  in  great  irreg- 
ularity and  increase  of  time,  for  the  reason,  as  already  stated, 
that  all  there  is  for  attention  to  do  is  to  break  up  and  reestab- 
lish processes  already  unified  under  habit. 

But  why  even  the  small  margin  in  favor  of  the  motor  time 
at  the  close  of  a  course  of  practice  on  the  two  forms  ?  The  rea- 
son usually  given  is  that  '  attention  to  the  movement  is  the  be- 
ginning of  it.'  But  if  the  whole  act  is  not  the  mere  hand  move- 
ment, but  the  coordination  of  ear  and  hand,  it  is  difficult  to  see 
why  the  sensory  form  is  not  as  much  the  beginning  of  the  act 
as  is  the  motor.  If  attention  to  the  hand  is  the  *  beginning  of  the 
hand  movement '  it  is  no  less  true  that  attention  to  the  ear  is 


CHICAGO  PSYCHOLOGICAL  LABORATORY.  257 

the  beginning  of  the  sound.  And  this  is  not  mere  '  arm  chair* 
psychologizing,  for  as  a  matter  of  fact,  at  the  beginning  of  the 
series,  nearly  all  M's  premature  responses  occurred  in  the  sen- 
sory form,  and  at  the  close  of  the  series  about  as  many  occurred 
in  one  form  as  in  the  other.  When  the  premature  response 
came,  it  was  always  preceded  by  a  feeling  of  great  tension  in 
the  ear,  and  succeeded  by  a  corresponding  feeling  of  relief  in 
the  ear,  and  when  in  this  case  the  true  signal  came  it  was  fre- 
quently lost  entirely  by  the  reagent.  Again,  it  is  said,  that  in 
attention  to  the  hand  a  much  larger  portion  of  the  whole  path- 
way of  discharge  is  '  innervated '  than  in  attention  to  the  ear. 
This  seems  to  assume  that  only  that  part  of  the  total  pathway 
is  *  innervated '  which  is  represented  in  the  focus  of  attention. 
But  if  *  innervation '  is  necessary  to  movement,  and  the  focus  of 
attention  is  necessary  to  *  innervation,' how,  e.  g.,  does  walking 
go  on  when  the  focus  of  attention  is  elsewhere?  The  answer 
is,  that  we  must  interpret  the  focus  of  attention  not  as  a  point  of 
innervation  merely,  but  as  a  -point  of  conflicting  innervations 
demanding  adjustment.  It  is  not  the  need  of  innervation  as  such, 
but  of  adjustment  of  innervations,  that  determines  the  focus. 
But,  even  supposing  that  attention  means  increased  innervation, 
there  appears  no  reason  why,  assuming  the  nervous  structure 
homogeneous,  and  the  amount  of  innervation  the  same,  its  ap- 
plication should  be  more  effective  at  one  point  than  at  another. 
As  to  the  distribution  of  the  innervation  over  a  larger  area,  if 
the  amount  is  the  same,  it  must  be  correspondingly  weakened 
at  each  point,  and  so  nothing  be  gained. 

It  appears,  then,  that  for  an  explanation  of  the  fact  that  at 
the  end  of  the  course  of  practice,  when  both  forms  had  became 
highly  reflex,  the  motor  form  was  little  the  faster,  we  must  ap- 
peal again  to  the  relation  between  Habit  and  Attention,  still  re- 
garding, in  the  objective  way,  the  sensory  and  motor  reactions 
as  *  two  forms '  of  the  *  same '  act,  this  fact  of  the  shorter  motor 
time  means,  (i)  in  terms  of  Attention,  that  the  stimulus  presented 
by  the  ear  adjustment  affords  less  material  for  the  continued  exer- 
cise of  attention  than  that  presented  by  the  hand ;  (2)  in  terms  of 
Habit  it  means  that  the  ear  process  becomes  more  rapidly  and 
more  completely  habitual  than  that  of  the  hand.  It  takes  but  a 


258  LOUIS    GRANT    WHITEHEAD. 

short  time  to  'get  used*  to  even  the  strangest  sound.  After 
this  the  character  of  the  sound  is  comparatively  fixed.  It 
cannot  be  changed  through  further  adjustment.  This  appears 
due  largely  to  the  more  stable  character  of  the  inherited  ear 
mechanism.  On  the  other  hand,  the  phase  of  the  stimulus  pre- 
sented by  the  hand  is  not  nearly  so  fixed  and  stable.  Here 
there  is  much  more  opportunity  for  continued  variation,  hence 
more  ground  for  the  continued  exercise  of  attention.  Applying 
what  has  already  been  said,  we  should,  then,  expect  that  act  to 
be  faster  in  which  the  focus  of  attention  is  upon  the  less  stable 
phase  of  the  hand  element  of  the  coordination  rather  than  when  it 
is  more  *  artificially'  occupied  in  breaking  up  the  more  completely 
established  ear  adjustment.  In  a  word  the  time  question  is  not 
a  case  of  a  '  sensory '  vs.  a  *  motor '  reaction,  but  of  a  sensori- 
motor  less  habitual  vs.  a  sensori-motor  more  habitual. 

As  stated  at  the  outset,  this  interpretation  in  terms  of  Habit 
and  Attention  seems  to  us  to  combine  elements  from  both  sides  of 
the  'type  discussion.'  On  the  Princeton  side  it  would  say :  (i) 
that  the  '  type '  of  attention  and  its  accompanying  time  are  deter- 
mined by  the  relation  between  the  individual's  stock  of  coordi- 
nations, inherited  and  acquired,  already  on  hand,  and  the  par- 
ticular coordination  required  by  the  reaction  5(2)  that  the  '  sen- 
sory form'  may  still  be  the  faster  even  after  the  'motor  form'  has 
clearly  emerged  in  consciousness.  On  the  Leipzig  side  it 
would  say  that  under  practice,  in  both  forms,  upon  the  same 
coordination,  the  sensory  phase  passes  more  completely  under 
the  control  of  habit  and  thus  leaves  the  faster  time  to  the 
motor  form. 


II.  A  STUDY  OF  VISUAL  AND  AURAL  MEMORY  PROCESSES. 

BY  LOUIS  GRANT  WHITEHEAD. 

PROBLEM. 

We  have  been  concerned  in  the  experiments  here  reported 
to  determine  the  general  validity  of  the  Ebbinghaus-Muller- 
Schumann  method  of  procedure  when  applied  to  the  following 
problems,  and  to  obtain  as  far  as  possible  answers  to  the  same. 


CHICAGO  PSYCHOLOGICAL  LABORATORY.  259 

(i)  What  is  the  relative  quickness  of  the  visual  and  the  aural 
senses  when  employed  in  the  memorizing  of  nonsense  syllables 
constructed  like  those  of  the  above  mentioned  authors?  (2.) 
What  is  the  relative  power  of  retention  for  matter  memorized 
visually  compared  with  that  memorized  aurally?  Or,  put  other- 
wise, what  is  the  relative  rate  of  forgetting  for  material  memo- 
rized in  the  two  ways?  (3.)  In  what  manner  is  the  ease  of 
learning  anew  matter  once  memorized — but  now  partially  or 
wholly  forgotten — affected  by  the  fact  of  its  being  presented  on 
the  second  occasion  to  a  different  sense  from  that  to  which  it 
was  originally  presented?  For  example,  out  of  six  sets  of  syl- 
lables learned  to-day  from  visual  presentations,  three  will  a 
week  from  to-day  be  presented  and  learned  again  in  visual 
terms,  the  other  three  in  auditory  terms.  Will  the  mental  co- 
ordinations constantly  occurring  between  aural  and  visual  pre- 
sentations of  the  linguistic  type,  and  generally  mediated  in  these 
cases  by  the  motor  activities  incident  to  enunciation,  manifest 
themselves  as  complete  or  not?  That  is  to  say,  having  memo- 
rized a  certain  amount  of  material  from  visual  presentations,  will  it 
require  less  time  a  week  later  to  memorize  this  anew  from  the 
auditory  form  of  presentation  than  it  did  the  first  time  in  visual 
form ;  and  will  it  require  as  little  time  as  does  the  fresh  memo- 
rizing of  the  same  matter  from  visual  presentation?  What  are 
the  results  when  reverse  conditions  are  employed  and  the  origi- 
nal presentations  are  made  in  auditory  form? 

METHOD. 

Very  little  need  be  said  of  the  method.  It  was  essentially 
that  now  familiar  to  every  one  by  the  work  of  the  authors  al- 
ready cited.  Nonsense  syllables  constituted  by  a  vowel  placed 
between  two  consonants  were  arranged  in  a  series,  containing 
in  this  case  from  seven  to  twelve  syllables  each.  These  sepa- 
rate syllables  were  presented  at  regular  intervals,  the  interval 
being  given  by  a  metronome.  Five  seconds  were  allowed  to 
elapse  between  each  presentation  of  a  series  ;  and  after  the  suc- 
cessful memorizing  of  the  series  three  minutes  intervened  before 
the  next  series  commenced.  All  the  usual  precautions  were 


260  LOUIS   GRANT    WHITEHEAD. 

taken  to  prevent  the  forming  of  significant  syllables,  rhyme, 
assonance,  etc.  The  test  of  success  in  the  memorizing  was  the 
ability  to  repeat  the  lists  aloud  at  the  rate  in  which  they  were 
given,  a  feat  which  many  subjects  found  exceedingly  difficult, 
owing  apparently  to  inability  to  make  enunciatory  movements 
synchronously  with  the  outside  standard. 

We  incline  to  think  that  this  requirement,  which  has  char- 
acterized the  work  of  our  predecessors,  is  unwise.  We  would 
insist  on  the  subjects  adhering  to  a  fixed  rate,  but  it  does  not 
appear  that  it  is  imperative  to  have  this  given  from  without, 
much  less  to  have  it  identical  with  the  rate  of  presentation.  The 
rate  at  which  the  syllables  are  most  easily  learned  has  not  proved 
to  be  the  easiest  rate  at  which  to  repeat  them,  and  although  sep- 
arate tests  are  necessary  to  give  an  unequivocal  answer  to  the 
problem,  we  certainly  found  many  subjects  much  hampered 
by  the  necessity  of  speaking  at  an  artificially  fixed  rate.  It  is 
not  so  much  that  subjects  wish  to  speak  slowly  and  reflect  as 
they  go,  as  that  they  object  to  a  ready-made  rate  which  they 
find  a  distracting  and  inhibiting  element. 

We  may  at  this  point  properly  say  a  word  about  the  general 
subject  of  rate.  Ebbinghaus  used  a  rate  so  rapid  as  to  seem  to 
us  objectionable  on  several  accounts.  We  hit  upon  our  own  rate 
— 58  beats  per  minute — after  considerable  experiment,  as  being 
that  most  suitable  in  its  avoidance  of  rush  and  hurry,  on  the  one 
hand,  and  drag  and  tedium,  on  the  other.  From  a  number  of  ob- 
servations made  during  the  progress  of  tests,  however,  we  began 
to  suspect  that  the  rate  which  permitted  the  most  rapid  and  sat- 
isfactory memorizing  was  essentially  that  of  the  pulse.  Our 
evidence  is  insufficient  to  warrant  us  in  speaking  dogmatically, 
and  the  matter  must  be  submitted  to  yet  further  test.  But 
the  indications  have  at  times  been  quite  striking.  The  rate  58 
it  will  be  observed,  on  which  we  decided,  from  considerations 
based  upon  the  subjective  feelings  of  confusion  and  tedium,  is 
very  near  the  pulse  rate,  though  a  trifle  slow  for  most  of  our 
subjects. 

The  series  presented  visually  were  placed  on  a  drum  revolv- 
ing in  front  of  a  screen,  through  a  window  in  which  the  sylla- 
bles became  successively  visible. 


CHICAGO  PSYCHOLOGICAL  LABORATORY.  261 

The  aural  presentations  were  made  by  reading  aloud,  the 
voice  being  kept  as  nearly  uniform  in  intensity  as  possible. 
Rhythm  in  the  reading  was  suppressed.  The  subject  invariably 
supplied  his  own  rhythmic  interpretation  of  the  series,  and  it 
seemed  wiser  to  let  this  be  the  determinant  than  to  introduce 
arbitrarily  any  special  form,  which  with  the  series  of  different 
lengths  would  certainly  produce  different  results,  e.  g.,  with 
iambic  meter  the  lists  with  an  odd  number  of  syllables  would 
come  out  with  a  syllable  left  over.  In  any  event,  it  was  thought 
best  to  let  the  subject  follow  his  native  bent,  so  far  as  possible. 
In  this  respect  our  procedure  is  at  variance  with  that  of  Ebbing- 
haus  and  Schumann-Muller.  There  is  much  to  be  said  on  their 
side.  Though  they  found  the  memorizing  to  be  more  rapid  under 
their  conditions,  yet  granting  this  to  be  true,  our  method  still 
seems  to  us  more  correct.  The  total  time  occupied  in  memoriz- 
ing each  series,  as  well  as  the  number  of  repetitions  necessary, 
was  carefully  noted.  The  importance  of  this  last  matter  will  be 
commented  on  later. 

At  present,  and  before  proceeding  to  examine  any  of  the 
results,  let  us  consider  a  moment  the  exact  conditions  which  con- 
stituted the  test,  in  order  the  more  intelligently  to  interpret  the 
report  which  follows.  One  of  two  general  conditions  was  always 
involved  ;  the  subject  was  either  learning  or  giving  at  fixed  inter- 
vals successive  groups  of  letters  forming  unfamiliar  syllables. 
Under  both  conditions  the  disposition  of  almost  every  person 
experimented  upon  was  to  turn  the  presentation  immediately 
over  into  motor  terms,  through  a  subdued  mental  enunciation  of 
the  syllables,  which  often  passed  over  into  actual  movements  of 
the  lips.  Nor  has  this  apparently  depended  in  our  subjects 
upon  the  prevalent  type  of  mental  imagery.  The  predominant 
imagery  was,  perhaps,  visual ;  but  nothing  very  marked  showed 
itself,  and  in  general  the  mental  furniture  appeared  normal  in  its 
mixture  of  visual,  auditory  and  motor  elements.  The  admix- 
ture of  motor  activities  was  a  trifle  more  noticeable,  with  visual 
than  with  auditory  presentations.  But  this  condition  of  affairs 
is  not  abnormal  nor  peculiar  merely  to  this  experiment.  On  the 
contrary,  it  is  the  common  experience  in  practically  all  attempts 
to  memorize  verbatim.  The  tendency  crops  out  with  perfect 


262  LOUIS    GRANT    WHITEHEAD. 

naturalness  and  is  exceedingly  hard  to  inhibit.  On  the  last  ac- 
count we  have  not  tried  to  prevent  it.  But  the  result  is  that, 
instead  of  having  a  presentation  material  affording  ground  for 
direct  comparison  of  visual  and  aural  factors,  we  have  in  the 
majority  of  cases  a  material  giving  us  visual  motor  factors  to 
compare  with  auditory  motor  factors.  As  a  test  of  the  practical 
working  peculiarities  of  the  memory  for  aural  as  compared  with 
visual  elements,  this  consideration  deserves  no  very  great  weight 
after  it  is  once  explicitly  recognized,  because,  as  noted  above, 
the  actual  conditions  of  memorizing  linguistic  material  are 
exactly  the  same.  It  does,  however,  exhibit  a  difficulty,  which 
the  method  does  not  seem  competent  to  surmount,  into  making  a 
direct  comparison  of  pure  aural  and  pure  visual  forms  of  mem- 
ory. In  calling  them  forms  of  pure  aural  and  pure  visual 
memory  what  is  meant  is  not  of  course  forms  which  are  discon- 
nected from  any  motor  connections,  for  that  is  absurd,  but  forms 
which,  during  the  process  of  memorizing,  are  disconnected 
from  any  enunciatory  motor  activities,  which  same  activities 
must  of  course  enter  into  the  test  of  the  successful  or  unsuccess- 
ful attempt  to  memorize,  this  always  being  tried  by  the  effort  to 
repeat  the  syllables. 

Criticisms  have  not  been  wanting  upon  the  asserted  homo- 
geneity of  such  material  as  has  been  used.  Indeed,  Ebbing- 
haus  himself  dwells  upon  the  matter  and  admits  the  justice  of 
the  criticism.  It  has  been  maintained  upon  various  grounds, 
which  we  need  not  canvass,  that  nonsense  syllables  do  not,  as 
they  ought  for  the  purpose  of  memory  tests,  possess  exactly 
equivalent  tendencies  to  set  up  association  processes.  In  this 
connection  we  may  say  that  our  observations  have  substantiated 
those  of  the  authors  heretofore  mentioned.  We  found  that  cer- 
tain lists  of  syllables,  quite  apart  from  any  assignable  reason, 
have  shown  themselves  much  harder  to  memorize,  or  much 
easier,  as  the  case  might  be,  than  the  great  majority  of  lists. 
This  general  question  takes  on  a  new  importance  in  connection 
with  this  special  inquiry,  where  it  comes  up  in  a  somewhat 
different  form.  Granted  that  nonsense  syllables  when  carefully 
selected  and  arranged  do  furnish  an  essentially  homogeneous 
subject-matter  when  presented  to  a  single  sense,  it  does  not  at 


CHICAGO  PSYCHOLOGICAL  LABORATORY.  263 

all  necessarily  follow  that  the  same  material  when  presented  to 
a  different  sense  is  homogeneous.  For  it  will  at  once  appear, 
in  so  much  as  one  of  the  well  recognized  conditions  of  ready 
and  successful  memorizing  is  found  in  clear  and  moderately  in- 
tense stimulation  of  the  sense  organ,  that  we  must  show  the 
stimulations  to  the  eye  and  the  ear  possess  essentially  equal  in- 
tensity and  clearness,  and  that  the  presentations  made  to  each 
are  of  essentially  equal  subjective  duration.  Now  there  is  only 
one  condition  which  can  be  applied  to  eye  and  ear  that  can  be 
admitted  as  in  any  measure  equivalent  in  point  of  intensity  and 
duration  of  stimulus.  This  is  found  in  such  a  combination  of 
the  two  as  shall  just  furnish  each  sense  with  clear  and  un- 
equivocal perceptions.  But  obviously  the  different  character- 
istics of  the  eye  and  the  ear  render  widely  divergent  the  stimuli 
which,  objectively  measured,  are  just  competent  to  render  a 
clear  perception.  Furthermore,  under  the  conditions  of  the  ex- 
periment the  perception  of  a  clearly  enunciated  syllable  requires 
less  time  than  is  necessary  for  a  clear  visual  perception.  In 
other  words,  the  ear  requires  a  quicker  presentation  than  the  eye 
to  make  the  conditions  equal.  But  the  attempt  to  reduce  very 
materially  the  time  of  the  exposure  of  the  visual  presentation, 
in  order  to  make  it  more  nearly  equivalent  to  the  auditory  pres- 
entation, results  simply  in  the  introduction  of  disturbing  and 
fatiguing  eye  movements  and  after  images. 

Here  again,  however,  as  was  remarked  above,  these  same 
conditions  are  substantially  those  met  with  in  actual  every-day 
experience,  and  as  a  test  of  the  mere  practical  aspect  of  the 
problem  the  method  might  possibly  stand  unimpeached.  But 
where  absolutely  accurate  information  is  sought  the  situation 
is  as  set  forth.  Any  results  gained  in  this  way  must  stand 
ready  for  possible  overthrow  by  some  more  satisfactory  method.1 
Our  own  procedure  has  given  us  aural  and  visual  presenta- 
tions of  the  character  mentioned,  *'.  £.,  as  nearly  just  clear  and 
readily  perceptible  as  possible.  The  auditory  presentations  were 
given  in  a  clear,  crisp  form  of  enunciation.  The  visual  pres- 

xWe  believe  these  difficulties  might  at  least  be  minimized  by  using  an  iris 
photographic  diaphragm  to  make  the  visual  exposures.  This  would,  however, 
require  a  somewhat  complicated  mechanism. 


264  LOUIS   GRANT   WHITEHEAD. 

entations  at  the  same  rate  were  actually  in  clear  sight  about  .5 
of  a  second.  We  believe,  therefore,  that  our  results  are  fairly 
comparable  among  themselves,  yet  we  believe  also  that  for 
ideally  accurate  material  it  is  necessary,  if  possible,  to  decide  by 
preliminary  experimentation  the  conditions  which  secure  most 
nearly  subjective  equality  of  duration  and  intensity  for  the  visual 
and  aural  stimuli. 

It  has  been  customary  in  handling  the  results  from  memory 
tests  of  this  general  character,  to  lay  the  chief  emphasis  upon 
the  number  of  repetitions  necessary  for  successful  memorizing. 
There  is,  over  against  this,  the  possibility  of  employing  the  time 
occupied  as  a  criterion.  Ebbinghaus  has  discussed  this  matter 
in  its  purely  theoretical  and  mathematical  bearings,  and  upon 
the  basis  of  his  conclusions  retained  the  number  of  repetitions  as 
the  standard  of  reference  in  cases  where  either  the  speed  of 
memorizing  or  the  permanency  of  the  impression  was  considered. 
The  conditions  with  him,  however,  as  with  Miiller  and  Schumann, 
were  sufficiently  different  from  ours  to  warrant  examination. 
In  our  tests  the  subject  had  been  instructed  to  make  no  attempt 
to  repeat  the  series  until  he  felt  he  could  do  so  successfully. 
Now  as  a  matter  of  fact  the  actual  number  of  attempts  to  repeat 
varies  widely  from  time  to  time  and  with  different  subjects.  It 
will  be  noticed  in  the  tables  subjoined  that,  other  things  being 
equal,  the  greater  the  number  of  repetitions  necessary  to  memo- 
rize a  list,  the  less  is  the  number  required  to  memorize  it  anew 
later  on.  This  agrees  with  the  results  of  Ebbinghaus.  Again, 
the  unsuccessful  attempts  to  repeat  a  list  often  results  in  an  ap- 
parent confusion  which  requires  several  extra  repetitions  to  over- 
come. Furthermore,  a  half  dozen  repetitions  with  three  unsuc- 
cessful attempts  to  repeat,  may  occupy  as  much  time  as  eight 
repetitions  with  only  one  attempt  at  repeating,  and  that  success- 
ful. During  these  attempts  to  repeat,  the  subject  is  of  course 
giving  himself  both  auditory  and  motor  stimulations,  which  will 
be  helpful  or  otherwise  in  somewhat  the  same  degree  in  which 
they  are  accurate.  It  does  not  commend  itself  as  wise  to  place 
any  restrictions  upon  the  subject's  attempt  to  repeat,  for  this 
would  introduce  an  artificiality  into  the  method  more  obnoxious 
than  anything  yet  touched  upon.  The  subjective  certainty  of 


CHICAGO  PSYCHOLOGICAL  LABORATORY.  265 

the  subject  is  far  from  being  a  trustworthy  criterion  in  any  re- 
gard, for  it  not  only  happens  that  one  is  often  quite  sure  he  has 
repeated  a  list  correctly  when  such  is  not  the  case,  but  the  con- 
verse also  occurs  and  one  finds  he  can  repeat  correctly  a  list 
about  which  he  felt  no  certainty  at  all.  In  view  of  this  it  ap- 
pears that  we  must  ascribe  a  certain  weight  at  least  to  the  time 
involved  as  well  as  to  the  mere  number  of  repetitions.  We  have 
kept  such  time  records,  and  an  accurate  stop-watch  has  shown 
itself  very  useful.  The  difficulty  of  fixing  upon  a  convenient 
rate  table,  adequate  to  express  the  results  in  terms  having  refer- 
ence at  once  to  the  number  of  repetitions  and  to  the  time  con- 
sumed, is  that  we  have  no  really  reliable  index  as  to  how  much 
influence  should  be  ascribed  to  one  factor  as  compared  with  the 
other.  In  fact,  our  experience  leads  us  to  the  opinion  that  this 
interrelation  between  the  time  and  the  number  of  repetitions  is 
one  of  considerable  irregularity.  The  most  desirable  proce- 
dure which  suggests  itself  as  actually  feasible  is  to  eliminate 
all  cases  from  the  results  where  more  than  one  attempt  to  repeat 
has  occurred.  This  involves  a  much  larger  body  of  tests,  for, 
of  course,  the  subject  ought  not  to  know  that  such  a  method  is 
to  be  pursued.  Yet  it  would  at  least  free  the  statistics  from 
the  ambiguity  now  under  consideration. 

We  reach  then  the  following  conclusion  concerning  the  ade- 
quacy of  our  method  for  answering  the  questions  put  at  the  begin- 
ning of  this  paper.  The  nonsense  syllable  method  is  competent 
for  the  solution  of  the  problems  proposed,  but  only  within  certain 
limits  and  under  certain  specific  restrictions  as  to  conditions, 
which  we  have  already  canvassed.  The  main  objection  which 
holds  against  it  is  the  apparent  impossibility  of  excluding  enun- 
ciatory  motor  activities.  We  doubt  whether  any  method  which 
submits  the  eye  and  the  ear  to  a  test  upon  the  peculiarities  of  the 
memory  processes  can  hope  to  avoid  the  difficulty.  It  will 
come  up  indirectly  through  association  processes,  if  it  does  not 
occur  directly  as  in  this  case.  Even  Wolfe's  experiments  upon 
tone  memory  do  not  escape  it  entirely.  In  replying  to  the  last 
of  our  three  special  questions  we  beg  to  emphasize  that,  in  ac- 
cordance with  all  we  have  heretofore  said,  we  regard  our  re- 
sults gained  by  this  method  as  provisional.  The  experiments 


266 


LOUIS   GRANT   WHITEHEAD. 


have  extended  over  about  nine  months  and  consist  of  tests  upon 
thirteen  persons,  six  women  and  seven  men.  A  considerable 
number  of  the  experiments  we  have  eliminated  as  untrustworthy 
from  defects  of  one  kind  and  another.  We  give  results  in  terms 
both  of  time  and  repetition. 

TABLE  I. 


WOMEN. 

MEN. 

Visual  present'n. 

Aural  present'n. 

Visual  present'n. 

Aural  present'n. 

00 

C0 

} 

Av.  time 

Av.  rep- 

Av.  time 

Av.  rep- 

Da" 

Av.  time 

Av.  rep- 

Av.  time 

Av.  rep- 

3 

<n 

in  min. 

etit'ns. 

in  mm. 

etit'ns. 

3 
CA2 

in  mm. 

etit'ns. 

in  mm. 

etit'ns. 

i 

1.41 

7-53 

2.388 

IO. 

? 

2.153 

7.06 

1.52 

6.06 

2 

2.435 

9.8 

3- 

12.79 

8 

2.18 

9.8 

2.326 

11.66 

3 

2-397 

9-J5 

2.355 

9-05 

9 

2.34 

9-56 

2.54 

11.08 

4 

2.395 

10.75 

4.17 

16.15 

10 

2-35 

9.64 

2-37 

8.86 

5 

4.41 

12. 

4.42 

16.2 

ii 

2-45 

11.4 

2.477 

12.  1 

6 

3.ii 

14.8 

4.338 

19-93 

12 

2.15 

11.46 

2.54 

13.4 

13 

6.2 

23-1 

8.63 

32. 

The  table  takes  the  number  of  visual  repetitions  as  a  stand- 
ard. Visual  repetitions  are  arranged  with  reference  to  this  in 
a  progressive  series,  beginning  with  the  lowest  and  ending  with 
the  highest  number  both  for  women  and  men.  A  comparison 
of  the  sexes  is  consequently  easy.  The  general  averages  show 
that  ten  persons  were  visually  quicker;  two  aurally  and  one 
doubtful.  It  must  be  borne  in  mind  that,  although  in  the  large 
majority  of  our  subjects  the  average  for  all  the  cases  shows  the 
visual  processes  faster,  the  auditory  presentations  were  in  many 
individual  instances  more  rapidly  memorized.  For  example,  it 
may  happen  that  a  whole  set  containing  seven  syllables  each 
will  be  memorized  more  rapidly  from  the  auditory  form  of 
presentation,  although  the  sets  containing  from  nine  to  twelve 
syllables  are  learned  more  readily  from  visual  presentations. 
This  would  seem  to  indicate  that  the  formulations  made  by  pre- 
vious investigators  of  the  relation  between  the  length  of  the 
presentation  and  the  speed  of  memorizing  must  be  revised  for 
the  separate  senses. 


CHICAGO  PSYCHOLOGICAL  LABORATORY. 

TABLE  II.1 


267 


VISUAL  PRESENTATIONS. 

AURAL  PRESENTATIONS. 

3 
s- 

Time  in  min. 

Repetitions. 

Time  in  min. 

Repetitions. 

3 

C/3 

ist  pres. 

2d  pres. 

ist  pres. 

2d  pres. 

ist  pres. 

2d  pres. 

ist  pres. 

2d  pres. 

I 

1.414 

1.  10 

7.285 

5.285 

2.171 

L4I5 

10.285 

8. 

2 

2.10 

1.40 

10.  1  6 

6.83 

2-43 

i-35 

13-33 

6-5 

3 

2.288 

1.266 

10.55 

5-66 

2.40 

1.566 

9-77 

6.66 

4 

1-57 

1.  15 

8. 

4.75 

6.45 

2. 

23-75 

5-5 

5 

3-512 

2.212 

11.25 

8. 

4-15 

2.40 

12.25 

8.25 

6 

3-268 

1.376 

15-66 

8.16 

3.288 

I.I48 

15.66 

7.16 

7 

1-52 

1-34 

7.6 

5- 

1.  12 

1-35 

4.8 

5-4 

8 

2.38 

1-33 

H.5 

6.5 

2.293 

I.I4 

11.166 

5-5 

9 

2.10 

1-35 

8-33 

6.66 

3. 

2.25 

11.5 

8. 

10 

2.318 

I.5I7 

9.428 

6.21 

2.I2I 

1.492 

7.714 

6.07 

ii 

2. 

2.13 

7-8 

9.24 

2.48 

1.48 

II.2 

6.8 

12 

2.283 

1.39 

9- 

7-33 

3-045 

1.50 

13-5 

8.5 

13 

7.233 

3.116 

24.66 

ii. 

8.57 

3-39 

34-4 

ii. 

Table  II.  shows  by  general  averages  the  difference  between 
the  first  and  second  presentation  of  the  same  series  to  the  same 
sense.  With  two  possible  exceptions,  the  second  presentations 
are  quicker.  The  larger  the  number  of  first  presentations,  the 
greater  the  difference.  A  comparison  of  the  two  senses  shows 
that  this  is  true  of  each.  In  two  cases  only  was  the  gain  of 
one  sense  sufficient  to  overcome  the  lead  of  the  other.  Hence 
the  conclusion  must  be  that  the  relative  power  of  retention,  or 
the  relative  rate  of  forgetting  is  about  the  same.  A  mathe- 
matically exact  statement  of  the  relation  would  evidently  show 
that  individuals  varied  somewhat.  Such  a  statement  is  now, 
however,  beyond  our  purpose. 


JIn  cases  where  the  powers  of  retention  were  tested   an  interval  of  one 
week  intervened  between  the  first  and  the  second  presentation. 


268 


LOUIS   GRANT    WHITEHEAD. 

TABLE  III. 


VISUAL-AURAL  PRESENTATIONS. 

AURAL-  VISUAL  PRESENT  AT     NS. 

10 

I 

Time  in  min. 

Repetitions. 

Time  in  min. 

Repetitions. 

w 

Visual 

Aural 

Visual 

Aural 

Aural 

Visual 

Aural 

Visual 

pres. 

pres. 

pres. 

pres. 

pres. 

pres. 

pres. 

pres. 

I 

1.328 

1.357 

6.428 

7.282 

1-45 

1.  10 

8.714 

5.142 

2 

2.50 

2.075 

13-75 

10. 

2.II2 

1.487 

10.5 

8. 

3 

2.466 

2.233 

9-833 

8.166 

2.15 

1.116 

9-5 

4-833 

4 

2.518 

1.484 

n-437 

4-937 

3.464 

1.488 

14-237 

5-437 

5 

3.412 

2.50 

12.187 

4.309 

2.49 

13-375 

8.875 

6 

2.177 

1.562 

12.25 

10.25 

3.13 

1.497 

14-25 

9- 

7 

1.  12 

1.  12 

4-2 

4-4 

I.I5 

1,14 

4.4 

3-8 

8 

I.5I 

1.43 

8.25 

7-75 

3-342 

1-342 

16.25 

6.75 

9 

2.412 

3.10 

9-3 

10.4 

3-025 

1.555 

9-7 

6.8 

10 

2.409 

1.572 

9.909 

6.272 

2.472 

2.218 

8.818 

7-545 

ii 

3.398 

2-34 

II.  2 

9-25 

2.34 

2.14 

9-25 

9-4 

12 

2.142 

2.17 

9-5 

9-75 

2-457 

1-365 

12. 

6.5 

13 

5-15 

2.525 

20.75 

ii. 

9-23 

4-433 

28. 

16. 

The  third  table  shows  by  general  averages,  the  difference 
between  a  presentation  to  one  sense,  and  the  same  presentation 
repeated  later  on  to  another  sense.  Except  for  four  possible 
cases,  the  presentation  to  a  different  sense  is  memorized  more 
quickly.  Hence  it  appears  that  internal  mental  coordinations 
have  taken  place.  The  gain  measured  by  repetitions  is  ap- 
proximately 26  % . 

To  answer  our  original  questions  explicitly  and  seriatim,  we 
may  say:  (i)  of  our  thirteen  subjects  ten  showed  themselves 
able  to  memorize  most  rapidly  from  visual  presentations  and 
two  from  auditory,  while  one  gave  ambiguous  results.  This 
outcome  is  without  much  doubt  to  be  correlated  with  the  fact 
that  so  much  of  our  memorizing,  whether  it  occurs  in  the  ver- 
batim form,  or  merely  as  the  assimilation  of  meaning,  is  brought 
about  through  visual  processes.  (2)  Matter  memorized  aur- 
ally appears  to  be  retained  slightly  better  than  that  mem- 
orized visually.  It  requires  less  repetition  by  32%  to  learn 
anew  from  visual  presentations  matter  memorized  visually  a 
week  previous,  and  less  repetition  by  40%  for  aural  memor- 
izing of  the  same  kind.  The  difference  is  insignificant  in 


CHICAGO  PSYCHOLOGICAL  LABORATORY.  269 

view  of  the  total  number  of  cases.1  It  seems  to  be  simply  a 
special  case  illustrative  of  the  general  principle  already  men- 
tioned that  the  greater  the  number  of  original  repetitions 
the  less  the  number  necessary  for  learning  anew.2  (3)  when 
visual  presentations  are  memorized  and  then  a  week  later  sub- 
mitted to  the  ear  for  learning,  we  find  unmistakable  evidence 
that  mental  coordination  between  the  visual  and  auditory  pro- 
cesses has  occurred  in  large  degree.  When  the  order  of 
procedure  is  reversed,  the  same  thing  holds  true.  This  is 
shown  by  the  saving  in  time  and  repetitions  necessary  to  mem- 
orize the  series  anew.  This  saving  varies  with  the  order  of 
procedure,  the  greatest  saving  occurring  when  the  first  presen- 
tation is  made  to  that  sense  in  which  the  memorizing  pro- 
ceeds most  slowly.  This  must  be  remembered  when  the  per- 
centage of  gain  (26%)  under  these  conditions  is  compared 
with  the  percentage  of  gain  in  the  cases  where  both  the  first  and 
second  presentations  are  made  to  the  same  sense  (32%  and 
40  %  )  •  It  is  quite  possible  that  with  longer  practice  than  our 
subjects  have  had  these  percentages  might  be  altered  some- 
what, but  we  believe  nevertheless  that  they  indicate  in  a  reliable 
way  the  general  relations  of  the  processes  investigated. 

*An  apparent  discrepancy  in  the  figures  of  the  different  tables  arises  from 
the  fact  that  we  have  not  been  able  to  obtain  exactly  the  same  number  of  tests 
from  all  our  subjects.  Yet  for  the  purposes  we  had  in  view  it  seemed  desirable 
to  employ  a  considerable  number  of  persons.  We  should  much  have  preferred 
a  stricter  uniformity,  but  were  forced  to  content  ourselves  with  what  we  could 
get.  We  do  not  believe  our  results  are  vitiated  by  this  fact,  although  it  would 
plainly  render  certain  problems  and  conclusions  impossible. 

2 This  is  additional  substantiation  of  results  attained  by  Miss  Calkins,  show- 
ing the  preponderating  influence  of  frequency  over  other  factors  affecting  cases 
of  association. 


STUDIES  FROM  THE  HARVARD  PSYCHOLOGICAL 
LABORATORY  (V.) 

THE  ^ESTHETICS  OF  SIMPLE  FORMS.     II.  THE  FUNCTIONS  OF 
THE  ELEMENTS. 

BY  EDGAR  PIERCE. 

At  the  same  time  as  the  experiments  of  our  first  article,  those 
intended  to  determine  the  conditions  for  the  preference  of  the 
golden  section  or  the  symmetrical  arrangement,  another  series 
was  conducted  in  which  the  same  figure  appeared  in  the  ver- 
tical position.  Here  neither  symmetry  nor  the  golden  sec- 
tion was  chosen  nor  indeed  any  one  proportion,  but  various 
associations  determined  the  result.  The  testimony  of  the  sub- 
jects obtained  through  introspection  made  it  evident,  however, 
that  the  movable  lines  were  not  placed  utterly  at  random.  The 
principle  that  governed  most  of  the  cases  was  that  of  stability. 
If  the  figure  seemed  firm  it  was  more  or  less  pleasing.  The 
precise  place  where  the  line  was  placed  was  very  often  due  to 
some  specific  association,  as  a  column  or  bottle  or  vase.  Now, 
when  the  whole  figure  is  in  a  vertical  position  it  is  clear  that  the 
various  lines  of  which  it  is  composed  bear  a  very  different  rela- 
tion to  the  eyes  and  their  movements  from  what  they  do  when 
in  the  horizontal  position.  We  have  seen  that  when  the  figure 
is  horizontal  the  eyes  move  horizontally,  either  connecting  the 
ends  of  the  lines  or  traveling  across  them  from  side  to  side.  In 
the  vertical  position,  however,  the  eyes  move  naturally  up  and 
down  across  the  lines  or  connecting  their  ends.  Now  it  seemed 
as  if  it  might  throw  some  light  on  the  function  of  the  eye-move- 
ments if,  when  the  objects  were  in  a  horizontal  position  the  eyes 
were  made  to  move  as  they  would  for  a  vertical  object.  This 
is  not  at  all  difficult  to  accomplish,  for  if  the  subject  lie  on  his 
side  parallel  to  the  floor  with  his  head  at  the  height  of  the  hori- 
zontal object  and  his  eyes  opposite  the  center  of  the  figure,  the 
horizontal  object  will  then  be  in  precisely  the  same  relation  to 

* 


HARVARD  PSYCHOLOGICAL  LABORATORY.  271 

his  eyes  as  a  vertical  figure  is  when  he  is  sitting  in  the  normal 
position.  It  seemed  as  if  it  would  be  very  interesting  and  in- 
structive to  compare  the  results  obtained  by  experiments  on  the 
subject  while  sitting,  or  in  the  normal  position,  with  those  ob- 
tained when  he  was  lying  or  in  the  abnormal  position.  Will 
the  vertical  eye-movements  with  a  horizontal  object  cause  the 
line  to  be  placed  as  it  is  in  a  vertical  object  or  as  it  is  in  a  hori- 
zontal object,  or  will  a  compromise  between  the  two  be  made  ? 
With  a  view  of  answering  these  questions  and  with  the  hope  of 
throwing  light  on  the  more  general  question  as  to  the  function 
of  the  eye-movements  in  relation  to  the  (Esthetic  consciousness  the 
following  experiments  were  undertaken  with  Messrs.  Hart, 
Hylan,  Gehring,  Lough,  James  Pierce  and  the  writer. 

The  instrument  (the  same  as  used  in  the  former  series)  was 
so  arranged  that  the  lines  were  opposite  and  at  the  height  of  the 
eyes  of  the  subject  when  sitting ;  a  table  was  at  hand  on  which 
the  subject  could  lie  on  his  side  ;  it  was  of  such  a  height  that  then 
also  the  eyes  would  be  opposite  the  lines  and  at  the  same  height. 
First  a  series  of  experiments  was  made  in  the  normal  position, 
the  lines  appearing  first  horizontal  with  the  movable  line  at  the 
subject's  left,  then  vertical  the  movable  line  at  the  top,  then  at 
the  right,  then  vertical  again  the  movable  line  at  the  bottom. 
Then  the  subject  was  asked  to  take  his  place  on  the  table  and 
the  same  series  was  repeated.  All  the  minor  arrangements  were 
the  same  as  in  the  former  experiments.  There  were  six  differ- 
ent combinations  of  forms  used ;  three  with  a  line  30  cm.  long, 
1.5  cm.  wide  in  the  center,  two  blue  lines  12  cm.  distant  from 
the  middle  line,  each  10  cm.  long,  0.5  cm.  wide.  At  one  side 
a  red  line  20  cm.  long,  1.5  cm.  wide ;  then  three  with  a  central 
line  5  cm.  long,  1.5  cm.  wide,  all  the  others  being  the  same  as 
before  ;  the  movable  parts  in  both  cases  were  a  line  10  cm.  long, 
1.5  cm.  wide,  a  square  with  sides  5  cm.  long,  and  a  star  of  5 
cm.  diameter ;  all  these  forms  were  red. 

In  the  statement  of  the  results  Hn.  means  that  the  figure  was 
horizontal  and  the  subject  in  the  normal  position,  that  is  sitting 
in  front  of  the  board ;  Vab.  means  that  the  figure  was  vertical 
in  relation  to  the  floor ;  but  that  the  subject  was  in  the  abnormal 
position,  that  is  lying  on  the  table  in  the  manner  described ;  thus 


272  JED  GAR  PIERCE. 

in  relation  to  the  eyes  the  figure  was  the  same  as  a  real  hori- 
zontal figure ;  Vn.  means  that  the  figure  was  vertical  in  rela- 
tion to  the  floor  and  the  subject  in  the  normal  position ;  the 
figures  for  the  Vn.  position  are  farther  divided  into  the  positions 
of  the  line  at  the  top  of  the  figure  and  at  the  bottom ;  Hab.  is 
the  horizontal  position  of  the  figure  in  relation  to  the  floor,  but, 
as  the  subject  is  in  the  abnormal  position  its  relation  to  his  eyes 
corresponds  to  that  of  the  Vn. ;  that  is  to  say  when  the  movable 
point  is  to  the  left  in  the  figure  which  is  really  horizontal  it  is  in 
the  same  relation  to  the  eyes  of  the  subject  in  the  abnormal 
position  as  the  movable  part  in  the  real  vertical  position  is  when 
the  subject  is  in  the  normal  position ;  when  the  movable  part  is 
to  the  right,  it  of  course  follows  that  the  movable  part  is  in  the 
same  relation  as  one  at  the  top  of  a  real  vertical  figure  when  he 
is  in  the  normal  position.  Thus  the  Hab.  also  is  divided  into 
the  position  for  the  line  at  the  top  and  bottom  in  relation  to  the 
eyes.1  The  figures  are  the  averages  of  12  judgments  for  the 
apparent  horizontal  position  and  of  6  for  the  two  apparent  verti- 
cal positions ;  the  figures  give  the  distance  of  the  movable  lines 
from  the  blue  side  lines. 

L. — Hn,  15.5  ;  Vab,  16.0 ;  Vntop,  10.9 ;  bottom,  9.6  :  Hab 
right,  1 1. 2;  left,  10.1. 

J.  P. — Hn,  16.7;  Vab,  16.2;  Vn,  top,  18.2;  bottom,  15.5  ; 
Hab  right,  17.1 :  left,  14.8. 

Hy. — Hn,  17.6;  Vab,  16.0;  Vn,  top,  16.2  ;  bottom,  13.9; 
Hab,  right,  17.0,  left,  15.5. 

Ha. — Hn,  16.5;  Vab,  16.7;  Vn,  top,  15.7;  bottom,  16.0; 
Hab,  right,  15.2;  left,  15.8. 

G. — Hn,  20.3;  VAb,  19.7;  Vn,  top,  19.4;  bottom,  20.8; 
Hab,  right,  19.6;  left,  20.7. 

E  P. — Hn,  16.9;  Vab,  16.4;  Vn,  top,  14.4;  bottom,  18.4; 
Hab,  right,  15.9;  left,  17.3. 

The  results  of  these  experiments,  except  in  one  case,  are,  I 
think,  perfectly  clear.  The  horizontal  normal  and  the  vertical 
abnormal  correspond ;  the  vertical  normal  top  corresponds  with 

*In  Hab.  right  the  movable  lines  are  in  the  same  relation  to  the  eyes  as  in 
Vn.  top ;  in  Hab.  left  they  are  related  to  the  eyes  as  in  Vn.  bottom. 


HARVARD  PSYCHOLOGICAL  LABORATORY.  273 

the  horizontal  abnormal  right,  and   the  vertical  normal  bottom 
corresponds  with  the  horizontal  abnormal  left. 

The  testimony  of  the  subjects  is  very  important  in  these  ex- 
periments. In  this  series  few  direct  questions  were  asked,  for 
fear  of  influencing  the  results  as  all  the  subjects  but  myself 
were  perfectly  unaware  of  the  ultimate  purpose  of  the  ex- 
periments;  they  agreed,  however,  in  saying  that  in  the  ab- 
normal position  it  seemed  somewhat  more  difficult  than  in  the 
normal  to  decide  when  they  like  the  line  best ;  that  the  eyes 
in  the  horizontal  position  would  naturally  move  across  the  lines 
from  left  to  right  or  the  reverse,  while  in  the  vertical  position  they 
moved  up  and  down.  In  the  abnormal  position  it  was  said  that 
there  was  sometimes  a  tendency  to  twist  the  eyes  and  head  so  as 
to  bring  the  eyes  into  the  same  position  in  relation  to  the  figure 
as  in  the  normal  position.  When  this  tendency  was  checked, 
the  figure  seemed  different  from  what  it  did  when  the  tendency 
was  allowed  to  work.  If,  however,  the  head  were  kept  motion- 
less any  attempt  to  twist  the  eyes  was  uncomfortable  and  could 
not  be  long  continued.  As  concerns  myself,  I  feel  sure  that  if 
in  the  abnormal  position  when  the  figure  was  really  horizontal 
I  moved  my  eyes  as  seemed  natural,  that  is  up  and  down  in  re- 
lation to  the  head,  that  the  figure  would  then  appear  vertical. 
If  I  forced  the  eyes  to  twist,  the  figure  appeared  more  doubtful, 
possibly  more  like  the  horizontal,  but  it  was  difficult  to  decide. 
Moreover,  the  subjects  agreed  that  if  they  considered  the  rela- 
tions of  the  board  to  the  rest  of  the  room  when  in  the  abnormal 
position  that  it  influenced  the  result ;  they  then  tried  to  place  the 
line  as  nearly  as  possible  where  they  thought  they  should  like  it 
when  they  were  in  the  normal  position ;  if  they  abstracted  from 
the  rest  of  the  room,  and  from  their  own  position  the  figure  was 
judged  on  its  own  merits,  it  was  merely  considered  as  a  figure 
and  was  judged  by  the  intrinsic  value  of  the  relations  of  its 
parts.  On  my  part,  I  am  sure  that  it  was  much  more  natural 
for  me  not  to  consider  the  relations  of  the  board  and  of  my 
own  body  to  the  floor,  for  this  necessitated  a  very  complex 
mental  operation  ;  I  much  preferred  simply  to  ask  myself  what 
was  the  best  position  of  the  movable  part  in  and  for  itself  under 
the  given  conditions. 


274  EDGAR  PIERCE. 

It  is  to  be  noted  that  there  is  no  mention  of  the  words  hori- 
zontal or  vertical  in  the  above  account  of  the  subjective  feelings 
of  the  subjects,  except  in  my  own  case.  This  is  due  to  two 
reasons,  I  believe.  In  the  first  place,  I  asked  the  subjects  be- 
fore doing  any  experiments  to  speak  of  the  movable  part  in 
relation  to  the  center  as  'out  from  the  center'  or  « in  near  it;' 
never  to  use  the  terms  right  or  left,  or  top  or  bottom.  I  did  this 
so  as  to  have  the  judgments  as  free  from  any  associations  as 
possible.  Also  I  believe  that  in  the  abnormal  position  their  at- 
tention had  been  so  turned  away  from  considering  the  vertical 
and  horizontal  relation  that  they  did  not  then  consider  these  re- 
lations at  all,  but  merely  placed  the  lines  as  they  liked  them 
best,  without  being  fully  conscious  of  the  reasons.  In  fact, 
after  finishing  this  series,  I  asked  the  subjects  if  they  had 
thought  about  the  figure  as  horizontal  or  vertical,  and  with  only 
one  exception  they  answered  in  the  negative. 

Hy.'s  testimony  was,  however,  somewhat  different,  as  in  fact 
was  his  whole  attitude  during  the  experiments.  I  noticed  that 
in  the  normal  position  Hy.  frequently  held  his  head  on  one  side ; 
this,  of  course,  altered  the  relation  of  his  eyes  to  the  board,  a 
thing  I  wished  particularly  to  avoid  in  this  series.  In  spite  of 
frequent  cautions,  I  believe  that  even  to  the  end  this  habit  con- 
tinued to  operate  to  some  extent.  When  he  reclined  on  the  table 
he  was  also  tempted  to  raise  his  head  a  little,  thus  throwing  it 
toward  one  shoulder  and  rendering  the  effect  of  the  abnormal 
position  less  pure.  I  was  able,  however,  to  control  the  posi- 
tion of  the  head  better  in  this  case,  as  I  could  fix  his  head 
on  his  arms  in  the  right  position  after  he  had  lain  down.  Even 
then  he  moved  sometimes,  and  he  did  not  appear  as  much  at 
his  ease  in  the  abnormal  position  as  did  the  others.  Hy.  said 
that  it  was  almost  impossible  for  him  not  to  consider  the  relation 
of  the  figure,  and  his  body  to  the  rest  of  the  room,  that  he  al- 
most always  reasoned  out  where  he  was  and  where  the  figure 
was,  as  it  were.  Still  this  was  not  always  the  case,  and  when 
he  did  not,  the  position  of  the  movable  line  which  he  preferred 
seemed  to  him  to  be  different.  I  requested  Hy.  to  think  as  little 
as  possible  about  the  spacial  relations. 

The  points  in  this  series  of  experiments  to  which  I  wish 


HARVARD  PSYCHOLOGICAL  LABORATORY.  275 

especially  to  call  attention  are,  then :  that  in  the  abnormal  po- 
sition with  the  figure  vertical  there  is  a  strong  tendency  to  place 
the  movable  line  as  it  is  placed  in  a  horizontal  figure  when  the 
subject  is  in  the  normal  position,  and  the  like  is  true  for  the 
horizontal  abnormal ;  that  this  tendency  with  the  majority  of 
the  subjects  was  not  an  explicitly  conscious  one — the  subjects 
did  not  know  that  the  abnormal  vertical  seemed  like  a  normal 
horizontal,  but  as  a  matter  of  fact  they  did  place  the  lines  in  the 
same  position  when  the  eye-movements  were  the  same ;  that  the 
subject  Hy.  was  an  exception  in  both  the  objective  and  subjec- 
tive results. 

The  second  series  of  experiments  concerning  the  same 
problem,  resembled  the  first,  except  that  the  board  was  turned  so 
that  its  diagonals  were  respectively  perpendicular  and  parallel 
to  the  floor,  thus  making  the  figure  appear  in  an  oblique  posi- 
tion. The  movable  part  was  shown  first  to  the  left  at  the  top, 
then  to  the  right  at  the  top,  then  to  the  right  at  the  bottom,  then 
to  the  left  at  the  bottom.  The  subjects  were  in  both  normal 
and  abnormal  positions  as  before.  In  this  series  I  asked  the 
subjects  to  pay  especial  attention  in  both  normal  and  abnormal 
positions  to  whether  the  figure  seemed  more  like  a  horizontal 
or  more  like  a  vertical  figure.  The  results  were  as  follows : 

The  figure  was  regarded  by  all  the  subjects  together,  when 
in  the  normal  position  and  when  the  movable  line  was  at  the 
top  to  the  left,  36%  vertical,  6%  horizontal  and  58%  neither. 
The  movable  line  at  the  top  to  the  right  was  apperceived  39% 
vertical,  8%  horizontal,  53%  neither;  when  the  line  was  to  the 
left  at  the  bottom,  22%  vertical,  45%  horizontal,  33%  neither. 
In  the  abnormal  position  when  the  line  was  to  the  left  and  at 
the  top  it  seemed  6  %  vertical  and  94  %  horizontal ;  when  to  the 
right  at  the  top,  91%  vertical,  3%  horizontal,  6%  neither; 
when  at  the  right  at  the  bottom,  3%  vertical,  94%  horizontal 
and  3%  neither;  when  at  the  left  at  the  bottom,  89%  vertical 
and  -11%  horizontal. 

This  means  that  in  the  normal  position  the  figure  was  much 
more  generally  regarded  as  an  oblique  figure,  although  it  seemed 
slightly  more  like  a  vertical  one  when  the  movable  part  was  at 
the  top,  more  like  a  horizontal  one  when  the  movable  part  was 


276  EDGAR  PIERCE. 

at  the  bottom ;  the  feeling  was  not  strong,  however.  In  the  ab- 
normal position,  almost  without  exception,  the  positions  where 
the  line  is  to  the  left  at  the  top  and  where  it  is  to  the  right  at 
the  bottom  seemed  horizontal ;  when  the  line  is  to  the  right  at 
the  top  it  seemed  vertical,  the  movable  line  at  the  top ;  when 
the  line  is  to  the  left  at  the  bottom  the  figure  seemed  vertical 
with  the  movable  part  at  the  bottom.  So  much  for  the  subjective 
testimony;  let  us  now  see  how  the  objective  position  of  the 
movable  line  corresponds.  The  figures  for  each  subject,  indi- 
cating the  position  of  the  movable  line  as  before,  are  as  fol- 
lows : 

L. — Normal,    left  up,  16.5;  right  up,  15.5;    right  down, 
16.2  ;  left  down,  17.2. 

Abnormal,  left  up  and  right  down  apperceived  as  horizontal, 
16.8 ;  right  up,  12.1 ;  left  down,  14.8. 

J.  P. — Normal,  left  up,  18.0;  right  up,  18.0;  right  down, 
15.6;  left  down,  14.6. 

Abnormal,  left  up  and  right  down'apperceived  as  horizontal, 
15.6;  right  up,  18.0;  left  down,  16.6. 

Hy. — Normal,  left  up,   15.4;  right  up,  16.1 ;    right  down, 
13.4;  left  down,  13.1. 

Abnormal,  Left  up   and  right  down,  apperceived  as  hori- 
zontal, 15.3  ;  right  up,  16.8 ;  left  down,  12.9. 

Ha. — Normal,  left  up,   16.7 ;  right  up,  17.5  ;  right  down, 
16.6 ;  left  down,  16.6. 

Abnormal,  left  up  and  right  down  apperceived  as  horizon- 
tal, 16.6;  right  up,  15.9;  left  down,  17.6. 

G. — Normal,  left  up,  18.2 ;  right   up,   17.5  ;   right   down, 
17.1 ;  left  down,  18.2. 

Abnormal  left  up  and  right  down  apperceived  as  horizontal, 
18.0 ;  right  up,  18.5  ;  left  down,  16.6. 

E.  P. — Normal,  left  up,  15.7;  right  up,  16.5;  right  down, 
16.9 ;  left  down,  18.0. 

Abnormal,  left  up  and  right  down  apperceived  as  horizon- 
tal, 17.2  ;  right  up,  16.3  ;  left  down,  18.6. 

Now  if  these  figures  are  compared  with  those  for  the  same 
subjects  in  the  normal  position  with  the  board  horizontal  and 


HARVARD  PSYCHOLOGICAL  LABORATORY.  277 

vertical,  it  will  be  seen  that  they  correspond  with  the  subjective 
results  we  have  already  noted.  In  the  normal  position  with  the 
figure  oblique,  the  table  shows  a  slight  tendency  to  place  the 
line  as  in  a  vertical  figure.  This  is  not  very  strong,  however, 
and  many  variations  result.  The  tendency  is  strongest,  how- 
ever, for  Hy.,  J.  P.  and  G.  There  is  also  a  tendency  shown 
by  the  figures  for  E.  P.,  Ha.  and  L.,  to  place  the  line  when  it 
is  at  the  bottom  more  nearly  like  in  the  horizontal  figure.  It  is 
to  be  noted,  however,  that  the  figures  show  great  variations  from 
the  normal  horizontal  as  given  in  the  former  series.  The  fig- 
ures for  Hy.  show  the  greatest  approach  to  three  of  the  former 
series.  For  the  normal  vertical  he  had,  top,  16.2 ;  bottom, 
13.9.  For  the  normal  oblique,  top,  15.7  ;  bottom,  13.2. 

The  abnormal  oblique  shows  a  marked  resemblance  to  those 
for  the  horizontal  and  vertical  normal,  the  left  top  and  right 
bottom  corresponding  to  the  horizontal,  the  right  top  with  the 
vertical,  the  movable  line  up  ;  the  left  down  with  the  vertical, 
the  movable  part  down.  L.,  in  one  instance,  the  right  up,  is 
an  exception ;  it  seems  probable  that  here  some  association  in- 
fluenced the  result.  Hy .  also  shows  a  considerable  variation  in 
his  choice  for  the  left  up  and  right  down,  the  figure  for  this  be- 
ing 15 .7,  while  the  normal  horizonal  was  for  him  17.6. 

This  is  then  a  very  strong  tendency  when  the  figure  is 
oblique  and  the  subject  in  the  normal  position  to  regard  the  fig- 
ure as  oblique,  that  is  to  say  as  neither  horizontal  nor  vertical. 
Some  subjects  show  a  tendency,  however,  to  regard  it  as  either 
horizontal  or  vertical ;  in  the  abnormal  position  the  figure  is  re- 
garded almost  universally  as  either  horizontal  or  vertical  ac- 
cording to  the  position;  here  the  subjects  practically  agree. 
These  results  are  in  accord  with  both  the  testimony  of  the  sub- 
jects and  the  objective  results  obtained.  Hy.  is  different  from 
the  others  in  almost  every  case.  It  is  also  to  be  noticed  that 
in  all  cases  the  general  tendency  of  apperception  determines  the 
position  of  the  movable  line. 

The  explanation  for  the  changes  in  these  tendencies  of  ap- 
perception and  for  the  resulting  changes  in  the  position  of  the 
movable  line  is  undoubtedly  to  be  found  in  the  changes  of  the 
eye  movements.  Notice  the  perfect  parallelism  between  the  two. 


278  EDGAR  PIERCE. 

In  the  horizontal  normal  position  the  eye  movements  are  from 
one  side  of  the  head  to  the  other — the  figure  is  apperceived  as 
horizontal ;  in  the  vertical  position  the  eye  movements  are  from 
the  top  of  the  head  toward  the  chin,  or  the  reverse — the  figure 
is  seen  as  vertical ;  in  the  abnormal  position  when  the  figure  is 
really  horizontal  we  see  that  there  is  a  tendency  to  apperceive 
the  figure  as  vertical ;  here  we  have  the  eye  movements  that  go 
with  a  real  vertical  position ;  the  reverse  is  true  for  the  abnormal 
vertical.  When  the  figure  is  oblique  and  the  subject  normal 
the  eye  movements  are  neither  like  those  in  the  vertical  nor 
like  those  in  the  horizontal  positions ;  the  figure  is  usually  ap- 
perceived as  oblique  and  is  always  different  from  either  hori- 
zontal or  vertical.  In  the  abnormal  oblique  we  have  a  peculiar 
case  and  one  that  seems  contrary  to  our  theory,  for  here  with 
eye  movements  that  are  in  reality  neither  horizontal  nor  vertical > 
yet  the  figure  is  apperceived  with  almost  absolute  certainty  as 
either  horizontal  or  vertical.  To  explain  this  we  must  make  a 
rather  detailed  examination  of  the  conditions  which  influence 
the  apperception. 

Reference  to  the  testimony  of  the  subjects  shows  that  asso- 
ciations called  forth  by  the  position  of  the  body  might  influence 
the  apperception  of  the  object.  If  while  in  the  abnormal  posi- 
tion they  thought  about  the  fact  that  they  were  lying  on  their 
side,  and  that  the  figure  was  parallel  to  the  floor,  the  position  in 
which  they  preferred  the  movable  line  was  changed.  Most  of 
the  subjects  found  it  easier  not  to  make  this  connection.  Hy. 
however,  found  much  difficulty  in  not  doing  this.  The  explana- 
tion is  simple.  In  the  abnormal  position  Hy.  was  not  very  com- 
fortable ;  this  means  that  sensations  from  his  body  were  continu- 
ally being  forced  on  his  attention ;  hence  it  was,  of  course,  difficult 
for  him  to  abstract  from  the  position  in  which  he  found  himself. 
The  figures  show  that  the  effect  of  the  abnormal  position  was 
less  powerful  with  him  than  with  the  others.  Associations, 
then,  form  other  sources,  as  well  as  eye  movements  and  their 
associations,  can  influence  the  apperception. 

In  the  normal  oblique  position  the  eye  movements  aroused 
usually  the  idea  of  an  oblique  figure ;  this  is  probably  due  to 
their  effect  above,  as  is  corroborated  by  the  peculiar  figures  in 


HARVARD  PSYCHOLOGICAL  LABORATORY.  279 

the  results  of  Hy.,  where  the  obliques  were  much  more  nearly 
like  the  horizontal  and  vertical  than  was  the  case  with  the  other 
subjects.  It  will  be  remembered,  however,  that  Hy.,  had  a 
strong  tendency  to  hold  his  head  on  one  side.  His  eye  move- 
ments, then,  were  never  purely  from  side  to  side,  or  up  and 
down,  but  were  more  nearly  like  those  for  an  oblique  position 
of  the  figure  with  the  head  normal.  A  change  from  horizontal 
to  oblique  was  then,  for  him,  not  one  of  kind  but  only  of  degree 
as  is  shown  by  the  figures.  But  in  the  normal  oblique  there 
was  also  a  tendency  to  approach  the  horizontal  and  vertical 
with  the  other  subjects,  his  I  believe  to  be  due  to  the  fact  that 
we  are  accustomed  to  see  at  times  objects  which  are  normally 
horizontal  tipped  to  one  side ;  these  objects  would  cause  oblique 
eye  movements.  It  is  natural  then  that  these  oblique  eye 
movements  should  at  times  arouse  associations  with  a  horizon- 
tal or  vertical  figure. 

We  may  now  return  to  the  abnormal  oblique  from  which  we 
started.  Hy.  it  will  be  remembered  for  the  *  left  up '  and  *  right 
down'  abnormal  positions,  upon  which  all  the  others  showed 
great  agreement,  placed  the  line  very  excentrically.  But  we 
saw  that  the  associations  called  forth  by  his  body  played  an  im- 
portant part  in  his  judgments.  In  the  abnormal  position  then  it 
seemed  probable  that  he  was  more  or  less  conscious  of  being  in 
an  abnormal  position  and  that  the  board  was  really  oblique. 
When  such  associations  were  aroused  we  have  seen  that  a  dif- 
ferent position  of  the  line  was  chosen  by  all.  Hy.  is  no  excep- 
tion for  the  figure  for  the  abnormal  oblique  position  (which  the 
others  apperceived  as  horizontal)  were  15.7,  while  the  normal 
horizontal  was  17.6.  Moreover,  we  saw  that  there  was  nearly 
uniformity  in  the  apperception  of  the  oblique  abnormal  for  the 
other  subjects,  only  nine  variations  in  one  being  recorded ;  of 
these  Hy.  had.  5. 

In  the  case  of  the  rest  of  the  subjects  these  associations  from 
the  position  of  the  body  were  largely  absent ;  they  were  more- 
over accustomed  to  place  the  line  without  considering  the  rela- 
tion in  space.  Now  in  the  normal  position  we  saw  that  the 
general  habits  of  the  eyes  determined  the  apperception,  but  that 
when  these  were  ambiguous  the  apperception  was  ambiguous. 


280  EDGAR  PIERCE. 

In  the  abnormal  position  where  the  line  is  up  and  to  the  left 
there  is  first  the  side  movements  of  the  eyes ;  this  suggests  a 
horizontal  figure ;  there  is  also  a  vertical  movement  of  the  eyes 
which  suggests  a  vertical  figure ;  we  should  then  expect  an  am- 
biguous result  in  the  figure,  but  this  is  not  the  case.  There  is 
no  doubt,  however,  that  the  eye  movements  most  easily  made 
in  this  case  are  side  ones  meaning  a  horizontal  figure.  Now 
the  whole  situation  is  very  strange,  and  in  order  to  make 
the  necessary  connections  and  apperceive  the  figure  as  oblique 
a  very  complicated  process,  as  we  have  seen,  would  have  to 
occur.  But  the  subjects  are  trained  to  inhibit  even  much  less 
difficult  processes  ;  it  follows  then  that  the  eye  movements  which 
preponderate  will  determine  the  apperception  immediately  with- 
out more  ado.  Such  we  find  to  be  the  case  for  nearly  every 
subject.  When  associations  are  aroused  as  with  Hy.  the  result 
is  very  different. 

In  every  case  then  it  is  perfectly  clear  that  the  eye  movements 
and  the  intellectual  associations  determined  a  general  way  of  ap- 
perceiving  the  object,  although  this  tendency  of  apperception  was 
not  present  to  the  individual  consciousness  unless  attention  was 
called  to  it.  The  line  was  in  every  case  placed  in  accord  with 
this  general  way  of  apperceiving,  whether  this  was  wholly  con- 
scious or  not.  This  is  proved  not  only  by  the  general  agree- 
ment, but  also  by  the  individual  variations,  and  is  corroborated 
by  the  subjective  testimony. 

There  is  then  no  doubt  but  that  in  these  simple  forms  one 
function  of  the  eye  movements  is  to  suggest  the  general  way  of 
apperceiving  the  object;  they  are  not  the  only  elements,  as 
association  from  other  sources  may  influence  the  result.  But 
we  have  seen  in  our  former  paper  on  symmetry  that  eye  move- 
ments and  associations  influence  the  proportions  between  the  dif- 
ferent parts  of  the  figure,  that  is  to  say  these  elements  fix  the 
relations  between  the  parts  of  the  object.  It  seems  then  as  if  the 
eye  movements  -with  the  other  elements  suggested  a  given  kind  of 
apperception  of  the  object,  which  tendency  need  not  be  fully 
conscious,  and  also  by  laws  of  their  own  determined  the  ob- 
jective relations  necessary  to  complete  this  apperception.  When 
the  objective  conditions  fulfill  the  suggestions  aroused  by  it,  then 
the  object  satisfies  the  cesthetic  demands. 


HARVARD  PSYCHOLOGICAL   LABORATORY.  281 

We  started  out  in  our  experiments  to  explain  the  aesthetic 
consciousness  derived  from  simple  forms.  We  found  the  first 
condition  of  these  to  be  unity  and  variety.  We  found  also  that 
in  the  horizontal  position  where  variety  is  given  that  the  sym- 
metrical arrangement  was  preferred  for  this  gave  unity.  The 
objective  condition  for  this  unity  varied  with  the  content  and 
involved  sensational  and  intellectual  elements. 

In  the  vertical  position  we  found  other  conditions.  Stability 
was  here  the  important  unifying  element ;  the  objective  condi- 
tions which  produced  stability  were  probably  due  to  the  same 
elements  that  produced  symmetry.  The  elements  that  enter  in 
to  the  unity  of  these  forms  are  sensational  and  intellectual. 

Why  do  we  demand  unity  was  the  next  question,  and  it 
seemed  as  if  a  study  of  the  elements  that  constituted  this  unity 
might  explain  it.  An  examination  of  the  different  forms  showed 
us  that  certain  sensational  and  other  elements  determined 
whether  we  should  regard  the  forms  as  horizontal  or  vertical, 
and  that  the  specific  position  of  the  line  always  corresponded  to 
the  general  tendency  of  apperception.  The  desire  then  to  make 
the  objective  conditions  correspond  with  the  subjective  ones 
is  what  necessitates  unity  in  our  forms  and  is  the  one  essential 
condition  for  the  emergence  of  the  (Esthetic  consciousness. 

But  it  will  be  seen  that  in  our  experiments  something  sug- 
gested in  a  general  way  has  been  just  as  necessary  as  the  unity 
of  the  forms.  This  in  itself  necessitates  a  variety  of  elements, 
for  one  kind  of  elements  is  not  rich  enough  to  suggest  such  a 
general  tendency  of  apperception.  Thus  unity  and  variety  re- 
sult from  the  fact  that  the  aesthetic  consciousness  is  the  feeling 
resulting  from  a  realization  by  the  object  of  a  tendency  sug- 
gested by  it.  Any  form  then  that  by  means  of  any  elements 
suggests  a  general  tendency  which  can  be  satisfied  by  the  ele- 
ments it  contains,  apperceived  as  a  whole,  may  be  beautiful. 
One  more  limitation  is,  however,  necessary  before  we  reach  a 
true  idea  of  the  aesthetic  consciousness.  We  saw  in  the  hori- 
zontal position  that  symmetry  was  preferred,  in  the  vertical 
usually  the  stable,  but  that  associations  often  influenced  the  re- 
sult. Thus,  if  one  thinks  of  a  vase,  the  lines  are  put  so  as  to 
carry  out  the  idea.  It  seemingly  then  makes  no  difference 


282  JAMES  E.   LOUGH. 

what  the  general  tendency  is  as  long  as  the  object  carries  out 
this  tendency.  The  essential  thing  is  the  fulfillment  of  a 
tendency  of  whatever  sort  for  its  own  sake  without  involving 
any  purpose.  The  aesthetic  consciousness  is,  then,  a  state 
aroused  by  the  objective  fulfillment  of  a  tendency  regarded 
without  reference  to  any  ulterior  end,  and  the  function  of  the 
elements  of  the  beautiful  object  is  to  suggest  such  tendency  and 
at  the  same  time  to  fulfill  it. 


A    NEW    PERIMETER. 

BY  JAMES  E.   LOUGH. 

Indirect  vision  is  one  of  several  problems  of  sight  now 
under  investigation  in  the  Harvard  Psychological  Laboratory. 
For  the  purposes  of  this  study  the  ordinary  perimeter  and  cam- 
pimeter  have  proven  themselves  almost  useless.  In  these  instru- 
ments the  eye  looks  at  a  stationary  point,  whilst  the  stimulating 
object  changes  its  place  on  the  graduated  arc.  This  change  of 
place  alters  the  objective  illumination,  etc.,  of  the  object,  so 
that  the  effect  of  fine  changes  in  its  intensity,  size,  etc.,  cannot 
be  accurately  studied.  This  difficulty  has  been  overcome  in  the 
instrument  here  described  by  reversing  the  usual  order  of  things 
and  making  the  fixation  point  movable  while  the  stimulus  is  the 
stationary  part  of  the  apparatus.  By  this  arrangment  the  oper- 
ator is  given  absolute  control  over  the  variations  of  the  stimulus. 

A  description  of  this  instrument  is  published  now  before  any 
exact  results  can  be  reported,  in  the  hope  that  it  may  prove 
helpful  to  others  engaged  in  this  same  line  of  investigation. 

I. 

Figure  i  shows  the  ground  plan,  a  semi-cylinder  of  black- 
ened brass.  A,  30  cm.  high,  with  a  radius  of  30  cm.,  is  sup- 
ported by  a  base  board  60  cm.  X4O  cm.  and  by  back  and  side 
boards  B  and  F.  In  the  middle  of  A  and  extending  through 
B  is  a  window,  W,  10  cm.  x  10  cm.  This  opening  may  be  filled 


HARVARD  PSYCHOLOGICAL  LITERATURE. 


283 


FIG.  i. 

by  the  various  contrivances  described  later.  E  is  the  point  of 
fixation  which  may  be  moved  to  any  position  on  A.  The  angle 
W  C  E  can  be  read  from  a  scale  on  A.  The  eye  piece  C  re- 
tains the  eye  exactly  at  the  center  of  the  cylinder,  but  as  it  ro- 
tates freely  upon  its  axis  the  eye  may  always  fixate  E,  throwing 
W  into  indirect  vision.  The  chin  rest  D  will  give  the  head  a 
firm  support. 

II. 

Figure  2  fills  the  window  W  during  the  investigation  of  the 
various  retinal  parts.  It  consists  of  a  sheet  of  blackened  brass 
bearing  a  circle  of  brass,  pivoted  at  X.  The  slit  O  Sis  ^4  mm. 
wide  and  except  for  y2  mm.  at  O  is  covered  by  the  circle  N. 
This  circle  contains  a  series  of  holes  ^  mm.  in  diameter  placed 
%  mm.  apart  upon  the  line  of  an  archimedean  spiral. 

When  this  shutter  (shown  in  Fig.  2)  is  placed  in  the  win- 
dow W,  and  a  lamp  back  of  it,  the  eye  at  C  will  always  see  one 
point  of  light  at  O,  while  a  second  point  will  also  be  visible 


284  JAMES  E.  LOUGH. 

whenever  one  of  'the  holes  in  the  circle  coincides  with  the  slit 
O  S.  The  rotation  of  the  circle  about  X  will  vary  the  distance 
between  these  two  points.  This  distance  can  be  easily  read  to 
£mm.  (2')  upon  the  scale  P.  The  intensity  of  the  stimulating 
light  is  easily  regulated  by  the  distance  of  the  lamp,  while  the 
quality  of  the  light  may  be  varied  by  the  use  of  gelatine  sheets. 


FIG.  2. 

By  this  apparatus,  therefore,  the  vertical  and  horizontal  distance 
at  which  two  points  of  light  stimulating  the  retina  appear  as  one 
(the  retinal  unit)  may  be  obtained  for  all  portions  of  the  retina. 
And  the  influence  of  the  intensity  and  the  quality  of  light  upon 
the  retinal  units  may  be  determined. 

Another  shutter  may  be  placed  in  the  window  W,  having  an 
opening  at  the  center,  the  size  of  which  is  controlled  by  an  iris 


HARVARD  PSYCHOLOGICAL  LABORATORY.  285 

diaphragm.  By  means  of  a  lamp  and  gelatine  sheets  a  light 
stimulus  of  any  quality,  intensity  or  size  may  be  made  to  excite 
any  portion  of  the  retina.  Such  experiments  quickly  demon- 
strate that  the  *  color  fields '  depend  entirely  upon  the  size  and 
intensity  of  the  stimulating  color. 

This  instrument  facilitates  the  study  of  two  points  of  differ- 
ent color  within  one  retinal  unit ;  of  the  threshold  for  colors ;  of 
the  perception  of  differences  in  quality,  in  intensity  and  in  posi- 
tion for  all  portions  of  the  [retina.  Reports  of  these  and  of 
other  investigations  will  be  published  as  they  are  completed. 


THE  ACCURACY  OF  RECOLLECTION  AND  OBSER- 
VATION. 

BY  FREDERICK  E.  BOLTON. 
University  of  Wisconsin. 

The  following  observations  and  discussion  are  offered  as  a 
further  contribution  to  the  line  of  study  suggested  by  Prof. 
Cattell's  article  on  *  Measurement  of  the  Accuracy  of  Recollec- 
tion* which  appeared  in  Science,  Dec.  6,  1895,  and  in  which 
the  author  intimated  that  a  fruitful  field  of  psychological  re- 
search might  be  opened  up  by  comparison  of  results  obtained 
from  classes  of  persons  differing  in  certain  specified  character- 
istics. 

A  series  of  questions,  similar  to  those  given  by  Prof.  Cat- 
tell,  together  with  several  others,  was  assigned  by  Prof.  Jastrow 
to  his  psychology  class  in  the  University  of  Wisconsin.  The 
class  consisted  of  juniors  and  seniors,  92  in  number,  26  being 
women.  From  the  results  obtained  it  is  possible  to  make  com- 
parisons of  the  U.  W.  students  and  Columbia  students  as  classes, 
and  also  to  compare  the  records  of  students  in  different  courses, 
of  men  and  women,  and  of  classes  made  upon  basis  of  college 
standings.  To  ascertain  the  degree  of  confidence,  in  all  answers 
the  students  were  requested  to  mark  their  answers  *c'  if  very 
confident,  '  c'  if  confident,  *  m'  if  moderately  sure,  *  D '  if  doubt- 
ful, and  'Z?'  if  very  doubtful. 

The  question  given  to  determine  the  reliability  of  recollection 
was  the  same  as  the  one  proposed  at  Columbia;  viz:  "What 
was  the  weather  a  week  ago  to-day  ?  "  The  answers  showed  great 
divergence.  Out  of  the  92  that  answered,  there  were  56  that 
said  'cold,'  32  'warm/  36  ' clear'  or  'fair,'  37  'stormy,'  and  21 
indicated  that  rain  fell  while  21  said  it  snowed.  (Many  gave 
double  answers,  as  '  cold'  and  '  snowy.')  On  the  day  in  ques- 
tion it  was  very  moist  in  the  morning,  sprinkling  a  little,  while 
later  in  the  day  it  turned  to  rain  and  sleet.  The  temperature 
286 


RECOLLECTION  AND    OBSERVATION.  287 

varied  from  a  little  above  freezing  in  the  morning  to  a  little  be- 
low at  night.  Perhaps  little  weight  could  be  attached  to  those 
answers  classed  as  cold,  inasmuch  as  standards  of  cold  vary  so 
greatly.  Also,  the  most  natural  assumption  would  be  that  it  was 
cold  on  any  December  day.  While  the  answers  *  stormy'  only 
just  exceed  those  of  '  clear '  or  <  fair '  yet  it  is  worthy  of  note  that 
16  out  of  18  of  those  who  indicated  that  they  were  very  confi- 
dent were  correct  in  their  answers.  The  distribution  of  confi- 
dence in  the  37  correct  answers  was  as  follows  :  16  c,  4  c,  9  m, 
6  D,  2  D.  Out  of  the  remaining  55  answers  only  2  were  c  and 
14  c,  thus  indicating  that  the  degree  of  confidence  is  of  great 
weight  in  this  case. 

On  comparison  of  the  records  of  the  26  women  of  the  class 
with  those  of  an  equal  number  of  men  (selected  by  lot)  it  was 
found  that  14  women  gave  answers  substantially  correct,  while 
only  5  of  the  men's  answers  were  correct.  The  degree  of  con- 
fidence shown  is  also  significant.  The  women's  answers  were 
marked  as  follows :  13  c,  4  c,  6  m,  3  D.  The  men's :  I  c,  10 
c,  7  m,  3  D,  i  D,  4  unexpressed.  Assigning  the  following 
scale  of  marking  to  the  answers,  £=5,  c=4,  m=3,  D=2,  Z>=i, 
we  should  have  as  the  women's  index  of  confidence  4.04  and 
the  men's  3.32.  The  above  results,  both  as  to  accuracy  and 
confidence  seem  to  suggest  (unless  the  result  is  accidental)  that 
women  are  better  observers  or  *  recollectors '  of  the  weather  than 
men. 

The  answers  given  to  the  question  relating  to  the  direction 
in  which  apple  seeds  point  were  42  *  toward  the  stem,'  31 
*  away,'  10  '  toward  the  center,'  3  indefinite.  Thus  the  right 
answers,  although  not  a  majority  of  all  the  answers,  include 
4-3  as  many  as  any  other  class.  Of  the  42  correct  answers, 
3  were  marked  c,  10  c,  17  m,  and  12  D.  Of  the  26  women 
12  were  correct  and  of  the  same  number  of  men  13  were 
right.  The  degree  of  confidence  in  the  correct  answers  of 
the  women,  however,  considerably  exceeds  that  of  the  men. 
In  the  former  the  answers  were  distributed  as  follows  :  3  c,  3  c, 
2  m,  3  D,  i  D.  In  the  latter :  2  c,  7  m,  4  D.  Marking  on  the 
same  scale  as  above,  the  index  of  confidence  for  all  the  women's 
answers  is  3.33,  for  the  men  2.97.  Comparing  the  answers  of 


288  FREDERICK  E.  BOLT  ON. 

the  entire  class  with  the  Columbia  records,  we  find  exactly  the 
same  proportion  of  correct  answers.  There  is  some  variation 
in  the  wrong  answers.  A  comparison  on  the  basis  of  confidence 
cannot  be  made,  because  the  results  from  Columbia  were  not 
given  on  that  basis. 

The  question  asking  the  relative  date  of  Luther's  and 
Michael  Angelo's  birth  received  an  equal  number  of  answers 
giving  each  the  precedence.  But  the  average  of  all  the  answers 
assigned  the  earlier  date  by  6.6  years  to  Michael  Angelo,  giv- 
ing a  constant  error  of — 1.4  years  with  an  average  departure  of 
52  years  from  the  correct  date.  The  Columbia  records  showed 
a  constant  error  of+4  years  and  an  average  error  of  54  years. 
In  this  again  the  records  of  the  women  were  more  nearly  cor- 
rect, they  having  placed  the  birth  of  Michael  Angelo  n.i  years 
before  that  of  Luther,  while  the  men's  average  showed  that 
Luther  was  born  the  earlier  by  9.1  years,  or  17  years  from  the 
correct  date. 

The  next  two  questions  were:  "In  what  year  did  Victor 
Hugo  die?  Chas.  Dickens?"  The  average  of  the  class  placed 
Hugo's  death  1851  (true  date  1885),  and  Dicken's  1862  (true 
date  1870) .  In  the  first  the  average  departure  from  the  true  date 
was  35  years  and  in  the  second  17  years.  This  gives  the  Co- 
lumbia students  the  nearer  average  estimate  by  22  years,  and 
an  average  error  of  22  years  less  than  the  Wisconsin  students. 
In  these  two  questions  the  men  came  much  nearer  the  correct 
date  than  the  women,  placing  Hugo's  death  in  1860  and  Dicken's 
1865.  The  women's  averages  indicated  that  Hugo's  death  oc- 
curred in  1847,  38  years  from  the  correct  date,  while  Dicken's 
death  was  placed  in  1860,  10  years  from  the  true  date.  The 
average  of  the  entire  class  came  considerably  nearer  to  the  cor- 
rect date  of  Dicken's  death  than  Hugo's,  which  is  perhaps  due 
to  the  apparently  closer  relationship  of  Dickens  to  us.  Several 
of  the  answers  showed  great  deviation,  as  at  Columbia,  from 
the  correct  ones.  Hugo's  death  was  placed  as  early  as  1735  by 
one  and  as  late  as  1890  by  several.  Of  the  entire  number  3 
were  right  concerning  Hugo's  death ;  one  of  the  3  was  c,  one 
D  and  the  other  D;  6  were  right  concerning  Dickens  ;  of  these 
i  was  c,  3  D  and  2  D.  The  degree  of  confidence  based  upon 


RECOLLECTION  AND   OBSERVATION. 


289 


the  scale  of  marking  is  about  equal  in  the  two  cases,  1.84  for 
Dickens,  and  1.82  for  Hugo. 

To  determine  the  average  accuracy  in  estimating  weight, 
distance  and  time,  Prof.  Jastrow  gave  similar  questions  to  those 
given  by  Prof.  Cattell,  as  follows  : 

I.  (a)  Estimate  in  feet  the  distance  from  one  college  build- 
ing, "A,"  to  a  second  one,  "  B."     (b)  The  distance  from  build- 
ing "A"  to  a  third  one,  "  C."     (c)  The  distance  from  building 
"  B  "  to  building  "  C,"  (the  three  buildings  being  situated  at  the 
vertices  of  a  familiar  triangle  on  the  campus) . 

II.  Estimate  in  seconds  the  time  required  in  walking  from 
"  B  "  to  "  C."     (All  had  repeatedly  walked  the  given  distance) . 

III.  Estimate  in  ounces  the  weight  of  James'  Psychology 
(Briefer  Course) . 

The  results  obtained  are  tabulated  for  convenient  reference 
in  the  following  form  : 


fr 

A 

& 

£ 

w 

A 

ESTIMATION 

OF 

!< 

P 

1* 

>  I-1 

|| 

^ 

20.5 

-3-5 

8 

19.6 

Entire  Class. 

Ounces. 

24 

22.8 
I9.8 

—  4.2 

8.8 
8.8 

20 
18 

Men. 
Women. 

(17) 

(-7) 

(8) 

(16) 

Columbia. 

Feet  from 
"A"  to  «B." 

810 

580 
606 

455 

—  230 
—  204 
—  355 

306.7 
224 
462 

575 
600 

350 

Entire  Class. 
Men. 
Women. 

Feet  from 
"A"  to  "  C." 

750 

508 

546 
402 

—  242 
—  204 
-348 

229.9 
216 
416 

500.5 
300 

Entire   Class. 
Men. 
Women. 

Feet  from 
"B"to"C." 

450 

276 
296 
261 

—  174 

—  154 
-189 

216.6 
186 
333 

245 
262.5 

210 

Entire  Class. 
Men. 
Women. 

Seconds 

182 

+  22 

48 

182 

Entire  Class. 

from 

160 

177 

+  17 

62 

180 

Men. 

"A"  to  "  B." 

187 

44 

180 

Women. 

Seconds. 

35 

66 

+  31 

40 

60 

Columbia. 

From  these  tables  it  will  be  seen  that  the  average  estimates  re- 
lating to  weight  and  time  were  more  nearly  accurate  than  those 
obtained  at  Columbia.  Instead  of  a  difference  of  over  of  the 


290  FREDERICK  E.   BOLTON. 

weight  of  the  book  as  at  Columbia  ours  differed  only  about  1-7 . 
The  number  of  seconds  instead  of  differing  by  90  %  was  cor- 
rect within  15%.  The  actual  magnitudes  compared  in  the 
time  estimates  not  being  the  same,  the  comparison  must  be  only 
a  general  one ;  the  numerical  constant  error  at  Columbia  when 
35  seconds  was  the  actual  magnitude,  was  greater  than  at  Wis- 
consin'with  1 60  seconds  as  the  actual  magnitude.  The  average 
error  in  the  weight  estimate  is  the  same  in  both  records,  but  the 
Wisconsin  median  estimate  is  considerably  closer.  There  is 
some  difference  between  the  men's  and  women's  records ;  in 
each  of  the  above  the  men  being  more  nearly  correct. 

Our  results  relating  to  distance  show  a  much  greater  con- 
stant error  than  those  obtained  by  Prof.  Cattell.  Ours  show 
positive  constant  errors  of  over  30  %  while  his  show  negative 
errors  of  only  15  %.  The  most  interesting  point,  however,  is 
in  the  direction  of  the  constant  errors.  In  the  Columbia  results 
"  there  was  a  marked  tendency  to  underestimate  weight  and  to 
overestimate  time.  Length  was  overestimated,  but  to  a  less  de- 
gree." At  Wisconsin  the  errors  were  in  the  same  direction  for 
time  and  weight  estimates  as  at  Columbia,  though  of  considerably 
smaller  degree.  The  average  errors  in  the  distance  estimates 
were  smaller  than  at  Columbia,  ours  being  less  than  40  % ,  ex- 
cept in  the  3d  case,  while  theirs  is  nearly  50  %  •  The  average 
of  the  U.  W.  distance  estimates  is  71.5  %  of  the  actual,  while 
at  Columbia  it  is  115  % .  We  find  that  the  greater  the  distance 
the  nearer  correct  the  actual  estimate  is.  The  distance  450 
ft.,  which  is  nearest  to  the  Columbia  distance  was  estimated 
with  the  least  degree  of  accuracy,  and  diverges  most  from  the 
Columbia  results.  Should  a  few  exceptional  results  be  elimi- 
nated, the  average  errors  would  be  very  small.  One  person 
gave  the  distance  from  «A'  to  *  B '  2000  ft.,  nearly  half  a  mile, 
and  another  recorded  it  45  ft.,  less  than  three  rods.  These  ex- 
tremes are  found  in  the  women's  records.  An  examination  of 
the  tables  reveals  the  fact  that  the  men's  average  estimates  are 
much  more  nearly  correct  and  their  average  errors  much  smaller 
than  the  women's. 

The  records  of  the  women  on  distance  show  a  very  small 
degree  of  confidence  in  their   answers,  the  sign  'c'  occurring 


RECOLLECTION  AND   OBSERVATION. 


29I 


but  once.  A  large  majority  expressed  themselves  as  doubtful. 
Among  the  answers  of  the  men  there  was  a  considerable  num- 
ber who  were  '  c '  and  '  m.'  From  these  comparisons  we  should 
judge  that  in  quantitative  estimations  of  measurement  that  men 
are  more  accurate  than  women,  and  that  their  index  of  confi- 
dence is  higher.  The  following  diagrams  show  the  distribution 
of  answers  to  the  weight  estimate  and  a  comparison  of  the  actual 
and  estimated  distances. 


to      20     JO      t/o 
FIG.  i. — Weight  in  02. 


Triangle  ABC  represents  actual  dis- 
tances. 

Triangle  a  b  c  represents  men's  esti- 
mated distances. 

Triangle  a  p  y  represents  women's  esti- 
mated distances. 


The  Wisconsin  students  were  asked  to  draw  a  ground  floor 
plan  of  the  *  Library  Hall '  on  a  scale  of  •£$  inch  to  the  foot. 
This  would  give  drawings,  if  accurate,  of  extreme  length  and 
width  of  c^-J  in.  x^J  in.  A  measurement  of  the  drawings  re- 
vealed the  fact  that  all  had  considerably  underestimated  the  size. 
The  size  of  the  paper  on  which  the  drawings  were  made  was 
8  in.  x  10  in.  The  drawings  averaged  3^  in.  x6  in.,  or  indi- 
cated that  the  building  was  about  55  ft.  xp5  ft.,  instead  of 
78  ft.  x  155  ft.  In  these  records  we  see  clearly  the  same  ten- 
dency to  under-estimate  distance.  Many  of  the  drawings  ex- 
hibited all  the  characteristic  features  of  the  correct  plan,  and 
would  give  a  tolerably  correct  impression  of  the  building.  A 
composite  drawing  made  from  the  collection  would  show  the 
plan  to  quite  a  degree  of  exactness.  Only  five  drawings  were 
too  large,  and  these  only  slightly. 

Another  task  to  test  memory  and  observation  was  to  draw  a 


292 


FREDERICK  E.   BOLT  ON. 


print  of  a  dog's  foot  as  it  appears  in  the  snow.  The  drawings 
present  a  great  variety,  and  not  a  very  correct  impression  of 
what  was  intended  could  be  gained  from  most  of  the  drawings, 
taken  separately.  It  is  possible  that  a  composite  drawing  made 
from  the  collection  would  exhibit  the  most  prominent  character- 
istics. A  classification,  made  on  the  basis  of  number  of  toes, 
gave  the  following  results:  3,  two  toes;  16,  three  toes;  44, 
four  toes;  22,  five  toes;  i,  six  toes;  6,  no  toes  at  all,  the  foot 
being  one  solid  piece  with  slight  lobes.  Fac-similes  of  a  few 
drawings  are  appended. 


FIG.  3. — Fac-similes  of  drawings  of  dog's  foot  print. 

The  last  question  was  (a)  tell  the  number  of  steps  in  a  famil- 
iar stairway  '  L '  and  (b)  the  number  of  steps  in  another  stair- 
way *  S.'  The  results  obtained  are  given  in  the  following  table. 


1 

k 

ft 

W 

W 

A. 

ESTIMATION 

fc 

&~' 

d 

• 

a±; 

| 

OF. 

IB 
P 

2% 

85 

•< 

P 

H 

•4 

P 

I 

£ 

Steps  in 

«T       »> 

6 

5-43 
5-5 

—  57 
—•5 

i-3 
1.27 

if 

Entire  Class. 
Men. 

5-2 

—.8 

1.44 

5-4 

Women. 

Step  in 

«  C   " 

H 

9-8 
10.8 

—4.2 
—3-2 

4.4 
4.2 

9-75 
IO. 

Entire  Class. 
Men. 

9.1 

—4.9 

5- 

8-75 

Women. 

RECOLLECTION  AND   OBSERVATION. 


293 


Curves  are  added  below  which  represent  the  distribution  of 
answers  to  the  last  question. 


FIG.  4. — Steps  in  '  L.' 


o  r  „  if 

FIG.  5.— Steps  in  '  S.' 


A  study  was  made  of  the  entire  records  on  the  basis  of  the 
course  in  college  and  also  by  classifying  according  to  college 
standing.  No  definite  results  could  be  secured  on  the  last 
named  basis  inasmuch  as  the  standards  of  marking  are  so  purely 
conventional  with  each  different  instructor  that  no  safe  working 
basis  of  comparison  is  available.  The  results  most  nearly  cor- 
rect seem  to  be  found  in  the  records  of  the  class  with  lowest 
standings,  which  is  probably  due  to  the  fact  that  the  women, 
whose  records  show  greater  errors  than  the  men's  are  found,  the 
great  part,  in  the  class  with  highest  standings. 

The  comparison  of  '  general  science '  students  with  *  ancient 
classical '  students  shows  that  on  the  whole  the  former  are  more 
nearly  correct  in  their  estimates.  In  these  the  number  of  women 
is  about  equal  in  each.  In  the  three  distance  estimates  the 
*  general  science '  student's  estimate  averaged  71.5  %  of  the  ac- 
tual while  the  *  ancient  classical '  student's  estimate  was  only 
51.5  %  of  the  actual.  The  average  of  the  science  students  placed 
Dicken's  death  in  1868,  the  classical  in  1856.  Hugo's  death 
was  given  1854  by  t^ie  science  students  and  1839  ^7  t^ie  classical 
students.  The  answers  relating  to  the  weather  were  slightly 
nearer  to  the  correct  and  the  one  relating  to  the  apple  seeds  much 
more  generally  correct  in  the  answers  of  the  science  students. 
In  two  cases  the  classical  students'  answers  showed  a  better 
though  only  slightly  better  average,  than  the  science  students. 


294 


FREDERICK  E.   BOLT  ON. 


A  general  study  of  the  distribution  of  confidence  in  the  sev- 
eral answers  is  interesting  and  suggestive.  Comparing  first 
the  average  confidence  in  the  several  answers,  as  expressed  in 
the  scale  of  marking  used  above,  we  find  a  high  degree  of  con- 
fidence in  the  answers  relating  to  weather  (3.33)  ;  in  the  esti- 
mate of  time  (3.28)  ;  and  in  the  question  relating  to  the  direc- 
tion of  the  apple  seeds.  A  second  group,  in  which  the  confidence 
has  an  intermediate  value,  consists  of  the  two  questions  relating 
to  the  number  of  steps  (av.  confidence,  2.52  and  2.92)  ;  of  the 
three  estimates  of  distance  (2.49,  2.56,  2.54),  and  the  estimate 
of  weight  (2.29).  The  third  group,  with  the  low  confidence, 
comprises  the  historical  group,  relating  to  the  death  of  Hugo, 
M.  Angelo  and  Luther  (av.  confidence,  1.82,  1.84,  1.79).  It 
thus  appears  that  the  smallest  degree  of  confidence  attaches  to 
those  questions  that  depend  upon  memory  alone,  the  highest 
degree  to  those  depending  mainly  upon  observations  (with  a 
slight  memory  factor) ,  while  an  intermediate  degree  of  confi- 
dence attaches  to  those  questions  involving  in  addition  to  memory 
and  observation,  a  process  of  estimation. 

It  would  be  interesting  to  compare  the  general  correctness 
of  the  answers  with  their  confidence,  but  the  nature  of  the 
answers  prevents  such  comparison,  except  in  a  few  cases.  We 
can  compare  the  various  estimates  of  number,  weight  and  time. 
We  thus  find  that  the  two  questions  most  correctly  answered  are 
the  estimate  of  time  and  the  number  of  steps  in  a  certain  flight, 
and  these  are  also  those  that  have  the  highest  confidence  in  the 
group.  The  estimate  of  weight  is,  however,  somewhat  of  an 
exception  to  this  relation,  as  the  answers  are  good,  but  expressed 
with  little  confidence,  while  in  the  other  estimates  we  have  an 
amount  of  correctness  as  well  as  of  confidence. 

We  may  finally  compare  the  general  distribution  of  confi- 
dence in  the  whole  group  of  answers,  as  below : 


Very 
Doubtful. 

Doubtful. 

Moderately 
Sure. 

Confident. 

Confident. 

Average 
Confidence. 

Total  .   . 

15-7 

31-9 

36.0 

12.8 

3-6 

2.57 

Men  .  .    . 

H.7 

34-0 

36.7 

14.0 

3-6 

2.77 

Women.  . 

18.4 

334 

26.1 

14.4 

7-7 

2.56 

RECOLLECTION  AND    OBSERVATION.  295 

The  numbers  in  the  table  express  percentages  of  occurrence. 
It  is  observed  that  there  are  relatively  more  doubtful  and  very 
doubtful  than  confident  and  very  confident  answers.  We  ob- 
serve, also,  that,  while  the  men  tend  to  use  the  moderate  confi- 
dence more  than  the  women,  the  women  use  the  extremely  con- 
fident and  extremely  doubtful  marks  more  than  the  men.  This 
feminine  tendency  is  due  to  the  extreme  confidence  in  the  ques- 
tion regarding  the  weather,  and  to  their  extreme  doubt  regard- 
ing the  questions  of  date. 

I  desire  to  acknowledge  many  helpful  suggestions  from  Prof. 
Jastrow  in  the  arrangement  and  interpretation  of  these  results. 


DISCUSSION  AND  REPORTS. 


CONSCIOUSNESS  AND   EVOLUTION.1 

MR.  PRESIDENT  AND  GENTLEMEN:  This  conference  between 
those  who  look  upon  many  of  the  same  phenomena  from  two  points 
of  view,  the  biological  and  the  psychological,  seems  to  me  significant 
and  promising.  I  think  it  is  one  of  several  indications  that  in  general 
the  devotees  of  the  different  particular  sciences  are  coming  more 
clearly  to  recognize  the  community  of  truth  and  interest  which  makes 
them  dependent  upon  each  other ;  and  that  this  recognition  is  produ- 
cing more  of  the  spirit  of  appreciation  and  of  sympathy  among  them 
all.  It  is  to  be  hoped  that  the  day  of  the  mere  specialist  is  waning. 
It  may  reasonably  be  believed  that  the  day  is  dawning  when  a  broad 
culture,  a  genial  attitude  and  a  firm  grasp  upon  the  unities  of  nature 
and  of  life  will  characterize  the  various  departments  of  human  knowl- 
edge. 

The  peculiarly  close  relations  between  biology  and  psychology  are 
easily  made  apparent.  I  think  that  biologists  are  destined  to  make  in- 
creasingly intelligent  and  emphatic  the  acknowledgment  that  they  can- 
not understand  or  explain  the  phenomena  of  living  animal  forms  (and, 
perhaps,  not  those  of  living  plant  forms)  without  appealing  to  the  sci- 
ence of  psychical  phenomena.  And  since  all  science  of  psychical  phe- 
nomena must  forever  take  its  rise  from  and  return,  after  its  attempted 
excursions  into  the  fields  of  comparative  psychology,  again  to  the  sci- 
ence of  human  consciousness,  biology  must  always  owe  much  to 
human  psychology.  On  the  other  hand,  every  progressive  student  of 
psychology  is  entirely  ready  to  recognize  a  constant  and  growing  obli- 
gation on  the  part  of  his  science  to  modern  biology.  Indeed,  just  now 
many  psychologists  are  in  danger  of  becoming  too  timid  and — if  I  may 
be  pardoned  the  word — even  servile  in  their  attitude  towards  the  physi- 
cal and  natural  sciences.  It  would  seem  that  they  often  prejudice  the 
facts  of  their  own  science,  and  reject  the  most  convenient  and  satis- 
factory theoretical  explanations  of  the  facts  by  being  more  dogmatic 

1  Discussion  before  the  American  Psychological  Association,  Philadelphia, 
1895. 

296 


DISCUSSION  AND  REPORTS.  297 

about  the  validity  and  universal  application  of  so-called  'natural 
laws '  than  are  the  physicists  and  biologists  themselves.  Witness  the 
hasty  and  excessive  confidence  of  many  psychologists  in  the  principle 
of  causation,  as  conceived  of  after  the  pattern  of  physics  and  carried  in 
again  upon  the  sphere  of  mental  life  in  discussing  the  phenomena  of 
will ;  or  the  gingerly  way  in  which  the  facts  and  laws  of  conscious- 
ness in  its  relation  to  brain  states  are  discussed,  whenever  the  shadow 
of  the  very  dubious  principle  of  the  conservation  and  correlation  of 
energy  is  thrown  over  this  problem.  It  has  been  my  experience  that, 
on  the  whole,  psychologists  are  much  more  inclined  to  dogmatism 
over  many  alleged  physical  principles  than  are  the  most  candid  and 
thoughtful  students  of  physics  and  biology. 

Without  criticising  or  dissenting  from  Professor  James'  threefold 
division  of  the  problem  of  consciousness  and  evolution,  it  seems  to  me 
that  we  may  regard  this  problem  from  two  points  of  view.  If  we  take 
one  of  these  points  of  view  we  look  backward  and  ask  ourselves  as  to 
the  origin  of  consciousness,  and  as  to  the  possibility  of  explaining  it  by 
considerations  which  the  student  of  biology  is  able  to  present  and  to 
verify.  If  we  take  the  other  point  of  view  we  look  from  it  in  the 
forward  direction ;  and  then  we  ask  ourselves  as  to  the  part  which 
consciousness  itself  ever  plays — has  played  and  will  continue  to  play — 
in  the  evolution  of  animal  organisms.  Our  first  question  is  :  How  far 
does  the  evolution  of  organisms,  histologically  and  physiologically 
considered,  enable  us  to  give  the  history  and  the  explanation  of  the 
rise  and  development  of  consciousness?  Our  other  question  is: 
How  far  does  consciousness,  having  once  got  established,  so  to  speak, 
influence — quicken,  accelerate,  retard  and  mark  out  into  definite  lines 
— the  development  of  organisms? 

The  first  of  these  two  questions  we  may  consider  either  in  the  more 
purely  historical  and  descriptive  way,  or  in  the  more  profoundly  phil- 
osophical way.  And  it  is  difficult,  in  all  thorough  discussion  of  the 
subject,  to  separate  between  the  two.  But  a  few  words  upon  each  of 
these  ways  of  consideration,  or  sets  of  considerations,  may  not  be  out 
of  place  here. 

It  must  be  admitted  with  gladness  and  thanksgiving  that  the  modern 
doctrine  of  biological  evolution  has  drawn  a  most  interesting  and  in- 
structive picture  of  how  the  different  forms  of  animal  life  might  have 
succeeded  each  other,  and  of  the  relations,  whether  to  each  other  by 
physical  generation  or  to  their  total  environment,  under  which  they 
have  appeared  in  succession,  been  modified,  and  disappeared,  giving 
place  to  other  forms.  But  it  may  well  be  questioned  how  far  all  this 


298  CONSCIOUSNESS  AND  EVOLUTION. 

puts  us  in  possession  of  the  descriptive  history,  not  to  say  the  scien- 
tific explanation,  of  the  rise  and  development  of  consciousness.  For, 
in  the  first  place,  we  are  still  almost  wholly  in  the  dark  as  to  precisely 
where,  in  the  series  which  evolution  presents,  consciousness  in  fact  had 
its  rise.  Was  it  with  those  most  elementary  living  forms  which  expert 
biologists  hesitate  to  assign  either  to  the  animal  kingdom  or  to  the  field 
of  plant  life?  And,  if  so,  shall  we  go  on  with  Fechner  to  assume 
'souls'  as  belonging  to  all  the  plants;  or  even  with  Clifford,  to  dis- 
tribute our  'soul  stuff'  as  widely  and  generously  as  Nature  herself 
seems  to  have  distributed  the  '  stuff '  out  of  which  things  are  made  ? 

It  seems  to  me  that  the  most  significant  truth  which  biology  is  about 
to  establish  in  such  connection  is  this :  The  more  careful  and  patient 
study  of  the  micro-organisms  with  the  higher  powers  of  the  microscope 
shows  that  an  unexpectedly  high  development  and  complex  exercise 
of  psychic  functions  needs  to  be  assumed  to  account  for  their  behavior. 
Where,  then,  and  how  'low  down'  shall  be  placed  the  rise  of  consci- 
ousness in  the  so-called  scale  of  animal  life  ? 

But,  even  if  we  could  find  in  biological  evolution  any  answer  to 
the  question  just  raised,  and  also  any  answer  to  the  inquiry  for  a 
trustworthy  descripti  ve  history  of  the  development  of  conscious  life  as 
connected  with  organisms,  all  this  would  not  give  us  a  valid  explana- 
tion of  conscious  phenomena.  For,  as  is  admitted  by  all  when  brought 
face  to  face  with  the  problem,  consciousness  is  $er  se — if  I  may  so 
speak — a  phenomenon  of  a  totally  different  order  from  those  phenomena 
with  which  histology  and  physiology  deal.  It  appears,  indeed,  quite 
as  hopeless  a  task  for  our  imagination,  to  ask  it  to  conceive  how  the 
simplest  and  lowest  form  of  consciousness  can  arise  out  of  the  uncon- 
scious as  to  conceive  the  denial  of  the  scholastic  maxim  :  Ex  nihilo  nil 
-fit.  If  we  had  our  two  parallel  sciences  complete — comparative  an- 
atomy and  physiology  in  one  line  and  comparative  psychology  in  an- 
other— we  should  still  exhaust  all  our  wisdom  with  the  sentence :  Just 
at  this  time,  it  would  appear,  the  fiat  went  forth  :  '  Let  there  be  Con- 
sciousness, and  consciousness  was.' 

I  will  not  attempt  to  take  the  question  as  to  the  relations  between 
consciousness  and  the  evolution  of  material  forms  out  into  the  broader 
fields  of  general  metaphysical  philosophy.  It  seems  to  me,  however, 
the  history  of  speculation  has  sufficiently  shown  that  all  theories 
which  make  consciousness  ultimately  dependent  upon  the  evolution  o^ 
unconscious  forms  of  existence  succeed  only  by  smuggling  into  their  ex- 
planations everything  which  the  very  essentials  of  the  theories  require 
them  to  leave  out.  I  will  only  call  attention  to  one  important  truth  in 


DISCUSSION  AND  REPORTS.  299 

the  theory  of  knowledge.  It  is  impossible  to  have  any  science  what- 
ever without  basing  it  upon  a  system  of  metaphysical  postulates  and 
metaphysical  conceptions.  But  all  these  conceptions  are  themselves 
only  products  or  processes  in  consciousness ;  and  all  the  postulates  are 
only  the  assumptions,  the  natural  or  acquired  *  faiths'  of  human  con- 
sciousness. If,  then,  whatever  may  be  thought  of  the  chronological 
position  which  human  consciousness  occupies  in  relation  to  the  develop- 
ment of  organisms,  you  do  away  with  the  logical  a  priority  and  the 
ontological  value  of  consciousness,  as  rational  thinking,  as  willing,  as 
knowing,  you  remove  all  science.  In  the  macrocosm  it  would  appear 
that  there  is  no  escape  from  the  position ;  being — so  far  as  being  can 
be  known,  or  thought  by  us — is  dependent  for  its  genesis  and  evolution 
on  some  consciousness. 

As  to  the  other  most  interesting  and  important  problem,  namely, 
the  dependence  of  the  evolution  of  specific  animal  organisms  upon 
the  conscious  psychoses  of  the  animals  themselves,  it  seems  to  me  our 
trustworthy  evidence  of  an  experiential  sort  is  much  greater.  I  was 
not  a  little  delighted  at  the  main  position  which  Professor  Cope  took 
in  his  address.  But  I  believe  that  biologists  will  be  compelled  to  go 
even  further  than  he  appears  to,  at  present,  in  valuing  the  influence 
of  consciousness  upon  the  evolution  of  organisms.  To  speak  in 
popular  and  figurative  phrase,  the  psychical  characteri sties  and  psychi- 
cal activities  of  every  species  of  animal  is  an  active  and  authoritative 
factor  in  the  excitement  and  direction  of  organic  changes  in  the  indi- 
vidual. The  activities  of  even  the  lower  forms  of  animal  life  are 
within  indefinite  but  really  existing  limitations  determined  by  the 
mental  representations,  the  passions,  the  conscious  wants,  desires  and 
volitions  of  the  animal.  These  forms  are  not  in  their  individual  de- 
velopment, mere  molecular  mechanisms. 

I  think  that  most  biologists  have  quite  failed  sufficiently  to  reflect 
upon  the  significance  of  much  of  the  terminology  which  they  employ. 
How  much  of  it  is  taken  from  our  own  conscious  life,  our  psychical 
experience !  Strip  it  of  the  more  obvious  meaning  which  it  seems 
to  have  as  applied  to  this  life  and  to  this  experience,  and  how  difficult 
it  becomes  to  give  it  any  meaning,  whatever,  which  shall  make  our 
theory  of  evolution  much  more  than  a  ceaseless,  unprogressive  repeti- 
tion of  the  facts.  Some  years  ago,  when  discussing  this  subject  with 
a  class  of  graduate  students,  a  member  of  the  class  who  had  taught 
for  years  in  a  large  high  school  expressed  his  astonishment  as  he 
once  beheld  an  amoeba  and  a  fresh- water  hydra,  after  preliminary  exhi 
bitions  of  rage  and  cunning,  come  to  a  pitched  battle  with  each  other 


300  CONSCZOt/SNESS  AND  EVOLUTION. 

which  ended  in  the  hydra  taking  the  entire  insides  out  of  the  amoeba. 
Here  was  indeed  '  a  struggle  for  existence '  with  a  vengeance  ! 

For  myself,  I  do  not  propose  to  be  deterred  by  doubtful  principles  of 
physics,  from  the  most  obvious  inference  that  the  animals,  including  the 
micro-organisms,  have  a  true  psychic  existence ;  and  that  this  psychic 
existence  is  a  force,  and  an  important  force,  for  the  preservation  or  de- 
struction of  the  species.  Only  the  settlement  by  biology  of  the  dis- 
puted question  as  to  the  limits  of  heredity  can  decide  how  much 
psychic  forces  count  for  in  the  modification  and  direction  of  the  physi- 
cal evolution  of  species.  Without  emotion  and  what  we  call  instinct 
to  act  as  verce  causce  in  the  evolution  of  their  organisms,  the  world  of 
animal  forms  would  be  a  system  of  pale  shadows,  moved  by  toy-like 
mechanism,  compared  with  the  exceedingly  interesting  and  dreadfully 
earnest  thing  which  it  now  is. 

It  is  here,  of  course,  however,  that  comparative  psychology  and 
biology  came  so  close  to  each  other ;  indeed,  seem  to  run  together. 
And  comparative  psychology — as  the  very  term  signifies — cannot  be 
cultivated  without  knowledge  of  human  psychology.  Here,  therefore, 
I  am  brought  around  again  to  the  remark  with  which  I  started.  Such  a 
conference  as  this  is  significant  of  the  unity  of  interest  that  maintains 
itself  among  the  sciences ;  and  it  is  promising  of  a  more  warm  sym- 
pathy and  a  more  helpful  intercourse  between  them. 

GEORGE  TRUMBULL  LADD. 
YALE  UNIVERSITY. 


CONSCIOUSNESS  AND  EVOLUTION.1 

The  addresses  to  which  we  have  already  listened  by  Professors 
James  and  Cope  have  raised  so  many  interesting  questions,  and  the 
various  aspects  of  the  general  problem  have  been  so  clearly  formulated, 
that  I  shall  confine  myself  to  a  few  remarks  upon  the  positions  which 
these  speakers  have  taken. 

Professor  Cope's  position  on  the  place  of  consciousness  in  evolution 
seems  in  the  main  the  true  one,  as  far  as  the  question  of  fact  is  con- 
cerned. I  agree  with  him  that  no  adequate  theory  of  the  development 
of  organic  nature  can  be  formulated  without  taking  conscious  states 
into  account.  The  fact  of  adaptation  requires  on  the  part  of  the  indi- 
vidual organism  something  equivalent  to  what  we  call  consciousness 

discussion  (revised)  before  the  Amer.  Psychol.  Assoc.,  at  Philadelphia, 
Dec.  28,  1895. 


DISCUSSION  AND  REPORTS.  301 

in  ourselves.  But  I  do  not  think  that  the  need  of  recognizing  con- 
sciousness in  connection  with  organic  functions  leads  at  all  necessarily 
to  the  view  that  conciousness  is  a  causa  vera  whose  modes  of  action 
do  not  have  physiological  parallel  processes  in  the  brain  and  nerves. 
The  alternatives  are  not  really  two  only,  automatism — a  theory  of 
mechanical  causation  of  all  movement,  with  the  inference  that  con- 
sciousness is  a  by-product  of  no  importance,  and  this  vera  causa 
view  which  makes  consciousness  a  new  force  injected  into  the  activities 
of  the  brain.  There  is  another  way  of  looking  at  the  question  to  which 
I  return  below. 

With  Professor  Cope's  view  that  the  recognition  of  consciousness  as 
a  factor  in  evolution  requires  a  Neo-Lamarckian  theory  of  heredity  I 
am  not  at  all  in  accord.  I  have  recently  discussed  the  question 
apropos  of  Professor  Cope's  views  in  Science  (Aug.  23,  1895).  In- 
stead of  finding  with  Professor  Cope  that  the  emphasis  of  conscious 
function  in  evolution  makes  it  necessary  to  recognize  the  Lamarckian 
factor,  I  think  the  facts  point  just  the  other  way.  As  soon  as  there  is 
much  development  of  mind,  the  gregarious  or  social  life  begins ;  and 
in  it  we  have  a  new  way  of  transmitting  the  acquisitions  of  one  gen- 
eration to  another,  which  tends  to  supersede  the  action — if  it  exists — 
of  natural  heredity  in  such  transmission.  This  transmission  by  '  So- 
cial Heredity'  (as  we  may  call  the  individual's  process  of  learning 
from  society  by  imitation,  instruction,  etc.,)  is  so  universal  a  fact  with 
vertebrates  that  we  may,  it  seems  to  me,  say  at  once  that  the  arguments 
for  Neo-Lamarckism  drawn  by  Mr.  Spencer  and  others  from  the 
phenomena  of  human  progress,  at  least,  are  completely  neutralized  by 
them.  And  there  are  facts  which  should  show  that  the  same  state  of 
things  descend  below  man. 

It  is  very  probable,  as  far  as  the  early  life  of  the  child  may  be 
taken  as  indicating  the  factors  of  evolution,  that  the  main  function  of 
consciousness  is  to  enable  him  to  learn  things  which  natural  heredity 
fails  to  transmit;  and  with  the  child  the  fact  that  consciousness  is  the 
essential  means  of  all  his  learning  is  correlated  with  the  other  fact 
that  the  child  is  the  very  creature  for  which  natural  heredity  gives  few 
independent  functions.  It  is  in  this  field  only  that  I  venture  to  speak 
with  assurance ;  but  the  recognition  of  this  influence  has  been  reached 
by  Weismann,  Morgan  and  others  on  the  purely  biological  side. 

The  instinctive  equipment  of  the  lower  animals  is  replaced  by  the 
plasticity  necessary  for  learning  by  consciousness.  So  it  seems  to  me 
that  the  evidence  points  to  some  inverse  ratio  between  the  importance 
of  consciousness  as  factor  in  development  and  the  need  of  the  inheri- 


303  CONSCIOUSNESS  AND  EVOLUTION 

tance  of  acquired  characters  as  factor  in  development.  This  presumptive 
argument  may  be  supplemented,  I  think,  with  positive  refutations  of 
the  considerations  which  Professor  Cope,  Romanes  and  others  present 
for  the  view  that  the  transmission  of  functions  secured  by  conscious- 
ness requires  the  Lamarckian  factor.1 

The  examination  of  the  biological  evidence  just  cited  by  Mr. 
Cope  in  support  of  Neo-Lamarckism  I  am  not  competent  to  make ; 
but  there  is  present  another  distinguished  biologist,  Prof.  Minot,  from 
whom  I  hope  we  may  hear. 

There  is  one  omission  in  Professor  James'  excellent  division  of  our 
topic  into  its  members — an  omission  whose  importance  may  justify 
my  bringing  up  a  phase  of  the  general  question  to  which  I  think  too 
much  importance  can  hardly  be  attached.  It  is,  in  biological  phrase, 
the  ontogenetic  question,  the  examination  of  development  of  con- 
sciousness in  the  individual,  with  a  view  to  the  generalization  of 
results  and  their  application  to  race-development.  Professor  Cope's 
emphasis  on  consciousness  rests  here,  and  it  is  well  placed.  In  the 
life  history  of  the  organism  we  have  the  problem  of  development 
actually  in  a  measure  solved  before  us.  The  biologist  recognizes  this 
in  his  emphasis  on  embryology  and  also  to  a  degree  in  his  paleon- 
tology. But  the  psychologist  has  not  realized  the  weapon  he  has 
both  for  biological  and  for  psychological  use  in  the  mental  develop- 
ment of  the  child.  Moreover  the  biologist  no  less  than  the  psycholo- 
gist must  needs  resort  to  this  field  of  investigation  if  he  would  finally 
settle  the  function  of  consciousness  in  evolution.  The  fossils  tell 
nothing  of  any  such  factor  as  consciousness.  Nor  does  the  embryo. 
So,  as  difficult  as  the  ontogenetic  question  is,  it  is  one  of  the  really 
hopeful  fields  on  both  sides.  I  may  be  allowed,  therefore,  to  give  a 
brief  summary  of  certain  results  reached  by  this  method  in  my  own 
work ;  especially  since  it  will  set  out  more  fully,  even  in  its  defects 
and  inadequacies,  the  general  bearing  of  this  problem. 

That  there  is  some  general  principle  running  through  all  the  con- 
scious adaptations  of  movement  which  the  individual  creature  makes 
is  indicated  by  the  very  unity  of  the  organism  itself.  The  principle  of 
Habit  must  be  recognized  in  some  general  way  which  will  allow  the 
organism  to  do  new  things  without  utterly  undoing  what  it  has  al- 
ready acquired.  This  means  that  old  habits  must  be  substantially 
preserved  in  the  new  functions ;  that  all  new  functions  must  be 

J  See  my  articles  on  Heredity  and  Instinct,  Science,  March  20  and  April  10, 
'96;  Prof.  Cope's  reply  and  my  further  note  may  be  found  in  the  Amer.  Natur- 
alist, April  and  May,  '96. 


DISCUSSION  AND  REPORTS.  303 

reached  by  gradual  modifications.  And  we  will  all  go  further  and 
say,  I  think,  that  the  only  way  that  these  modifications  can  be  got  at 
all  is  through  some  sort  of  interaction  of  the  organism  with  its  envi- 
ronment. Now,  as  soon  as  we  ask  how  the  stimulations  of  the  envi- 
ronment can  produce  new  adaptive  movements,  we  have  the  answer  of 
Spencer  and  Bain — an  answer  directly  confirmed,  I  think,  without 
question,  by  the  study  both  of  the  child  and  of  the  adult — by  the  selec- 
tion of  fit  movements  from  excessively  produced  movements,  i.  e.,  from 
movement  'variations.  So  granting  this,  we  now  have  the  further 
question :  How  do  these  movement  variations  come  to  be  produced 
when  and  where  they  are  needed^  And  with  it,  the  question  :  How 
does  the  organism  keep  those  movements  going  which  are  thus  selected, 
and  suppress  those  which  are  not  selected  ? 

Now  these  two  questions  are  the  ones  which  the  biologists  fail  to 
answer.  And  the  force  of  the  facts  leads  to  the  hypotheses  of  *  con- 
scious force'  of  Cope,  'self-development'  of  Henslow,  and  'directive 
tendency'  or  'determinate  variation'  of  the  American  school — all 
aspects  of  the  new  vitalism  which  just  these  questions  and  the  facts 
which  they  rest  upon  are  now  forcing  to  the  front.  Have  we  anything 
definite,  drawn  from  the  study  of  the  individual  on  the  psychological 
side,  to  substitute  for  these  confessedly  vague  biological  phrases? 
Spencer  gave  an  answer  in  a  general  way  long  ago  to  the  second  of 
these  questions,  by  saying  that  in  consciousness  the  function  of  pleasure 
and  pain  is  just  to  keep  some  actions  or  movements  going  and  to  sup- 
press others.  The  evidence  of  this  seems  to  me  to  be  coextensive, 
actually,  with  the  range  of  conscious  experience,  however  we  may  be 
disposed  to  define  the  physiological  processes  which  are  involved  in 
pleasure  and  pain.  Actions  which  secure  pleasurable  conditions  to 
the  organism  are  determined  by  the  pleasure  to  be  repeated,  and  so 
to  secure  the  continuance  of  the  pleasurable  conditions ;  and  actions 
which  get  the  organism  into  pain  are  by  the  very  fact  of  pain  sup- 
pressed. 

But  as  soon  as  we  enquire  more  closely  into  the  actual  working  of 
pleasure  and  pain  reactions,  we  find  an  answer  suggested  to  the  first 
question  also,  i.  e.,  the  question  as  to  how  the  organism  comes  to 
make  the  kind  and  sort  of  movements  which  the  environment  calls  for 

JThis  is  just  the  question  that  Weismann  seeks  to  answer  (in  respect  to  the 
supply  of  variations  in  forms  which  the  paleontologists  require),  with  his 
doctrine  of  '  Germinal  Selection  '  (Monist,  Jan.,  1896).  Why  are  not  such  appli- 
cations of  the  principle  of  natural  selection  to  variations  in  the  parts  and  func- 
tions of  the  single  organism  just  as  reasonable  and  legitimate  as  is  the  applica- 
tion of  it  to  variations  in  separate  organisms? 


304  CONSCIOUSNESS  AND  EVOLUTION. 

— the  movement-variations  when  and  where  they  are  required.  The 
pleasure  or  pain  produced  by  a  stimulus — and  by  a  movement  also,  for 
the  utility  of  movement  is  always  that  it  secures  stimulation  of  this 
sort  or  that — does  not  lead  to  diffused,  neutral,  and  characterless 
movements,  as  Spencer  and  Bain  suppose :  this  is  disputed  no  less  by 
the  infant's  movements  than  by  the  actions  of  unicellular  creatures. 
There  are  characteristic  differences  in  vital  movements  wherever  we 
find  them.  Even  if  Mr.  Spencer's  undifferentiated  protoplasmic 
movements  had  existed,  natural  selection  would  very  soon  have  put  an 
end  to  it.  There  is  a  characteristic  antithesis  between  movements 
always.  Healthy,  overflowing,  favorable,  outreaching,  expansive,  vital 
effects  are  associated  with  pleasure ;  and  the  contrary,  the  withdraw- 
ing, depressive,  contractive,  decreasing,  vital  effects  are  associated 
with  pain.  This  is  exactly  the  state  of  things  which  a  theory  of  the  se- 
lection of  movements  from  overproduced  movements  requires,  /.  £.,  that 
increased  vitality,  represented  by  pleasure,  should  give  excess  move- 
ments, from  which  new  adaptations  are  selected ;  and  that  decreased 
vitality  represented  by  pain  should  to  the  reverse — draw  off  energy  and 
suppress  movement. 

If,  therefore,  we  say  that  here  is  a  type  of  reaction  which  all  vital- 
ity shows,  we  may  give  it  a  general  descriptive  name,  i.  e.,  the 
*  Circular  Reaction,'  in  that  its  significance  for  evolution  is  that  it  is 
not  a  random  response  in  movement  to  all  stimulations  alike,  but  that 
it  distinguishes  in  its  very  form  and  amount  between  stimulations 
which  are  vitally  good  and  those  which  are  vitally  bad,  tending  to  re- 
tain the  good  stimulations  and  to  draw  away  from  and  so  suppress  the 
bad.  The  term  4  circular '  is  used  to  emphasize  the  way  such  a  reaction 
tends  to  keep  itself  going,  over  and  over,  by  reproducing  the  condi- 
tions of  its  own  stimulation.  It  represents  habit,  since  it  tends  to  keep 
up  old  movements ;  but  it  secures  new  adaptations,  since  it  provides 
for  the  overproduction  of  movement-variations  for  the  operation  of 
selection.  This  kind  of  selection,  since  it  requires  the  direct  coopera- 
tion of  the  organism  itself,  I  have  called  '  Organic  Selection.'  It 
might  be  called  '  motor'  or  even  '  psychic'  selection,  since  the  part  of 
consciousness,  in  the  form  of  pleasure  and  pain,  and  later  on  experi- 
ence generally,  intelligence,  etc.,  is  so  prominent.1 

1  See  Chap.  VII.  on  '  The  Theory  of  Development'  in  my  Menial  Develop- 
ment in  the  Child  and  the  Race  (2d  ed.,  1895).  I  have  prepared  a  new  chapter 
(XVI.)  for  the  German  and  French  editions  of  this  work,  incorporating  the  po- 
sitions which  this  view  of  ontogenetic  development  leads  to  in  respect  to  heredity, 
as  suggested  in  the  article  referred  to  in  Science.  It  will  appear  as  an  article  in 
the  American  Naturalist  for  June,  1896.  It  secures  determinate  variations  in 
phylogeny,  without  the  inheritance  of  acquired  characters. 


DISCUSSION  AND  REPORTS.  305 

This  is  a  psychological  attempt  to  discover  the  method  of  the  in- 
dividual's adaptations;  it  has  detailed  applications  in  the  field  of 
higher  mental  process,  where  imitation,  volition,  etc.,  give  direct  ex- 
emplifications of  the  circular  type  of  reaction.  But  if  the  truth  of  it 
be  allowed  by  the  biologist  for  the  individual's  development,  it  follows 
from  the  doctrine  of  recapitulation  that  this  type  function  shall  run 
through  all  life.  This  would  mean  that  something  analogous  to  con- 
sciousness (as  pleasure  and  pain,  etc.,)  is  coextensive  with  life,  and 
that  the  vital  process  itself  shows  a  fundamental  difference  in  move- 
ments— analogous  to  the  difference  between  pleasure-incited  and  pain- 
incited  movements.  The  biologist  may  say  that  this  is  too  special — 
this  difference  of  reaction — to  be  fundamental;  so  it  may  be.  But 
then  so  is  life  special,  very  special ! 

Whatever  we  may  say  to  such  particular  conclusions,  they  illus- 
trate one  of  the  topics  which  should  be  discussed  by  anyone,  biologist 
or  psychologist,  who  wants  to  find  all  the  factors  of  evolution.  There 
are  some  factors  revealed  in  ontogenesis  which  do  not  appear  in  the 
current  theories  of  phylogenetic  evolution.  Indeed,  so  far  beside  the 
mark  are  the  biologists  who  are  discussing  heredity  to-day  that  they 
generally  omit — except  when  they  hit  at  each  other — the  two  factors 
which  the  psychologist  has  to  recognize;  Social  Heredity,  for  the 
transmission  of  socially-acquired  characters,  and  Organic  Selection, 
for  the  accommodations  of  the  individual  organism,  and  through  them 
of  c  determinate  variations '  in  phylogeny. 

Indeed,  I  do  not  see  how  either  theory  of  heredity  can  get  along 
without  this  appeal  to  ontogenesis.  For  if  we  agree  in  denying  the 
inheritance  of  acquired  characters,  thus  throwing  the  emphasis  on  va- 
riations, still  it  is  only  by  the  interpretation  of  ontogenic  processes  and 
characters  that  any  general  theory  of  variations  can  be  reached. 
Either  experience  causes  the  variations,  as  one  theory  of  heredity  holds ; 
or  it  exemplifies  them,  as  the  other  theory  holds ;  in  either  case,  it  is 
the  only  sphere  of  fact  to  which  appeal  can  be  made  if  we  would  un- 
derstand them.  So  why  do  biologists  speculate  so  long  and  so  loud 
on  the  question  of  the  mode  of  transmission,  when  the  question  of 
the  mode  of  acquisition  is  so  generally  neglected  by  them? 

The  only  additional  point  which  I  may  claim  a  little  time  to  speak 
of  is  that  to  which  Professor  James  referred  in  describing  the  current 
doctrines  of  the  relation  of  mind  and  body.  He  described  the  view 
that  consciousness  does  not  in  any  way  interfere  with  the  activities  of 
the  brain,  as  the  '  automaton  theory,'  and  spoke  as  if  in  his  mind  a 
real  automatism — a  view  which  considered  the  brain  processes  as  the 


306  CONSCIOUSNESS  AND  EVOLUTION. 

sufficient  statement  of  the  causes  of  all  voluntary  movement — was  the 
outcome  of  any  denial  of  causal  energy  in  consciousness.  In  other 
words  that  there  is  no  alternative  to  what  is  called  the  epi-phenom- 
enon  theory  of  consciousness  except  a  theory  holding  that  the  law  of 
conservation  of  physical  energy  is  violated  in  voluntary  movement. 

Now  this  reduction  of  the  possible  views  to  two  is,  in  my  view,  un- 
necessary and,  indeed,  impossible.  In  speaking  of  the  antecedents  of 
a  voluntary  movement  we  have  to  consider  the  entire  group  of  phe- 
nomenal events  which  are  always  there  when  voluntary  movement 
takes  place ;  and  among  the  phenomena  really  there  the  conscious 
state  called  volition  is  really  there.  To  say  that  the  same  movement 
could  take  place  without  this  state  of  consciousness  is  to  say  that  a 
lesser  group  of  phenomenal  antecedents  occurs  in  some  cases  and  a 
larger  group  in  other  cases  of  the  same  event.  Why  not  go  to  the 
other  extreme,  and  say  that  the  brain  is  not  necessary  to  voluntary 
movement,  since  volition  could  bring  about  the  movement  without 
using  the  nervous  processes  to  do  it  with  ?  In  his  posthumous  book 
on  Matter  and  Monism,  the  late  Mr.  Romanes  brings  out  this  inade- 
quacy of  the  automaton  view,  using  the  figure  of  an  electro-magnet, 
which  attracts  iron  filings  only  when  it  is  magnetized  by  the  current 
of  electricity.  Whatever  the  electricity  be,  the  magnet  is  a  magnet 
only  when  it  attracts  iron  filings ;  to  say  that  it  might  do  as  much 
without  the  electricity  would  be  to  deny  that  it  is  a  magnet ;  and  the 
proof  is  found  in  the  fact  simply  that  it  does  not  attract  iron-filings 
when  the  current  is  not  there.  So  the  brain  is  not  a  brain  when  con- 
sciousness is  not  there ;  it  could  not  produce  voluntary  movement, 
simply  because,  as  a  matter  of  fact,  it  does  not.  So  consciousness 
does  not,  on  the  other  hand,  produce  movement  without  a  brain.  The 
whole  difficulty  seems  to  lie,  I  think,  in  an  illegitimate  use  of  the  word 
4  causation.'  Professor  Ladd  seems  to  me  to  be  correct  in  holding 
that  such  a  conception  as  physical  causation  can  not  be  applied  be- 
yond the  sphere  of  things  in  which  it  has  become  the  explaining  prin- 
ciple, i.  e.,  in  the  objective,  external  world  of  things.  The  moment 
we  ask  questions  concerning  a  group  of  phenomena  which  include 
more  than  these  things,  that  moment  we  are  liable  to  some  new 
statement  of  the  law  of  change  in  the  group  as  a  whole.  Such  a 
statement  is  the  third  alternative  in  this  case ;  and  it  is  the  problem 
of  the  metaphysics  of  experience  to  find  the  category,  or  the  most 
general  principles  of  experience  as  a  whole,  both  objective  and  sub- 
jective. This  I  do  not  care  to  discuss,  but  I  am  far  from  thinking 
that  the  automaton  or  epi-phenomenon  man  can  argue  his  case  with 
much  force  in  this  higher  court  of  appeal. 


DISCUSSION  AND  REPORTS.  307 

The  other  extreme  is  represented  by  those  writers  who  think 
that  the  revision  of  the  law  of  causation  can  be  made  in  the  sphere  of 
objective  phenomenal  action  represented  by  the  brain ;  and  so  claim 
that  there  is  a  violation  of  the  principle  of  conservation  of  energy  in  a 
voluntary  movement,  an  actual  efficiency  of  some  kind  in  consciousness 
itself  for  producing  physical  effects.  This  is  as  illegitimate  as  the 
other  view — is  it  not?  It  seems  to  deny  the  results  of  all  objective 
empirical  science  and  so  to  sweep  away  the  statements  of  law  (on 
one  side)  on  which  the  higher  interpretation  of  the  group  of  phenomena 
as  a  whole  must  be  based.  And  it  does  it  in  favor  of  an  equally 
empirical  statement  of  law  on  the  other  side.  I  do  not  see  how  any 
result  for  the  more  complex  system  of  events  can  be  reached  if  we 
deny  the  only  principles  which  we  have  in  the  partial  groups.  To  do 
so  is  to  attempt  to  interpret  the  objective  in  terms  of  the  subjective 
factor  in  the  entire  group ;  and  we  reach  by  so  doing  a  result  which  is 
just  as  partial  as  that  which  the  epi-phenomenon  man  reaches  in  his 
mechanical  explanation.  Lotze  made  the  same  mistake  long  ago,  but 
his  hesitations  on  the  subject  showed  that  he  appreciated  the  difficulty. 
I  agree  with  these  writers  in  the  claim  that  the  mechanical  view  of 
causation  can  not  be  used  as  an  adequate  explaining  principle  of  the 
whole  personality  of  man ;  but  for  reasons  of  much  the  same  kind  it 
seems  equally  true  that  as  long  as  we  are  talking  of  events  of  the  ex- 
ternal kind,  /.  £.,  of  brain  processes,  we  can  not  deny  what  we  know  of 
these  events  as  such. 


The  general  state  of  the  problem  may  be  shown  by  the  accompany- 
ing diagram,  which  will  at  any  rate  serve  the  modest  purpose  of  indi- 
cating the  alternatives.  The  line  above,  of  the  two  parallels,  may  rep- 
resent the  statements  on  the  psychological  side  which,  on  the  theory 
of  parallelism,  mental  science  has  a  right  to  make ;  the  lower  of  the 
parallels,  the  corresponding  series  of  statements  made  by  physics  and 
natural  science,  includes  the  chemistry  and  physiology  of  the  brain. 
Where  they  stop  an  upright  line  may  be  drawn  to  indicate  the  setting 
of  the  problem  of  interpretation  in  which  both  the  other  series  of 


308  CONSCIOUSNESS  AND  EVOLUTION. 

statements  claim  to  be  true ;  and  the  further  line  to  the  right  then 
gives  the  phenomena  and  statements  of  them  which  we  have  to  deal 
with  when  we  come  to  consider  man  as  a  whole.  Now  my  point  is 
that  we  can  neither  deny  either  of  the  parallel  lines  in  dealing  with 
the  phenomena  of  the  single  line  to  the  right,  nor  can  we  take  either 
of  them  as  a  sufficient  statement  of  the  farther  problem  which  the  line 
to  the  right  proposes.  To  take  the  line  representing  the  mechanical 
principles  of  nature  and  extend  it  alone  beyond  the  upright  is  to  throw 
out  of  nature  the  whole  series  of  phenomena  which  belong  in  the  up- 
per parallel  line  and  are  not  capable  of  statement  in  mechanical  terms. 
And  to  extend  the  upper  line  alone  beyond  the  upright  is  to  allow  that 
mechanical  principles  break  down  in  their  own  sphere. 

As  to  the  interpretation  of  the  single  line  to  the  right,  it  may  al- 
ways remain  the  problem  that  it  now  is.  The  best  we  can  do  is  to  get 
points  of  view  regarding  it;  and  the  main  progress  of  philosophy 
seems  to  me  to  be  in  getting  an  adequate  sense  of  the  conditions  of  the 
problem  itself.  From  the  more  humble  side  of  psychology,  I  think 
the  growth  of  consciousness  itself  may  teach  us  how  the  problem 
comes  to  be  set  in  the  form  of  seemingly  irreconcilable  antinomies. 
The  person  grows  both  in  body  and  mind,  and  this  growth  has  to 
have  two  sides,  the  side  facing  toward  the  direction  from  which,  the 
4  retrospective  reference,'  and  the  side  facing  the  direction  toward 
which,  the  '  prospective  reference '  of  growth  and  the  consciousness  of 
growth.  The  positive  sciences  have  by  their  very  nature  to  face  back- 
wards, to  look  retrospectively,  to  be  '  descriptive, '  as  the  term  is  used 
by  Professor  Royce — these  give  the  lower  of  our  parallel  lines.  The 
moral  sciences,  so-called,  on  the  other  hand,  deal  with  judgments,  ap- 
preciations>  organizations,  expectations,  and  so  represent  the  other, 
the  'prospective'  mental  attitude  and  its  corresponding  aspects  of 
reality.  This  gives  character  largely  to  the  upper  one  of  our  parallel 
lines.  But  to  get  a  construction  of  the  further  line,  the  one  to  the 
right,  is  to  ask  for  both  these  points  of  view  at  once — to  stand  at  both 
ends  of  the  line — at  a  point  where  description  takes  the  place  of 
prophecy  and  where  reality  has  nothing  further  to  add  to  thought. 
I  believe  for  myself  that  the  best  evidence  looking  to  the  attainment  of 
this  double  point  of  view  is  found  just  in  the  fact  that  we  are  able  to 
compass  both  of  these  functions  in  a  measure  at  once ;  and  that  in  our 
own  self-consciousness  we  have  an  inkling  of  what  that  ultimate 
point  of  view  is  like.1  I  do  not  mean  to  bring  up  points  in  philosophy ; 

1 1  may  refer  to  the  extended  use  made  of  this  general  antithesis  in  my 
paper  in  this  REVIEW  for  November,  1895,  and  to  the  philosophical  consider- 
ations based  on  it  by  Mr.  W.  M.  Urban  in  the  number  of  January,  1896. 


DISCUSSION  AND  REPORTS.  309 

but  it  is  to  me  the  very  essence  of  such  a  contention  in  philosophy  that 
it  is  a  comprehension  of  both  aspects  of  phenomenal  reality  and  not 
the  violation  or  denial  of  either  of  them.  J.  MARK  BALDWIN. 

PRINCETON. 


PAIN  NERVES. 

That  specific  nerves  of  pain  have  at  last  been  established  with  a 
certainty  fully  equal  to  that  for  any  of  the  other  dermal  nerves  is  an 
event,  for  psychology,  of  the  first  magnitude.  Considering  the  role 
that  traditional  pain-pleasure  dogmas  have  played  in  fundamental  con- 
ceptions of  mind,  in  ethical  theories,  and  in  philosophic  deductions,  it 
is  perhaps  not  too  much  to  say  that  this  event  is  one  of  the  most  impor- 
tant determinations  happening  within  the  epoch  of  Modern  Psychology. 

I  refer  to  the  demonstration  of  pain-nerves  through  clinical  evidence 
by  Dr.  Henry  Head,  of  University  College  Hospital.1  To  many  the 
revolution  in  conceptions  which  this  work  must  necessitate  will  cause 
bewilderment,  and  perhaps  also  a  lingering  skepticism.  For  it  was 
but  a  few  months  ago  that  Dr.  Strong  presented  to  the  public  his  re- 
ports2— which  from  their  grave  judicial  tone  had  quite  the  appearance 
of  being  official — assuring  us  that  according  to  his  summary  of  the  evi- 
dence the  existence  of  special  pain-nerves  was  4  more  than  doubtful ;' 
which,  of  course,  from  this  accurate  writer  could  alone  mean  that  they 
were  no  longer  possible.  Yet  at  the  very  time  of  Dr.  Strong's  writ- 
ing (1895)  the  magnificent  report ,  of  Dr.  Head,  which  must  set 
this  dispute  at  rest  forever,  had  been  nearly  two  years  in  print  in  the 
official  journal  of  Neurology  for  the  English  Language,  and  had  been 
twice  read  in  public  the  year  previous  (1892). 

The  proof  which  Dr.  Head's  work  offers  for  separate  pain-nerves 
rests  on  clinical  demonstration  that  the  skin  of  the  body  is  divided  into 
definite  zones  of  nerve-supply  for  pain,  which  zones  do  not  correspond 
to  the  zones  of  nerve-distribution  for  touch.  These  zones  for  pain  are 
coextensive  with  those  for  heat,  cold  and  trophic  nerves,  and  all  of 
these  four  kinds  of  nerves  (pain,  heat,  cold  and  trophic)  supplying  any 
given  zone  have  common  origin  in  a  single  corresponding  segment  of 
the  cord.  In  other  words,  each  segment  of  the  cord  has  its  own  zone 
of  distribution  for  these  four  kinds  of  nerves.  These  zones  are  sharply 

1  Disturbances  of  Sensation  with  especial  reference  to  the  Pain  of  Visceral 
Disease.    By  Henry  Head,   M.  A.,  M.  D.     Brain,  1893,  p.  i,  and  1894,  p.  339. 
2PsY,  REV.,  March,  1895,  p.  44,  July,  1895,  and  January,  1896. 


310  PAIN  NERVES. 

separate,  do  not  overlap,  and  do  not  correspond  to  the  zones  of  distri- 
bution of  the  touch-nerves.  As  is  well  known,  the  distribution  of  the 
touch-nerves  had  been  previously  traced  with  great  accuracy  from  the 
posterior  roots,  where  they  are  gathered  from  several  segments  of  the 
cord,  to  peripheral  zones,  which  markedly  overlap  or  interlace  for  the 
respective  nerve-roots.  As  a  consequence  of  these  facts:  (a)  that 
the  zones  of  distribution  for  pain,  heat,  and  trophic  nerves  cover  mark- 
edly different  fixed  areas  of  the  skin  from  the  zones  of  distribution  of 
of  the  touch-nerves;  (b)  that  the  former  zones  do  not  overlap  one 
another,  while  the  touch-zones  do  overlap  one  another ;  and  (c)  that 
the  pain,  heat,  cold,  trophic  zones  are  each  supplied  by  nerves  having 
origin  in  a  single  segment  of  the  cord,  while  the  touch-zones  are  sup- 
plied by  nerves  having  origin  in  several  segments — from  these  facts 
results  follow  which  demonstrate  the  existence  of  separate  nerves  for 
touch,  pain,  heat  and  cold-sensations  with  something  very  near  to  cer- 
tainty. 

No  less  significant,  as  the  title  to  Dr.  Head's  papers  suggest,  is  the 
relation  of  these  peripheral  pain-zones  to  the  distribution  of  nerves  in 
the  viscera.  In  a  word,  the  different  viscera  are  supplied  with  nerves 
from  definite  segments  of  the  cord.  As  a  consequence,  disturbances  in 
the  different  viscera  cause  excitations  to  pass  along  these  nerves  to 
their  respective  segments  in  the  cord ;  produce  hyperalgesia  for  all  the 
pain-nerves  having  origin  in  the  segments  so  affected ;  and  their  pain- 
sensations  become  c  referred'  or  reflected  to  the  dermal  pain-zones  cor- 
responding to  their  segments.  A  large  part  of  the  papers  are  taken  up 
with  demonstration  of  the  zones  of  'dermal  tenderness,'  i.  e.,  painful- 
ness,  which  are  exhibited  in  various  visceral  disorders. 

It  would  be  inadmissible  here  to  give  even  enumeration  to  the  long 
list  of  visceral,  spinal  and  dermal  disorders  which  Dr.  Head  marshals 
into  line  with  his  remarkable  discovery.  Suffice  it  to  say  that  separate 
nerves  of  pain  are  placed  beyond  reasonable  doubt,  and  the  multitude 
of  heretofore  inexplicable  cases  of  the  loss  or  the  exhaltation  of  any 
one  of  the  functions  of  touch,  heat,  cold,  touch-pains,  heat-pains  and 
cold-pains,  or  of  any  sort  of  partial  combination  of  these  independ- 
ently from  the  remainder  (such  as  were  quoted  by  Dr.  Strong  against 
pain-nerves) ,  receive  explanation  upon  the  basis  of  separate  nerve-fibres 
for  each  of  the  six  separate  kinds  of  sensations. 

This  much  being  determined  three  lines  of  investigation  remain  to 
be  cleared  up  before  the  subject  of  pain-nerves  shall  be  complete. 
These  have  reference  to  the  end-organs,  and  modes  of  stimulation  for 
the  different  sources  of  pain  (mechanical,  chemical,  thermal) .  The 


DISCUSSION  AND  REPORTS.  311 

mode  by  which  pain  is  conducted  through  the  cord.     And  the  corti- 
cal localization  of  pain. 

Regarding  the  first  of  these,  we  are  perfectly  in  the  dark  as  to 
the  ultimate  relations  of  stimulus,  end-organ  and  nerve-impulse  for 
all  sensory  nerves.  It  is  not  surprising,  therefore,  that  the  discovery 
of  Dr.  Head  leaves  us  as  ignorant  of  the  means  by  which  mechanical 
pressure,  heat  and  cold  respectively  affect  the  pain-fibres  as  we  are  of 
how  they  respectively  affect  the  touch,  the  heat  and  the  cold-fibres. 
Since,  however,  it  is  now  certain  that  the  nerves  of  pain  are  separate 
from  those  of  touch  and  from  those  of  heat  and  cold,  it  is  evident 
that  there  is  identically  the  same  grounds  for  expecting  different 
end-organs  as  between  touch-pains  and  temperature-pains  as  for 
expecting  specific  end  apparatus  for  any  kind  of  sensory  fibres.  It 
may  be  that  light  acts  directly  on  the  optic  nerves,  and  temperature 
directly  on  all  sorts  of  temperature-nerves.  If  so  we  should  not  re- 
quire three  different  '  sets '  of  pain-nerves  for  the  three  different  mode 
of  pain  stimulates,  i.  e.,  pressure,  heat  and  cold.  Right  or  wrong, 
however,  the  prejudice  of  science  at  present  runs  in  favor  of  specific 
end  organs  for  most  if  not  all  of  our  sensations  and  so  strongly  for 
sensations  of  heat  and  of  cold;  and  now,  knowing  that  the  distri- 
bution of  pain-nerves  coincides  with  that  of  the  heat  and  cold-nerves, 
and  does  not  coincide  with  that  of  touch,  it  seems  more  necessary  than 
ever  to  expect  different  end-organs  for  heat-pains,  and  cold-pains 
(though  these  may  be  identical  with  the  end-organs  for  heat  and  cold- 
sensations)  in  order  to  explain  the  cases  cited  by  Dr.  Strong  of  hyper- 
algesia  to  temperature  in  the  midst  of  analgesia  to  mechanical  pres- 
sure, i.  e.,  to  explain  the  very  cases  on  which,  apparently,  he  rests  his 
entire  opinion.  Under  this  head  also,  in  order  to  clear  the  field  of  a 
confusion,  as  it  seem  to  me,  quite  unnecessarily  raised  by  Dr.  Strong, 
I  must  humbly  decline  his  flattering  imputation  of  superior  erudition 
on  this  subject,  and  declare  that  I  know  of  no  literature,  certainly  none 
of  my  own  writing,  which  has  ever  in  the  remotest  way  suggested 
'  three  distinct  sets  of  pain-nerves  '  if  by  '  sets '  is  implied  any  require- 
ments for  additional  'sets'  for  '  muscular  pains,  colics,  toothaches,  etc.* 
Of  course  Dr.  Strong's  suggestion  to  this  effect  is  graceful  from  the 
literary  standpoint,  and  entertaining  to  '  the  galleries,'  but  was  it 
worth  while  deliberately  to  mislead  for  the  sake  of  being  facetious 
regarding  a  matter  of  scientific  probability  that  now  turns  out  to  be 
next  door  to  a  certainty  ?  If  it  prove  true  that  there  be  different  end- 
organs  for  heat-pains  and  cold-pains,  still  no  sober  man  would  speak 
of  separate  4  kinds '  of  pain-nerves  for  this  reason,  any  more  than  he 


312  PAIN  NERVES. 

would  speak  of  different  *  kinds '  of  touch-nerves  for  the  reason  that 
certain  touch-nerves  have  apparently  free  endings  while  others  have  dif- 
ferent kinds  of  touch-corpuscles. 

The  second  line  of  investigation  concerns  the  mode  of  transmission 
of  pain-impulses  in  the  cord.  And  here  again  I  must  beg  Dr.  Strong 
patiently  to  extend  his  courtesy  toward  me,  while  I  make  plain  wherein 
Prof.  Wundt's  theory  of  this  subject  does  require  a  more  complicated 
mode  of  transmission  than  is  necessary  or  likely.  In  the  first  place, 
Dr.  Strong  jumps  quite  unwarrantably  to  the  conclusion  that  if  there  be 
separate  pain-fibres  from  the  periphery  to  the  cord,  then  these  must 
continue  through  the  cord.  I,  for  one,  hold  it  to  be  probable  that 
such  is  not  the  case  for  the  entire  cord,  though  it  is  likely  to  hold  good 
for  the  single  segment  into  which  the  pain-nerves  enter.  For  the 
greater  portion  of  the  cord  it  is  probably  true  that  the  pain-impulses 
are  transmitted  from  segment  to  segment  rather  than  by  continuous 
paths  throughout,  and  the  reason  for  this,  when  fully  explained,  is 
likely  to  prove  one  of  the  most  instructive  evidences  of  nerve-evolution 
in  the  range  of  anatomy.  That  there  should  be  separate  pain-paths 
for  touch-pains,  heat-pains  and  cold-pains  from  the  periphery  to  the 
cord,  and  a  single  common  path  for  pain  thence  onward  to  the  brain, 
is,  however,  far  and  away  a  simpler  requirement  than  a  '  shunt '  ar- 
rangement in  the  cord  attached  to  common  paths  for  pain  and  other 
sensations  between  the  cord  and  the  periphery,  as  Prof.  Wundt  pro- 
poses and  Dr.  Strong  accepts.  It  would  require  a  wonderful  distribu- 
tion of  '  lesions'  indeed,  for  the  various  phenomena  falling  under  Dr. 
Head's  list  of  disorders,  to  explain  them  on  Dr.  Strong's  plan.  And 
the  simplicity  of  the  conduction  without  l  shunts '  is  so  obvious  above 
that  of  conduction  with  shunts  that  Dr.  Strong,  I  trust,  will  now  feel 
relieved  from  all  embarassment  against  undue  prodigality  of  Nature, 
without  further  comment. 

The  third  line  of  investigation,  that  of  cortical  localization  of  pain 
is  of  no  less  importance  than  the  others  and  is  receiving  considerable 
attention  among  scientists,  which  is  sure  to  be  greatly  stimulated  by 
Dr.  Head's  discovery. 

Incidentally,  I  may  remark  that  Dr.  Head's  papers  make  it  doubt- 
ful if  the  viscera  are  capable  of  sending  any  impulses  to  the  cortex 
save  through  the  common  pain-path  of  the  cord,  the  vagus,  and  the  paths 
of  the  sympathetic  system;  and  from  the  close  alliance  of  these  sources, 
it  seems  likely  that  the  viscera  are  capable  of  no  direct  sensory  re- 
sponse save  one  of  pain ;  all  of  which  is  in  accord  with  the  summary 
of  experimental  and  clinical  evidence  already  cited  by  Foster  on 


DISCUSSION  AND  REPORTS.  313 

this  point.  In  face  of  this  it  seems  more  obscure  than  ever  how 
holders  of  the  James-Lange  Theory  of  Emotions  are  to  explain 
emotions  of  joy  from  visceral  reverberations  capable  alone  of  direct 
^tezVz-responses.  And  in  proportion  as  the  James-Lange  theory  goes 
down,  by  reason  of  the  evidence  from  Dr.  Head's  remarkable  paper, 
will  the  Instinct-Innervation  Theory  of  Emotions,  which  I  presented 
in  the  Philosophical  Review  (September,  1895),  become  more 
plainly  true. 

In  addition  to  this  major  evidence  for  pain-nerves  I  must  mention 
as  also  apparently  overlooked  by  Dr.  Strong,  the  papers  of  Dr.  von 
Frey,  of  Leipzig,  which  may  claim  independently  to  have  demonstrated 
the  existence  of  pain-nerves1.  They  throw  much  less  light  on  pain- 
distribution  and  pain-conduction  in  the  cord,  and  I  have  therefore  con- 
fined myself  to  a  report  of  Dr.  Head's  work.  The  existence  of  specific 
pain-nerves,  however,  now  stands  upon  abundant  evidence  sufficiently 
independent  in  source  and  sure  in  substantiation  to  convert  the  most 
fastidious  from  the  time-honored  superstitions. 

HERBERT  NICHOLS. 
JOHNS  HOPKINS  UNIVERSITY. 


THE  RELATION  BETWEEN  PSYCHOLOGY  AND  LOGIC. 

The  influence  of  new  tendencies  in  psychology  is  becoming  more 
and  more  visible  in  the  field  of  logic.  One  need  only  turn  a  few 
pages  in  the  more  recent  books  on  logic  to  mark  what  a  transforma- 
tion has  taken  place  since  the  days  when  Kant  could  say  that  the  sci- 
ence had  come  from  Aristotle's  hands  practically  a  finished  work. 
Evidently,  the  Aristotelian  Logic  is  now  generally  refused  recognition 
as  a  completed  science,  for  dissatisfaction  is  shown  in  various  ways ; 
one  and  another  Aristotelian  distinction  is  neglected,  and  it  is  pointed 
out  that  the  complicated  facts  of  actual  judgment  and  argument  can- 
not be  cramped  into  the  narrow  mould  of  the  ancients.  The  widened 
knowledge  we  have  of  the  diversity  of  thought,  of  individual  differ- 
ences, of  new  methods  of  procedure  in  the  modern  sciences,  of  pecu- 
liarities of  thought  brought  to  light  by  a  comparative  study  of  lan- 
guages, this  new  material,  it  is  said,  requires  a  recasting  of  the  older 
logic.  The  older  logic,  they  tell  us,  was  based  on  an  older  psychology, 
and,  as  a  consequence,  no  longer  fits  the  known  facts.  For  logic  must 

1  Two  of  these  papers  also  appear  to  have  been  in  print  a  year  previously  to 
Dr.  Strong's  research.  Berichten  d.  math.  phys.  Classe  d.  Konigl.  Sach. 
Gesellschaft  der  Wissenschaften  zu  Leipzig.  1894,  pp.  185  and  283 ;  1895,  p.  166. 


3H  PSYCHOLOGY  AND  LOGIC. 

be  readjusted  to  the  results  of  modern  psychology ;  or  better,  logic  is 
actually  a  department  of  psychology,  and  must  grow  with  the  growth 
of  this. 

But,  as  we  might  expect,  psychology  itself  has  been  effected  by 
the  change  it  is  producing  in  logic.  If  logic  is  the  psychology  of 
judgment  and  reasoning,  the  consideration  of  these  processes  may  be 
omitted  from  psychology  taken  in  the  narrower  sense.  Only  when  we 
seek  to  state  some  general  theory  to  cover  all  mental  complexes  need 
we  glance  over  the  whole  field,  and  point  out  that  our  explanatory 
principle  holds  wherever  we  go ;  in  such  cases  judgment  and  reason- 
ing get  some  attention,  even  in  strict  psychology.  But  we  find  a  strong 
tendency  to  turn  over  all  the  manifold  details  of  these  processes  to 
logic.  The  number  of  pages  given  to  judgment  and  reasoning  in  the 
books  on  psychology  becomes  less  and  less,  though  the  books  them- 
selves grow  ever  larger.  Of  course,  the  rise  of  the  experimental  side 
in  psychology  has  had  much  to  do  with  this  change  of  proportion ; 
the  new  methods  have  found  readier  application  in  the  field  of  sensa- 
tion and  perception,  and  consequently  have  swelled  the  corresponding 
chapters  with  a  mass  of  new  material.  But,  apart  from  this,  there  is 
doubtless  a  conscious  withdrawal  from  the  field  of  judgment  and 
reasoning,  on  the  ground  that  the  matter  is  already  dealt  with  in  a  psy- 
chological way  in  logic.  Logic  has  become  more  and  more  a  psychol- 
ogy of  judgment  and  reasoning,  while  psychology  in  the  exact  sense  is 
more  and  more  restricted  to  the  less  complete  processes  of  mind. 

To  many  this  will  seem  a  happy  division  of  labor.  Psychology, 
they  will  say,  can  become  a  more  exhaustive  account  of  the  other 
functions  of  the  mind  if  it  is  relieved  of  a  special  treatment  of  judg- 
ment and  reasoning,  while  the  latter  will  receive  more  thorough  treat- 
ment when  marked  off  as  the  matter  of  a  special  science.  It  would, 
therefore,  seem  an  advantage  to  both  sciences  to  adopt  such  a  basis  of 
distinction. 

If  it  were  merely  a  question  of  nomenclature  or  of  division  of  labor 
there  certainly  would  be  no  objection  to  this.  But  the  apparent  ad- 
vantages of  this  settlement  should  not  close  our  eyes  to  the  theoretical 
error  upon  which  it  is  based.  The  proposed  division  really  interferes 
with  the  proper  work  of  each  of  these  sciences. 

In  the  first  place,  the  rigidly  psychological  treatment  of  judgment 
and  reasoning  is  endangered  when  turned  over  to  the  care  of  those 
whose  main  interest  is  in  the  logical  aspect  of  the  case.  And,  on  the 
other  hand,  the  problems  of  logic  suffer  violence  when  once  we  begin 
to  treat  them  as  purely  psychological  problems.  For  the  problems 


DISCUSSION  AND  REPORTS.  315 

arising  in  the  two  sciences  are  vitally  different,  and  are  to  be  solved  by 
different  methods.  The  answer  to  the  psychological  questions  regard- 
ing judgment  and  reasoning  is  not  in  itself  an  answer  to  the  logical 
questions  involved;  the  very  kernel  of  the  logical  problem  will  have 
been  left  untouched.  Nor  is  the  solution  of  the  strictly  logical  problem 
any  solution  of  the  psychological  problem  in  the  case.  Logic  and 
psychology  deal  with  the  same  materials,  within  certain  limits ;  but  in 
working  up  the  materials  there  is  in  each  of  these  sciences  a  different 
end  in  view,  and  a  different  method  of  procedure.  The  findings  of 
both  are  necessary  to  the  body  of  knowledge ;  consequently  it  is  idle, 
and  only  brings  confusion,  when  we  try  to  substitute  the  results  of  the 
one  for  those  of  the  other.  But  when  we  see  that  each,  though  a  work 
in  the  same  field,  is  a  different  and  indispensable  work,  such  an  at- 
tempt at  substitution  will  no  longer  be  made.  There  cannot  then  be 
any  clash  between  these  two  different  interests. 

The  divergent  aims  of  the  two  sciences  may  be  succinctly  expressed, 
perhaps,  as  follows:  Psychology  is  an  effort  to  state  the  natural 
causes  of  the  various  mental  occurrences.  Analysis,  classification,  and 
even  description,  all  of  which  the  history  of  psychology  shows  to  have 
played  such  important  parts,  we  must  view  as  but  means  to  the  great 
end,  which  is  explanation.  Under  what  causal  circumstances,  we  ask, 
does  such  or  such  a  mental  fact  arise  ?  Under  what  circumstances  does 
the  experience  undergo  change  ?  What  are  the  conditions  that  cause 
its  disappearance  ?  The  main  question  is  entirely  regarding  matters  of 
fact :  What  is  the  actual  causal  order  or  connection  in  the  mental  life  ? 

Logic,  on  the  other  hand,  is  not  a  search  for  the  causes  of  mental 
occurrences,  but,  rather,  an  attempt  to  develop  a  principle  of  criti- 
cism. In  logic,  we  assume  the  facts  of  reasoning,  and  proceed,  not  to 
explain,  in  the  scientific  sense,  but  to  set  forth  the  abstract  marks 
which  distinguish  the  consistent  from  the  inconsistent.  What  relations 
must  there  be  among  the  premises,  and  what  between  the  premises 
and  the  conclusion — such  are  the  questions  asked — if  the  conclusion  is 
to  be  justified  by  the  premises  ?  What  sort  of  procedure  is  required  if 
the  procedure  is  to  justify  the  outcome?  Strictly  speaking,  in  logic 
we  ask  not  a  word  as  to  what  the  causes  are  that  actually  produce  con- 
clusions ;  nor  as  to  what  the  various  influences  are  that  give  to  some 
mental  facts  one  character,  and  to  others  another.  The  marks  of  the 
one  character  or  of  the  other  are  set  forth  in  logic,  but  the  marks  of  a 
given  character  are  not  the  causes  of  that  character.  It  does  not  fall 
within  the  province  of  logic  to  ask  what  the  scientific  explanation  of 
fallacy  is,  or  what  a  similar  explanation  of  consistent  reasoning  is. 


316  PSYCHOLOGY  AND  LOGIC. 

The  moment  we  ask  such  questions  we  turn  aside  from  the  proper  and 
vital  problem  of  logic,  and  for  the  time  become  interested  in  psychol- 
ogy ;  for  the  questions  mentioned  are  questions  of  psychology.  The 
problem  of  logic  is  to  present  in  full  the  system  of  inner  relations  by 
which  consistent,  cogent,  '  logical '  thinking  is  distinguished  from  the 
loose,  fallacious,  '  illogical '  sort. 

It  is  possible,  however,  by  a  little  effort  to  state  the  problem  of 
logic  so  that  it  will  seem  to  fall  within  the  general  limits  of  pscyhol- 
°gy*  We  might  say,  for  instance,  that  psychology  is  the  search  for 
the  conditions  of  mental  occurrences  in  general,  while  logic  is  the 
search  for  the  conditions  of  the  particular  occurrence  called  reasoning. 
But  if  it  were  meant  by  this  that  logic  deals  with  reasoning  in  exactly 
the  same  way  that  psychology  deals  with  the  other  mental  occurrences, 
then  we  should  have  no  science  that  presents  the  detailed  criteria  by 
which  logical  reasoning  is  recognized  and  distinguished  from  illogical 
reasoning ;  and  yet  such  a  science  is  necessary,  and  is  historically  to  be 
identified  with  logic.  For  psychology  does  not  supply  the  need  here. 
The  grounds  for  the  distinction  between  good  reasoning  and  bad  rea- 
soning, in  the  logical  sense,  psychology  would  have  to  accept  from 
without,  just  as  it  must  accept  from  without  the  bases  for  the  distinc- 
tion between  a  moral  state  of  consciousness  and  an  immoral.  Psychol- 
ogy, after  such  acceptance,  may  go  on  to  investigate  the  psychological 
differences,  if  there  be  any,  that  accompany  these  distinctions ;  that  is 
to  say,  we  may  ask  whether  an  illogical  conclusion  has  any  psychologi- 
cal difference  from  a  logical  one,  or  what  are  the  psychological  causes 
of  morality  or  of  immorality.  But  psychology  must  always  presup- 
pose the  system  of  criteria  by  which  such  distinctions  are  made,  and 
for  the  sake  of  exactness  must  require  that  these  criteria  be  pre- 
sented with  scientific  elaboration.  The  statement  of  the  psychological 
causes  of  moral  action  would  not  be  ethics,  nor  would  the  statement 
of  the  psychological  causes  of  correct  reasoning  be  logic.  Instead  of 
logic,  we  should  have  under  psychology  a  presentation  of  the  various 
influences  that  permit  the  correct  reasoner  to  thread  his  way  past  all 
the  possibilities  of  fallacy,  and  to  land  safe  on  the  right  conclusion. 
But,  as  I  have  said,  we  could  only  make  such  an  investigation  after  we 
knew  how  to  recognize  correct  reasoning ;  and  if  the  recognition  is  to 
be  anything  more  than  haphazard  and  naive,  there  must  first  have  been 
developed  a  system  of  logic.  For  we  should  need  some  test  of  the 
various  relations  which  constitute  the  evidences  that  the  consistent 
is  consistent ;  that  is  to  say,  we  should  need  a  critical  decision  as  to 
what  the  requirements  of  consistency  are.  What  are  the  postulates, 
we  must  always  ask,  of  this  ideal  that  we  call  logical  unity? 


DISCUSSION  AND  REPORTS.  317 

But  since,  in  answering  such  a  question,  we  do  (in  a  way)  give 
the  internal  web  and  woof  of  the  phenomena  called  consistent  reason- 
ing, we  do  seem  for  the  time  to  be  working,  though  not  in  explana- 
tory psychology,  at  least  in  descriptive ;  and  thus  logic  would  appear 
to  be  a  part  of  an  auxiliary  subdivision  of  psychology,  grant  as  much 
as  one  may  that  description  is  subordinate  in  importance  to  explana- 
tion. Yet  a  little  reflection  will  bring  out  a  wide  difference  even  here. 
For,  in  carrying  out  a  descriptive  psychology  of  judgment  and  reason- 
ing, we  should  inevitably  get  interested  in  all  phases  of  these  facts — 
in  the  possible  changes  in  the  distinctness  or  the  intensity  of  the  Vor- 
stellungen  as  the  processes  developed ;  in  the  tone  of  feeling  accom- 
panying the  movement,  and  changing,  say,  with  different  rates  or 
arrangements ;  in  the  time  aspects  of  the  mental  act  and  its  parts,  and 
in  the  order  of  succession  of  the  parts.  For  the  purposes  of  logic, 
however,  we  are  indifferent  to  all  these  things.  And  rightly  so,  be~ 
cause  they  have  no  bearing  on  the  problem  in  hand.  So  far  as  the 
logical  worth  of  a  proposition  or  of  a  train  of  reasoning  is  concerned, 
it  makes  no  difference  whether  the  filling  of  the  mental  presentations 
is  auditory  or  visual ;  whether  the  presentations  are  more  intense  or 
less  so ;  whether  the  process  is  accompanied  by  this  feeling  or  by  that, 
or  by  no  feeling  at  all ;  whether  a  given  part  occupies  more  time  or 
less  time  than  certain  others ;  or,  finally,  whether  the  conclusion  comes 
first,  last  or  in  the  middle.  In  logic  we  can  afford  to  neglect  all  these 
as  irrelevant  to  the  work  in  hand,  and  actually  do  neglect  them  with- 
out loss.  But  we  cannot  complete  the  work  of  descriptive  psychology 
without  attending  to  them  all.  In  logic  we  go  far  enough  with  psy- 
chology to  get  materials  for  the  special  criteria  desired ;  but  in  our 
choice  of  what  we  will  attend  to,  we  bring  out  clearly  how  different 
the  aim  of  the  one  science  is  from  that  of  the  other. 

The  attempt  to  state  the  problem  of  logic  so  as  to  make  it  fall 
within  the  field  of  psychology  would  end,  then,  in  missing  the  very 
heart  of  the  logical  problem.  And  if  we  should  undertake  enlarging 
the  bounds  of  psychology  so  as  to  include  the  logical  problem  we 
should  bring  into  psychology  a  discordant  element  and  destroy  the 
unity  of  its  aim. 

To  make  it  perhaps  clearer  how  essentially  different  the  interests  of 
the  two  sciences  are,  one  need  only  recall  the  actual  details  that  each 
science  respectively  admits  as  pertinent  to  its  purpose.  It  will  then 
be  seen  that  certain  combinations  perfectly  admissible  in  psychology 
are  not  so  in  logic ;  and,  on  the  other  hand,  what  we  might  judge  to 
be  relevant  from  the  standpoint  of  logic  we  should  condemn  from  the 


3*8  PSYCHOLOGY  AND  LOGIC. 

standpoint  of  psychology.  In  logic,  for  instance,  it  is  truly  said  that 
every  judgment  presupposes  sufficient  premises,  and  that  given  prem- 
ises necessarily  lead  to  a  conclusion  just  such  and  so.  But  in  psy- 
chology it  is  just  as  truly  said  that  in  living  experience  we  make  judg- 
ments without  any  premises  whatever,  to  say  nothing  of  adequate 
ones,  and  that  premises  which  in  logic  lead  to  the  conclusion  c  Caius 
is  mortal,'  in  Q^s  process  of  consciousness  lead  to  no  conclusion  at  all, 
or  possibly  to  the  conclusion  that  '  Caius  isn't  mortal.'  From  the 
point  of  view  of  psychology  all  such  experiences  are  as  interesting 
and  respectable  as  the  logically  faultless  are,  and  we  assume  that  they 
are  completely  explicable  were  the  constitution  of  mind  once  fully 
understood. 

On  the  other  hand,  according  to  logic,  certain  psychic  collocations 
are  declared  to  present  an  intimate  and  faultless  unity,  when,  accord- 
ing to  psychology,  they  utterly  lack  connection.  We  may  suppose,  for 
example,  the  case  of  three  judgments  in  the  form  of  a  logically  valid 
syllogism,  which  occur  in  a  certain  person's  consciousness  in  the  tem- 
poral order  of  (i)  major  premise;  (2)  minor  premise,  and  (3)  con- 
clusion. From  the  standpoint  of  logic  we  should  see  in  this  an  ex- 
ample of  perfect  conformity  to  law  should  hold  that  the  premises  led 
to  the  conclusion  and  that  the  conclusion  was  grounded  on  the  prem- 
ises. But,  psychologically,  there  may  have  been  an  utter  absence  of 
causal  connection  between  premises  and  conclusion ;  other  factors,  we 
may  suppose,  called  up  the  conclusion  at  the  happy  moment ;  some- 
body whispered  it  in  the  person's  ear  or  the  sight  of  a  book  brought 
back  the  judgment  in  isolation  from  yesterday's  reverie.  We  should 
then  have  two  causal  trains  of  activity,  to  be  represented,  perhaps,  by 
the  two  columns  below,  in  which  each  item  is  caused  by  the  item  im- 
mediately above  it,  the  different  levels  representing  differences  of  time. 


c 
d 
major  premise 


minor  premise 


t 
conclusion 


The  two  trains  are  here  so  timed  that  the  conclusion  comes  in  the 
second  just  at  the  very  moment  when  it  would  have  come  if  causally 


DISCUSSION  AND  REPORTS.  319 

included  in  the  other  series,  yet  its  cause  does  not  lie  there.  But  this 
fact  would  be  no  objection  to  the  syllogism  from  a  logical  point  of 
view;  the  syllogism,  as  a  syllogism,  is  not  concerned  with  such  a  fact. 
To  the  syllogism  the  three  judgments  are  simply  in  the  peculiar  rela- 
tion which  the  logical  standards  require.  But  from  the  point  of  view 
of  psychology,  we  should  have  to  declare  that  in  this  case  neither  the 
temporal  sequence  nor  the  conformity  to  the  logical  norm  is  sufficient 
to  meet  the  special  requirements;  the  absence  of  causal  connections, 
in  the  sense  meant  by  natural  science,  is  fatal.  Consequently,  when 
examining  these  items  with  the  interests  of  a  psychologist,  we  should 
note  a  much  closer  connection  between  4  conclusion'  and  '  t;'  while, 
for  logical  purposes,  the  line  of  combination  runs  from  4  conclusion ' 
directly  back  to  4  minor  premise '  and  '  major  premise,'  leaving  out 
the  natural  cause  of  '  conclusion '  (namely,  '  t ')  as  of  no  interest. 

The  two  sciences  thus  present  different  and  distinct  standards  of 
worth.  For  logic  those  combinations  are  good,  the  parts  of  which 
are  related  in  accordance  'with  what  tve  call  logical  norms.  For 
psychology  those  combinations  are  good,  the  parts  of  which  are 
causally  connected.  As  said  above,  the  whole  machinery  of  psychol- 
ogy is  contrived  for  the  purpose  of  explanation;  while  the  aim  of 
logic  is  to  present  a  critical  canon.  In  psychology  the  question  is, 
What  has  produced  the  given  facts  ?  In  logic  it  is,  rather,  Are  the 
facts  a  justifiable  combination,  and  why  ? 

There  is  hardly  any  need  of  saying  that  each  of  these  sciences  has 
a  right  to  its  own  special  aim.  The  work  of  psychology  does  not 
make  useless  or  superfluous  the  work  of  logic,  nor  can  we  substitute 
the  results  of  logic  for  those  of  psychology.  We  need  a  psychology 
of  judgment  and  reasoning,  and  also  a  logic  of  these  processes,  each 
science  existing  without  prejudice  to  the  other.  For  when  we  have 
decided  what  causal  relation  exist  among  mental  occurrences  we  have 
settled  nothing  as  to  what  forms  of  combination  satisfy  our  logical 
needs.  And,  on  the  other  hand,  the  decision  that  such  and  such  com- 
binations are  logically  necessary  (i.  e.,  exist  de  jure),  of  course  set- 
tles nothing  as  to  what  the  combinations  are  de  facto,  nor  as  to  the 
causes  of  these  combinations. 

Simple  as  this  truth  is,  it  is  not  always  borne  in  mind  by  those  who 
write  on  these  sciences.  There  is  frequent  evidence  of  hazy  or  ill-ob- 
served boundaries ;  as  when  psychologists  incline  to  leave  part  of  their 
subject  untouched,  or  when  logicians  alone  are  found  treating  of  cer- 
tain problems  that  are  really  psychological.  Certainly  there  is  no  ab- 
solute objection  to  inserting  in  books  on  logic  much  that  by  nice  dis- 


320  HEART  DISEASE  AND    THE  EMOTIONS. 

tinction  belongs  to  another  science ;  this  is  a  matter  of  expediency,  and 
not  to  be  decided  by  rigid  definition.  It  would  be  well,  however,  al- 
ways to  make  clear  when  we  are  within  the  strict  domains  of  the 
science,  and  when  we  are  digressing  into  attractive  neighboring  fields. 
Questions,  for  instance,  as  to  the  genetic  relation  between  judgment 
and  concept — whether  judgments  are  developed  out  of  concepts,  or  the 
reverse ;  as  to  the  temporal  order  of  premises  and  conclusion ;  as  to 
whether  we  actually  quantify  the  predicate  (this  is  carefully  to  be  dis- 
tinguished from  the  question  as  to  the  logical  importance  of  such  a 
quantification,  which  is  a  question  of  logic) — such  questions  are  usu- 
ally discussed  exclusively  in  the  logics,  and  yet  they  are  in  fact  psy- 
chological problems,  and  are  to  be  settled,  if  at  all,  by  the  methods  of 
psychology. 

It  would  seem,  then,  to  be  in  the  interest  of  better  logic  and  of 
better  psychology  to  have  more  definite  bounds  set  up  between  them. 
For  many  a  psychological  problem  fails  to  get  proper  psychological 
treatment  because,  by  reason  of  defective  definition,  it  seems  to  be 
merely  a  logical  problem ;  and  many  of  the  foundation-truths  of  logic, 
for  a  parallel  reason,  have  appeared  to  lack  validity  because  shown  not 
to  be  psychological  laws.  Such  errors  would,  of  course,  be  impos- 
sible were  the  real  basis  of  distinction  between  the  two  sciences  once 
clearly  seen  and  settled.  GEORGE  M.  STRATTON. 

LEIPZIG. 


THE   TESTIMONY  OF   HEART   DISEASE   TO   THE   SEN- 
SORY FACIES  OF  THE  EMOTIONS. 

What  in  ordinary  parlance,  as  indeed  in  most  psychological  discus- 
sions, is  termed  emotion,  is  in  reality  a  very  complex  activity.  It  is 
perhaps  only  in  pathological  states  that  the  elements  are  analyzed  by 
the  falling  out  or  suppression  of  certain  elements.  This  analysis  may 
be  made  in  the  case  of  fear.  As  a  rule  in  the  normal  state,  we  have 
in  fear  a  very  vivid  and  attention-compelling  concept  of  the  fearful 
object,  together  with  a  more  or  less  distinct  representation  of  the  fate  of 
which  we  are  apprehensive. 

Perhaps  in  the  majority  of  cases  these  elements  usurp  the  promi- 
nent place  in  the  complex,  yet  it  is  evident  that  neither  of  them  is  fear 
or  emotion  of  any  kind.  We  also  usually  have  a  more  or  less  definite, 
if  only  implicate  judgment  of  the  reason  for  fear,  but  this  is,  of  course, 


DISCUSSION  AND  REPORTS.  $21 

no  more  fear  than  the  judgment  that  if  our  body  is  unsupported  it  will 
fall. 

A  vivid  reproduction  or  imagination  of  an  event  of  a  disastrous 
kind  is  quite  sufficient,  in  my  own  case,  to  produce  the  physical  and 
mental  symptoms  of  fear.  These  symptoms  are,  in  the  one  case,  sun- 
dry muscular  contractions  of  a  spasmodic  nature,  which  may  have  a 
more  or  less  distant  relation  to  the  fearful  event,  or  the  still  more  dis- 
tant associational  connection  seen  in  expression  of  emotion  of  dis- 
pleasure, or  the  wholly  unassociated  innervation  of  excited  attention. 
Most  writers  make  too  little  of  this  class  of  effects  of  emotional  impulse, 
*.  £.,  of  the  state  of  general  innervation  in  suspense,  which  has  no  as- 
sociation with  any  special  purposive  act,  but  which  is  a  sort  of  prelimi- 
nary tension  (Spannung)  preparatory  to  any  possible  impulse.  In  the 
other  or  mental  domain  these  symptoms  are  obscure,  that  is  unlocalized 
(but  not  therefore  weak)  sensations  of  innervations,  but  more  particu- 
larly of  vascular  disturbance. 

Entirely  secondary,  but  often  appearing  more  conspicuous,  because 
localizable,  are  peripheral  sensations.  It  may  be  shown  that  the  real 
core  of  the  fear  is  in  the  sensations  of  vascular  change.  It  is  perhaps 
idle  to  inquire  whether  the  source  of  the  disturbance  is  in  the  vascular 
change  or  whether  it  arises  in  the  medulla,  where  its  nervous  center 
is  situated.  When  an  object  of  apprehension  is  imaged  to  conscious- 
ness it  is  certain  that  the  vaso-motor  center  is  affected  and  those  circu- 
latory changes  characteristic  of  fear  are  produced.  If  this  be  not  the 
case  I  may  still  view  the  serried  ranks  approaching  and  hear  the  horrid 
din  of  battle  and  may  be  fully  conscious  that  any  minute  may  stretch 
me  on  the  ground  mutilated  beyond  recognition,  like  a  comrade  at 
my  feet,  but  I  still  have  no  fear  as  I  calmly  serve  the  gun.  On  the 
other  hand,  as  I  tread  my  way  through  the  dense  forest  and  suddenly 
find  myself  face  to  face  with  a  little  green  snake  which  I  have  often 
handled  with  impunity — nay  with  pleasure,  every  drop  of  blood  seems 
to  stagnate  in  the  heart,  and  I  am  a  prey  to  unreasoning  and  unreason- 
able fear.  It  is,  however,  the  pathological  states  of  heart  disease  that 
are  most  conclusive.  The  irritable  heart  of  neurasthenia  affords  proof 
of  the  connection  of  the  sensation  of  fear  with  irregularities  of  the  cir- 
culation. Thus,  after  a  fatiguing  day  one  falls  asleep  and  rests  quietly 
for  several  hours,  then  on  awakening  feels  no  pain  or  inconvenience 
of  any  kind,  but  soon  finds  his  being  suffused  with  what  may  be  called 
a  disassociated  sense  of  fear  or  anxiety.  One  seeks  for  some  reason 
for  it  in  vain.  In  the  earlier  instances  this  disassociated  fear  soon 
affects  its  association  with  some  concept  of  menacing  content,  such  as 


322  HEART  DISEASE  AND    THE  EMOTIONS. 

that  of  a  previous  hemorrhage  or  the  like,  or  perhaps  of  some  external 
event,  and  one  is  easily  persuaded  that  it  was  this  concept  which  had, 
unknown  to  him,  produced  the  fear.  Directly  the  heart  begins  to 
throb  and  palpitate  and  the  paroxism  runs  its  course,  after  which  the 
fear  disappears.  After  a  time,  one  comes  to  recognize  the  meaning  of 
the  feeling  of  apprehension  and,  knowing  its  relative  insignificance, 
calmly  analyzes  the  state  as  he  awaits  its  culmination.  4  c  There  is  noth- 
ing to  fear — I  shall  be  all  right  in  ten  minutes — there  is  no  pain,"  etc., 
but  all  the  while  the  fear  is  there.  If  one  succeeds  in  preventing  the 
erroneous  association  he  escapes  the  secondary  reflex  effects  of  the  fright- 
ful concept,  but  the  fear  remains  and  only  passes  away  with  the 
paroxism.  Anyone  who  has  had  this  experience  can  have  no  doubt 
of  the  sensational  nature  and  vasomoter  occasion  of  fears. 

The  reader  may  recall  the  experiments  of  Mosso  which  showed 
that  even  slight  irritations  of  the  skin  or  sense  organs  produce  con- 
tractions of  the  peripheral  vessels,  while  in  painful  emotion  the  vaso- 
motor  changes  were  excessive,  and  were  accompanied  by  changes  in 
the  respiration  and  muscular  tension.  Laehr1  considers  that  the  vas- 
cular center  controls  painful  emotion  as  the  cortex  serves  for  the  intel- 
lect. If  the  cerebrum  has  an  excitation  adapted  to  produce  painful 
emotion,  part  of  the  reaction  passes  to  the  vascular  center  and  part  to 
the  appropriate  muscle  centers.  If  the  cerebral  action  is  shunted  out 
in  any  way,  the  reaction  on  the  vascular  center  may  be  the  more  in- 
tense. He  considers  that  the  painful  emotions  have  a  transitory  value 
only  in  the  phylogeny  and  will  disappear  in  the  progress  of  a  normal 
evolution.  C.  L.  HERRICK. 

DENISON  UNIVERSITY. 

*Die  Angst.,  Berliner  Klinik,  58. 


PSYCHOLOGICAL  LITERATURE. 


Outlines  of  Psychology.     OSWALD  KULPE.     Translated  by  E.  B. 

Titchener.       London,    Sonnenschein ;    New    York,    Macmillan. 

1895.     Pp.  462. 

The  translation  of  Kiilpe's  Grundriss  der  Psychologic  into  English 
calls  for  some  further  notice  of  this  already  much-reviewed  book. 
Several  circumstances  have  combined  to  give  unusual  prominence  to 
this  work,  of  which  its  real  merit  and  originality  are  certainly  the 
first.  But  any  writer  so  well  known  as  Kiilpe,  who,  in  these  days  of 
monographs  and  special  researches,  has  the  courage  and  the  scholar- 
ship to  venture  a  general  text-book  in  psychology  based  upon  experi- 
mental data,  may  be  sure  that  his  book  will  receive  attention.  This 
work  is  characterized  by  thorough  and  logical  treatment  of  every  sub- 
ject which  it  undertakes.  It  is  free  from  any  evidence  of  hasty  or 
superficial  work.  It  summarizes  a  large  amount  of  experimental 
research  (chiefly  German  however),  and  thus  becomes  an  indispen- 
sable handbook  for  psychologists.  It  is  marked  also  by  decided 
originality  both  in  the  division  of  the  subject  and  in  the  treatment  of 
special  topics.  The  latter,  however,  is  hardly  a  merit  in  a  book  of 
this  kind.  It  seems  to  have  been  thought  by  many  that  this  work 
would  serve  as  a  general  text-book  for  classes  in  psychology,  a  hope 
encouraged  no  doubt  by  the  title,  Outlines  of  Psychology,  Based 
upon  the  Results  of  Experimental  Investigation.  The  author's  wide 
departures  from  beaten  tracks  are  interesting  as  contributions  to  psy- 
chological literature,  but  are  somewhat  too  radical  to  permit  the  book 
to  be  generally  used  in  the  above  capacity.  The  same  result  must 
follow  from  the  relatively  too-exhaustive  treatment  of  some  subjects, 
such  as  the  psychophysical  methods  and  the  fusion  of  tones,  to  the 
omission  or  partial  treatment  of  others,  such  as  habit,  instinct,  judg- 
ment and  reasoning.  The  author  appears  to  have  labored  so  long 
over  fundamental  elements  and  processes  that  he  forgets  to  make  men- 
tion of  those  finished  mental  products  that  the  average  student  de- 
mands some  account  of. 

One  of  the  best  features  of  the  work  is  the  author's  clear  and  simple 
analysis  and  classification  of  the  elements  of  consciousness.     There 

323 


324  KULPES  PSYCHOLOGY. 

are  but  three  classes,  peripherally  excited  sensations,  centrally  excited 
sensations  and  feelings,  or,  as  we  should  say,  sensations,  images  and 
feelings.  The  prominence  given  to  memory,  under  the  head  of  cen- 
trally excited  sensations,  and  the  clear  and  exhaustive  treatment  of  the 
problems  of  reproduction,  recognition  and  association,  are  most  satis- 
factory. Equally  commendable  to  my  mind  is  his  practical  suppres- 
sion of  the  will  as  representing  any  kind  of  simple  conscious  content. 
May  one  hope  that  this  is  the  beginning  of  the  end  of  this  common 
source  of  confusion  and  mystery  ?  So  called  elementary  will  is  re- 
solved by  the  author  partly  into  certain  feelings  of  effort  and  partly 
into  certain  tendinous  and  articular  sensations. 

The  section  on  the  feelings  seems  rather  barren  in  contrast  with  that 
on  memory.  Feelings  are  not  attributes  of  sensations,  nor  functions 
of  sensations,  but  independent  conscious  processes.  They  are  not 
classifiable  except  as  pleasant  and  unpleasant.  They  have,  like  sen- 
sations, the  attributes  of  quality,  intensity  and  duration.  But  their 
qualities  are  only  two,  pleasant  and  unpleasant.  They  are  investigated 
by  two  methods,  the  serial  (Reihenmethode)  and  the  method  of  ex- 
pression. The  former  consists  in  observing  what  changes  of  feeling 
follow  systematic  changes  of  stimulus ;  the  latter  consists  in  observing 
the  effects  of  feeling  in  producing  changes  of  pulse,  respiration,  vol- 
untary movements  and  changes  in  the  volume  of  a  limb,  recorded  by 
the  sphygmograph,  pneumatograph,  dynamometer  and  plethysmo- 
graph  respectively.  A  few  results  of  experiments  with  these  in- 
struments are  given,  and  they  furnish,  as  the  author  says,  about  all  the 
experimental  material  we  have  for  the  treatment  of  the  feelings.  But 
these  researches  suggest  to  the  author  the  hypothesis  that  pleasantness 
is  the  accompaniment  of  increased  excitability  of  the  cerebral  cortex, 
and  unpleasantness  the  accompaniment  of  a  diminution  of  the  same, 
but  whether  this  is  to  be  finally  reduced,  with  Meynert,  to  increased 
and  decreased  blood  supply  and  metabolism  in  the  nervous  elements, 
or,  with  Wundt,  to  the  form  of  reaction  of  a  special  apperception  center 
upon  sensory  excitations,  the  author  is  unable  to  decide.  At  any  rate, 
pleasantness  and  unpleasantness  are  to  be  explained  by  central  nervous 
processes,  and  not  in  the  common  way  as  mere  accompaniments  of 
healthful  and  harmful  stimuli,  nor  as  due  to  the  state  of  nutrition  in  the 
nerves. 

The  important  subject  of  pain  is  practically  omitted.  Two  short 
paragraphs  in  different  places  are  devoted  to  it,  which  do  not  agree 
with  each  other,  and  one  of  which,  at  the  author's  suggestion,  has  been, 
rewritten  by  the  translator.  In  neither  text  is  the  author's  theory 


PSYCHOLOGICAL  LITERATURE.  325 

of  pain  clear.  He  does  not,  however,  accept  special  pain  nerves  and 
distinguishes  pain  from  its  accompanying  '  feeling '  quality,  which 
leads  him  in  discussing  cutaneous  sensations  to  the  statement  that 
4  pain  is  decidedly  unpleasant.*  Fifty  pages  are  devoted  to  the  feel- 
ings, occupied  principally  with  classification,  analysis,  discussion, 
criticism  and  hypothesis,  while  of  these  not  more  than  four  or  five 
pages  are  devoted  to  the  actual  results  of  experimental  investigation, 
the  latter  in  fact  being  almost  limited  to  some  experiments  with  the 
sphygmograph,  etc.,  and  to  a  few  experiments  upon  the  aesthetic  re- 
sults of  the  division  of  lines. 

The  author's  position  on  a  few  special  points  may  be  noticed.  On 
the  relation  of  mind  and  body  he  maintains  as  psychologist  the  psy- 
chophysical  i  parallelism'  of  Wundt.  The  relations  of  mind  and  body 
are  not  temporally  determined,  t.  e.,  causal.  But  the  author's  paral- 
lelism turns  out  to  be  only  a  half-hearted  one,  for  mind  and  body  are 
so  related  that  any  change  in  the  one  '  expresses  itself  by  a  change  in 
the  other.  In  his  more  recent  Einleitung  iu  die  Philosophic,  where 
fuller  treatment  of  this  subject  is  permitted,  the  author  bravely  takes 
the  dualistic  position.  Concerning  the  question  of  space  perception, 
the  author  affirms  that  the  origin  of  the  space  idea  does  not  belong  to 
psychology.  Extension  is  an  attribute  of  sensation  and  space  is  thus 
an  original  datum.  Any  theory  which  would  derive  the  space  idea 
from  experience  is  impracticable.  There  is  clear  and  detailed  discus- 
sion of  all  the  problems  of  sensations  of  sight  and  visual  perception. 
The  author  criticises  the  color-sensation  theory  both  of  Helmholtz 
and  Hering  and  regards  the  theory  of  Wundt  as  the  most  satisfactory. 
In  discussing  the  intensity  of  sensations  he  rules  out  visual  sensations 
entirely.  In  sight  mere  increase  of  stimulus  produces  qualitatively 
different  sensations  of  brightness.  The  author  discusses  the  psycho- 
physical,  physiological  and  psychological  interpretations  of  Weber's 
law,  rejecting  the  first  and  not  deciding  between  the  other  two. 
Kiilpe's  work  is  throughout  analytical  and  critical  and  is  not  at  all  an 
outline  of  psychology  based  upon  experimental  research.  But  the 
analysis  is  careful  and  the  criticism  keen.  To  be  sure  the  criticism  is 
rather  of  the  crushing  kind,  but  the  reader  soon  learns  that  it  is  not  so 
annihilating  as  it  first  appears,  for  instance,  where  he  majestically 
sweeps  aside  the  common  dictum  that  there  is  nothing  in  the  memory 
which  was  not  first  given  in  sensation,  only  to  arrive  in  the  end  at  the 
not-original  conclusion  that  memory  images  differ  from  sensations 
mainly  in  intensity  and  that  they  contain  no  qualities  not  found  among 
the  latter. 


3  26  CONANT'S    NUMBER   CONCEPT. 

As  regards  the  translation,  Professor  Titchener  deserves  the  thanks 
of  English  readers  for  giving  them  a  good  idiomatic  version  of  this 
valuable  book.  A  translation  is  always  easy  to  criticise,  and  this  one 
is  not  free  from  faults.  The  rendering  is  very  free,  so  that  in  some 
cases  the  author's  meaning  is  changed  somewhat,  and  occasionally 
what  is  clear  in  the  original  is  confused  in  the  translation.  The 
translator  has  made  a  special  study  of  the  English  equivalents  of  Ger- 
man psychological  terms  and  his  choices  are  for  the  most  part  good. 
But  his  preference  for  Latin  forms  produces  a  somewhat  dry  and 
scholastic  effect,  which  makes  the  English  less  attractive  than  it  would 
be  with  more  Saxon  forms.  '  Colligation*  for  'Verkniipfung,'  '  limen,' 
for  '  Schwelle,'  '  replica'  for  '  Wiedergabe,'  'limits  of  stimulability ' 
for  '  Reizgrenzen,'  'multeity*  for  ' Vielheit,'  c  modal  sensitivity'  for 
'  Sinnesempfindlichkeit  '  and  '  memorial  image  '  for  '  Erinnerungs- 
bild '  are  examples.  '  Local  signature '  for  what  the  translator  calls 
the  '  collective  '  use  of  '  Localzeichen  '  is  perhaps  the  worst,  although 
it  seems  a  pity  to  translate  the  expression  '  Schwelle '  by  the  word 
'  limen,'  when  we  have  a  perfect  English  equivalent. 

In  its  mechanical  aspect  this  book  is  a  sad  commentary  on  English 
and  American  book-making  as  compared  with  German.  The  Ger- 
man book  is  compact,  well  bound,  clearly  printed  on  cream  paper, 
and  lies  open  at  any  page  upon  your  table.  The  English  book  is 
spongy,  loose  jointed,  printed  upon  glaring  white  paper  with  typo- 
graphical errors,  and  yet  refuses  to  be  read  unless  held  open  by  brute 
force. 

UNIVERSITY  OF  IOWA.  G.  T.  W.  PATRICK. 

The  Number  Concept :  Its  Origin  and  Development.  New  York 
and  London.  Macmillan  &  Co.,  1896.  ($2.00.)  By  LEVI  L. 
CON  ANT,  PH.  D. 

Only  one  exception  can  be  taken  to  this  book — as  to  its  title.  The 
book  is  not  upon  the  origin  of  the  number  concept  nor  yet  upon  its 
development.  The  book  deals  with  primitive  methods  of  counting 
and  with  modes  of  expressing  or  registering  the  results  of  such  count- 
ing. The  true  title  would  be:  'Numeral  Systems  (or  Number 
Words),  Their  Origins  and  Various  Forms.'  Since  the  work  actu- 
ally undertaken  is  thoroughly  and  accurately  carried  out,  this  matter 
of  title  is,  perhaps,  of  little  account ;  yet  one  who  approaches  the  book 
expecting  to  have  light  thrown  upon  the  psychology  of  the  numerical 
idea  will  be  struck  by  the  discrepancy  between  the  title  and  the 
contents. 


PSYCHOLOGICAL  LITERATURE.  327 

This  discrepancy  is  worth  insisting  upon,  because  there  is  possible 
a  psychological  inquiry  upon  an  anthropological  basis  which  would 
agree  with  the  title.  The  author  insists  (on  pages  2-4)  that  the  ques- 
tion of  the  origin  of  number  is  outside  the  limits  of  inquiry,  with  his 
title  page  still  staring  him  in  the  face !  u  Philosophers  have  endeav- 
ored to  establish  certain  propositions  concerning  this  subject,  but,  as 
might  have  been  expected,  have  failed  to  reach  any  common  ground." 
The  context  shows  that  Dr.  Conant  understands  by  this  subject  the 
old  controversy  as  to  whether  numerical  judgments  are  a  priori  or  the 
result  of  experience.  He  is  quite  right  in  ruling  out  this  topic  from 
an  anthropological  investigation,  and  confining  himself  to  the  simple 
statement  that  all  primitive  societies  reveal  that  they  have  some,  how- 
ever crude,  sense  of  number.  But  this  is  not  the  point  from  which  the 
psychologist  is  interested  in  the  problem.  The  sense  of  number  is  a 
historical,  an  evolutionary  development.  It  arises  in  the  race  and  in 
the  individual.  The  psychological  (and  the  pedagogical)  problem 
is :  Under  what  circumstances,  in  response  to  what  stimuli  or  needs, 
in  what  psychical  context,  does  this  sense  arise?  It  would  be 
impossible  to  say,  in  advance,  just  how  much  light  anthropological 
investigation  would  throw  upon  this  problem ;  but  it  may  safely  be 
said  that  it  will  throw  some  light ;  and  it  is  a  pity  that  Dr.  Conant, 
through  confusing  the  metaphysical  and  the  psychological  problems 
of  origin,  should  not  have  contributed  what  his  learning  and  thorough 
research  fit  him  to  contribute.  The  book  would  then  have  been  as 
useful  to  the  psychologist  as  it  now  is  to  the  philologist. 

The  following  points  of  psychological  interest  may  be  gleaned  from 
the  philological  data  :  i .  The  numerical  systems  are  rythmical.  The 
count  proceeds  up  to  a  certain  point  (sometimes  only  2  ;  sometimes  3, 
joints  of  a  finger;  sometimes  5,  fingers  of  one  hand;  sometimes  10, 
both  hands ;  sometimes  20,  fingers  and  toes ;  then  a  knot  is  tied,  a  notch 
cut,  etc.,  and  the  count  repeated.  With  further  developments,  com- 
pound words  are  formed,  making  it  possible  to  dispense,  more  or  less, 
with  the  notch  or  knot,  a  definite  base  of  reference  being  formed.  2. 
While  the  origin  of  many  number  names  is  from  the  fingers,  many 
denote  activities  performed  upon  the  fingers.  For  example,  I  may 
mean  '  used  to  start  with,'  or  '  the  end  is  bent.'  3.  The  rhythms  of 
the  system  show  reference  ahead  and  also  backwards.  For  example,  9 
may  mean  'almost  done,'  'that  which  has  not  its  10,'  'there  is  still 
one  more,'  '  hand  next  to  complete,'  '  keep  back  one  finger,'  etc. 
The  reference  to  the  starting  point,  however,  is  much  more  common. 
9  will  more  often  mean  '4  of  the  other  hand,'  or  'hand  with 4* 


328  CONANT'S    NUMBER    CONCEPT. 

or  '  end  and  4.'  It  is  undoubtedly  true,  as  Dr.  Conant  remarks 
(p.  72,)  that  the  savage  does  not  discriminate  the  numerical  idea 
from  the  concrete  image  of  fingers  or  whatever  with  which  it  is  bound 
up,  i.  £.,  does  not  consciously  abstract.  But  it  is  equally  true  that  this 
continual  thought  of  reference  forwards  or  backwards  in  the  larger 
number,  is,  psychologically  considered,  an  abstracting  movement. 
When,  for  instance,  in  the  Zuni  scale,  3  means  '  the  equally  dividing 
finger,'  instead  of  simply  the  biggest  finger,  it  must  be  acknowledged 
that  abstraction  is  pretty  well  along.  While  it  is  not  true  to  the  same 
extent  of  the  verbal  form  in  which  6  means  '  I  on  the  other,'  still  the 
element  of  relation  is  obviously  prominent  in  the  latter.  While  a  care- 
ful study  of  the  actual  circumstances  under  which  savages  use  number 
would  be  necessary  to  justify  the  statement  that  the  ratio  element  in 
number  early  comes  to  consciousness,  the  philological  material  col- 
lected by  Dr.  Conant  points  in  that  direction.  4.  The  fact  that  the 
"student  is  struck  with  the  prevalence  of  the  dual  number"  in  the 
grammatical  structure  of  the  earlier  languages  is  an  important  fact. 
Mind  first  dichotomizes  the  universe;  the  world  is  'this  and  that,' 
'this'  and  'the  other  one.'  Observations  which  I  have  made  on  such 
small  children  as  have  come  within  my  scope  bear  out  this  principle 
for  the  individual.  There  was  not,  at  first  (with  these  children 
at  least),  a  plural  number,  but  conscious  selection  or  preference. 
2  denoted  not  a  couple,  but  a  contrast,  something  left  out  or  ruled 
out.  2  was  not  used  in  an  aggregative  or  enumerative  sense  until  an 
effort  was  made  also  to  recognize  aggregates  larger  than  2,  which  at 
first  (agreeing  here  also  with  the  philological  record)  took  the  form  of 
'  a  lot ' — many.  I  cannot,  however,  agree  with  Dr.  Conant  that  the 
difficulty  which  the  savage  met  in  attempting  '  to  pass  beyond  2,  and 
to  count  3,  4,  5,  is,  of  course,  but  slight.'  On  the  contrary,  it  seems  to 
me  the  essential  difficulty,  marking  a  distinct  advance  in  consciousness. 
It  is  one  thing  to  mark  off  the  mental  universe  into  this  and  not  this ; 
it  is  quite  another  to  assume  the  attitude  of  ordering  things  within  the 
universe,  and  this  is  what  occurs  when  numbers  develop  into  a 
row  or  sequence.  At  all  events,  in  the  observation  of  children  just  re- 
ferred to,  I  found  that  the  attaching  of  any  meaning  to  3  was  a  much 
later  accomplishment  (often  a  year  intervening)  than  in  the  case  of  2  ; 
and  that  when  the  idea  of  3  was  grasped  there  was  no  difficulty  in 
getting  the  child  to  count  intelligently  to  10;  thus  indicating  that  the 
idea  of  3  is  not  simply  cumulative,  but  marks  a  different  psychical 
attitude.  Till  ?  child  can  grasp  the  idea  of  3,  numbers  like  3,  4,  5» 
etc.,  are  taken  by  him  to  be  the  absolute  names  of  certain  individuals 


PSYCHOLOGICAL  LITERATURE.  329 

An  incidental  psychological  contribution,  which  will  not  fail  of 
catching  the  attention  of  those  psychologists  and  sociologists  who  are 
dwelling  upon  the  importance  of  imitation,  is  found  on  p.  1 1 .  Ex- 
periments were  made  upon  five  different  primary  rooms  in  Worcester, 
Mass.,  to  determine  the  4  natural'  place  of  beginning  in  counting  off 
on  the  finger.  In  two  cases  the  teacher  allowed  one  child  to  count 
while  the  other  children  watched.  In  both  cases  every  other  child 
followed  exactly  the  example  of  the  leader. 

It  is  to  be  hoped  that  Dr.  Conant,  or  some  other  equally  com- 
petent student,  will  supplement  this  book  with  another,  in  which  the 
anthropological  data  concerning  the  circumstances  and  motives  with 
relation  to  which  savages  count  will  be  collected  so  as  to  extend  and  to 
justify  the  philological  data  and  conclusions ;  and  will  also  take  up 
the  matter  of  systems  of  measurement,  upon  both  a  philological  and 
anthropological  basis.  In  this  case  the  contributions  to  psychology 
will  be  direct  and  not  simply  incidental.  JOHN  DEWEY. 

UNIVERSITY  OF  CHICAGO. 

Die  Spiele  der  Thiere.  KARL  GROOS.  Jena,  Gustav  Fischer. 
1896.  Pp.  xvi-f  359. 

When  it  is  learned  that  the  above  is  a  volume  of  340  pages,  exclu- 
sive of  an  excellent  index,  it  will  at  once  be  plain  that  the  treatmen1 
of  the  subject  is  of  the  most  thorough  kind. 

The  book  is  well  printed  on  good  paper  and  with  a  type  that  en- 
courages one  to  keep  on  when  once  he  has  begun  the  reading — a  very 
important  matter  in  a  work  which  is,  after  all,  of  special  rather  than 
general  interest.  In  the  introduction  a  succinct  statement  of  the 
author's  entire  position  is  given.  The  work  is  rendered  valuable  for 
reference  by  reason  of  a  very  full  bibliography. 

The  subjects  of  the  different  chapters  are  as  follows : 

I.  Consideration  of  the  theory  that  play  is  an  expression  of  excess 
or  overflow  of  energy. 

II.  Play  and  Instinct. 

III.  Forms  oi  Play  among  Animals,  which  is  continued  in  a  fourth 
chapter  as  '  Die  Liebesspiele,'  the  two  together  making  over  200  pages 
of  matter. 

V.  The  Psychology  of  Animal  Play. 

The  author  gives  the  most  ample  evidence  of  familiarity  with  the 
literature  that  bears  on  his  subject,  whether  directly  or  indirectly,  and 
well-known  American  writers  on  psychology  are  quoted  again  and 
again,  some  of  the  citations  indicating  that  the  writer  appreciates  not 


33°  DIE   SPIELE  DER    THIERE. 

only  their  matter  but  their  style,  as  when  he  says:  "James  hat  voll- 
kommen  Recht,  wenn  er  z.  B.  bei  der  briitenden  Henne  keine  weit- 
eren  Erfahrungen  und  psychischen  Vorgange  annimmt  als  das  gefiihl, 
das  eben  ein  solches  Ei,  *  the  never-to-be-too-much-sat-upon  object'  ist." 

No  doubt  Professor  Baldwin's  work  on  mental  development  would 
have  proved  to  the  author  a  mine  to  be  well  worked  had  it  appeared 
in  time.  However,  it  will  serve  a  still  better  purpose  in  connection 
with  that  second  treatise  Dr.  Groos  promises,  '  Die  Spiele  der  Men- 
schen.* 

Briefly  as  to  the  author's  views :  Animal  psychology  has  been 
wrongly  regarded  as  a  sort  of  mere  amusement  in  consequence  of  which 
the  subject  has  suffered.  It  has  also  been  lacking  in  aims  and  methods. 
It  would  be  well  to  consider  what  in  men  is  animal  (thierisch)  if  we  go 
no  further,  and  this  implies  a  close  study  of  animals.  The  author 
then  sets  forth  his  views  as  to  the  qualifications  of  the  man  who  would 
make  a  thoroughly  successful  study  of  animals,  and  they  so  perfectly 
agree  with  my  own  that  I  will  quote  the  passage  in  the  hope  that  the 
editor  may  not  throw  it  out  for  being  too  lengthy. 

"Der  Verfasser  einer  Psychologic  der  thierischen  Spiele  miisste 
eigentlich  nicht  nur  zwei,  sondern  mehrere  Seelen  in  seiner  Brust  be- 
herbergen.  Er  miisste  mit  einer  allgemeinen  psycho logischen,  phy- 
siologischen  und  biologischen  Vorbildung  die  Erfahrungen  eines 
Weltreisenden,  die  Kenntnisse  eines  Thiergarten-Directors  und  die 
Erinnerungen  eines  wahrheitsliebenden  Oberforsters  vereinigen. 
Und  auch  dann  wiirde  er  schwerlich  sein  Werk  zu  einem 
befriedigenden  Abschluss  fiihren  konnen,  wenn  er  nicht  zugleich  mit 
den  Bestrebungen  der  modernen  Aesthetik  vertraut  ware.  Ja  gerade 
diesen  letzten  Punkt  halte  ich  fur  so  wesentlich,  dass  ich  behaupten 
mochte :  nur  ein  Aesthetiker  kann  die  Psychologic  des  Spiels  schrei- 
ben." 

Dr.  Groos  does  not  reject  the  l  overflow  of  energy '  theory  origina- 
ting with  Schiller  and  expanded  by  Spencer,  but  considers  it  inade- 
quate. 

Play  is  a  development  and  preparation  for  the  use  or  expression  of 
certain  instincts.  Without  this  preparation  the  'blind  might'  of  in- 
stinct would  often  be  unavailing. 

The  author's  work  is  saturated  with  the  doctrines  of  evolution,  of 
which  he  makes  abundant  use  and  with  critical  discrimination. 

Bearing  in  mind  the  all  pervading  nature  of  the  sexual  instinct,  he 
endeavors  to  prove  that  play  is  essential  for  the  successful  attainment 
of  the  the  objects  of  this  instinct,  especially  on  account  of  the  instinc- 
tive shyness  of  the  females. 


PSYCHOLOGICAL  LITERATURE.  331 

Dr.  Groos  thinks  he  has  discovered  a  new  i  principle '  as  described 
above,  necessary  to  complete  and  correct  those  of  Wallace,  Weismann, 
Galton,  Spencer  and  Darwin.  He  does  not  believe  that  the  females 
select  the  males,  but  that  the  peculiar  forms  and  colors  of  the  males 
tend  to  diminish  the  shyness  of  the  female,  so  that  with  the  addition 
of  his  own  principle  that  great  end  of  nature,  the  propagation  of 
species,  is  accomplished.  Through  these  two  principles,  attraction  of 
females  by  the  forms,  colors,  etc.,  of  males,  and  that  behavior  for 
which  play  is  a  preparation,  suitable  matings  result. 

The  principle  of  special  interest  in  psychology  in  this  connection, 
and  especially  for  ^Esthetics,  is  l  der  Scheinthatigkeit  oder  der  bewuss- 
ten  Selbstauschung.' 

Whether  one  agrees  wholly  with  the  writer  of  this  book  or  not,  he 
will  get  many  tidbits  by  the  way  and  is  likely  to  feel  more  than  ever 
the  force  of  the  well-known  saying  of  Bacon,  *  Reading  maketh  a 
full  man.'  WESLEY  MILLS. 

MONTREAL. 


THE  PSYCHOLOGY  OF  ART. 

Ueber  den  psychologischen  Ursprung  der  Poesie  und  Kunst.     M. 

J.  MONRAD.     Archiv   f.   system.     Philosophic,  Bd.   I.  347-362. 

1895. 

In  the  fourth  chapter  of  the  '  Poetics '  Aristotle  refers  the  psy- 
chological origin  of  Poetry  to  two  sources,  the  impulse  to  and  de- 
light in  imitation  and  the  impulse  to  and  delight  in  rhythm  and 
harmony.  Connecting  the  first  with  the  theoretic  impulse — we  first 
learn  by  imitation — he  finds  an  essential  element  in  aesthetic  enjoyment 
to  be  the  pleasure  of  recognition.  Certain  persons  in  whom  the  imita- 
tive impulse  was  stronger  than  the  rest  began  with  imitations  which 
expressed  the  temporary  interest  of  the  occasion,  and  these,  perfected 
by  practice,  gradually  became  a  developed  art. 

The  essay  of  Herr  Monrad  is  an  elaboration  and  application  to  art 
generally  of  the  above  Aristotelian  theses  respecting  the  origin  and 
development  of  poetry.  Aristotle's  remark  about  learning  beginning 
with  imitation  receives  a  deeper  significance  than  its  author  probably 
intended  in  the  observation  that  in  learning  there  is  an  inwardizing,  a 
spiritual  reproduction,  of  the  object.  Such  idealization  is  a  character- 
istic factor  in  human  imitation,  and  enables  it  to  rise  above  the  brute 
stage  at  which  it  begins  and  where  it  approaches  the  reflex  type, 


33  2  THE  PSYCHOLOGY  OF  ART. 

and  to  become  an  imitation,  not  merely  of  movements,  but  of  objects. 
Connected  with  this  ideal  reproduction,  this  imitation  in  the  sub- 
ject, is  the  impulse  to  objectification,  for  which  the  twofold  reason  is 
assigned  that  it  is  necessary  both  to  define  the  image  and  to  commu- 
nicate it.  The  psychological  motifs  which  are  the  vehicles  of  these 
reasons  are  not  stated,  unless  the  remark  referring  to  the  latter  of 
them  be  regarded  as  such,  namely,  that  the  person,  as  of  essentially  a 
social  nature,  wills  to  express  himself  and  to  see  himself  mirrored  in 
his  work  and  in  the  recognition  of  others.  The  result  of  this  ex- 
pression is  to  bring  out  the  essential  and  universal  import  of  the  image 
by  placing  it  where  it  can  be  modified  by  the  similar  expressions  of 
other  persons.  Thus  every  man  is  a  born  artist.  Only  the  exception- 
ally gifted,  however,  succeed  in  giving  an  adequately  universal  ex- 
pression to  their  idea.  Besides  the  pleasure  of  recognition,  mentioned 
by  Aristotle,  delight  in  the  work  of  art  is  connected  with  its  freedom 
from  all  practical  interests  as  being  only  image,  form,  and  not  reality, 
and  with  the  fact  that  it  is  a  form  produced  freely  from  the  spirit  and 
bearing  its  stamp.  It  is  also  connected  with  the  formal  elements  of 
technical  superiority,  and,  intrinsically,  of  rhythm  and  harmony,  these 
terms  being  used  in  a  more  comprehensive  sense  than  Aristotle's. 
The  essay  closes  with  a  strong  characterization  of  that  '  Af terkunst ' 
which  passes  under  the  name  of  Realism,  the  function  of  true  art 
being,  in  the  author's  view,  to  give  such  expression  to  the  things  of  the 
spirit  that  the  spirit  may  recognize  and  rejoice  in  its  own  ideality. 
SMITH  COLLEGE.  H.  N.  GARDINER. 

Sex  and  Art.  COLIN  A.  SCOTT,  Fellow  in  Psychology,  Clark  Uni- 
versity. The  American  Journal  of  Psychology,  VII.  153-226. 
Jan.  1896. 

Mr.  Scott  undertakes  to  bring  a  vast  mass  of  heterogeneous  phe- 
nomena under  a  few  relatively  simple  concepts.  Erethism,  he  holds, 
is  the  foundation  of  all  sexual  phenomena.  At  first  general,  it  is  soon 
found  chiefly  in  organs  specialized  for  the  performance  of  the  sexual 
function,  to  which  the  balance  of  the  organism  is  brought  into  relation 
by  the  law  of  radiation:  "Starting  from  the  act  of  copulation,  the 
sexual  instinct  tends  to  widen  and  become  more  complicated,  until 
the  whole  of  the  organism  is  involved  in  its  activity."  With  progress- 
ing sexual  differentiation  sexual  selection  comes  to  view.  It  is  effected 
chiefly  by  means  of  combat  and  courting,  out  of  which  have  sprung 
the  emotions  of  fear  and  anger,  shame,  coyness,  probably  the  pa- 
rental instincts,  and  the  aesthetic  sense.  Out  of  the  last  named  sprang 


PSYCHOLOGICAL  LITERATURE.  333 

in  turn  the  instinct  for  ornamentation,  and  this,  conjoined  with  the 
sense  of  shame,  has  given  rise  to  clothing.  From  the  symbolism 
and  fetichism  so  characteristic  of  savage  races,  which  is  at  bottom  a 
tendency  to  attach  the  complex  and  subjective  to  things  concrete  and 
objective  and  which  lies  at  the  foundation  of  all  our  conceptual  and 
symbolic  thought,  there  springs  phallicism,  in  which  the  vague  emo- 
tions grouped  as  above  described  about  the  sexual  function  become 
attached  to  a  definite  symbol,  associated  with  cosmological  notions 
and  give  rise  to  religion.  The  relation  of  the  primitive  sex  instinct 
to  the  more  complex  instincts  and  emotions  its  derivatives  may  be  ex- 
pressed in  physiological  terms  by  the  relation  of  a  simple  reflex  arc 
and  its  ganglion  cell  to  complex  systems  of  similar  arcs  and  cells, 
which  may  stimulate  or  inhibit  the  functioning  of  the  primitive  and 
may  even  become  dissociated  from  the  primitive  and  function  inde- 
pendently. 

Such  are  the  main  outlines  of  Mr.  Scott's  inductions.  The 
balance  of  his  paper  illustrates  these  conceptions  in  sundry  connec- 
tions. He  sketches  the  general  features  and  laws  of  courting,  bringing 
to  view  the  katabolic  tendencies  of  the  male  as  opposed  to  the  anabolic 
tendencies  of  the  female,  analyses  the  phenomena  of  degeneration  and 
perversion,  describes  the  state  of  ecstasy,  which  u  as  involving  an 
emotional  condition  accompanying  the  operation  of  the  phantasy,  is  a 
connecting  link  between  art  and  sex,  "  and,finally,  aesthetics.  He  con- 
cludes that  the  higher  derivatives  of  the  sexual  instinct  are  not  only 
excitants  of  their  primitive,  but  also  inhabitants  of  and  substitutes  for 
it,  and  urges  that  "  what  we  need  at  present  is  a  modern  phallicism,  a 
religious  and  artistic  spirit  that  goes  out  to  meet  the  sexual  instinct 
and  is  able  to  find  in  it  the  center  of  evolution,  the  heart  and  soul  of 
the  world,  the  holy  of  holies  to  all  right  feeling  men."  In  education 
we  should  seize  upon  the  artistic  sense  at  the  outset  and  seek  to  de- 
velop it  to  the  utmost.  "  Love,  in  its  best  development  in  a  continued 
married  life,  gives  us  the  pulse  of  this  (the  artistic)  movement,  (and) 
the  ennobling  ecstasies  of  poetry,  music,  painting  and  the  enthusiasms 
generally,  are  at  the  same  time  an  outcome  of  and  a  substitution  for 
this  happiness." 

This  is  a  most  interesting  and  suggestive  paper,  showing  on  every 
page  the  author's  acute  psychological  insight  and  mastery  of  his  ma- 
terial. Yet,  as  is  perhaps  inevitable  in  so  wide  and  new  a  field,  its  defects 
are  many.  In  reading  it  the  suspicion  constantly  arises  that  generaliza- 
tions so  comprehensive  may  include  or  perhaps  be  based  upon  mere 
superficial  resemblances,  and  the  fear  is  increased  by  the  lack  of  any 


334  THE  PSYCHOLOGY  OF  ART. 

attempt  on  the  part  of  the  author  to  criticise  or  define  such  concepts  as 
those  of  erethism,  art,  religion,  etc.  The  psychological  scheme  which 
Mr.  Scott  propounds  raises  a  similar  doubt.  If  it  be  regarded  as  an 
attempt  to  express  the  facts  of  observation  in  symbolic  form — a  series 
of  physiological  fetiches — no  one  will  object  to  it,  although  the  same 
end  would  be  as  well  or  better  attained  by  a  notation  similar  to  that  of 
algebra  or  chemistry.  But  if  we  are  to  conceive  it  as  representative  of 
what  goes  on  in  the  nervous  system,  it  must  be  regarded  as  purely 
mythical. 

That  the  primitive  sexual  passion  has  been  a  leading  factor  in  the 
evolution  of  the  artistic  sense,  and  has  been  concerned  in  that  of  the 
religious  spirit,  scarcely  admits  of  question,  and  the  positive  side  of 
Mr.  Scott's  paper  is  a  permanent  and  valuable  contribution  to  our 
knowledge  of  the  subject.  But  his  treatment  seems  to  the  present 
writer  essentially  defective  from  the  theoretical  point  of  view,  and 
from  the  practical  entirely  misleading.  Fear  has  been  evolved  in  the 
presence  of  dangers  of  all  kinds,  and  not  merely  of  those  arising  from 
rival  aspirants  for  the  favor  of  the  female.  The  primary  factor  in  the 
evolution  of  religion  is  to  be  found,  not  in  the  sex  instinct,  but  in  the 
use  of  a  belief  in  the  continued  existence  of  deceased  parents  and  chief- 
tains as  a  fetich  for  the  repressive  influence  of  the  community.  In  its 
later  forms  religion  has  entirely  cut  loose,  and,  as  I  believe,  finally  and 
forever  cut  loose  from  its  early  association  with  the  sex  passion,  and 
Mr.  Scott's  plea  for  a  'Modern  Phallicism,'  even  in  the  refined  sense 
in  which  he  uses  the  expression,  is  little  short  of  grotesque.  In  the 
evolution  of  the  aesthetic  emotions  the  sexual  feelings  have  probably 
played  the  leading  part,  yet  non-sexual  utilities  have  had  much  to  do 
with  their  fashioning.  And  while  one  cannot  but  support  Mr.  Scott's 
plea  for  the  wider  recognition  of  the  aesthetic  emotions  in  education, 
the  facts  which  he  alleges  do  not  afford  a  sufficient  warrant  for  it. 
The  aesthetic  sense  can,  and  sometimes  does,  act  as  an  inhibitant  of  or 
substitute  for  the  grosser  sex  passion,  but  we  have  no  reason  for  be- 
lieving that  with  increase  in  aesthetic  sensibility  we  should  see  a  dim- 
inution of  sexual  excesses.  The  history  of  Greece  and  Rome,  of 
modern  France,  Italy  and  Spain,  and  of  the  cultured  and  leisured 
classes  in  every  community,  shows  conclusively  that  there  is  at  least 
no  inconsistency  between  high  artistic  development  and  gross  sexual 
laxity.  Mr.  Scott  duly  recognizes  the  fact  that  the  aesthetic  sense 
serves  to  awaken  as  well  as  control  the  sex  passion,  but  he  fails  in  his 
practical  deductions  to  give  due  weight  to  that  recognition.  Further, 
he  makes  no  mention  of  the  regulative  function — the  so-called  moral 


PSYCHOLOGICAL  LITERATURE.  335 

sense — which  has  been  evolved  expressly  for  the  control  of  the  animal 
passions  in  the  interests  of  individuals  as  well  as  of  society. 

However,  it  may  well  be  that  such  sins  of  omission  and  exagger- 
ation are  inseparable  from  any  attempt  to  deal  in  narrow  limits  with 
such  raw  material,  and  as  an  earnest  attempt  at  original  construction 
Mr.  Scott's  paper  will  meet  with  a  cordial  welcome. 

UNIVERSITY  OF  PENNSYLVANIA.  W.  ROMAINE  NEWBOLD. 


Temperament  et  caractere,  selon  les  individus,  les  sexes  et  les  races. 
ALF.  FOUILLEE.  Paris,  Alcan.  Pp.  xx+278. 

u  General  Psychology,"  says  Ribot,  ''studies  exclusively  abstract 
laws,  whereas  the  psychology  of  character  studies  types  produced  by  a 
particular  combination  of  general  laws  and  classifying  individuals."  The 
character  of  an  individual  is  his  average  mode  of  feeling,  thinking  and 
acting.  It  is  the  result  of  a  series  of  causes,  the  first  of  which  is  race, 
the  second  the  fundamental  difference  between  the  sexes  (the  signifi- 
cance of  which  is  not  only  biological  but  also  psychological) ,  and  the 
last  a  product  of  -the  individual  constitution  and  temperament.  Thus 
is  formed  the  innate  character,  the  present  manifestation  of  a  long  series 
of  evolutionary  changes.  But  the  innate  character  is  only  a  starting  point 
for  new  developments ;  it  is  passive  under  exterior  influences,  but  active 
through  the  reaction  of  the  intelligence  and  of  the  will.  It  is  indeed 
these  personal  reactions  that  constitute  par  excellence  the  character 
properly  so-called  by  assimilation  with  the  innate  temperament  and 
constitution.  Hence  the  influence  of  education  and  culture. 

Making  these  principles  his  starting  point  and  drawing  some  of  his 
observations  and  theories  from  those  who  had  previously  contributed 
to  the  new  science  of  character,  M.  Fouille"e  studies : 

I.  Physical   and  moral  temperaments,  which    result   from    the 
uature  of  changes  in  the  body.     There  are  two  types,  the  reflective 
and  the  active,  with  their  subdivisions.      So  much  may  be  said  from 
the  standpoint  of  the  body  (which  may  be  modified  as  age  advances) , 
liut  it  must  not  be  forgotten  that  character  is  affected  by  the  will  as 
well  as  by  the  organism,  and  that  the  physical  constitution,  according 
as  it  is  well  or  ill   directed,  affects  the  moral  order  for  good  or  evil. 
Following  Descartes,  Pascal,  Rousseau  and  Biron,  M.  Fouille"e  con- 
siders it  essential  that  a  place  should  be  given  to  ethics  in  the  reflective 
and  emotional  life,  which  act  not  by  virtue  of  abstract  precepts,  but 
by  a  concrete  influence  on  the  being. 

II.  Character  and  intelligence.     The  type  of  character  is  a  re- 


336  TEMPERAMENT  ET  CARACTERE. 

suit  of  the  mutual  relations  of  the  three  important  psychic  functions 
inseparable  from  the  will,  sensation,  emotion  and  desire.  A  character 
is  well  balanced  when  no  one  of  these  factors  predominates,  otherwise 
according  to  the  element  that  predominates  it  becomes  sensuous,  intel- 
lectual or  volitional. 

III.  Temperament  and  character  according  to  sex.     Following 
M.  A.  Sabatier  the  fundamental  features  of  the  female  character  are 
said  to  be  concentration,  unification,  cohesion.     The  elements  of  the 
masculine  character  are  on  the  contrary  separation  and  production ;  the 
one  collects,  the  other  gives  out ;  the  one  is  dependent  on  and  the  other 
independent  of  surroundings.     From  these  fundamental    differences 
result  the  dissimilarity  of  the  male  and  female  character. 

IV.  Character  of  the  human  races.     The  general  character  of  a 
race  is  the  result  of  selection  under  given  conditions.     Those  races 
which  have  degenerated  from  a  moral  or  physical  point  of  view  may 
be  regenerated   in  two  ways,  the  one  psychological  and  the  other 
physiological — education  and  intermarriage.   In  conclusion,  M.  Fouill^e 
remarks  that  the  period  in  which  the  physical  and  moral  differences 
between  races  were  large,  while  the  differences  between  individuals 
were  small,  belongs  to  the  past.     This  state  of  things  is  reversed  to- 
day, but  we  are  approaching  a  third  period,  in  which  differences  be- 
tween individuals  will  again  decrease  without  lessening  the  similarity 
of  races,  and  thus  will  arise  the  true  type  of  man. 

In  the  course  of  the  work  the  writer  discusses  different  classifica- 
tions of  character,  especially  those  of  Ribot  and  Paulhan,  and  empha- 
sizes the  value  of  these  researches.  "From  a  practical  point  of 
view,"  says  M.  Fouillee,  "the  science  of  character  would  be  of  un- 
doubted usefulness  to  the  moralist  and  teacher.  As  it  is  indispen- 
sable to  the  student  of  hygiene  to  recognize  different  physical  tempera- 
ments that  he  may  adapt  general  prescriptions  to  individual  constitu- 
tions, so  must  the  moralist  adapt  his  precepts  to  different  moral 
temperaments.  It  would  be  absurd  to  conclude  that  what  is  successful 
in  one  case  would  produce  like  effects  in  another,  as  Kingsley  did  in 
preaching  that  all  should  find  happiness  in  the  study  of  marine  ani- 
mals. The  educator  cannot  apply  the  same  rules  in  dealing  with  dif- 
ferent children ;  severity  will  influence  some,  affection  will  influence 
others.  To  fear  is  necessary  for  some,  to  love  is  best  for  others.  We 
do  not  indeed  go  so  far  as  to  say  with  M.  Stewart  that  classes  in  a 
school  should  be  divided  into  four  parts  in  order  to  group  together 
children  of  the  same  character  and  apply  to  them  special  methods. 
But  it  is  certain  that  educators  ignore  too  much  the  physiology  of 


PSYCHOLOGICAL  LITERATURE.  337 

character,  as  they  ignore  the  hygiene  of  intellectual  work.  If  the  first 
educators,  the  parents,  understood  the  intimate  relations  of  physical 
and  moral  temperaments  they  would  begin  to  decipher  the  nature  of 
their  children  from  the  very  first  and  would  learn  better  and  better  to 
appreciate  their  aptitudes." 

Let  us  hope  that  the  appeal  will  receive  the  attention  of  educators. 

JEAN  PHILIPPE. 
PARIS. 

Die  moderne  Physiologische  Psychologic  in  Deutschland.  DR.  W. 
HEINRICH.  Zurich,  E.  Speidel,  1895.  Pp.  iv+235. 

The  scope  of  this  book  will  be  best  indicated  by  referring  to  the 
author's  explanation  of  how  he  came  to  write  it.  His  first  and  final 
aim  is  to  attempt  the  construction  of  a  new  theory  of  attention.  On 
the  way  to  the  accomplishment  of  this  end  he  had  to  review  preceding 
psychological  theories  which  bore  special  relation  to  this  problem. 
This  volume  contains  the  result  of  these  studies,  the  presentation  of 
the  author's  own  theory  being  postponed. 

The  book  has,  on  the  whole,  an  unsatisfactory  character.  It  con- 
tains criticisms  and  discussions  which,  however  acute  and  however  im- 
portant in  themselves  and  in  the  development  of  the  author's  studies, 
have  no  close  bearing  on  the  problem  of  attention,  or,  at  any  rate, 
lack  the  unification  and  justification  which  might  have  been  given  to 
them  if  we  had  been  presented  with  positive  constructive  conceptions. 
On  the  other  hand,  the  book  is  too  brief  and  the  selection  of  topics 
for  discussion  is  too  one-sided  to  allow  us  to  take  it  as  a  history  of 
physiological  psychology. 

Dr.  Heinrich  states  in  the  preface  that  the  only  objective  criterion 
for  theories  of  attention  is  to  be  found  in  the  law  of  psycho-physical 
parallelism;  ''Desist  nun  zu  entscheiden  in  ivie  fern  die  Psycho- 
logen,  die  ja  alle  den  psychophysischen  Parallelismus  theoretisch 
anerkennen  ihm  auch  praktisch  treu  geblieben  sind"  Our  author, 
at  least,  is  true  to  his  principle ;  there  are,  however,  hardly  any  psy- 
chologists who  are  not  found  to  be  unfaithful.  In  truth,  if  a  psycholo- 
gist sets  himself  faithfully  to  interpret  facts,  he  will  hardly  fail  to  come 
into  conflict  with  a  dogmatically  assumed  Gesetz. 

Dr.  Heinrich  finds  that  Kiilpe's  recent  work  on  psychology  "  while 
it  may  perhaps  be  of  some  use  as  a  text  book,"  ...  u  is  of  no  scientific 
value."  The  mere  statement  of  this  judgment  serves  as  well  as  anything 
could  do  for  a  criticism  of  Heinrich's  treatment.  That  Kiilpe  should 
profess  to  investigate  only  Beiuusstseins-Erscheinungen  and  should 


33^  DIE    GESICHTSEMPFINDUNGEN. 

yet  study  attention  along  with  other  factors  as  a  Zustand  des  Bewusst- 
seins  is  found  to  be  inexplicable  and  at  least  to  involve  a  contradic- 
tion. One  may  admit  that  Prof.  Kiilpe  might  have  made  more  clear 
what  he  means  by  Zustand,  but  that  there  is  a  contradiction  involved 
seems  by  no  means  to  follow. 

Evidently  it  is  Avenarius  whose  philosophy  is  to  give  an  adequate 
solution  of  the  problem  of  attention,  and  we  are  presented  with  an 
account  of  certain  general  conceptions  which,  according  to  Avenarius 
and  our  author,  should  dominate  psychological  investigation.  I  can- 
not see  that  Dr.  Heinrich's  approval  of  Avenarius  in  this  respect  is 
more  justifiable  than  his  condemnation  of  Kiilpe. 

It  may  be  noted  that  Dr.  Heinrich  refers  only  to  German  psycholo- 
gists. This  would  be  more  natural  if  he  were  studying  attention  only 
in  its  psycho-physical  aspect ;  it  must  be  considered  as  a  defect  when 
we  remember  that  his  aim  is  far  wider  and  that  his  professed  object  is 
to  construct  a  general  theory  of  attention. 

W.  G.  SMITH. 

SMITH  COLLEGE. 

Zur  Psychophysik   der   Gesichtsempjindungen.     G.   E.  MOLLER. 
Ztsch.  f.  Psychologic  und  Physiologic  der  Sinnesorgane  X.,  1-83. 

Besides  the  axioms  which  it  has  in  common  with  physics  and 
chemistry,  psychophysics  assumes  five  which  are  peculiar  to  itself. 
They  are : 

(1)  Some  material  process  (a  so-called  psychophysical  process) 
is  at  the  basis  of  every  state  of  consciousness. 

(2)  To  the  equality,  similarity,  difference  of  a  sensation   (we  shall 
not  here  discuss  other  states  of  consciousness,  though  the  same  axioms 
hold  for  all),  correspond  respectively  an  equality,  similarity,  differ- 
ence of  the  underlying  psychophysical  process  and  conversely. 

(3)  If  the  changes  which  a  sensation  runs  through  have  the  same 
direction,  or  if  the  differences  between  a  series  of  sensations  have  the 
same  direction,  the  like  will  be  the  case  in  regard  to  the  corresponding 
psychophysical  process;  if  a  sensation  is  variable  in  n  directions,  so 
also  is  its  psychophysical  process. 

(4)  The  directions  in  which  a  sensation  can  be  varied  are  of  dif- 
ferent kinds.  If  a  given  direction  is  towards  zero  (that  is,  if  the  sen- 
sation, by  continuous  change  in  the  same  direction,  finally  vanishes) , 
we  say  that  the  sensation  is  suffering  a  diminution  of  intensity  (and 
if  the  change  is  the  exact  reverse  of  this,  we  speak  of  an  increase  of 
intensity) .  Among  the  different  directions  which  lead  to  zero,  that 


PSYCHOLOGICAL   LITERATURE.  339 

one  is  of  peculiar  importance  which  leads  to  zero  by  the  shortest  route 
(that  is,  by  passing  through  the  smallest  number  of  perceptible  inter- 
vals) .  In  this  direction,  or  in  its  opposite,  the  change  is  said  to  be  a 
change  of  pure  intensity.  In  any  other  course  towards  zero  the 
change  is  said  to  be  one  of  mixed  intensity  and  quality.  A  change  is 
purely  qualitative  when  it  leads  neither  towards  nor  from  the  zero 
point  of  sensation. 

The  fifth  axiom  will  be  stated  later. 

From  the  fourth  axiom  it  follows  that  to  every  qualitative  change 
of  sensation  there  corresponds  a  qualitative  change  in  the  psycho- 
physical  process,  and  conversely ;  and  that  to  an  increase  or  a  dimi- 
nution of  the  one  corresponds  an  increase  or  a  diminution  of  the  other. 

These  axioms  may  be  summed  up  in  the  general  doctrine  of  a 
psychophysical  parallelism.  But  the  history  of  the  doctrine  shows 
too  conclusively  the  necessity  of  setting  out  in  detail  the  elements  of 
which  it  is  composed.  The  definition  of  psychophysical  process  is 
such  a  material  process  in  the  brain  as  is  accompanied  by  sensation 
(or  other  condition  of  consciousness).  This  is  the  converse  of  axiom  i . 

The  above  axioms  have  been  stated  with  more  or  less  clearness  by 
Lotze,  Fechner,  Mach  and  Hering.  But  when  Hering  says  that  a 
given  sensation  of  gray  may  be  caused  by  psychophysical  processes 
very  different  in  amount,  provided  the  proportion  of  the  white  process 
to  the  black  process  remains  the  same,  he  misinterprets  the  principle 
of  parallelism.  If  this  were  so,  the  white  process  and  the  black  pro- 
cess might  become  excessively  small  in  amount  without  producing  any 
change  in  the  sensation,  and  upon  their  finally  vanishing,  the  sensation 
would  cease  suddenly  without  having  previously  suffered  any  diminu- 
tion of  intensity.  This  is  in  complete  contradiction  with  the  prin- 
ciple of  continuity ;  it  also  is  in  disaccord  with  our  fourth  axiom,  and 
with  experience  in  the  corresponding  region  of  sound.  A  principle 
object  of  this  paper  is  to  modify  Hering's  theory  of  antagonistic  colors 
in  such  a  way  that  it  can  dispense  with  this  assumption. 

Since  all  sensations  vary  in  intensity,  the  psychophysical  process 
which  underlies  them  must  in  every  instance  have  a  corresponding 
variation.  Shall  we  suppose  that  this  variation  is  a  variation  in 
strength  (to  be  measured  by  the  energy,  the  velocity,  the  acceleration 
or  some  other  function  of  moving  particles) ,  or  a  variation  in  exten- 
sion (that  is,  in  the  number  of  particles  which  take  part  in  the  mo- 
tion) ?  A  full  discussion  of  this  question  leads  to  the  conclusion  that 
Fechner's  view  is  best,  that  subjective  intensity  must  depend  upon 
both  of  these  factors,  and  that  it  is  not  at  present  possible  to  distin- 


34°  DIE    GESICHTSEMPFINDUNGEN. 

guish  between  them  in  consciousness.  The  naif  view  which  regards 
the  feeling  of  the  extension  of  a  colored  surface  as  dependent  upon 
the  extension  of  its  image  upon  the  retina,  and  then  the  connection  of 
the  retinal  elements  with  a  definitely  extended  portion  of  the  cortex, 
could  only  be  supported  if  it  had  been  shown  that  in  all  the  senses 
(whose  cortical  connections  have  also,  of  course,  a  definite  extent) 
the  same  relation  holds  between  extent  in  space  of  cortical  elements, 
and  an  attributed  extension  of  the  sensation.  And  what  sensation 
element  should  we  attribute  to  the  extension  of  the  cortical  process  in 
the  third  dimension  ?  As  regards  Lotze's  theory  of  the  local  sign,  it 
is  to  be  remarked  that  no  difference  in  sensation  is  necessary  as  its 
basis  ;  it  is  sufficient  to  point  out  that  different  retinal  elements  must, 
on  discharging  in  the  brain,  form  part  of  different  association  tracts, 
and  hence  be  the  basis  of  different  ideas  of  locality,  whether  they 
produce  different  sensations  or  not.  For  Lotze  the  association  was  a 
purely  spiritual  process  ;  we  take  now  a  more  material  view  of  it. 

The  psychophysical  processes  may  be  either  simple  or  mixed  ;  a 
simple  process  is  either  really  such,  or  is  never  separated  in  our  ex- 
perience into  parts,  and  is  never  composed  of  its  parts  mixed  in 
different  proportions.  The  sensation  corresponding  to  this  is  a  pure 
sensation,  but  a  mixed  sensation  is  not  such  in  the  sense  that  it  can 
be  looked  upon  as  a  complex  of  several  distinct  sensations.  If  fj.  is  a 
mixed  sensation,  and  a  and  b  are  the  intensities  of  the  two  partial  psy- 
chophysical processes  which  call  it  forth,  and  if  a  and  /?  are  the  sen- 
sations which  these  processes  would  call  forth  if  acting  by  themselves, 
then  for  the  degree  of  resemblance  of  the  mixed  sensation  to  a  we 
have  (as  the  simplest  and  most  plausible  expression)  a  ,  and  for  its 
degree  of  resemblance  to  /?,  _1_.  But  if  a  a  fi  resemble  each  other  to 
a  degree  represented  by  R(a$),  then  these  two  expressions  must  be 
modified,  and  they  become  respectively 


a  +  b  a  +  b 

This  gives  an  expression  for  the  quality  of  a  mixture  in  terms  of 
the  intensity  of  its  two  (or  more)  partial  processes,  and  it  constitutes 
the  fifth  axiom.  By  differentiating  these  expressions  we  are  able  to 
prove  (among  other  things)  that  the  degree  of  whiteness  of  a  mixture 
of  white  with  a  color  increases,  for  a  given  increment  of  the  white-ex- 
citation, more  when  the  color  is  yellow  than  when  it  is  blue  (since 
yellow  is,  to  begin  with,  more  like  white  than  blue  is)  .  This  formula 
(which  gives  -^-,  for  instance,  for  the  degree  of  whiteness  of  a  given 


PSYCHOLOGICAL  LITERATURE.  341 

gray)  resembles  that  given  by  Hering,  but  with  him  w  stands  for  the 
intensity  of  the  partial  sensation,  here  it  is  the  intensity  of  the  partial 
psychophysical  process.  Hering  has,  as  is  well  known,  given  up  the 
idea  that  the  brightness  of  a  pure  color  is  yz ,  but,  since  introducing  his 
idea  of  the  specific  brightness  of  colors,  he  has  not  said  what  it  is. 
Miiller  here  fills  up  this  lacuna.  [He  uses  brightness — Helligkeit — 
therefore,  as  synonymous  with  '  degree  of  resemblance  to  white'] .  It 
is  proved,  in  passing,  that  the  addition  of  blue  to  a  given  gray  does 
not  always  darken  it,  as  Hering  affirms,  but  only  when  the  gray  had 
a  certain  (not  great)  brightness  at  first,  and,  also,  that  yellow  does  not 
brighten  a  given  gray,  unless  the  gray  had  a  certain  (not  small)  bright- 
ness at  first.  From  all  this  it  does  not  follow  that  the  Purkinje  phe- 
nomenon can  be  wholly  explained  by  the  specific  brightness  of  the 
colors. 

According  to  Hering,  the  series  of  grays  is  a  quality  series,  and  not 
an  intensity  series.  This  is  true,  as  matter  of  fact ;  we  do  not  see  a  dif- 
ferent grey  in  different  intensities  (or  hardly  different) .  But  this  is 
merely  due  to  the  accidental  fact  that,  starting  from  a  given  grey,  that 
of  the  self-light  of  the  retina,  for  instance,  any  external  cause  which 
increases  the  white  constituent  does  not  also  increase  the  black  constit- 
uent, but,  on  the  contrary,  diminishes  it.  We  are  not  in  the  position 
of  ever  being  able  to  vary  the  black  and  the  white  constituents  in  the 
same  direction  at  the  same  time.  It  is  this,  and  not  any  theoretical 
difficulty,  which  prevents  us  from  seeing  a  given  quality  of  grey  in  dif- 
ferent intensities. 

When  a  sensation  changes  in  quality  we  are  able,  to  a  certain  ex- 
tent, to  form  a  judgment  as  to  whether  the  change  is  in  a  constant  di- 
rection or  not  (and  even  though  there  should  be  a  change  of  intensity 
at  the  same  time).  A  series  of  sensations  in  which  the  quality  changes 
continuously  and  in  a  constant  direction,  we  shall  call  a  psychic 
quality  series.  Such  a  series  is  the  series  of  grays.  A  psychic  quality 
series  may  be  intrinsically  limited  or  not.  The  black-white  series 
(unlike  the  series  of  tones)  is  intrinsically  limited,  because  it  is  a  series 
which  consists  in  becoming  more  like  white  or  more  like  black,  and  we 
cannot  conceive  of  it  as  passing  beyond  a  pure  white  or  a  pure  black. 

Corresponding  to  a  given  psychic  quality-series  there  must  be  a 
psychophysical  series,  which  must  also  be  continuous  and  in  a  con- 
stant direction.  But  a  series  of  processes  of  this  description  can  be  of 
either  one  of  two  kinds :  (i)  it  may  consist  in  a  series  of  changes  of  a 
qualitative  nature  (for  instance,  of  a  vibration  period)  ;  or  (2)  it  may 
consist  in  a  change  of  the  relative  intensity  of  the  two  constituents  of 


342  DIE   SPECIFISCHE   SINNESENERGIEN. 

a  mixture.  It  is  shown,  by  a  very  complicated  argument,  stretching" 
over  sixteen  pages,  that,  in  the  case  of  the  black-white  series,  we  may 
assume  that  the  underlying  psychophysical  process  is  of  the  second  kind. 
This  argument  depends  upon  the  axioms  already  stated,  the  assump- 
tion that  the  retinal  process  is  of  a  chemical  nature  (and  therefore  not 
capable  of  a  large  number  of  different  qualities),  and  that  to  every 
excitation  in  the  visual  nerve,  which  varies  continuously  and  in  a  con- 
stant direction,  there  corresponds  an  excitation  in  the  retina  of  a  sim- 
ilar description,  and  finally  that  we  are  able  to  recognize  a  psychic 
quality-series  (that  is,  can  tell  whether  a  series  is  varying  in  a  con- 
stant direction  or  not).  All  this  forces  upon  us  the  assumption  of  the 
six  retinal  processes  of  Hering.  The  further  development  of  these 
considerations  is  reserved  for  another  occasion. 

It  has  been  known  for  some  time  that  Prof.  Mil  Her  was  engaged 
upon  a  profound  modification  of  Hering's  theory,  and  his  conclusion 
of  this  subject  will  be  awaited  with  great  interest. 

CHR.  LADD  FRANKLIN. 

Die  Lehre  von  den  Spezifischen  Sinnesenergien.  DR.  RUDOLF 
WEINMANN.  Verlag  v.  L.  Voss,  Hamburg  und  Leipzig.  1895. 
Pp.  96. 

The  first  part  of  this  book  is  mainly  historical.  In  the  first  section 
of  this  part  the  author  gives  Miiller's  well-known  theory  of  4  specific 
energies.'  He  then  goes  on  in  several  sections  to  give  the  forerunners 
of  the  theory,  naming  among  others  Newton,  Eichel,  Elliot  and 
Autenrieth.  He  then  gives  an  account  of  the  so-called  new  form  of 
the  theory  in  its  applications,  citing  the  application  of  the  theory  by 
Natonson  to  the  different  qualities  in  the  various  '  modes '  of  sensation. 
He  cites  the  work  of  Helmholtz  in  the  sense  of  hearing,  and  in  the 
sense  of  sight  the  Young-Helmholtz  theory  of  color  and  also  Hering's 
color  theory.  The  author  then  continues  the  historical  account  through 
the  various  senses.  Finally  he  concludes  the  first  part  with  a  critical 
summing-up  in  which  he  gives  the  criticism  of  the  theory  by  Lotze, 
Weber  and  Dessoir,  concluding  first,  that  in  the  cases  of  admitted  phe- 
nomena with  a  doubtful  interpretation  no  sure  decision  between  the 
theory  and  its  afore-mentioned  critics  can  be  had,  and  that  nothing 
prevents  the  assumption  that,  where  the  different  senses  give  their  own 
reaction  in  spite  of  apparently  inadequate  stimuli,  nevertheless  ade- 
quate stimuli  may  be  present.  Second,  that  there  is  another  class  of 
cases  where  the  phenomena  themselves  are  doubtful.  Third,  that 
still  another  class  remain  unaccounted  for,  where,  for  example,  light 


PSYCHOLOGICAL  LITERATURE.  343 

waves  are  without  effect  for  hearing,  taste,  smell ;  and  sound  waves  are 
without  effect  for  sight,  etc.  Finally,  granted  the  newer  form  of  the 
theory,  it  yet  stands  in  opposition  to  the  main  point  of  the  theory  as 
given  by  Miiller,  which  presupposes  the  indifference  of  stimulus, 
while  the  newer  theory  only  shows  that  the  nervous  organization  shows 
a  greater  complexity  and  '  division  of  labor '  than  was  formerly  sup- 
posed. 

In  the  second  part  the  author  seeks  to  reach  certain  theoretic  re- 
sults. Miiller's  theory,  he  says,  takes  a  group  of  facts  and  puts  them 
together  under  a  name.  Suppose  now  we  grant  the  facts,  the  theory 
intends  to  explain  these  and  seeks  to  do  so  by  ascribing  a  '  specific 
energy'  to  the  sense  nerves.  This  'energy'  is  after  all  only  a  word, 
and  we  must  seek  the  concrete  explanation  of  the  phenomena.  In  the 
first  section  of  this  part  the  author  seeks  to  show  that  the  question  of 
the  theory  is  purely  a  physiological  matter.  A  sense  reaction  means 
two  things,  a  physiological  occurrence  and  a  conscious  reaction.  Now 
it  is  admitted  that  with  a  nerve  process  x  is  always  the  determined 
sensation  x' ;  not  every  similar  stimulus,  but  every  similar  nerve  process, 
must  have  the  corresponding  sensation.  From  this  it  follows  that  the 
physiological  reaction  must  be  specific,  and  the  theory  must  explain 
this.  Lotze,  says  the  author,  was  the  first  to  realize  this.  Miiller 
failed  to  do  so,  and  hence  confusion  resulted.  What,  then,  asks  the 
author  in  the  next  two  sections,  is  specific  energy  ?  He  agrees  with 
Lotze's  view,  which  he  cites  as  the  correct  one.  The  phrase  has  a 
meaning,  when  applied  to  sensation,  viz. :  "the  sensation  of  tone  is 
the  peculiar  reaction  of  the  auditory  nerves."  But  to  lay  such  a  prin- 
ciple at  the  basis  of  nerve  processes  means  to  violate  all  scientific 
method  in  the  admission  of  wantonly  assumed  forces.  It  means  to 
give  up  explanation  and  rest  in  a  word.  We  must,  he  claims,  seek  the 
explanation  with  Lotze  in  the  universal  mechanical  laws  which  hold 
when  one  object  impinges  on  another.  After  an  analysis  of  Lotze's 
position  Dr.  Weinmann  concludes  that,  instead  of  the  doctrine  of  spe- 
cific energies,  we  should  speak  of  the  doctrine  of  the  '  diverse  nature  of 
the  physiological  bearer  of  the  sensation.'  In  the  next  section  he  con- 
siders the  question  as  to  the  seat  of  the  '  specific  energy '  in  this  sense, 
and  in  the  following  section  he  takes  up  the  question  as  to  whether 
it  is  innate  or  acquired.  Both  of  these  sections  we  must  pass  by  for 
want  of  space.  In  the  third  and  last  part  of  the  book  the  author  con- 
siders the  epistemological  aspect  of  the  theory  in  its  new  form.  He  con- 
cludes that  it  cannot  be  used  in  support  of  Miiller's  subjective  sense 
physiology,  nor  as  an  empirical  proof  of  the  doctrine  of  the  subjec- 


344  RECOGNITION. 

tivity  of  the  secondary  qualities.       Though  in  general  it  favors  sub- 
jective epistemology,  its  interest  is  mainly  physiological. 

PRINCETON.  C.   W.   HODGE. 

The  Recognition- Theory  of  Perception.  Recognition.  ARTHUR 
ALLIN.  American  Journal  of  Psychology,  Vol.  VII.  237-273, 
January,  1896. 

Dr.  Allin's  articles  are  primarily  an  attack  upon  a  common  theory 
of  immediate  recognition,  the  supposition  that  it  occurs  through  the 
fusion  of  images  of  an  object  with  the  percept  of  the  same.  Hoff- 
ding  is  rightly  named  as  the  chief  upholder  of  the  theory,  but  it  is 
traced  in  the  writings  of  Herbart  and  of  Spencer,  of  Mill  and  of  Bain, 
of  Wundt  and  of  Ward,  associationists  and  apperceptionists  as  well. 
Incidentally,  the  author  finds  opportunity  for  a  vigorous  and  success- 
ful criticism  of  many  traditional  definitions  and  formulations  of  psy- 
chology. His  main  positions  are  the  following : 

I.  a.  Perception  is  not  a  case  of  immediate  recognition.     This  is 
proved  on  the  testimony  of   ordinary  introspection.      "Perception  is. 
not     *     *     *     *     an  act  of  memory     *     *     *     *     If  I  burn  myself, 
I  know  it  is  hot  without  any  reference  to   former   experiences    (p* 
240)." 

b.  In  particular,  perception  is  not  a  fusion  of  percept  with  similar 
images.     The  virtual  abandonment  of  the  position  by  the  admission 
of  its  supporters  that  the  fusion  is   '  theoretical/    '  metaphorical '  or 
'ideal'  (p.  241)  is  clearly  indicated. 

Above  all,  Dr.  Allin  combats  'the  unconscious'  as  explanation  of 
the  association.  "If  unconscious,"  he  says,  "then  obviously  it  does 
not  exist  as  a  conscious  or  mental  fact  (p.  242)."  "Statements  of 
an  unconscious,  conscious  act,"  he  concludes,  "  are  too  obviously  im- 
possible to  demand  refutation  (p.  242)." 

c.  Finally  the  theory  that  perception  involves  immediate  recogni- 
tion leaves  no  room  for  the  explanation  of  sense-illusions,  since  it  re- 
quires recognition,  as  well  as  perception,  of  all  objects  (p.  247). 

II.  This  fusion  of  percept  with  similar  images,  even  granting  its 
existence,  can  not  possibly  be  all  that  it  is  claimed. 

a.  Such  fusion  (so-called  4  association  by  similarity ')  is  not  a  case 
of  the  revival  of  former  impressions,  for  such  a  resurrection  of  the 
past  simply  does  not  occur. 

b.  Such  fusion  is  not  association  at  all,  for  if  it  were,  "then  the 
two  presentations  associated  must  be  separately  cognized  in  order  to 
be  associated   (p.  257)." 


PS  YCHOLOGICAL  LITER  A  TURE. 


345 


c.  Such  fusion  certainly  is  not  recognition.  "  Objectively  con- 
sidered, it  may  be  a  second  cognition  *  *  *  but  subjectively,  it 
would  be  for  the  percipient's  consciousness  simply  (Object  and  Object) 
becoming  eventually  fused  into  (Object)  (p.  257)." 

III.  Recognition,  however,  both  of  the  obviously  associative  type 
and  in  the  form  '  immediate  recognition '  unquestionably  does  occur 
and  is  to  be  explained. 

a.  The  term  '  recognition '  refers  to  the  consciousness  that  an  ob- 
ject is  again  presented,  not  to  a  second  nor  to  a  thousandth  presenta- 
tion  of   an   object  without   the   accompanying  consciousness  of   the 
repetition.     Therefore, 

b.  The  mere  fact  of  reproduction  does  not  convert  an  image  into 
a  memory  image.     "The  stages  of   *     *     *    imagination  are  not  re- 
cognition proper  (p.  255)."     And, 

c.  Neither  the  bare  presence  of  associated  elements,  nor  the  occur- 
rence of  a  feeling  of  ease  is  in  itself  immediate  recognition.      "The 
added  or  differing  associates  in  themselves  are  no  memory." 

IV.  Positively,  therefore,  recognition  is  'classification  as  known 
again'    on   the   ground   of   certain   observed  characteristics.       These 
include   the   lack    'of   vividness,'    'of   spatial  localization,'    'of  per- 
sistency,' 'of  muscle  and  joint  sensation ;' the  presence  of  associated 
objects ;  the  rapidity,  the  ease  and  the  pleasure  of  the  recognition-con- 
sciousness.    No  one  of  these  characteristics  is  identical  with  recogni- 
tion or  even  necessary  to  it ;  but  one  or  more  of  them  form  the  accom- 
paniment or  psychological  explanation  of  the  recognition,  its  '  charac- 
terization causes.' 

a.  Immediate  recognition  is  marked  by  an  absence  of  accompany- 
ing definite  associations,  and  by  the  presence  of  the  pleasure  feeling, 
or  of  a  consciousness  of  ease  and  rapidity  in  the  perception.     This 
4  surprising  immediacy  and  celerity '  appears  to  Dr.  Allin  to  consti- 
tute the  prominent  feature  of  paramnesia ;  but  he  also  explains  it  by 
actual  association  with  dream  experiences  and  with  waking  images, 
and  by  general  bodily  conditions. 

b.  The  classification,  however,  in  which  recognition  consists,  is  of 
objects  not  of  percepts  (p.  267).      "Perceptions  when  they  once  pass 
out  of  consciousness  are  never  known  again,  for  they  no  longer  exist;" 
but  a  distinction  gradually  arises  between  '  certain  presentations,  faint, 
dim,'  etc.,  to  which  'there  are  no  corresponding  external  qualities,' 
and  other  perceptual  presentation  '  fresh,  full,  vivid,  steady  in  their 
spatial  localization ;'   the  latter  are  called  '  objects  present,'  while  the 
former  are  objects  known  again.     "  This"  says  Dr.  Allin,  "  as  far  as 


346  RE  CO  GNITION. 

I  can  see  is  a  simple  classification  like  that  of  certain  sensations  into 
color  *  *  *  and  sound  sensations."  Finally 

c.  "There  is  in  recognition  no  ' identification  of  the  past  *  *  with 
the  present*  *  *  (p.  269)." 

Dr.  Allin's  quotations  amply  verify  the  need  for  his  protest  against 
the  'recognition  theory  of  perception'  and  for  his  insistence  upon  the 
obscured  distinction  between  image  and  memory-image.  The  writer 
of  this  notice  subscribes  cordially  to  the  critical  conclusions  of  the 
author,  but  questions  the  adequacy  of  his  analysis  of  recognition.  The 
express  identification  (p.  267)  of  'external  reality'  with  'the  present' 
obscures  many  features  of  the  consciousness  of  external  reality,  and 
ignores  the  most  significant  of  them — the  assumption  of  the  parallel 
consciousness  of  other  selves.  The  treatment  of  the  past  as  the  known- 
again-with-its-associates  betrays  an  equally  unsatisfactory  analysis  of 
the  time-consciousness,  but  this  follows  logically  from  the  central  error 
of  the  theory :  the  assertion  that  recognition  does  not  imply  identifi- 
cation or  comparison.  This  is  argued  by  a  reference  to  the  cases  of 
immediate  recognition,  which  are  admitted  to  'take  place  without  a 
second  presentation  of  the  same  object.'  But  immediate  recognition 
does,  nevertheless,  include  comparison  with  the  past  experience  of  the 
subject,  only  the  comparison  is  wavering  and  restless,  and  the  identi- 
fication is  incomplete.  When  a  face  'seems  familiar'  I  am  eagerly 
comparing  it  with  faces  I  have  already  seen,  trying  to  identify  the 
present  with  the  past.  If  this  sort  of  comparison  were  entirely  absent, 
then  the  'feeling  of  familiarity'  would  not  have  risen  to  the  plane  of 
recognition  at  all. 

Dr.  Allin's  definition  of  the  '  recognized '  as  the  '  known  again, ' 
though  it  recalls  Hoffding's  Bekanntheitsqualitat  which  he  rejects, 
is  psychologically  quite  satisfactory,  for  psychology  avowedly  adopts 
the  matter-of-fact  standpoint,  and  properly  declines  to  enter  upon  a 
metaphysical  search  for  ultimates.  But  to  deny  the  identity  of  the 
'known  again'  and  the  'compared, '  and  to  suggest  the  parallel  of  the 
'known  again'  with  sensation  (p.  267),  is  to  confuse  contents  of  con- 
sciousness which  are  metaphysically  as  well  as  psychologically  irre- 
ducible, with  contents  which  lead  by  philosophical  necessity  to  the  in- 
ference of  a  self  underlying  phenomena. 

The  entire  discussion  would  have  gained  in  force  and  in  arrange- 
ment if  it  had  been  presented  as  one  essay,  rather  than  two.  There  is 
a  tendency  also  to  over-quotation,  which  sometimes  obscures  the  au- 
thor's meaning  and  overloads  his  page,  especially  when  he  pauses  to 
comment  on  some  irrelevant  error,  or  repeats  a  quotation  already 


PATHOLOGICAL.  347 

made.     The  occurrence  in  the  body  of  the  text  of  citation  references 
to  title,  volume  and  page  is  also  a  serious  annoyance  to  the  reader. 
WELLESLEY  COLLEGE.  MARY  WHITON  CALKINS. 


PATHOLOGICAL. 

Die  Physiologic  des  Trigeminus  nach  Untersuchungen  am  Men- 
schen,  bei  denen  das  Ganglion  Gasseri  entfernt  ivorden  ist. 
PROF.  DR.  FEDOR  KRAUSE.  Miinchener  Medicinwochenschrift 
1895,  No.  27-27. 

Intracranial  resection  of  the  different  branches  of  the  trigeminus  not 
having  proved  a  complete  safeguard  against  relapse,  the  author  de- 
termined to  perform  a  more  radical  operation,  that  of  removing  the 
ganglion  Gasseri  together  with  the  trigeminal  root  situated  centrally 
from  it.  The  author  promises  a  special  monograph  on  the  histological 
changes  in  the  ganglion  Gasseri  in  cases  of  neuralgia.  The  phenom- 
ena of  abrogation  appearing  in  patients  thus  operated  on  are  inter- 
esting. There  must  be  a  much  greater  possibility  of  accurately  de- 
termining the  functions  of  this  nerve-root  in  this  way  than  in  experi- 
ments on  animals.  The  observations  contained  in  the  above  treatise 
refer  to  cases  in  which  these  phenomena  were  investigated  in  patients 
at  intervals  of  from  18  days  to  two  years  after  the  performance  of  the 
operation.  During  the  operation  no  usual  investigation  of  the  phenom- 
ena of  abrogation  was  attempted,  although  the  author,  so  far  as  it 
was  possible  and  the  condition  of  the  patients  permitted,  commenced 
his  examination  before  the  extirpation  of  the  ganglion.  The  circum- 
stance must  be  noted  that  in  all  investigated  cases  resections  of  the 
peripheral  trigeminal  branches  had  been  performed  several  years  be- 
fore. The  general  result  of  these  interesting  researches  is  the  demon- 
stration of  complete  anaesthesia  in  the  entire  region  of  the  three 
branches  of  the  trigeminus. 

Ober    periodische     Schwankungen     der     Hirnrindenfunctionen. 
RICHARD  STERN,  aus  der    med.    Klinik    in  Breslau.      Archiv 
fur  Psychiatric  Bd.  27,  Heft  3,  p.  850-917.      1895. 
The  author  describes  two  remarkable,  morbid  phenomena,   hith- 
erto unnoticed,  which  appeared  in  two  men  as  subsequent  phenomena 
after  serious  injuries    on  the  head.     They  consist  principally  in  a 
complex  of  symptoms  which  the  author  attributes  to  a  periodically 
recurring  relaxation  of  the  functions  of  the  cerebral  revolutions.     This 
periodical  relaxation,  designated  by  the  author  as  '  fluctuations,'  ap- 


348  PA  THOL  O  GICAL. 

pears  at  the  same  time  in  sensory,  intellectual  and  motor  regions,  and 
influenced,  in  the  first  case,  all  sense-activities,  in  the  second  even  the 
breathing.  The  reaction-times  measured  during  this  condition  were 
about  three  times  the  normal  length.  Speech  and  writing  were  both 
injured  by  these  peculiar  fluctuations,  the  activity  of  the  memory  was 
greatly  lessened  and  mental  work  (Kraepelin's  method  being  applied) 
much  more  slowly  performed.  The  work  is  of  great  interest  and  is 
worthy  of  further  notice. 

Beitrag  zur  Pathologic  des   Gedachtnisses.     P.   OTTO  BARTHEL. 
Inaug.  Diss.  Miinchen.     1894.     P.  1-48. 

After  a  few  introductory  remarks,  the  author  gives  an  account  of 
the  disease  of  two  individuals,  presenting  the  symptom  of  a  peculiar 
loss  of  memory,  in  consequence  of  which  the  patients  appeared  to  have 
remained  stationary  at  a  certain  period  of  their  lives.  The  first  of 
these,  a  day  laborer  of  55  years  of  age,  had  been  injured  in  his  growth 
by  a  blow  on  the  head,  and  although  hereditary  predisposition  was  not 
traceable,  his  mania,  of  a  religious  and  sexual  nature,  gradually  devel- 
oped into  a  condition  of  secondary  imbecility.  This  man,  in  answer 
to  any  questions  addressed  to  him,  replied  that  he  was  23  years  old,  at 
which  age  his  mania  broke  out.  He  was  able  to  recall  correctly  all 
events  fixed  in  his  memory  up  till  this  time,  whereas  all  later  incidents 
were  for  him  nonexistent. 

The  second  account  relates  to  a  pupil  of  the  gymnasium,  who  be- 
came ill  in  his  twentieth  year,  being  at  present  47  years  old.  An  attack 
of  typhus  prepared  the  way  for  the  disease,  as  also  mental  over-exer- 
tion by  which  the  patient  had  tried  to  supply  intellectual  deficiencies. 
He  lived  entirely  in  his  2ist  and  22d  year. 

The  author  then  communicates  a  number  of  similar  cases  drawn 
from  earlier  literature  and  comes  to  the  conclusion  that  however  varied 
the  psycho-pathological  conditions  may  be  in  the  individual,  mental 
weakness  forms  the  link  which  binds  them  together.  With  the  ap- 
pearance of  this  weakness  the  patient  becomes  unable  to  assimilate 
fresh  material  for  the  memory.  "This  symptom  is  the  expression  of 
true  agennesia  of  the  memory,  and  it  forms  the  boundary-line  between 
health  and  disease  in  primary  psychopathy ;  in  secondary  conditions 
between  primary  and  secondary  alteration." 

FRIEDRICH  KIESOW. 

LEIPZIG. 


PSYCHOLOGICAL  LITERATURE.  349 


EXPERIMENTAL. 

On  the  Apparent  Size  of  Objects.     W.  H.  R.  RIVERS.     Mind,  N. 
S.  V.,  71-80.     Jan.,  1896. 

When  the  ciliary  muscle  is  paralyzed  by  atropin,  there  occurs  a 
micropsia  of  the  affected  eye ;  objects  appear  to  it  smaller.  Bonders 
and  others  explained  this  phenomenon  as  due  to  the  greater  effort  of 
accommodation,  causing  a  judgment  that  the  object  was  nearer,  hence 
smaller.  Rivers  distinguishes  two  kinds  of  micropsia — affecting  ob- 
jects at  the  fixation  point,  and  objects  beyond  it — and  claims  that  they 
are  due  to  entirely  different  causes. 

Micropsia  at  the  fixation  point  is  a  phenomenon  or  irradiation.  It 
affects  black  objects  on  white  ground,  not  white  on  black.  A  small 
artificial  pupil  before  the  affected  eye  corrects  it.  Hence  it  is  due  to 
dilatation  of  the  pupil  increasing  irradiation,  and  not  to  an  affection  of 
accommodation. 

Micropsia  beyond  the  fixation  point  is  observable  by  the  normal 
eye,  but  more  easily  under  atropin.  Rivers  shows  that  this  form  is 
not  due  to  irradiation,  and  adopts  an  explanation  which  is  a  modifica- 
tion of  that  of  Hering.  What  determines  the  apparent  size  and  dis- 
tance of  an  object  not  fixated,  is  its  relation  to  the  fixation  point,  and 
not  to  the  eye.  The  retinal  image  has  remained  constant,  but  it  is 
multiplied  by  a  smaller  factor  with  greater  distance  from  the  fixation 
point.  So  far  then  as  localization  relative  to  the  fixation  point  is  con- 
cerned, there  is  no  evidence  that  the  alteration  of  spatial  relations  is 
in  any  way  dependent  on  accommodation.  As  to  the  localization  of 
the  fixation  point  itself,  the  atropin  experiments  show  that  this  takes 
place  in  the  absence  of  any  peripheral  accommodation,  and  with  ex- 
clusion of  peripheral  influences  from  the  unused  eye  by  treating  that 
with  atropin  also.  Rivers  therefore  regards  these  experiments  as  go- 
ing far  towards  proving  that  the  localization  of  the  fixation  point  de- 
pends on  central  factors. 

Objects  nearer  than  the  fixation  point  appear  larger  to  the  normal 
eye,  and  especially  so  to  an  eye  in  which  spasm  of  the  ciliary  muscle 
is  produced  by  eserin.  This  macropsia  can  be  interpreted  in  harmony 
with  the  explanation  given  for  micropsia. 

BROWN  UNIVERSITY.  E.  B.  DELABARRE. 


35°  EXPERIMENTAL. 

Die    Wirkung  akustischer   Sinnesreize  auf  Puls  und  Athmung. 

P.   MENTZ.     Philosophische  Studien,   Bd.   xi.  pp.   61-124,  37I- 

393,  562-602. 

The  attempts  to  judge  indirectly  the  quality  and  intensity  of  psy- 
chical states  by  means  of  the  accompanying  vasomotor  and  respira- 
tory change  have,  unfortunately,  produced  meager  results  and  the 
present  investigation  emphasizes  the  fact  that  such  attempts  meet 
many  difficulties  which  with  our  present  limited  knowledge  are  in- 
surmountable. The  complicated  nature  of  the  purely  physiological 
phenomena  concerned  is  by  no  means  fully  understood  and  the  results 
depend  upon  so  many  and  varied  conditions  that  exact  measurement 
is  out  of  the  question.  The  author  found  that  the  changes  which  ap- 
peared to  furnish  the  most  reliable  basis  for  judgment  were  the  in- 
crease and  decrease  of  in  the  rapidity  of  the  pulse,  in  other  words  the 
shortening  or  lengthening  of  the  abscissa  of  a  single  pulse  curve. 
The  respiration  curves  are  less  constant  and  for  the  most  part  ne- 
glected. This  may  be  regarded  as  a  deficiency  in  the  investigation, 
since  it  is  true  beyond  a  doubt  the  circulation  is  very  much  influenced 
by  the  breathing  and  the  question  is  at  least  open  whether  the  changes 
in  the  action  of  the  heart  and  arteries  may  not  in  reality  be  largely 
secondary  phenomena  depending  on  respiration. 

The  first  series  of  experiments  was  made  with  single  noises  and 
tones  of  moderate  intensity  as  stimuli,  with  the  result  that  the  pulse 
and  often  the  breathing  showed  a  decrease  in  rate.  These  well-known 
accompaniments  of  agreeable  sensations  are  attributed  in  this  case  to 
the  pleasure  arising  from  the  mere  exercise  of  the  function.  When 
the  stimulus  was  repeated  the  decrease  was  less  marked.  If  the  in- 
tensity of  the  sound  was  increased,  a  limit  was  reached  where  the  indi- 
cations of  pleasure  disappeared  arid  after  a  period  of  indifference  the 
pulse  rate  increased.  The  pleasure  produced  by  musical  notes  was 
most  intense  at  middle  e  and  gradually  diminished  as  the  ends  of  the 
scale  were  approached  until,  after  passing  through  a  point  of  indiffer- 
ence, signs  of  unpleasant  sensation  became  apparent.  When  the 
sensation  was  received  passively,  that  is  without  any  strain  of  atten- 
tion, the  pulse  rate,  as  above  noted,  decreases;  when,  on  the  other 
hand,  the  subject  voluntarily  concentrates  the  pulse  increases  in  rapidity. 
In  regard  to  tempo  it  was  found  that  a  certain  rate,  which  varied 
with  the  individual,  gave  pleasure,  and  from  this  rate  in  both  direc- 
tions— when  the  tempo  was  made  faster  or  slower — the  pleasure 
passed  through  an  indifferent  stage  into  its  opposite.  When  series  of 
sounds  are  used  the  rhythm  of  inspiration  and  expiration  tends  to  coin- 


PSYCHOLOGICAL   LITERATURE.  351 

cide  with  that  of  the  sounds.  The  same  results  appear  when  the  sub- 
ject represents  to  himself  a  certain  rhythm  without  hearing  it.  At- 
tempts to  deal  with  the  higher  emotions,  such  as  surprise,  etc., 
produced  nothing  definite.  When  musical  compositions  were  pas- 
sively heard,  the  effects  were  those  above  pointed  out  as  the  result  of 
involuntary  attention  to  agreeable  sensations;  when,  on  the  other 
hand,  the  subject  made  an  effort  to  analyze,  in  other  words  voluntarily 
strained  the  attention,  the  result  was  a  quickening  of  the  pulse. 
LEIPZIG.  C.  H.  JUDD. 

Untersuchungen  iiber  Temperaturempjindungen.  FRIEDRICH 
KIESOW.  Philosophische  Studien,  Vol.  XI.  135-145.  1895. 

The  author  used,  for  searching  out  temperature  points  on  the  arms 
of  seven  persons,  the  brass  cylinder  (9  cm.  x  3  cm.  with  conical  ends 
tapering  i  cm.)  of  Goldschieder.  Cylinder  was  passed  through  a  piece 
of  cork  or  rubber  tubing ;  warmed  by  a  gas-flame,  for  qualitative  experi- 
ments, and  in  warm  water  the  temperature  of  which  was  read  from  a 
Celsius  thermometer  for  quantitative  determinations ;  cooled  in  a  solu- 
tion of  salt  and  chlorcalcium.  For  marking  the  points  three  colors  were 
used.  A  square  was  marked  on  the  arm  and  the  points  within  it 
searched  out  and  marked.  The  doctrine  of  separate  temperature- 
points  was  thoroughly  confirmed ;  they  remained  constant  for  I  */& 
months.  There  is  a  marked  difference  in  intensity  of  different  points. 
A  figure  in  the  text  shows  the  square  of  one  subject.  Intervals  be- 
tween points  are  at  first  indifferent,  but  after  3  seconds  diffusely 
and  superficially  cold.  The  importance  given  to  hair-cells  by  Gold- 
scheider  as  points  of  temperature  sensation  is  at  least  questionable. 

For  testing  the  '  specific  energy '  of  temperature-points  four  kinds 
of  stimuli  were  used — mechanical,  electrical,  needle-point  stimulus, 
and  the  reversed  or  opposite  stimulus.  All  the  experiments  demanded 
exercise  in  both  the  experimenter  and  subject,  the  mechanical  succeed- 
ing first.  For  these  a  wrooden  suitably-pointed  cylinder  was  used. 
Following  Goldscheider,  the  skin  was  somewhat  stretched.  The  cold 
points  'blaze'  out  when  touched,  while  the  warm  rather  glow;  the 
latter  are  the  more  difficult  to  locate.  As  to  cold  points,  the  author  is 
convinced  of  their  existence.  After  two  weeks,  out  of  46  possible  cold 
points  21  proved  to  be  positively  cold.  In  another  case,  9  out  of  30 
possible  ones  proved  positive.  The  warm  points  took  a  longer  time 
and  were  less  clear.  Finally  10  out  of  30  on  the  author  proved  posi- 
tively warm;  on  another  subject,  5  in  15 ;  another  had  only  cold  sen- 
sations; another,  for  two  days,  had  10  cold  and  10  warm  points. 


35  2  ETHICAL. 

For  electrical  stimulus  Faradic  current  was  used.  Here  the  skin 
might  react  to  the  touch  of  the  electrodes  with  its  own  sensation  in- 
stead of  to  the  current,  to  prevent  which  the  electrodes  were  warmed. 
Cold  points  show  a  direct  increase  of  intensity  of  sensation  with  the 
increase  of  current  up  to  a  certain  point.  In  the  case  of  warm  points 
the  sensation  was  due  to  current — shown  by  using  a  cold  cylinder  as  a 
test.  Where  the  current  gave  a  weakly  warm  sensation  the  cold  cyl- 
inder, on  the  same  point,  gave  cold.  All  the  subjects  gave  a  large  per 
cent,  of  both  points. 

With  the  needle  warmed  in  a  flame,  warm  points  were  always 
painful ;  by  far  the  most  sensations  were  cold ;  many  points  gave  only 
pain.  In  the  experiments  with  opposite  stimuli,  cold  stimulus  for  warm 
points  and  warm  for  cold  points,  the  temperatures  were  15°— 20°  C. 
for  cold  stimulus  and  38°-4O°  C.  for  warm.  A  cold  sensation  was 
never  produced  on  a  warm  point  with  cold  cylinder;  but  scarcely 
any  cold  point  did  not  give  warm  sensation  to  stimulus  beyond  47° 
or  50°.  The  article  states  that  beyond  this  point  painful  temperature- 
sensations  always  came,  but  the  author  informs  us  personally  that  the 
statement  should  be  modified.  "The  great  majority  of  cold  points &n 
the  skin  are  at  the  same  time  sensitive  to  warmth."  The  experiments 
are  being  continued,  and  the  author  hopes  for  clearer  results  with 
better  apparatus.  GUY  TAWNEY. 

LEIPZIG. 

ETHICAL. 

Ueber  Werthaltung  und    Wert.     A.  MEINONG.     Archiv.  fur  syst. 

Philos.     I.,  pp.  327-346. 

In  his  recently  published  Psychologisch-ethische  Untersuch- 
ungen  zur  Werttheorie  the  author  sought  to  determine  the  relations 
between  the  value  or  worth  of  an  object  and  the  feeling  attaching  it- 
self to  the  knowledge  of  the  existence  or  non-existence  of  the  object. 
The  value  of  an  object  was  defined  as  its  capacity  to  evoke  a  feeling 
of  pleasure  (for  this  is  what  is  meant  ultimately  by  Werthaltungsge- 
fuhl}.  This  feeling  was  distinguished  from  the  value,  but  at  the 
same  time  the  greatness  of  the  value  was  held  to  depend  on  the  in- 
tensity of  the  feeling  in  a  normally  constituted  individual.  But  the 
objection  was  near  at  hand  that  this  ratio  is  not  true  to  fact.  A  highly 
valued  friendship  may  be  attended  by  little  feeling,  while  a  trifle  may 
call  out  an  altogether  disproportionate  feeling.  The  present  article 
seeks  to  supplement  the  theory  by  a  conception  taken  from  economics, 
where  it  is  customary  to  make  value  depend  upon  the  urgency  of  the 


PSYCHOLOGICAL  LITERATURE.  353 

want  to  be  satisfied  and  upon  the  other  available  means  for  supplying 
it.  This  leads  to  the  revised  formula  that  the  effective  value  of  an  ob- 
ject is  determined  not  only  by  the  value  which  its  existence  brings 
with  it,  but  also  by  the  discomfort  or  pain  (  Umvert)  which  would  be 
occasioned  by  its  absence.  This  latter  is  evidently  the  chief  factor  in 
estimating  the  value  of  such  common  objects  as  air  and  water,  for 
here  the  lack  of  any  particular  portion  can  ordinarily  be  fully  compen- 
sated for,  although  under  certain  conditions  the  value  may  become 
priceless.  Further,  in  these  cases,  as  in  the  case  of  long-standing 
friendship,  the  feelings  obey  the  law  of  fatigue  and  the  accustomed 
ceases  to  excite  positive  feeling. 

This  second  element,  however,  involves  the  consideration  of  de- 
sire ;  for  the  degree  of  discomfort  referred  to  above  will  depend  on 
how  much  I  desire  the  object.  Hence  value  might  also  be  defined  as 
4  the  capacity  of  an  object  to  maintain  itself  in  the  struggle  of  mo- 
tives, or,  if  the  expression  be  preferred,  in  the  struggle  for  existence,' 
or  again,  u  the  value  of  an  object  represents  the  force  as  motive  which 
belongs  to  an  object  either  intrinsically  or  by  virtue  of  the  nature  of 
its  environment  or  of  that  of  the  appreciating  subject." 

From  the  fact  that  the  value  of  an  object  is  related  to  feelings  de- 
pendent respectively  on  the  existence  and  non-existence  of  the  object 
it  follows  that  as  these  factors  are  mutually  exclusive  the  value  can 
never  be  '  felt '  in  its  totality.  We  are  forced  to  resort  to  an  intellec- 
tual apprehension.  We  pronounce  a  '  judgment  of  value  '  (  Wertur- 
theil).  This  is  not  to  be  confused  with  another  use  of  the  term  Wert- 
urtheil,  in  which  it  has  been  defined  as  signifying  4  judgments  which 
arise  through  simultaneous  action  of  ideation  and  feeling ' — a  technical 
theological  usage. 

An  adequate  theory  of  value  would  require  a  more  thorough  study 
of  the  part  played  by  choice,  and  volition  in  measuring  value.  The 
time  and  labor  expended,  or  to  be  expended,  form  a  very  common 
standard,  and  one  that  we  regard  as  more  reliable  than  the  attendant 
feeling.  Further,  the  reaction  of  a  choice  which  identifies  a  given 
object  with  the  self  is  also  a  very  important  factor  in  our  estimate  of 
value.  J.  H.  TUFTS. 

UNIVERSITY  OF  CHICAGO. 

Skizze  einer  Willenstheorie.     G.  SIMMEL.     Zeitschrift  fur  Psychol- 
ogic und  Physiologic  der  Sinnesorgane.  IX.  206-220.   Oct.,  1895. 
The  author's  discussion  is  based  on  a  theory  of  instinct  as  the  first 
step  in  volition  and  as  a  series  of  purely  physical  changes  beginning 


354  NEW  BOOKS. 

with  stimulus  and  ending  with  movement,  the  Spencerian  conception 
of  instinct.  It  is  a  <  closed '  physical  '  unity  which  does  not  transcend 
itself  so  as  to  contain  within  itself  a  teleological  moment.'  Instinct  is 
the  conscious  side  of  the  innervation  which  we  finally  regard  as  an 
act.  Fear,  e.  g.,  is  nothing  other  than  the  feeling  of  the  beginning  of 
the  flight  movement. 

The  theory  reduces  will  to  a  mere  psychic  accompaniment  (Mit- 
klingen)  of  a  closed  physical  series  which  issues  ultimately  in  move- 
ment or  actions.  In  consciousness,  the  act  seems  to  follow  the  will, 
but  in  reality,  the  feeling  of  having  willed  follows  and  results  from 
the  act.  An  apparent  contradiction  arises  in  cases  of  volitions  which  do 
not  result  in  immediate  action,  as  in  willing  to  be  rich.  The  author 
answers  that  as  a  child  cannot  desire  anything  without  immediately 
acting  out  the  desire,  therefore  this  apparent  case  of  will  without  ac- 
companying action  is  '  a  secondary  and  complex  psychological  pro- 
duct '  which  represents  no  elementary  function,  but  must  be  explained 
by  a  synthesis  of  simpler  deeper  lying  processes.  Complicated  psychic 
states  bring  with  them  a  large  number  of  sympathetic  innervation-sen- 
sations  to  which  the  volition-tones  of  such  reflections  as  the  will  to  be 
rich  is  probably  due. 

But  the  author  does  not  seem  to  see  that  every  act  of  accommoda- 
tion contradicts  this  theory,  the  only  principle  of  which  is  habit. 
Adaptations,  if  they  ever  occurred  on  such  a  basis  would  be  purely 
accidental.  The  small  beginnings  of  assimilative  processes  seen  in 
the  child's  recognition  of  the  meaning  of  objects  resembling  those 
with  which  it  is  more  familiar — processes  going  on  at  the  same  time 
that  the  child  must  act  out  every  desire — would  be  impossible  on  this 
theory  except  as  happy  accidents.  The  theory  has  the  defects  of  a 
materialistic  and  mechanical  conception  of  the  will. 

LEIPZIG.  GUY  TAWNEY. 


NEW   BOOKS. 

The  Primary  Factors  of  Organic  Evolution.  E.  D.  COPE.  Chi- 
cago and  London,  The  Open  Court  Pub.  Co.,  1896.  Pp.  xvi-f  547. 

Outlines  of  Logic  and  Metaphysics.  JOHANN  EDUARD  ERDMANN. 
Translated  by  B.  C.  Burt.  London,  Swan,  Sonnenschein  &  Co. ; 
New  York,  Macmillan  &  Co.  1896.  Pp.  xviii  +  253. 

The  Philosophy  of  T.  H.  Green.  W.  H.  FAIRBROTHER.  London, 
Methuen  &  Co. ;  New  York,  Macmillan  &  Co.  1896.  Pp.  vi+  187. 


NOTES.  355 

Pear.     ANGELO  Mosso.     Translated  by  E.  Lough  and  F.  Kiesow. 

London  and  New  York,  Longmans,  Green  &  Co.  1896.  Pp.  278. 
The  Theory  of  Knowledge.  L.  T.  HOBHOUSE.  London,  Meth- 

uen  &  Co. ;  New  York,  Macmillan  &  Co.  1896.  xx-f  622. 
Grundriss  der  Psychologic.  W.  WUNDT.  Leipzig,  Engelmann. 

Pp.  392. 


NOTES. 

WE  have  received  the  first  number  of  the  first  volume  of  a  new 
psychological  Archiv,  to  be  entitled  Beitrdge  zur  Psychologie  und 
Philosophic,  and  edited  by  Prof.  Gotz  Martius,  of  the  University  of 
Bonn.  Numbers  will  appear  at  irregular  intervals,  and  can  be  ob- 
tained separately.  In  an  introduction  the  editor  explains  the  philo- 
sophical standpoint  to  be  represented  by  this  publication ;  it  is,  in  brief, 
that  the  connection  between  mind  and  matter  is  neither  that  of  com- 
plete independence  in  connection  with  a  preestablished  harmony,  nor 
that  of  simple  dependence  of  either  upon  the  other,  but  something  far 
more  complicated  than  this — something  upon  which  there  is  always 
hope  that  light  may  be  thrown  by  the  results  of  experimental  psy- 
chology. The  four  papers  which  compose  this  number  are  all  on 
brightness  (Helligkeit) .  We  shall  notice  them  in  a  future  number  of 
this  REVIEW. 

THE  fourth  International  Congress  of  Criminal  Anthropology  will 
be  held  at  Geneva,  August  25-29,  1896.  Applications  for  member- 
ship should  be  sent  to  M.  Maurice  Bedot,  Muse"e  d'histoire  naturelle, 
Geneva,  Switzerland.  The  time  and  place  are  convenient  for  those 
who  attend  the  Psychological  Congress  at  Munich,  August  4-7,  and 
the  published  program  is  of  great  interest  to  psychologists. 

A  MARBLE  bust  in  memory  of  the  philosopher  Luigi  Ferri  was 
placed  on  March  i6th,  the  first  anniversary  of  his  death,  in  the  hall 
of  the  University  of  Rome,  where  Ferri  taught  for  twenty-four  years. 
For  this  memorial  about  $200  had  been  collected  by  subscription. 

PROFESSOR  W.  WUNDT  has  been  elected  a  foreign  associate  and  M. 
J.  Lachelier  a  member  of  the  Paris  Institut  (Academy  of  Moral  and 
Political  Sciences). 

THE  provisional  program  of  the  International  Congress  of  Pyschol- 
ogy,  to  be  held  at  Munich  from  the  4th  to  the  7th  of  August,  announces 
102  papers,  and  others  will  be  announced  later. 


35  6  NOTES. 

A  SECTION  of  the  new  New  York  Academy  of  Sciences  has  been 
formed  devoted  to  psychology,  anthropology  and  philology.  The  first 
meeting  was  held  on  April  27th,  and  meetings  will  be  held  on  the 
fourth  Monday  in  the  month  during  the  Academic  year.  An  Anthro- 
pological Club  for  informal  discussion  was  formed  in  New  York  on 
March  4th.  At  this  meeting  the  recent  works  on  children  and  child 
psychology  by  Sully,  Baldwin  and  Chamberlain  were  discussed. 

PROF.  WUNDT'S  Grundriss  der  Psychologie  is  being  translated 
into  English  by  Mr.  C.  H.  Judd,  and  Prof.  Baldwin's  Mental  De- 
velopment of  the  Child  and  the  Race  is  being  translated  into  Ger- 
man by  Dr.  Kiesow  and  into  French  by  Prof.  E.  Nourry. 

FELIX  ALCAN  announces  as  in  press  La  psychologie  des  sentiments 
by  Prof.  Ribot  and  Les  type  intellectuels  by  Prof.  Paulhan. 

THE  number  of  the  Z,eitschrift  fur  Psychologie,  etc. ,  issued  on 
Jan.  n,  contains  an  index  of  psychological  literature  for  1894.  The 
list  contains  1,504  titles  and  is  very  complete,  especially  with  regard 
to  publications  on  the  senses. 

PROF.  E.  B.  DELABARRE,  of  Brown  University,  has  been  ap- 
pointed director  of  the  psychological  laboratory  of  Harvard  Uni- 
versity for  next  year  during  the  absence  of  Prof.  Miinsterberg.  In  the 
same  University  James  Edwin  Lough,  A.  M.,  has  been  appointed  in- 
structor in  experimental  psychology  and  C.  M.  Bakewell,  A.  M., 
instructor  in  psychology. 

DR.  MARK  WENLEY,  recently  examiner  in  philosophy  in  the  Uni- 
versity of  Glasgow  and  lecturer  at  the  Queen  Margaret  College,  has 
been  appointed  professor  of  philosophy  in  the  University  of  Michigan. 

PROF.  JAMES  SETH,  of  Brown  University,  has  been  elected  profes- 
sor of  ethics  in  Cornell  University. 

EDGAR  A.  SINGER,  JR.,  has  been  appointed  to  a  senior  fellow- 
ship in  the  University  of  Pennsylvania,  under  the  George  L.  Harrison 
Foundation. 

MR.  S.  I.  FRANZ  AND  MR.  L.  B.  McWnooD  have  been  ap- 
pointed fellows  in  psychology  in  Columbia  University. 

A  COURSE  in  experimental  psychology  will  be  given  at  Bryn  Mawr 
College  by  Prof.  Lightner  Witmer,  of  the  University  of  Pennsylvania. 

IT  is  announced  that  Prof.  Ladd,  of  Yale  University,  and  Prof. 
Earl  Barnes,  of  Stanford  University,  will  lecture  at  the  University 
of  Chicago  during  the  summer  term. 


VOL.  III.     No.  4.  JULY,  1896. 


THE  PSYCHOLOGICAL  REVIEW. 


THE  REFLEX  ARC  CONCEPT  IN  PSYCHOLOGY. 

BY  PROFESSOR  JOHN  DEWEY, 

University  of  Chicago. 

That  the  greater  demand  for  a  unifying  principle  and  con- 
trolling working  hypothesis  in  psychology  should  come  at  just 
the  time  when  all  generalizations  and  classifications  are  most 
questioned  and  questionable  is  natural  enough.  It  is  the  very 
cumulation  of  discrete  facts  creating  the  demand  for  unification 
that  also  breaks  down  previous  lines  of  classification.  The  ma- 
terial is  too  great  in  mass  and  too  varied  in  style  to  fit  into 
existing  pigeon-holes,  and  the  cabinets  of  science  break  of  their 
own  dead  weight.  The  idea  of  the  reflex  arc  has  upon  the 
whole  come  nearer  to  meeting  this  demand  for  a  general  working 
hypothesis  than  any  other  single  concept.  It  being  admitted 
that  the  sensori-motor  apparatus  represents  both  the  unit  of 
nerve  structure  and  the  type  of  nerve  function,  the  image  of 
this  relationship  passed  over  into  psychology,  and  became  an  or- 
ganizing principle  to  hold  together  the  multiplicity  of  fact. 

In  criticising  this  conception  it  is  not  intended  to  make  a  plea 
for  the  principles  of  explanation  and  classification  which  the  re- 
flex arc  idea  has  replaced ;  but,  on  the  contrary,  to  urge  that 
they  are  not  sufficiently  displaced,  and  that  in  the  idea  of  the 
sensori-motor  circuit,  conceptions  of  the  nature  of  sensation  and 
of  action  derived  from  the  nominally  displaced  psychology  are 
still  in  control. 

The  older  dualism  between  sensation  and  idea  is  repeated  in 
the  current  dualism  of  peripheral  and  central  structures  and 
functions ;  the  older  dualism  of  body  and  soul  finds  a  distinct 


35§  JOHN  DEWEY. 

echo  in  the  current  dualism  of  stimulus  and  response.  Instead 
of  interpreting  the  character  of  sensation,  idea  and  action  from 
their  place  and  function  in  the  sensori-motor  circuit,  we  still  in- 
cline to  interpret  the  latter  from  our  preconceived  and  preform- 
ulated  ideas  of  rigid  distinctions  between  sensations,  thoughts 
and  acts.  The  sensory  stimulus  is  one  thing,  the  central  ac- 
tivity, standing  for  the  idea,  is  another  thing,  and  the  motor  dis- 
charge, standing  for  the  act  proper,  is  a  third.  As  a  result,  the 
reflex  arc  is  not  a  comprehensive,  or  organic  unity,  but  a  patch- 
work of  disjointed  parts,  a  mechanical  conjunction  of  unallied 
processes.  What  is  needed  is  that  the  principle  underlying  the 
idea  of  the  reflex  arc  as  the  fundamental  psychical  unity  shall 
react  into  and  determine  the  values  of  its  constitutive  factors. 
More  specifically,  what  is  wanted  is  that  sensory  stimulus, 
central  connections  and  motor  responses  shall  be  viewed,  not 
as  separate  and  complete  entities  in  themselves,  but  as  divisions 
of  labor,  functioning  factors,  within  the  single  concrete  whole, 
now  designated  the  reflex  arc. 

-__  What  is  the  reality  so  designated?  What  shall  we  term  that 
which  is  not  sensation-followed-by-idea-followed-by-movement, 
but  which  is  primary ;  which  is,  as  it  were,  the  psychical  organ- 
ism of  which  sensation,  idea  and  movement  are  the  chief  or- 
gans? Stated  on  the  physiological  side,  this  reality  may  most 
conveniently  be  termed  coordination.  This  is  the  essence  of  the 
facts  hold  together  by  and  subsumed  under  the  reflex  arc  con- 
cept. /Let  us  take,  for  our  example,  the  familiar  child-candle 
instance.  (James,  Psychology,  Vol.  I,  p.  25.)  The  ordinary  in- 
terpretation would  say  the  sensation  of  light  is  a  stimulus  to  the 
grasping  as  a  response,  the  burn  resulting  is  a  stimulus  to  with- 
drawing the  hand  as  response  and  so  on.  There  is,  of  course,  no 
doubt  that  is  a  rough  practical  way  of  representing  the  process. 
But  when  we  ask  for  its  psychological  adequacy,  the  case  is 
quite  different.  Upon  analysis,  we  find  that  we  begin  not  with 
a  sensory  stimulus,  but  with  a  sensori-motor  coordination,  the 
optical-ocular,  and  that  in  a  certain  sense  it  is  the  movement 
which  is  primary,  and  the  sensation  which  is  secondary,  the 
movement  of  body,  head  and  eye  muscles  determining  the  quality 
of  what  is  experienced.  /  In  other  words,  the  real  beginning  is 


THE  REFLEX  ARC  CONCEPT.  359 

with  the  act  of  seeing;  it  is  looking,  and  not  a  sensation  of 
light.  The  sensory  quale  gives  the  value  of  the  act,  just  as  the 
movement  furnishes  its  mechanism  and  control,  but  both  sensa- 
tion and  movement  lie  inside,  not  outside  the  act. 

Now  if  /this  act,  the  seeing/  stimulates  another  act,  the 
reaching,  it  is  because  both  of  mese  acts  fall  within  a  larger 
coordination  ;  because  seeing  and  grasping  have  been  so  often 
bound  together  to  reinforce  each  other,  to  help  each  other  out, 
that  each  may  be  considered  practically  a  subordinate  member 
of  a  bigger  coordination.  More  specifically,  the  ability  of  the 
hand  to  do  its  work  will  depend,  either  directly  or  indirectly, 
upon  its  control,  as  well  as  its  stimulation,  by  the  act  of  vision. 
If  the  sight  did  not  inhibit  as  well  as  excite  the  reaching,  the 
latter  would  be  purely  indeterminate,  it  would  be  for  anything 
or  nothing,  not  for  the  particular  object  seen.  The  reaching, 
in  turn,  must  both  stimulate  and  control  the  seeing.  The  eye 
must  be  kept  upon  the  candle  if  the  arm  is  to  do  its  work  ;  let  it 
wander  and  the  arm  takes  up  another  task.  In  other  words, 
we  now  have  an  enlarged  and  transformed  coordination  ;  the 
act  is  seeing  no  less  than  before,  but  it  is  now  seeing-for- 
reaching  purposes.  There  is  still  a  sensori-motor  circuit,  one 
with  more  content  or  value,  not  a  substitution  of  a  motor 
response  for  a  sensory  stimulus.1 

Now  take  the  affairs  at  its  next  stage,  that  in  which  the 
child  gets  burned.  It  is  hardly  necessary  to  point  out  again 
that  this  is  also  a  sensori-motor  coordination  and  not  a  mere  sen- 
sation. It  is  worth  while,  however,  to  note  especially  the  fact 
that  it  is  simply  the  completion,  or  fulfillment,  of  the  previous 
eye-arm-hand  coordination  and  not  an  entirely  new  occurrence. 
Only  because  the  heat-pain  quale  enters  into  the  same  circuit  of 
experience  with  the  optical-ocular  and  muscular  quales,  does  the 
child  learn  from  the  experience  and  get  the  ability  to  avoid  the 
experience  in  the  future. 

More  technically  stated,  the  so-called  response  is  not  merely 
to  the  stimulus  ;  it  is  into  it.  The  burn  is  the  original  seeing, 


THE  PSYCHOLOGICAL  REVIEW  for  May,  1896,  p.  253,  for  an  excellent 
statement  and  illustration,  by  Messrs.  Angell  and  Moore,  of  this  mutuality  of 
stimulation. 


360  JOHN  DEWEY. 

the  original  optical-ocular  experience  enlarged  and  transformed 
in  its  value.  It  is  no  longer  mere  seeing ;  it  is  seeing-of-a 
light-that-means-pain-when-contact-occurs.  The  ordinary  re- 
flex arc  theory  proceeds  upon  the  more  or  less  tacit  assumption 
that  the  outcome  of  the  response  is  a  totally  new  experience ; 
that  it  is,  say,  the  substitution  of  a  burn  sensation  for  a  light 
sensation  through  the  intervention  of  motion.  The  fact  is  that 
the  sole  meaning  of  the  intervening  movement  is  to  maintain, 
reinforce  or  transform  (as  the  case  may  be)  the  original  quale ; 
that  we  do  not  have  the  replacing  of  one  sort  of  experience  by 
another,  but  the  development  (or  as  it  seems  convenient  to 
term  it)  the  mediation  of  an  experience.  The  seeing,  in  a 
word,  remains  to  control  the  reaching,  and  is,  in  turn,  inter- 
preted by  the  burning.1 

The  discusssion  up  to  this  point  may  be  summarized  by__say^ 
jng  that  the  reflex  arc  idea,  as  commonly  employed,  is  defec- 
tive in  that  it  assumes  sensory  stimulus  and  motor  response  as_ 
distinct  psychical  existences,  while  in  realiiy  they  are  always 
inside  a  coordination  and  have  their  significance  purely  from, 
the  part  played  in  maintaining  nr  rer.nnptii-nti.npr  the  coordination ; 
and  (secondly)  in  assuming  that  the  quale  of  experience  which 
precedes  the  *  motor '  phase  and  that  which  succeeds  it  are 
two  different  states,  instead  of  the  last  being  always  the  first 
reconstituted,  the  motor  phase  coming  in  only  for  the  sake 
of  such  mediation.  The  result  is  that  the  reflex  arc  idea  leaves 
us  with  a  disjointed  psychology,  whether  viewed  from  the 
standpoint  of  development  in  the  individual  or  in  the  race,  or 
from  that  of  the  analysis  of  the  mature  consciousness.  As  to 
the  former,  in  its  failure  to  see  that  the  arc  of  which  it  talks  is 
virtually  a  circuit,  a  continual  reconstitution,  it  breaks  continuity 
and  leaves  us  nothing  but  a  series  of  jerks,  the  origin  of  each 
jerk  to  be  sought  outside  the  process  of  experience  itself,  in  either 
an  external  pressure  of  *  environment,'  or  else  in  an  unaccount- 
able spontaneous  variation  from  within  the  *  soul '  or  the  '  or- 
ganism.'2 As  to  the  latter,  failing  to  see  the  -tmity-o-f  activity, 

1See,  for  a  further  statement  of  mediation,  my  Syllabus  of  Ethics,  p.  15. 
2  It  is  not  too  much  to  say  that  the  whole  controversy  in  biology  regarding 
the  source  of  variation,  represented   by  Weismann  and   Spencer  respectively 


THE  REFLEX  ARC   CONCEPT.  361 

no  matter  how  much  it  may  prate  of  unity,  it  still  leaves  us  with 
sensation  or  peripheral  stimulus ;  idea,  or  central  process  (the 
equivalent  of  attention)  ;  and  motor  response,  or  act,  as  three 
disconnected  existences,  having  to  be  somehow  adjusted  to 
each  other,  whether  through  the  intervention  of  an  extra- 
experimental  soul,  or  by  mechanical  push  and  pull. 

Before  proceeding  to  a  consideration  of  the  general  meaning 
for  psychology  of  the  summary,  it  may  be  well  to  give  another 
descriptive  analysis,  as  the  value  of  the  statement  depends  en- 
tirely upon  the  universality  of  its  range  of  application.  For 
such  an  instance  we  may  conveniently  take  Baldwin's  analysis 
of  the  reactive  consciousness.  In  this  there  are,  he  says  (Feel- 
ing and  Will,  p.  60),  "three  elements  corresponding  to  the 
three  elements  of  the  nervous  arc.  First,  the  receiving  con- 
sciousness, the  stimulus — say  a  loud,  unexpected  sound  ;  second, 
the  attention  involuntarily  drawn,  the  registering  element ;  and, 
third,  the  muscular  reaction  following  upon  the  sound — say 
flight  from  fancied  danger."  Now,  in  the  first  place,  such  an 
analysis  is  incomplete ;  it  ignores  the  status  prior  to  hearing  the 
sound.  Of  course,  if  this  status  is  irrelevant  to  what  happens 
afterwards,  such  ignoring  is  quite  legitimate.  But  is  it  irrele- 
vant either  to  the  quantity  or  the  quality  of  the  stimulus? 

/  If  one  is  reading  a  book,  if  one  is  hunting,  if  one  is  watch- 
ing in  a  dark  place  on  a  lonely  night,  if  one  is  performing  a 
chemical  experiment,  in  each  case,  the  noise  has  a  very  different 
psychical  value  ;  it  is  a  different  experience.  In  any  case,  what 
proceeds/  the  *  stimulus '  is  a  whole  act,  a  sensori-motor  coordi- 
nation. /What  is  more  to  the  point,  the  *  stimulus'  emerges 
out  of  mis  coordination ;  it  is  born  from  it  as  its  matrix ;  it  rep- 
resents as  it  were  an  escape  from  it.  I  might  here  fall  back 
upon  authority,  and  refer  to  the  widely  accepted  sensation  con- 
tinuum theory,  according  to  which  the  sound  cannot  be  abso- 
lutely ex  abru-pto  from  the  outside,  but  is  simply  a  shifting 

arises  from  beginning  with  stimulus  or  response  instead  of  with  the  coSrdina- 
tion  with  reference  to  which  stimulus  and  response  are  functional  divisions  of 
labor.  The  same  may  be  said,  on  the  psychological  side,  of  the  controversy 
between  the  Wundtian  '  apperceptionists '  and  their  opponents.  Each  has  a 
disjectum  membrum  of  the  same  organic  whole,  whichever  is  selected  being  an 
arbitrary  matter  of  personal  taste. 


362  JOHN  DEWEY. 

of  focus  of  emphasis,  a  redistribution  of  tensions  within  the 
former  act;  and  declare  that  unless  the  sound  activity  had 
been  present  to  some  extent  in  the  prior  coordination,  it  would 
be  impossible  for  it  now  to  come  to  prominence  in  conscious- 
ness. And  such  a  reference  would  be  only  an  amplification  of 
what  has  already  been  said  concerning  the  way  in  which  the 
prior  activity  influences  the  value  of  the  sound  sensation.  Or, 
we  might  point  to  cases  of  hypnotism,  mono-ideaism  and  ab- 
sent-mindedness, like  that  of  Archimedes,  as  evidences  that  if 
the  previous  coordination  is  such  as  rigidly  to  lock  the  door,  the 
auditory  disturbance  will  knock  in  vain  for  admission  to  con- 
sciousness. Or,  to  speak  more  truly  in  the  metaphor,  the  audi- 
tory activity  must  already  have  one  foot  over  the  threshold,  if  it 
is  ever  to  gain  admittance. 

But  it  will  be  more  satisfactory,  probably,  to  refer  to  the 
biological  side  of  the  case,  and  point  out  that  as  the  ear  activity 
has  been  evolved  on  account  of  the  advantage  gained  by  the 
whole  organism,  it  must  stand  in  the  strictest  histological  and 
physiological  connection  with  the  eye,  or  hand,  or  leg,  or  what- 
ever other  organ  has  been  the  overt  center  of  action.  It  is  ab- 
solutely impossible  to  think  of  the  eye  center  as  monopolizing 
consciousness  and  the  ear  apparatus  as  wholly  quiescent. 
What  happens  is  a  certain  relative  prominence  and  subsidence 
as  between  the  various  organs  which  maintain  the  organic 
equilibrium. 

Furthermore,  the  sound  is  not  a  mere  stimulus,  or  mere 
sensation ;  it  again  is  an  act,  that  of  hearing.  The  muscular 
response  is  involved  in  this  as  well  as  sensory  stimulus ;  that 
is,  there  is  a  certain  definite  set  of  the  motor  apparatus  in- 
volved in  hearing  just  as  much  as  there  is  in  subsequent  run- 
ning away.  The  movement  and  posture  of  the  head,  the  ten- 
sion of  the  ear  muscles,  are  required  for  the  *  reception '  of  the 
sound.  It  is  just  as  true  to  say  that  the  sensation  of  sound 
arises  from  a  motor  response  as  that  the  running  away  is  a  re- 
sponse to  the  sound.  This  may  be  brought  out  by  reference 
to  the  fact  that  Professor  Baldwin,  in  the  passage  quoted, 
has  inverted  the  real  order  as  between  his  first  and  second 
elements.  We  do  not  have  first  a  sound  and  then  activity 


THE  REFLEX  ARC    CONCEPT.  363 

of  attention,  unless  sound  is  taken  as  mere  nervous  shock  or 
physical  event,  not  as  conscious  value.  The  conscious  sen- 
sation of  sound  depends  upon  the  motor  response  having 
already  taken  place ;  or,  in  terms  of  the  previous  statement  (if 
stimulus  is  used  as  a  conscious  fact,  and  not  as  a  mere  physical 
event)  it  is  the  motor  response  or  attention  which  constitutes 
that,  which  finally  becomes  the  stimulus  to  another  act.  Once 
more,  the  final  '  element,'  the  running  away,  is  not  merely 
motor,  but  is  sensori-motor,  having  its  sensory  value  and  its 
muscular  mechanism.  It  is  also  a  coordination.  And,  finally, 
this  sensori-motor  coordination  is  not  a  new  act,  supervening 
upon  what  preceded.  Just  as  the  *  response '  is  necessary  to 
constitute  the  stimulus,  to  determine  it  as  sound  and  as  this 
kind  of  sound,  of  wild  beast  or  robber,  so  the  sound  experience 
must  persist  as  a  value  in  the  running,  to  keep  it  up,  to  control 
it.  The  motor  reaction  involved  in  the  running  is,  once  more, 
into,  not  merely  to,  the  sound.  It  occurs  to  change  the  sound, 
to  get  rid  of  it.  The  resulting  quale,  whatever  it  may  be, 
has  its  meaning  wholly  determined  by  reference  to  the  hearing 
of  the  sound.  It  is  that  experience  mediated.1  What  we  have 
is  a  circuit,  not  an  arc  or  broken  segment  of  a  circle.  This 
circuit  is  more  truly  termed  organic  than  reflex,  because  the 
motor  response  determines  the  stimulus,  just  as  truly  as  sensory 
stimulus  determines  movement.  Indeed,  the  movement  is  only 
for  the  sake  of  determining  the  stimulus,  of  fixing  what  kind  of 
a  stimulus  it  is,  of  interpreting  it. 

I  hope  it  will  not  appear  that  I  am  introducing  needless  re 
finements  and  distinctions  into  what,  it  may  be  urged,  is  after 
all  an  undoubted  fact,  that  movement  as  response  follows  sensa- 
tion as  stimulus.     It  is  not  a  question  of  making  the  account  of 
the  process  more  complicated,  though  it  is  always  wise  to  be- 

1In  other  words,  every  reaction  is  of  the  same  type  as  that  which  Professor 
Baldwin  ascribes  to  imitation  alone,  viz.,  circular.  Imitation  is  simply  that 
particular  form  of  the  circuit  in  which  the  'response'  lends  itself  to  compara- 
tively unchanged  maintainance  of  the  prior  experience.  I  say  comparatively 
unchanged,  for  as  far  as  this  maintainance  means  additional  control  over  the 
experience,  it  is  being  psychically  changed,  becoming  more  distinct.  It  is  safe 
to  suppose,  moreover,  that  the  '  repetition '  is  kept  up  only  so  long  as  this 
growth  or  mediation  goes  on.  There  is  the  new-in-the-old,  if  it  is  only  the  new 
sense  of  power. 


364  JOHN  DEWEY. 

ware  of  that  false  simplicity  which  is  reached  by  leaving  out 
of  account  a  large  part  of  the  problem.  It  is  a  question  of 
finding  out  what  stimulus  or  sensation,  what  movement  and 
response  mean ;  a  question  of  seeing  that  they  mean  distinc- 
tions of  flexible  function  only,  not  of  fixed  existence ;  that  one 
and  the  same  occurrence  plays  either  or  both  parts,  according  to 
the  shift  of  interest ;  and  that  because  of  this  functional  distinc- 
tion and  relationship,  the  supposed  problem  of  the  adjustment 
of  one  to  the  other,  whether  by  superior  force  in  the  stimulus 
or  an  agency  ad  hoc  in  the  center  or  the  soul,  is  a  purely  self- 
created  problem. 

We  may  see  the  disjointed  character  of  the  present  theory, 
by  calling  to  mind  that  it  is  impossible  to  apply  the  phrase 
*  sensori-motor '  to  the  occurrence  as  a  simple  phrase  of  descrip- 
tion ;  it  has  validity  only  as  a  term  of  interpretation,  only,  that 
is,  as  defining  various  functions  exercised.  In  terms  of  descrip- 
tion, the  whole  process  may  be  sensory  or  it  may  be  motor,  but 
it  cannot  be  sensori-motor.  /  The  *  stimulus,'  the  excitation  of 
the  nerve  ending  and  of  the  sensory  nerve,  the  central  change, 
are  just  as  much,  or  just  as  little,  motion  as  the  events  taking 
place  in  the  motor  nerve  and  the  muscles.  It  is  one  uninter- 
rupted, continuous  redistribution  of  mass  in  motion.  /And  there 
is  nothing  in  the  process,  from  the  standpoint  of  description, 
which  entitles  us  to  call  this  reflex.  It  is  redistribution  pure  and 
simple ;  as  much  so  as  the  burning  of  a  log,  or  the  falling  of  a 
house  or  the  movement  of  the  wind.  In  the  physical  process, 
as  physical,  there  is  nothing  which  can  be  set  off  as  stimulus, 
nothing  which  reacts,  nothing  which  is  response.  There  is 
just  a  change  in  the  system  of  tensions. 

The  same  sort  of  thing  is  true  when  we  describe  the  process 
purely  from  the  psychical  side.  It  is  now  all  sensation,  all  sen- 
sory quale ;  the  motion,  as  psychically  described,  is  just  as  much 
sensation  as  is  sound  or  light  or  burn.  Take  the  withdrawing 
of  the  hand  from  the  candle  flame  as  example.  What  we  have 
is  a  certain  visual-heat-pain-muscular-quale,  transformed  into 
another  visual-touch-muscular-quale — the  flame  now  being  vis- 
ible only  at  a  distance,  or  not  at  all,  the  touch  sensation  being 
altered,  etc.  If  we  symbolize  the  original  visual  quale  by  v, 


THE  REFLEX  ARC  CONCEPT.  365 

the  temperature  by  h,  the  accompanying  muscular  sensation  by 
m,  the  whole  experience  may  be  stated  as  \\im-v\un-vhm' ;  m 
being  the  quale  of  withdrawing,  m1  the  sense  of  the  status  after 
the  withdrawal.  The  motion  is  not  a  certain  kind  of  existence  ; 
it  is  a  sort  of  sensory  experience  interpreted,  just  as  is  candle 
flame,  or  burn  from  candle  flame.  All  are  on  a  par. 

But,  in  spite  of  all  this,  it  will  be  urged,  there  is  a  distinction 
between  stimulus  and  response,  between  sensation  and  motion. 
Precisely ;  but  we  ought  now  to  be  in  a  condition  to  ask  of  what 
nature  is  the  distinction,  instead  of  taking  it  for  granted  as  a  dis- 
tinction somehow  lying  in  the  existence  of  the  facts  themselves. 
We  ought  to  be  able  to  see  that  the  ordinary  conception  of  the 
reflex  arc  theory,  instead  of  being  a  case  of  plain  science,  is  a 
survival  of  the  metaphysical  dualism,  first  formulated  by  Plato, 
according  to  which  the  sensation  is  an  ambiguous  dweller  on  the 
border  land  of  soul  and  body,  the  idea  (or  central  process)  is 
purely  psychical,  and  the  act  (or  movement)  purely  physical. 
Thus  the  reflex  arc  formulation  is  neither  physical  (or  physi- 
ological) nor  psychological ;  it  is  a  mixed  materialistic-spiritu- 
alistic assumption. 

If  the  previous  descriptive  analysis  has  made  obvious  the 
need  of  a  reconsideration  of  the  reflex  arc  idea,  of  the  nest  of 
difficulties  and  assumptions  in  the  apparently  simple  statement, 
it  is  now  time  to  undertake  an  explanatory  analysis.  The  fact 
is  that  stimulus  and  reponse  are  not  distinctions  of  existence,  but 
teleological  distinctions,  that  is,  distinctions  of  function,  or  part 
played,  with  reference  to  reaching  or  maintaining  an  end. 
With  respect  to  this  teleological  process,  two  stages  should  be 
discriminated,  as  their  confusion  is  one  cause  of  the  confusion 
attending  the  whole  matter.  In  one  case,  the  relation  repre- 
sents an  organization  of  means  with  reference  to  a  comprehen- 
sive end.  It  represents  an  accomplished  adaptation.  Such  is 
the  case  in  all  well  developed  instincts,  as  when  we  say  that  the 
contact  of  eggs  is  a  stimulus  to  the  hen  to  set ;  or  the  sight  of 
corn  a  stimulus  to  pick ;  such  also  is  the  case  with  all  thor- 
oughly formed  habits,  as  when  the  contact  with  the  floor  stimu- 
lates walking.  In  these  instances  there  is  no  question  of  con- 
sciousness of  stimulus  as  stimulus,  of  response  as  response. 


366  JOHN  DEWEY. 

There  is  simply  a  continuously  ordered  sequence  of  acts,  all 
adapted  in  themselves  and  in  the  order  of  their  sequence,  to 
reach  a  certain  objective  end,  the  reproduction  of  the  species, 
the  preservation  of  life,  locomotion  to  a  certain  place.  The  end 
has  got  thoroughly  organized  into  the  means.  In  calling  one 
stimulus,  another  response  we  mean  nothing  more  than  that 
such  an  orderly  sequence  of  acts  is  taking  place.  The  same 
sort  of  statement  might  be  made  equally  well  with  reference  to 
the  succession  of  changes  in  a  plant,  so  far  as  these  are  con- 
sidered with  reference  to  their  adaptation  to,  say,  producing 
seed.  It  is  equally  applicable  to  the  series  of  events  in  the  cir- 
culation of  the  blood,  or  the  sequence  of  acts  occurring  in  a 
self-binding  reaper.1 

Regarding  such  cases  of  organization  viewed  as  already  at- 
tained, we  may  say,  positively,  that  it  is  only  the  assumed  com- 
mon reference  to  an  inclusive  end  which  marks  each  member 
off  as  stimulus  and  response,  that  apart  from  such  reference  we 
have  only  antecedent  and  consequent  ;2  in  other  words,  the  dis- 
tinction is  one  of  interpretation.  Negatively,  it  must  be  pointed 
out  that  it  is  not  legitimate  to  carry  over,  without  change,  exactly 
the  same  order  of  considerations  to  cases  where  it  is  a  question 
of  conscious  stimulation  and  response.  We  may,  in  the  above 
case,  regard,  if  we  please,  stimulus  and  response  each  as  an 
entire  act,  having  an  individuality  of  its  own,  subject  even  here 
to  the  qualification  that  individuality  means  not  an  entirely  in- 
dependent whole,  but  a  division  of  labor  as  regards  maintaining 
or  reaching  an  end.  But  in  any  case,  it  is  an  act,  a  sensori- 
motor  coordination,  which  stimulates  the  response,  itself  in  turn 
sensori-motor,  not  a  sensation  which  stimulates  a  movement. 
Hence  the  illegitimacy  of  identifying,  as  is  so  often  done,  such 
cases  of  organized  instincts  or  habits  with  the  so-called  reflex 
arc,  or  of  transferring,  without  modification,  considerations 

JTo  avoid  misapprehension,  I  would  say  that  I  am  not  raising  the  question 
as  to  how  far  this  teleology  is  real  in  any  one  of  these  cases ;  real  or  unreal, 
my  point  holds  equally  well.  It  is  only  when  we  regard  the  sequence  of  acts  as 
tfthey  were  adapted  to  reach  some  end  that  it  occurs  to  us  to  speak  of  one  as 
stimulus  and  the  other  as  response.  Otherwise,  we  look  at  them  as  a  mere 
series. 

2Whether,  even  in  such  a  determination,  there  is  still  not  a  reference  of  a 
more  latent  kind  to  an  end  is,  of  course,  left  open. 


THE  REFLEX  ARC   CONCEPT.  367 

valid  of  this  serial  coordination  of  acts  to  the  sensation-move- 
ment case. 

The  fallacy  that  arises  when  this  is  done  is  virtually  the 
psychological  or  historical  fallacy.  A  set  of  considerations 
which  hold  good  only  because  of  a  completed  process,  is  read 
into  the  content  of  the  process  which  conditions  this  completed 
result.  A  state  of  things  characterizing  an  outcome  is  re- 
garded as  a  true  description  of  the  events  which  led  up  to  this 
outcome  ;  when,  as  a  matter  of  fact,  if  this  outcome  had  already 
been  in  existence,  there  would  have  been  no  necessity  for  the 
process.  Or,  to  make  the  application  to  the  case  in  hand,  con- 
siderations valid  of  an  attained  organization  or  coordination,  the 
orderly  sequence  of  minor  acts  in  a  comprehensive  coordination, 
are  used  to  describe  a  process,  viz.,  the  distinction  of  mere  sensa- 
tion as  stimulus  and  of  mere  movement  as  response,  which  takes 
place  only  because  such  an  attained  organization  is  no  longer  at 
hand,  but  is  in  process  of  constitution.  Neither  mere  sensation, 
nor  mere  movement,  can  ever  be  either  stimulus  or  response ; 
only  an  act  can  be  that ;  the  sensation  as  stimulus  means  the 
lack  of  and  search  for  such  an  objective  stimulus,  or  orderly  plac- 
ing of  an  act ;  just  as  mere  movement  as  response  means  the  lack 
of  and  search  for  the  right  act  to  complete  a  given  coordination. 

A  recurrence  to  our  example  will  make  these  formulas  clearer, 
As  long  as  the  seeing  is  an  unbroken  act,  which  is  as  experienced 
no  more  mere  sensation  than  it  is  mere  motion  (though  the  on- 
looker or  psychological  observer  can  interpret  it  into  sensation 
and  movement) ,  it  is  in  no  sense  the  sensation  which  stimulates 
the  reaching ;  we  have,  as  already  sufficiently  indicated,  only 
the  serial  steps  in  a  coordination  of  acts.  But  now  take  a  child 
who,  upon  reaching  for  bright  light  (that  is,  exercising  the  see- 
ing-reaching  coordination)  has  sometimes  had  a  delightful  exer- 
cise, sometimes  found  something  good  to  eat  and  sometimes 
burned  himself.  Now  the  response  is  not  only  uncertain,  but 
the  stimulus  is  equally  uncertain  ;  one  is  uncertain  only  in  so  far 
as  the  other  is.  The  real  problem  may  be  equally  well  stated 
as  either  to  discover  the  right  stimulus,  to  constitute  the  stimulus, 
or  to  discover,  to  constitute,  the  response.  The  question  of 
whether  to  reach  or  to  abstain  from  reaching  is  the  question  what 


368  JOHN  DEWEY. 

sort  of  a  bright  light  have  we  here  ?  Is  it  the  one  which  means 
playing  with  one's  hands,  eating  milk,  or  burning  one's  fingers? 
The  stimulus  must  be  constituted  for  the  response  to  occur.  Now 
it  is  at  precisely  this  juncture  and  because  of  it  that  the  dis- 
tinction of  sensation  as  stimulus  and  motion  as  response  arises. 

The  sensation  or  conscious  stimulus  is  not  a  thing  or  exist- 
I  ence  by  itself ;  it  is  that  phase  of  a  coordination  requiring  atten- 
tion because,  by  reason  of  the  conflict  within  the  coordination, 
it  is  uncertain  how  to  complete  it.  It  is  to  doubt  as  to  the  next 
act,  whether  to  reach  or  no,  which  gives  the  motive  to  exami- 
ning the  act.  The  end  to  follow  is,  in  this  sense,  the  stimulus.  It 
furnishes  the  motivation  to  attend  to  what  has  just  taken  place ; 
to  define  it  more  carefully.  From  this  point  of  view  the  dis- 
covery of  the  stimulus  is  the  '  response '  to  possible  movement  as 
« stimulus.'  We  must  have  an  anticipatory  sensation,  an  image, 
of  the  movements  that  may  occur,  together  with  their  respective 
values,  before  attention  will  go  to  the  seeing  to  break  it  up  as  a 
sensation  of  light,  and  of  light  of  this  particular  kind.  It  is  the 
initiated  activities  of  reaching,  which,  inhibited  by  the  conflict 
in  the  coordination,  turn  round,  as  it  were,  upon  the  seeing,  and 
hold  it  from  passing  over  into  further  act  until  its  quality  is  de- 
termined. Just  here  the  act  as  objective  stimulus  becomes  trans- 
formed into  sensation  as  possible,  as  conscious,  stimulus.  Just 
here  also,  motion  as  conscious  response  emerges. 

In  other  words,  sensation  as  stimulus  does  not  mean  any  par- 
ticular psychical  existence.  It  means  simply  a  function,  and 
will  have  its  value  shift  according  to  the  special  work  requiring 
to  be  done.  At  one  moment  the  various  activities  of  reaching 
and  withdrawing  will  be  the  sensation,  because  they  are  that 
phase  of  activity  which  sets  the  problem,  or  creates  the  demand 
for,  the  next  act.  At  the  next  moment  the  previous  act  of 
seeing  will  furnish  the  sensation,  being,  in  turn,  that  phase  of 
activity  which  sets  the  pace  upon  which  depends  further  action. 
/Generalized,  sensation  as  stimulus,  is  always  that  phase  of . 
j  activity  requiring  to  be  defined  in  order  that  a  coordination  may  \ 
be  completed.  What  the  sensation  will  be  in  particular  at  a 
given  time,  therefore,  will  depend  entirely  upon  the  way  in 
which  an  activity  is  being  used.  It  has  no  fixed  quality  of  its 


THE  REFLEX  ARC    CONCEPT.  369 

own.  The  search  for  the  stimulus  is  the  search  for  exact  con- 
ditions of  action ;  that  is,  for  the  state  of  things  which  decides 
how  a  beginning  coordination  should  be  completed. 

Similarly,  motion,  as  response,  has  only  a  functional  value. 
It  is  whatever  will  serve  to  complete  the  disintegrating  coordi- 
nation. Just  as  the  discovery  of  the  sensation  marks  the  estab- 
lishing of  the  problem,  so  the  constitution  of  the  response  marks 
the  solution  of  this  problem.  At  one  time,  fixing  attention, 
holding  the  eye  fixed,  upon  the  seeing  and  thus  bringing  out  a 
certain  quale  of  light  is  the  response,  because  that  is  the  par- 
ticular act  called  for  just  then ;  at  another  time,  the  movement 
of  the  arm  away  from  the  light  is  the  response.  There  is  noth- 
ing in  itself  which  may  be  labelled  response.  That  one  certain 
set  of  sensory  quales  should  be  marked  off  by  themselves  as 
*  motion '  and  put  in  antithesis  to  such  sensory  quales  as  those  of 
color,  sound  and  contact,  as  legitimate  claimants  to  the  title 
of  sensation,  is  wholly  inexplicable  unless  we  keep  the  differ- 
ence of  function  in  view.  It  is  the  eye  and  ear  sensations 
which  fix  for  us  the  problem ;  which  report  to  us  the  conditions 
which  have  to  be  met  if  the  coordination  is  to  be  successfully 
completed ;  and  just  the  moment  we  need  to  know  about  our 
movements  to  get  an  adequate  report,  just  that  moment,  motion 
miraculously  (from  the  ordinary  standpoint)  ceases  to  be  mo- 
tion and  become  *  muscular  sensation. '  On  the  other  hand, 
take  the  change  in  values  of  experience,  the  transformation  of 
sensory  quales.  Whether  this  change  will  or  will  not  be  inter- 
preted as  movement,  whether  or  not  any  consciousness  of  move- 
ment will  arise,  will  depend  upon  whether  this  change  is  satis- 
factory, whether  or  not  it  is  regarded  as  a  harmonious  develop- 
ment of  a  coordination,  or  whether  the  change  is  regarded  as 
simply  a  means  in  solving  a  problem,  an  instrument  in  reaching 
a  more  satisfactory  coordination.  So  long  as  our  experience 
runs  smoothly  we  are  no  more  conscious  of  motion  as  motion 
than  we  are  of  this  or  that  color  or  sound  by  itself. 

To  sum  up :  the  distinction  of  sensation  and  movement  as 
stimulus  and  response  respectively  is  not  a  distinction  which  can 
be  regarded  as  descriptive  of  anything  which  holds  of  psychical 
events  or  existences  as  such.  The  only  events  to  which  the 
terms  stimulus  and  response  can  be  descriptively  applied  are  to 


37°  JOHN  DEWEY. 

minor  acts  serving  by  their  respective  positions  to  the  main- 
tenance of  some  organized  coordination.  The  conscious  stim- 
ulus or  sensation,  and  the  conscious  response  or  motion,  have 
a  special  genesis  or  motivation,  and  a  special  end  or  function. 
The  reflex  arc  theory,  by  neglecting,  by  abstracting  from,  this 
genesis  and  this  function  gives  us  one  disjointed  part  of  a  pro- 
cess as  if  it  were  the  whole.  It  gives  us  literally  an  arc,  in- 
stead of  the  circuit ;  and  not  giving  us  the  circuit  of  which  it  is 
an  arc,  does  not  enable  us  to  place,  to  center,  the  arc.  This 
arc,  again,  falls  apart  into  two  separate  existences  having  to  be 
either  mechanically  or  externally  adjusted  to  each  other. 

The  circle  is  a  coordination,  some  of  whose  members  have 
come  into  conflict  with  each  other.  It  is  the  temporary  disin- 
tegration and  need  of  reconstitution  which  occasions,  which  af- 
fords the  genesis  of,  the  conscious  distinction  into  sensory  stim- 
ulus on  one  side  and  motor  response  on  the  other.  The  stim- 
ulus is  that  phase  of  the  forming  coordination  which  represents 
the  conditions  which  have  to  be  met  in  bringing  it  to  a  successful 
issue ;  the  response  is  that  phase  of  one  and  the  same  forming 
coordination  which  gives  the  key  to  meeting  these  conditions, 
which  serves  as  instrument  in  effecting  the  successful  coordina- 
tion. T^ey  are  therefore  strictly  correlative  and  contempora- 
neous./The  stimulus  is  something  to  be  discovered ;  to  be  made 
out/ if  the  activity  affords  its  own  adequate  stimulation,  there  is 
no 'stimulus  save  in  the  objective  sense  already  referred  to.  As 
soon  as  it  is  adequately  determined,  then  and  then  only  is  the 
response  also  complete.  To  attain  either,  means  that  the  coor- 
dination has  completed  itself.  Moreover,  it  is  the  motor  re- 
sponse which  assists  in  discovering  and  constituting  the  stim- 
ulus. It  is  the  holding  of  the  movement  at  a  certain  stage 
which  creates  the  sensation,  which  throws  it  into  relief. 

It  is  the  coordination  which  unifies  that  which  the  reflex  arc 
concept  gives  us  only  in  disjointed  fragments.  It  is  the  circuit 
within  which  fall  distinctions  of  stimulus  and  response  as  func- 
tional phases  of  its  own  mediation  or  completion.  The  point  of 
this  story  is  in  its  application ;  but  the  application  of  it  to  the 
question  of  the  nature  of  psychical  evolution,  to  the  distinction 
between  sensational  and  rational  consciousness,  and  the  nature  of 
judgment  must  be  deferred  to  a  more  favorable  opportunity. 


STUDIES  FROM  THE  PSYCHOLOGICAL  LABORA- 
TORY OF  THE  UNIVERSITY  OF  CHICAGO. 

III.  THE  ORGANIC  EFFECTS  OF  AGREEABLE  AND  DISAGREE- 
ABLE STIMULI. 

BY  JAMES   ROWLAND   ANGELL  AND   SIMON  F.  McLENNAN. 

Amid  all  the  recent  discussion  upon  the  significance  of  the 
activities  of  the  physical  organism  under  conditions  of  emo- 
tional excitement,  and  in  other  affective  states,  there  has  been 
an  apparent  consensus  of  opinion,  that  states  of  consciousness 
belonging  to  the  two  general  classes  agreeable  and  disagreeable, 
are  accompanied  on  the  one  hand,  by  conditions  of  expanded 
vascularity  and  heightened  muscle  tone  of  the  voluntary  sys- 
tem, and  on  the  other  hand,  by  vascular  constrictions  and  de- 
pressed muscle  tone  of  the  voluntary  system.  The  greater 
emphasis  is  ordinarily  laid  upon  the  vascular  alterations  and  ac- 
companying disturbances  in  the  involuntary  system.  The  con- 
fidence in  this  doctrine  rests  upon  a  fairly  wide  basis  of  experi- 
ment, and  yet  certain  restricting  corollaries  need  to  be  pointed 
out.  The  present  piece  of  work,  forming  part  of  a  broader 
inquiry  into  the  nature  of  affective  states,  can  only  hope  to  add 
a  mite  to  the  general  store  of  information  upon  the  topic  in 
hand.1  Nor  does  it  pretend  to  deal  with  the  more  fundamental 
physiological  aspects  of  the  problem  still  left  unsolved.  For 
example,  we  have  no  theory  to  offer,  and  no  conclusive  evi- 
dence to  show,  whether  the  fluctuating  vascular  conditions  to 
be  commented  upon  are  due  entirely  to  alterations  in  the  action 
of  the  heart,  or  in  part  to  the  vascular  system ;  nor  yet  whether 
the  dilators  or  constrictors  of  the  latter  system  or  both  are  con- 
cerned in  producing  the  changes. 

1  Many  of  the  points  we  shall  touch  upon  have  already  been  more  or  less 
fully  reported,  but  seldom  with  any  proper  emphasis  on  their  connection  with 
one  another,  which  is  what  we  shall  dwell  on. 

371 


372       JAMES  R.   ANGELL  AND   SIMON  F.   McLENNAN. 

Incidentally  we  may  say  that  the  frequency  with  which 
alterations  of  breathing,  pulse  beat  and  blood  supply  occur  in 
conjunction,  would  point  to  the  probability  that  the  effects  are 
due  to  no  one  set  of  organic  processes,  but  rather  to  diffused 
disturbances  in  several  of  the  higher  centers.  This  diffusion 
might,  of  course,  be  a  secondary  phenomenon  of  the  nature  of 
a  reflex,  discharged  from  a  center  primarily  affected,  but  the 
results  give  no  evidence  specially  suggestive  of  such  a  state  of 
things. 

This  general  class  of  considerations,  however,  appears  to  us 
to  possess  less  immediate  importance  than  those  which  we  pro- 
pose to  urge.  We  desire  to  emphasize,  on  the  basis  of  a  large 
number  of  experiments  (we  retain  as  trustworthy  over  1,100  of 
all  we  have  made),  conducted  under  conditions  of  great  care, 
certain  fundamental  difficulties  connected  with  this  method  of 
investigating  affective  states.  While  offering  very  little  that  is 
distinctly  new,  we  purpose  to  bring  into  strong  relief  the  dis- 
crepancies of  the  method,  and  to  call  in  question  again  the  exact 
significance  and  worth  of  results  attained  through  its  use. 

Before  proceeding  to  a  detailed  discussion  of  our  subject,  a 
few  words  are  in  order  concerning  our  apparatus,  method  of 
work,  etc. 

A  modification  of  Mosso's  plethysmograph,  hung  in  a  swing, 
served  to  give  us  both  the  vasomotor  disturbances  and  the  pulse 
beat.  The  plethysmograph  was  connected  with  Marey  tam- 
bours writing  on  the  drum  of  a  Stocking  kymograph — a  machine 
which  is  practically  noiseless  and  exceedingly  constant  in  its 
running.  The  hand  and  arm  up  to  the  elbow  were  immersed 
in  the  water  of  the  plethysmograph.  The  changes  in  the 
breathing  were  registered  by  means  of  tambours  arranged  as  a 
pneumograph.  A  wooden  spur  attached  to  the  breast  and  pres- 
sing against  a  tambour  permitted  us  to  get  the  slightest  fluctua- 
tions. We  abandoned  the  use  of  a  cardiograph  and  sphygmo- 
graph,  upon  finding  that  our  other  arrangements  were  going  to 
give  us  the  essential  points  in  which  we  were  interested,  at  a 
great  saving  of  labor.  The  senses  of  smell,  taste,  hearing  and 
sight  were  experimented  upon,  such  stimuli  being  used  as 
would,  supposedly,  produce  affective  states  readily  distinguish- 


CHICAGO  PSYCHOLOGICAL  LABORATORY.  373 

able  as  agreeable,  or  disagreeable.  For  sight  stimulations 
rotating  disks  were  employed;  for  smell,  cologne,  bayrum, 
assafoetida,  iodoform  and  turpentine  were  used ;  for  taste,  sugar, 
salt,  capsicum  and  quassia;  for  sound,  (i)  noises  of  various 
kinds,  e.  g.,  rasping,  snapping,  grinding,  (2)  tones  from 
mounted  tuning  forks.  The  external  conditions,  atmospheric 
and  otherwise,  were  kept  as  constant  and  favorable  as  possible. 
The  subjects,  with  whom  most  of  the  work  was  done,  were 
selected  from  a  considerable  number  of  students,  as  being  those 
who  gave  the  most  unequivocal  results. 

Stated  again  and  a  little  more  narrowly,  we  were  concerned 
with  the  interpretation  of  certain  organic  disturbances  due 
merely  to  processes,  initiated  in  the  centers,  as  compared  with 
those  due  to  -peripherally  excited  affective  conditions.  We  no- 
ticed very  early  in  the  experimentation  that  the  alterations  in 
organic  conditions  under  examination  depended,  as  has  been 
recognized,1  in  very  large  measure  upon  the  thorough  processes 
at  that  time  in  progress.  It  is,  of  course,  impossible  to  control 
these  entirely,  and  the  difficulty  is  increased  when,  as  in  the 
present  instance,  it  becomes  highly  desirable  to  have  the  mind 
as  nearly  quiescent  as  possible  in  order  to  obtain  unmistakable 
evidence  of  the  alterations  due  to  the  various  stimuli  employed 
to  produce  the  agreeable  and  disagreeable  states.  That  is  to 
say,  before  drowsiness  comes  on,  as  it  generally  does,  if  the 
mind  is  kept  quiet  for  a  little,  it  is  often  necessary  to  make  con- 
siderable effort  of  attention  to  keep  the  thought  processes  from 
running  off  into  all  sorts  of  vagaries  of  revery,  any  portion  of 
which  may  call  up  affective  disturbances.  The  mind,  if  kept 
*  empty,'  as  we  say,  is  frequently  kept  so  only  with  strain,  and 
this  strain  then  diverts  attention  from  the  incoming  stimuli  and 
so  complicates  the  affective  conditions,  which  they  are  intended 
to  set  up.  Thus,  one  gets  the  not  affective  state  brought  on  by 
stimulus,  but  the  affective  state  modified  by  and  blended  with  the 
prevailing  mental  state,  which  may  itself  be  already  affective, 
or  in  any  event  unfavorable  to  the  unambiguous  effectiveness 
of  the  stimulus.  In  this  connection  we  found  that  by  artificially 

1  In  this  general  connection  may  be  mentioned  Mosso's  observations  upon 
attention  and  cortical  circulation. 


374        JAMES  R.   AN G ELL  AND   SIMON  F.  McLENNAN. 

altering  the  thought  processes,  regardless  of  the  external  stim- 
uli, organic  disturbances  could  be  produced  essentially  similar,  in 
kind  if  not  degree,  to  those  which  occurred  under  the  affective 
conditions  induced  by  peripheral  stimulation.  Indeed,  were 
there  not  experimental  evidence  for  it,  one  might  fairly  antici- 
pate, from  the  general  interconnection  of  mental  and  bodily 
states,  that  the  change  in  mental  processes  would,  regardless  of 
its  affective  tones,  manifest  itself  in  some  change  of  bodily  con- 
dition. 

To  be  still  more  specific  on  this  head,  we  find,  for  instance, 
that  disagreeable  stimulations  of  taste  and  smell  produce  inco- 
ordinated  and  spasmodic  breathing,  depressions  and  irregular- 
ities of  pulse  and  decrease  of  blood  supply  to  the  periphery 
—  meaning  by  the  periphery  not  simply  the  skin,  but  the 
total  member  concerned,  in  this  case  the  hand  and  forearm. 
These  conditions  become  increasingly  violent  and  spasmodic,  as 
the  intensity  of  the  stimulation  and  the  lack  of  expectation  in 
the  subject  increases.  The  degree  of  uniformity  in  this  in- 
crease we  have  not  attempted  to  measure  accurately.  The 
general  fact,  has,  however,  been  shown  clearly.  Moreover, 
the  after  effect  as  revealed  in  these  ways  continues  for  a  very 
considerable  time.  A  reverse  condition  in  the  organic  pro- 
cesses manifests  itself  when  agreeable  stimuli  of  moderate  in- 
tensity are  employed,  with  a  somewhat  important  exception  to 
be  mentioned  later.  But  now  we  find  these  identical  motor  dis- 
turbances repeated  in  the  same  form,  though  generally  in  less 
degree,  when  the  subject  is  left  to  his  own  meditations,  or  when 
he  is  required  to  indulge  in  mental  gymnastics,  such,  for  exam- 
ple, as  performing  mathematical  calculations  and  this  too,  quite 
regardless  of  any  peripheral  stimulation.  Similar  results  show 
themselves  when  the  subject  is  allowed  to  read.  Often  marked 
changes  in  the  breathing  and  blood  supply  —  less  marked  in 
the  pulse  —  occur  when  the  thought  process  reveals  little  or 
nothing  adequate,  subjectively  considered,  to  produce  the  dis- 
turbance. These  fluctuations  could,  of  course  be  accounted 
for  on  purely  physiological  grounds,  as  due  to  changes  in  the 
chemical  conditions  in  the  blood,  brought  on  by  any  one  of  a 
dozen  physical  causes  directly  affecting  the  centers.  But  when 


CHICAGO  PSYCHOLOGICAL   LABORATORY.  375 

the  mind  is  kept  perfectly  passive,  and  especially  when  the 
first  stages  of  sleep  are  coming  on,  we  find,  almost  without  ex- 
ception, that  all  these  organic  processes  are  quiet  and  undis- 
turbed. This  fact  tends  to  render  it  probable  that  the  changes 
are  often,  if  not  always,  caused  by  cortical  conditions  regarded 
independently  of  the  mere  physical  environment.  We  have 
already  stated  that  the  atmospheric  conditions,  etc.,  were  kept 
as  constant  as  possible.  It  is  possible  that  some  of  these  results 
are  due  to  what  one  may  call  the  general  mood,  which  prevails 
at  the  time,  but  this  does  not  militate  against  our  contention. 

From  the  standpoint  of  method  then,  we  must  maintain  that 
any  attempt  to  use  these  particular  organic  activities  as  avenues 
of  approach,  in  the  study  of  delicate  affective  conditions,  appears 
essentially  impossible,  at  least  with  any  appliances  now  at  hand. 
And  this  not  because  affective  conditions  are  not  represented 
here,  but  because  so  many  other  factors,  in  no  fair  sense  to  be 
recognized  as  affective,  enter  in.  In  the  case  of  coarser  affective 
states  the  results  of  previous  investigations  are  substantially  cor- 
roborated by  our  own.1  But  it  is  not  invariably  true  that  the  de- 
liverances of  consciousness  and  the  performance  of  the  organism 
coincide,  e.  g. ,  it  does  not  always  occur  that  a  stimulus  pronounced 
agreeable  is  followed  by  observable  increase  of  blood  supply  to 
the  periphery.  Indeed,  there  is  considerable  difficulty  in  obtain- 
ing stimulations  of  short  durations,  whose  effects,  therefore,  are  at 

1  Without  furnishing  a  complete  tabulation  of  our  results,  which  could  not, 
unless  accompanied  by  cuts  of  the  curves,  be  made  very  intelligible,  we  may  say, 
that  with  stimulations  felt  as  clearly  disagreeable,  about  90%  of  all  the  cases 
show  a  fall  in  the  various  curves.  The  percentage  of  cases  of  rise  in  the  curves, 
corresponding  to  agreeable  stimuli,  has  been  considerably  smaller.  But  this  is 
in  large  measure,  no  doubt,  to  be  accounted  for  by  the  relative  weakness  of  the 
pleasure  tone  arising  from  the  stimuli.  The  difficulty  encountered  in  obtaining 
stimuli  to  produce  agreeable  affective  states  is  mentioned  elsewhere  in  the  paper. 
In  cases  where  the  subject  reports  the  stimulus  as  indifferent,  we  get  both 
kinds  of  result,  with  consequent  ambiguity  in  the  significance. 

It  is  interesting  to  note,  that  in  cases  where  the  attention  was  strongly 
focused  on  intellectual  activities,  such  as  reading  or  mental  arithmetic,  about 
25  %  of  the  results  show  alliance  with  the  agreeable  affective  states  by  a  slight 
but  continued  rise  in  the  curves,  while  75  %  show  a  more  or  less  sudden  and 
marked  decrease.  The  disturbances  in  these  processes,  due  to  mere  shifting  of 
the  attention,  have  already  been  somewhat  studied  abroad.  It  remains  for  some- 
one to  work  up  the  significance  of  these  facts  for  a  psycho-physical  theory  of 
aesthetics. 


376        JAMES  R.   ANGELL  AND   SIMON  F.   McLENNAN. 

all  readily  comparable,  which  possess  any  considerable  strength 
of  pleasure  tone.  Nor  is  there  any  obvious  and  exact  corre- 
spondence in  the  degree  of  the  subjectively  expressed  feeling 
tone  with  the  amount  of  the  disturbance  in  the  organism. 
Stimuli  to  the  various  senses  naturally  show  the  widest  differ- 
ences in  the  degree  which  they  affect  particular  ones  of  these 
processes,  and  the  subjective  effect  keeps  pace  only  in  a  general 
and  often  remote  way.  For  example,  agreeable  and  disagree- 
able odors  influence  the  breathing  process  in  a  very  pronounced 
manner.  A  very  faint  whiff  of  ammonia  will  in  a  merely  reflex 
way  produce  considerable  disturbance  of  this  character,  and  yet, 
it  may  not  be  judged  so  disagreeable  as  a  flickering  light,  which 
brings  about  much  less  change  in  these  organic  processes.  So 
we  feel  justified  in  reiterating  that  the  very  complex  conditions, 
under  which  affective  states  may  be  and  are  induced,  renders  it 
essentially  impossible  to  employ  this  means  of  investigation, 
when  delicate  results  are  sought.  In  any  event  the  general 
statement  that  agreeable  states  and  disagreeable  states  are  ac- 
companied respectively  by  increase  and  decrease  in  the  func- 
tional activities  of  the  organic  processes  here  considered,  requires 
to  be  offset  with  the  statement  that  other  mental  conditions,  be- 
sides those  subjectively  recognized  as  affective,  produce  similar 
results,  and  that  the  amount  of  the  bodily  manifestation  does  not 
seem  to  run  exactly  parallel  with  the  subjective  estimation  of 
the  agreeableness  or  disagreeableness  of  the  conscious  state. 

We  mentioned  above  a  minor  point  of  divergence  from  most 
observations  upon  which  we  should  comment.  It  is  this,  not 
infrequently  it  happens  that  a  stimulus  felt  to  be  pleasurable,  pro- 
duces for  a  few  seconds  a  decrease  in  the  blood  supply  to  the 
periphery  and  then  a  subsequent  increase.  So  far  as  we  could 
determine,  this  was  in  no  sense  due  to  the  intensity  of  the  stimu- 
lation, for  then  we  should  with  relatively  intense  stimuli  obtain 
subjective  conditions,  in  which  the  agreeableness  was  question- 
able, but  rather  to  a  condition  psychologically  equivalent  to  shock 
or  surprise,  and  springing  in  the  case  of  our  experiments  from 
even  the  slightest  maladjustment  of  expectation.  This  was  by 
no  means  of  sufficient  intensity  always  to  excite  notice  on  the 
part  of  the  subject,  but  it  tends  to  lend  new  and  striking  testi- 


CHICAGO  PSYCHOLOGICAL  LABORATORY.  377 

mony  to  the  intimate  connection  of  attraction  with  affective 
conditions.  For,  stated  again  and  more  concisely,  we  have 
here  a  case  of  an  agreeable  stimulus  producing  the  character- 
istic external  manifestations  of  a  disagreeable  stimulus,  not 
because  the  existing  mood,  or  affective  state,  is  unpropitious, 
for  both  these  may  be  neutral,  but  simply  because  the  adjust- 
ment of  the  attention  is  not  perfect.  This  peculiarity  was 
especially  marked  in  the  case  of  the  tuning-fork  stimulations. 
We  had  supposed  these  would  in  most  cases  be  felt  as  agree- 
able. But  this  was  far  from  being  always  the  case  when  at  all 
loud,  or  long  continued,  or  unexpected,  they  became  distinctly 
disagreeable. 

In  conclusion,  we  may  be  permitted,  perhaps,  to  insist  that 
out  of  the  purely  negative  considerations,  which  we  have  been 
urging,  certain  equally  positive  inferences  are  to  be  drawn. 
We  believe  that  the  results  traversed  in  what  we  have  said  lend 
striking  confirmation  to  the  essential  solidarity  of  consciousness, 
and  to  the  utter  futility  of  attempting  to  attack  the  problem  of 
the  peculiarities  of  any  one  aspect,  without  due  regard  to  all  the 
others  involved.  Affective  states  as  such  do  manifest  certain 
fairly  constant  and  experimentally  demonstrable  motor  expres- 
sions, but  the  same  motor  expressions  are  also  characteristic  of 
other  conscious  states,  not  recognizable  as  predominantly  affec- 
tive ;  nor  do  the  bodily  manifestations  of  these  affective  states 
run  absolutely  parallel  with  the  latter.  Observable  changes  in 
the  one  do  not  always  betoken  observable  changes  in  the  other. 
The  impossibility  of  asserting  in  any  particular  case  the  relative 
significance  of  the  bodily  modifications  for  the  affective  state  on 
the  one  hand,  and  the  merely  intellective,  or  cognitive,  state  on 
the  other,  renders  it  exceedingly  problematic  how  one  is  to  in- 
terpret results  gained  from  this  method.  It  is  greatly  to  be 
hoped,  however,  that  we  may  have  a  really  careful  test  made  on 
the  intensive  side  of  the  exact  relation  obtaining  between  the 
amount  of  the  bodily  manifestation,  and  the  subjective  estimate 
of  the  degree  of  the  agreeableness  or  disagreeableness  felt. 


37§  AMY  TANNER  AND  KATE  ANDERSON. 

IV.    SIMULTANEOUS  SENSE  STIMULATIONS. 
PRACTICE  STUDY.1 

BY  AMY  TANNER  AND  KATE  ANDERSON. 

The  published  work  of  Urbantschitsch,2  who  has  apparently 
made  the  most  extended  examination  of  the  phenomena  under 
consideration,  contains  no  account  of  apparatus  and  but  little  of 
his  method  of  procedure.  The  present  study  has  been  carried 
on  with  special  reference  to  the  peculiar  effects  produced  upon 
attention  and  the  interpretation  of  the  same.  In  general,  we 
find  confirmation  of  Urbantschitsch's  reported  observations,  but 
the  wide  divergences  shown  by  his  different  subjects,  and  by 
the  same  subjects  under  different  conditions,  together  with  his 
apparent  disregard  of  the  effects  of  attention,  render  it  probable 
that  much  of  his  report  is  untrustworthy  and  that  more  careful 
experimentation  would  give  less  equivocal  results.  We  have 
confined  ourselves  to  the  partial  interaction  of  auditory,  visual 
and  electrically  stimulated  tactual-muscular  sensations,  whereas 
Urbantschitsch  examined  the  effects  of  the  stimulation  of  each 
sense  upon  all  the  others. 

Stated  in  terms  of  attention,  the  problem  is  this  :  When  at- 
tention is  focused  upon  a  barely  perceptible  sensation,  does  the 
addition  of  another  sensation  render  the  first  more  or  less  per- 
ceptible? Or,  in  another  form — is  the  threshold  for  any  sensa- 
tion raised  or  lowered  by  the  presence  of  another  sensation  ? 

The  same  question  can,  of  course,  be  put  from  the  purely 
physiological  side.  Is  the  functional  activity  of  any  sense  or- 
gan conditioned  by  the  activity  of  any  other?  Is  the  inertia  of 
the  central  nervous  tracts  connected  with  any  sense  organ 
affected  by  excitation  in  other  sensory  regions  ?  The  question 
is,  however,  essentially  psycho-physical,  and  no  solution  which 
neglects  this  truth  can  really  do  justice  to  all  the  facts. 

1  In  accordance  with  the  usage  of  the  laboratory  in  which  their  work  has 
been  done,  the  authors,  in  connection  with  an  introductory  course,  began  this 
study  in  a  field  already  worked,  in  part  for  merely  disciplinary  purposes,  in  part 
to  determine  how  adequately  and  carefully  the  previous  investigations  had  been 
conducted. 

2  Pflugers  Archiv.,  1888. 


CHICAGO  PSYCHOLOGICAL  LABORATORY.  379 

We  find  that  in  a  large  majority  of  cases,  visual  sensations 
just  below  or  just  at  the  threshold  are,  upon  the  introduction  of 
a  second  sensation  from  either  the  same  or  another  sense  organ, 
brought  clearly  above  the  threshold.  We  find  that  in  some 
considerable  number  of  cases  the  mere  enlargement  of  the  field 
of  attention  results  in  a  brightening  of  the  center  of  the  field. 
Upon  this  point  Ladd1  states  :  "  Distraction  of  attention,  if  the 
aggregate  of  psychic  energy  be  not  increased,  necessarily  fol- 
lows upon  the  introduction  of  any  such  new  factor  or  object." 
If  this  statement  be  true,  we  must,  on  the  basis  of  such  results 
as  are  here  offered,  assert  that  the  sum  total  of  psychic  energy 
is  increased,  ordinarily,  if  not  invariably,  when  a  new  stimulus 
is  given.  Such  a  conception  is  certainly  not  current  in  our 
text-book  treatments  of  sensation. 

If  we  make  sharply  the  distinction  between  the  content  of 
attention  and  the  attentive  activity  itself,  and  also  the  distinc- 
tion between  attending  to  a  clear  sensation,  and  clearly  or  in- 
tensely attending  to  a  sensation,  then  our  results  compel  us  to 
revise  the  old  statement  that  the  more  things  we  attend  to 
simultaneously  the  less  clearly  do  we  perceive  any  one,  and  to  say 
that,  when  attention  is  directed  to  a  content  presented  to  any  one 
sense,  the  simultaneous  stimulation  of  other  senses  may  enlarge 
and  render  more  clear  the  field  of  the  first  sense,  though  we 
cannot  speak  with  entire  confidence  as  to  whether  or  not  the 
activity  of  the  attention  in  this  direction  is  or  is  not  increased. 

In  merely  neural  terms  the  results  seem  to  mean  that  the 
nervous  system  represents  at  any  moment  a  certain  amount  of 
inertia ;  that  this  is  attacked  by  every  sense  stimulation,  and 
that  the  inertia  of  any  region,  such  as  that  represented  by  the 
visual  tracts,  may  be  in  part  so  overcome  by  disturbance  from 
other  regions,  that  nervous  impulses  otherwise  ineffective 
may  successfully  penetrate  to  their  appropriate  cortical  centers 
and  there  set  up  the  processes  which  parallel  consciousness. 
This  result  probably  extends  in  some  cases  to  the  sense  organs 
themselves.  A  portion  of  our  experiments  comes  under  this  lat- 
ter head.  Such  are  the  answers  to  our  original  inquiries  when 
expressed  in  both  psychical  and  physiological  terms. 

1  Psychology,  Descriptive  and  Explanatory,  p.  72- 


380  AMY  TANNER  AND   KATE  ANDERSON. 

The  tests  here  reported  were  made  during  the  spring  and 
fall  of  1895.  Three  months  were  occupied  in  perfecting  appa- 
ratus and  making  preliminary  experiments.  The  present  re- 
port refers  to  six  weeks  of  work  done  under  the  improved  con- 
ditions. 

Our  apparatus  consisted  of  three  tubes  —  light-tight,  black- 
ened inside,  and  sliding  into  each  other.  At  one  end  was  a 
perforated  pasteboard  slide  arranged  so  that  the  light  from  col- 
ored glasses  could  be  seen  through  the  perforations.  The 
light  was  daylight,  reflected  from  a  white  pasteboard  in  front 
of  the  slide,  and  the  glasses  used  were  red,  yellow,  green  and 
blue. 

The  auditory  stimuli  were  given  by  tuning-forks  of  256  v. 
and  2048  v.,  and  also  by  the  whirring  noise  of  the  vibrator  on 
a  DuBois  Reymond  coil.  The  intensity  of  the  tones  of  the 
forks  was  controlled  by  a  ball  pendulum  which  was  employed 
to  strike  them.  Electrical  stimuli  from  the  coil  were  used  to 
stimulate  the  skin  of  the  palms.  The  added  visual  stimuli  were 
colors  of  the  same  size  as  those  first  exposed.  This  case,  of 
course,  introduces  the  question  of  merely  retinal  peculiarities 
as  distinguished  from  central  effects.  In  the  cases  here  reported 
the  intensities  of  the  stimuli  were  kept  constant.  In  passing  we 
may  say  that  from  other  tests  we  incline  to  think,  in  opposition 
to  Urbantschitsch,  that  the  observable  changes  due  to  altera- 
tions of  intensity  are,  except  near  the  upper  and  lower  limits, 
of  relatively  small  significance. 

The  experiments  were  carried  on  in  a  quiet  room  in  which 
experimenter  and  subject  were  alone.  The  subject  sat  at  the 
open  end  of  the  tube  with  his  face  supported  by  a  head-rest, 
and  his  head  and  shoulders  covered  by  a  camera  cloth  so  that 
he  was  in  total  darkness  and  could  see  none  of  the  operator's 
movements.  We  used  only  the  right  eye  in  our  experiments, 
and  in  order  to  cover  the  left,  and  yet  not  strain  it,  the  subject 
wore  spectacles  in  which  the  right  glass  was  removed  and  the 
left  covered  with  black  felt. 

In  order  to  obtain  good  conditions  each  subject  was  used 
only  twenty  minutes  a  day,  and  in  case  of  unusual  fatigue, 
cold,  etc.,  was  not  used  at  all.  Every  precaution  was  observed 


CHICAGO  PSYCHOLOGICAL  LABORATORY.  381 

to  prevent  the  subjects  from  knowing  either  the  purpose  or 
results  of  the  tests.  In  working  for  such  purposes,  with  sen- 
sations near  the  thresholds  this  is  indispensable  to  accuracy. 

The  method  of  procedure  was  as  follows :  At  the  outset  of 
the  experimentation  the  color  thresholds  for  the  various  sub- 
jects were  determined  by  means  of  the  sliding  tubes.  After  a 
brief  pause,  some  one  of  the  colors  was  shown,  either  at  or 
just  below  the  threshold.  Then  the  second  stimulus  was  given 
and  the  effect  on  the  color  reported.  The  length  of  time  con- 
sumed by  the  various  parts  of  the  test  was  kept  fairly  constant, 
save  that  occasionally  a  little  longer  time  than  usual  was 
allowed  for  the  giving  of  the  second  stimulus,  in  order  to  be 
sure  the  changes  were  not  due  to  pulses  of  attention,  which  so 
certainly  figure  in  the  report  of  Urb  ants  chits  ch.  The  greater 
constancy  of  our  own  results  also  argue  in  favor  of  this  con- 
clusion. 


TABLE  I.* 


ADDED  STIMULUS.  —  2048  v.  fork. 

ADDED   STIMULUS. 
256  v.  fork. 

CONTINUED  STIMULI. 

j 

CONTINUED 
STIMULI  . 

05 

1 

3 

reen. 

-6 

t 

,0 

3 

G 

. 

* 

> 

M 

O 

tf 

>< 

w 

0 

rt 

Faintly  perceived 
Unperceived. 

H 

5 

32 

28 
H 

38 
17 

112 

55 

H 
i 

30 

II 

18 
8 

45 

107 

•n 

Wrongly  perceived. 
Color  brought  out  or  intensified 
Unchanged. 

41 
49 
ii 

9 
56 
4 

18 
56 
4 

5 
57 
4 

73 

218 

22 

45 

5l 

19 

53 

7 

34 
9 

2 
56 

4 

IOO 
212 
28 

*  In  all  these  tables  the  number  of  subjects  is  three ;  and  twenty  tests  were 
made  with  each  of  the  subjects  with  each  of  the  continued  stimuli. 


382 


AMY  TANNER  AND  KATE  ANDERSON. 


TABLE   II. 


ADDED  STIMULUS  —  RED. 

ADDED  STIMULUS  — 
YELLOW. 

CONTINUED  STIMULI. 

. 

CONTINUED 
STIMULI. 

to 

^ 

3 

£ 

Er 

d 

O 

d 

o 

*« 

i 

8 

H 

| 

1 

-d 

H 

> 

m 

O 

M 

0 

ti 

Faintly  perceived. 
Unperceived. 

Ts 

29 
30 

45 

12 

"5 
60 

15 
45 

39 

21 

28 

22 

88 

Wrongly  perceived. 
Color  brought  out  or  intensified 
Unchanged. 

i 

546 

51 
9 

3 

5 
150 

21 

o 

0 

59 
i 

10 

49 

ii 

10 
150 
30 

ADDED  STIMULUS  —  BLUE. 

ADDED  STIMULUS  — 
GREEN. 

CONTINUED  STIMULI. 

to 

CONTINUED 
STIMULI. 

to 

. 

3 

13 

C 

|? 

o 

p 

Q 

i 

<u 

e 

"o 

H 

v> 

CD 

^ 

H 

& 

o 

!* 

* 

m 

^ 

Faintly  perceived. 

i3 

«s 

41 

69 

17 

9 

47 

73 

Unperceived. 

33 

44 

18 

W 

42 

9 

1  02 

Wrongly  perceived. 
Color  brought  out  or  intensified 
Unchanged. 

i 

i 
47 
13 

i 
36 
24 

16 

125 

55 

12 

o 

48 

12 

4 
47 
13 

5 
H3 
37 

TABLE   III. 


ADDED  STIMULUS. — ELECTRICITY. 


CONTINUED  STIMULI. 

to 

CONTINUED 
STIMULI. 

to 

1 

U 

<u 

3 

a 
p 

<u 

,5 

s 
£ 

"^ 

OJ 

3 

P 

73 
U 

rt 

e 

^ 

m 

O 

rt 

> 

M 

0 

M 

Faintly  perceived. 
Unperceived. 

27 

9 
20 

2 

34 

18 
30 

56 

92 

58 
i 

21 

6 

17 
24 

30 

J4 

108 
4^ 

Wrongly  perceived. 
Color  brought  out  or  intensified 
Unchanged. 

25 
27 

33 

3i 
23 
37 

24 

a 

12 
26 

34 

92 

JIO 

130 

20 

25 
35 

32 

21 

39 

19 
27 

33 

16 

22 
38 

87 
95 
H5 

ADDED  STIMULUS. — 
NOISE. 


CHICAGO  PSYCHOLOGICAL  LABORATORY.  383 

TABLE  IV. — RESULTS. 


Color 

Number  of 
tests. 

Faintly  per- 
ceived. 

Unper- 
ceived. 

Wrongly 
perceived. 

brought  out 
or 

Color 
unaffected. 

intensified. 

1680 

722 

570 

388 

1212 

468 

From  the  above  experiments  we  see  that  72+ per  cent,  of 
the  whole  number  gave  positive  results ;  with  the  2048  fork,  90 
per  cent. ;  with  the  256,  88  per  cent. ;  with  red,  88  per  cent. ; 
with  yellow,  83  per  cent. ;  with  green,  80  per  cent. ;  with  blue, 
70  per  cent. ;  with  electricity,  46  per  cent. ;  with  noise,  40  per 
cent. 

The  fact  that  only  40  per  cent,  of  the  experiments  with 
noise  are  positive,  contradicts  the  assumption  that  the  results 
vary  with  the  sense.  Otherwise  we  might  say  that  the  associ- 
ations of  eye  with  ear  are  closer  than  those  of  one  part  of  the 
retina  with  other  parts,  or  than  those  of  hand  with  eye.  Further 
experiments  may  show  that  pleasure  and  pain  have  some  con- 
stant relation  to  the  effects ;  but  here,  so  far  as  inquiries  were 
made,  the  added  stimuli  were  indifferent,  except  the  electricity, 
which  was  disagreeable  to  A.  A.  F. 

With  colors,  the  red  and  yellow,  which  gave  the  largest  per 
cent,  of  positive  results,  are  visible  at  greater  distances  than  the 
green  and  blue.  But  where  red  and  yellow  are  the  continued 
stimuli  the  results  are  no  more  positive  than  where  green  and 
blue  are.  That  red  and  yellow  should  have  this  peculiarity  ap- 
parently furnishes  another  presumption  in  favor  of  Heiny's 
theory. 

Although  the  conditions  were  not  all  that  could  be  desired, 
we  failed,  in  connection  with  a  considerable  number  of  tests  con- 
ducted by  Miss  Faith  Clark,  to  find  any  constant  positive  effect 
upon  the  accommodating  apparatus  of  the  eye,  either  from  the 
stimuli  here  mentioned,  or  from  gustatory  or  olfactory  stimula- 
tions. The  elimination  of  the  disturbances  due  to  fluctuating 
attention  on  this  form  of  the  experiment  are  much  more  difficult 
and  require  much  more  delicate  appliances. 


SOME  REMARKS   UPON  APPERCEPTION. 

BY  J.   KODIS, 
Chicago. 

The  great  significance  which  the  conception  of  apperception 
has  obtained  in  modern  psychology  necessitates  a  thorough  un- 
derstanding of  the  content  of  this  conception.  An  historical 
investigation  of  the  meanings  that  have  been  ascribed  to  the 
conception  of  apperception  gives  no  positive  and  satisfactory 
result ;  not  only  has  apperception  been  differently  conceived  by 
different  philosophers,  but  many  philosophers  have  used  one  of 
these  conceptions  for  another,  and  even  in  the  construction  of  a 

*  theory  of  apperception'  have  blended  together  a  number  of 
different    psychical   phenomena.       Nevertheless,    in   order   to 
analyze  this  notion,  it  will  be  necessary  to  arrange  the  separate 
types  of  these  different  conceptions  into  their  different  classes.1 

In  all  we  are  able  to  gather  from  the  history  of  psychology 
three  types  of  the  notion  of  apperception. 

1.  Apperception  as  an  event  which  imparts  clearness  to  rep- 
resentations. 

2.  Apperception  as  reflective  knowledge. 

3.  Apperception  as  an  act  of  knowledge  produced  by  the 
impact  of  two  groups  of  representations. 

(i)  Apperception  as  an  event  which  imparts  clearness  to 
representations.  The  historical  development  of  this  conception 
begins  with  Descartes  in  his  definition  of  a  clear  perception,  his 

*  clear  perception '  being  namely,  one  which  manifests  itself  im- 
mediately and  explicitly  in  an  attentive  intellect  (Principes  de 
la  phil.,  trad,  par  Aime  Martin,  p.  2pf),  just  as  when  an  object 
sufficiently  affects  the  eye  and  the  latter  is  disposed  to  see  it. 
This  conception  was  also  used  by  Leibnitz  in  the  *  Nouv.  Ess.'2 

1  In  regard  to  the  proof  for  this  affirmation  see  my  '  Zur  Analyse  des  Apper- 
ceptionsbegriffs.'     Calvary  &  Companie,  Berlin. 
2 Nouv.  Ess.,  p.  23,  Opera  philosophica. 

384 


APPERCEPTION.  385 

According  to  the  definition  found  there,  apperception  is  to  be 
distinguished  only  quantitatively  from  perception;  from  the 
summation  or  the  strengthening  of  perceptions  arises  appercep- 
tion. Lately  the  word  apperception  has  been  much  used  by 
Wundt  in  the  sense  of  the  clear  perception  of  Descartes.  This 
is  particularly  marked  in  his  use  of  the  Cartesian  illustration  in 
which  perception  is  compared  with  a  visible  object.  Perception, 
according  to  Wundt,  corresponds  to  vision  in  the  field  of  vision, 
apperception  to  vision  in  the  fovea  centralist 

(2)  Apperception  as  reflective  knowledge  >  *  connaissance 
reflexive.''  This  reflective  knowledge  consists  in  the  act  of 
thought,  concerning  the  relation  of  the  object  of  recognition 
and  the  thinking  ego. 

The  first  to  ascribe  this  meaning  to  apperception  was  Leibnitz,2 
but  this  conception  was  left  by  him  relatively  undeveloped. 
He  defines  reflective  knowledge  as  an  act  of  thought  about  some- 
thing that  is  taking  place  in  our  ego.  This  theory  was  taken 
up  and  extended  by  Wolf.  According  to  Wolf,  when  we  be- 
come conscious  of  the  perceived  object,  we  perceive  a  certain 
act  of  the  soul,  namely,  apperception.  We  distinguish  our- 
selves at  once  as  perceiving  subject  from  the  perceived  object. 
We  recognize  that  the  subject  is  different  from  this  object.3 

The  fullest  development  of  this  theory  is  attained  in  the  con- 
ception of  Kant  in  his  concept  of  transcendental  apperception, 
which  is  namely  the  representation  of  the  ego  in  relation  to  all 
other  representations.4  '  This  original  and  necessary  conscious- 
ness of  the  identity  of  self,'  being  at  the  same  time  the  consci- 
ousness of  an  equally  necessary  synthesis  of  all  phenomena 
through  representations. 

In  many  respects  Wundt's  theory  is  similar.  Indeed,  ac- 
cording to  Wundt,  apperception  is  at  bottom  the  same  func- 
tion as  will.  But  the  essence  of  will  is  the  feeling  of  individual 
doing  and  suffering.5  This  feeling,  considered  by  Wundt  as 
the  single  permanent  state  of  the  soul  is  what  Kant  designated 

lPhys.  Psyck.  cf.  p.  236  f  II,  4  Auflage. 

2  Monad,  p.  15  f. 

3  Psych.  Ration,  p.  19. 

*Krit  d.  r.  Vern.  p.  121,  2  Aufl.  ausg.  v.  Kehrbach. 
5  System  p.  384. 


3  86  j.  KODIS. 

the  transcendental  ego.  Thus  apperception  is  the  first  mani- 
festation of  the  will,  which  forms  at  the  same  time  a  basis  for 
the  continuity  of  consciousness  and  the  identity  of  the  individual. 

(3)  Apperception  as  the  production  of  knowledge  through 
the  impact  of  two  groups  of  representations.  This  conception 
of  apperception  was  originated  and  developed  by  Herbart  and 
his  school.  According  to  this  conception,  apperception  is  the 
process  by  which  the  incoming  representation  sets  in  motion 
already  existing  representations  and  at  last,  according  to  the 
laws  of  psychical  mechanics,  produces  an  end  result,  which  must 
be  considered  as  dependent  on  all  active  forces.  This  theory  is 
based  upon  the  assumption  of  an  eternal  existence  of  the  repre- 
sentations and  an  artificial  psychical  mechanics,  whose  laws, 
carried  out  speculatively,  are  assumed  to  be  analogous  to  phys- 
ical laws.1 

These  are  the  three  types  of  the  definition  of  apperception, 
disclosed  by  an  historical  sunvey.  Has  one  of  these  definitions 
a  stronger  claim  to  existence  than  another?  Are  all  three 
definitions  a  delineation  of  three  different  phases  of  the  same 
event,  or  are  all  three  definitions  a  delineation  of  three  separate 
and  distinct  events,  which  are  classed  as  one  and  the  same? 
And  is  apperception  in  all  or  any  of  these  theories  conceived 
as  an  especial  and  important  function  of  the  soul :  as  an 
especial  form  of  activity?  We  can  hope  to  answer  these  ques- 
tions only  by  an  analysis  of  the  psychical  acts,  which  have 
given  rise  to  these  psychological  theories.  Such  an  analysis 
necessitates  the  rejection  of  all  speculative  elements,  and  the 
setting  forth  of  the  psychical  facts  of  experience,  which  are  the 
kernel  of  these  theories.  This  is  the  method,  which  will  be 
attempted  in  the  following  pages. 

APPERCEPTION    AS   AN  EVENT   WHICH    IMPARTS  CONSCIOUS- 
NESS OR  CLEARNESS  TO  REPRESENTATIONS. 
It  is  known  that  Kant  used  the  conceptions  apperception  and 
consciousness  interchangeably  and  this  interchange  is  often  ob- 

*It  may  be  noticed  here,  that  the  meaning  which  Steinthal,  a  disciple  of 
Herbart,  attributes  co  attention,  is  nearly  the  same  as  the  meaning  of  appercep- 
tion in  the  sense  of  '  Connaissaflce  reflexive.'  See  Einleitung  in  d.  Psych,  p. 
231.  2  Aufl. 


APPERCEPTION.  387 

served  in  all  philosophers,  who  have  occupied  themselves  with 
the  theory  of  apperception,  most  of  them  having  used  as 
synonyms  clearness  and  consciousness.  But  when  it  is  a 
question  of  defining  '  Clearness '  more  particularly  the  two  de- 
finitions of  apperception  and  clearness  usually  differ.  Accord- 
ing to  Kant,  *  empirical  apperception '  is  the  consciousness  of 
self,  as  determined  by  our  condition  (Krit  d.  r.  Vern.  p.  673, 
2  Aufl.  Kehrbach),  and  'clearness'  the  state,  where  the  con- 
sciousness of  a  conception  rises  to  a  consciousness  of  its  differ- 
ence from  other  conceptions  (p.  692).  Thus  notwithstanding 
that  apperception,  as  an  event,  which  imparts  clearness  to  con- 
ception, may  be  easily  identified  with  consciousness,  this  identi- 
fication has  been  avoided,  whenever  the  question  of  exactness 
arose. 

The  reason  for  this  lies  probably  in  the  fact  that  most  psy- 
chologists (with  the  exception  of  Steinthal)  who  have  elabo- 
rated the  apperception  theory  have  used  not  the  conception  of 
consciousness  as  a  state,  but  the  conception  of  consciousness  as  a 
substance.  On  the  other  hand,  the  conception  of  apperception 
as  a  function  of  consciousness  could  not  pertain  to  a  substance. 
Consequently  the  relation  of  apperception  and  consciousness 
was  as  follows  :  Consciousness  was  believed  to  have  the  power 
of  giving  greater  clearness  to  representations,  this  power  being 
nothing  else  than  apperception.  In  this  way  when  we  possess 
a  representation,  its  clearness  is  not  an  inherent  element,  but 
something  added  to  it  by  some  extra  power  of  consciousness. 
Apperception  does  not  create  clearness  or  consciousness,  but 
serves  to  divide  and  to  heighten  it. 

In  addition  to  consciousness,  considered  as  a  substance,  a 
ground  for  the  assumption  of  an  especial  power  of  the  soul  for 
the  regulation  of  clearness  lies  in  the  fact  that  the  most  inten- 
sive representations  are  not  always  the  clearest.  This  problem 
of  the  separation  of  intensity  and  clearness  is  familiar  to  all 
who  follow  the  history  of  modern  psychology. 

In  reference  to  this  problem  it  has  happened  as  with  many 
other  problems,  that  it  was  not  solved,  but  postponed,  i.  e.,  since 
no  fixed  relation  could  be  determined  between  intensity  and 
clearness,  the  regulation  of  intensity  'was  attributed  to  an  es- 


/.   KODIS. 

pecial  power  of  the  soul.  This  power  of  the  soul,  i.  £.,  apper- 
ception, was  enabled  to  perform  its  function  spontaneously. 
In  this  way  it  was  believed  possible  to  overcome  the  difficulty 
of  distinguishing  the  phenomena  of  clearness  and  intensity  in 
representations. 

Recently  this  theory  has  been  modified  by  Wundt.  The 
regulation  of  consciousness  is  ascribed  not  to  the  metaphysical 
spontaneity  of  the  soul,  but  to  the  empirical  faculty  of  the  will. 
The  state  of  affairs  is  in  consequence  not  greatly  changed, 
since  the  metaphysical  spontaneity  of  the  soul  is  hereby  simply 
relegated  to  the  will,  to  which  is  given  the  creative  power  in 
evoking  representations.  In  order  to  enter  clearly  into  the 
foregoing  questions,  it  is  necessary  to  consider  more  closely  the 
relationship  between  intensity  and  consciousness,  and  the  theory 
of  the  spontaneity  of  the  soul. 

THE  SEPARATION  OF  INTENSITY  AND  CONSCIOUSNESS  IN 
PSYCHICAL  PHENOMENA. 

The  natural  presumption  is,  that  the  most  intensive  in  the 
psychical  life  is  at  the  same  time  the  clearest.  This  presumption 
is  perhaps  based  upon  an  unauthorized  generalization  from  a  fact 
often  observed.  But  wider  experience  shows  us  that  often  rep- 
resentations so  weak  as  to  be  almost  unable  to  awaken  any  con- 
siderable feeling  suddenly  rise  into  complete  clearness.  To 
explain  this  phenomenon  Herbart  enunciated  his  law  of  *  Hiilfen,' 
according  to  which  representations  rise  into  consciousness,  not 
met  by  reason  of  their  own  force,  but  in  consequence  of  a  favor- 
able combination  with  other  representations  they  are  enabled  to 
awaken  consciousness  and  to  thrust  into  the  background  other 
representations.  In  recent  times  two  opposed  theories  are  held 
in  relation  to  this  problem :  the  theory  of  association  and  the 
theory  of  will,  but  neither  of  these  theories  is  sufficient  to  ex- 
plain the  problem  and  the  adverse  criticism  of  the  adherents  of 
both  these  theories  is  justified.  In  fact,  if  we  ascribe  to  the  will 
the  bringing  into  consciousness  of  representations,  it  is  neces- 
sary to  consider  will  in  a  certain  measure  anthropomorphic. 
Since  we  know  that  we  choose  among  conceptions,  we  now  attri- 
bute thisiaculty  to  the  will,  It  is  no  longer  the  man  who  executes 


APPERCEPTION.  389 

the  choice,  but  his  will  acts  in  this  manner.  The  matter  is 
thereby  rendered  not  in  the  least  clearer.  What  we  have 
hitherto  ascribed  to  our  entire  human  nature  is  merely  relegated 
without  warrant  to  a  province  of  our  nature.  This  theory  is 
furthermore  unwarranted  since  it  excludes  the  possibility  of  a 
consistent  carrying  out  of  the  principle  of  the  dependence  of  the 
psychical  phenomena  upon  the  physiological  condition  of  the 
organism.  The  physiological  phenomena  are  determined  by 
the  law  of  causality  and  subject  to  the  law  of  the  conservation  of 
energy.  A  free  activity  of  the  will  could  in  nowise  be  attached  to 
such  a  strictly  determined  condition.1 

Although  the  association  theory  does  not  contain  this  funda- 
mental mistake,  it  is  nevertheless  insufficient,  since  it  has  not 
succeeded  in  giving  the  characteristics  of  the  psychical  phe- 
nomena which  are  conditions  of  a  higher  grade  of  conscious- 
ness. So  it  remains  unknown,  why  in  the  whole  mass  of 
knowledge  of  the  individual  only  especial  representations  and 
conceptions  are  able  to  undergo  such  associations  that  they 
reach  the  highest  grade  of  consciousness. 

The  fault  of  these  theories  lies  in  the  fact  that  they  proceed 
to  explanations  before  all  the  facts  are  discovered  and  their  re- 
lations to  one  another  described.  In  addition,  in  spite  of  the 
wish  of  many  psychologists,  that  the  objective,  i.  e.9  the  physi- 
ological condition  of  consciousness  should  be  determined,  most 
authors  make  no  effort  to  do  so.  And  yet  this  is  the  only  way 
to  obtain  a  general  solution  of  the  problem.  Only  on  the  basis 
of  the  relationship  between  psychical  phenomena  and  central 
nervous  processes,  can  we  pretend  to  reach  a  satisfactory 
explanation. 

Such  an  attempt  we  find  in  the  theory  of  R.  Avenarius 
(Kritik  d.  reinen  Erfahrung,  p.  51,  B.  I  and  p.  18,  B.  II), 
which  considers  intensity  and  consciousness  as  dependent  on 
the  centro-nervous  processes  from  which  they  derive  their 
especial  character.  In  this  way  the  difference  between  in- 
tensity and  consciousness  (in  the  sense  of  state  of  consciousness) 
is  kept  distinct.  We  know  from  experience,  that  the  intensity 
among  physical  phenomena  is  dependent  upon  the  size  of  the 

1  Zur  Analyse  des  Apperceptionsbegrijfs,  p.  135. 


39°  /•   KODIS. 

waves.  Hence  we  approach  the  supposition,  that  the  intensity 
of  our  representations  depends  immediately  upon  the  size  of  the 
centro-nervous  vibrations  of  a  thinking  individual. 

Concerning  consciousness  (consciousness  considered  as  a 
state) ,  we  see  that  through  the  variations  in  the  environment  of 
an  individual  the  consciousness  of  the  individual  may  be  trans- 
ferred from  one  object  to  another.  This  fact  leads  us  to  the 
affirmation  that  consciousness  depends  upon  some  deviation  from 
the  customary  arrangement  of  the  vibrations  in  the  centro- 
nervous  system  (Krit.  d.  r.  Erf.  See  Abhebung,  p.  57,  B.  II). 
Thus,  since  it  often  happens,  that  the  increase  in  intensity  of 
one  part  of  the  general  impression  is  sufficient  to  change  the 
customary  arrangement  of  the  centro-nervous  vibrations  it  comes 
about  that  intensity  and  consciousness  coincide. 

The  scientific  value  of  this  theory  is  apparent,  since  it  is 
possible  through  variations  in  the  environment  of  the  individual 
or  in  his  customary  mass  of  knowledge  to  bring  about  a  con- 
scious state  and  to  conduct  the  consciousness  from  one  repre- 
sentation to  another.  We  can  proceed  experimentally  to  aug- 
ment or  to  decrease  the  intensity,  we  are  able  also  to  augment 
or  to  decrease  consciousness  in  proportion  to  the  time,  which 
passes  during  the  variation  of  some  customary  mass  of  knowl- 
edge. 

SPONTANEITY  IN  THE  PRODUCTION  OF  REPRESENTATIONS. 

The  theory  of  spontaneity  was  formed  by  Leibnitz  upon  the 
ground  of  *  inner  experience.'  He  declared  in  a  letter  to  de 
Bayle :  "  L'experience  interne  refute  la  doctrine  Epicurienne." 
According  to  him  the  spontaneity  of  the  soul  is  necessary  in 
order  to  explain  that  which  we  have  observed  in  the  *  inner  ex- 
perience.' Thus  we  see  from  an  historical  investigation  that  the 
ground  which  we  mentioned  above  for  the  assumption  of  the 
spontaneity  of  the  soul,  namely,  the  separation  of  the  phenomena 
of  consciousness  and  intensity,  is  not  the  only  one.  An  element 
presumably  still  more  important  lies  in  the  fact  that  -we  are  able, 
-without  any  known  external  cause  to  originate  independent 
chains  of  thought. 

A  third  ground  for  this  affirmation  lies  in  the  fact,  that  we 


APPERCEPTION.  391 

are  able  to  experience  directly  the  feeling  of  the  spontaneity  of 
our  acts.  With  the  first  of  these  three  reasons,  we  are  at  pres- 
ent not  occupied,  but  when  we  investigate  the  two  latter  more 
closely,  we  see  that  the  explanation  of  these  facts  by  means  of 
the  help  of  the  theory  of  spontaneity  arises  from  the  old  ten- 
dency to  consider  psychical  phenomena  of  a  central  character 
as  independent  of  physiological  processes.  But  if  we  enter 
the  ground  of  the  dependence  of  psychical  phenomena  upon 
physiological  states  of  the  nervous  system,  there  disappears  the 
inconceivability  of  both  the  independent  production  of  chains  of 
thought  and  the  sensation  of  spontaneity. 

Indeed,  it  is  well  known  to  the  physiologist,  that  the  activity 
of  the  nerves  arises  not  only  in  consequence  of  peripheral  stim- 
ulation, but  also  as  a  result  of  the  nutrition  of  the  centers.  The 
functions  of  the  organism,  which  originate  by  means  of  the 
latter  method,  are  the  so-called  *  automatic  functions.'  This 
automaticity  of  the  central  nervous  system  originates  nervous 
processes,  which  have  as  correlates  chains  of  thought,  the  causes 
of  which  can  not  be  traced  to  other  psychical  phenomena. 
This  fact  has  long  been  known  and  ased  in  psychiatry,  in  the 
treatment  of  disturbances  arising  from  an  under  or  an  over  sup- 
ply of  blood  to  the  brain. 

We  see,  therefore,  that  the  spontaneity  of  the  soul  is  req- 
uisite to  explain  facts  of  this  kind,  but  under  the  condition  that 
we  derive  the  psychical  states  unreservedly  one  from  another 
as  we  do  in  dealing  with  physiological  states.  But  so  long  as 
we  retain  the  conception  that  psychical  states  are  the  corollaries 
of  physiological  states,  which  follow  among  themselves  the  law 
of  causation,  the  theory  of  spontaneity  remains  useless. 

The  third  ground  for  the  assumption  of  spontaneity,  the 
direct  sensation  of  impulse  in  thought,  has  been  so  much  dis- 
cussed that  this  feeling  no  longer  plays  a  role  as  something  of 
mysterious  importance.  Although  psychological  analysis  has 
not  yet  definitely  determined,  whether  this  feeling  rests  upon  sen- 
sations coming  from  the  organs  and  from  muscular  contractions, 
or  whether  it  is  a  sensation  of  motion,  produced  in  the  central 
nervous  system,  it  is  nevertheless  classed  among  the  feelings 
under  the  name  of  a  feeling  of  innervation.  Consequently  it  is 


392  /•   KODIS. 

subject  to  the  same  laws  as  other  feelings.  Thus  we  see,  that 
all  three  reasons  for  the  acceptation  of  the  spontaneity  of  the 
soul  prove  worthless.  Consequently,  apperception,  as  an  event, 
which  imparts  clearness  to  representations  is  a  useless  concep- 
tion, which  really  means  no  more  than  clearness,  and  has  grown 
out  of  a  conception  of  consciousness  as  a  substance  and  rests 
upon  a  false  idea  of  the  spontaneity  of  the  soul. 

APPERCEPTION  AS  REFLECTIVE  KNOWLEDGE. 

Apperception,  in  the  sense  of  reflective  knowledge  was  first 
taken  into  consideration  as  a  fact  of  observation,  but  afterwards 
this  fact  received  explanations,  which  came  to  be  substituted  for 
the  fact  itself.  Naturally,  through  this  circumstance,  the  whole 
theory,  instead  of  being  elucidated,  was  considerably  obscured. 
We  shall  now  endeavor  to  determine  the  results  of  observation. 

When  we  recognize  with  full  consciousness  something  that 
belongs  to  the  world  of  thoughts  or  of  affairs,  this  act  of  recog- 
nition is  bound  up  with  a  feeling  of  appropriation.  We  know 
and  feel  at  the  same  time,  that  we  appropriate  it,  i.  e.,  the  ego 
appropriates  the  thought  or  the  object  which  confronts  it.  Along 
with  this  act  we  experience  feelings  from  the  organs,  corre- 
sponding to  the  way,  in  which  the  knowledge  originates.  Thus 
we  feel  that  an  object  is  perceived  or  a  thought  is  conceived. 

Knowledge  through  reflection  is,  therefore,  nothing  else 
than  a  becoming  conscious  of  this  especial  content  of  knowledge. 
In  fact,  according  to  the  authors  of  the  theory  of  reflective 
knowledge,  the  latter  is  merely  the  bringing  into  relation  of  the 
ego  to  an  object  thought  of  or  perceived.  That  is  to  say,  it  is  the 
act  of  becoming  conscious  of  the  fact,  that  a  certain  determined 
value  is  thought  of  or  perceived  by  the  ego. 

Reflective  knowledge,  as  this  especial  content  of  knowledge 
deserves  indeed  the  important  place  that  has  been  assigned  to  it 
in  psychology,  as  will  be  seen  from  the  following  statements : 
Only  a  part  of  this  content  of  knowledge  is  varied  during  the 
course  of  the  individual  life,  namely,  things  or  thoughts  which 
form  objects  of  recognition,  for  the  ego  with  the  organic  feel- 
ings, which  accompany  perception  or  ideation,  remains  ever 
the  same.  It  is,  so  to  say,  a  constant  in  the  psychical  life. 


APPERCEPTION.  393 

Kant  expressed  this  fact  in  the  well-known  proposition  that  the 
conception  of  self  accompanies  or  may  accompany  every  repre- 
sentation. In  modern  philosophy  it  has  been  especially  pointed 
out  by  W.  Schuppe1  and  R.  Avenarius2  that  the  ego  and  its 
experiences  form  a  single  system.  Both  the  self  and  its  experi- 
ences belong  always  and  inseparably  together. 

But  since  notwithstanding  that  the  representations  of  the  ego 
may  accompany  every  state  of  consciousness,  this  accompani- 
ment does  not  always  take  place,  we  must  determine  more 
accurately  what  are  the  facts.  Although  the  self  and  its  experi- 
ences form  a  system  in  which  the  self  represents  a  relatively 
unchanging  member,  nevertheless,  the  self  is  also  an  object  of 
experience  like  all  other  experiences.  Thus  it  is  possible  that 
the  self  with  its  experiences  forms  a  content  of  knowledge,  but 
on  the  other  hand,  it  is  possible  that  this  content  is  formed  only 
by  the  experiences  of  the  self,  i.  e.,  by  things  or  by  thoughts. 
In  this  case  not  the  whole  system  of  the  self  with  its  affairs  and 
its  thoughts  is  known,  but  only  a  part  of  the  same.  Not  the 
whole  relation  is  recognized  but  only  one  of  its  members  is  abso- 
lutely apprehended.1  So  for  example,  when  a  man  recognizes  a 
table  and  reflects  only  upon  this  object,  he  perceives  the  table 
absolutely.  If,  however,  he  recognizes  the  table  as  an  object 
perceived  by  him,  it  is  a  case  of  relative  knowledge.  So  it 
may  be  seen,  that  every  absolute  act  of  knowing  may  pass 
over  into  a  relative  act  of  knowing. 

Is    REFLECTIVE    KNOWLEDGE   AN    ESPECIAL    FUNCTION    OF 

MIND? 

We  have  stated  above  that  reflective  knowledge  is  a  content 
of  knowledge,  which  is  deserving  of  especial  attention.  The 
question  now  arises  whether  reflective  knowledge  is  not  an 
especial  function  of  mind?  Apperception  in  the  sense  of  re- 
flective knowledge  has  generally  been  considered  an  especial 
function  of  the  soul,  even  the  highest  function.  We  have  seen 

1  Erkentnisstheoretisclie  Logik. 

2  Weltbegrif. 

1 1  use  the  expressions  '  absolute '  and  '  relative '  knowledge  according  to  the 
terminology  of  Avenarius  in  Weltbegriff,  p.  15. 


394  /.    KODIS. 

already  that  knowledge  through  reflection  is  knowledge  that  is 
directed  to  the  relation  between  the  ego  and  its  affairs  and 
thoughts.  But  among  our  thoughts  there  are  countless  cases  of 
knowledge  directed  to  relations.  Therefore,  we  can  believe 
that  reflective  knowledge  is  a  special  function  of  mind  only 
when  the  relation  between  the  self  and  its  thoughts  and  affairs 
includes  elements  of  an  especial  nature. 

The  relation  between  the  ego  and  its  experiences  was  indeed 
conceived  as  something  especial  and  different  from  all  else. 
The  reason  for  this  lay  in  the  conception  of  the  ego,  as  a  terri- 
tory sharply  bounded  off  from  its  whole  environment.  In  this 
enclosed  province  the  « inner  experience '  was  believed  to  reign. 
On  the  contrary  the  events  of  which  the  ego  took  cognizance 
were  conceived  as  lying  in  the  province  of  the  *  outer  experi- 
ence/ As  the  two  sorts  of  experiences  were  believed  to  be 
fundamentally  different,  apperception  was  assigned  the  im- 
portant role  of  bringing  the  '  outer  experiences '  into  the  *  inner 
experiences'  of  the  ego.  The  outside  world  was  to  be  brought 
by  apperception  into  the  ego.  The  '  outer  experiences '  must 
come  into  contact  with  the  '  inner  experiences.' 

So  long  as  we  remain  in  the  province  of  the  philosophy, 
which  assumes  the  *  outer '  and  the  '  inner '  experiences  as 
fundamentally  different,  we  must  accept  *  apperception '  as  a 
special  function  of  mind.  But  in  case  we  do  not  accept  the 
two  kinds  of  experiences,  as  things  fundamentally  different,  we 
cannot  accept  the  act  of  bringing  these  experiences  into  relation 
as  an  event,  which  is  peculiar  among  examples  of  relative 
thinking.  Given  the  content  of  reflective  knowledge,  it  is  not 
possible  by  psychological  analysis  to  prove  the  bringing  of  the 
*  outer  experiences'  into  the  'inner  experiences.'  We  have 
been  able  to  prove  only  the  feeling  of  appropriation,  a  state 
which  depends  upon  certain  modifications  in  our  sensation  of 
motion.  Therefore,  so  long  as  we  remain  upon  empirical 
ground  we  cannot  receive  as  an  element  of  apperception  the  act 
of  bringing  the  *  outer '  into  the  'inner'  experience.  This  is 
merely  a  theory  based  upon  the  assumption  of  a  fundamental 
difference  between  the  inner  and  the  outer  world — only  a  method 
of  elucidation  of  the  way  in  which  it  comes  about  that  the  ego 


APPERCEPTION.  395 

sharply  bounded  off  from  the  outside  world  appropriates  some- 
thing of  the  latter  to  itself.  But  since  we  demand  not  a  specu- 
lative but  an  empirical  psychology,  we  may  not  treat  as  facts 
the  results  of  speculation.  We  must  become  clear  upon  the 
fact,  that  we  cannot  prove  empirically  the  bringing  of  the 
*  outer'  into  the  'inner'  world.  If  any  one  for  the  sake  of 
some  metaphysical  theory  wishes  to  assume  that  such  a  trans- 
formation may  take  place,  he  is  naturally  free  to  do  so,  but  so 
far  as  we  are  concerned,  we  shall  not  make  use  of  this  assump- 
tion. The  more  so,  as  in  the  light  of  recent  criticism  the  philo- 
sophical justification  for  such  a  course  seems  more  than 
doubtful.1 

Reflective  knowledge  must,  therefore,  be  considered  as  a 
content  of  knowledge,  which  is  produced  through  the  relation 
between  the  ego  and  its  affairs  or  thoughts,  and  which  is  ac- 
companied by  the  specific  organic  feeling  of  thought  or  per- 
ception, together  with  the  feeling  of  appropriation,  which  is  a 
modification  of  the  feeling  of  motion. 

APPERCEPTION  AS  THE  PRODUCTION  OF  KNOWLEDGE  THROUGH 

THE  IMPACT  OF  Two  GROUPS  OF  REPRESENTATIONS. 
Apperception,  as  understood  by  the  Herbartian  school,  may, 
in  contrast  to  knowledge,  through  reflection,  be  defined  as  fol- 
lows :  Reflective  knowledge  is  an  event,  where  any  conscious 
content  of  knowledge  comes  into  contact  with  the  consciousness 
of  self,  whereas  apperception  in  its  third  signification  is  only  the 
first  part  of  this  act.  Only  the  act  of  the  production  of  knowl- 
edge was  investigated  by  Herbart.  Every  knowledge  may,  in 
the  moment  of  its  formation  be  divided  into  two  parts :  a  new 
content  of  knowledge,  and  the  determination  of  the  same  through 
previously  acquired  knowledge.2 

This  fact  Herbart  interprets  from  his  speculative  standpoint 
as  the  motion  and  impact  of  two  different  groups  of  representa- 
tions of  which  the  newer  group  awakes  and  is  modified  by  the 
older  group.  To-day,  when  the  belief  in  the  eternal  existence 

1  Reference  may  here  be  made  to  Schuppe's  Erkentnisstheoretische  Logik, 
R.  Avenarius,    Weltbegrijf.     E.  Mach's  Zur  Analyse  der  Empfindtingen. 

2  Wundt  expressed  nearly  the  same  idea,  when  he  declared  that  every  cogni- 
tion is  at  the  same  time  a  recognition. 


396  /.   KODIS. 

of  representations  is  no  longer  seriously  maintained,  such  an 
hypothesis  is  no  longer  permissible.  But  the  fact,  which  forms 
the  basis  of  Herbart's  theory  remains.  It  is  possible  to  prove 
both  experimentally  and  by  the  aid  of  comparative  philology, 
that  with  every  act  of  knowledge  there  takes  place  either  a  com- 
bination of  new  with  already  existing  values  (namely  a  recogni- 
tion in  a  certain  limited  sense  of  this  word),  or  a  grouping  of 
new  values  within  a  class  whose  value  has  been  previously 
known.  Generally  speaking,  it  may  be  said  that  an  entirely 
new  value  cannot  possibly  form  an  object  of  knowledge  until 
by  means  of  frequent  repetition  of  this  value  a  new  habit  has 
been  formed.  Every  act  of  consciousness  be  it  single  or  com- 
posed of  a  chain  of  thought  is  always  a  process  of  reducing  the 
unknown  to  the  known.  If,  therefore,  recognition  does  not 
take  place  immediately,  the  chain  of  thought  will  not  be  fin- 
ished l  until  there  is  found  a  value  which  is  equal  or  similar  to 
or  contained  in  the  new  value.  If  now  this  possibility  is  absent 
two  others  are  at  hand.2 

In  the  normal  development  of  a  chain  of  thought  the  in- 
dividual, after  sufficient  time,  will  form  a  new  habit  of  thought. 
The  chain  of  thought  is  in  this  case  closed  through  a  repetition 
of  the  originally  given  value  but  with  a  totally  different  quality  of 
feeling.  The  *  unknown,'  with  its  negative  characteristics,  dis- 
appears in  presence  of  the  feeling  of  the  <  known.'  A  new  habit 
of  thought  has  been  formed. 

The  other  possibility  is  where  the  development  of  the  chain 
of  thought  does  not  occur  in  a  regular  way.  The  interest  of  the 
thinking  individual  becomes  transported  from  the  original  value 
to  some  other  value  and  the  former  is  characterized  as  '  without 
importance.' 

The  determination  of  every  act  of  knowledge  through 
knowledge  previously  acquired  is  effected  not  only  for  the  gen- 
eral character  of  the  representations  but  for  every  element  and 
quality  of  feeling  of  such  representations.  Every  new  experi- 
ence must  be  considered  only  as  a  variation  of  previously  ac- 

1  It  may  of  course  happen  that  the  chain  of  thought  will  be  uninterrupted, 
but  this  will  take  place  usually  only  in  cases  that  have  no  great  importance  for 
the  thinking  individual. 

2 1  follow  here  Avenarius  :  Kritik  der  reinen  Erfahrung  p.  292,  II. 


APPERCEPTION.  397 

quired  knowledge.  It  need  not  be  mentioned  that  these  rela- 
tions in  the  psychical  world  have  their  basis  in  the  formation  of 
the  central  nervous  system  of  the  thinking  individual.  The 
nervous  system,  constructed  in  a  certain  definite  way,  permits 
the  existence  of  only  certain  definite  physiological  functions  and 
these  have  as  their  correlates  only  definite  psychological  values. 

SUMMARY. 

If  now  we  sum  up  the  results  of  our  analysis  of  apperception 
in  the  three  different  significations  of  this  conception,  we  find 
that  these  different  significations  are  not  false  conceptions  of 
the  notion,  but  a  use  of  the  same  nomenclature  for  three 
different  phenomena.  In  addition,  apperception  in  the  first 
meaning  of  this  word  and  also  in  the  meaning  of  the  Her- 
bartian  school  are  partial  phenomena  which  can  be  excluded 
from  no  act  of  knowledge.  Apperception  as  reflective  knowl- 
edge may  arise,  but  does  not  of  necessity  arise  with  every  act 
of  knowledge. 

If  now  the  question  arises  to  which  of  these  three  different 
phenomena  the  name  apperception  most  properly  belongs,  it 
seems  to  us  that  the  phenomena  of  reflective  knowledge  may 
most  rightfully  lay  claim  to  this  title.  Clearness  is  covered,  or 
at  least  should  be  covered  by  the  word  consciousness.  To  ap- 
perception, considered  as  an  act  of  knowledge,  produced  by 
the  impact  of  two  groups  of  representations  must  be  given  a 
meaning  entirely  different  from  the  meaning  used  by  the  Her- 
bartian  school,  since  the  movement  of  representation  is  entirely 
non-existent,  there  being  only  a  determination  of  every  new  act 
of  knowledge  through  the  mass  of  previously  acquired  knowl- 
edge. Thus  reflective  knowledge  remains  a  special  content  of 
knowledge,  which  is  of  particular  importance  for  the  formation 
of  the  psychical  personality.  The  historical  sanction  for  this 
use  of  the  word  apperception  was  given  by  Kant,  who  often 
describes  it  as  'the  representation  of  the  self.'  But  if  we  are  to 
meet  the  demands  of  modern  psychology,  we  must  avoid  all 
excursions  into  the  domain  of  transcendentalism,  and  endeavor 
to  deal  with  the  notion  of  apperception  as  an  empirical  one, 
which  must  be  treated  according  to  empirical  methods. 


TYPES  OF  IMAGINATION. 

BY   RAY   H.    STETSON. 

Oberltn  College. 

In  order  to  make  any  accurate  determination  of  one's  imagi- 
native thought  material,  it  is  essential  to  define  what  is  meant 
by  *  forms  of  imagination,'  «  mind-stuff,'  *  symbols  in  conscious- 
ness,' etc.  That  the  memory  actually  possesses  a  vast  store  of 
images  corresponding  to  every  sense,  and  representations  of  all 
the  varied  movements  possible  to  the  organism,  there  can  be  no 
doubt ;  otherwise  it  would  be  impossible  to  recognize  any  im- 
pression, or  execute  any  movement.  In  terms  of  physiological 
psychology,  this  simply  means  tha^t  certain  permanent  modifica- 
tions of  the  central  nervous  organs  have  taken  place,  and  does 
not  involve  the  implication  that  all  these  images  be  present  to 
consciousness,  or  become  genuine  mental  factors.  Images  of 
every  sort,  in  this  general  sense,  are  possessed  by  every  indi- 
vidual, but  each  mind  chooses  out  of  this  varied  stock  of  pre- 
sentations those  of  one  or  more  senses,  which  serve  it  exclusively 
as  symbols  for  the  embodiment  of  a  large  part  of  its  thought. 
It  is  in  this  last  sense  that  a  person  is  called  a  *  visualist,'  or  a 
'  tactualist.'  The  images  with  which  we  are  concerned  are  a 
part  of  the  conscious  life  of  the  mind,  and  can  be  called  up  vol- 
untarily. Memory  images  here  treated  of  as  forms  of  imagina- 
tion may  be  defined  :  « the  appearance  in  consciousness,  under 
voluntary  control,  of  images  without  any  sensory  stimulus.'  For 
example,  A  may  be  an  exclusive  visualist.  A  certain  idea  may 
come  to  him  through  hearing ;  as  the  sounds  strike  his  ear  they 
are  recognized  by  the  memory,  and  their  meaning  attaches  to 
them,  but  they  are  at  once  translated  in  consciousness  into  vis- 
ual images,  the  exclusive  form  of  his  representative  thought. 
Although  auditory  images  were  awakened,  the  idea  is  not  stored 
in  the  accessible  memory  as  auditory.  Now  the  idea  present  to 
A  in  visual  imagery  may  act  as  a  cue  to  call  up  motor  images  of 
398 


TYPES    OF  IMAGINATION.  399 

the  vocal  organs ;  not  necessarily  however — as  Baldwin  has 
pointed  out — through  kinsesthetic  images  present  to  conscious- 
ness. Thus,  while  this  idea  has  called  up  successively  with  A, 
auditory,  visual  and  motor  images,  and  while  the  auditory  im- 
ages, on  direct  sense  stimulation,  and  the  motor  images,  on  a 
visual  cue,  may  have  been  momentarily  present  to  conscious- 
ness, it  is  not  necessary  that  they  be  so  present,  and  their  mo- 
mentary presence  so  conditioned  does  not  affect  the  fact  that 
A's  imagination  is  exclusively  visual. 

No  doubt  but  few  images  of  the  normal  individual  are  strictly 
of  any  one  type.  Though  the  predominant  factor  in  any  one 
image  called  into  consciousness  can  usually  be  determined,  the 
image  is  nearly  always  tinged  or  enlarged  by  other  elements. 
Sometimes  the  subordinate  image  factor,  for  example  motor — 
visual  predominating — is  called  up  by  the  predominant  image 
factor  as  a  cue,  sometimes  the  subordinate  element  is  an  essen- 
tial of  the  whole  image  and  appears  as  a  part  of  it. 

In  order  to  determine  the  important  point  of  the  imaginative 
type  of  the  individual,  Professor  Jastrow  suggests  in  the  Pop- 
ular Science  Monthly  of  September,  1888,  an  objective  method 
for  determining  the  '  internal  language'  of  the  person.  His 
rules  follow : 

(1)  Determine  the  limit  of  the  capacity  of  both  hearing  and 
sight  for  receiving  impressions. 

(2)  Determine  the  amount  of  error,  and  the  nature  of  error 
of  each  sense. 

(3)  Determine  which  of  the  two  processes  of  perception  car- 
ried on  simultaneously  makes  the  greater  impression. 

From  these  united  tests  he  would  determine  the  type  of  im- 
agination as  to  whether  it  be  visual  or  auditory.  For  motor  and 
tactile  he  has  no  complete  method,  and  seems  to  think  that  they 
are  nearly  always  combined  with  visual  or  auditory  images, 
since  motions  are  nearly  always  under  the  guidance  of  the  eye 
or  ear.  But  because  the  motion  is  always  under  a  guidance  it 
does  not  follow  that  the  image  need  be  inseparable  from  the  vis- 
ual images;  indeed  many  of  our  movements  always  conducted 
with  the  aid  of  the  eye  are  possible  without  it,  e.  g:,  piano  play- 
ing and  writing.  And  it  may  be  just  as  important  to  treat  mo- 


400  RA  Y  H.    STETSON. 

tor  images  apart,  though  they  are  usually  associated  with  other 
sorts,  as  it  is  to  treat  auditory  images  apart,  which  with  the  most 
of  us  always  occur  with  visual. 

While  such  a  method  of  determination  would  no  doubt  be 
valuable  to  the  individual,  as  determining  his  best  method  of 
perceiving,  t.  e.,  receiving  things,  it  does  not  at  all  follow  that 
this  may  be  a  basis  for  a  psychological  determination  of  his  type 
of  imagination.  There  is  no  doubt  some  general  correspon- 
dence between  the  large  part  which  some  of  our  senses  play  in 
experience  and  the  predominance  of  their  images  in  imagina- 
tion, but  it  is  also  certain  that  the  connection  is  not  invariable — 
witness  the  anomalous  '  tactualists,'  *  motiles,'  and  even  *  olfac- 
taires.'  It  must  be  true  in  any  case,  whatever  the  predominant 
type  of  imagination,  that  the  individual  gains  most  of  his  ideas 
through  sight  and  hearing,  and  it  is  certain  that  he  will  have 
facility  in  receiving  impressions  through  those  senses,  but  the 
relative  ease  with  which  he  uses  hearing  or  sight  may  be  as  well 
the  result  of  an  original  idiosyncrasy  as  of  his  type  of  imagina- 
tion. 

In  determining  a  person's  type  of  imagination,  it  is  rather 
the  sense  images  which  he  uses  in  expressing  his  ideas,  and  the 
sense-images  to  which  he  appeals  in  another  person,  which  are 
to  be  looked  to  as  an  objective  clue  to  his  mind  stuff  than  the 
images  used  in  receiving  ideas.  Professor  Jastrow  himself 
mentions  the  possibility  of  image  translation,  and  Wilbrand  has 
determined  in  a  case  of  aphasia  that  the  brain  area  concerned  in 
visual  reception  is  not  identical  with  the  area  concerned  in  mem- 
ories of  visual  images.  E.  A.  Kirkpatrick,  in  an  article  in  THE 
PSYCHOLOGICAL  REVIEW,  notes  how  prone  school  children, 
upon  whom  he  was  making  memory  experiments,  were  to  trans- 
late presentation  forms  into  other  forms.  With  children  the 
process  often  shows  to  the  observer  by  their  murmuring  words 
to  themselves  which  are  presented  written,  counting  out  num- 
bers given  orally  on  their  fingers,  etc.  In  adults,  it  is  not  often 
that  the  images  substituted  in  the  mind  are  allowed  to  picture 
themselves  forth  in  movements. 

In  the  studies  from  the  Harvard  Psych.  Lab.  given  in  THE 
PSYCHOLOGICAL  REVIEW,  a  report  is  given  of  an  investigation  on 


TYPES   OF  IMAGINATION.  401 

memory,  in  which  a  similar  method  was  used,  but  for  a  some- 
what different  purpose.  The  object  seems  to  have  been  to 
arrive  at  general  conclusions  concerning  the  memory,  and  not  to 
investigate  the  type  of  the  individual,  but  some  of  the  conclu- 
sions reached  bear  upon  the  subject  in  hand.  The  method  con- 
sisted in  the  presentation  of  simple  visible  and  audible  contents 
under  varying  conditions.  The  things  chosen  were  numbers 
and  colors.  Extended  experiments  were  made  with  five  sub- 
jects. Two  of  the  conclusions  drawn  are  : 

(1)  When   two   senses  act  together   in   recollection   they 
hinder  each  other. 

(2)  When  isolated,  visual  memory  surpasses  by  far  aural ; 
when  combined,  the  aural  excels  the  visual,  with  one  excep- 
tion. 

If  these  five  men  were  average  types,  these  results  are  of 
some  importance  as  determining  the  sort  of  presentation  best 
used,  but  in  each  case  the  statement  of  the  conclusion  reached 
is  false.  The  statements  should  read  : 

(1)  When  two  senses  act  together  in  presentation,  recollec- 
tion is  hindered. 

(2)  The  memory  of  isolated  visual  presentations  surpasses 
by  far  the  memory  of  isolated  aural  presentations.     When  vis- 
ual and  aural  presentations  are  combined,  the  aural  are  best 
remembered.      (One  exception.) 

There  may  be  a  great  difference  between  '  visual  memory ' 
and  memory  of  visual  presentations.  Moreover,  the  presence 
of  one  exception  in  the  second  conclusion  quoted  is  not  very 
reassuring.  An  exception  of  20  per  cent,  is  rather  large, 
especially  when  only  five  cases,  however  accurately  deter- 
mined, are  under  consideration.  The  material  used  in  presen- 
tation is  peculiarly  liable  to  mental  translation.  Many  of  us 
remember  a  series  of  numbers  presented  through  the  ear  by 
images  of  the  vocal  organs  (motor).  About  45  out  of  a  100 
people  examined  in  a  given  case  reported  a  visual  scheme  for 
numbers.  Judging  from  that,  two  of  the  five  subjects  may 
have  remembered  their  numbers  by  the  aid  of  such  schemes. 

If  it  were  not  open  to  objection,  such  an  experimental  method 
of  investigating  an  individual's  type  of  imagination  would  be  the 


402  RA  Y  H.   STETSON. 

best.  It  gives  definite  results  and  has  the  charm  of  being  a 
laboratory  method,  but  it  seems  obvious  that  no  presentation 
method  can  avail  for  the  determination  of  the  predominant 
memory  images.  The  only  objective  method  capable  of  giving 
exact  results  would  seem  to  be  the  examination  and  classifica- 
tion of  cases  of  aphasia.  These  are  comparatively  rare,  and 
the  evidence  is  so  fragmentary  in  each  single  case,  that  only 
the  most  general  conclusions  can  be  drawn. 

Introspection  has  as  many  disadvantages  in  this  field,  as 
elsewhere,  but  coupled  with  such  objective  determinations  as 
seem  to  give  legitimate  clues,  perhaps  its  results  may  be  worth 
examination. 

A  list  of  test  questions  was  submitted  to  a  class  of  100  col- 
lege juniors  who  had  enough  knowledge  of  the  subject  to  under- 
stand what  was  wanted  but  who  were  not  biased  by  any  precon- 
ceptions. 

(1)  Observe  dreams  for  some  time  and  report  as  to  the  rela- 
tive prevalence  of  the  sorts  of  images.     (While  many  dreams, 
perhaps  even  all,  are  suggested  by  sense-stimuli  always  present 
to  sight,  hearing,  and  touch,  in  sleep,  it  is  still  true  that  the 
paths  of  association  awakened  by  such  sensations  will  probably 
be  those  most  frequently  used,  whether  the  occasioning  dis- 
turbance be  extra-cranial  or  not). 

(2)  Give  general  method  of  recall  in  recitation,  conversation, 
etc.,  as  well  as  possible.     A  special  report  was  secured  as  to 
method  of  recalling  the  forgotten  name  of  a  person.    (This  gives 
some  clue  as  to  visual  images  of  person  or  name,  or  auditory 
images  of  person's  voice   or  sound    of  name,  or  vocal-motor 
images  of  pronunciation  of  name.) 

(3)  a  As  to  memory  of  breakfast  table  ;  were  objects  colored  ? 

(referred  to  Galton's  experiment  mentioned  in  James' 
Briefer  Course.) 

b  As  to  schemes,  visual  or  otherwise,  for  numbers,  colors, 
days  of  week,  months,  or  any  other  series  schema- 
tized in  imagination.  With  any  clues  as  to  the  origin 
of  these  schemes. 

(4)  a  As  to  method  of   recalling  a  piece  of  music  (audi- 

tory, visual  or  motor) . 


TYPES   OF  IMAGINATION.  403 

b  As  to  which  is  best  remembered  in  music  first  heard ; 
rhythm  (motor)  or  melody  (auditory  with  perhaps 
vocal  motor). 

c  As  to  whether  a  melody  remembered  is  recalled  with 
a  tone  color,  or  merely  as  abstract  melody. 

d  As  to  whether  images  are  called  up  in  listening  to 

music,  and  of  what  sort. 

^5)  a  As  to  the  possibility  of  conceiving  bubble  and  toddle 
with  open  lips  and  passive  tongue. 

b  As  to  presence  of   suppressed  articulation  in  reading. 

c  As  to  how  concept  riding-a-wheel  is  conceived.  (At 
least  three-fourths  of  class  had  ridden  wheels.) 
These  will  give  some  clue  as  to  the  presence  of  mo- 
tor images. 

(6)  As  to  presence  of  images  for  concepts  :  Relation,  cause- 
and-effect,  classification.      (This  may  show  tendency  to  image 
abstracts  and  also  the  presence  of  visual  and  motor  images.) 

(7)  As  to  any  change  in  the  type  of  imagination  which  may 
have  occurred. 

(8)  State  conclusion  as  to  which  type  the  individual  thinks 
predominates.     What  sorts  were  second  and  third,  and  if  all  the 
sorts  of  imagery  were  present. 

Where  unusual  types  were  reported,  (auditory,  motor,  tac- 
tile,) as  predominating  this  list  was  supplemented  by  a  second, 
bearing  on  that  especial  sort. 

Of  100  cases  reported,  82  were  from  their  own  conclusions 
and  other  data  judged  to  be  predominantly  visual,  6  auditory,  4 
motor,  i  tactual;  5  from  their  own  conclusions,  corroborated 
by  their  reports  were  equally  visualists  and  *  audiles ' ;  2  were 
equally  visualists  and  *  motiles.' 

The  auditory  constituted  a  large  element  in  20,  the  motor  in 
10,  the  tactual  in  4. 

None  lacked  visual  or  auditory  images,  though  one  consid- 
ered the  auditory  doubtful.  One  lacked  motor  images,  3  lacked 
tactual  images,  some  4  of  the  class,  age  19-24,  were  without 
much  imagery. 

Serial  schemes  for  numbers,  etc.,  were  usually  confined  to 
the  visualists,  though  with  some  exceptions.  41  reported 


H.    STETSON. 

schemes  for  numbers,  letters  of  alphabet,  days  of  week,  etc.  As 
a  rule,  where  one  common  series  was  schematized,  others  were. 
In  12  cases  the  origin  of  the  scheme  was  reported.  Appear- 
ance of  a  page  where  first  learned  is  usually  the  orgin  of  alpha- 
bet schemes,  also  often  of  number  schemes.  Many  number 
schemes,  whose  form  in  detail  cannot  be  accounted  for,  have 
breaks  or  sharp  turns  at  six,  eight,  twelve  and  twenty,  probably 
marking  the  successive  stages  at  which  numbers  up  to  that  point 
exclusively  were  dealt  with  in  their  early  school  work.  Days- 
of-week  schemes  often  show  traces  of  calendars.  The  very 
common  circular  arrangement  of  the  months  is  probably  due  to 
vague  associations  with  the  zodiac  and  the  earth's  revolution ; 
several  reported  this  definitely.  Of  course,  the  circle  is  a  very 
convenient  symbol  for  a  series  returning  upon  itself,  but  there 
is  no  reason  why  the  days  of  the  week  be  not  so  arranged  as 
well  as  the  months.  The  majority  of  number  schemes  reported 
rise  from  right  to  left ;  there  is  nearly  always  a  break  at  twenty, 
and  the  scheme  usually  does  not  extend  beyond  one  hundred. 
Usually  days  of  the  week  rise  from  Sunday  to  some  point  in 
the  middle  of  the  week  and  then  slope  down  to  a  second  Sunday. 
One  of  the  most  interesting  schemes  reported  shows  a  re- 
markable power  of  visualizing.  Numbers,  days  of  week,  years 
in  century,  and  even  days  of  month  are  represented  by  regular 
rows  of  five  squares  placed  beneath  each  other.  If  the  number 
does  not  fill  out  a  row,  a  corresponding  blank  is  left.  Thus 
nine  is  represented  by  : 

D  D  D  D  D 
D  D  D  D 

Days  of  the  week  and  month  run  on  in  same  order,  Sunday 
being  a  dark  square : 

•  D  D  D  D 
D  D  •  D  D 

This  scheme  is  thought  to  have  been  derived  from  a  calen- 
dar: 


TYPES   OF  IMAGINATION.  405 

Auditory  images  are  usually  of  words  or  music  where  the 
images  play  a  large  part  in  thinking.  In  either  case,  as  James 
points  out,  it  is  easy  to  mistake  a  motor  image  of  the  vocal  or- 
gans for  a  recall  of  the  sound.  Often  unnoticed  vocal-motor 
images  serve  as  the  necessary  cue  to  the  recall  of  a  strain  of 
music  or  of  the  sound  of  a  passage  read.  The  motor  element 
is  so  easily  overlooked  that  probably  not  a  few  who  think  that 
the  auditory  plays  a  large  element  in  theii  imagination  would 
find  the  real  element  motor.  Even  in  memory  of  music  where 
it  would  be  expected  that  auditory  images  would  greatly  pre- 
dominate, the  reports  seem  to  bear  this  out.  Of  83  reporting  as 
to  how  they  recalled  a  memorized  piece  of  music,  25  reported, 
by  auditory,  23  by  tactile  and  motor,  and  35  by  visual  images. 

The  true  '  audile '  in  reading  often  hears  the  words  as 
though  in  the  head  or  even  in  the  eyes,  but  not  in  the  throat. 

Motor  images  seem  from  the  reports  to  be  a  mfcch  more  im- 
portant element  in  imagination  than  is  usually  assumed.  Of 
the  abstract  concepts,  cause-and-effect  and  classification,  which 
at  least  one-half  of  the  class  image,  the  first  was  nearly  always 
reported  as  containing  a  motor  element,  usually  coupled  with  a 
visual,  and  the  second,  '  classification,'  was  also  motor  in  color- 
ing in  a  majority  of  the  images  reported.  It  seems  but  natural 
that  the  transitive  states  should  be  pictured  in  memory  by  motor 
images,  as  the  very  name  *  transitive'  indicates.  The  difficulty 
of  distinguishing  auditory  and  motor  images  has  already  been 
noted.  In  an  equal  number  of  cases,  rhythm  was  better  re- 
membered than  melody.  It  would  seem  as  though  any  recall 
of  rhythm  must  necessarily  be  motor.  The  number  of  cases  in 
which  a  piece  of  music  is  recalled  by  auditory  images,  25,  is 
but  little  larger  than  the  number  of  cases  in  which  the  recall 
was  by  motor  and  tactile,  23.  The  deaf  Beethoven,  writing 
grand  compositions,  has  been  cited  as  a  remarkable  instance  of 
auditory  imagination ;  but  the  same  deaf  Beethoven,  working 
out  those  compositions  at  the  piano  he  could  not  hear,  and 
extemporizing  on  stringed  instruments  he  could  not  tune,  shows 
the  importance  even  to  him,  master  of  tones,  of  motor  and 
tactual  experiences  in  the  expression  of  ideas. 

Not  a  few  of  our  concepts  of  motions  are  symbolized  in 


406  RA  Y  H.    STETSON. 

motor  images.  In  a  large  number  of  cases,  *  riding-a-wheel'  was 
represented  by  a  distinct  feeling  of  motion  in  the  legs,  or  of  the 
whole  body  in  mounting.  About  60  of  100  reported  suppressed 
articulation  in  all  reading.  No  doubt  many  of  our  gestures  are 
the  results  of  motor  forms  of  imagination.  To  be  sure,  many 
gestures,  especially  expressions  of  emotion,  are  spontaneous  and 
preceded  in  consciousness  by  no  motor  image  which  they  real- 
ize ;  but  it  is  not  difficult  to  distinguish  such  gestures  from 
those  which  do  delineate  motor  images.  The  latter  are  con- 
scious, under  control  of  the  will,  and  are  often  felt  as  giving 
expression  to  motor  impulses.  Witness  the  man  who  shapes 
his  thought  in  his  hands  as  he  speaks,  who  has  a  definite  feel- 
ing, located  in  his  hands,  that  in  a  logical  train  of  thought  one 
thought  draws  another  after  it.  Probably  motor  and  tactile 
images  are  of  great  importance  in  imagining  emotional  states. 
In  some  cases  the  thought  of  the  cause  of  the  emotion  will  call 
up  a  faint  repetition  of  the  bodily  state,  but  often  this  does  not 
or  cannot  happen,  and  if  the  emotion  is  recalled  at  all  it  must 
be  by  the  aid  of  motor  and  tactile  images  of  those  states. 

To  a  person  whose  imagination  is  largely  motor,  many  con- 
ceptions cannot  be  grasped  without  this  motor  element.  It  seems 
the  very  life  of  the  notion.  Power,  sublimity,  life,  are  such  con- 
cepts. None  of  the  persons  reporting  as  *  motiles  '  could  con- 
ceive of  a  personification  without  involving  a  motor  element. 
To  many  a  person  in  his  ordinary  thought,  it  is  this  motor  ele- 
ment which  distinguishes  the  beautiful  from  the  sublime ;  it  is 
his  way  of  representing  power  and  might.  One  person  in  the 
class,  who  cannot  conceive  what  a  motor  image  would  be 
like,  never  appreciates  any  personification,  or  has  the  slightest 
tendency  to  personify ;  although  interested  in  oratory,  he  has  no 
tendency  to  gesture. 

A  motor  element  is  involved  in  many  of  the  schemes  reported 
for  months  and  days  of  week.  Climbing  up  hill  during  winter 
months  or  early  part  of  week,  and  going  down  during  summer 
months,  or  last  of  week.  In  the  case  of  the  days  of  the  week, 
the  scheme  with  the  hill  in  the  middle,  rarely  toward  end,  was 
formed  during  the  college  course,  when  the  press  of  work  is 
greatest  at  mid-week. 


TYPES    OF  IMAGINATION.  407 

Aesthetic  enjoyment  is  largely  conditioned  by  motor  and 
tactile  imagery.  One  of  the  chief  demands  in  modern  painting 
and  sculpture  is  action,  i.e.,  the  capability  of  immobile  things 
to  rouse  motor  imagery.  Fromentin's  Arab  Falconer  would  be 
sorry  sight  if  it  only  roused  visual  associations ;  but  the  distorted 
drawing  and  the  grand  swing  of  the  uplifted  arm  suggest  motor 
images  of  mad,  dashing  energy  and  fierce,  free  muscular  life. 
We  participate  in  the  mad  galop  of  the  steed  and  sympathize 
with  the  rider  because  *  we  picture  to  ourselves  how  it  feels,' 
t.  e.9  we  call  up  motor  and  tactual  images.  It  is  delightful  to 
poise  in  imagination  with  a  sculptured  Mercury,  or  to  share  for 
a  few  moments  the  brawny  firmness  of  some  bronze  hero.  Even 
in  poetry  and  music  we  feel  the  wild  galop  suggested  by  the 
rhythm  of  Browning's  '  How  They  Brought  the  Good  News 
from  Ghent,'  or  of  Schubert's  *  Erlkonig.'  Lotze  makes  our 
enjoyment  in  watching  many  forms  of  animal  life,  and  in  view- 
ing many  pictures,  to  consist  in  an  ability  to  imagine  how  we 
should  feel  in  their  places  ;  we  get  a  joy  out  of  the  swift  flight 
of  the  swallow  or  the  petty  industry  of  the  ant,  because  we  live 
over  again  to  ourselves  what  we  imagine  their  life  to  be.  No 
doubt  our  representations  are  far  enough  from  the  reality,  but 
they  must  consist  in  more  or  less  vivid  motor  and  tactile  images 
with  the  possible  accompaniment  of  other  sorts.  Architecture, 
at  first  glance,  is  thought  of  as  appealing  only  to  the  eye ;  but 
if  this  were  the  case,  we  should  not  have  a  sense  of  unreality 
and  disappointment  in  finding  what  seemed  an  imposing  marble 
temple  at  a  little  distance  to  be  but  framework  and  stucco.  A 
part  of  the  interest  in  architecture  comes  in  imagining  the  vast 
load  borne  up  by  the  aspiring  under-structure.  If  architecture 
be  « frozen  music,'  this  inter-play  and  combination  of  opposing 
forces  respresents  the  rhythm.  To  most  of  us  it  is  essentially 
a  matter  of  motor  representation.  We  get  a  vivid  example  of 
this  when  at  the  foot  of  a  perpendicular  cliff  or  towering  edifice, 
we  have  the  sense  of  its  pressing  down  upon  us,  overhanging 
and  about  to  crush  us. 

Tactual  images  are  agreed  by  all  to  play  the  slightest  role 
in  imagination.  They  are  oftenest  entirely  lacking.  A  single 
case  of  tactual  images  predominating  was  reported  among  the 


408  RAY  H.    STETSON. 

hundred  examined.  In  this  case,  general  concepts  are  not 
imaged  in  any  way.  Dreams  are  almost  exclusively  tactual. 
It  would  be  hard  to  imagine  a  tactual  scheme  for  numbers,  yet 
this  man's  imagination  solves  the  problem  easily  enough.  His 
number  scheme  consists  of  the  representation  of  the  series  of 
sensations  produced  by  tapping  the  tips  of  the  fingers  of  the  right 
hand  successively  upon  a  surface.  Thus  sensation  at  tip  of  little 
finger  corresponds  to  «  5'  and  its  tens,  sensation  at  tip  of  thumb — 
second  round — for  '  6'  and  its  tens,  etc.  Scheme  was  formed 
while  learning  the  multiplication  table  by  counting  on  his  fingers. 

Little  was  reported  as  to  any  remembered  change  in  types 
of  imagination.  Two  people  of  unusual  types,  tactile  and  mo- 
tile, report  that  the  visual  is  increasing.  Four  report  a  recent 
increase  of  auditory  images ;  the  increase  was  referred  to  at- 
tention to  music,  if  any  reason  was  given.  In  no  case  was  there 
a  tendency  to  increase  of  imagery.  Five  report  a  decrease. 
The  members  of  class,  of  course,  were  not  old  enough  to  fur- 
nish any  examples  of  the  decided  decrease  toward  middle  age 
of  the  image-tendency  noted  by  James  and  others. 

It  is  hard  to  obtain  data  as  to  the  imagination  of  children 
and  illiterate  persons,  so  that  the  effect  of  education  on  the 
imagination  is  largely  a  matter  of  speculation.  It  seems  quite 
probable  that  in  the  early  childhood  of  the  individual  and  the 
race  all  sorts  of  impressions  are  stored  in  the  memory  and 
recalled.  Voluntary  attention  does  not  then  determine  the 
trend  of  the  imagination,  and  to  the  child,  auditory,  motor, 
tactile  and  even  gustatory  images  would  seem  to  have  as  good 
a  right  to  be  remembered  as  the  visual.  Inherited  tendencies 
in  the  neural  tracts  may  have  something  to  do  with  the  re- 
sult, but  aside  from  that,  it  is  very  probable  that  early  life  is 
characterized  by  a  much  larger  variety  of  images  and  a  more 
exclusive  use  of  them  than  later  life.  There  is  little  doubt  that 
motor  images  have  a  full  share  in  the  imagination  of  the  child 
and  the  savage.  Vocabularies  of  infant  speech,  as  usually 
given  with  a  large  percentage  of  substantives  and  a  small  per- 
centage of  verbs,  would  not  seem  to  bear  this  out,  but  Professor 
Dewey,  in  an  article  in  THE  PSYCHOLOGICAL  REVIEW  (v.  I.,  p. 
63),  calls  attention  to  a  common  error  in  compiling  such  vo- 


TYPES    OF  IMAGINATION.  409 

cabularies.  He  shows  that  the  young  child  uses  words  with 
little  or  no  feeling  for  a  fixed  part-of-speech  significance,  and 
that  the  same  word  may  be  noun,  verb  and  adjective.  He  em- 
phasizes the  large  percentage  of  verbs  actually  to  be  found  in  a 
child's  speech.  Among  savages,  the  universal  tendency  to 
descriptive  gesture  and  sign  language  attests  the  motor  element 
in  the  primitive  imagination.  From  a  utilitarian  standpoint, 
motor  images  are  quite  as  important  as  visual  to  either  the  sav- 
age or  the  child.  Movement  constitutes  a  large  part  of  the  life 
of  either.  Baldwin  states  that  in  the  growth  of  language-mem- 
ory, the  auditory  and  visual  memories  must  get  the  start  of  the 
motor  memory,  though  later  the  adult  becomes  vocal-motor.  No 
doubt,  a  large  part  of  the  imagery  of  the  adult — especially  if 
*  audile '  or  «  motile ' — consists  of  images  of  words,  but  there  is 
no  reason  why  the  mind-stuff  of  a  child  should  not  be  largely 
motor  before  the  development  of  motor  speech.  With  the  adult, 
much  of  image-thought  is  not  by  word-symbols  of  any  sort ; 
words  at  best  can  usually  mark  only  the  distinct,  substantive 
parts.  The  transitive  and  the  vague  upon  which  James  lays  so 
much  stress  can  seldom  be  expressed  in  words,  and  may  very 
well,  in  both  child  and  adult,  be  symboled  in  consciousness  by 
motor-tinged  imagery.  Even  distinct  concepts  are  not  always 
represented  by  words  ;  we  are  constantly  making  new  concepts, 
unnamed,  which  we  represent  in  thought  by  some  convenient 
sign  and  use  for  the  time  being.  The  child  who  knows  but  a 
few  words,  visual,  auditory,  or  motor,  but  who  thinks  a  multi- 
tude of  actions  and  things,  must  be  dependent  in  much  of  his 
thought  on  wordless  representative  imagery. 

Perhaps  in  early  child  life,  all  sense  presentations  are  re- 
membered equally  well,  but  later  the  superior  expressiveness  of 
sight,  and  the  fact  that  it  is  so  largely  used  in  all  our  processes 
of  education,  leads  the  mind  to  devote  its  chief  attention  to  that 
form  of  memory.  Gradually  voluntary  control  of  the  auditory, 
motor,  tactual,  gustatory,  and  olfactory  memories  becomes  less 
and  less — degree  varying  with  the  individual — or  is  entirely 
lost.  Some  original  structural  peculiarity  of  the  central  organs 
may  account  for  unusual  types.  There  is  no  doubt  that  atten- 
tion to  a  single  sense  tends  to  develop  memory  images  of  that 


410  RAY  H.    STETSON. 

sort.  Among  the  few  changes  in  type  of  imagination  noted  in 
the  reports  mentioned  above,  several  had  increased  their  audi- 
tory memory  by  the  study  of  music,  and  a  tactualist  reported 
himself  as  constantly  becoming  more  visual. 

It  almost  goes  without  saying  that  the  mental  life  of  lower 
orders  is  limited  by  the  definiteness  and  variety  of  images  pos- 
sible to  them.  The  senses  limit  their  thought.  The  world  to 
the  earth-worm  must  be  a  matter  of  tactual  and  motor  images. 

The  image-tendency  seems  to  reach  its  culmination  in  the 
early  life  of  the  adult,  along  with  the  aesthetic  and  emotional  im- 
pulses. In  middle  life,  the  use  of  symbols,  even  visual,  grows 
less  and  less,  and  often  fades  out  altogether.  That  Galton's 
older,  scientific  men  visualized  less  than  younger,  more  insig- 
nificant men  need  not  be  due  to  any  incompatability  between 
scientific  generalization  and  imagery ;  it  is  probably  due  to  their 
being  older  men.  Descriptive  science  is  greatly  aided  by 
visualization.  The  reason  that  old  men  dwell  so  much  on  their 
earlier  life,  and  disregard  their  middle  age  may  be  that  those 
early  memories  are  still  connected  with  image  associations.  The 
work  of  middle-life  has  no  such  corresponding  series  of  pictures. 
They  live  over  their  early  childhood  and  youth  because  they 
can  live  it  over  again  in  imagination. 

Perhaps  the  difference  between  men  and  women,  which 
Lotze  characterizes  as  a  tendency  of  men  to  regard  the  mechani- 
cal and  of  women  to  regard  the  ideal,  may  be  due  to  education. 
The  life  and  education  of  the  girl  emphasizes  the  visual  and 
auditory  in  their  more  delicate  forms.  The  boy,  on  the  other 
hand,  has  a  far  greater  opportunity  for  the  acquisition  of  motor 
images  and  impulses.  He  has  a  contempt  for  a  girl  who  may 
know  how  a  thing  looks  or  sounds  but  who  doesn't  know  how  it 
works. 

Imaging  has  many  disadvantages.  It  is  often  a  positive 
hindrance,  e.  g. ,  motor  images  in  reading,  visual  number-schemes 
in  calculation.  It  often  leads  to  a  narrow  view,  if  the  type  is 
exclusive,  and  the  symbol  is  taken  for  the  reality.  Some  one 
has  pointed  out  the  vice  of  visualization  as  the  basis  of  the  phi- 
losophies of  Locke,  Berkeley  and  Hume.  Much  of  the  feel- 
ing and  expression  of  other  men  must  be  lost  to  the  person  with 


TYPES   OF  IMAGINATION.  411 

a  pure  type  of  imagination.  Most  men  possess  enough  of  the 
common  types,  though  subordinated  to  the  ever-present  visual, 
to  enable  them  to  call  up  on  suggestion  the  image  present  to 
another. 

But  there  are  also  advantages.  Facility  in  image-thinking 
must  enhance  aesthetic  appreciation,  if  it  is  not  essential  to  it. 
For  the  development  of  details  in  dynamic  science,  gestures  in 
oratory,  figures  in  writing,  and  for  the  appreciation  of  all  forms 
of  art,  an  imagination  richly  stocked  is  of  great  value.  True 
enough,  as  James  remarks,  bare  concepts  do  just  as  well  as 
colored  images  in  running  the  ordinary  affairs  of  life.  But 
bare  concepts  are  meager  material  with  which  to  enjoy  in  mem- 
ory a  favorite  picture,  bring  back  a  bit  of  music  or  a  dear  face, 
live  over  again  a  deep  emotion. 


ON  INDIVIDUAL  SENSIBILITY  TO  PAIN.1 

BY  DR.  HAROLD  GRIFFING. 

The  relative  sensibility  of  individuals  to  pain  is  a  problem 
of  practical  as  well  as  theoretical  interest.  A  more  definite 
knowledge  of  the  subject  might  be  utilized  not  only  in  medicine 
but  also  in  education.  The  data  obtained  are,  however,  quite 
limited ;  and  most  of  the  observations  published  have  been 
made  by  anthropologists  with  but  little  consideration  of  the 
sources  of  error  involved.  The  experiments  here  reported 
were  undertaken  with  a  view  to  throwing  light  on  these  sources 
of  error  rather  than  for  statistical  purposes. 

The  tests  were  made  with  Professor  Cattell's  pressure  al- 
gometer  and  with  the  induction  coil.  The  algometer  registered 
the  pressure  exerted  up  to  15  kilo.  It  was  applied  by  me  on 
the  palm  of  the  hand  and  the  forehead  in  most  of  the  experi- 
ments ;  but  in  some,  the  latter  ones,  the  observer  applied  the 
pressure  himself,  and  the  fleshy  part  of  the  thumb  was  used 
instead  of  the  palm  of  the  hand.  The  pressure  was  increased 
slowly  at  a  rate  as  constant  as  practicable  until  the  sensation 
became  uncomfortable. 

In  the  electrical  tests  the  two  forefingers  of  each  hand  were 
placed  in  separate  cups  of  water  and  the  alternating  current 
was  sent  through  the  body  from  hand  to  hand.  Four  gravity 
cells  were  used  with  an  induction  coil.  The  distance  of  the 
primary  coil  from  the  secondary  served  as  a  rough  indicator  of 
the  electromotive  force  of  the  current,  which  may  be  taken  to 
represent  the  intensity  of  the  stimulus. 

The  purpose  of  the  first  group  of  experiments  was  principally 
to  find  whether  the  sensibility  of  a  sense  organ  might  not  be 
determined,  in  whole  or  in  part,  by  the  degree  of  protection  given 
by  other  tissues.  If  decreased  sensibility  to  pain  may  be  due  to 
the  thickness  of  the  skin,  the  determination  of  the  dermal  thresh- 
old for  pain  tells  us  nothing  of  a  person's  general  sensibility  to 

1  From  the  Psychological  Laboratory  of  Columbia  University. 
412 


SENSIBILITY  TO  PAIN. 


pain.  In  order  to  investigate  this  source  of  error,  before  mak- 
ing the  test  with  the  algometer,  I  recorded  my  judgment  of  the 
probable  result  from  the  appearance  of  the  hand.  This  was 
done  on  fifty-three  students,  four  tests  being  made  on  each  per- 
son, two  on  each  hand.  The  men  were  marked  #,  b,  c  or  d, 
according  to  their  estimated  sensibility.  I  give  below  the  re- 
sulting average  values  of  the  pain  threshold  in  kilograms,  with 
the  maxima  and  minima.  The  results  are  given  in  two  groups, 
I.  and  II.,  since  in  group  II.,  the  observer  applied  the  stimulus 
to  the  thumb,  whereas  in  I.,  I  applied  it  myself  to  the  palm. 
Some  of  the  tests  in  II.  were  kindly  made  for  me  by  advanced 
students  in  the  Columbia  Psychological  Laboratory  in  connec- 
tion with  other  independent  tests. 

TABLE  I. 


NUMBER. 

EST.  SENS'Y. 

AVGE.  T. 

MAX.  T. 

MIN.  T. 

I. 

11. 

o 

I. 

II. 

I. 

II. 

I. 

II. 

I. 

6 

A 

5-i 

8.2 

2.1 

19 

10 

B 

IO.O 

6.9 

13-8 

15+ 

4.0 

4.0 

ii 

3 

C 

12.4 

13-7 

15+ 

i5+ 

7-i 

9.4 

4 

D 

14.4 

15+ 

13-7 

First  vertical  column  gives  number  of  observers ;  the  second  gives  the  esti- 
mated sensibility,  the  others  the  average  and  maximum  and  minimum  values  of 
the  pain  threshold  (T). 

From  the  results  above  given  it  is  evident  that,  as  might  be 
expected,  the  thickness  of  the  skin  and  subcutaneous  tissues  is 
an  important  element  in  determining  the  threshold  for  dermal 
pain.  It  is  not,  however,  the  only  element  involved.  Some 
observers  were  much  more  sensitive  and  others  less  sensitive 
than  one  might  expect  from  the  appearance  of  the  hand. 

If  the  protection  given  by  the  tissues  varies  with  individuals, 
then  the  relative  sensibility  of  different  parts  of  the  body  will 
presumably  also  be  subject  to  individual  variations.  This  I 
found  to  be  true.  Those  having  a  high  pain  threshold  for  the 
hand  were  not  always  correspondingly  sensitive  to  pressure  ap- 
plied to  the  forehead  and  top  of  the  head. 

Nevertheless,  as  will  be  seen  by  the  following  table,  those 
who  were  sensitive  on  the  hand  were  on  the  average  more  sen- 


4H 


HAROLD    GRIPPING. 


sitive  on  the  head.  I  give  now  the  average  values,  with  maxi- 
mum and  minima,  of  the  pain  threshold  for  the  head,  for  the 
different  sets  rated  according  to  the  value  of  their  hand  thresh- 
old. The  first  half  of  the  table  is  for  the  men  classed  group  I. 
in  the  previous  table,  and  the  second  is  for  those  classed  in 
group  II.  The  top  of  the  head  was  used  with  group  II.,  the 
forehead  for  group  I. 

TABLE  II. 


NUMBER. 

T.  FOR  HAND. 

T.  FOR  HEAD. 

MAX. 

MIN. 

12 

Over  13 

6-5 

13-4 

3-2 

15 

10  to  13 

5-0 

5-7 

3-4 

12 

Under  10 

3-5 

4.6 

3 

Over  10 

7.0 

"•5 

4.8 

6 

6  to  10 

2-3 

3-5 

i.i 

H 

Under  6 

1.9 

5-i 

I.O 

The  first  vertical  column  gives  number  of  observers. 

The  second  vertical  column  gives  threshhold  values  for  three  groups  in  or- 
der of  sensibility. 

The  third,  fourth,  and  fifth  columns  give  average  threshhold  and  maximum 
and  minimum  values  for  observers  mentioned  in  second  column. 

It  has  generally  been  assumed  that  the  sensibility  to  one 
form  of  painful  stimulation  may  serve  as  an  index  to  pain  sensi- 
bility in  general.  But  there  is  no  evidence  for  such  an  as- 
sumption. In  order  to  obtain  data  on  the  subject,  I  tested  27 
observers  with  the  induction  coil  as  well  as  with  the  pressure 
algometer.  In  this  way  I  found  that  the  sensibility  to  electrical 
stimulation  to  be  quite  independent  of  pressure  sensibility. 
Three  observers,  among  the  most  sensitive  to  pressure  on  the 
hand  and  head  declare,  that  they  felt  no  discomfort  at  all  when 
the  maximum  strength  of  current  was  given.  One  of  these  did 
not  « feel '  the  current  when  six  cells  were  used  instead  of  four, 
although  the  muscles  of  his  fingers  contracted  from  the  stimula- 
tion of  the  current.  On  the  other  hand  one  student  to  whom  a 
pressure  of  15  +  kilo,  on  the  hand  and  n  kilo,  on  the  head, 
gave  no  discomfort,  considered  the  electrical  effect  unpleasant 
when  the  current  was  of  the  average  strength. 

The  above  experiments  do  not,  however,  prove  that  the  pain 
sensibility  of  the  nervous  system  to  different  forms  of  stimu- 


SENSIBILITY  TO  PAIN.  415 

lation  is  not  the  same.  We  can  only  conclude  that  the  pain 
sensibility  to  sensory  stimulation  varies  with  the  conditions  of 
stimulation.  Not  knowing  the  path  of  the  current  in  the  body, 
we  have  no  right  to  assume  any  special  physiological  or  psycho- 
logical basis  for  the  data  obtained  from  introspection. 

The  probable  fact  that  in  the  pressure  experiments,  the  vari- 
ations cannot  all  be  explained  by  the  thickness  of  the  skin  and 
similar  conditions,  goes  to  show  that  there  is  such  a  thing  as 
general  sensibility  to  pain ;  and  the  general  correspondence  of 
the  results  for  different  places  of  stimulation  may  be  interpreted 
in  the  same  way.  But  even  these  results  may  be  due  to  pe- 
ripheral causes,  and  not  to  any  property  of  the  central  nervous 
system,  or  of  the  consciousness  by  which  it  is  accompanied. 


THE  THIRD  YEAR  AT  THE  YALE  LABORATORY. 


BY  E.  W.  SCRIPTURE, 
Yale  University. 

The  report  is  taken  up  from  the  point  at  which  it  was  left  in 
THE  PSYCHOLOGICAL  REVIEW,  1895,  II.,  379. 

The  investigation  of  hallucination  and  suggestion  by  C.  E. 
Seashore  was  continued  throughout  the  third  year  and  was 
brought  to  a  close  in  May,  1895.  The  first  section  of  this  in- 
vestigation concerned  the  suggestive  influence  of  size  on  judg- 
ments of  weight.  Two  sets  of  blocks  were  used.  Set  A  varied 
in  size,  but  had  a  uniform  weight,  while  set  B  varied  in  weight, 
but  had  a  uniform  size.  The  problem  was  to  pick  out  that 
block  of  set  B  which  appeared  of  the  same  weight  as  a  given 
block  from  set  A.  The  difference  thus  made  between  the  esti- 
mated weight  of  an  A  block  and  its  true  weight,  gave  the  effect 
of  the  suggestive  influence  due  to  the  difference  in  size.  The 
experiments,  carried  out  with  the  greatest  care,  gave  a  definite 
suggestive  influence  for  each  difference  in  size.  The  law  gov- 
erning the  results  is  shown  in  Fig.  i.  The  investigation  was 
extended  to  the  various  forms  under  which  size  shows  its  influ- 


+y     INFLUENCE  or  SIZE  ON  JUDGMENTS 

OF  WEIGHT 

DIFFERENCE  IN  sizE,x*A-B  IN  MM. 

DIFFERENCE  IN  wEiGHT,v=B-A  m  c. 

ACTUAL  RESULTS 
IDEAL  RESULTS 


416 


FIG.  i, 


THE    YALE  LABORATORY. 


ence,  e.  g.,  with  the  blocks  indirectly  seen,  or  seen  and  then 
hidden,  or  estimated  by  muscle-sense,  or  by  touch,  etc.  The 
results  are  shown  in  figures  2  and  3. 


Illusion  OF  WEIGHT  FROM 
SENSES 

SiZE  ESTIMATED  BY 

H.  MUSCLE  SENSE 

I  . TOUCH 

J.  SIGHT 

0.  MUSCLE  SENSE  TOUCH  ft  SIGHT 


FlG.    2. 


) 
I 

INFLUENCE  OF  stze  Of 

OF    WEIGHT 

D.  DIRECT   VrSIOtf 
E    INDIRECT    ViSIOtf 
F.   VISUAL    MEMORf 
G    NO    KNOWLEDGE, 

FIG.  3. 

The  next  section  investigated  hallucinations  of  warmth. ^'I 
was  found  that  with  an  appropriate  suggestion,  a  pure^halluci 
nation  of  heat  could  be  regularly  produced. 


41 8  E.    W  SCRIPTURE. 

A  third  section  investigated  the  effect  of  expectation  and 
suggestion  on  the  least  perceptible  differences  in  lights.  It  was 
found  that  the  repetition  of  a  number  of  experiments  was  suffi- 
cient to  regularly  create  a  perceptible  difference  when  abso- 
lutely no  difference  existed. 

A  fourth  section  showed  that  expectation  was  sufficient  to  cre- 
ate a  perceptible  continuous  change  in  the  intensity  of  an  illumi- 
nated disc. 

In  a  fifth  section  hallucinations  of  a  non-existing  object  were 
produced ;  in  a  sixth,  of  a  non-existing  tone ;  and,  in  a  seventh, 
of  non-existing  sensations  of  touch,  taste,  smell  and  electrical 
stimulation. 

In  every  case  the  experiments  were  quantitative ;  the  scale 
was  more  or  less  an  arbitrary  one,  but  always  admitted  reduc- 
tion to  some  standard  unit  of  energy.  Thus,  on  the  principle 
that  the  intensity  of  an  hallucination  is  the  same  as  that  of  a  sen- 
sation from  which  it  cannot  be  distinguished,  the  intensity  of  the 
hallucination  was  measured  in  terms  of  the  physical  stimulus. 

It  is  to  be  added  that  all  these  experiments  were  made  on 
normal,  healthy,  unsuspecting  individuals. 

The  second  extended  investigation  was  by  John  M.  Moore 
on  the  subject  of  fatigue.  In  the  first  place  the  two  eyes  were 
fatigued  by  being  required  to  estimate  depths.  The  subject 
looking  through  a  slit  at  G  (fig.  4),  had  to  adjust  the  bead  B 


FIG.  4. 

midway  between  the  beads  A  and  C,  while  seeing  only  one  at 
a  time.  This  middle  bead  B  was  placed  always  beyond  the 
true  middle,  the  error  increasing  with  fatigue. 

The  experiment  was   repeated   forty  times  in  succession. 
The  average  amount  by  which  the  successive  experiments  in- 


THE    YALE  LABORATORY. 


419 


creased  the  error  of  the  first  one  is  shown  for  one  observer  in 
Fig.  5- 


no 


f  stria.  I  n  urn  &tr  of  txfitrtffitn  t 
^ft  error   In    mm. 


JT.Junt 


X 


5          10 


15 


20 25 30  35 40 


FIG.  5. 


The  investigation  then  proceeded  to  test  one  eye  instead  of 
*two.  Similar  but  less  steep  curves  of  fatigue  were  found. 
Thereafter  the  curve  of  fatigue  was  determined  for  steadily 


420 


E.    W.    SCRIPTURE. 


repeated  accommodations  of  the'  eye  with  results  as  shown  in 
Fig.  6.     Finally  the  effect  of  fatigue  on  rapidly  repeated  taps 


.X ,  serial  Hamper  of  experiment 
Y,  atcojnnoefation-ttau  ia 

of  ji  second 


M 

'  M*      » 


V>V 


01          IU          /*•/  IH         in 

FIG.  6. 


was  determined.     The  general  course  of  fatigue  in  this  case  is 
shown  in  Fig.  7. 


/oo 
/r« 

/•oo 
*r« 


X  ,  t»f*t  *a*tf?  »f  ttfrnmtnt 

Y.   tint  of  t*f   i>    tlio»i<ut<itf,s  of  a 


FIG.  7. 

These  two  investigations  were  presented  and  accepted  for 
the  degree  of  Ph.  D.,  making  four  such  theses  in  three  years. 

Edward  M.  Weyer  succeeded  in  measuring  the  reaction 
time  of  a  dog  finding  it  to  be  an  average  of  89^.  A  method  of 
measuring  the  dog's  time  of  thought  was  devised  with  great 
labor ;  owing,  however,  to  difficulties  with  the  spark  records,  no 
definite  conclusion  was  reached  on  this  point. 


THE    YALE  LABORATORY. 


421 


The  activity  of  the  workshop  was  greater  than  ever,  thirty 
or  forty  new  instruments  having  been  invented  and  constructed. 
Among  them  are  to  be  found  the  pendulum  chronoscope,  the 
standard  drum  for  very  accurate  measurements  of  time,  the 
electric  color- wheel  with  speed  indicator,  etc. 

The  results  of  the  completed  investigations  were  published 
in  the  Studies  from  the  Yale  Psychological  Laboratory ,  1895. 

The  officers  of  the  laboratory  were  E.  W.  Scripture,  in- 
structor and  director,  and  J.  Allen  Gilbert,  assistant.  Dr. 
Gilbert  left  at  the  end  of  the  year  to  take  the  place  of  assist- 
ant professor  in  the  University  of  Iowa. 


DISCUSSION   AND   REPORTS. 

A    PSYCHOLOGICAL    INTERPRETATION    OF    CERTAIN 
DOCTRINES  IN  FORMAL  LOGIC.1 

The  tendency  of  the  later  modern  logic  has  certainly  been  to  free 
the  account  of  the  thought  process  from  its  limitations  to  grammatical 
forms  and  analogies.  The  extent  to  which  logic  has  suffered  from  the 
bondage  of  grammar  can  hardly  be  overstated.  Mere  differences  in 
the  mother-tongues  have  been  at  the  bottom  of  many  of  the  dis- 
agreements between  French  and  German  or  between  English  and 
French  logicians.  The  rules  of  the  syllogism,  although  international 
in  their  cogency,  have  done  much  to  keep  thought  as  an  object  of  logi- 
cal study  within  its  mediaeval  bounds  of  word-gymnastics  long  after 
the  thinkers  themselves  have  left  the  cloister  and  its  formal  abstractions 
and  turned  their  thinking,  their  scientific  activity,  into  all  phases  of 
experience.  Those  time-honored  rules,  useful  perhaps  in  the  good 
old  times,  have  become  not  altogether  appropriate  to  the  sort  of  think- 
ing that  goes  on  in  a  modern  laboratory,  nor  are  they  quite  adequate 
to  a  game  of  ball,  which  is  as  complete  an  expression  of  thought  in 
these  times  as  were  the  exciting  tourneys  of  long  ago  with  ante  rem, 
post  rem  and  in  re  for  weapons. 

The  first  attempts  to  free  logic  from  language  and  grammar  were 
in  the  different  notations  devised.  The  circular  notation,  for  example, 
accomplished  a  good  deal ;  and  the  algebra  of  logic  has  reached  a 
high  degree  of  abstraction  from  grammatical  conditions.  But  logic  in 
recent  years  has  been  getting  most  of  its  inspiration  from  psychology. 
Thus  the  simple  suggestion  of  such  a  possibility  as  an  '  unconscious  con- 
clusion,' whatever  be  the  objections  to  the  form  that  the  doctrine  first 
took,  cannot  but  have  had  its  lasting  effect  upon  subsequent  ideas  of  con- 
scious conclusions.  Logic,  it  must  be  admitted,  has  had  rather  a 
thick  skull,  but  for  all  that  the  new  ideas  have  made  their  way  in. 
The  c  unconscious  conclusion '  was  one  of  the  ideas  that  did  much  to 
give  new  life  to  comparative  psychology,  and  comparative  or  bio- 
logical psychology  has  revolutionized  logic  at  least  in  one  respect. 
It  has  materially  changed  the  relation  of  language  to  thought.  Lan- 

1Read  by  title  at  the  meeting  of  the  American  Psychological  Association, 
Philadelphia,  1895. 
422 


DISCUSSION  AND  REPORTS.  423 

guage,  as  spoken  and  written,  is  to-day  regarded  as  but  one  part  of 
the  medium  in  which  rational  experience  is  expressed  or  made  objec- 
tive. Similarly  the  head  alone  is  no  longer  looked  upon  as  the  seat 
of  mind,  but  only  of  the  brain,  which  is  but  a  part,  albeit,  if  distinc- 
tions must  be  drawn,  an  important  part  of  the  organism,  in  which,  as 
a  whole,  mind  resides.  Environment  in  its  entirety  is  the  present-day 
logician's  medium  of  thought. 

Some  simple  evidences  of  the  freedom  of  logic  from  grammatical 
limitations  are  ( i )  in  the  recognized  universality  and  affirmative  char- 
acter of  all  judgments  or  rather  of  all  judgment,  since  to-day  we  must 
talk  rather  of  judgment  than  of  judgments ;  thus  you  may  have  nega- 
tive or  particular  sentences  but  neither  negative  nor  particular  judg- 
ments, and  (2)  in  the  notion  that  judgment  is  always  both,  analytic 
and  synthetic  or  both  inductive  and  deductive.  Judgment  is,  to  commit 
a  long  compound,  an  analytico-synthetic  tension.  Sentences  may  be 
explicative  and  ampliative,  analytical  and  synthetical ;  but  judgment 
is  like  impulse ;  it  is  one ;  it  is  not  to  be  cut  up  into  classes ;  at  the 
very  most  it  has  only  manifold  aspects  or  stages ;  with  due  caution  it 
can  be  defined  as  the  particular  becoming  universal,  or  the  negative 
becoming  affirmative,  or  the  concrete  becoming  abstract,  or  quantity 
becoming  quality.  Negation,  as  an  incident  of  judgment,  means 
separation  or  differentiation,  and  so  is  a  stage  or  aspect  of  organization. 
The  freed  logic  of  to-day  must  refuse  to  treat  lightly  the  mortality 
of  Socrates,  or  even  of  Gaius,  or  the  elementary  character  of  that 
useful  metal  iron.  It  has  no  choice  but  to  say  that  the  statements, 
'  Socrates  is  a  mortal '  and  4  Iron  is  a  metal,'  are  either  only  sen- 
tences and  then  merely  material  parts  of  a  total  experience  or  cases  of 
judgment  only  in  so  far  as  they  can  be  said  to  represent  a  living  pres- 
ent experience,  in  other  words,  as  their  predicates  are  taken  to  refer  to 
wholly  subjective  mental  states.  The  mortality  of  Socrates  was  a 
true  judgment,  I  would  suggest,  to  the  Athenians  of  Socrates'  time,  to 
the  grieved  Chrito  or  the  exultant  Anytus,  and  the  elementary  char- 
acter of  iron  has  been  a  true  judgment  to  some  scientists.  In  a  word, 
judgment  is  not  a  statement  or  a  proposition ;  it  is  not  an  expressed 
relation  between  two  terms  or  concepts ;  it  is  most  safely  described  as 
the  construction  of  reality  or  as  self-conscious  experience  of  reality,  or 
in  so  far  as  present  to  consciousness  as  the  tension  of  adjustment,  or 
again  as  organization.  The  true  predicate  of  judgment  is  no  word ; 
it  is  the  judging  self  as  distinguished  from  its  object,  the  not-self  or 
environment  or  grammatical  subject.  A  zs  B  is  a  judgment  only  in 
so  far  as  B  can  be  said  to  be  somebody's  self-conscious  attitude  towards 
A  or  a  real  subjective  experience  of  A  or  as  B  is  the  unity  of  the  self 


424  DOCTRINES  IN  FORMAL  LOGIC. 

at  the  particular  moment  of  the  A  experience.  To  express  the  same 
idea  in  still  another  way,  keeping,  however,  the  grammatical  analogy, 
the  subject  of  the  real  judgment  is  the  '  universe  of  discourse ' ;  the 
predicate  is  the  speaker  or  more  generally  the  agent.  Again  the  gram- 
matical subject  is  the  psychological  object,  the  world  of  experience ; 
the  predicate  is  the  self,  the  psychological  subject.  Some  may  say 
that  I  am  turning  things  around  completely,  that  the  world  is  the  real 
predicate,  and  so  on,  but  we  may  waive  that  possibility.  In  any  case 
a  sentence  is  never  the  judgment. 

The  doctrines  in  formal  logic,  the  different  rules  of  definition 
and  of  the  syllogism  and  the  like,  appear  in  quite  a  new  light  when 
environment  in  its  entirety  as  the  real  medium  of  thought  and  judgment 
as  construction  of  reality  or  as  organization  are  taken  into  account. 
The  doctrines  of  formal  logic  make  a  sort  of  linguistic  or  grammati- 
cal projection,  if  I  may  take  a  metaphor  from  mathematics,  of  fluent 
activity,  that  is,  of  fluency  in  the  use  of  the  medium  of  thought,  or 
again  of  what  in  biology  is  known  as  habit  or  accomplished  adjustment. 
Of  course  projection  is  always  a  great  disguise.  For  example,  a  mir- 
ror of  complex  surface  may  hide  one  even  from  himself.  Formal 
logic  projects  fluent  action  or  habit  upon  the  plane  of  language  and 
makes  it  all  but  unrecognizable.  Moreover  no  expression  of  fluent 
activity  is  more  distorted  and  disguised  by  the  change  than  the  natural 
use  of  language  itself. 

For  evidence  of  the  foregoing  let  us  consider  (i)  the  purely  formal 
copula  that  logic  has  insisted  upon,  (2)  the  concrete  and  quantified 
predicate,  (3)  the  abstraction  of  time,  (4)  the  definition  that  must  be 
virtually  an  equation,  and  (5)  the  different  rules  of  distribution. 
Many  other  sources  of  evidence  might  be  cited,  but  these  are  the  sim- 
pler ones.  We  shall  take  them  up  in  the  order  given,  although  be- 
fore the  review  is  finished  all  five  will  have  collapsed  into  one — which 
is  just  what  ought  to  happen. 

i.  In  the  real  judgment  the  copula  is  not  a  word  at  all.  It  is  the 
tension  of  consciousness,  the  attention.  The  copula  as  a  word  is  a  mere 
name,  naming  in  the  sentence  in  which  it  is  found  the  fact  of  a  former 
attention.  Moreover,  logic's  formal  copula  is  never  used  in  living, 
that  is,  in  natural  discourse.  As  to  the  real  copula,  attention,  if  the 
tension  of  consciousness  cease,  what  ensues  ?  It  is  clear  that  an  act  ex- 
pressing fulfilled  adjustment  ensues.  Logic's  formal  eviscerated  cop- 
ula, accordingly,  with  not  even  the  idea  of  existence  left  to  it,  to  say 
nothing  of  the  absence  of  all  time  ideas,  indicates  the  passing  of  tension 
or — the  same  thing — the  dying  of  consciousness  in  action. 


DISCUSSION  AND  REPORTS.  425 

2.  The  predicate  as  concrete  and  quantified  is  equally  strange  to 
the  real  judgment  in  consciousness.  Reduce  a  judgment  to  an  equation 
of  quantities,  and  you  do  in  so  far  make  it,  or  you  make  so  much  of 
your  environment  as  it  contains  a  mechanism— even  a  sentence  is  a 
mechanism — which  you  are  free  to  use  or  to  act  in.  Do  but  recall  that 
we  have  said  that  the  true  predicate  in  judgment  is  the  self.  The  quan- 
tified predicate,  then,  is  the  adjusted  self,  or,  biologically,  the  adjusted 
organism.  In  other  words,  quantification  of  the  predicate  is  logic's 
way  of  viewing  the  identification  of  the  self  with  its  environment. 
Complete  quantification  makes  subject  and  predicate  one,  not  two. 
The  man  holding  a  sledge-hammer  in  the  air,  measuring  positions  and 
distances  and  arranging  his  own  inner  states  at  the  same  time,  shows 
the  conscious  judgment,  the  tension  of  adjustment,  passing  into  the  ful- 
filled equation.  The  actual  blow  is  the  equation  or  definition  of  the  ex- 
perience. In  real  life  we  never  quantify  our  predicates ;  we  bring  our 
hammers  down  instead.  Quantification  of  the  predicate,  like  eviscer- 
ation of  the  copula,  means  action. 

3.  To  the  abstraction  of  time  by  formal  logic  some  reference  was 
made  in  what  was  said  about  the  copula.  It  may  here  be  added,  how- 
ever, that  the  timeless  or  tenseless  copula  and  the  quantified  predicate 
go  together.  As  just  pointed  out,  the  quantification  of  the  predicate 
makes  equation.  An  equation  of  course  is  timeless.  An  equation  is 
also  always  a  universal  proposition.  Even  in  such  a  case  as  Some  A. 
is  some  B  through  the  quantification  the  qualitative  difference  between 
A  and  B  is  so  far  overlooked  or  transcended  that  the  true  judgment  is 
rather  A.H  A.B  is  C.  Some  A.  is  some  B,  a  wholly  unnatural  form, 
is  but  a  linguistic  projection  of  a  timeless  continuous  experience  AB. 
The  lack  of  tense  only  testifies  to  this  continuity.  The  tenseless  cop- 
ula and  quantification  in  logic  answer  to  the  continuously  filled  time- 
interval  that  in  psychology  is  no  time  to  consciousness.  In  general, 
quantification,  as  its  contagion  spreads  to  the  predicate,  and  by  reaction 
more  precisely  measures  the  subject,  shows  experience  becoming  single, 
or  continuous,  and  so  from  the  standpoint  of  projection  in  language 
robs  the  copula  of  tense.  The  tenseless  copula,  finally,  is  evidently 
part  and  parcel  of  the  logical  distortion  of  the  freed  act. 

4.  To  the  definition  as  an  equation   reference   has   already   been 
made.     I  only  repeat  that  the  fulfilled  timeless  equation  of  quantities 
is  always  in  the  act  that  proves  adjustment. 

5.  Finally  in  the  syllogistic  rules  of  distribution  we  have  but  one 
more  view  of  the  way  in  which  formal  logic  projects  the  facts  of 
fluent  action  upon  the  medium  of  language.     The  rules  of  distribution 


426  COMMUNITY  OF  IDEAS. 

are  demands  for  universality.  In  the  case  of  the  middle  term  the  de- 
mand is  absolute.  But,  since  universality  and  tenselessness  and  freed 
activity  belong  together,  the  familiar  rule  that  the  middle  term  must 
be  distributed  only  shows  that  reasoning  depends  unconditionally  upon 
activity.  I  would  suggest,  in  order  rather  to  give  my  general  meaning 
than  to  say  anything  at  all  final,  that  the  fallacy  of  the  undistributed 
middle  represents  in  projection  an  unmediated  impulse,  while  the 
illicit  processes  of  the  major  and  the  minor  terms  represent  respect- 
ively action  under  coercion  from  environment  and  rash  or  random  action. 
But  I  must  conclude.  I  have  said  here  if  I  have  not  shown  ( i ) 
that  environment  in  its  entirety  is  the  real  medium  of  thought,  (2)  that 
judgment  is,  among  other  descriptions,  the  tension  of  adjustment,  and 
(3)  that  formal  logic  as  a  body  of  doctrine  is  activity  projected  upon 
language.  I  recognize  clearly  enough  that  my  ideal  in  this  short 
paper  has  been  better  than  the  execution.  If,  however,  only  what  I 
have  wanted  to  do  is  now  evident  the  labor  has  not  been  in  vain. 
Nothing  in  philosophy  is  so  much  needed  at  the  present  time  as  the 
adjustment  of  the  science  of  abstract  thought  to  the  science  of  organic 
action,  and  every  little  hint  as  to  how  that  adjustment  can  be  brought 
about  cannot  but  be  at  least  a  little  help.  The  evolution  of  conscious- 
ness must  be  almost  meaningless  until  the  simplest  case  of  accommo- 
dation as  seen  by  the  biologist  is  identified  with  the  most  perfect  case 
of  abstract  thought  that  the  logician  knows. 

ALFRED  H.  LLOYD. 
UNIVERSITY  OF  MICHIGAN. 


COMMUNITY   OF  IDEAS  OF  MEN  AND  WOMEN. 

Prof.  Jastrow's  criticism1  upon  the  methods,  and  therefore  the  re- 
sults, of  a  Wellesley  College  study  of  the  mental  community  of  men  and 
women2  has  led  me  to  repeat  the  experiment,  following  with  extreme 
precision  the  lines  which  he  has  laid  down.  At  the  outset,  I  wish  to 
acknowledge  the  justice  of  Dr.  Jastrow's  fundamental  criticism  upon 
the  divergence  of  method.  The  earlier  Wellesley  experiment  should 
indeed  have  conformed  exactly  with  the  methods  of  the  experiment 
whose  conclusions  were  questioned.  For  reasons  which  I  shall  later 
indicate,  the  divergencies  were  not  considered  '  essential,'  and  the  re- 
sults of  the  later  experiment  which  I  now  report  seem  to  me  to  confirm 

PSYCHOLOGICAL  REVIEW,  January,  1896.  p.  68. 
2  Ibid.  July,  1895,  p.  363. 


DISCUSSION  AND  REPORTS.  427 

this  view  in  some  important  features,  though  not  in  all.  In  this  new 
test,  lists  of  100  words  were  written  '  as  rapidly  as  possible  '  by  about 
fifty  women  students  of  Wellesley.  Twenty-five  of  these  lists  were 
chosen  entirely  at  random  from  among  those  written  in  the  shortest 
time.  The  average  time  occupied  was  five  minutes  and  one-sixth  sec- 
ond, a  somewhat  shorter  time  than  that  reported  by  Dr.  Jastrow  (five 
minutes  eight  seconds)  ;  the  lists  are  therefore  free  from  any  suspicion 
of  being  *  less  natural  and  unreflective  '  than  those  which  he  studies. 
With  the  efficient  aid  of  Miss  Mary  A.  Dartt  the  words  have  been 
very  carefully  classified.  I  have  guarded  the  entrance  to  every  one  of 
the  twenty-five  classes  by  a  scrupulous  consideration  of  each  of  the 
2,500  words,  and  have  even  ventured  to  submit  certain  doubtful  cases 
to  Dr.  Jastrow,  to  whom  my  thanks  are  due  for  his  kind  adjudication 
of  their  claims. 

Before  giving  the  results,  I  may  remark,  in  reference  to  one  of  Dr. 
Jastrow's  comments,  that  the  reason  for  using  only  fifteen  of  the  ear- 
lier lists,  in  the  count  of  different  words,  is  a  mysterious  loss  of  records. 
Making  every  allowance,  however,  for  the  increase  in  repetition  with 
the  growing  number  of  words,  it  is  overwhelmingly  probable  that  the 
ten  last  lists  together  contained  300  new  words,  a  number  more  than 
sufficient  to  bring  them  up  to  the  total  of  the  Wisconsin  men's  lists. 
Indeed,  the  ten  cards  last  classified  in  the  present  experiment  succes- 
sively added  more  than  thirty  new  words  to  the  '  different  words '  al- 
ready accumulated,  and  two  of  the  very  latest  lists  were  among  the 
most  varied. 

The  first  point  at  issue  is  the  bearing  of  the  experiment  upon  the 
relative  tendency  to  repetition  among  men  and  women.  Leaving  the 
earlier  comparison  out  of  account,  the  number  of  different  words  is 
given  in  connection  with  the  Wisconsin  results : 

Wise.  Univ.  Men.      Wise.  Univ.  Women.       Wellesley  Women  (1896.) 
1375  1123  1306 

The  comparison  of  the  percentage  of  different  words  (52  %)  in  the 
Wellesley  lists,  with  that  in  the  lists  of  the  Wisconsin  men  (55%), 
seems  to  me  an  insufficient  basis  for  the  conclusion  that  <•  there  is  less 
variety  among  women  than  among  men/  especially  as  it  is  possible 
that  the  slightly  greater  rapidity  with  which  the  Wellesley  lists  were 
written  may  have  reduced  the  number. 

The  comparison  of  '  unique  words  '  or  words  appearing  but  once, 
also  showrs  a  greater  originality  on  the  part  of  the  Wellesley  women. 
Among  our  2,500  words,  there  are  868  which  occur  but  once,  while  the 


428  COMMUNITY  OF  IDEAS. 

Wisconsin  men's  lists  include  746,  and  those  of  the  Wisconsin  women 
only  520.  Dr.  Jastrow  (who  has  kindly  read  this  paper  in  manuscript) 
regards  this  large  number  of  unique  words  as  '  suspicious,'  adding 
that  "  it  suggests  that  a  very  few  students  added  an  unusual  number 
of  different  and  unique  words."  Our  records,  however,  do  not  con- 
firm this  hypothesis,  for  they  show  that  the  lists  which  contain  an  un- 
usually small  number  of  '  unique '  words  approximately  balance  the 
particularly  full  records.  Dr.  Jastrow  adds  that  he  should  have  re- 
jected a  record  containing  a  long  list  of  prepositions  evidently  follow- 
ing upon  the  chance  occurrence  of  the  first  of  them,  "  as  the  associa- 
tions are  purely  verbal  and  artificial.  What  we  want,"  he  adds,  "  is 
one  hundred  different  ideas."  I  am  sorry  that  this  suggestion  came 
too  late  to  be  followed,  yet  I  think  that  it  proposes  an  unattainable 
standard,  since  it  seems  to  me  impossible  to  distinguish,  in  such  lists, 
between  '  verbal'  and  '  idea'  associations. 

The  view  that  some  other  influence  than  that  of  sex  may  account 
for  the  difference  in  '  repetition'  between  the  Wisconsin  men  and 
the  women,  seems  to  me  to  be  further  strengthened  by  the  results  of 
certain  experiments  in  controlled  association,  first  performed  by  Dr. 
Jastrow1  and  recently  repeated  at  Wellesley.  Ten  concrete  monosyl- 
labic nouns  were  successively  shown  and  the  subjects  were  directed, 
after  each,  to  write  '  the  first  word  suggested.'  Dr.  Jastrow  finds  that 
in  this  case  "  the  tendency  to  repeat  is  not  stronger  in  women  than  in 
men,"  and  our  Wellesley  results  from  42  records  (a  number  equalling 
that  of  the  Wisconsin  men  and  greater  than  that  of  the  Wisconsin 
women)  shows  an  even  lower  tendency  to  repetition ;  50%  as  com- 
pared with  65%.  Yet  if  there  is  really  among  women  a  greater  ten- 
dency to  repetition,  it  should  show  itself  in  every  form  of  unreflective 
and  immediate  thought. 

The  Wellesley  results  distinctly,  therefore,  oppose  the  generaliza- 
tion concerning  the  tendency  of  women  to  repeat  each  other.  On  the 
other  hand,  they  seem  to  confirm  several  conclusions  concerning  promi- 
nent objects  of  imagination.  The  full  classification  is  the  following 
and  includes  the  earlier  Wellesley  records,  for  purposes  of  comparison  : 

"^Educational  Review ,  II.  p.  448. 


DISCUSSION  AND  REPORTS. 
TABLE  OF  DIFFERENT  WORDS. 


429 


Men  of  Wis.  Univ. 

Women  of  Wis. 
Univ. 

* 

a 
«j  . 

P  >. 

l! 
I1 

« 

g  . 

1! 

i1 

I    Animal  Kingdom, 

2C4. 

178 

146 

227 

2.    Wearing  Apparel  and  Fabrics,     .... 

129 

I  Q4 

224 
l«53 

g 

0 

141 

4.  Verbs,     .    .           

197 

174 

279 

114 

5.  Implements  and  Utensils,     . 

2 

169 

121 

139 

132 

6.  Interior  Furnishings,                 

89 

I9O 

212 

84 

y.  Adjectives,                                  

177 

I  O2 

7OO 

2^4 

8.  Foods,                                           .... 

ri 

I7Q 

88 

56 

9.  Vegetable  Kingdom,          .    . 

121 

no 

IOI 

91 

10    Abstract  Terms, 

131 

Q7 

IOI 

280 

]j.  Buildings  and  Building  Materials,  .    .    .    . 

105 

IOI 

117 
IO5 

86 
66 

106 

34 

13.  Miscellaneous,      

91 

97 

123 

& 

14.  Geographical  and  Landscape  Features,    . 
15.  Mineral  Kingdom,              .    .        .    . 

97 

74 

So 
96 

70 
^o 

142 
54 

16.  Meteorological  and  Astronomical,      .    .    . 

\ 

109 
69 

26 
26 

18.  Occupations  and  Callings, 

<7I 

47 

24 

77 

67, 

C2 

19 

79 

74 

76 

IO2 

167 

21.  Other  Parts  of  Speech,  

96 

5 

164 

41 

33 

61 

17 

44 

3O 

M 

17 

1  02 

24.  Mercantile  Terms,  .           

3O 

29 

i* 

15 

17 

32 

42 

18 

Total,  

2,5OO 

2,  COO 

2,500 

2,500 

The  figures  of  the  two  Wellesley  experiments  certainly  differ  at 
several  points  and  thus  bear  out  the  view  of  Dr.  Jastrow  and  of  Mr. 
Havelock  Ellis,  that  the  lack  of  extreme  rapidity  in  writing  brought 
about  the  divergence  of  the  earlier  Wellesley  results.  This  difference 
is  very  marked  in  the  case  of  abstract  terms  which  fall  far  below  the 
figure  of  the  first  Wellesley  results,  though  it  is  proper  to  add  that 
in  the  fear  of  overcrowding  the  class  and  in  the  effort  to  follow  exactly 
Dr.  Jastrow's  principle  of  division,  many  words  which  seemed  to  me 
genuine  abstracts  were  omitted.  The  prominence  of  the  class  of 
interior  furnishings  is  the  case  of  most  marked  agreement  with  the 
Wisconsin  results.  Foods  also  appear  two-fifths  more  often  than  in 
the  men's  lists,  yet  only  half  as  often  as  in  the  Wisconsin  women's  lists. 
On  the  other  hand  c  wearing  apparel  and  fabrics,'  supposedly  objects 
of  ardent  feminine  interest  are  named  one-fourth  less  often  than  in  the 


43°  COMMUNITY  OF  IDEAS. 

men's  lists;  and  'arts'  and  'amusements'  fall  below  any  previous 
level.  The  results  thus  confirm  some,  yet  not  all,  the  conclusions  con- 
cerning differences  in  predominant  objects  of  interest.  They  certainly 
need  to  be  supplemented  by  other  figures  since,  as  Dr.  Jastrow  re- 
marks, "  in  dealing  with  such  small  groups  .  .  .  large  room  must  be 
allowed  for  accidental  variation." 

It  still  seems  to  me,  however,  that  such  investigation  is  likely  to 
lead  to  the  confusion  of  two  distinct  problems  and  that  one  of  these  is 
practically  insoluble.  A  statistical  study  may  truly,  if  sufficiently  ex- 
tended, establish  characteristic  differences  in  the  interests  of  men  and 
women,  and  all  Dr.  Jastrow's  conclusions  may  in  fact  be  interpreted  in 
this  way.  Mr.  Have  lock  Ellis,  however,  and  Dr.  Jastrow,  perhaps, 
by  the  expression  '  masculine  and  feminine  mental  traits,'  attempt  a 
distinction  between  masculine  and  feminine  intellect  per  se,  and  this 
seems  to  me  futile  and  impossible,  because  of  our  entire  inability  to 
eliminate  the  effect  of  environment.  Now  the  differences  in  the  train- 
ing and  tradition  of  men  and  women  begin  with  the  earliest  months  of 
infancy  and  continue  through  life.  Most  of  the  preferences  which  have 
been  substantiated  by  both  experimenters,  for  instance  that  of  women 
for  the  surroundings  of  a  home,  are  obviously  cultivated  interests. 
On  the  other  hand,  the  only  characteristics  discussed  on  which  the  sup- 
posed fundamental  distinction  of  masculine  and  feminine  intellect  could 
be  based,  are  the  prevalence  of  abstract  terms  and  the  tendency  to 
repetition.  On  the  former  score,  the  figures  certainly  show  more  ab- 
stract terms  on  the  men's  lists,  yet  the  whole  number  of  words  con- 
sidered seems  to  me  too  small  to  warrant  fixed  conclusions.  The 
number  of  '  repeated  words'  is  however  large  enough  to  form  a  fair 
basis  for  preliminary  conclusions,  yet  just  at  this  point  the  Wellesley 
figures  definitely  oppose  those  of  the  Wisconsin  experiment.  The 
question  of  the  essential  difference  between  masculine  and  feminine 
mind  seems  to  me,  therefore,  untouched  by  such  an  investigation. 

MARY  WHITON  CALKINS. 
WELLESLEY  COLLEGE. 

Miss  Calkins  has  submitted  the  above  notes  to  me  before  publica- 
tion ;  it  may,  therefore,  be  appropriate  for  me  to  record  my  conviction 
that  the  main  points  at  issue,  the  relative  variability  of  men  and  wo- 
men and  the  differences  in  their  interests,  still  seem  to  me  to  suggest 
the  solution  originally  outlined  in  my  paper.  On  re-reading  that  pa- 
per, I  can  find  no  suggestion  of  a  claim  for  a  wider  application  of  the 
generalizations  reached  than  that  of  the  special  results  presented.  The 


DISCUSSION  AND  REPORTS.  431 

repetition  of  the  Wellesley  results  have  shown  that  similarity  of  method 
is  necessary  to  comparable  conclusions,  and  they  show  this  so  strik- 
ingly as  to  form,  in  my  view,  a  valuable  illustration  of  the  applica- 
bility of  the  statistical  method  to  such  problems.  On  the  other  hand  it 
is  equally  clear  that  the  results  still  differ  considerably ;  this  means  to 
me  that  the  data  are  dissimilar  and  must  be  considerably  added  to  by 
repetition  of  the  experiments  in  other  institutions,  before  any  more 
definite  conclusions  can  be  reached.  Inasmuch  as  the  second  Welles- 
ley  test  has  brought  the  results  more  nearly  in  accord  with  the  Wis- 
consin results ;  and  inasmuch  as  the  Wisconsin  men  and  Wiscon- 
sin women  form  fairly  comparable  groups ;  and  inasmuch  as  there 
is  other  evidence  of  greater  uniformity  amongst  women  than  amongst 
men ;  and  inasmuch  as  the  exceptions  to  this  can  in  some  measure  be 
accounted  for,  I  must  still  claim  that  as  yet  the  indications,  imperfect 
as  they  are,  still  tend  toward  the  conclusions  first  suggested. 

JOSEPH  JASTROW. 
UNIVERSITY  OF  WISCONSIN. 


PSYCHOLOGICAL  LITERATURE. 

Studies  of  Childhood.     JAMES  SULLY.     D.  Appleton  &  Co.,  New 

York.     1896. 

The  name  of  this  veteran  psychologist  assures  a  courteous  recep- 
tion among  us,  for  all  his  work.  Nevertheless,  one  may  fear  that  this 
contribution  to  the  psychology  of  childhood  is  likely  to  be  under- 
valued. If  the  author  had  proposed  a  perfect  interlocking  system  of 
anthropogenesis,  or  new  and  daring  suggestions  toward  such  a  system, 
if  he  had  covered  his  pages  with  comprehensive  or  with  suggestive 
tables  of  statistics,  or  if  finally  he  had  written  just  the  book  that  lies 
before  us  twenty  years  ago — in  any  of  these  cases,  his  work  would  have 
been  received  as  an  event  of  first-rate  importance.  In  twenty  years, 
however,  a  great  deal  has  happened.  One  thing  at  any  rate  has  hap- 
pened and  that  is  differentiation  in  points  of  view  and  in  the  methods 
which  go  along  with  them.  If  Mr.  Sully  belonged  more  distinctly 
to  some  altogether  modern  group,  his  book,  strong  as  it  undoubtedly 
is,  would  be  met  with  the  kind  of  applause  and  of  attack  which  mean 
so  much  more  than  mere  courtesy  to  a  professional  colleague.  But 
Mr.  Sully's  book  does  none  of  the  things  indicated  above.  It  has  no 
closed  philosophy  of  anthropogenesis.  It  has  no  startling  new  theory. 
It  has  no  statistics.  So  far  as  the  spirit  and  method  of  the  book  are 
concerned  (much  of  the  material  is  entirely  modern)  it  might  have 
been  written  twenty  years  ago.  And,  therefore,  instead  of  applause 
or  attack,  the  book  is  likely  in  many  libraries  to  be  placed  respectfully 
upon  the  shelf  with  the  books  of  its  era. 

The  reviewer  sincerely  hopes  that  this  melancholy  prediction  will 
prove  false.  Mr.  Sully's  book  deserves  no  such  fate.  On  the  con- 
trary, it  deserves  not  only  from  the  laity,  for  whom  it  was  primarily 
written,  but  also  from  professional  psychologists,  attentive  considera- 
tion. Mr.  Sully  has  not  written  the  sort  of  book  upon  child  study 
which  many  of  us  would  like  to  see,  but  perhaps  many  of  us  fail  to 
recognize  the  independent  and  permanent  value  of  the  kind  of  book 
which  he  has  written.  The  intimate  personal,  natural  history  study 
of  children  of  which  the  work  is  composed,  was  indeed  possible  as 
long  ago  as  there  were  children  and  thoughtful  men  to  study  them, 
but  in  all  probability,  such  study  of  children  will  never  cease  to  be 
432 


PS  YCHOL  O  GICAL  LITER  A  TURE. 


433 


necessary.  The  reviewer  believes  in  the  future  of  a  more  systematic 
child  study,  but  the  discriminating  observations  of  one  who  sees  with 
a  trained  mind,  and  indeed  of  a  mind  trained  to  be  more  faithful  to 
fact  than  to  any  theory,  are  invaluable  at  every  date. 

Mr.  Sully  tells  what  he  proposes  to  do  in  the  following  words : 
"The  following  studies  are  not  a  complete  treatise  on  child  psychol- 
ogy, but  merely  deal  with  certain  aspects  of  children's  minds  which 
happen  to  have  come  under  my  notice  and  to  have  had  a  special  in- 
terest for  me.  In  preparing  them  I  have  tried  to  combine  with  the 
needed  measure  of  exactness  a  manner  of  presentation  which  should 
attract  other  readers  than  students  of  psychology,  more  particularly 
parents  and  young  teachers." 

In  the  introduction,  the  author  discusses  critically  though  moder- 
ately, the  various  methods  of  child  study  now  current,  concluding  with 
the  opinion  that  i  what  is  wanted  is  careful  studies  of  individual  chil- 
dren as  they  may  be  approached  in  the  nursery.' 

The  author  has  made  a  large  collection,  or  perhaps  he  would  pre- 
fer to  say,  selection  of  observations  upon  children.  A  primary  rule 
of  selection  has  been  to  take  observations  in  which  the  child  with  its 
surrounding  circumstances  were  well  known  to  the  observer.  Many 
of  the  observations  were  made  by  the  author  himself.  Others  were 
contributed  by  his  friends  and  correspondents.  Still  others  were  taken 
from  scientific  and  general  literature. 

The  author  has  grouped  this  material  about  certain  main  chapters 
in  Psychology  (Imagination,  Reason,  Language,  Fear,  Morals,  Art, 
&c.) .  He  has  written  under  each  head  the  conclusions  or  impressions 
arrived  at,  supporting  these  by  quotations  from  the  '  observations.* 

As  an  example  of  the  characters  of  the  book  I  shall  give  a  resume" 
of  the  section  entitled,  'Germs  of  Altruism,'  (pp.  242-251).  The 
various  forms  of  primitive  egoism  having  been  considered  in  the  pre- 
ceding section,  it  is  now  pointed  out  that  children  are  instinctively  at- 
tachable and  sociable,  craving  human  and  animal  companionship  and 
miserable  when  left  alone  (one  case) .  This  primitive  form  of  feeling 
is  not  sympathy  in  the  higher  sense  but  a  kind  of  imitation.  Thus  a 
dog  answers  the  howl  of  another  dog  and  a  child  cries  when  its  parents 
pretend  to  cry  (case  at  nine  months) .  Out  of  such  imitation  springs 
the  germ  of  a  higher  sympathy  (two  cases  in  proof  of  this  transition) . 
Later  comes  a  distinct  sympathetic  apprehension  of  the  other's  trouble 
(case  at  fourteen  months) .  Early  exhibitions  of  sympathy  (case  at 
three  years) .  Consolation  (case  at  two  and  a  half  years :  case  show- 
ing more  thoughtful  sympathy  at  five  years) .  Helpfulness  (case  at 


434  THE  PSYCHOLOGY  OF  NUMBER. 

twenty-five  months) .  Attempts  to  give  pleasure  (case  at  forty  months) . 
Love  for  animals  supplanting  fear  of  them  (two  cases,  one  at  fifteen 
months).  Sympathy  for  inanimate  objects,  dolls,  &c.  Dread  of  ar- 
tistic representations  of  cruelty  (case  under  four  years).  Dislike  of  sad 
stories.  "It  appears  to  me  incontestable  that  in  this  spontaneous  out- 
going of  fellow  feeling  toward  other  creatures,  human  and  animal, 
the  child  manifests  something  of  true  moral  quality." 

This  brief  example  which  is  characteristic  of  the  book  will  show 
why  it  is  necessary  to  cut  short  this  review.  There  is  no  way  to  sum- 
marize these  refined  commentaries  shading  each  into  the  next  from 
page  to  page.  Just  for  this  reason,  however,  the  book  will  be  valu- 
able to  intelligent  amateurs  who  wish  help  in  the  observations  of  their 
own  children. 

WM.  L.  BRYAN. 

UNIVERSITY  OF  INDIANA. 


The  Psychology  of  Number  and  its  Applications  to  Methods  of 
Teaching  Arithmetic.  By  JAMES  A.  McLELLAN  and  JOHN 
DEWEY.  New  York,  Appleton.  1895.  izmo.,  1 6  and  310  pp. 
(International  education  series,  Vol.  33.) 

No  more  useful  work  could  be  imagined  than  the  application  of 
the  results  of  modern  psychology  to  the  improvement  of  the  methods 
of  teaching  arithmetic.  On  the  whole,  this  task  is  admirably  accom- 
plished by  the  authors  of  this  work.  Every  intelligent  teacher  of 
arithmetic  will  read  the  book  with  profit.  The  first  half  is  devoted  to 
a  careful  psychological  analysis  of  the  origin  of  the  idea  of  number  as 
it  appears  in  the  fundamental  operations  of  arithmetic.  The  latter 
half  constitutes  a  kind  of  teacher's  guide  in  which  the  successive  stages 
in  the  ordinary  grammar  school  course  are  separately  discussed,  and 
specific  directions  are  given  about  the  methods  to  be  followed  in  teach- 
ing. The  main  fault  of  the  book  would  seem  to  be  diffuseness  and  some- 
what wearisome  repetition ;  the  essential  principles  and  their  applica- 
tion might  be  set  forth  in  a  book  of  less  than  half  the  size.  But  per- 
haps the  authors  know  their  public  better  than  does  the  reviewer. 

The  leading  thought  of  the  whole  work  is  the  demand  that,  in 
teaching  elementary  arithmetic,  the  idea  of  measurement  should  be 
introduced  from  the  beginning  and  insisted  upon  throughout,  that  con- 
tinuous quantity,  in  preference  to  discrete  objects,  should  be  used  for 
illustration,  that  number  should  be  regarded  as  a  means  of  valuation, 
and  counting  as  a  particular  kind'  of  measuring. 

It  is  doubtless  true  that,  to  the  mathematician,  such  a  view  of  num- 


PSYCHOLOGICAL   LITERATURE.  435 

ber  and  arithmetic  has  something  startling,  to  say  the  least.  Ever  since 
the  dawn  of  scientific  mathematical  thought,  from  the  times  of  Pythag- 
oras to  the  very  latest  researches  of  Weierstrass,  Kronecker,  G.  Can- 
tor, and  so  many  others,  has  a  fundamental  distinction  been  recognized 
between  pure  number  and  continuous  extension,  between  counting 
discrete  objects  and  measuring  quantity ;  and  arithmetic,  or  the  science 
of  number,  being  regarded  as  the  natural  starting  point  of  the  whole 
science  of  mathematics,  the  efforts  to  bridge  over  the  apparently  insu- 
perable gulf  that  separates  number  from  continuous  quantity  have 
taxed  the  keenest  minds.  Indeed,  the  tendency  to  '  arithmetize  *  the 
whole  of  mathematics,  to  base  it  exclusively  on  the  idea  of  the  whole 
number  as  the  only  sufficiently  simple  and  clear  notion  of  the  human 
mind  is  a  distinct  characteristic  of,  at  least,  one  phase  of  the  most 
advanced  development  of  modern  mathematics.  And  now  we  are  ap- 
parently told  in  this  book  that  all  this  is  wrong,  that  the  psychologist 
does  not  recognize  this  radical  distinction  between  pure  number  and 
continuous  quantity,  between  counting  and  measuring,  that  the  primary 
notion  is  not  the  absolute  integer  but  continuous  quantity,  and  that, 
therefore,  the  idea  of  pure  number  should  be  discarded  as  far  as  possi- 
ble from  the  first  teaching  of  elementary  arithmetic. 

How  can  such  directly  opposite  views  be  reconciled  ?  First  of  all, 
by  the  fact  that  elementary  arithmetic  as  taught  in  the  schools  is  not 
mathematical  science ;  it  is  far  more  a  practical  art  than  a  science.  It 
is  the  \ofiGTuri  of  the  Greeks  which  must  have  existed  long  before  the 
foundation  was  laid  for  a  science  of  mathematics  by  a  clear  and  defi- 
nite recognition  of  the  difference  between  pure  number  and  continuous 
quantity. 

Our  authors  ascribe  the  psychological  origin  of  number  to  the 
desire,  or  rather  to  the  necessity  in  which  man  finds  himself,  of 
evaluating  and  measuring  as  accurately  as  possible,  'to  the  pro- 
gressively accurate  adjustment  of  means  to  end.'  Counting  thus  ap- 
pears as  a  means  of  valuation,  number  as  an  expression  of  value. 
The  reasoning  used  in  proving  this  position  is  plausible,  if  not  quite 
convincing;  it  is  certainly  far  from  accounting  fully  for  the  peculiar 
nature  of  number.  There  are  numerous  cases  of  counting  into  wliich 
the  idea  of  valuation  or  measurement  does  not  enter  except  through  a 
strained  interpretation.  On  the  other  hand,  measuring  is  often  per- 
formed, even  with  considerable  accuracy,  without  any  use  of  number. 
What  is  essential  in  measuring  is  the  actual  '  application'  of  a  unit  or 
scale  to  the  quantity  to  be  measured.  Similarly,  what  is  essential  in 
counting  is  the  establishment  of  a  one-to-one  correspondence  between 


43  6  THE  PSYCHOLOGY  OF  NUMBER. 

the  things  to  be  counted  and  the  known  series  of  natural  numbers. 
Now  while  our  authors  insist  very  much,  and  very  appropriately,  on 
this  analogy  between  counting  and  measuring,  they  do  not  insist  suffi- 
ciently, it  would  seem,  on  the  essential  distinction  between  the  two 
operations,  on  the  distinction  between  number  and  continuous  exten- 
sion. It  must  be  conceded,  however,  that  this  distinction  can  only  be 
fully  appreciated  at  a  higher  stage  of  mental  development,  that  it  be- 
longs properly  to  apidfj^nxij  and  not  to  Ao^orwc??,  and  that  the  teacher 
of  elementary  arithmetic  is  mainly  interested,  as  Professor  Dewey  says 
in  his  letter  to  Science  (Vol.  III.,  No.  60,  p.  288),  in  the  "  task  of 
finding  out  what  sort  of  a  mental  condition  creates  a  demand  for  num- 
ber and  how  it  is  that  number  operates  to  satisfy  that  demand." 

We  cannot  refrain  from  quoting  another  passage  from  the  same 
very  interesting  letter:  "The  trained  mathematician  as  such  is,  of 
necessity,  interested  in  the  further  use  of  certain  finished  psychical 
products.  As  a  mathematician  any  reference  to  the  preliminary  de- 
velopment of  these  products  can  only  disturb  and  divert  him.  But 
the  problem  for  the  pupil  is  how  to  get  the  standpoint  of  the  mathe- 
matician; not  how  to  use  certain  tools,  but  how  to  make  them  ;  not 
how  to  carry  further  the  manipulation  of  certain  data,  but  how  to  get 
meaning  into  the  data."  The  justness  of  these  remarks  will  be  felt 
by  those  who  have  had  experience  in  teaching  mathematics ;  the  be- 
ginner's main  difficulty  lies  in  4  getting  meaning  into  the  data.'  And 
from  this  point  of  view  the  psychological  method  of  our  authors  is  of 
interest  not  only  for  that  applied  art,  elementary  arithmetic,  but  for 
mathematical  teaching  generally,  even  though  one  may  not  feel  ready 
to  subscribe  to  Professor  Dewey's  severe  arraignment  of  'our  text- 
books of  algebra,  geometry  and  high  analysis.' 

It  is  exceedingly  desirable  that  the  attempt  be  made  by  mathema- 
ticians 4  to  rethink  the  psychical  conditions  and  steps  through  which 
their  present  magnificent  apparatus  has  grown  out  of  primitive,  non- 
mathematical  or  crudely  mathematical  forms  up  to  its  present  high  es- 
tate.' But  there  is  some  danger  that,  by  insisting  too  much  on  this 
psychological  analysis,  the  pupil,  instead  of  being  actually  lifted  up  to 
the  pure  mathematical  idea,  may  be  left  behind  with  the  l  primitive, 
non- mathematical  or  crudely  mathematical  forms'  in  his  mind.  To 
come  back  to  our  starting  point,  it  might  happen,  that,-  owing  to  exces- 
sive attention  to  the  metrical  function  of  number  and  to  its  application  to 
measurement,  the  pupil  might  never  attain  to  a  clear  notion  of  pure 
number.  Even  though  the  logical  number  concept  and  the  symbolical 
aspect  of  arithmetical  operations  may  be  considered  as  lying  beyond 


PSYCHOLOGICAL  LITERATURE.  437 

the  limits  of  elementary  arithmetic,  the  teacher  of  this  subject  should 
keep  them  clearly  in  his  mind.  And  we  should  have  wished  to  see 
more  attention  paid  to  this  mathematical  side  of  arithmetic  in  a  work 
primarily  addressed  to  the  teacher. 

ALEXANDER  ZIWET. 
UNIVERSITY  OF  MICHIGAN,  May  3,  1896. 

Darwin,    and    after    Darwin.    II.    Post- Darwinian    Questions; 

Heredity  and  Utility.     By   the  late  GEORGE  JOHN  ROMANES, 

M.  A.,  LL.  D.,  F.  R.  S.     Chicago,  The  Open  Court  Publishing 

Co.,  1895.     Pp.  X  +  344. 
The  Primary  Factors  of  Organic  Evolution.     By  E.  D.   COPE, 

Ph.   D.  Chicago,  The  Open  Court   Publishing  Co.,   1896.     Pp. 

XVI+547- 

We  are  often  told  that  with  the  advance  of  knowledge  specializa  - 
tion  has  become  extreme.  Yet  between  the  zoology  and  the  psychology 
of  fifty  years  ago,  there  was  but  little  connection,  whereas  to-day  the 
more  impprtant  works  in  zoology,  such  as  these  by  Romanes  and  Pro- 
fessor Cope,  could  only  have  been  written  by  serious  students  of  psy- 
chology, and  in  turn  every  psychologist  must  read  these  books.  It  is 
perhaps  one  of  the  prerogatives  of  psychology  to  demonstrate  that  there 
are  not  only  sciences,  but  that  there  is  also  science. 

Both  of  the  books  before  us  offer  special  pleading  rather  than  judi- 
cial examination.  Cope  acknowledges  and  justifies  this.  He  writes : 
4 '  the  factors  of  evolution  which  were  first  clearly  formulated  by  La- 
marck are  really  such  *  *  *  and  the  book  is  a  plea  on  their  behalf." 
Romanes,  on  the  other  hand  writes:  "I  have  endeavored  to  be,  be- 
fore all  things  impartial."  Cope  writes  with  unusual  Derbheit,  with 
directness  and  condensation  based  on  intimate  knowledge  of  facts  at 
first  hand,  whereas  Romanes  is  more  diffuse  and  gives  the  impression 
of  being  an  able  amateur. 

Romanes'  Darwin,  and  after  Darwin  is,  it  is  true,  a  posthumous 
work,  and  did  not  receive  its  author's  final  revision.  It  has,  however, 
been  edited  with  much  care  and  skill  by  Prof.  C.  Lloyd  Morgan. 
The  present  part  is  concerned  with  *  questions  of  heredity  and  utility.' 
In  the  introduction  of  36  pp.,  the  views  of  Darwin  and  of  the  post- 
Darwinian  schools  are  reviewed.  It  is  so  well  known  that  Darwin 
admitted  the  hereditary  effects  of  use  and  disuse,  and  with  increasing 
emphasis  as  time  passed,  that  it  seems  scarcely  likely  that  confusion 
has  been  caused,  as  Romanes  claims,  by  applying  the  term  *  Darwinism' 
to  the  factors  in  evolution  made  leading  by  Darwin's  works.  Wallace 


43$  DARWIN,   AND  AFTER  DARWIN. 

doubtless  called  his  book  '  Darwinism '  as  a  tribute  to  the  greater  man, 
not  in  order  to  identify  Darwin's  views  with  his  own.  Neither  does  it 
seem  necessary  to  argue  at  length  against  the  claim  of  Wallace  that 
man  has  not  descended  by  natural  changes  from  other  species.  It  has 
been  said  that  as  each  has  a  blind  spot  in  his  eye,  so  each  has  an 
idiotic  spot  in  his  brain,  but  such  spots  may  be  properly  left  to  atro- 
phy. In  enumerating  the  American  Neo-Lamarckians  Romanes 
confuses  the  definite  views  of  Cope,  Hyatt  and  Ryder  with  the  some- 
what agnostic  attitude  of  Osborn  and  of  Brooks. 

Five  chapters  of  Romanes'  book  are  devoted  to  'characters  as 
hereditary  and  acquired.'  The  phenomena  of  reflex  action  are  brought 
forward  as  probably  the  most  cogent  in  favor  of  the  Lamarckian  fac- 
tors, the  argument  being  similar  to  that  from  co-adaptation  urged 
by  Spencer  and  others.  Romanes  argues  that  reflex  actions  cannot 
take  place  unless  all  parts  of  the  machinery  concerned  are  already 
present  and  already  coordinated  in  the  same  organism.  As  the 
stages  of  its  development  cannot  have  presented  any  degree  of  utility, 
they  cannot  have  been  preserved  by  natural  selection.  The  arguments 
from  co-adaptation  (including  reflexes)  seem  to  the  present  writer 
valid  but  not  conclusive.  Romanes  states  that  he  perceives  that 
Spencer's  arguments  based  on  co-adaptation  are  equivocal ;  his  own 
from  reflex  actions  are  equally  so.  If  congenital  variations  can  be  or- 
ganized by  use  into  useful  reflex  actions  the  variations  are  already  use- 
ful, and  when  further  congenital  variations  occur  which  tend  to  relieve 
consciousness  from  the  burden  of  interference,  they  are  also  useful  and 
will  be  preserved  by  natural  selection.  Here  as  everywhere  the  sur- 
vival of  useful  variations  is  accounted  for  by  natural  selection,  but 
not  their  origin.  The  Lamarckian  factors,  when  they  refer  to  environ- 
ment, do  attempt  to  account  for  variations,  but  when  they  refer  to 
the  guidance  of  consciousness  they  invoke  a  deus  ex  machina  and 
argue  ad  ignorantiam. 

Probably  the  most  valuable  part  of  Romanes'  book  is  the  account 
of  his  repetition  of  Brown-Sequard's  experiments  on  the  hereditary 
effects  of  local  injuries.  The  occurrence  of  epilepsy  in  guinea  pigs 
born  of  parents  which  had  been  made  epileptic  by  injury  to  the  spinal 
cord  or  section  of  the  sciatic  nerve  was  not  tested  by  Romanes,  but 
has  been  corroborated  by  others.  Romanes  states  that  he  has  not  been 
able  to  furnish  any  approach  to  a  full  corroboration  of  Brown-Se- 
quard's experiments,  but  he  has  found  gangrene  of  the  ears  in  the 
offspring  of  animals  in  which  this  condition  had  been  brought  about 
by  injury  to  the  restiform  body.  Brown-Sequard's  results  are  among 


PSYCHOLOGICAL  LITERATURE.  439 

the  most  curious  in  the  history  of  science.  It  is  the  essence  of  a 
valid  experiment  that  it  can  be  verified  by  any  competent  experi- 
menter, yet  many  of  Brown-Sequard's  experiments  remain,  in  spite 
of  their  importance,  isolated  observations.  Brown-Sequard's  positive 
statements  in  regard  to  the  *  elixir  of  life,'  have,  perhaps,  made  some 
men  of  science  sceptical  in  regard  to  these  experiments. 

The  second  section  of  Romanes'  book  is  on  '  Utility '  and  the  four 
chapters  are  all  entitled  'Characters  as  Co-adaptive  and  Specific.' 
There  is  an  extended  discussion  claiming  that  the  student  of  evolution 
should  regard  adaptations  rather  than  species,  and  pointing  out  the 
difficulties  in  the  way  of  defining  species.  Much  of  the  argument 
seems  superfluous;  when  Darwin  named  his  work  The  Origin  of 
Species,  he  did  not  mean  to  exclude  varieties,  genera  and  families, 
and  the  briefest  statement  of  the  doctrine  of  evolution  makes  it  clear 
that  species  represent  mere  degrees  of  gradation.  Romanes  holds 
that  many  characters  are  useless  and  have  developed  independently  of 
natural  selection.  He  gives  as  the  causes  of  these,  climate,  food, 
sexual  selection,  isolation  and  laws  of  growth.  That  variations  are 
conditioned  upon  climate  and  food  is  sufficiently  evident,  but  it  does 
not  follow  in  the  cases  given  by  Romanes  that  the  persistent  adaptations 
are  not  useful  under  the  changed  conditions.  Sexual  selection  (the 
taste  of  the  female)  and  isolation  might  preserve  variations  when  no 
longer  useful,  but  do  not  seem  to  be  efficient  causes  of  their  origin. 
*  Laws  of  growth '  is  a  phrase  apparently  used  to  cover  ignorance. 
There  is  no  one  who  claims  that  every  character  is  useful  per  se. 
The  single  organism  and  its  relations  to  the  physical  and  organic  en- 
vironment are  endlessly  complex,  and  while  it  is  impossible  to  prove 
that  every  trait  is  useful,  it  is  equally  impossible  to  prove  that  any 
given  trait  is  not  or  has  never  been  correlated  with  some  useful  trait. 
Further  it  should  be  remembered  that  an  organism  cannot  be  perma- 
nently adapted  to  a  changing  environment,  and  that  '  natural  selection' 
can  only  build  with  the  materials  offered  it.  The  most  zealous  ad- 
vocate of  natural  selection  can  only  claim  that  it  tends  to  establish 
useful  traits  and  obliterate  such  as  are  useless  and  harmful. 

Romanes'  book  closes  with  two  appendices  and  two  notes.  One 
appendix  deals  with  panmixia  and  the  other  with  adaptive  characters, 
discussing  further  the  views  of  Darwin,  Wallace  and  Huxley. 

As  Romanes'  book  is  itself  polemical  throughout,  the  reviewer  is 
apt  to  follow  unconsciously  similar  methods.  But  no  one  can  read 
this  book,  with  its  wide  and  deep  interest  in  fundamental  problems, 
with  its  sincere  and  eager  search  for  truth,  without  a  keen  apprecia- 


44°  THE  FACTORS   OF  ORGANIC  EVOLUTION. 

tion  of  the  irreparable   loss  science  has  suffered  in  the  death  of  Ro- 
manes. 

Professor  Cope's  Primary  Factors  of  Organic  Evolution  is  less 
polemical  than  Romanes'  book  and  undertakes  to  offer  fewer  argu- 
ments and  more  facts.  But  Cope  is  even  more  dogmatic  than  Ro- 
manes and  writes  as  though  problems  were  settled  that  have  as  yet 
scarcely  been  adequately  stated.  Still  the  work  is  one  of  great  value 
and  importance.  The  strong  impulse  that  leads  men  to  adopt  a  defi- 
nite theory  and  search  far  and  near  for  arguments  and  facts  in  its  sup- 
port is  wholesome  for  science,  for  thus  stepping  stones  are  laid  on 
which  we  pass  to  wider  knowledge.  If  those  who  make  no  hypoth- 
esis make  but  few  mistakes,  they  also  make  but  little  progress. 

The  book  before  us  opens  with  an  introduction  giving  Lamarck's 
statement  of  the  causes  of  evolution  and  tracing  the  subsequent  history 
of  the  theory  of  evolution ;  and  the  final  chapter  of  the  book  reviews 
the  opinions  of  American  Neo-Lamarckians.  The  three  parts  of  the 
book  are  entitled,  respectively,  'The  Nature  of  Variation,'  'The 
Causes  of  Variation*  and  'The  Inheritance  of  Variation.'  A  large 
part  of  the  details  is  outside  the  province  of  this  REVIEW  and  the  com- 
petence of  the  present  reviewer.  As  far  as  the  paleontological  evi- 
dence for  a  given  phylogeny  is  concerned  we  can  but  learn  from  the 
author,  who  probably  has  no  rival  in  intimate  acquaintance  with 
extinct  species. 

In  the  first  part  Cope  brings  forward  cases  of  variation  in  colora- 
tion and  structure,  quoting  at  length  from  others  as  he  does  throughout 
the  book.1  He  concludes  that  variations  are  not  promiscuous  but 
take  place  in  certain  definite  directions.  Just  100  pages  are  then 
given  to  tracing  certain  phylogenies  or  genealogies  based  largely  on 
the  author's  paleontological  research.  The  third  chapter  is  on  the 
parallelism  between  phylogenetic  and  embryonic  development,  Cope 
regarding  the  parallelism  as  closer  and  more  important  than  do  most 
recent  writers.  The  fourth  chapter  entitled  'Catagenesis,'  is  on  re- 
gression or  degeneracy.  '  Sports '  are  held  to  be  of  no  importance  in 
evolution.  The  whole  argument  of  this  part  is  directed  to  showing 
that  evolution  has  been  due  to  determinate  variation,  giving  pro- 
gressive advance  along  certain  main  lines. 

Under  the  second  part,  entitled  '  The  Causes  of  Variation,'  we 

xThe  long  quotations  from  the  author's  previous  publications  and  from 
other  writers  are  in  many  cases  superfluous,  but  in  others  they  are  useful,  so 
long  as  writers  will  contribute  original  work  to  journals  such  as  '  Agricultural 
Science,'  '  The  Radical  Review '  and  '  New  Occasions.' 


PSYCHOLOGICAL  LITERATURE.  441 

find  a  chapter  on  '  Natural  Selection,'  which  the  author  correctly  sees 
to  be  no  cause  of  variations,  whereas  the  '  Energy  of  Evolution '  and 
the  '  Function  of  Consciousness,'  which  he  holds  to  be  efficient  causes 
of  variation  are  not  placed  in  this  part  but  under  the  part  on  '  The  In- 
heritance of  Variation.'  The  subjects  here  discussed  are  environment 
and  the  movements  of  the  organism  as  causes  of  variations,  these  fac- 
tors being  called  '  physiogenesis  '  and  '  kinetogenesis.' 

The  chapter  on  physiogenesis  is  short  and  inadequate.  Every  little 
boy  knows  that  the  organism  is  affected  by  the  environment  and 
adapts  itself  to  it,  even  though  he  may  not  know  what  these  words 
mean.  The  first  time  he  goes  swimming  in  the  spring  the  sunburns 
his  skin,  after  that  it  becomes  brown  and  is  no  longer  burned.  But 
what  the  little  boy  does  not  know,  and  what  Cope  does  not  attempt  to 
explain,  is  how  there  comes  to  be  an  organism  that  reacts  in  this  way 
on  the  environment.  Yet  this  is  surely  the  central  problem  of  La- 
marckism.  Is  the  environment  the  efficient  cause  or  merely  the  occa- 
sion of  development  and  evolution  ?  Later  in  the  book  Cope  argues 
that  the  energy  of  evolution  is  not  that  which  characterizes  inorganic 
matter,  and  thus  seems  to  me  to  give  up  the  more  important  aspect  of 
Lamarckism  altogether,  for  I  think  that  the  movements  of  animals 
and  consciousness  cannot  be  regarded  as  efficient  causes  of  evolution, 
unless  their  origin  and  hereditary  transmission  can  be  accounted  for 
without  returning  in  a  circle  to  the  nature  of  the  structure  and  func- 
tions of  the  organism. 

Kinetogenesis  is  discussed  at  length,  139  pages  being  given  to  the 
subject.  The  details,  largely  drawn  from  Cope's  own  researches  on 
the  vertebrate  skeleton,  are  interesting  and  show  how  the  structure  of 
an  animal  is  fitted  for  the  movements  that  it  makes.  Changes  in  struc- 
ture in  the  individual  follow  on  the  movements  that  it  habitually  makes, 
but  then  why  does  the  creature  make  these  movements  ?  Because  they 
are  useful  under  the  circumstances  perhaps,  but  then  why  does  the 
animal  do  what  is  useful  ?  What  after  all  is  the  efficient  cause  of  an 
organism  that  can  make  these  movements  and  then  become  still  better 
adapted  to  making  them  ?  If  we  are  referred  to  '  laws  of  growth'  and 
*  anagenetic  energies,'  we  have  only  words  no  more  adequate  as  a  sci- 
entific explanation  than  the  logos  in  the  first  chapter  of  St.  John. 

Part  III.  is  on  the  inheritance  of  variation.  It  is  amply  clear  that 
variations  are  inherited  or  there  could  be  no  organic  evolution. 
Whether  the  variations  that  have  resulted  in  evolution  are  congenital 
or  acquired  by  the  individual  in  its  life-time,  is,  as  we  all  know,  a 
vexed  question.  Cope,  however,  is  very  sure  that  all  characters  now 


442  THE  FACTORS  OF  ORGANIC  EVOLUTION. 

congenital  have  been  at  some  period  or  another  acquired  by  the  indi- 
vidual. The  evidence  offered  in  support  of  this  point  of  view  is  not 
extensive,  consisting  chiefly  of  Hyatt's  observations  on  the  impressed 
zone  of  the  nautiloids,  and  cases  from  breeding  collected  by  Brewer. 

The  paleonto logical  evidence  seems  to  be  ambiguous.  If  we  admit 
that  adaptations  in  individuals  due  to  mechanical  causes  have  preceded 
the  establishment  of  these  adaptations  as  hereditary  characters, 
this  in  itself  does  not  prove  that  the  effects  of  use  are  inherited. 
As  Osborn  has  recently  pointed  out  (Science,  N.  S.,  Vol.  Ill,  p. 
530)  congenital  variations  that  facilitate  a  useful  action  would 
be  preserved  by  natural  selection,  and  it  would  appear  as  though  the 
variations  were  caused  by  the  action.  The  cases  quoted  from  Brewer 
are  direct  evidence,  and  if  admitted  would  prove  conclusive,  but 
miscellaneous  observations  that  cannot  be  repeated  or  confirmed  by 
experiment,  have  never  been  important  factors  in  the  advancement 
of  science.  What  we  need  is  an  extended  series  of  quantitative 
experiments  on  variation  and  heredity.1  If  these  were  properly 
conducted  we  could  learn  whether  or  not  a  given  change  in  environ- 
ment or  habit  would,  in  a  given  number  of  generations,  produce  any 
congenital  alterations  in  a  species.  So  long  as  such  experiments  are 
not  made  it  would  seem  that  we  are  talking  too  much  and  working  too 
little. 

The  chapters  on  «  The  Energy  of  Evolution'  and  on  '  The  Func- 
tion of  Consciousness,'  would  perhaps  be  regarded  by  the  author 
as  the  most  important  in  the  book.  In  the  former  he  argues  that 
the  forms  of  energy  of  the  inorganic  world  are  also  exhibited  by 
organisms,  but  that  to  account  for  assimilation,  reproduction  and 
growth,  '  anagenetic '  energies,  '  antichemism  '  and  l  bathism  '  must 
be  assumed.  It  may  be  necessary  to  go  back  to  vitalism,  but  if  one 
can  do  no  more  than  say  that  life  is  an  exhibition  of  '  bathism, ' 
the  preceding  arguments  of  the  book  have  indeed  ended  in  bathos. 
It  is,  I  fear,  true  that  Cope  is  more  successful  in  showing  that  we 
cannot  account  for  life  by  physical  and  chemical  energies  than  in 
proving  that  organic  evolution  has  resulted  from  l  physiogenesis '  and 
'  kinetogenesis.' 

Cope  holds  that  progressive  organic  evolution  is  due  to  the  move- 
ments of  the  organism  and  that  the  movements  are  due  to  conscious- 

irThe  nearest  approach  to  these  is  in  observations  made  incidentally  in  prac- 
tical horticulture.  Cope  does  not  discuss  this  evidence,  to  my  mind  much  the 
strongest  hitherto  adduced  in  favor  of  the  inheritance  of  characters  produced  in 
the  individual  by  the  action  of  the  environment. 


PSYCHOLOGICAL  LITERATURE.  443 

ness — an  effort  to  attain  "  some  position  which  is  favorable  for  the  pro 
curement  of  relief  from  some  unpleasant  sensation  or  the  acquisition 
of  some  agreeable  one."  Consciousness  is  thus  the  vera  causa  of  or- 
ganic evolution.  The  earth  is  supported  by  the  elephants  and  the 
elephants  stand  on  the  tortoises,  but  then  what  do  the  tortoises  stand 
on?  Presumably  on  the  earth,  for  Cope  probably  holds,  though  I  be- 
lieve he  does  not  explicitly  state,  that  consciousness  is  a  function  of 
the  nervous  system.  Consciousness  and  the  nervous  system  take 
turns  in  lifting  each  other  to  higher  places  and  so  we  rise  in  defiance 
of  the  laws  of  gravitation  and  logic.  I  do  not  forget  that  we  are  sup- 
posed to  have  the  help  of  antichemism  and  bathism,  so  we  thus  have 
in  addition  two  words  to  push  us  along.  When  Cope  takes  the  part 
of  metaphysics  versus  common  sense,  and  writes  "it  is  more  probable 
that  death  is  a  consequence  of  life,  rather  [sic]  than  that  the  living  is 
a  product  of  the  non-living"  and  "conscious  states  have  preceded 
organisms  in  time  and  evolution,"  we  can  but  admire  the  courage  of 
one  who  writes  these  things  in  a  paleontological  book  published  in  the 
days  of  the  triumph  of  material  science.  Cope  promises  a  special 
volume  on  the  evolution  of  mind  and  its  relation  to  the  organic  world, 
and  it  is  but  just  to  wait  for  this  rather  than  to  enter  into  an  extended 
criticism  of  a  single  chapter  of  the  present  book. 

In  conclusion  it  may  be  acknowledged  that  we  owe  chiefly  to  Cope 
and  the  other  American  Neo-Lamarckians  the  clear  formulation  and 
partial  proof  of  the  proposition  that  variations  are  not  promiscuous  nor 
multifarious,  but  are  of  certain  definite  kinds  and  in  certain  definite 
directions.  This  represents  an  important  advance  beyond  Darwin's 
position.  But  we  must  wait  for  a  second  Darwin  and  a  greater  Dar- 
win to  teach  us  the  efficient  causes  of  variations  and  of  heredity. 

J.  McKEEN.  CATTELL. 

The  Whence  and  the  Whither  of  Man.  By  JOHN  M.  TYLER,  Pro- 
fessor of  Biology,  Amherst  College.  New  York,  Charles  Scrib- 
ner's  Sons,  1896. 

The  above  title  is  given  to  a  series  of  ten  lectures  delivered  at  the 
Union  Theological  Seminary,  being  the  Morse  sections  of  1895.  The 
fund  was  left  by  Professor  Samuel  Morse,  for  lectures  on  the  relation 
of  the  Bible  to  the  various  sciences.  To  the  question  of  the  whence 
and  the  whither  of  man  the  Bible  gives  a  clear  and  definite  answer. 
The  object  of  these  lectures  is  to  show  that  science  gives  an  answer  in 
the  main  in  accord  with  that  of  the  Bible.  The  first  few  lectures  were 
devoted  to  tracing  '  the  great  line  of  development  through  a  few  of  its 


444         THE    WHENCE  AND    THE    WHITHER   OF  MAN. 

characteristic  stages  from  the  simplest  living  beings  up  to  man.'  The 
different  stages  are  marked  by  predominant  sets  of  functions  which 
succeed  one  another  in  an  orderly  sequence.  The  lowest  forms  are 
characterized  almost  exclusively  by  nutrition  and  reproduction.  To 
supply  the  needs  of  digestion  muscles  are  developed.  Development 
of  the  muscular  system  brings  about  the  nervous  system  and  finally, 
as  connection  between  stimulus  and  reaction  becomes  less  and  less  di- 
rect, the  growth  of  the  brain.  The  lower  functions,  the  digestive  and 
muscular  systems,  have  already  completed  their  development;  the 
higher  functions,  the  intellectual  and  spiritual,  are  capable  of  further 
and  apparently  infinite  development.  Professor  Tyler  looks  upon  the 
lower  functions  as  the  means  for  the  development  of  the  higher.  The 
end  of  evolution  is  the  development  of  mind.  If  comfort  and  security, 
plenty  of  food  and  favorable  conditions  for  reproduction,  were  the  goal 
of  development,  the  clam  should  be  considered  the  highest  product  of 
evolution.  The  development  of  mind  is  parallel  to  that  of  body. 
Already  in  the  hydra  we  see  signs  of  sentience.  In  the  higher  animals 
we  see  undoubted  signs  not  only  of  reasoning,  aesthetic  emotions 
and  voluntary  action,  but  of  moral  sentiments,  of  unselfish  love. 
Evolution  is  the  conformity  to  environment.  The  lower  animals  come 
into  vital  relation  with  but  a  small  part  of  it.  Environment  includes 
all  the  forces  in  existence,  material  and  spiritual.  Conformity  to  en- 
vironment produces  therefore  in  the  first  place  digestion  and  reproduc- 
tion, then  muscular  power,  then  shrewdness,  but  finally  unselfishness 
and  righteousness.  Environment  therefore  is  ultimately  God — a 
personality  making  for  righteousness. 

I  pass  over  the  chapters  showing  that  this  answer  of  science  to  the 
question  of  the  '  whither'  of  man  is  substantially  that  of  the  Bible — also 
the  very  interesting  chapter  on  the  present  aspects  of  the  theory  of  evo- 
lution, which  is  a  kind  of  appendix  to  the  rest  of  the  book.  The  lec- 
tures are  for  the  most  part  fresh  and  interesting  and  the  argument  is 
clear.  But  they  fail,  as  most  such  attempts  fail,  to  give  a  perfectly 
definite  answer  to  the  main  question.  We  are  told  that  man's  future 
is  spiritual ;  but  we  already  suspect  as  much.  Does  *  spiritual '  mean 
the  biblical  doctrine  of  a  future  life  for  the  individual  or  does  it  refer 
to  the  future  existence  of  the  race  as  such  ?  And,  if  the  latter,  of  what 
will  that  existence  consist?  These  are  questions  which  one  inquiring 
about  the  '  whither  'of  man  would  certainly  ask  and  I  cannot  see  that 
Professor  Tyler  has  answered  them. 

WARNER  FITE. 

WILLIAMS  COLLEGE. 


PSYCHOLOGICAL  LITERATURE.  445 

Fear.     ANGELO  Mosso.     Translated  from   the  fifth  edition  of   the 

Italian,  by   E.  Lough  and  F.  Kiesow.     Longmans,  Green  &  Co. 

London,  New  York,  and  Bombay.     1896.     Pp.  278. 

This  book  comes  from  one  of  the  best  known  living  physiologists. 
To  Prof.  Mosso  the  world  owes  some  of  the  choicest  methods  and  ap- 
paratus ever  invented ;  his  peculiar  domain  being  the  study  of  blood 
circulation,  respiration  and  fatigue,  with  special  reference  to  mental 
activity. 

In  attacking  Fear,  Prof.  Mosso  again  shows  his  keen  scent  for  cru- 
cial problems.  Yet  we  must  confess  that  the  results,  this  time,  re- 
vive our  impression  of  how  wonderful  the  inventor  was  within  his  old 
sphere,  rather  than  excite  us  with  valuable  contributions  for  his  new 
subject. 

The  first  eight  chapters  deal  with  '  How  the  Brain  Acts,'  '  Circu- 
lation of  the  Blood  in  the  Brain  during  Emotion,'  '  Pallor  and  Blush- 
ing,' '  Respiration,'  '  Trembling,'  and  kindred  topics.  In  them  the 
author  has  collated  the  principal  facts  now  known  regarding  these  mat- 
ters, and  has  done  so  in  language  as  simple  as  a  child's  fairy  tale — and 
often  as  extravagant.  The  trouble,  however,  with  this  part  of  the 
book,  from  a  scientific  stand-point  is,  that  late  experiments  of  highest 
repute1  explain  the  mysteries  of  blood  distribution  on  simple  princi- 
ples which  rob  the  Mosso  school  of  investigation  of  their  chief  charm; 
namely  their  seeming  promise  to  lead  to  a  solution  of  the  problems  of 
emotion.  These  eight  chapters,  therefore,  are  now  behind  the  times, 
and  misleading  if  significance  be  given  to  them  in  the  last  mentioned 
sense. 

Next  follow  chapters  on  'Expression,'  'Phenomena  Character- 
istic of  Fear,'  « Fright  and  Terror,'  '  Maladies  Produced  by  Fear,' 
'  Hereditary  Transmission,'  and  '  Education.'  These  are  disappoint- 
ing ;  they  contain  little  that  was  new  even  at  the  date  of  appearance  of 
the  first  edition,  and  by  getting  no  further  than  did  Darwin,  Spencer, 
and  Mantegazza,  they  emphasize  how  inadequate  the  conjectures  of 
these  great  men  were  in  this  peculiar  field.  It  is  true  that  to-day  very 
little  is  definitely  known  about  fear ;  and  this  author  has  perhaps  made 
as  good  a  collection  of  the  fragmentary  suggestions  currently  supposed 
to  have  bearing  on  the  subject  as  is  to  be  found  anywhere.  But  we 
had  a  right  to  expect  more  from  a  man  of  Professor  Mosso's  origi- 
nality and  rank. 

The  truth  is,  the  book  is  full  of  careless  statements  and  cheap  hand- 
Shields,  John  Hopkins.  First  number  of  American  Journal  of  Experimental 
Medicine.  1896. 


446  FEAR. 

ling  of  traditional  themes.  An  example  of  this  may  be  found  in  the 
author's  so-called  '  confirmation '  of  Mr.  Spencer's  theory  of  the  origin 
of  emotional  expression ;  which  theory  is  that,  in  emotional  excite- 
ment, general  waves  spread  through  all  the  motor  nerves,  and  effect 
the  muscles  proportionally  to  their  bulk,  and  the  inertia  of  the  parts 
they  move.  In  support  of  this  Professor  Mosso  offers  the  fact  that  he 
stimulated  the  facial  nerve  of  a  dog  electrically,  and  a  weak  current 
caused  an  attentive  pricking  of  the  ears ;  a  stronger  one  gave  a  move- 
ment of  the  nose  and  eyes ;  then  the  lips  and  mouth  opened ;  and 
finally,  with  a  powerful  current,  the  dog  assumed  the  fierce  expression 
of  one  about  to  attack — the  conclusion  being  reached  that,  '  the  me- 
chanical part  of  expression  is  therefore  much  simpler  than  one  thinks.' 
But  can  any  careful  man  seriously  suggest  that  our  various  emotional 
expressions  may  be  arranged  in  a  serial  order  dependent  on  the  intensity 
of  general  nervous  discharge !  If  so,  at  what  point  in  a  child  do 
those  for  violent  laughter  pass  over  into  the  contortions  of  crying,  or 
the  reverse  ?  And  why  not  explain  the  movements  of  Paderewski's 
fingers  by  the  same  '  simple '  plan,  since  they  must  be  the  most  easily 
moved  members  of  his  body  ? 

As  another  example  of  this  sort  of  looseness,  Professor  Mosso  attrib- 
utes i  frowning '  to  sympathetic  coordination  with  the  eye  muscles  for 
purposes  of  scrutiny  and  attention.  But  why  then,  at  the  theatre,  do  per- 
sons in  rapt  attention  and  scrutiny  of  the  comedian's  antics  raise  the 
brows  in  the  most  open  and  expansive  manner  ?  And  do  we  not  scru- 
tinize the  marvellous  as  closely  as  the  disgusting,  yet  with  the  brows 
set  quite  oppositely  ?  We  are  not  likely  to  arrive  at  any  profound  in- 
sight into  emotion,  until  scientists  are  willing  to  guess  at  its  problems 
a  bit  more  searchingly  than  they  would  at  a  newspaper  riddle. 

Again,  in  the  chapter  on  Heredity  the  doctrine  of  Acquired  Char- 
acteristics is  asserted  as  unquestioningly  as  if  the  great  Weismann  con- 
troversy never  existed.  Yet  regarding  its  scientific  aspect  it  remains 
to  be  said  that  the  fundamental  error  of  this  book  is  the  author's  entire 
neglect  of  the  psychologic  side  of  his  subject.  Never  once  does  he 
even  try  to  approach  it ;  and  one  should  know,  from  the  first,  that  a 
treatise  on  fear,  with  the  psychology  of  fear  left  out,  must  be  as  unsat- 
isfactory as  an  attempt  at  mint  julip,  which  gets  no  further  than  the 
glassware. 

In  summary  :  The  translators  tells  us  that  this  is  a  '  splendid  little 
work.'  Rather  it  is  a  splendid  little  Vaudeville ;  a  potpourri  of  all  sorts 
of  things,  from  Professor  Mosso's  Physiological  Scrap  Book,  thrown  to- 
gether for  the  popular  stage.  The  book  is  valuable,  as  any  work  from 


PSYCHOLOGICAL  LITERATURE.  447 

this  distinguished  scientist  must  be ;  but  we  feel  that  he  stepped  down 
to  write  it.  It  is  good  to  bring  science  to  the  people,  but  in  doing  so 
one  should  never  descend  to  tawdry,  and  much  of  the  rhetoric  of  the 
present  book  comes  near  this.  Scarcely  does  a  cock-sparrow  perform 
more  preposterous  antics  at  courting-time  than  does  this  author,  in 
places,  to  drive  his  subject  home  upon  the  attention  of  4  popular 
readers.'  (Pp.  36,  74,  200,  for  example.) 

The  work  of  the  translators,  Mr.  and  Mrs.  Kiesow  (formerly  Miss 
Lough),  is  extremely  commendable,  and  the  type  excellent. 

HERBERT  NICHOLS. 
JOHNS  HOPKINS  UNIVERSITY. 

Evolution  in  Art :  as  illustrated  by  the  Life-history  of  Designs, 
By  ALFRED  C.  HADDON,  Professor  of  Zoology,  Royal  College  of 
Science,  Dublin.     London.     Walter  Scott,   1895.     Imported  by 
Charles  Scribner's  Sons.     Pp.  XVIII,  364.     $1.25. 
There  is  a  great  deal  in  the  title  given  to  a  book ;  and  psychologists, 
interested  as  they  are  in  all  that  relates  to  evolutionary  doctrine,  will 
I  fear  suffer  some  disappointment  when  they  find  that  Professor  Haddon's 
excellent  treatise  deals  with  little  more  than  the  indications  that  some 
art  forms  are  developed  by  slow  processes  determined  by  the  inheri- 
tance and  the  character  of  men  as  affected  by  their  environment.     But 
this  disappointment  is  likely  to  be  displaced  by  a  sense  of  satisfaction, 
that  they  have  been  induced  to  read  a  work  that  might  have  been 
passed  over  had  the  title  been  more  accurately  descriptive  of  the  con- 
tents. 

Professor  Haddon  undertakes  to  study  certain  designs  used  in  art, 
treating  them  as  products  of  biological  evolution ;  and  he  succeeds  in 
showing,  rather  by  accumulation  of  indirect  evidence  than  by  formal 
argument,  that  the  processes  discoverable  in  the  psychicjlife  of  man  are 
adequate  to  account  for  the  original  use  of  the  principal  decorative  de- 
signs, found  amongst  the  savage  tribes  to  which  he  turns  his  attention ; 
and  that  the  persistence  of  certain  of  these  forms,  modified  to  a  greater 
or  less  degree,  is  on  the  whole  exactly  what  we  should  expect  to  find  in 
consideration  of  our  knowledge  of  the  psychic  life  of  man  as,  influ- 
enced by  imitation,  he  passes  through  the  normal  processes  of  mental 
evolution. 

Of  the  higher  forms  of  decorative  art  the  author,  perhaps  not  un- 
naturally, has  little  to  say ;  for  to  him,  as  to  all  biological  evolutionists, 
the  genesis  of  man's  capacities  seems  most  clearly  exemplified  in  the 
lives  of  uncultured  barbarians. 


448  INDUCTIVE  LOGIC. 

Where  Professor  Haddon  touches  upon  matters  of  distinctly  psycho- 
logical significance  (e.  g.  p.  308)  he  shows  himself  to  be  a  somewhat 
crude  materialist ;  but  as  he  is  not  often  led  away  from  purely  biolog- 
ical discussion,  this  crudity  does  not  take  from  the  worth  of  the  book 
which  will  surely  be  of  value  to  all  who  interest  themselves  in  artistic 
development. 

In  these  days  when  we  are  beginning  to  realize  that  art  must  be 
treated  scientifically,  that  it  is  no  mystic  gift  from  the  gods  which  we 
must  worship  but  which  we  may  not  defile  by  ordinary  investigations, 
all  books  are  welcome  which,  like  the  one  before  us,  tend  to  lead  the 
man  who  devotes  his  life  to  artistic  production  to  take  a  common  sense 
view  of  the  nature  of  his  endowments. 

The  book  is  fully  and  satisfactorily  illustrated.  The  classification, 
thrown  in  somewhat  at  haphazard  on  p.  8,  appears  to  the  writer  of 
this  review  to  require  full  explanation;  as  it  stands  it  does  not  seem 
logical,  and  it  is  clearly  not  necessary  to  the  argument  of  the  book. 

H.  R.  MARSHALL. 

Inductive  Logic.     By  JOHN  GRIER  HIBBEN,   PH.D.     New  York, 

Charles  Scribners'  Sons.     1896.     8vo.  Pp  345. 

The  preface  of  this  work  states  a  very  good  reason  for  its  existence, 
and  this  reason  is  the  impression  often  obtained  that  deductive  logic 
constitutes  the  whole  body  of  logical  doctrine,  while  as  a  matter  of 
fact  the  largest  amount  of  our  actual  reasoning  is  inductive  and  should 
receive  corresponding  emphasis  and  consideration  in  methodology. 
This  is  quite  true,  but  the  value  of  deduction  method  is  liable  to  de- 
preciation by  contrast,  unless  we  give  equal  respect  and  attention  to 
the  natural  demand  for  a  certitude  which  induction  does  not  give,  and 
which  governs  many  attempts  to  apply  deduction  for  that  purpose. 
Besides  this,  the  training  in  deductive  methods  with  all  its  laborious- 
ness  and  elaboration,  is  the  best  corrective  of  dogmatism  in  the  induc- 
tive field,  by  exposing  the  difference  between  methods  which  give  as- 
surance, and  those  which  keep  within  the  limits  of  probabilities  until 
verification  has  done  its  work.  It  is  assurance  in  conviction  that  most 
inquirers  seek,  and  if  they  are  taught  by  indirection  that  it  can  be  ob- 
tained by  inductive  reasoning  alone,  there  will  be  little  to  discriminate 
between  conjecture  and  certitude,  and  much  to  encourage  an  unhealthy 
dogmatism.  Not  that  I  am  charging  this  tendency  to  the  present 
work,  but  only  that  there  is  equal  danger  in  discussing  induction  with- 
out deduction. 

The  method  of  treatment  is  somewhat  open  to  criticism.     The  first 


PSYCHOLOGICAL  LITERATURE.  449 

chapter  properly  treats  of  the  nature  of  the  process,  but  unfortunately 
implies  by  both  its  title  and  the  discussion  that  '  induction '  stands  al- 
ways for  an  inference  or  process  of  ratiocination,  though  the  fact  is 
that  it  often  is  synonymous  with  scientific  method,  which  may  be  more 
than  reasoning,  and  in  one  of  its  historical  meanings  is  only  a  process 
of  generalization  by  observation,  the  inductio  per  enumerationem 
simplicem.  In  the  fourth  chapter  this  simple  enumeration  is  directly 
classified  as  one  form  of  the  inductive  inference  in  the  face  of  the  fact 
that  logicians  generally  repudiate  it  as  a  process  of  inference.  Even 
Bacon  excluded  it  from  the  '  induction '  which  he  was  discussing,  and 
which  he  intended  to  treat  as  going  far  beyond  mere  observation. 
The  second  type  of  inference  seems  equally  faulty  in  that  it  identifies 
analogy  and  comparison.  A  man  may  define  analogy  to  suit  this 
purpose,  but  many  logicians  consider  analogy  as  treating  only  of  a  re- 
semblance in  relations  and  not  a  resemblance  of  essential  qualities. 
This  view  ought  at  least  to  be  mentioned  and  discriminated  from  the 
conception  here  maintained.  In  the  chapter  on  Analogy  there  is  no 
trace  of  the  method  employed  by  Bishop  Butler  and  similar  writers 
and  discussed  by  Ueberweg  and  Jevons.  Much  confusion  must  follow 
such  a  loose  identification  between  analogy  and  comparison. 

Less  objection  can  be  presented  to  the  several  chapters  following  the 
fourth  and  including  the  topics  Causation,  Causal  Analysis,  Inductive 
Methods  and  Verification  and  Prediction.  But  it  is  quite  singular  that 
the  subject  of  Hypothesis  should  be  postponed  to  the  thirteenth  chap- 
ter ;  for  if  anything  is  of  the  nature  of  an  inductive  inference  hypothe- 
sis is  such.  But  it  is  here  treated  as  if  it  were  something  else  alto- 
gether and  yet  is  not  defined  as  more  than  a  preliminary  to  experi- 
ment. This  would  make  scientific  method  begin  with  hypothesis  to 
be  followed  and  ended  by  verification,  and  exclude  the  necessity  of  in- 
ductive reasoning  altogether,  unless  we  at  last  decided  to  identify 
hypothesis  and  inductive  inference,  which  is  not  consciously  done  in 
this  instance.  According  to  the  author's  definition  of  inductive  reason- 
ing, as  taking  us  beyond  the  premises,  he  ought  to  make  hypothesis 
the  very  essence  of  inductive  inference,  as  the  very  step  which  takes 
us  beyond  the  premises,  and  such  a  course  ought  to  place  the  dis- 
cussion of  it  before  that  of  verification,  and  at  least  in  the  chapter  pre- 
tending to  define  induction.  But  the  author  evidently  intends  to  treat 
it  as  wholly  distinct  from  the  ratiocinative  process  known  as  inductive, 
and  yet  he  would  not  regard  it  as  deductive,  nor  as  a  form  of  observa- 
tion. He  must  then  regard  it  as  a  third  kind  of  reasoning  new  to 
logicians,  or  has  not  discovered  its  identity  with  induction  as  defined 


45°  VISION  AND  GALVANOTROPISM. 

by  himself.  The  oversight  probably  comes  from  the  tendencies  to 
use  the  term  4  induction '  as  a  name  for  scientific  method  and  forget- 
ting its  distinct  meaning  as  a  ratiocinative  process. 

Only  one  other  criticism  requires  to  be  made  here  and  it  is  that  in 
the  present  critic's  opinion  many  of  the  illustrations  in  the  body  of 
the  work  might  better  be  used  for  practical  examples  and  exercises, 
at  the  end  where  there  is  a  very  good  collection  of  them.  Illustrations 
are  very  important,  but  only  a  few  require  to  be  carefully  analyzed  in 
order  to  explain  the  matter  of  method.  For  this  reason  more  atten- 
tion might  have  been  given  to  an  abstract-explanation  of  the  method, 
and  then  left  the  teacher  to  require  its  application  in  the  same  way  to 
a  large  number  of  promiscuous  examples. 

Taking  the  book  as  a  whole  and  considering  its  merits,  it  is  cer- 
tainly very  clearly  written  and  free  from  technicalities  of  style  or  undue 
philosophic  speculation.  It  will  serve  very  well  the  purpose  for  which 
it  was  written,  and  is  hardly  inferior  on  the  whole  to  Fowler's  work  on 
the  same  subject.  JAMES  H.  HYSLOP. 

COLUMBIA  UNIVERSITY. 


VISION   AND    GALVANOTROPISM. 

Spectrobolometrische  Untersuchungen  iiber  die  Durchlassigkeit 
der  Augenmedien  fur  rote  und  ultrarote  Strahlen.  E.  ASCH- 
KINASS.  Ztsch.  f.  Psych,  u  Phys.  d.  Sinnesorgane.  XL,  44-53. 
The  fact  that  the  eye  communicates  to  the  brain  a  sensation  of  light 
over  only  a  small  portion  of  the  spectrum,  may  be  due  to  either  of 
two  facts — the  nervous  apparatus,  or,  if  a  chemical  process  intervenes, 
the  chemical  apparatus  may  react  only  to  waves  of  a  limited  range  of 
lengths,  or  the  invisible  rays  may  be  so  absorbed  by  the  media  of  the 
eye  as  not  to  penetrate  to  the  retina.  It  has  been  conclusively  shown 
that  for  the  ultra-violet  rays  the  latter  is  not  the  case,  and  that  the 
ground  of  their  invisibility  is  in  the  insensitiveness  of  the  retina.  With 
regard  to  the  ultra  red  rays  the  evidence  has  been  conflicting.  Aschki- 
nass  has  therefore  applied  the  spectro-bolometric  method,  which  has 
now  been  brought  to  great  perfection,  to  the  determination  of  the  ques- 
tion, with  the  result  of  showing  that  the  media  of  the  eye  have  an  ab- 
sorption-spectrum very  nearly  the  same  as  that  of  water,  and  that  our 
blindness  to  uHra  red  is  due  to  the  same  cause  as  our  blindness  to  ultra 
violet,  namely,  the  insensitiveness  of  the  retina. 


PSYCHOLOGICAL  LITERATURE.  451 

Color  Saturation  and  its  Quantitative  Relations.  By  A.  KIRSCH- 
MANN.  Am.  Jour,  of  Psych.,  VII,  386-404.  1896. 
The  principle  contribution  of  this  paper  is  the  description  of  a  color 
disc  constructed  so  as  to  exhibit  from  center  to  periphery  a  constantly 
changing  saturation  with  an  invariable  color-tone  and  intensity.  This 
is  accomplished  in  the  following  manner :  A  number  of  concentric 
rings  are  drawn  on  a  circle,  and  from  the  center  are  drawn,  at  equal 
distances  apart,  twice  as  many  radii  as  there  are  concentric  rings,  if 
there  are  fifteen  rings,  two  adjacent  .radii  would  be  twelve  degrees 
apart.  If  the  points  where  the  radii  meet  the  corresponding  circles 
(the  nth  radius  the  nth  circle  on  each  half  of  the  diagram)  are  con- 
nected by  a  curved  line,  a  symmetrical  heart-shaped  figure  or  leaf  will 
result,  such  that  the  fractions  of  the  successive  rings  inside  the  leaf 
decrease  in  an  arithmetical  ratio  from  the  center  to  the  periphery.  If 
now  a  leaf  of  this  shape  is  cut  out  of  colored  paper  and  pasted  on  to  a 
gray  disk,  a  color  will  be  obtained,  upon  rotation,  of  constantly  dimin- 
ishing saturation  from  the  center  to  the  periphery.  But  in  order  that 
the  intensity  may  at  the  same  time  be  invariable,  it  is  necessary  that 
the  gray  chosen  should  be  of  exactly  the  same  brightness  as  the  colored 
paper  of  which  the  leaf  is  made.  To  avoid  the  vain  search  for  such 
a  gray  for  all  papers,  it  can  be  made  for  each  ring  by  another  applica- 
tion of  the  method  already  used.  The  brightness  of  the  colored  paper 
is  first  determined  by  the  method  of  Rood,  or  of  the  author,  to  be 
equal  to  that  of  a  gray  composed  on  the  rotating  disc  of  a  given  pro- 
portion of  white  to  black,  and  the  portions  of  the  rings  outside  the  leaf 
must  then  be  made  up  of  black  and  white  in  this  same  proportion. 
When  the  number  of  rings  is  very  large,  the  boundary  of  the  leaf  be- 
comes an  Archimedic  spiral,  for  which  the  author  gives  the  equation, 
and  also  for  the  boundary  of  the  black  and  white  surfaces.  The  discs 
so  constructed  actually  exhibited  a  constantly  changing  saturation 
with  an  invariable  color,  tone  and  brightness.  They  have  been  used 
for  testing  the  validity  of  Weber's  law  for  degrees  of  saturation ;  the 
results  of  this  investigation  are  not  yet  published. 

If  these  discs  are  made  in  black  and  white,  since  the  change  of 
brightness  proceeds  in  an  arithmetical  ratio,  the  disc  does  not  seem 
to  grow  brighter  or  darker  towards  the  edge  by  regular  degrees ;  that 
would  be  effected  by  a  separation  of  the  black  and  white  by  a  curve 
giving  equal  multiplicative  increments  instead  of  equal  additive  incre- 
ments. Such  a  curve  would  be,  in  polar  coordinates,  a  transcendental 
.curve  analogous  to  the  logarithmic  curve  in  rectangular  coordinates. 
The  equation  of  this  curve  is  given.  The  corresponding  discs  have 


452  VISION  AND    GALVANOTROPISM. 

been  made,  the  construction  being  for  each  third  of  a  circle,  to  obviate 
the  necessity  for  very  rapid  rotation,  and  the  increase  of  intensity  be- 
ing either  from  center  to  periphery  or  from  periphery  to  center.  In 
both  cases  the  discs,  when  in  rotation,  present  to  the  eye  a  surface  with 
apparently  uniform  transition  from  black  to  white,  that  is,  they  make 
the  impression  of  an  arithmetical  increase  of  intensity,  and  hence  form 
a  beautiful  means  of  demonstration  of  the  psycho-physical  law. 

There  is  also  a  modification  of  the  double  cone  representing 
the  entire  gamut,  or  rather  volume,  of  light  sensation,  by  which  ex- 
pression is  given  to  the  fact  that  yellow  is  the  brightest  color  of  the 
spectrum,  and  violet  blue  the  faintest,  and  that  the  whole  spectrum 
grows  more  yellowish  as  it  grows  intense,  and  more  bluish  as  it  grows 
faint. 

Zur    Theorie   des   Galvanotropismus.     JACQUES  LOEB  und  S.   S. 

MAXWELL.     Pfliiger's  Archiv.  LXIIL,  121-144. 

Every  advance  made  in  the  investigation  of  those  phenomena  of 
nature  which  are  of  a  positive  and  negative  character,  whether  it  be 
the  effect  of  the  two  opposite  directions  of  the  electric  current,  the  re- 
sults of  katabolic  and  anabolic  changes  in  nutrition,  or  the  action  of 
opposite  groups  of  muscles,  is  of  wider  than  immediate  interest ;  one 
never  knows  when  general  principles  may  be  made  out  which  will 
enable  us  to  disburden  the  world  of  anachronistic  theories  of  light-sen- 
sation which  ought  long  since  to  have  received  their  final  quietus. 
There  is  therefore  a  special  interest  attaching  to  this  paper  on  galvano- 
tropism,  by  writers  one  of  whom  has  for  some  time  made  the  sub- 
ject peculiarly  his  own. 

The  phenomenon  of  animal  galvanotropism  was  discovered  by  Her- 
mann. He  found  that  the  larvae  of  frogs  and  other  animals  have  the 
remarkable  property,  when  in  a  long  trough  through  which  an  electric 
current  is  passed,  of  placing  themselves  with  the  head  towards  the 
anode  (the  antidrome  position) ,  and  that  those  which  remained  in  the 
opposite  (homodrome)  position  exhibited  a  constant  restlessness.  His 
explanation  of  the  phenomenon  was  that  the  current  acted  upon  the 
central  nervous  system,  and  that  the  latter  was  permanently  excited  by 
the  ascending  current,  and  more  or  less  paralyzed  by  the  descending 
current,  and  that  the  larvae  sought  instinctively  the  position  of  least 
excitation.  The  experiments  here  described,  which  were  performed 
on  crabs,  ha^e  convinced  the  authors  that  the  assumption  of  a  quieting 
effect  by  the  descending  current,  and  of  an  exciting  and  painful  effect 
by  the  ascending  current,  is  incorrect.  They  find  that  the  imnredi- 


PSYCHOLOGICAL   LITERATURE.  453 

ate  effect  of  the  constant  current  consists,  in  crabs,  in  a  change  of 
tension  of  like  sense  in  associated  muscle  groups,  and  of  such  a 
nature  that  on  the  anode  side  of  the  animal  the  tension  of  the  flexors 
is  greater,  on  the  cathode  side  that  of  the  extensors.  This  difference 
of  tension  of  antagonistic  muscles  causes  these  animals,  on  account  of 
the  peculiar  mechanism  of  the  organs  of  locomotion,  to  swim  towards 
the  anode ;  if  the  current  is  strong,  they  become  completely  stiff  when 
in  the  antidrome  position ;  in  the  homodrome  position  they  are  not 
completely  stiff,  and  can  still  swim  backwards  toward  the  anode.  The 
same  assumption  of  changes  of  tension  of  associated  groups  of  muscles 
the  authors  believe  to  be  sufficient  to  account  for  all  the  corresponding 
phenomena  exhibited  by  vertebrates. 

Interesting  photographs  are  reproduced  of  the  crabs  with  their  legs 
stretched  out  and  bent  in  accordance  with  this  rule.  The  real  state  of 
things  was  not  discovered  before,  because  animals  without  legs  were 
largely  experimented  upon.  Galvanotropism  will,  without  doubt, 
prove  an  efficient  means  for  the  determination  of  the  position  of  motor 
centers. 

The  effect  of  the  electric  current  upon  the  retina  is  to  cause  com- 
plimentary color  sensations  according  as  it  is  ascending  or  descending. 
It  is  odd  that  Hering  has  not  dwelt  upon  this  circumstance  more  than 
he  has  done  as  support  for  his  conception,  that  complementary  colors 
are  connected  respectively  with  assimilation  and  dissimilation.  But  it 
is  perhaps  fortunate  for  his  theory,  for  it  now  appears  that  the  polar 
quality  of  the  current  translates  itself  in  the  animal  organism,  in 
this  well-marked  instance,  into  a  quality-change  of  some  sort  in  the 
muscle-regulating  nerves  and  not  in  a  simple  variation  in  assimilatory 
or  dissimilatory  activity.  For  it  will  hardly  be  assumed  that  an  in- 
creased tension  of  a  flexor  muscle  is  brought  about  by  increased  nu- 
trition and  an  increased  tension  of  an  extensor  muscle  by  increased 
degeneration  in  the  muscle,  or  in  the  nerve  which  regulates  it. 

C.  LADD  FRANKLIN. 

BALTIMORE,  MD. 

The   Colour-Sense  in  Literature.    HAVELOCK  ELLIS.     Contempo- 
rary Review,  May,  1896. 

Mr.  Have  lock  Ellis  gives  the  results  of  his  investigations  as  to  the 
color  words  most  used  by  representative  writers  from  Homer  down  to 
the  present  day,  including  Olive  Schreiner  and  D'Annunzio.  His 
only  Latin  poet  is.  Catullus,  thus  omitting  Vergil  and  Ovid  both  of 
whom  had  a  very  keen  sense  of  color.  From  a  partial  survey  of 


454  PA  THOL  O  GICAL. 

twenty-five  authors,  Hebrew,  Greek,  Latin,  French,  Italian,  English, 
etc.,  he  sees  that  the  color  analysis  of  a  writer's  style  will  fur- 
nish a  very  delicate  means  of  telling  "at  a  glance  something 
about  his  views  of  the  world  which  pages  of  description  could 
only  tell  us  with  uncertainty."  What  this  something  is  the  writer 
of  this  article  does  not  tell  us.  But  he  concludes  that  the  use 
of  color  in  the  writers  of  to-day,  as  it  much  more  nearly  resem- 
bles that  of  the  time  of  Chaucer  and  of  Shakespeare,  than  does  the 
usage  of  subsequent  writers,  shows  that  in  our  color  sense  at  least  we 
are  not  degenerate. 

We  are  told  that  in  literature  red  symbolizes  man ;  blue  and  green, 
nature ;  white,  yellow  and  black,  imagination ;  and  the  results  of  Mr. 
Ellis'  investigation  as  shown  in  his  tables  seem  to  corroborate  this  gen- 
eralization, as  red  is  the  most  predominant  color,  black,  white  and  yel- 
low come  next,  and  blue  and  green  occur  least  often.  But  when  he 
says  that  a  poet,  in  using  black,  white  and  yellow,  i  the  color  of 
golden  impossibilities  '  is  marked  thereby  as  a  poet  of  the  imagination, 
his  statement  is  an  example  of  what  may,  if  not  supported  by  exten- 
sive statistics,  turn  out  to  be  false  analogy.  WILFRID  LAY. 


PATHOLOGICAL. 

IS  Etat  Mental  des  Mourants.     P.  SOLLIER,  A.  MOULIN,  ALEX. 

KELLER.     Revue  Philosophique,  XLL,  303-313.     March,  1896. 

Continuing  the  discussion  begun  by  M.  Egger  (see  above  p.  236) , 
MM.  Moulin  and  Keller  record  in  detail  youthful  experiences  of  their 
own  in  drowning,  the  latter  also  a  more  recent  experience  of  syncope, 
while  Dr.  Sollier  reports  observations,  notably  of  several  grave  cases 
of  morphinomania,  in  which  the  sudden  suppression  of  the  habit  seemed 
to  the  patient  to  threaten  fatal  consequences.  The  most  constant 
phenomenon  in  all  these  cases  is  the  feeling  of  blissful  repose  preced- 
ing the  loss  of  consciousness.  In  only  two  of  the  ten  instances  here 
cited  is  there  any  vivid  revival  of  the  past  life.  M.  Keller  says  that 
among  twenty  cases  known  to  him,  not  one  presented  this  phenomenon 
with  any  precision.  The  most  distinct  idea  in  the  minds  of  both  the 
drowning  youths  was  that  they  would  never  again  see  their  relatives. 
Both  also  experienced  hallucinations.  As  to  the  feeling  of  fear,  Moulin 
felt  none  till  after  the  rescue  and  then  it  seems  to  have  been  due  to  chill ; 
Keller,  however,  speaks  of  the  self  as  full  of  fear  till  the  recognition 
of  the  impotency  of  the  struggle  brought  repose — an  evident,  and  pos 


PSYCHOLOGICAL  LITERATURE.  455 

sibly  false,  interpretation.  Sollier  is  careful  to  distinguish  the  cases; 
the  question  raised  by  M.  Egger,  he  says,  relates  to  the  reaction  of  the 
self,  not  to  death,  but  to  the  idea  of  death,  and  this  varies  within  a 
wide  range  of  possible  combinations  of  circumstances.  Confining 
himself  to  death  from  sudden  accident,  on  the  one  hand,  and  to  death 
from  rapid  exhaustion  of  the  organism  on  the  other,  he  proposes 
the  following  theory  to  account  for  the  feeling  of  beatitude,  the 
analgesia  and  anesthesia  noted  by  M.  Egger,  and  the  vivid  resurgence 
of  memory-images.  The  more  negative  than  positive  feeling  of  bliss- 
ful repose  he  regards  as  the  direct  result  of  the  bodily  insensibility. 
The  latter,  in  the  case  of  accident,  is  due  to  distraction  of  the  attention, 
its  concentration  on  the  object.  The  feeling  of  self  is  here,  in  the  strug- 
gle for  self-preservation,  at  its  maximum,  and  hence,  possibly,  the 
spontaneous,  panoramic  vision  of  the  total  past  self.  In  the  patholog- 
ical cases,  the  bodily  insensibility  is  due  to  physical  exhaustion.  Here, 
too,  the  self  is  thrown  back  upon  its  past  organization.  Thus  in  the 
first  case,  the  revival  of  memory-images  is  connected  with  exaltation 
of  the  former,  in  the  second,  with  the  suppression  of  the  actual 
self.  This  is  probably  a  little  schematic  and  Dr.  Sollier  has  himself 
the  good  sense  to  say  that  it  is  only  a  theory  and  to  suggest  further 
inquiry  along  the  lines  indicated. 

H.  N.  GARDINER. 
SMITH  COLLEGE. 


Ueber  die  Delirien  der  Alkoholiken  und  iiber  kiinstUch  lei  ihnen 

hervorgerufene   Visionen.      H.  LIEPMANN.      Aus  den  psychia- 

trischen    und  Nervenklinik  der    Konigl.    Charite"    (Prof.    Jolly), 

Berlin.  Archiv  fur  Psychiatric,  Heft  I.  171-232.   1895. 

In  the  above  treatise  the  author  communicates  observations  made 

in  the  summer  of   1894  on  125  alcoholists  at  the  Charite  in  Berlin. 

His  first  method  of  procedure  was  to  make  himself  acquainted  with  the 

previous  history  of  the  patient's  illness.     On  account  of  unavoidable 

incompleteness  in  this  method,  however,  the  author  next  endeavored 

to   produce   artificial   visions   in  the    delirious.     The  above  work*  is 

therefore  divided  into  two  parts :  I.  Spontaneous  delirium,  II.  Sense 

deceptions  artificially  produced  :  pressure  visions. 

I.  The  author  considers  the  affective  side  of  spontaneous  delirium 
and  the  fancies  of  the  delirious,  dwelling  more  particularly  on  the 
anomalies  of  their  sense-activity,  their  illusions  and  hallucinations. 
Taken  as  a  whole  the  conclusion  arrived  at  is,  that  the  primary  effect 
dominating  the  inner  life  in  delirium  tremens  is  fear,  which  then 


456  EXPERIMENTAL. 

leads  to   actions   for  self-preservation.     Elementary  sense-anomalies 
appeared  in  many  cases  even  before  the  outbreak  of  the  actual  disease. 

II.  In  common  with  Nacke  the  author  propounds:  "If  all  or 
some  of  the  hallucinations  of  the  delirious  drunkards  arise  from 
stimuli,  then  conversely,  artificial  production  of  such  must  call 
forth  hallucinations."  The  simplest  and  least  harmful  irritant  appears 
to  be  a  continued  pressure  on  the  eyeball.  The  author  suggests 
that  Purkinje's  figures  produced  in  healthy  subjects  by  pressure  on 
the  eye,  which  belongs  to  the  domain  of  normal  sensations,  is  trans- 
formed in  the  delirious  into  complicated  visions,  in  which  they  see 
and  even  fluently  read  printed  and  written  characters.  The  author 
then  seeks  to  prove  that  visions  so  produced  are  caused  by  the  pres- 
sure as  such  and  are  not  a  continuation  of  spontaneous  visions.  He 
further  shows  that  this  method  is  not  only  applicable  in  the  case  of 
delirious  alcoholists,  but  could  also  be  extended  to  the  investigation  of 
hallucinations  in  general,  although  he  only  wishes  his  own  plan  to  be 
considered  as  a  beginning  in  the  investigation  of  sense  deceptions. 

It  may  be  added  that  the  author  holds  delirium  tremens  to  be  an 
acute  exacerbation  of  chronic  alcoholism  and  that  in  the  '  Abortivfor- 
men '  described  by  Nacke,  he  only  recognizes  a  lower  degree  of  the 
same  disease. 

FRIEDRICH  KIESOW. 
LEIPZIG. 

EXPERIMENTAL. 

Experiment elle  Studien  iiber  Associationen.     By  GUSTAV  ASCHAF 
FENBURG.     Psychol.  Arbeiten,  1895,  I,  209-299. 
The  present  investigation  deals  with  normal  cases  entirely,  and  is 
preliminary  to  a  study  of  the  effects  of  fatigue  and  stimulants  upon 
association.     For   the  kind  of   stimulus   used  in   these   experiments 
— a  word  spoken  by  the  operator — the  author  adopts  the  following 
classification :    I.  Immediate  Association :  a.  Internal,    (embracing)  • 
i.    Co-ordination    and    subordination:     2.   Relation    of    predication: 
3.  Causal  relation,     b.  External:    i.  Space  and  time ;    2.  Identities 
(synonyms,  etc.)  ;  3.  Revival  of  former  verbal  succession,     c.  Stimu 
lus  acting  merely  as  sound :    i.  Completion  of  word;    2.  Association 
through  sound  or  rhyme,     d.   Stimulus  producing  merely  reaction  • 
i.  Repetition  of   stimulus- word ;     2.   Repetition   of   former  reaction 
without  meaning ;  3.  Association  with  former  stimulus ;  4.  Reaction 
with  no  traceable  connection.     II.  Mediate  Association. 

Three  distinct  methods  of  research  were^employed.     In  the  first 


PSYCHOLOGICAL  LITERATURE.  457 

only  the  initial  stimulus  was  given  by  the  operator ;  the  subject  was 
required  to  write  down  in  order  his  successive  associations  until  a  list 
of  100  had  been  made ;  these  were  then  examined  and  classed  accord- 
ing to  the  above  scheme.  In  the  second  series  the  subject  responded 
to  the  given  word  by  a  single  association,  and  a  number  of  such  asso- 
ciations (usually  100)  were  included  in  the  series.  Finally,  experi- 
ments similar  to  these  latter  were  made,  in  which,  however,  the  reac- 
tion-time was  also  measured,  by  means  of  a  pair  of  lip  keys.  Seven- 
teen different  persons  in  all  acted  as  reagents,  and  the  entire  investiga- 
tion consisted  of  44  series  of  about  100  experiments  each.  The  com- 
paratively small  number  of  series  recorded  may  be  attributed  to  the 
amount  of  time  necessarily  spent  in  preliminary  practice.  Certain 
series  are  open  to  admitted  objections,  on  account  of  the  variability  in 
physical  and  mental  conditions  which  it  was  impossible  always  to  avoid. 

The  external  associations  were  in  general  more  numerous  than  the 
internal,  and  show  on  the  average  a  shorter  duration.  The  reaction- 
time  varied  greatly  among  the  reagents,  the  average  lying  between 
nocxr  and  1400(7;  one  reagent  gave  a  much  lower  average,  and  one  a 
considerably  higher  (20000-)  ;  hence  a  long  association  time  cannot  be 
considered  prima  facie  evidence  of  pathological  conditions.  Lack  of 
complete  attention  is  indicated  by  a  tendency  to  associations  of  the 
types  c  and  d,  as  well  as  by  a  break  in  the  series  under  the  first 
method ;  while  repetition  of  the  same  associations  in  the  same  series 
may  indicate  the  presence  of  unfavorable  physiological  conditions. 
An  interesting  fact  brought  out  is  the  frequency  with  which  the  same 
stimulus  led  to  the  same  word-association  in  different  individuals. 
The  same  stimulus-series  was  given  to  five  different  persons ;  all  five 
had  2  responses  in  common,  four  had  4,  three  16,  and  two  39,  out  of 
100.  Another  series  given  to  four  different  persons  shows  similar 
results.  These  percentages  may  be  regarded  as  the  measure  of  their 
common  '  intellectual  atmosphere.' 

Apart  from  such  general  conclusions  as  these  the  results  are  rather 
negative.  They  serve  to  emphasize  especially  the  fact  of  individual 
differences  under  substantially  the  same  conditions — the  fact  that 
important  differences  exist  among  normal  individuals  in  respect  to 
both  the  kind  of  association  and  the  length  of  reaction-time. 

PRINCETON.  H.   C.   WARREN. 

Die  Aufmerksamkeit  und  die  Funktion  der  Sinnesorgane.  By 
W.  HEINRICH.  Zeitschrift  fur  Psychologic  und  Physiologic  der 
Sinnesorgane.  Vol.  IX.,  Nos.  5  and  6,  pp.  343-388. 


45  8  EXPERIMENTAL. 

The  present  theories  of  attention,  says  Dr.  Heinrich,  are  unscien- 
tific since  they  are  arrived  at  by  explaining  the  known  by  the  unknown 
(Wundt,  Kiilpe)  ;  or  else  by  reducing  attention  to  association  (Ziehen) 
or  to  muscle  sensations  (Miinsterberg)  which  do  not  explain  all  the 
-phenomena  of  attention.  Experimentation  must  be  introduced  to 
-control  conditions,  and  do  away  with  introspection.  It  is  generally 
belived  that  attention  is  independent  of  the  sense  organs.  This  is 
thought  to  be  supported  by  the  experiment  of  Helmholtz  in  which  he 
found  he  could  change  the  direction  of  visual  attention  without  the  aid 
of  visual  objects.  Helmholtz,  therefore,  concluded  that  the  attention 
is  wholly  independent  of  the  accommodation  of  the  eye. 

Dr.  Heinrich  considers  this  verdict  unscientific,  and  devised  a 
method  to  test  it  by  physical  measurements.  A  perimeter  was  used 
.with  an  ophthalmometer  having  cross  threads  on  its  front  end  for  a 
fixation  point.  The  latter  was  placed  close  behind  the  perimeter  so 
•that  the  axes  of  the  two  instruments  coincided.  With  the  left  eye 
fixated  on  the  threads  and  the  right  eye  covered,  the  subject  was  re- 
quired to  direct  his  attention  to  white  squares,  2^  cm.  to  4  cm.  on  a 
side,  placed  at  an  angle  of  50°,  60°  or  70°  to  the  left  along  a  meridian, 
and  to  tell  what  letter  was  printed  on  the  square.  In  one  form  of  the 
experiment  the  light  came  from  a  gas  lamp  placed  near  the  perimeter 
on  the  nasal  side  of  the  left  eye.  In  another  form  the  light  came 
from  one  northeast  window,  the  other  windows  being  darkened.  In 
both  cases  the  image  of  the  light  was  reflected  in  the  middle  of  the 
pupil.  The  head  was  steadied  by  a  prop  held  in  the  teeth. 

Following  are  the  diameters  of  the  pupil  in  millimeters  taken  from 
the  ophthalmometer  when  the  white  squares  were  at  different  positions, 
and  also  when  the  subject  performed  a  difficult  problem  in  multipli- 
cation. 


With 
gas  lamp. 

With 
daylight. 

3-6899 
4.1245 
3-3247 
4.3943 

3.0091 
4.9094 

3-95H 
6.(x6< 

"     laterally  50°    .    . 

"          "           "        70°   . 

With  reckoning  .  . 

Dr.  Heinrich  concludes  that : 

i st.  The  pupil  enlarges  when  the  attention  is  turned  to  an  object 
seen  laterally.  This  is  dependent  upon  the  angle  of  the  laterally  seen 
object. 

2nd.  When  the  subject  turns  his  attention  wholly  from  the  object 


PSYCHOLOGICAL    LITERATURE.  459 

as  in  reckoning,  the  pupil  is  enlarged  most  of  all.  Since  the  light  was 
constant  these  changes  were  not  due  to  changes  in  light,  but  to  changes 
in  attention.  Later  modifications  of  the  experiment  in  which  black 
squares  were  used,  and  when  the  light  came  from  behind,  show  that 
the  adaptation  is  inconstant  when  the  attention  is  not  on  a  visual  im- 
pression in  the  axis  of  vision.  The  curvature  of  the  lens  was  found 
to  undergo  similar  changes.  J.  P.  HYLAN. 

CLARK  UNIVERSITY. 

EPISTEMOLOGY. 

Zur  Kritik  des  Seelenbegriffs.     A  Vannerus.     Archiv  f .     System. 

Philos.     Bd.  I.     Heft.  3,  1895. 

The  author  investigates  Prof.  Wundt's  conception  of  the  soul,  as 
neither  an  ensemble  of  associatively  bound  together  elements,  nor  a 
material  or  spiritual  substance  which  underlies  the  empirical  flow  of 
changing  states,  but  as  on  the  contrary  a  real  activity  which  is  actual 
in  that  it  is  immediately  known  in  psychic  experience — an  activity 
which  is  a  known  Ding  an  sick.  The  author  admits  that  from  a  psy- 
chological standpoint  the  Wundtian  conception  is  the  true  one ;  but 
contends  that  from  an  objective  point  of  view  the  conception  exagger- 
ates the  fact  of  activity.  Activity  presupposes  an  actor.  Yes,  replies 
Wundt,  in  the  objective  world  of  material  things;  but  "the  unity  of 
volition  (Willenseinheiten)  to  which  the  ontological  regression  leads 
is  not  an  acting  substance  but  rather  a  substance-producing  activity." 
To  the  author,  who  substitutes  a  unified  whole  and  its  contained 
elements  for  the  changing  appearance  and  underlying  reality  which 
Wundt  names  the  '  substance-concept,'  '  an  absolute  change  is  a  logi- 
cal and  psychological  impossibility.'  Activity,  event  and  change  are 
all  causal  conceptions ;  and  thought  must  embrace  their  ground  just 
as  much  as  the  effect.  The  comparing,  relating  functions  (e.  ^.,)  de- 
mand a  permanent  subject.  We  may  conceive  this  common  factor  in 
all  mental  states  as  an  activity,  indeed  as  a  $ure  activity  if  we  hold 
fast  the  thought  that  it  includes  a  constant  factor  which  consists  in  this 
that  it  is  always  one  and  the  same  activity,  viz.  :  the  relational  func- 
tion. If  the  author  means  an  activity  which  in  form  is  always  one 
and  the  same,  his  conception  as  here  expressed  is  probably  identical 
with  that  of  Prof.  Wundt ;  but  if  he  means  one  and  the  same  actor, 
the  discussion  becomes  a  defence  of  the  '  substance-concept '  of  which, 
as  the  author  writes,  Prof.  Wundt  is  '  the  sworn  enemy.'  But  the 
relation  of  the  author's  own  position  to  that  of  Wundt  is  not  perfectly 


EPIS  TEMOL  OGY. 

clear  in  some  parts  of  the  discussion.  The  author's  many  references 
to  Wundt's  works  make  the  discussion  very  helpful,  as  well  as  sugges- 
tive, to  those  who  wish  to  study  the  Wundtian  conception  in  the 
original. 

The  author  seems  finally  to  make  a  separation  of  the  changing  con- 
tent of  consciousness  from  its  underlying  ground,  conceived  as  perma- 
nent ;  but  this  is  of  course  just  the  effort  to  reduce  the  soul  to  mechani- 
cal conceptions  which  Prof.  Wundt  regards  as  both  unnecessary  and 
seductive.  It  may  still  be  true  that  the  soul  cannot  be  logically,  i.  e., 
mediately  conceived,  and  must  be  immediately  realized  in  the  unity  of 
its  own  activities ;  and  this  possibility  the  author  does  not  seem  to  dis- 
cuss. 

Grundlinien  einer  Theorie  der  Willensbildung.  PAUL  NATORP  : 
Archiv  f.  system.  Philos.  Bd.  I.  Hefte  2  and  3.  1895. 
The  author's  problem  is  pedagogical,  '  the  content  of  that  which 
should  be  developed  out  of  man,'  the  theory  of  knowledge  and  aesthetics 
being  as  important  as  ethics  in  determining  the  answer.  4  Will  is 
direction  of  consciousness '  determined  by  the  unconditional  demand 
for  '  unity  in  the  manifold,'  to  which  consciousness  stands  related  not 
only  as  a  legislator  to  his  law  but  also  as  subject.  The  author's 
Unconditioned  is  this  object  of  demand  not  merely  as  something  exist- 
ing but  as  something  which  ought  to  exist.  Will  is  thus  something 
fundamentally  different  from  the  determination  of  action  by  the  posi- 
tion in  which  one  finds  himself  or  by  an  estimate  of  positions  in  which 
he  is  able  to  place  himself.  From  a  formal  point  of  view  it  is  the 
necessary  reference,  imposed  by  consciousness  upon  itself,  to  the  un- 
conditioned as  law.  Its  material  content  is  determined  by  experience, 
the  bond  between  them  being  expressed  as  direction,  striving  or  ten- 
dency (Trieb). 

What,  in  concrete,  is  the  object  of  will  ?  Three  considerations  de- 
termine the  author's  answer.  Tendency  in  some  direction  is  presup- 
posed— this  is  Bain's  spontaneity  and  Baldwin's  '  Law  of  Excess.' 
Will,  formally  considered,  gives  to  tendency  its  form —  the  unity  of 
direction  which  consciousness  unconditionally  demands,  at  the  same 
time  rendering  tendency  objective  in  its  reference.  Tendency  is 
a  priori  and  must  be  centrally  grounded  and  not  peripherally.  The  ob- 
jective reference  of  Will  is  ignored  by  all  who  (as  Hume)  see  in  it 
merely  a  sum  of  given  simultaneously  operating  forces.  The  firm  be- 
lief in  a  thing,  that  it  means  unity,  explains  both  fanaticism  and 
heroism.  Rational  will,  the  third  consideration,  adds  to  unity  of  tend- 


PSYCHOLOGICAL  LITERATURE.  461 

ency  the  insight  that  this  is  the  Unconditioned.  Whence  then,  rational 
will  ?  The  author's  answer  is  social  Technique,  the  influence  of  so- 
ciety with  her  opinions,  institutions  and  customs  on  the  individual — 
4  moral  consciousness  is  social  consciousness/  The  individual  depends 
on  society  for  self-consciousness,  for  perception  or  his  view  of  his  not- 
me,  for  his  opinions  and  ideals.  The  pupil  must  not  see  with  the 
teacher's  eyes,  but  imitate  the  teacher  in  the  use  of  his  own.  The  pri- 
mary influence  of  society  is  on  the  will ;  one  learns  to  will  by  putting 
himself  in  the  point  of  view  of  others.  The  law  for  the  individual  is ; 
to  give  to  the  will  the  direction  which  society  is  disposed  to  demand, 
i.  £.,  the  law  of  humanity.  The  good  is  a  problem  for  the  individual 
only  in  so  far  as  he  participates  in  the  life  of  the  whole.  What 
morality  is  for  each  depends  upon  what  it  is  for  persons  in  general. 

The  author  develops  a  system  of  cardinal  virtues  embracing  Truth, 
Moral  Strength,  Purity,  the  moral  ordering  of  the  emotional  life;  and 
Justice,  'the  love  of  the  wise  man.'  This  part  of  the  discussion  is 
very  interesting  and  throughout  suggestive. 

On  a  Kantian  basis^the  author  goes  to  the  bottom  of  the  question 
of  will.  In  the  account  of  the  social  nature  of  the  objective  conscious- 
ness, the  author's  view  resembles  that  of  Prof.  Royce.  The  principle 
of  imitation  as  the  law  of  individual  appropriation  of  that  which  so- 
ciety offers  its  members,  the  principle  which  Prof.  Baldwin  in  his  last 
work  has  shown  to  be  of  tremendous  importance  in  this  connection, 
is  also  hinted  at  by  the  author.  Rather  than  the  theory  of  self-de- 
pendence and  self- legislation  of  the  transcendental  idealists,  the  dis- 
cussion leans  toward  the  opposite  extreme  of  making  the  individual 
entirely  dependent  on  society,  just  as  Prof.  Royce  seems  to  in  compar- 
ing the  relation  of  the  individual  to  society  to  that  of  a  hypnotic  sub- 
ject to  an  operator.  That  instinctive  sense  of  unity  which  conscious- 
ness contributes  to  Will,  especially  in  individuals  possessed  of  a  high 
degree  of  what  the  author  names  Tendency,  i.  e.,  Geniuses,  often  as- 
serts itself  against  society  in  favor  of  an  ideal  so  superior  to  society, 
it  may  be,  that  the  latter  cannot  appreciate  it.  Moreover,  the  author 
emphasizes  the  legal,  formal  side  of  the  Unconditioned  as  aim.  This 
has  two  difficulties — moral  development  becomes  the  problem  of  fol- 
lowing a  rule,  life  is  *  sicklied  o'er  with  the  pale  cast  of  thought ; ' 
and  then  there  are  no  ideal  formal  laws  capable  of  obvious  applica- 
tion to  conduct.  This  conception  really  makes  unnecessary  the  prin- 
ciple of  imitation  at  which  the  author  hints.  Finally  it  remains  un- 
clear to  us  what  the  author's  Unconditioned,  as  a  matter  of  concrete 
content,  is,  although  he  has  given  it  a  clear  formal  determination. 


462  EPIS  TEMOL  OGY. 

Neither  Spinoza's  absence  of  determination,  nor  Kant's  sum  of  all 
conditions,  nor  Spencer's  sum  of  all  force  would  answer.  All  that 
the  author  says  points  to  self-consciousness  in  the  form  of  self-activity 
as  that  which  alone  transcends  the  empirical  manifold  and  becomes  the 
aim  of  Will.  But  if  we  ask  for  a  closer  definition  of  self-activity,  we 
simply  come  back  to  the  question  to  answer  which  the  interesting  dis- 
cussion was  written.  The  individual  depends  on  society,  but  society 
is  a  sum  of  individuals,  and  streams  do  not  rise  higher  than  their 
source.  According  to  this  it  seems  as  though  our  moral  emotion 
ought  to  be  what  it  is,  not  merely  an  aspiration  after  something  better 
than  we  are ;  whereas  it  has  in  fact  a  positive  demand  that  we  be  that 
which  we  ought.  It  seems  as  though  this  difficulty  is  not  solved  by 
the  discussion.  GUY  TAWNEY. 

LEIPZIG. 

Ueber   Glaube   und    Gewissheit.     JULIUS    BERGMANN.      Ztsch.    f. 

Philos.,  1896,  CVIL,  176-202. 

Following  the  tendency  established  by  earlier  theological  writers, 
many  philosophers  down  to  the  present  time  have  inclined  to  regard 
the  belief  based  upon  our  ordinary  avenues  of  knowledge  as  implying 
some  degree  of  uncertainty.  This  is  the  reason  for  the  many  attempts 
that  have  been  made  to  discover  other  avenues  of  knowledge  capable 
of  yielding  more  certain  results.  Herr  Bergmann,  on  the  other  hand, 
claims  that  certainty  is  the  essence  of  belief  of  every  sort. 

' '  The  belief  in  the  content  of  a  judgment  ...  is  never  some- 
thing added  to  the  judgment,  but  the  judgment  itself  is  this  belief." 
Every  judgment  carries  with  it  a  belief  not  only  in  its  own  truth,  but 
also  in  its  own  certainty.  In  order  to  this  certainty,  one  must  have 
an  assurance  of  truth.  Such  assurance  is  found,  either  (i)  in  the 
identical  character  of  the  proposition;  or  (2)  in  its  agreement  with 
experience;  or  (3)  in  the  fact  that  the  judgment  follows  as  a  conse- 
quence, from  recognized  truths.  The  only  real  assurance  of  the  truth 
of  an  opinion,  then,  is  the  perception  of  its  truth;  i.  e.,  the  perception 
(which  may  be  but  dimly  present  in  consciousness)  that  one  of  these 
criteria  holds  with  respect  to  it.  Belief  and  the  feeling  of  certainty 
thus  become  functions  of  the  understanding  7  and  the  understanding 
is  the  sole  judge  as  to  whether  a  thing  which  has  been  considered  true 
and  certain  is  so  in  reality.  Truth  is  not  an  attribute  of  the  notion  as 
such,  but  merely  of  the  notion  as  predicated,  and  hence  belief  is  al- 
ways belief  in  objective  certainty,  or  truth. 

The  present  paper  is  a  defense  of  the  writer's  views  as  elaborated 
in  his  work :  '  Die  Grundprobleme  der  Logik,'  and  to  this  he  refers  in 


PSYCHOLOGICAL   LITERATURE.  463 

several  places  for  amplification — e.  g.,  in  his  discussion  of  Kant's  syn- 
thetic judgments  a  priori;  Herr  Bergmann  holds  these  to  be  merely 
special  forms  of  the  analytic  judgment,  as  of  course  his  scheme  would 
require  of  all  necessary  judgments.  H.  C.  WARREN. 

PRINCETON. 

L?  Hegemonic  de  la  Science  et  de  la  Philosophic.     A.  FOUILLEE. 

Revue  Philosophique.     Philadelphia.     January,  1896. 
The    Hegemony    of    Science    and    Philosophy.     INTERNATIONAL 

JOURNAL  ETHICS.     January,  1896. 

The  problem  which  the  author  would  consider  under  this  title  is 
stated  at  the  outset  in  the  form  of  a  question.  Are  there,  as  the  Kan- 
tians  hold,  limits  beyond  which  scientific  methods  do  not  apply,  regions 
in  which  speculation  must  be  controlled  by  entirely  different  prin- 
ciples? Or  is  there,  as  Aug.  Comte  would  hold,  a  'cerebral  unity* 
of  mankind  capable  of  being  constructed  on  the  data  of  science  alone  ? 
To  which  of  the  two  must  we  grant  the  true  intellectual  hegemony 

(P-  137)- 

The  author  distinguishes  between  two  senses  in  which  the  term 

science  is  used.  In  its  broader  sense  it  means  'a  rationally  estab- 
lished system  of  facts  and  ideas  which,  over  a  given  range  of  objects, 
confers  certainty,  assurance,  probability,  or  even  a  doubt  that  knows 
why  it  doubts'  (p.  143).  Thus  understood  science  includes  any  be- 
lief founded  on  reason;  universal  philosophy  as  well  as  so-called 
special  sciences.  It  excludes  belief  '  founded  on  the  authority  of  oth- 
ers, not  regulated,  and  incapable  of  demonstration,  or  on  the  imagina- 
tion or  feelings  to  which  a  supernatural  bearing  is  given. '  In  its 
narrower,  its  '  true '  sense,  however,  science  '  hinges  on  the  relations 
of  objects  to  each  other,  independently  of  their  relation  to  the  sentient 
and  thinking  subject.'  It  is  'the  perception  of  the  constant  relation 
between  things  such  as  these  appear  to  us,  independently  of  what  they 
may  be  in  themselves'  (p.  144).  Is  it  to  science,  in  this  latter  sense, 
to  philosophy,  or  to  religion  that  the  hegemony  belongs  ? 

In  favor  of  science  it  may  be  said  that  it  is  the  strongest  bond  of 
agreement  in  society.  Scientific  ideas  are  the  only  ones  identical 
among  individuals.  Science  must,  then,  '  take  an  ever-increasing  part 
in  the  utilitarian  and  even  moral  direction  of  humanity'  (p.  144). 
'  Science  is  nothing  else  than  that  social  knowledge  which  is  one  of 
the  essential  elements  of  social  consciousness'  (p.  145). 

But,  though  the  idea  of  an  'organization  by  science'  can  merit 
only  universal  assent,  the  question  remains  whether  the  individual  sci- 


464  EPIS  TEMOL  OGY. 

ences  are  sufficient  to  found  the  true  '  cerebral  unity '  of  the  human 
race.  Three  hypotheses  are  possible.  Either  (i)  religion  and  phi- 
losophy will  be  absorbed  in  the  particular  sciences,  or  (2)  they  will  con- 
tinue to  coexist  with  science,  but  within  more  and  more  circumscribed 
spheres,  or  (3)  they  will  grow  with  the  growth  of  science  itself. 

Taking  up  arms  for  philosophy,  Fouille"e  holds  that,  while  it  is  mani- 
fest that  the  metaphysics  which  would  explain  the  *  facts  of  experience 
by  means  of  entities  and  of  causes  which  cannot  be  verified  by  experi- 
ence or  established  in  a  definite  relation  with  it'  ought  to  disappear  (p. 
147),  yet  the  history  of  true  metaphysics,  from  Plato  to  Hegel, 
shows  no  tendency  to  grow  poorer.  Not  only  so ;  but  science  is,  and 
must  be,  theoretically  and  practically  incomplete.  Theoretically  it 
abstracts  (i)  from  a  sentient  and  thinking  subject,  (2)  from  the  whole 
of  existence.  Practically  it  abstracts  from  the  moral  aspect  of  the 
universe.  Philosophy  rests  assured  of  a  'perennial  function'  in  cor- 
recting the  abstraction  that  has  thus  been  made  of  the  thinking 
subject,  and  in  reestablishing  the  unity  of  nature  and  of  thought  (p. 
148).  And,  further,  to  it  'the  intellectual  hegemony  in  the  practical 
order  of  things  belongs,'  '  because  the  rational  basis  of  morality  depends 
neither  on  the  positive  sciences  nor  on  religious  faith,  but  on  philosophy 
itself  (p.  150).  Science  treats  the  world  of  organisms  as  machines; 
philosophy  regards  them  as  conscious,  as  animate.  Science  treats 
inanimate  objects  as  phenomena,  philosophy  in  animating  them  treats 
them  as  real  (p.  151).  Only  for  philosophy  is  a  moral  attitude  pos- 
sible (p.  152). 

To  the  science,  then,  '  that  is  at  once  objective  and  subjective,  with 
philosophy  as  its  indispensable  crown,'  not  to  purely  objective  science, 
belongs  the  moral  hegemony  of  humanity.  There  remains,  however, 
a  certain  validity  to  sentiment,  especially  to  religious  sentiment.  Not, 
indeed,  to  sentiment  supposed  to  be  a  faith  that  increases  our  assur- 
ance without  increasing  our  knowledge,  but  to  sentiment  that  is  the  re- 
sultant of  tendencies,  for  the  most  part  inherited,  unanalyzed  and  com- 
plex; but  not  for  that  reason  unanalyzable  (pp.  153-155).  A  'good 
sentiment'  is  a  collective  reason  instead  of  being  reason  in  detail ;  but  it 
is  none  the  less  reasonable  for  not  having  been  reasoned  out'  (p.  155). 
Religion,  while  it  may  lose  its  mythology  as  metaphysics  must  lose  its 
entities,  may  pass  over  into  philosophy ;  but  cannot  be  merged  into 
the  pure  sciences  with  their  objective  methods.  "Religion  is  a  philos- 
ophy of  sentiment  and  of  imagination  which  is  chiefly  social,  although 
it  addresses  itself  to  the  individual ;  it  is  a  poetry  of  consciousness,  seek- 
ing after  the  loftiest  universal  ideal."  (p.  160). 


PSYCHOLOGICAL  LITERATURE.  465 

But  while  we  grant  a  moral  and  intellectual  hegemony  to  philoso- 
phy and  science,  it  is  not  to  these  as  contemplating  dead  facts  and 
their  relations,  but  to  them  as  actions  and  productions.  The  question 
being  put  to  nature  is  essential  to  its  being  answered.  The  result  is 
a  'philosophy  of  action,  in  which  thought  is  no  longer  merely  a  reflec- 
tion and  a  copy  of  the  model  subjectively  presented ;  but  a  creation  of 
new  effects  in  harmony  with  those  already  existing'  (p.  104).  Fouil- 
l£e  concludes,  therefore,  that  'the  true  hegemony  belongs  to  the 
intelligent  volition  of  universal  ends,  a  volition  which  exists  as  ob- 
scure consciousness  in  religion,  but  reaches  in  philosophy  and  in  sci- 
ence the  clear  consciousness  of  its  goal  and  of  its  means'  (p.  164). 

Enough  of  the  substance  of  FouilleVs  article  has  been  here  given 
to  convince  the  reader  of  its  healthy  tone  and  comprehensive  view. 
Nothing  could  be  freer  from  that  paltry  spirit  of  reconciliation  that 
cannot  rest  until  it  has  left  the  ghosts  of  philosophy,  science  and  relig- 
ion locked  in  an  empty  embrace  in  a  vacuum  that  was  once  filled 
by  the  fruitful  struggles  of  their  substantial  selves.  And  on  the 
whole,  despite  some  vaguenesses  that  naturally  springs  from  the 
difficulty  of  putting  a  system  of  philosophy  in  a  few  words,  one  feels 
the  justice  of  the  author's  conclusion.  It  is,  for  example,  true  that 
4  pure '  science  is  content  to  rest  upon  certain  abstractions,  that  religion 
misleads  insofar  as  it  separates  certain  emotions,  as  different  in  kind, 
from  the  rest  of  experience.  But  one  may  be  inclined  to  question 
whether  Fouiltee  has  not  mistaken  an  illegitimate  abstraction  of  the  sci- 
entist for  the  necessary,  or  at  least  convenient,  abstraction  of  science. 
Must  science  abstract  from  the  sentient  and  thinking  subject?  Must 
it  abstract  from  the  rest  of  the  universe  ?  Must  it  omit  moral  aspects  ? 
Are,  in  short,  its  '  phenomena '  to  be  opposed  to  the  *  realities'  of  phil- 
osophy? Science  may,  indeed,  speak  of  an  azoic  age,  may  define 
sound  as  air  vibrations,  may  employ  the  concept  of  '  1'homme  ma- 
chine.' But  science  may  also  ask  what  is  the  relation  of  the  azoic  age 
to  the  rest  of  experience,  may  also  define  sound  as  sensation,  may  also 
regard  certain,  or  all,  actions  as  meaningful.  The  azoic  age,  the  sen- 
sation, the  meaning,  however,  must  be  such  as  can  be  '  verified  by  ex- 
perience or  established  in  a  definite  relation  with  it.'  To  abstract 
from  them,  thus  understood,  is  to  set  a  limitation  from  considerations 
of  economy,  of  division  of  labor.  To  include  them  is  to  bring  in  no 
new  principles.  That  from  which  science  does  seek  to  abstract,  is  not 
the  'thinking'  subject ;'  but  the  individual  point  of  view — in  short,  illu- 
sion. Since  to  perform  this  abstraction  is  to  consider  only  that  which  can 
find  confirmation,  the  object  of  science  is,  in  a  true  sense,  the  object  of 


466  NEW  BOOKS. 

a  '  social  consciousness.'  The  more  accurate,  the  more  complete  the 
confirmation ;  the  more  perfect,  the  more  i  objective '  the  science. 

It  is  true  that  the  scientist  may  seek  to  establish  for  his  object  a 
false  independence  from  the  rest  of  experience.  He  may  rob  it  of  all 
characteristics  that  make  it  an  experience  at  all.  But  in  so  doing  he 
sins  against  the  intelligibility  of  his  science  itself.  The  philosopher, 
however,  is  in  danger  of  committing  the  same  sin  if  he  would 
make  the  'reality 'of  his  object  depend  upon  a  '  meaning'  which  is 
not  itself  a  phenomenon  to  be  verified  by  and  related  to  experience. 
Such  an  eject,  based  upon  a  false  interpretation  of  analogy  and  of 
experience  falls  most  naturally  under  the  head  of  those  very  'entities' 
and  *  causes '  for  employing  which  Fouille"  e  so  justly  condemns  false 
metaphysics.  The  'meaning'  of  actions,  however,  is  a  conception 
that  has  proved  so  difficult  in  the  past,  that  one  must  rest  in  doubt  as 
to  whether  one  should  accuse  Fouille"e  of  a  fallacy,  or  oneself  of  a  mis- 
understanding. Properly  understanding  them,  however,  science  need 
not  abstract  from  '  meanings.'  If  it  does  not,  its  separation  from  phil- 
osophy is  merely  a  practical  result  of  the  economy  of  thought. 
Science  rests,  in  its  historical  position,  a  less  reflective  philosophy, 
philosophy  a  more  reflective  science.  Is  philosophy  destined  to  dis- 
appear in  the  growing  reflectiveness  of  science  ?  Perhaps,  when  there 
are  no  more  reflections  to  be  made.  But  then  we  shall  be  neither 
scientists  nor  philosophers ;  but  in  the  happier  sense  of  the  word — 
sophists.  EDGAR  A.  SINGER,  JR. 

UNIVERSITY  OF  PENNSYLVANIA. 


NEW   BOOKS. 

La  psychologic  des  sentiments.    TH.   RIBOT.    Paris,  Alcan.     1896. 
Pp.  xi+443. 

L'annee  psychologique.    Publiee  par.     H.  BEAUNIS  and  A.  BINET. 

Paris,  Alcan.      1896.     Pp.  1010. 
The  School  of  Plato.     F.  W.  BUSSELL.     London,  Methuen  &  Co, 

New  York,  Macmillan  &  Co.     1896.     Pp.  xvi  +  346.     $2.75. 
Outlines  of  Logic  and  Metaphysics.     JOHANN  EDWARD  ERDMANN. 

Translated  by  B.  C.  Burt.     London,  Swan  Sonnenschein  &  Co. 

New  York,  Macmillan  &  Co.     1896.     Pp.  xviii+253.     $1.60. 
Primer  of  Philosophy.     DR.  PAUL  CARUS.    Revised  edition.     Chi 

cago,  Open  Court  Publishing  Co.     1896.     Pp.  xiv-f  232. 


NOTES.  467 

Studien  zu  Methodenlehre   und  Erkenntnisskritik.      FRIEDRICH 

DREYER.     Leipzig,  Engelmann.     1895.     Pp.  xiii-f  223.     M  4. 
Hegel  as  Educator.     FREDERIC  LUDLOW  LUQUEER.     Thesis  for  the 

degree  of  Doctor  of  Philosophy  in  Columbia  University.     New 

York.     1896.     Pp.  185. 
Agnosticism    and    Religion.       J.    G.    SCHURMAN.      New    York, 

Charles  Scribner's  Sons.     1896.     Pp.  181. 


NOTES. 

A  DICTIONARY  OF  PHILOSOPHY  AND  PSYCHOLOGY. 

Macmillan  &  Co.  have  made  arrangements  for  the  issue  in  New 
York  and  London  of  a  '  Dictionary  of  Philosophy  and  Psychology ' 
under  the  editorial  supervision  of  Professor  Baldwin  of  Princeton  Uni- 
versity. The  work  is  to  have  the  following  general  features : 

1 .  It  will  contain  concise  definitions  of  all  the  terms  in  use  in  the 
whole  range  of  philosophical   study   (philosophy,  metaphysics,  psy- 
chology, ethics,. logic,  &c). 

2.  It  will  contain  such  historical  matter  under  each  term  as  may  be 
necessary  to  justify  the  definition  given  and  to  show  that  the  usage 
suggested  is  the  outcome  of  the  progress  of  philosophy,  together  with 
special  historical  articles. 

3.  It  will  have  very  full  bibliographies  both  of  philosophy  gener- 
ally and  of  the  special  topics  which  are  connected  with  it. 

With  these  features  to  give  it  character,  and  with  the  contributions 
of  the  leading  men  in  this  department  of  thought,  chosen  from  Eng- 
land, America,  and  for  the  German  and  French  usage,  also  from 
Germany  and  France,  to  give  it  authority,  it  is  hoped  that  it  may  come 
to  be  a  standard  work,  and  serve  two  main  purposes  as  follows : 

First,  It  should,  if  successfully  carried  out,  render  to  philosophy, 
in  a  measure,  the  service  of  4  setting'  the  terminology,  in  the  differ- 
ent philosophical  disciplines ;  and  thus  remove  what  is  by  common 
consent  the  greatest  hindrance  to  their  advance,  i.  e.,  the  varying  and 
conflicting  usages  of  terms  which  now  prevail. 

Such  a  book  should  serve  both  the  teacher  and  the  student  in  a 
most  essential  way.  Teachers  would  have  a  consistent  and,  as  far  as 
the  influence  of  the  book  might  extend,  uniform  system  of  meanings 
with  which  to  introduce  these  topics  in  the  class  room ;  and  students 
would  have  the  corresponding  advantage  of  learning  once  for  all  an 
accepted  terminology. 


468  NOTES. 

Second,  It  should  serve  as  a  general  introduction  to  all  the  philo- 
sophical disciplines  for  all  those  who  take  interest  in  them. 

Further,  it  is  expected  that  men  who  are  most  competent  in  the 
several  departments  will  contribute,  and  that  in  the  result  their 
work  may  present  a  fairly  adequate  statement  of  the  present  state  of 
these  studies  in  the  world.  All  the  matter  in  the  Dictionary  will  be 
original  and  signed. 

The  following  assignments  of  topics  with  the  names  of  the  au- 
thorities who  will  contribute  original  matter  may  be  already  an- 
nounced : 

General  Philosophy  and  Metaphysics,  Prof.  Andrew  Seth, 
Edinburgh  University ;  Prof.  John  Dewey,  Chicago  University ;  His- 
tory of  Philosophy,  Prof.  Josiah  Royce,  Harvard  University ;  Logic, 
Prof.  R.  Adamson,  Glasgow  University;  Ethics,  Prof.  W.  R.  Sor- 
ley,  Aberdeen  University ;  Psychology,  Prof.  J.  McK.  Cattell,  Colum- 
bia University;  G.  F.  Stout,  W.  E.  Johnson,  Cambridge  University; 
Prof.  E.  B.  Titchener,  Cornell  University;  The  Editor,  Princeton 
University;  Mental  Pathology  and  Anthropology,  Prof.  Joseph 
Jastrow,  Wisconsin  University ;  Biology,  Prof.  Lloyd  Morgan,  Uni- 
versity College,  Bristol ;  Bibliography,  Dr.  Benjamin  Rand,  Har- 
vard University. 

THE  first  number  of  Kant  Studien,  the  new  philosophical  journal, 
edited  by  Dr.  Hans  Vaihinger,  of  the  University  of  Halle,  was  pub- 
lished by  Leopold  Voss  on  April  25th.  The  number  contains,  in 
addition  to  an  introduction  by  the  editor,  articles  by  Professors  E. 
Adickes,  K.  Forlander,  A.  Sadtler  and  A.  Pinloche,  the  last  in 
French.  Forty-three  pages  are  devoted  to  reviews  and  '  Kantiana.' 

THE  American  Association  for  the  Advancement  of  Science  meets 
this  year  at  Buffalo,  from  August  23d  to  29th.  The  anthropological 
section  offers  an  opportunity  for  the  reading  of  psychological  papers, 
and  the  meeting  is  a  favorable  occasion  to  meet  men  of  science  work- 
ing in  allied  departments. 

DR.  FRANZ  BOAS  has  been  appointed  lecturer  on  physical  anthro- 
pology in  Columbia  University. 

DR.  ARTHUR  ALLIN,  honorary  fellow  in  psychology  in  Clark 
University,  has  been  appointed  to  the  professorship  of  psychology  and 
pedagogy  in  the  Ohio  University  at  Athens. 

DR.  CHARLES  H.  JUDD  has  been  appointed  instructor  in  psycho- 
logy at  Wesleyan  University. 


VOL.  III.,  PLATE  i. 


THE  PSYCHOLOGICAL  REVIEW. 

Illustrations  to  article  by 
PROFESSOR  G.  T.  W.  PATRICK  AND  DR.  J.  ALLEN  GILHERT. 


VOL.  III.     No.  5.  SEPTEMBER,  1896. 


THE  PSYCHOLOGICAL  REVIEW. 


STUDIES   FROM   THE   PSYCHOLOGICAL    LABORA- 
TORY OF  THE  UNIVERSITY  OF  IOWA. 

ON  THE  EFFECTS  OF  Loss  OF  SLEEP.1 

BY  PROFESSOR  G.  T.  W.  PATRICK  AND  DR.  J.  ALLEN  GILBERT. 

The  object  of  the  following  experiments  was  to  determine 
some  of  the  physiological  and  mental  effects  of  enforced  absti- 
nence from  sleep.  In  an  address  before  the  International  Medi- 
cal Congress  at  Rome  in  1894,  M.  de  Manaceine  reported  some 
experiments  upon  young  dogs  on  the  effects  of  absolute  insom- 
nia. The  animals  were  kept  from  sleeping,  and  died  at  the  end 
of  the  fourth  or  fifth  day.  (Arch.  Ital.  Biol.  XXI,  2.  PSYCHO- 
LOGICAL REVIEW  II,  i,  p.  81.)  So  far  as  is  known  to  the 
present  writers,  no  experiments  upon  human  subjects  have 
hitherto  been  made  on  enforced  insomnia  for  psychological 
purposes.  The  plan  of  our  experiments  was  as  follows :  It 
was  proposed  to  keep  the  subjects  awake  continuously  for  about 
90  hours,  to  make  a  series  of  physiological  and  psychological 
tests  upon  them  at  intervals  of  6  hours  in  respect  to  reaction- 
time,  discrimination-time,  motor  ability,  memory,  attention, 
etc. ;  to  observe  secondly,  the  general  effects  of  insomnia,  and 
finally  to  observe  the  depth,  character  and  amount  of  sleep  fol- 
lowing the  period  of  waking.  This  plan  was  successfully  car- 
ried out  with  three  subjects,  the  depth  of  sleep  being  ascer- 
tained, however,  in  the  case  of  only  one.  The  subjects  were 
in  each  case  constantly  attended  by  either  one  or  two  watchers. 

1  One  of  the  three  experiments  described  in  this  article  was  reported  in  a 
paper  by  Professor  Patrick  at  the  December  meeting  of  the  American  Psycho- 
logical Association  at  Philadelphia. 


47°  G.  T.    W.  PATRICK  AND  J.  ALLEN  GILBERT. 

They  took  their  regular  meals  at  7  a.  m.,  12.30  p.  m.,  and  6 
p.  m.,  the  food  being  normal  in  character  and  amount.  In 
addition  they  ate  a  very  light  lunch  at  12.30  a.  m.  The  days 
were  spent  in  occupations  conforming  as  nearly  as  possible  to 
the  usual  daily  work  of  the  subject.  The  nights  were  spent  at 
first  in  reading  or  playing  light  games,  and  toward  the  end  of 
the  experiments  in  any  way  best  adapted  to  keep  the  subjects 
awake,  such  as  walking,  working  upon  apparatus,  or  playing 
active  games.  Each  set  of  experiments,  however,  took  nearly 
two  hours,  so  that  this  occupation  consumed  almost  one-third  of 
the  time  both  day  and  night. 

We  give  first  a  general  account  of  the  subjects  and  experi- 
ments. The  first  subject,  J.  A.  G.,  is  a  young  man  of  28  years, 
assistant  professor  in  the  University.  He  is  unmarried,  of  per- 
fect health,  of  nervous  temperament,  of  very  great  vitality  and 
activity.  He  is  accustomed  to  about  8  hours  of  sound  sleep 
from  10  p.  m.  to  6  a.  m.  He  awoke  at  his  usual  time  Wed- 
nesday morning,  November  27,  and  remained  awake  until  12 
o'clock  Saturday  night.  The  second  night  he  did  not  feel  well 
and  suffered  severely  from  sleepiness.  The  third  night  he  suf- 
fered less.  The  fourth  day  and  the  evening  following  he  felt 
well  and  was  able  to  pass  his  time  in  his  usual  occupations. 
During  the  last  50  hours,  however,  he  had  to  be  watched 
closely,  and  could  not  be  allowed  to  sit  down  unoccupied,  as  he 
showed  a  tendency  to  fall  asleep  immediately,  his  own  will  to 
keep  awake  being  of  no  avail.  The  daily  rhythm  was  well 
marked.  During  the  afternoon  and  evening  the  subject  was 
less  troubled  with  sleepiness.  The  sleepy  period  was  from 
midnight  until  noon,  of  which  the  worst  part  was  about  dawn. 

The  most  marked  effect  of  the  abstinence  from  sleep  with 
this  subject  was  the  presence  of  hallucinations  of  sight.  These 
were  persistent  after  the  second  night.  .The  subject  complained 
that  the  floor  was  covered  with  a  greasy-looking,  molecular 
layer  of  rapidly  moving  or  oscillating  particles.  Often  this 
layer  was  a  foot  above  the  floor  and  parallel  with  it  and  caused 
the  subject  trouble  in  walking,  as  he  would  try  to  step  up  on  it. 
Later  the  air  was  full  of  these  dancing  particles  which  devel- 
oped into  swarms  of  little  bodies  like  gnats,  but  colored  red, 


IOWA   PSYCHOLOGICAL  LABORATORY.  471 

purple,  or  black.  The  subject  would  climb  upon  a  chair  to 
brush  them  from  about  the  gas  jet  or  stealthily  try  to  touch 
an  imaginary  fly  on  the  table  with  his  finger.  These  phenom- 
ena did  not  move  with  movements  of  the  eye  and  appeared  to 
be  true  hallucinations,  centrally  caused,  but  due  no  doubt  to  the 
long  and  unusual  strain  put  upon  the  eyes.  Meanwhile  the 
subject's  sharpness  of  vision  was  not  impaired.  At  no  other 
time  has  he  had  hallucinations  of  sight  and  they  entirely  disap- 
peared after  sleep. 

The  period  of  90  hours  being  completed  at  12  o'clock  Satur- 
day night,  the  subject  was  allowed  to  go  to  sleep,  which  he  did 
immediately.  He  was  awakened  at  intervals  of  one  hour  to  as- 
certain the  depth  of  sleep,  but  fell  asleep  again  at  once  after  each 
awakening,  and  slept  until  half  past  ten  Sunday  morning.  He 
awoke  then  spontaneously,  wholly  refreshed,  felt  quite  as  well 
as  ever,  and  did  not  feel  sleepy  the  following  evening.  He 
slept,  however,  two  hours  later  than  usual  Monday  morning. 

The  special  tests  made  upon  this  subject,  14  in  number,  are 
shown  with  the  results  in  Table  I.  They  were  all  repeated 
every  6  hours  throughout  the  whole  period,  and  repeated  again 
finally  after  the  subject  had  slept.  The  results  of  the  latter  tests 
are  shown  in  the  last  column.  In  reaction-time  and  discrimina- 
tion-time, the  effects  of  practice  were  eliminated  as  far  as  pos- 
sible by  preparatory  training  preliminary  to  the  experiment.  A 
few  words  of  explanation  of  methods  and  apparatus  are  neces- 
sary. The  pulse  was  taken  at  the  beginning  of  each  set  of 
tests  and  then  again  at  the  end  immediately  after  the  subject 
was  fatigued  by  tapping  with  the  forefinger  as  rapidly  as  possi- 
ble for  60  seconds.  The  subject  was  weighed  the  same  time 
after  each  meal  and  in  the  same  clothing.  Grip  was  taken  with 
an  ordinary  hand  dynamometer.  Pull  was  taken  with  the  same 
instrument,  the  subject  using  the  second  finger  of  each  hand. 

For  reaction-time  the  stimulus  was  a  telephone  click,  with 
signal,  the  reaction  being  the  release  of  a  key,  the  subject  be- 
ing in  the  dark  room,  away  from  the  recording  drum.  Each 
reaction-time  given  represents  the  mean  value  of  from  10  to  15 
reactions.  For  discrimination  a  modification  of  the  same  appa- 
ratus was  used,  the  subject  reacting  only  to  the  loud  stimulus. 


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IOWA   PSYCHOLOGICAL  LABORATORY.  473 

Sensibility  to  pain  was  tested  by  a  specially  prepared  algometer, 
arranged  to  bring  any  desired  pressure  upon  the  middle  of  the 
fingernail  of  the  first  finger,  the  finger  being  inserted  between 
two  horizontal  bars,  the  one  pressing  upon  the  fingernail  being 
a  very  dull  wooden  knife  edge.  The  figures  record  the  pres- 
sure in  grams,  the  lower  threshold  representing  the  first  feeling 
of  pain,  the  upper  threshold  the  point  at  which  the  pain  could  no 
longer  be  endured.  Acuteness  of  vision  was  tested  in  the  dark 
room  by  finding  the  greatest  distance  at  which  the  subject  could 
read  a  section  of  a  page  from  Wundt's  Studien  by  the  light  of 
one  standard  candle  at  a  distance  of  25  cm.  The  memory  test 
consisted  in  committing  to  memory  10  of  the  Ebbinghaus  non- 
sense syllables.  These  were  used  in  the  ordinary  way,  but  we 
consider  this  test  of  very  slight  value,  for  it  is  impossible  not  to 
learn  these  lists  by  association,  and  impossible  to  get  different 
lists  which  offer  equal  ease  or  difficulty  in  association.  The  ef- 
fects of  loss  of  sleep  upon  attention  and  association  we  at- 
tempted also  to  ascertain  by  determining  the  greatest  number  of 
figures  in  prepared  columns  that  could  be  added  in  three 
minutes.  Voluntary  motor  ability  was  tested  by  having  the 
subject  tap  with  the  forefinger  as  rapidly  as  possible  upon  a  key 
for  5  seconds,  using  the  recording  drum  and  graphic  chronom- 
eter. He  then  continued  tapping  for  60  seconds  to  fatigue 
the  muscles.  The  number  of  taps  during  the  last  5  seconds 
was  then  recorded.  In  the  table  is  given  first  the  number 
of  taps  in  the  first  5  seconds,  then  the  percentage  of  loss 
in  the  last  5  seconds  due  to  fatigue.  The  results  of  the 
special  tests  may  best  be  studied  from  the  table.  Attention  is 
called,  however,  especially  to  the  following.  The  steady  in- 
crease in  the  subject's  weight  during  the  experiment  and  the 
sudden  decrease  in  weight  after  sleep  are  noteworthy,  and  appar- 
ently not  to  be  accounted  for  by  accidental  circumstances.  His 
average  weight  during  the  last  24  hours  was  18  ounces  greater 
than  the  average  during  the  first  24  hours,  and  at  9  o'clock 
Saturday  night  the  subject  weighed  27  ounces  more  than  at  9 
o'clock  Wednesday  morning.  During  the  10^  hours'  sleep, 
however,  which  followed  the  experiment,  the  subject  lost  38 
ounces,  being  n  ounces  more  than  he  had  gained  during  the 


474  G.  T.   W.  PATRICK  AND  J.  ALLEN  GILBERT. 

experiment.  In  the  tests  with  the  dynamometer  the  subject 
lost  slightly  and  gradually  in  strength  of  both  grip  and  pull,  re- 
gaining all  after  sleep.  On  Saturday  afternoon,  however,  the 
subject  made  what  appeared  to  be  a  spurt,  in  view,  perhaps,  of 
the  approaching  end,  and  gripped  and  pulled  nearly  as  much  as 
at  the  beginning.  The  reaction-time  beginning  with  122*7 
increased  somewhat  regularly,  reaching  its  maximum,  165^7 
Saturday  afternoon,  after  81  hours  without  sleep,  and  dropped 
back  to  the  normal  immediately  after  sleep.  The  discrimina- 
tion-time appears  to  decrease,  but  as  it  does  not  increase  after 
sleep  the  result  cannot  in  this  case  be  attributed  to  loss  of  sleep. 
The  acuteness  of  vision  uniformly  increased  throughout  the  ex- 
periment, falling  below  the  normal  after  sleep.  The  slight  re- 
tardation in  the  increase  in  the  second  night  corresponds  with 
the  period  of  slight  sickness  at  that  time.  There  is  a  significant 
decrease  in  voluntary  motor  ability.  The  decrease  in  this  sub- 
ject's pulse-beat  after  fatigue  by  tapping  is  abnormal  and  ap- 
parently a  result  of  loss  of  sleep. 

The  above  experiment  upon  J.  A.  G.  was  regarded  as  some- 
what preliminary.  It  was,  therefore,  decided  to  repeat  the  ex- 
periment upon  two  other  subjects,  making  such  modifications  in 
the  special  tests  and  apparatus  as  seemed  to  be  desirable.  The 
second  subject,  A.  G.  S.,  was  a  young  man  of  27  years,  in- 
structor in  the  University,  unmarried,  quiet  and  of  excellent 
health.  The  third  subject,  G.  N.  B.,  was  a  young  man  of  24 
years,  instructor  in  the  University,  unmarried,  of  German 
parentage,  stout  and  perfectly  healthy.  At  the  time  of  the  ex- 
periment, A.  G.  S.  was  accustomed  to  9  hours  of  sound  and 
regular  sleep ;  G.  N.  B.  to  8  hours.  These  two  subjects  en- 
tered upon  their  sleep  fast  at  7  o'clock,  Tuesday  morning, 
March  17,  1896.  90  hours  was  again  the  period  determined 
upon.  On  Friday  night,  March  20,  .at  11.15,  the  last  set  of 
experiments  being  completed,  they  were  allowed  to  retire,  so 
that  their  waking  period  was  actually  88 ^  hours.  In  the  case 
of  these  two  subjects  there  was  no  illness,  no  hallucinations  of 
sight,  and  no  serious  suffering  or  discomfort.  A.  G.  S.  became 
very  sleepy  during  the  last  24  hours  and  had  to  be  watched 
constantly.  On  Friday,  at  9  p.  m.,  after  a  brisk  walk  in 


IOWA   PSYCHOLOGICAL  LABORATORY.  475 

the  cool  air,  his  temperature  sank  to  35.3°  Cent.  (95.6°  F.), 
but  in  15  minutes  rose  to  36.3°  Cent.  (97.3°  F.).  Of  the  three 
subjects  he  was  the  only  one  who  apparently  could  not  have 
prolonged  the  experiment  beyond  the  period  of  90  hours  with- 
out danger.  G.  N.  B.  had  less  trouble  in  keeping  awake  and 
showed  outwardly  but  slight  effects  of  the  abstinence  from  sleep. 
Both  subjects  slept  immediately  upon  retiring  at  11.15  P-  m-> 
Friday.  They  both  slept  uninterruptedly  until  10.30  a.  m., 
Saturday.  They  both  awoke  then  for  a  few  moments  and  slept 
again,  A.  G.  S.  until  11.15  a<  m->  G.  N.  B.  until  2.40  p.  m. 
They  both  felt  wholly  refreshed  upon  awaking,  required  no 
further  extra  sleep,  and  felt  no  ill  effects  from  the  experiment. 
The  special  tests  made  upon  these  two  subjects  are  shown 
with  the  results  in  Table  II.  and  Table  III.,  and  exhibited,  in 
part,  in  graphic  form  in  the  subjoined  curves.  They  were 
as  before,  repeated  every  6  hours.  To  eliminate,  as  far  as 
possible,  the  effects  of  practice,  the  tests  were  begun  two 
or  three  days  before  the  beginning  of  the  sleep  fast.  The 
first  three  sets  of  results  in  the  tables,  being  taken  the  first 
day  before  any  loss  of  sleep,  should  represent  the  normal 
reaction  of  the  subject.  These,  taken  together  with  the 
results  of  the  tests  made  after  awaking  shown  in  the  last 
column  of  the  tables,  make  a  fairly  adequate  standard  for 
comparison  with  the  results  obtained  during  the  sleep  fast. 
The  tests  in  respect  to  pulse,  temperature,  weight,  grip,  re- 
action-time, discrimination-time,  sharpness  of  vision,  voluntary 
motor  ability,  and  fatigue,  were  the  same  as  described  above 
for  the  first  subject.  The  strength  of  pull  was  taken  with 
an  ordinary  lift  dynamometer,  the  subject,  standing  upon  a 
small  platform  with  bent  knees  and  straightened  back,  lifting 
his  utmost  by  means  of  two  handles  connected  by  ropes  with  a 
large  spring  balance.  In  the  memory  test,  the  nonsense  sylla- 
bles were  discarded  and  18  figures  substituted.  18  small 
squares  of  cardboard  were  provided  upon  which  were  printed 
the  9  figures,  each  figure  thus  appearing  twice.  For  each  ex- 
periment a  random  order  of  these  figures  was  made,  and  then 
modified,  if  necessary,  to  prevent  adjacence  of  same  figure  and 
suggestive  combinations.  The  subject,  timed  with  a  stop 


476  G.  T.    W.  PATRICK  AND  J.  ALLEN  GILBERT. 

watch,  committed  to  memory  the  list,  the  watch  being  stopped 
when  the  subject  announced  his  readiness  to  recite  the  list. 
Each  experiment  consisted  in  committing  to  memory  three  such 
lists.  The  tables  show  in  seconds  the  average  of  these  three 
trials  in  each  case.  No.  u  was  a  test  in  adding  numbers.  The 
sheets  of  figures  used  by  Miss  Holmes  in  studying  fatigue  in 
school  children  and  described  in  the  Pedagogical  Seminary, 
Vol.  III.,  No.  2,  were  used.  The  subject  was  required  to  add 
each  set  of  40  figures  by  twos,  setting  down  the  results.  He 
then  added  the  results  and  then  added  the  original  figures  in  a 
different  order.  Any  variation  recorded  in  the  two  results  in- 
dicated errors.  The  tables  give  the  time  required  for  the  whole 
process.  Test  No.  12  was  designed  to  determine  the  subject's 
facility  in  seeing  and  naming  letters.  A  page  from  THE  PSYCHO- 
LOGICAL REVIEW  was  used ;  the  subject  reading  the  lines  back- 
ward merely  named  the  letters  as  fast  as  possible.  The  tables 
record  the  number  of  letters,  average  of  two  trials,  named  in  one 
minute.  Test  No.  9  was  designed  to  show  the  acuteness  of  hear- 
ing by  discrimination  of  the  intensity  of  two  sounds.  The  sounds 
were  vibrations  of  a  tuning  fork  heard  in  a  telephone  in  the  silent 
room,  the  intensity  being  varied  by  a  resistance  board,  only  one 
telephone  being  used.  The  results  in  the  tables  have  only  rela- 
tive value,  indicating  the  number  of  divisions  upon  the  resist- 
ance board  by  which  the  resistance  had  to  be  increased  to  en- 
able the  subject  to  detect  the  difference  in  the  intensity  of  the 
sounds. 

We  may  call  special  attention  to  a  few  of  the  results.  In 
both  subjects  we  again  observe  an  increase  in  weight  through- 
out the  experiment  with  decrease  after  sleep.  But  with  these 
subjects  the  decrease  is  less  than  the  increase.  In  strength  of 
lift  both  subjects  lose  quite  regularly  and  seriously,  but  regain 
nearly  all  after  sleep.  In  the  memory  tests,  the  results  are  very 
marked,  especially  with  G.  N.  B.  His  average  time  in  normal 
condition  for  committing  the  18  figures  was  134  seconds.  No 
remarkable  increase  in  this  time  was  observed  until  the  expira- 
tion of  72  hours.  At  9  a.  m.  Friday  the  subject  required 
960  seconds  to  commit  the  first  set  of  figures  and  failed  entirely 
to  commit  the  third  set,  working  at  it  for  20  minutes.  At  9 


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IOWA   PSYCHOLOGICAL  LABORATORY.  479 

p.  m.  he  could  not  commit  the  figures,  and  having  made  no 
progress  after  15  minutes  he  desisted.  The  attention  could 
not  be  held  upon  the  work.  A  kind  of  mental  lapse  would 
constantly  undo  the  work  done.  With  both  subjects  an  ener- 
getic *  waking  up '  by  means  of  brisk  walking  and  fresh  air  was 
often  necessary  during  the  latter  time  in  order  to  address  them- 
selves to  these  mental  tasks.  After  sleep,  A.  G.  S.  easily  com- 
mitted the  figures  in  88  seconds,  and  G.  N.  B.  in  106  seconds, 
this  being  in  both  cases  the  shortest  time  in  which  the  work  was 
done.  In  respect  to  the  number  of  letters  named  in  one  minute, 
there  is  with  both  subjects  a  steady  decrease  with  the  progress 
of  the  insomnia,  with  immediate  return  to  the  normal  after 
sleep.  In  adding  numbers  similar  results  appear  in  a  marked 
form  in  the  case  of  A.  G.  S.,  but  with  G.  N.  B.  adding  time 
was  affected  but  slightly.  Reaction-time  increases  with  A.  G. 
S.,  as  with  J.  A.  G.,  but  the  reaction-time  of  G.  N.  B.  is  not 
lengthened.  In  respect  to  reaction  with  discrimination  and 
choice  the  results  are  irregular  and  unsatisfactory.  There  is 
an  irregular  increase  with  A.  G.  S.,  but  an  actual  shortening 
of  time  with  the  other  two  subjects. 

Attention  should  be  called  to  the  length  of  sleep  following 
the  sleep  fast  and  its  relation  to  the  whole  amount  of  sleep  lost. 
A.  G.  S.  found  it  necessary  to  make  up  but  16  %  of  the  lost 
sleep,  as  measured  by  time ;  J.  A.  G.  25  %  ;  G.  N.  B.  35.3  %  ; 
As  restoration  was  in  each  case  apparently  complete,  explana- 
tion must  be  sought  in  one  of  two  hypotheses  or  in  both.  The 
first  is  that,  owing  to  the  greater  *  depth '  of  sleep  after  the  sleep 
fast,  the  anabolism  accompanying  restoration  was  more  rapid. 
The  second  is  that  the  partial  restoration  which  normally  ac- 
companies the  waking  period  was,  in  the  case  of  this  long  wak- 
ing, greater  than  usual ;  that  the  subjects,  in  other  words,  al- 
though apparently  awake  and,  indeed,  as  wide  awake  as  they 
could  be  kept,  were  nevertheless  at  times  partially  asleep. 
There  are  reasons  to  believe  that  the  results  depend  upon  both 
of  these  causes.  Our  subjects  well  illustrated  the  fact  that  sleep 
is  a  matter  of  degree.  All  that  could  be  done  both  by  objective 
diligence  and  subjective  effort  to  keep  the  subjects  wide  awake 
was  done.  If  the  subject,  contrary  to  his  own  intention,  closed 


480  G.  T.    W.  PATRICK  AND  J.  ALLEN  GILBERT. 

his  eyes,  although  he  immediately  opened  them  in  response  to 
his  watcher's  command,  still  there  was  time  for  a  short  and,  per- 
haps, refreshing  '  nap.'  Again,  one  of  our  subjects,  who  was 
kept  jogging  about  the  streets  during  a  sleepy  period  at  5  a.  m., 
afterwards  could  remember  little  about  the  walk.  Another  sub- 
ject, standing  with  eyes  open,  reflectively  gazing  at  a  piece  of  ap- 
paratus upon  which  there  were  some  pieces  of  rope,  suddenly  re- 
ported that  he  had  had  a  dream  about  a  man  being  hung.  With 
our  first  subject  we  undertook  to  test  the  delicacy  of  the  muscle 
sense  by  means  of  lifting  weights.  These  weights  were  small 
tin  pails  loaded  with  graded  weights  and  lifted  by  a  detachable 
handle.  Lifting  these  pails  was  found  to  be  very  monotonous 
and  sleepy  work.  The  subject  was  not  permitted  to  let  his  at- 
tention wander,  and  yet  he  reported  at  least  four  dreams.  For 
instance,  he  lifted  two  pails,  carefully  judged  their  relative 
weight,  and  as  he  set  the  second  one  down,  instead  of  saying 
that  No.  i  or  No.  2  was  the  heavier,  he  said  *  trimmings,'  evi- 
dently having  fallen  asleep  as  he  was  lifting  or  setting  down 
the  pails  and  dreamed  that  they  contained  trimmings.  It  must 
be  understood  that  these  dreams  were  instantaneous  and  the 
subject  as  wide  awake  as  he  could  be  kept,  but  these  facts  reveal 
a  cerebral  condition  related  to  sleep.  This  hypothesis  alone, 
however,  would  not  seem  to  account  fully  for  the  small  propor- 
tion of  sleep  made  up.  And,  indeed,  a  study  of  our  special 
tests  shows  that  restoration  took  place  chiefly  during  the  pro- 
found sleep  following  the  sleep  fast,  and  took  place  rapidly. 
That  this  sleep  was  actually  more  profound  and  that  the  pro- 
found part  of  it  was  longer  than  usual  was  shown  by  our  ex- 
periments in  depth  of  sleep  in  the  case  of  J.  A.  G.  reported  be- 
low. 

The  depth  of  normal  sleep  for  the  consecutive  hours  of  the 
night  has  been  studied  by  Michelsen  and  by  Kohlschiitter,  and 
the  results  presented  in  the  so-called  sleep  curves.  The  depth 
of  sleep  was  determined  by  these  observers  by  the  intensity  of 
sound  necessary  to  awaken  the  sleeper.  Their  results  show  the 
greatest  depth  of  sleep  at  the  end  of  the  first  hour.  After  the 
first  hour  the  curve  drops  abruptly  and  rapidly.  Already  at 
the  end  of  the  second  hour  sleep  is  light  and  continues  slowly 


IOWA   PSYCHOLOGICAL  LABORATORY.  481 

to  become  lighter  until  morning.  In  the  case  of  our  first  sub- 
ject, J.  A.  G.,  we  attempted  to  ascertain  the  relative  depth  of 
sleep  for  the  consecutive  hours  of  the  profound  sleep  following 
the  sleep  fast,  for  the  sake  of  comparing  our  results  with  the 
normal  sleep  curve.  As  a  sound  stimulus  would  not  be  practi- 
cable, for  the  reason  that,  the  experiments  all  being  made  in  the 
same  period  of  sleep  the  sleeper  would  soon  become  accus- 
tomed to  it,  we  substituted  a  pain  stimulus.  An  electric  garter, 
to  which  the  subject  had  become  accustomed  by  wearing  it 
for  some  nights  preceding  the  sleep  fast,  was  attached  to  the 
sleeper's  ankle  and  connected  with  an  induction  coil  in  an  ad- 
joining room,  and  so  arranged  that  the  current  could  be  closed 
for  a  constant  time,  viz.,  .334  sec.,  by  means  of  a  pendulum, 
and  that  the  strength  of  the  current  could  be  varied  by  means 
of  a  resistance  tube.  It  was  agreed  that  the  sleeper  should  an- 
nounce his  awaking  by  means  of  an  electric  button  at  his  bed- 
side. The  current  was  turned  on  at  intervals  of  one  hour. 
Unfortunately  the  least  resistance  that  could  be  arranged  with 
the  resistance  tube  failed  to  awaken  the  sleeper  at  the  first  three 
periods,  so  that  it  was  necessary  to  cut  out  the  tube  and  the  pen- 
dulum and  apply  the  direct  current  and  measure  it  roughly  by 
the  time  the  circuit  had  to  be  closed.  Our  results,  therefore, 
lack  the  exactness  necessary  for  the  construction  of  a  curve  or 
table,  but  still  show  plainly  the  relative  depth  of  sleep  for  the 
consecutive  hours.  The  deepest  sleep  was  found  at  the  end  of 
the  second  hour,  when  the  subject  could  not  be  aroused  suffi- 
ciently to  ring  the  bell,  but  responded  by  a  cry  of  pain.  The 
next  deepest  sleep  was  found  at  the  end  of  the  first  hour  and 
the  next  at  the  third  hour.  The  current  used  at  these  three 
times  was  one  which  it  was  altogether  out  of  the  question  for 
the  subject  to  endure  when  awake.  At  the  end  of  the  second 
hour,  just  after  the  experiment,  we  entered  the  sleeper's  room 
and  attempted  to  awaken  him  by  speaking  to  him  in  a  loud 
voice  without  avail.  At  the  fourth  hour  the  sleep  was  less 
deep,  and  continued  to  become  lighter  regularly  until  awaking, 
but  the  decrease  in  depth  was  very  much  less  rapid  than  in  the 
normal  sleep  curves  reported  above.  At  10  a.  m.  a  very 
slight  current  awakened  the  sleeper,  and  at  10 130  he  awoke 
spontaneously  as  stated. 


482 


G.  T.    W.  PATRICK  AND  J.  ALLEN  GILBERT. 


The  tendency  of  our  subjects  to  have  short  semi-waking 
dreams  suggested  to  us  that  in  enforced  insomnia  there  would 
be  offered  a  good  opportunity  for  a  study  of  dreams.  This,  of 
course,  was  incompatible  with  our  purpose,  but  in  the  cases  of 
A.  G.  S.  and  G.  N.  B.,  at  the  end  of  the  sleep  fast  and  before 
allowing  the  subjects  to  retire,  we  undertook  a  few  experi- 
ments in  dreams.  We  allowed  the  subjects  to  sit  with  head 
supported  behind,  and  to  sleep  for  periods  of  30  seconds,  one 

TABLE  IV. 


J.  A.  G. 

2d  day  be  fore 
experiment. 

ist  day  before 
experiment. 

&i 

•sS 

£jj 
•ofc 
2ft 

M 

Sj 

11 

p 

L 

n 
ji 

x 
\* 

°s 
frl 

^fc 

ft* 

4th  day  of  ex- 
periment. 
(Sleep.) 

ist  day  after 
experiment. 

ad  day  after 
experiment. 

24 
1475 

24 
1370 

24 
1270 

H 
805 

"# 

400 

24 
950 

Total  amount  urine(ccm.) 

Grams  N.  per  hour  .    .    . 

0.901 

0.929 

0.667 

0.723 

0.490 

0.723 

Grams  P2  O5  per  hour  .    . 

0.1327 

0.1438 

0.1105 

0.1304 

0.0564 

0.0888 

Relation  P2  O5  to  N.  .  .    . 

1:6.8 

1:6.5 

i:  6.0 

i:5.5 

1:8.7 

1:8.1 

A.  G.  S. 

Hours                               .    . 

38 
1308 

24 
1510 

24 

1700 

24 
1420 

i3# 

750 

12* 
525 

24 

1000 

24 
1240 

Total  amount  urine  (ccm.) 

Grams  N.  per  hour  .    .    . 

0.655 

0.661 

0.628 

o.745 

0.661 

0.414 

0.6175 

0.761 

Grams  P2  O5  per  hour  .    . 
Relation  P2  O-  to  N.  .  .    . 

0.07 
i:  8 

65 
.6 

0.0708 
1:9.3 

0.0791 
1:7.9 

O.IOII 

i:  7-4 

O.IOOO 

1:6.6 

0.0674 

1:6.1 

0.0907 

1:6.8 

0.1023 
i:7.5 

G.  N.  B. 

Hours    

24X 

24 

24 

23 

I3# 

i6# 

24^ 

24 

Total  amount  urine  (ccm.) 

920 

1240 

1205 

1730 

650 

365 

705 

705 

Grams  N.  per  hour  .    .    . 

0.4853 

0.7094 

0.6270 

0.6123 

0.5195 

0.3390 

0.5020 

0.4765 

Grams  P2  O5  per  hour  .    . 

0.0574 

0.0802 

0.0931 

0.0826 

0.0815 

0.0435 

0.0616 

0.0613 

Relation  P2  O6  to  N.  .  .    . 

1:8.5 

1:8.8 

1:6.7 

1:7.4 

i:  6.4 

1:7-8 

1:8.1 

1:7-8 

IOWA  PSYCHOLOGICAL  LABORATORY.  483 

minute,  three  minutes,  etc.,  then  awakening  them  and  asking 
for  their  dreams.  No  dreams  were  obtained  in  any  case.  If 
the  period  was  less  than  one  minute  the  subject  sometimes  had 
a  hazy  memory  of  something  like  a  dream  which  could  not  be 
put  into  words.  If  the  sleep  was  longer  it  was  apparently  pro- 
found and  dreamless.  These  rough  experiments  confirm,  of 
course,  the  generally  accepted  opinion  that  dreams  are  the  prod- 
uct of  light  sleep,  representing  indeed  the  reinstatement  of 
consciousness  after  the  early  and  profound  sleep. 

Through  the  kindness  of  Dr.  E.  W.  Rockwood,  of  the  Uni- 
versity, a  chemical  analysis  of  the  urine  was  made  throughout 
the  experiments  in  the  case  of  each  of  the  subjects.  The  object 
of  the  analysis  was  to  determine  the  influence  of  continued 
waking  upon  the  relative  amounts  of  nitrogen  and  phosphoric 
acid  respectively  excreted.  The  results  are  fully  exhibited  in 
Table  IV.  as  compiled  by  Dr.  Rockwood.  Considered  in  rela- 
tion to  the  fact  that  each  subject  increased  in  weight  during  the 
insomnia,  the  results  are  significant.  They  show  not  merely 
that  there  was  an  increase  in  the  excretion  of  both  nitrogen  and 
phosphoric  acid  during  the  period  of  insomnia,  but  that 
relatively  more  phosphoric  acid  was  excreted  than  nitrogen.  A 
certain  amount  of  support  is  thus  given  to  the  theory  of  a  special 
connection  between  mental  activity  and  the  katabolism  of  the 
phosphorized  bodies  of  the  nervous  system. 


STUDIES   FROM  THE   PSYCHOLOGICAL    LABORA- 
TORY OF  HARVARD  UNIVERSITY. 

I.  THE  RELATIONS  OF  INTENSITY  TO  DURATION  OF   STIMU- 
LATION IN  OUR  SENSATIONS  OF  LIGHT. 

BY  JAMES  E.  LOUGH. 
Instructor  in  Psychology,  Harvard  University. 

These  experiments  were  made  for  the  purpose  of  ascertain- 
ing the  exact  relation  existing  between  the  duration  of  a  stimu- 
lus and  the  intensity  of  the  resulting  sensation.  They  were 
suggested  by  the  phenomena  of  color-mixing  by  means  of 
Maxwell's  discs.  This  method  of  color-mixing  shows  that  the 
influence  of  a  given  color  upon  the  final  mixture  varies  with  the 
size  of  the  sector  of  that  color.  In  these  rotations  the  color 
does  not  vary  in  intensity,  but  the  time  during  which  it  stimu- 
lates a  given  portion  of  the  retina  changes.  The  relative  time, 
however,  is  the  only  effective  element,  for  after  the  colors  once 
fuse,  any  increase  in  the  speed  of  a  rotation  produces  no 
change  in  the  intensity  of  the  colors. 

My  first  experiments  repeated  the  conditions  given  by  Max- 
well's discs,  but  with  apparatus  so  arranged  that  the  experi- 
menter could  determine  the  exact  amount  of  variation  in  the  in- 
tensity of  the  sensation,  resulting  from  a  given  difference  in  the 
duration  of  the  stimulating  light. 

Vx*  t          c 


FIG.  i. 

The  apparatus  used  may  be  understood  from  the  ground 
plan  shown  in  Fig.  i. 
484 


HARVARD  PSYCHOLOGICAL  LABORATORY. 


485 


A  B  and  B  C  are  two  wooden  arms  along  which  slide  lamps 
a  b  of  one  standard  candle  power  each.  The  lamp  a  stands  a 
little  higher  than  b ;  and  the  dead  white  reflector  #',  standing 
at  its  level,  reflects  its  light  through  the  upper  half  of  the  slit 
E.  The  reflector  b1  reflects  the  light  from  b  through  the  lower 
half  of  the  same  slit.  G  is  a  large  black  screen  to  protect  the 
subject's  eyes  from  lateral  lights.  In  it  is  the  slit  E  I  cm.  wide 
by  4  cm.  high.  F  is  a  black  tube  to  fix  the  eye  and  still  far- 
ther cut  off  side  light.  D  is  a  dead  black  disc  rotated  by  a 
color  wheel.  A  window,  d1  d",  is  cut  out  of  this  disc,  as  is 
shown  in  Fig.  2. 


FIG.  2. 

The  lines  m  h,  Ik  and/ /are  radial  and  m  /,  kj  and  h  i  arcs 
of  concentric  circles.  D  is  placed  so  that  when  the  window 
covers  the  reflectors  a'  and  b1  the  line  j  k  is  level  with  the  hori- 
zontal line  dividing  them.  Consequently  a'  stimulates  the  eye 
while  d'  is  passing  between  it  and  the  slit,  and  b'  while  d"  is 
passing.  The  absolute  duration  of  this  stimulation  will  depend 
upon  the  rotation-rate  of  the  disc,  but  we  have  seen  that  it  is 
only  the  relative  time  we  need  to  consider  in  comparing  the  ef- 
fects of  stimuli  of  different  duration.  The  relative  times  of  ex- 
posure to  the  eye  of  the  lamps  a  and  b  will  be  proportional  to 
in  and  k  n  severally. 

The  room  was  darkened  and  the  lamps  placed  20  cm.  from 
the  reflectors  (correction  being  made  in  this  and  every  other 
experiment  reported  for  any  over-estimation  of  intensity  due  to 
position,  etc.).  The  disk,  with  jn  and  kn  in  the  ratio  of  2  :i, 
was  rotated  100  times  per  second,  under  which  conditions  the 


486  JAMES  E.  LOUGH. 

after-images  from  a1  and  b1  fused  completely,  so  that  each  reflec- 
tor gave  a  continuous  impression.  But  the  lower  one  now  ap- 
peared much  darker  than  the  upper  one.  In  order  to  determine 
how  much  darker,  the  lamp  b  was  moved  toward  3',  thus  increas- 
ing its  objective  intensity  until  the  two  reflectors  again  appeared 
equally  illuminated.  In  other  words,  until  the  intensity  of  sen- 
sation lost  through  the  shorter  time  of  stimulation  was  compen- 
sated by  the  greater  intensity  of  the  stimulus.  The  relative  in- 
tensity of  the  reflected  lights  may  now  be  calculated  from  the 
distances  of  the  lamps,  and  the  ratio  between  the  original  inten- 
sity of  b  and  the  final  one  will  express  the  loss  of  intensity  due 
to  its  shorter  time  of  stimulation. 

The  results  of  this  experiment  are  given  in  Table  L,  each 
ratio  given  being  the  average  of  ten  determinations.  The  sub- 
jects were  Dr.  Singer  and  the  writer. 

TABLE  I. 

Ratio  of  Ratio  of 

d< :  d"  Intensity.  Subject. 

'  i-35  S. 

:   1.39  L. 

:   2.05  L. 


2.05  :  I 
2.93:  i 
3.00:  i 


2.97  S. 

3.02  L. 


It  is  clear  from  this  table  that  when  the  difference  of  time 
between  d'  and  d"  is  not  greater  than  that  here  employed,  the 
intensity  of  the  resultant  sensation  is  proportional  to  the  time  of 
stimulation. 

A  second  series  of  experiments  followed  these,  differing 
from  them  only  in  this,  that  the  light  from  a'  was  not  inter- 
rupted at  all,  and  hence  always  produced  its  maximum  effect. 
The  light  from  b1  was  interrupted  by  sectors  of  the  disc  D. 
If  S  represents  the  width,  in  degrees,  of  the  sector,  then 
360 :  360-8  will  represent  the  relative  duration  of  the  stimuli 
from  a1  and  b'.  The  rapid  rotation  of  the  disc  caused  b'  im- 
mediately to  appear  much  darker,  a1 ',  of  course,  remaining  un- 
changed. The  intensity  of  b'  was  then  made  to  equal  a'  by 
moving  the  lamp  b  nearer  its  reflector.  From  these  data  it  is 


HARVARD  PSYCHOLOGICAL  LABORATORY. 


487 


possible  to  determine  the  loss  of  intensity  due  to  the  shortened 
time.  The  experiment  was  made  with  light  of  different  intensi- 
ties. That  reported  in  Table  II.  was  produced  by  one  candle- 
power  at  100  cm.  The  experiments  using  other  intensities  gave 
the  same  results.  Each  number  in  the  table  represents  the 
average  of  a  large  number  of  determinations.  In  this  and  all 
the  following  experiments  the  writer  was  the  only  subject,  other 
persons  being  used  only  to  confirm  the  results  given. 


TABLE  II. 


Ratio  of 

duration. 


•0055 

.0083 

.Oil 

.014 

.0166 

.0194 

.O222 

.025 

.0277 

•0555 

.083 

.1111 

•139 
.166 
.194 


atio  of                     Ratio  of 

tensity.                   duration. 

.006                     I 

.222 

.0078                  I 
.Oil                     I 
.OI2                     I 
.0164                  I 
.0177                  I 
.0225                  I 

•25 
.306 
.361 

•5 
.611 
.666 

.0249                  I 

.702 

.0273                  I 
.059                     I 
.091                     I 

•7°5 
.803 

.888 

.121                         I 

.156 

.176                        I 

.902 
.904 
•97 

.209 

Ratio  of 
intensity. 

•239 

.272 

.385 

•463 
.538 
.645 
.662 

•7 
.702 

.813 
.909 

•943 

•97 

.98 


This  table  shows  that  throughout  the  entire  series  a  decrease 
in  the  time  of  stimulation  results  in  a  proportional  decrease  in 
the  intensity  of  the  resultant  sensation.  All  of  these  experiments 
were  then  repeated  with  colored  lights,  produced  by  interposing 
gelatine  sheets  ;  red,  green,  blue  and  yellow  were  used.  These 
gave  the  same  results  as  those  given  in  Table  II. 

It  would  appear  from  these  experiments  that  the  chemical 
processes  in  the  retina  take  place  only  after  a  certain  inertia  has 
been  overcome,  and  that  this  requires  a  certain  duration  of 
stimulation.  When  under  ordinary  conditions  a  stimulus  of 
a  given  intensity  excites  the  retina  it  produces  a  chemical  dis- 


JAMES  E.  LOUGH. 

integration,  which  is  a  growing  process  up  to  a  fixed  limit,  which 
depends  upon  the  intensity  of  the  stimulus.  When  this  limit  is 
reached,  the  light  produces  its  maximum  effect.  Beyond  the 
point  of  maximum  effect,  time  produces  no  difference  of  inten- 
sity ;  looking  at  a  lamp  for  two  minutes  does  not  make  it  seem 
brighter  than  when  it  is  seen  for  only  one  minute.  But  below 
this  point  of  maximum  effect,  the  duration  of  the  stimulus  is  one 
of  the  factors  determining  the  amount  of  disintegration  in  the 
retina  and  so  the  intensity  of  the  resulting  sensation.  It  was 
the  object  of  a  third  series  of  experiments  to  find  the  point  of 
maximum  effect.  The  apparatus  was  the  same  as  that  already 
described,  except  that  a  large  dead  black  screen  swinging  upon 
a  pendulum  apparatus  took  the  place  of  the  disc  D.  The  screen 
contained  a  window  similar  to  that  in  the  disc. 

Let  us  call  'the  upper  and  narrower  half  of  this  opening  s', 
and  this  lower  and  wider  half  s",  and  the  reflectors  back  of  the 
screen  a'  and  b'  as  before.  The  opening  was  so  arranged  that 
at  the  lowest  point  of  the  swing,  both  reflectors  came  simulta- 
neously into  view,  a1  being  seen  through  5',  and  b1  through  s". 
The  relative  time  during  which  a'  and  b7  will  stimulate  the  eye 
will  depend  upon  the  relative  width  of  s?  and  j",  while  the  ab- 
solute time  of  both  stimulations  will  depend  upon  the  arc  through 
which  the  pendulum  swings.  The  absolute  time  of  exposure 
was  determined  for  each  degree  of  swing  by  the  ordinary 
means.  The  pendulum  apparatus  was  made  especially  for  this 
laboratory  by  Elbs  Freiburg,  after  Miinsterberg.  The  length 
of  pendulum  is  2  meters,  but  adjustable  weights  and  counter- 
weights give  every  rate  of  swing  desired.  The  screen  and 
opening  were  made  in  Cambridge,  Mass. 

In  order  to  obtain  the  time  for  maximum  effect,  the  lamps 
were  placed  so  that  a1  and  b'  gave  sensations  of  equal  in- 
tensity and  s'  and  s"  were  then  adjusted  to  the  relation  of  1:2. 
When  now  the  pendulum  was  allowed  to  swing  through  a 
small  arc  the  two  reflectors  seemed  equal,  but  as  the  amplitude 
of  the  swing  increased,  a  point  was  soon  reached  where  a'  ap- 
peared just  perceptibly  darker  than  b'.  This  marks  the  point 
where  a'  fails  to  produce  a  maximum  effect.  With  the  openings 
and  lamps  adjusted  as  before,  the  pendulum  was  now  given  a 


HARVARD  PSYCHOLOGICAL  LABORATORY.  489 

much  larger  swing.  This  caused  a'  to  appear  much  less  in- 
tense, while  b'  retained  its  former  intensity.  The  amplitude  of 
the  swing  was  gradually  decreased ;  with  this  a'  becomes  gradu- 
ally more  intense  until  it  finally  becomes  equal  to  b' ;  after  this 
no  farther  change  will  take  place.  This  also  makes  the  point  of 
maximum  effect  for  a'.  These  points  were  ascertained  by  a 
large  number  of  experiments  and  their  mean  taken  as  the  real 
time  necessary  to  produce  a  maximum  effect.  This  point  of 
maximum  effect  was  found  for  light  of  several  intensities,  as 
given  in  Table  III.  The  light  of  a  single  candle-power  lamp  at 
320  cm. — the  limit  of  the  apparatus — was  taken  as  the  unit. 

TABLE  III. 

Intensity  of  Light.  Time  of  Maximum  Effect. 

I.  148  ff 

4  no  ff 

16  100  ff 

64  85  ff 

256  90  ff 

It  will  be  seen  from  this  table  that  while  the  time  becomes  a 
little  longer  for  the  weaker  stimili  it  remains  very  nearly  the 
same  for  all  but  the  very  lowest.  Other  subjects  gave  similar 
results,  but  the  absolute  times  varied  somewhat. 

It  should  be  remarked  here  that  the  point  of  maximum  effect 
— where  duration  influences  intensity — is  in  no  way  connected 
with  the  threshold  for  time  judgments.  The  judgment  of  a 
difference  of  duration  does  not  go  over  into  a  judgment  of  dif- 
ference of  intensity. 

A  third  series  of  experiments  were  made  to  determine  the 
amount  of  intensity  lost  in  a  single  stimulation  by  any  given  reduc- 
tion of  time  below  that  required  for  the  maximum  effect.  Two 
methods  were  employed  to  reduce  the  time,  giving  rise  to  two 
sets  of  experiments.  One  method  used  a  difference  of  swing, 
while  the  window  remained  constant ;  the  other  varied  the  size 
of  s',  while  the  swing  was  the  same  throughout.  The  first  series 
employed  the  method  of  right  and  wrong  cases  to  determine  the 
position  of  the  lamps ;  the  second  used  the  method  of  just  per- 
ceptible differences. 


490 


JAMBS  E.  LOUGH. 


The  first  of  these  experiments  was  as  follows :  The  pen- 
dulum apparatus  above  described  was  used,  s'  and  s"  were  ad- 
justed in  the  relation  1:2,  and  the  lamp  b  placed  20  cm.  from  the 
reflectors.  The  pendulum  was  allowed  to  swing  through  a 
given  arc,  and  a  moved  until  a'  appeared  similar  to  b' '.  Table 
IV.  gives  the  results  of  this  experiment.  The  two  series  were 
separated  by  several  months,  both  are  given  here  to  show  the 
constancy  of  the  results.  Each  number  is  determined  by  the 
method  of  right  and  wrong  cases. 


Duration  of  stimuli. 


Arc. 

S'a 

S"a 

60° 

30 

60 

50 

40 

So 

40 

60 

120 

30 

85 

170 

24 

no 

22O 

20 

150 

300 

18 

i  So 

360 

16 

250 

5OO 

310    620 


TABLE  IV. 

Ratio  of  time. 

2 
2 
2 
2 
2 
2 
2 
2 
2 


Ratio  of 
t  series. 

intensity. 
2d  series. 

1.99 

1.94 

2.03 
.69 

I 
I 

2.03 
1.85 

•23 

.08 

I 

I 

1.23 
1.  06 

.10 

I 

1.  00 

.10 

I 

1.  02 

We  see  from  this  table  that  until  40°  is  reached  the  lights 
keep  the  same  ratio  as  the  openings.  Both  reflectors  did,  how- 
ever, become  lighter  as  the  duration  of  the  stimulation  became 
longer.  Below  40°  b'  remains  constant  and  a'  approaches  it ;  in 
other  words,  b'  produces  its  maximum  effect,  at  between  1200- 
and  1 70*7.  After  18°  the  two  reflectors  are  of  equal  intensity; 
a'  is  also  producing  its  maximum  effect.  This  point  is  somewhere 
between  1500-  and  1800.  These  numbers  differ  from  those  given 
in  Table  III.  But  the  determinations  for  Table  III.  were  made 
with  a  more  perfect  reflector,  giving  a  much  more  intense  light. 
Figure  3  gives  the  curve  of  intensities  as  obtained  from  Table 
IV. 

Between  the  two  points  of  maximum  effect  the  intensity  of 
the  sensation  is  seen  to  be  exactly  proportional  to  the  duration 
of  the  stimulus. 

The  other  set  of  experiments  under  this  head  gave  a  wider 


HARVARD   PSYCHOLOGICAL   LABORATORY.  491 


so  Jut      w        jj»        i/o  ipo         i  to  tro 

FIG.  3. 

range  of  time  for  investigation.  By  the  first  method  the  time 
was  limited  by  the  maximum  point  for  b'.  With  the  second 
method  the  pendulum  swung  through  a  constant  arc,  and  s"  also 
remained  constant,  always  producing  a  maximum  effect,  while 
the  duration  of  a'  was  regulated  by  the  size  of  s'.  The  inten- 
sity of  light  chosen  was  one  candle-power  at  80  cm.  The  time 
of  maximum  effect  was  first  found  for  s'  when  s'  and  s"  were  in 
the  rated  i  :  2  in  the  manner  already  described.  It  was  found 
to  be  100  a,  and  this  was  taken  as  the  unit  of  time. 

The  time  of  a'  was  now  made  one-half  of  the  standard, 
ioo<r,  by  reducing  s' ,  and  the  loss  of  intensity  resulting  deter- 
mined as  before.  This  was  repeated  with  other  lengths  of 
stimulation  as  given  in  Table  V. 

The  first  column  gives  the  duration  of  a1  in  fractions  of  the 
maximum  time,  the  second  column  giving  the  corresponding 
reduction  of  intensity. 


TABLE  V. 


Time. 
I. 


•5 

.25 

.125 

.0625 

.0312 


Intensity. 


I. 


•55 

•33 
.115 
.065 
.029 


The  exact  relation  between  the  duration  of  short  stimuli  and 
the  intensity  of  the  sensation  must  be  accepted.     We  see  that  it 


492          LEON  M.  SOLOMONS  AND    GERTRUDE   STEIN. 

holds  both  for  rapidly  succeeding  stimuli  and  for  single  stimu- 
lations. 

The  inertia  of  the  retina  against  chemical  disintegration  may 
be  accepted  as  a  fact.  The  amount  of  this  disintegration 
determines  the  intensity  of  the  sensation.  A  strong  stimulus 
acting  for  half  the  time  necessary  to  produce  its  maximum 
effect  gives  rise  to  a  sensation  of  exactly  the  same  intensity 
as  that  produced  by  half  as  strong  a  stimulus  producing 
its  maximum  effect.  The  stronger  sensation  does  contain  the 
weaker,  temporally,  for  between  the  first  moment  of  stimulation 
and  the  moment  of  maximum  effect  the  disintegrating  process 
will  pass  through  the  series  o  to  this  maximum.  Each  step  in 
this  series  is  the  basis  of  a  sensation  of  corresponding  intensity. 
While  these  growing  sensations  as  such  do  not  enter  conscious- 
ness, they  may  be  the  elements  of  our  feeling  of  '  more '  or 
*  less,'  as  concerning  the  intensity  of  sensations. 

In  this  way  we  may  conceive  of  a  physiological  basis  of  in- 
tensity which  does  not  give  a  qualitative  difference  to  the  sensa- 
tion. 


II.  NORMAL  MOTOR  AUTOMATISM. 

BY  LEON  M.    SOLOMONS  AND   GERTRUDE   STEIN. 

It  is  well  known  that  many  hysterical  subjects  exhibit  a  re- 
markable development  of  the  subconscious  life,  amounting,  in 
many  cases,  to  that  most  interesting  phenomenon  known  as 
double  personality.  It  has  often  been  argued  that  the  perform- 
ances of  these  *  second  personalities '  are  essentially  different 
from  the  merely  automatic  movements  of  ordinary  people — so 
different,  in  fact,  as  to  compel  us  to  accept  the  name  '  second 
personality '  as  a  literal  expression  of  the  real  state  of  things. 
Against  this  view  it  is  urged  that  we  underestimate  the  automatic 
powers  of  the  normal  subject.  We  are  told  that  many  of  the 
acts  which  we  usually  do  quite  consciously  might  really  be  done 
without  consciousness.  In  support  of  this  assertion  such  facts 
are  pointed  out,  as  men  completely  undressing  without  knowing 
it,  when  their  attention  is  distracted  by  other  matters.  If  this 


HARVARD  PSYCHOLOGICAL   LABORATORY.  493 

latter  explanation  is  to  hold,  however,  something  more  than 
assertion  must  be  forthcoming.  The  limit  of  automatism  is 
something  that  is  essentially  capable  of  demonstration  by  ex- 
perimental methods,  and  its  investigation  forms  the  subject  of 
this  paper. 

It  must  not  be  understood  that  any  attempt  is  made  to  answer 
the  vexed  question  of  a  so-called  *  subliminal  consciousness.' 
This  question  cannot  be  settled  experimentally,  unless  it  be  ad- 
mitted beforehand  that  the  automatic  acts  of  normal  subjects, 
between  which  and  the  *  second  personality '  an  analogy  is  as- 
serted, are  themselves  unaccompanied  by  consciousness.  But 
this  is  by  no  means  universally  admitted.  The  question  of  con- 
sciousness, in  all  cases  where  it  is  not  directly  experienced,  is 
essentially  a  philosophical  one,  and  the  facts  of  psychology 
have  little,  comparatively,  to  do  with  it.  But  the  question  of 
whether  the  performances  of  the  '  second  personality '  are  to  be 
allied  to  the  automatic  acts  of  ordinary  people,  or  whether  they 
are  to  be  allied  to  those  acts  which  never  go  on  save  in  the  full 
glare  of  consciousness — by  the  aid  of  reflection,  judgment  and 
will ;  this  question  is  perfectly  definite,  capable  of  satisfactory 
solution  by  observation  and  experiment,  and  of  great  importance 
to  scientific  psychology. 

The  object  of  our  experiments,  then,  was  primarily  to  de- 
termine the  limits  of  normal  automatism,  and,  if  possible,  show 
them  to  be  really  equal  to  the  explanation  of  the  second  person- 
ality ;  and  incidentally  to  study  as  carefully  as  possible  the 
process  by  which  a  reaction  becomes  automatic.  Above  all, 
we  wished  to  avoid  anything  like  a  real  production  of  a  second 
personality.  For  the  experiments  to  really  settle  the  point  at 
issue  it  was  essential  that  no  suspicion  should  rest  upon  the 
complete  *  normality '  of  the  subject  throughout  the  experiments. 
Our  idea  was  to  reproduce  rather  the  essential  elements  of  the 
'  second  personality,'  if  possible,  in  so  far  as  they  consist  of 
definite  motor  reactions  unaccompanied  by  consciousness — or 
shall  we  say,  out  of  deference  to  the  subliminal  consciousness 
theory,  unaccompanied  by  '  conscious  consciousness.'  These 
elements  appeared  to  us  to  be  conveniently  considered  under 
four  groups,  as  follows  : 


494          LEON  M.  SOLOMONS  AND    GERTRUDE   STEIN. 

1.  General  tendency  to  movement  without  conscious  motor 
impulse. 

2.  Tendency  of  an  idea  in  the  mind  to  go  over  into  a  move- 
ment involuntarily  and  unconsciously. 

3.  Tendency  of  a  sensory  current  to  pass  over  into  a  motor 
reaction  subconsciously. 

4.  Unconscious  exercise  of  memory  and  invention. 

In  the  complete  second  personality  all  these  elements  exist 
at  once.  We  proposed  to  prove  their  existence  in  normal  sub- 
jects separately. 

i.  General  tendency  to  movement.  For  these  experiments 
a  planchette  was  used.  Both  of  us  had  previously  tried  in  vain 
to  '  write  planchette.'  Neither  of  us  has  any  aptitude  for  will 
ing  games,  etc.  We  may  both  as  far  as  we  know  stand  as 
representatives  of  the  perfectly  normal — or  perfectly  ordinary — 
being,  so  far  as  hysteria  is  concerned. 

The  planchette  used  was  a  glass  plate  mounted  on  metal 
balls,  with  a  metal  arm  holding  a  pencil.  The  subject  placed 
one  hand  firmly  on  this  and  then  proceeded  to  get  himself  as 
deeply  interested  in  a  novel  as  possible.  In  this  way  it  is  easy 
to  show  that  although  the  arm  does  not  really  move  spontane- 
ously, yet  any  movement  once  started  up  tends  to  continue  of 
itself.  Further,  very  slight  stimuli  are  capable  of  starting  the 
movement.  For  example,  as  soon  as  the  position  of  the  arm 
grows  uncomfortable,  or  would  be  uncomfortable  if  the  subject 
attended  to  it,  it  is  likely  to  begin  movement.  By  slightly  moving 
the  planchette  it  is  easy  to  start  the  arm  to  moving,  after  which 
it  will  continue  of  itself  if  not  deliberately  checked  by  the  will 
of  the  subject.  If  the  story  that  the  subject  is  reading  be  suffi- 
ciently interesting,  all  this  goes  on  without  his  knowledge. 
Where  he  is  conscious  of  the  movements  of  his  arm,  however, 
they  appear  to  him  to  be  extra  personal.  It  is  not  he  but  his 
arm  that  is  doing  it.  He  cannot  say  whether  his  arm  is  mov- 
ing spontaneously  or  whether  it  is  being  moved  by  the  operator. 
Later,  if  allowed  practice,  he  may  learn  to  make  this  distinc- 
tion, but  the  movements  do  not  at  all  lose  their  extra  personal 
character.  He  readily  perceives  that  they  are  of  two  kinds  de 
pending  on  whether  the  operator  moves  the  planchette  or  his 


HARVARD  PSYCHOLOGICAL   LABORATORY.  495 

arm  moves,  but  both  these  movements  seem  equally  discon- 
nected with  himself.  He  gains  his  knowledge  of  the  movement 
purely  through  sensations  from  the  arm.  He  has  no  feeling  of 
intention  or  desire ;  no  fore-knowledge  of  what  the  movement 
is  to  be.  As  we  shall  see,  this  feeling  of  extra  personality  ap- 
pears in  all  our  experiments  whenever  knowledge  of  movement 
is  gained  purely  from  sensations — whenever  there  is  no  preced- 
ing feeling  of  intention.  Where  the  attention  of  the  subject  is 
completely  distracted  by  the  reading,  all  knowledge  of  the  ex- 
periment disappears  and  the  movements  go  on  entirely  without 
his  knowledge  and  quite  as  well.  The  only  interference 
comes  if  the  story  gets  too  exciting,  when  emotional  reflexes 
are  likely  to  interfere  either  by  causing  violent  movement  or 
by  stopping  all  movement. 

Sometimes  it  is  possible  to  '  teach '  the  arm  some  special 
movement,  which  it  will  then  go  on  making  of  its  own  accord. 
For  example,  the  operator  may  start  the  planchette  to  making 
m  strokes,  and  as  soon  as  the  hand  has  caught  the  movement — 
shown  by  the  absence  of  resistance — stop.  The  arm  goes  on 
making  the  strokes.  Gradually,  however,  it  gets  them  more 
and  more  out  of  shape  until  it  has  got  into  an  elliptical  move- 
ment which  is  more  natural  to  it,  apparently.  When  this  habit 
— that  of  making  wide  elliptical  movements,  has  become  well 
developed,  the  arm  loses  its  *  suggestiblity '  and  can  no  longer 
be  taught  special  movements.  The  moment  the  planchette  is 
released  it  starts  back  to  its  own  movement.  In  connection 
with  this  natural  movement  it  should  be  noticed  that  it  is  much 
more  difficult  for  the  subject  to  distinguish  between  spontaneous 
movements  and  movements  impressed  by  the  operator,  when 
the  impressed  movement  is  the  natural  one,  than  when  it  is 
widely  different  from  this.  Apparently  the  arm  quickly  falls 
in  to  the  suggested  movement  when  it  is  its  own  natural  move- 
ment ;  while  in  other  cases  this  falling  in  is  delayed,  resulting 
in  a  tension  in  the  muscles  of  the  arm  representing  its  '  hang- 
ing back '  behind  the  movement  impressed  on  the  hand  by  the 
motion  of  the  planchette.  It  is  by  learning  to  recognize  this 
tension  that  the  subject  is  enabled  to  distinguish  between  spon- 
taneous and  impressed  movements.  Introspectively  this  seemed 


496          LEON  M.  SOLOMONS  AND    GERTRUDE   STEIN. 

to  be  about  the  method,  that  is,  and  it  agrees  well  with  the  fact 
just  noted. 

From  these  experiments  we  concluded  that  in  normal  sub- 
jects there  is  a  general  tendency  to  movement  from  purely  sen- 
sory stimuli,  independent  of  any  conscious  motor  impulse  or 
volition.  This  tendency  is  ordinarily  inhibited  by  the  will,  but 
comes  out  as  soon  as  the  attention  of  the  subject  is  removed. 
This  tendency  to  stop  automatic  movements  and  bring  them 
under  the  control  of  the  will  is  very  strong.  Nothing  is  more 
difficult  than  to  allow  a  movement  of  which  we  are  conscious  to 
go  on  of  itself.  The  desire  to  take  charge  of  it  is  almost  irre- 
sistible. But  as  we  shall  see  later  it  is  a  habit  that  can  be  over- 
come, and  a  trained  subject  can  watch  his  automatic  movements 
without  interfering  with  their  complete  non-voluntariness. 

From  now  on,  having  demonstrated  the  tendency  to  sponta- 
neous movement,  we  did  not  hesitate  to  make  the  mere  move- 
ment element  voluntary. 

2.  Tendency  of  ideas  to  go  over  into  movement.  For  these 
experiments  the  subject  was  given  a  pencil  which  he  kept  mov- 
ing over  a  paper  as  though  writing — a  sort  of  continuous  move- 
ment— he  meanwhile  being  engaged  in  reading  a  story.  The 
writing  movements  quickly  become  automatic,  and  nothing  pre- 
vents the  subject  from  giving  his  full  attention  to  his  reading. 
Under  these  circumstances  there  is  a  very  decided  tendency  to 
write  down  words  read,  especially  simple  words  such  as  the,  in, 
it,  etc. 

Sometimes  the  writing  of  the  word  was  completely  uncon- 
scious, but  more  often  the  subject  knew  what  was  going  on. 
His  knowledge,  however,  was  obtained  by  sensations  from  the 
arm.  He  was  conscious  that  he  just  had  written  a  word,  not 
that  he  was  about  to  do  so.  While  mere  scribbling  went  on  the 
subject  would  scarcely  be  conscious  that  he  was  doing  anything  ; 
but  the  writing  of  a  word — either  because  of  the  different  char- 
acter of  the  movements,  or  their  greater  energy — seemed  to  at- 
tract his  attention.  Small  words  would  usually  be  completely 
written  before  the  subject  knew  about  it,  but  large  words  would 
only  get  started.  But  even  where  there  was  no  interference 
from  the  attraction  of  the  voluntary  attention  large  words  were 


HARVARD  PSYCHOLOGICAL   LABORATORY.  497 

seldom  attempted,  and,  still  more  rarely,  more  than  just  begun. 
This  fact  may,  however,  very  easily  be  referred  to  the  fact  that 
reading  is  so  much  faster  than  writing  that  subsequent  words, 
with  different  motor  reactions,  interfere  with  the  writing  of  a 
long  word.  But  a  word  that  can  be  written  with  one  impulse 
is  not  affected  by  this.  Succeeding  words  may  be  read  before 
it  is  written,  but  their  motor  impulses  do  not  reach  the  arm  in 
time  to  interfere. 

As  experiments  of  this  kind  were  of  necessity  also  carried 
on  during  the  next  series,  they  were  not  prolonged. 

3.  Unconscious  passage  of  sensation  into  motor  reaction. 

The  first  form  of  this  which  we  tried  was  writing  at  dicta- 
tion. As  in  the  other  experiments,  the  subject's  attention  was 
occupied  as  fully  as  possible  in  reading.  He  kept  his  pencil 
moving  constantly,  scribbling  when  no  dictation  was  going  on. 
These  experiments  were  by  far  the  most  difficult  we  attempted, 
and  required  the  most  training. 

At  the  first  attempt  the  subject  is  entirely  unable  to  follow 
what  he  is  reading.  He  reads,  but  does  not  get  the  meaning. 
He  is  painfully  conscious  of  the  experiment  and  everything 
connected  with  it.  He  has  an  irresistible  tendency  to  stop 
whenever  a  word  is  given  to  him  and  attend  to  that  until  it  is 
written,  and  then  go  on  with  his  reading.  In  a  word,  the  con- 
ditions demanded  by  the  experiment  are  opposed  to  all  his 
habits  of  attention,  and  the  successful  carrying  out  of  the  ex- 
periment demanded  that  these  habits  be  overcome.  And  yet, 
in  spite  of  this,  there  were  momentary  lapses  of  consciousness 
right  from  the  start.  Very  uncertain  in  character  and  very 
rare,  but  enough  to  encourage  us  to  persevere. 

One  very  quickly  gets  sufficiently  accustomed  to  the  experi- 
ment to  follow  the  story.  But  the  habit  of  turning  the  attention 
to  the  writing  whenever  a  word  is  given  is  difficult  to  overcome. 
The  facility  one  acquires  in  rapidly  shifting  the  attention  from 
reading  to  writing  and  back,  without  confusion  or  effort,  is 
really  quite  remarkable.  Where  at  first  the  effort  produces 
nothing  but  confusion  of  the  worst  kind,  in  a  few  hours'  practice 
one  is  able  to  read  his  story  with  perfect  ease  and  comfort,  un- 
disturbed by  the  constant  interruptions  for  writing,  even  when 


498          LEON  M.    SOLOMONS  AND    GERTRUDE   STEIN. 

these  are  quite  frequent — say  every  15  or  20  seconds.  But 
when  the  story  grows  interesting  the  attention  is  held  too 
powerfully  for  this,  and  cases  of  pure  automatism  begin  to  ap- 
pear frequently.  The  word  is  written  or  half  written  before 
the  subject  knows  anything  about  it,  or  perhaps  he  never  knows 
about  it.  For  overcoming  this  habit  of  attention  we  found  con- 
stant repetition  of  one  word  of  great  value.  By  such  methods 
as  these  we  gradually  began  to  get  control  of  our  attention,  and 
produce  the  necessary  conditions  for  the  experiment.  There 
are  four  elements  to  be  distinguished  in  the  writing  of  a  word 
at  dictation,  i,  The  heard  sound;  2,  the  formation  of  a  motor 
impulse  ;  3,  a  feeling  of  effort ;  4,  sensation  from  the  arm  telling 
of  the  written  word.  2  and  3  are  frequently  indistinguishable 
in  consciousness,  but  they  are  distinct,  for  they  come  and  go 
under  different  circumstances.  2  consists  of  a  melange  of 
visual  and  kinaesthetic  material — whatever  ordinarily  innervates 
our  writing — as  well  as  other  elements  not  easily  described,  and 
perhaps  really  a  direct  consciousness  of  a  motor  current.  On 
this  point  more  later. 

The  first  thing  to  disappear  is  the  feeling  of  effort.  We  hear 
the  word,  have  an  idea  of  how  it  should  be  written,  and  then  it 
is  written.  The  writing  seems  perfectly  voluntary,  but  there  is 
no  sense  of  difficulty,  of  '  something  accomplished.'  The 
strong  self-consciousness  that  accompanies  a  concentration  of 
the  will  at  any  point  is  entirely  lacking,  but  nevertheless  the 
writing  feels  thoroughly  voluntary.  This  feeling  of  effort  re- 
appears after  a  while,  and  then  it  is  time  to  stop  the  experiment, 
for  the  arm  is  tired.  It  comes  back  also  if  the  voice  of  the 
operator  falls  too  low. 

The  next  step  is  the  disappearance  of  the  motor  impulse. 
The  writing  becomes  non-voluntary.  We  hear  the  word,  and 
we  know  what  we  have  written ;  that  is  all.  This  is  the  gen- 
eral condition  of  things  throughout  the  experiment,  after  the 
preliminary  training  is  over.  The  writing  is  conscious,  but 
non-voluntary  and  largely  extra  personal.  The  feeling  that 
the  writing  is  our  writing  seems  to  disappear  with  the  motor 
impulse.  This  fact  is  doubly  significant  here,  for  in  this  case 
we  have  a  fore  knowledge  of  what  the  written  word  will  be, 


HARVARD  PSYCHOLOGICAL   LABORATORY.  499 

since  we  hear  this  dictated  word.  The  reaction  of  the  arm  is 
not  really  unexpected,  yet  it  is  still  not  felt  to  belong  to  the  will- 
ing subject.  It  sometimes  seemed  that  the  visual  element 
of  the  motor  impulse  might  remain,  and  the  reaction  still  feel 
extra  personal.  But  opportunities  for  observing  this  were  few, 
and  we  advance  the  proposition  with  hesitation.  If  true  it  would 
lead  to  the  conclusion  that  the  motor  impulse  contains  a  direct 
consciousness  of  a  motor  current,  which  is  the  essential  element 
in  an  act  of  will ;  for  the  kinaesthetic  element  of  the  impulse  is, 
with  us,  extremely  slight,  if,  indeed,  it  exists  at  all  in  ordinary 
unstudied  movements.  This  view,  that  the  motor  impulses,  de- 
scending from  the  higher  centers  to  the  lower,  are  accompanied 
by  consciousness,  is  one  that  all  our  experiments  have  tended 
to  impress  powerfully  upon  us.  Yet  the  tangible,  <  statable '  evi- 
dence for  it  is  extremely  slight.  It  seems  to  be  an  uncon- 
sciously produced  conviction  proceeding  from  a  multitude  of 
elusive  trifles. 

Real  automatism,  that  is,  dropping  out  of  consciousness  of 
the  other  two  elements,  heard  sound,  and  return  sensations 
from  the  arm,  comes  only  at  intervals  and  for  short  periods  at 
a  time.  But  it  com/?s  whenever  the  attention  is  sufficiently  dis- 
tracted. In  no  case  does  withdrawal  of  the  attention  interfere 
in  the  least  with  the  reaction.  The  writing  goes  on  just  the 
same,  but  below  consciousness.  The  only  exception  to  this 
comes  on  the  emotional  side.  If  the  story  gets  very  exciting 
the  muscular  tension,  which  is  one  of  the  expressions  of  intense 
suspense,  stops  the  arm  movements  entirely,  and,  of  course, 
with  that  the  possibility  of  writing  words.  Also,  in  very  excit- 
ing parts,  the  tendency  to  write  words  from  one's  reading  is  also 
increased,  but  this  does  not  interfere  much. 

A  very  distinct  stage  in  the  process  of  becoming  uncon- 
scious is  where  we  find  the  word  started  before  we  are  con- 
scious of  having  heard  it,  or  we  learn  the  word  first  from  our 
writing,  and  then  perhaps  recall  its  sound  by  the  memory  after- 
image ;  or  we  are  uncertain  what  word  was  dictated,  and 
while  we  are  wondering  the  word  is  written.  Every  once  in  a 
while  the  story  grows  interesting,  and  we  return  to  ourselves 
with  a  start  to  find  that  we  have  been  going  on  writing  just  the 


500         LEON  M.  SOLOMONS  AND    GERTRUDE   STEIN. 

same.  In  this  connection  it  is  important  to  notice  that  the  re- 
turn to  consciousness  is  always  from  the  motor  side.  We  sud- 
denly become  aware  that  our  hand  is  writing  something.  It  is 
never  the  sound  that  recalls  us.  This,  of  course,  may  be  an 
individual  peculiarity  to  a  certain  extent,  and  possibly  would 
not  be  true  of  everyone.  Yet,  Miss  Stein  has  a  strong  auditory 
consciousness,  and  sounds  usually  determine  the  direction  of 
her  attention. 

For  a  long  time  during  these  experiments  nothing  was  more 
marked  than  the  complete  failure  of  automatism  as  soon  as  the 
voice  fell  below  a  certain  degree  of  loudness.  The  moment  that 
happened  the  writing  would  not  continue  without  the  formation 
of  a  motor  impulse,  usually  accompanied  by  a  feeling  of  effort. 
This  minimal  loudness  was  so  near  the  point  of  difficult  hearing 
that  we  could  not  say  whether  the  feeling  of  effort  really  be- 
longed to  the  identification  of  the  sound,  or  the  formation  of 
the  motor  impulse. 

After  long  practice  this  phenomenon  disappeared  quite 
suddenly.  The  minimum  loudness  took  a  big  drop  to  a 
point  rather  below  easy  hearing.  It  now  became  very  much 
easier  not  to  attend  to  the  dictation,  and  the  intervals  of  com- 
plete unconsciousness  lasted  much  longer,  and  occurred  much 
more  frequently.  Our  results  were  now  entirely  satisfactory 
and  we  stopped  the  experiment. 

As  to  the  extent  of  the  unconscious  intervals,  they  fre- 
quently extended  for  five  or  six  words  with  complete  uncon- 
sciousness, while  the  successive  occurrence  of  several  such  in- 
tervals, separated  only  by  momentary  flashes  of  consciousness, 
was  not  uncommon. 

As  to  the  test  for  unconsciousness,  of  course,  in  the  nature  of 
things,  the  only  test  can  be  that  of  memory.  One  cannot  di- 
rectly observe  unconsciousness.  Here  it  will,  of  course,  be  said 
that  there  is  no  proof  that  it  is  not  merely  memory  that  is  at  fault. 
We  may  be  momentarily  conscious  of  these  reactions,  but  forget 
them.  Of  course,  the  same  objection  can  be  made  to  any 
alleged  case  of  automatism,  and  the  fundamental  object  of 
these  experiments,  to  establish  an  analogy  between  the  acts  of 
the  second  personality  and  what  is  ordinarily  called  automatism, 


HARVARD  PSYCHOLOGICAL   LABORATORY.  501 

is  not  affected  by  this  objection.  There  is  no  proof,  save 
that  of  memory,  for  the  performance  of  the  so-called  '  split-off 
consciousness'  being  other  than  a  performance  of  the  primary 
consciousness,  nor  for  any  of  the  simple  reflexes  ordinarily 
called  unconscious  being  really  not  cases  of  rapid  alterna- 
tion. Our  problem,  being  purely  one  of  similarity  between  two 
well  marked  systems  of  phenomena,  is  independent  of  the 
ultimate  interpretation  of  either  group.  We  simply  wish  to 
show  that  what  holds  for  one  holds  also  for  the  other. 

Nevertheless,  this  question  of  alternation  without  memory, 
versus  real  unconsciousness,  is  an  important  one,  and  as  we 
made  observations  bearing  on  this  subject  it  will  be  well  to  re- 
cord them  here. 

In  brief,  what  we  observed  was  a  phenomenon  different 
from  true  unconsciousness,  but  corresponding  almost  exactly  to 
the  conception  of  alternation  without  memory.  The  subject 
was  absolutely  unable  to  recall  a  single  word  written,  but  never- 
theless felt  quite  certain  that  he  had  been  writing,  and  that  he 
had  been  conscious  of  every  word  as  he  wrote  it.  This,  in  fact, 
was  the  general  condition  of  things  through  the  greater  part  of 
the  experiments,  after  training  was  well  under  way.  The 
same  sentence  might  be  dictated  to  the  subject  over  and  over 
again,  and  at  the  end  of  the  series  he  would  not  know  what  it 
was.  Yet  not  a  single  instance  of  what  we  have  called  uncon- 
sciousness occurred  during  the  interval.  Of  course,  this  is  not 
conclusive,  for  obviously  there  is  memory  of  some  kind  even  in 
this  case,  though  not  a  memory  of  what  was  written.  But  the 
important  point  is  that  real  unconsciousness  appeared,  not  as  a 
last  stage  of  this,  but  as  an  altogether  different  phenomenon 
coming  quite  suddenly,  and  under  different  conditions.  The 
consciousness  without  memory  seems  to  approach  as  its  limit, 
simply  a  condition  in  which  the  subject  has  not  the  faintest  ink- 
ling of  what  he  has  written,  but  feels  quite  sure  that  he  has 
been  writing.  It  shows  no  tendency  to  pass  beyond  this  into 
real  unconsciousness.  It  seems  to  depend  on  the  lack  of  asso- 
ciations between  the  different  words — one  word  going  out  of 
consciousness  before  another  has  come  in  to  be  associated  with 
it.  It  is  facilitated  by  slow  dictation.  And  conversely  real 


502          LEON  M.  SOLOMONS  AND    GERTRUDE   STEIN. 

unconsciousness  appears  not  as  a  final  stage  of  a  gradually  de- 
creasing memory,  but  quite  suddenly.  It  may  break  into  a 
period  of  consciousness  without  memory,  and  be  followed  by  such 
again,  but  it  is  equally  likely  to  break  into  a  period  of  complete 
memory.  In  either  case  it  comes  entirely  unheralded  by  any 
transition  form,  and  departs  as  suddenly  and  silently.  It  does 
not  seem  to  depend  upon  association  elements  at  all — is  entirely 
independent  of  the  speed  of  dictation  up  to  the  limit  of  writing 
speed. 

This  identification  of  a  phenomenon  so  strikingly  in  accord 
with  the  «  alternation-without-memory '  theory,  yet  so  strikingly 
different  from  the  well  known  phenomenon  of  unconsciousness, 
seems  to  us  to  leave  little  room  for  reasonable  doubt  as  to  the 
correctness  of  the  common  sense  view  of  the  unconscious — the 
view,  that  is,  that  it  really  is  unconscious. 

This  phenomenon  of  failure  of  memory,  in  spite  of  the  pres- 
ence of  consciousness,  will  at  once  be  recognized  as  correspond- 
ing quite  closely  to  some  well  known  hysterical  phenomena. 
We  shall  come  across  more  instructive  instances  of  it  later  on  in 
automatic  reading. 

It  will  perhaps  be  objected  to  these  experiments  that  the  long 
training  required  to  bring  them  out  destroys  their  value,  for  the 
hysterique  does  all  these  things  without  special  training.  It 
will  be  said  that  to  prove  that  the  second  personality  uses  noth- 
ing but  habitual  brain  paths  it  is  scarcely  permissible  to  estab- 
lish new  paths. 

But  it  must  be  remembered  that  our  training  was  purely  a 
training  of  the  attention.  Our  trouble  never  came  from  a  fail- 
ure of 'reaction ,  but  from  a  functioning  of  the  attention.  It  was 
our  inability  to  take  our  minds  off  of  the  experiment  that  inter- 
fered. From  the  start,  whenever,  by  good  luck,  this  did  hap- 
pen, the  reaction  went  on  automatically.  (The  exception  noted 
from  intense  excitement  is,  of  course,  of  no  importance  in  this 
connection.)  The  hysterique  has  no  trouble  here,  for  he  is 
unable  to  attend  to  the  sensation,  attention  to  which  bothered  us. 
It  is  his  ar.aethesias  which  make  automatism  possible.  What 
in  his  case  is  done  for  him  by  his  disease  we  had  to  do  by 
acquiring  a  control  over  our  attention. 


HARVARD   PSYCHOLOGICAL   LABORATORY.  503 

But  if  there  was  no  real  creation  of  new  paths,  it  will  be 
objected  that  yet  the  lowering  of  the  minimal  loudness  of  dicta- 
tion, so  essential  to  the  success  of  the  experiment,  was  at  least 
an  opening  up  and  *  smoothing '  of  old  paths.  This  is  doubt- 
less true,  but  it  must  be  remembered  that  training  of  this  kind 
the  hysterique  can  get  during  the  early  stages  of  his  disease. 
The  formation  of  a  second  personality  is  a  late  development, 
and  sub-conscious  acts  of  an  irregular  character  occur  for  a 
long  time  before  the  organized  second  personality  appears. 
During  this  stage  paths  which  are  not  yet  well  worn  may  be 
opened  up.  It  will  be  remembered  that  in  our  experiments  we 
found  automatism  easier  when  the  arm  was  fresh.  When  tired 
it  suddenly  failed.  Apparently,  the  energy  reaching  it  along 
the  automatic  path  is  no  longer  sufficient.  Produce  this  back- 
wards now.  Imagine  an  arm  in  the  condition  of  '  chronic  rest' 
of  an  hysterical  paralysis.  Is  it  not  altogether  likely  that  it 
often  acquires  great  sensitiveness  from  this,  so  that  stimuli 
reaching  it  along  the  automatic  path,  not  strong  enough  to  pro- 
duce a  reaction  in  a  normally  exercised  arm,  may  yet  produce 
a  reaction  in  the  hyperassthetic  arm?  In  this  way  old  paths 
may  gradually  be  widened,  until  the  second  personality  emerges 
— possibly  with  a  sub-conscious  hyperassthesia  to  trouble  some 
psychical  researcher. 

Automatic  Reading. — This  is  a  very  pretty  experiment  be- 
cause it  is  quite  easy  and  the  results  are  very  satisfactory.  The 
subject  reads  in  a  low  voice,  and  preferably  something  compar- 
atively uninteresting,  while  the  operator  reads  to  him  an  inter- 
esting story.  If  he  does  not  go  insane  during  the  first  few  trials 
he  will  quickly  learn  to  concentrate  his  attention  fully  on  what 
is  being  read  to  him,  yet  go  on  reading  just  the  same.  The 
reading  becomes  completely  unconscious  for  periods  of  as  much 
as  a  page.  In  this  experiment  when  well  under  way,  it  is  the 
moments  of  conciousness  that  are  rare.  One  remembers  having 
read  something  at  the  beginning  of  the  paragraph  and  suddenly 
finds  himself  at  its  end.  All  between  is  a  blank.  One  feels 
that  he  surely  must  simply  have  suddenly  let  his  eyes  drop  from 
one  end  to  the  other.  Often,  though  the  reading  is  entirely  un- 
conscious he  is  conscious  of  a  confused  murmer  heard  all  the 


504         LEON  M.  SOLOMONS  AND    GERTRUDE    STEIN. 

time — the  sound  of  his  voice — but  it  bears  about  the  same  re- 
lation to  his  consciousness  as  the  murmer  of  the  stream,  beside 
which  one  reads  on  a  summer  day — a  general  background  of 
sound,  not  belonging  to  anything  in  particular. 

The  reading  is  not  entirely  lacking  in  expression,  and  the 
pauses  are  made  quite  properly.  But  the  tone  is  usually  more 
monotonous  than  the  reader's  normal.  Absurd  mistakes  are  oc- 
casionly  made  in  the  reading  of  words — substitutions  similar  in 
sound  but  utterly  different  in  sense.  The  usual  suggestibility 
of  the  unconscious  is  shown  in  a  tendency  to  insert  words  from 
the  reading  which  is  attended  to.  (Here  it  will  be  noticed  ap- 
pears an  automatic  path  from  ear  to  mouth.)  The  words  read 
must  be  familiar  for  the  automatism  to  work  well.  Dialect 
stories  do  not  go  well  at  all. 

The  "eye  movements  in  this  experiment  are  most  interesting. 
The  tendency  to  raise  ones  eyes  from  the  book  one  is  reading, 
and  turn  them  on  the  person  one  is  listening  to,  is  very  strong. 
A  compromise  is  frequently  the  result.  One's  eyes  are  focused 
at  a  point  a  little  above  the  book,  and  the  reading  goes  on  out 
of  the  corner  of  one's  eye.  Tendencies  of  this  kind,  however, 
are  not  so  hard  to  overcome  as  one  supposes  the  first  time  he 
tries.  Eye  movements  here  seem  to  be  simply  a  result  of  at- 
tention, not  in  any  sense  the  thing  itself. 

The  feeling  of  extra  personality  appeared  here  too.  When- 
ever it  happened,  that  is,  that  the  subject  after  a  period  of  auto- 
matic reading  suddenly  began  to  hear  what  he  was  reading,  his 
voice  seemed  as  though  that  of  another  person.  This  effect  did 
not  disappear  immediately  when  he  began  to  see  the  printed 
words.  Not  until  he  had,  as  it  were,  *  taken  in  hand '  the  pro- 
cess by  which  printed  words  pass  into  speech,  did  extra-person- 
ality disappear  from  his  reading. 

When  both  persons  read  with  equal  loudness,  each  trying  to 
pay  attention  to  the  other,  the  conditions  are  very  different.  In 
the  simpler  experiments  the  problem  is  simply  to  pay  attention 
to  sounds,  and  not  to  sight  and  speech.  When  both  read  equally 
loud,  however,  this  is  not  enough.  It  is  easy  enough  to  get  the 
reading  automatic,  but  to  listen  to  another  person's  voice  and 
not  to  one's  own  is  another  matter.  Here  comes  in  the  distinc- 


HARVARD  PSYCHOLOGICAL   LABORATORY.  505 

tion  pointed  out  in  the  automatic  writing  between  the  mere  en- 
tering of  consciousness  and  the  establishment  of  associations 
giving  memory  and  meaning.  It  is  not  possible  to  hear  only 
the  other  person's  voice.  If  the  centers  for  the  consciousness 
of  sound  are  in  a  condition  to  respond  to  afferent  currents  at 
all  they  respond  to  all,  or,  at  least,  do  not  discriminate  except  at 
haphazard.  But  it  is  possible  to  grasp  the  meaning  si  one  only, 
the  other  being  in  the  condition  of  the  words  written,  but  not  re- 
membered, in  the  automatic  writing.  This  affords  a  most  in- 
teresting field  of  observation,  but  as  it  concerns  a  different  prob- 
lem from  the  one  in  hand  I  speak  no  further  of  it  here.  It  will 
form  part  of  another  series  of  experiments  having  as  their  prob- 
lem the  general  relation  of  attention  and  memory.  These  two 
elements  of  attention  are  very  distinct.  The  one  a  mere  attend- 
ing to  certain  classes  of  sensations — a  physiological  distribu- 
tion— the  other  inseparably  bound  up  with  the  laws  of  associa- 
tion and  the  act  of  thinking  things  together,  the  holding  before 
the  mind  of  a  general  conception  which  is  gradually  modified 
by  new  information. 

4.  Ifnconscwus  memory  and  invention. — The  first  experi- 
ments in  this  line  were  on  automatic  speaking,  and  were  car- 
ried out  in  connection  with  the  automatic  writing  at  dictation. 
For  this  purpose  the  person  writing  read  aloud  while  the  per- 
son dictating  listened  to  the  reading.  In  this  way  it  not  infre- 
quently happened  that,  at  interesting  parts  of  the  story,  we 
would  have  the  curious  phenomenon  of  one  person  uncon- 
sciously dictating  sentences  which  the  other  unconsciously 
wrote  down ;  both  persons  meanwhile  being  absorbed  in  some 
thrilling  story. 

In  this  experiment,  as  in  the  automatic  reading  already  de- 
scribed, whenever  it  happened  that  the  speaker  became  aware 
of  his  dictation  solely  by  hearing  his  own  voice,  his  voice 
seemed  strange  and  extra  personal.  The  dictation  was  of  the 
character  that  we  already  had  used  during  the  experiments, 
short,  simple  words  strung  along  grammatically,  but  not  repre- 
senting usually  any  special  thought. 

Spontaneous  automatic  -writing. — This  became  quite  easy 
after  a  little  practice.  We  had  now  gained  so  much  control 


506          LEON  M.   SOLOMONS  AND    GERTRUDE   STEIN. 

over  our  habits  of  attention  that  distraction  by  reading  was  al- 
most unnecessary.  Miss  Stein  found  it  sufficient  distraction  of- 
ten to  simply  read  what  her  arm  wrote,  but  following  three  or 
four  words  behind  her  pencil.  All  the  phenomena  observed  in 
the  writing  at  dictation  were  confirmed  here — the  order  of  dis- 
appearance from  consciousness,  extra  personality,  difference 
between  memory  and  consciousness,  etc.  Two  very  interesting 
phenomena  were  here  observed  for  the  first  time. 

A  marked  tendency  to  repetition. — A  phrase  would  seem  to 
get  into  the  head  and  keep  repeating  itself  at  every  opportunity, 
and  hang  over  from  day  to  day  even.  The  stuff  written  was 
grammatical,  and  the  words  and  phrases  fitted  together  all 
right,  but  there  was  not  much  connected  thought.  The  uncon- 
sciousness was  broken  into  every  six  or  seven  words  by  flashes 
of  consciousness,  so  that  one  cannot  be  sure  but  what  the  slight 
element  of  connected  thought  which  occasionally  appeared  was 
due  to  these  flashes  of  consciousness.  But  the  ability  to  write 
stuff  that  sounds  all  right,  without  consciousness,  was  fairly  well 
demonstrated  by  the  experiments.  Here  are  a  few  specimens  : 

"  Hence  there  is  no  possible  way  of  avoiding  what  I  have 
spoken  of,  and  if  this  is  not  believed  by  the  people  of  whom 
you  have  spoken,  then  it  is  not  possible  to  prevent  the  people  of 
whom  you  have  spoken  so  glibly  .  .  .  ." 

Here  is  a  bit  more  poetical  than  intelligible : 

"  When  he  could  not  be  the  longest  and  thus  to  be,  and  thus 
to  be,  the  strongest." 

And  here  one  that  is  neither  : 

"This  long  time  when  he  did  this  best  time,  and  he  could 
thus  have  been  bound,  and  in  this  long  time,  when  he  could 
be  this  to  first  use  of  this  long  time  .  .  .  ." 

In  this  automatic  writing  from  invention  appeared  more 
strongly  than  anywhere  else  the  fact  that  the  motor  impulse  is 
necessary  for  the  feeling  of  personality.  For  it  was  easy  here 
for  long  periods  to  get  the  process  in  a  condition  where  there 
was  often  an  expectation  of  what  word  would  be  written,  but  no 
intention  to  write  it.  One  watched  his  arm  with  an  idle  curi- 
osity, wondering  whether  or  no  the  expected  word  would  be 
written.  In  these  experiments  more  than  in  any  others  did  we 


HARVARD  PSYCHOLOGICAL  LABORATORY.  S°7 

feel  the  need  of  supposing  that  conciousness  accompanies  motor 
currents.  If  we  wrote  without  watching  what  we  wrote  the 
writing  was  rapid  and  very  illegible.  By  watching  the  writing, 
however,  or,  more  correctly,  by  keeping  our  eyes  on  it,  for  there 
was  no  attention  to  it,  the  writing  was  kept  even,  legible,  and 
at  moderate  speed.  The  control  of  movements  by  return  sen- 
sation of  sight  is  thus  demonstrated  to  be  an  automatic  process. 

Subconscious  exercise  of  memory. — The  subject  while  his  at- 
tention was  distracted  by  listening  to  reading  wrote  some  bit  of 
poetry  well  known  to  him.  The  object  was  to  see  whether  the 
memory,  though  in  purely  sound  and  speech  terms,  would  yet 
go  over  into  writing  reactions  automatically.  The  things 
written  were  bits  of  poetry  that  the  subject  had  often  repeated 
to  himself,  but  never  written.  The  experiment  was  successful. 
Its  significance  is  that  it  shows  that  an  act,  to  go  on  automat- 
ically, need  not  have  been  done  before,  provided  all  its  ele- 
ments have  been  done  before.  Thus  in  this  case  we  have  a 
combination  of  the  automatic  going  over  of  ideas,  or  words, 
into  writing  reactions,  the  tendency  of  words  written  by  the 
hand  to  call  up  in  the  mind  their  corresponding  sound,  and  this 
to  call  up  the  next  word  of  the  poem  which  had  been  memorized 
in  sound  terms.  The  experiment  is  thus  a  justification  of  our 
general  method  of  splitting  up  the  second  personality  into  its 
elements,  and  reproducing  them  automatically,  instead  of  striv- 
ing to  reproduce  the  entire  phenomenon  at  once. 

Some  general  characteristics  of  the  experiments. — In  all 
automatism  the  tendency  toward  increased  speed  is  marked. 
Writing  tends  towards  a  pace  that  very  quickly  tires,  reading 
towards  a  rapidity  that  prevents  distinct  articulation,  dictating 
toward  a  speed  that  soon  becomes  hopelessly  fast  for  the  writer. 
The  increase  of  speed  is  gradual,  and  occasional  corrections 
during  flashes  of  consciousness  suffice  usually  to  keep  down  the 
tendency.  The  monotony  of  the  automatic  reading  has  its 
parallel  in  automatic  writing.  In  the  writing  at  dictation  for 
example  it  was  usually  possible  for  the  operator  to  tell  from  the 
way  a  word  was  written  whether  or  not  it  had  been  entirely 
non-voluntary.  The  dropping  out  of  consciousness  produced 
no  change  in  the  writing  if  it  was  already  in  the  non-voluntary 


508          LEON  M.  SOLOMONS  AND    GERTRUDE   STEIN. 

stage.  But  the  presence  or  absence  of  the  motor  impulse  made 
an  enormous  difference.  The  purely  non-voluntary  writing  has 
a  perfect  ease  and  smoothness  about  it,  and  a  perfect  character- 
lessness. The  change  is  not  in  the  appearance  of  the  writing, 
but  in  the  hand  movements.  The  pencil  movements  are  more 
regular  in  speed,  and  unaccented,  while  in  the  voluntary  move- 
ments the  writing  is  more  jerky. 

For  distracting  attention,  literature  that  is  easily  followed 
and  emotional  in  character  is  by  far  the  best.  The  advantage 
of  the  emotional  element  is,  of  course,  simply  its  well-known 
hold  upon  the  attention.  But  the  need  that  it  shall  be  something 
which  does  not  demand  a  reaction  from  the  intellect  of  the  per- 
son is  a  subtler  affair.  The  mechanism  appears  to  be  this,  that 
when  the  idea  cannot  be  grasped  without  a  conscious  effort  to 
keep  past  facts  in  mind  to  compare  with  present,  the  attention 
is  kept  in  a  general  condition  of  alertness,  unfavorable  to  the 
complete  neglect  of  any  class  of  sensations.  These  general 
attitudes  of  attention  are  very  hard  to  describe,  but  very  inter- 
esting and  very  distinct.  One  of  the  most  suggestive,  for  exam- 
ple, was  this :  We  noticed  on  several  occasions  that  if,  for  any 
reason,  we  had  missed  any  portion  of  the  story,  and  wanted  to 
go  back  and  read  it  over  again,  the  doing  this  stopped  the  auto- 
matic writing.  This  curious  effect  we  traced  to  a  general  feel- 
ing of  '  keeping  things  in  check '  for  a  moment.  The  idea  of 
stopping  the  reading  and  going  back  brought  the  feeling  that 
things  must  be  held  in  check  until  this  back  reading  had  been 
done ;  and  this  feeling  of  holding  in  check  expressed  itself  in 
stopping  the  automatic  writing,  as  the  intense  excitement  and 
suspense  did,  save  that  there  was  no  marked  muscular  tension 
here. 

Anything  which  favored  rapid  changes  of  attention  was  un- 
favorable to  keeping  the  attention  off  .the  experiment.  Stories 
that  moved  along  smoothly  and  quickly  and  called  for  no  reac- 
tion but  an  emotional  one  were  the  most  favorable.  Any  stir- 
ring up  of  the  attention  was  likely  to  bring  it  back  to  the  experi- 
ment. 

General  Summary. — How  far  now  have  we  gone  toward 
proving  our  general  proposition?  We  may  sum  up  the  experi- 


HARVARD  PSYCHOLOGICAL   LABORATORY.  509 

ments  by  saying  that  a  large  number  of  acts  ordinarily  called 
intelligent,  such  as  reading,  writing,  etc.,  can  go  on  quite  auto- 
matically in  ordinary  people.  We  have  shown  a  general  ten- 
dency, on  the  part  of  normal  people,  to  act,  without  any  express 
desire  or  conscious  volition,  in  a  manner  in  general  accord  with 
the  previous  habits  of  the  person,  and  showing  a  full  possession 
of  the  faculty  of  memory ;  and  that  these  acts  may  go  on  just  as 
well  outside  the  field  of  consciousness ;  that  for  them,  not  only 
volition  is  unnecessary,  but  that  consciousness  as  well  is  entirely 
superfluous  and  plays  a  purely  cognitive  part,  when  present. 
By  consciousness  we  here  mean,  of  course,  '  empirical  con- 
sciousness '  or  *  conscious  consciousness,'  as  we  have  called  it 
elsewhere.  A  possible  split  off  consciousness  is  expressly  ex- 
cluded from  consideration  for  the  reasons  given  in  the  introduc- 
tion. 

That  the  second  personality  shows,  in  general,  no  abilities 
beyond  this  will,  I  think,  be  readily  admitted.  But  it  will  be 
claimed  that  in  exceptional  cases  the  performances  of  the  second 
personality  involve  something  more — a  real  judgment  and  dis- 
crimination, or  the  keeping  before  the  mind  of  an  idea  which  is 
gradually  elaborated. 

Of  course,  it  is  not  possible  to  enter  into  a  complete  discus- 
sion of  the  theory  of  these  phenomena  here.  But  a  few  words 
in  defense  of  the  main  contention  of  our  experiments  will  not 
be  out  of  place.  We  must  leave  out  at  once  all  the  alleged 
phenomena  of  spiritualism,  as  being  still  under  dispute  and  be- 
ing equally  inexplicable  on  either  of  the  two  theories  between 
which  it  is  the  purpose  of  these  experiments  to  decide.  Ruling 
these  out  there  remains  a  small  number  of  cases  apparently  not 
fully  explained  as  automatic,  if  our  experiments  be  taken  as 
showing  the  limit  of  automatism.  These  cases  may  be  divided 
into  two  groups.  The  first  are  those  where  the  reactions  seem 
to  be  rather  too  intelligent  to  involve  nothing  more  than  habit 
and  memory.  These  need  not  offer  much  difficulty.  Without 
a  full  knowledge  of  the  -past  history  of  the  patient,  it  is  not  pos- 
sible to  tell  just  where  the  limits  of  habit  lie.  There  is  oppor- 
tunity for  large  individual  difference  here,  and  we  must  allow 
for  it.  What  one  person  would  have  to  think  about,  another 


510          LEON  M.  SOLOMONS  AND    GERTRUDE   STEIN. 

may  be  so  familiar  with  as  to  do  quite  without  thought.  It  will 
usually  be  far  more  reasonable  to  suppose  special  habits  for 
unusual  cases  than  to  fly  in  the  face  of  all  analogy  and  suppose 
a  real  second  personality  present.  It  must  be  remembered,  too, 
that  real  unconsciousness  is  hard  to  prove. 

Our  observations  on  consciousness  without  memory  show 
that  in  many  cases  the  *  second  personality '  may  be  helped 
over  a  knotty  point  by  flashes  of  primary  personality,  and  ex- 
ceptional cases  would  have  to  be  examined  from  this  stand- 
point before  used  to  overthrow  the  automaton  theory. 

The  other  group  embraces  the  cases  that  appear  in  connec- 
tion with  hystero-epilepsy  and  post-hypnotic  suggestion.  The 
peculiarity  of  these  cases  is  that  instead  of  one  act  forming  the 
stimulus  for  the  succeeding  one — which  would  involve  nothing 
but  simple  association — we  have  a  dominant  idea  present  which 
guides  proceedings.  This,  of  course,  suggests  the  action  of 
voluntary  attention.  It  is  like  the  man  who  is  at  work  on  a 
problem  and  voluntarily  keeps  the  problem  before  his  mind  un- 
til the  right  associations  have  been  called  up  by  it.  The  diffi- 
culty presented  by  these  cases  disappears,  however,  as  soon  as 
we  remember  that  here  we  have  to  do  with  an  essentially  new  ele- 
ment— a  fixed  idea — either  the  subconscious  fixed  idea  of  hys- 
tero-epilepsy, or  the  apparently  similar  subconscious  idea  of 
post-hypnotic  suggestion.  The  presence  of  these  fully  explains 
this  apparently  voluntary  and  actively  attentive  character  of  the 
acts  without  calling  in  any  aid  from  the  voluntary  attention. 
The  mechanism  of  these  fixed  ideas  need  not  concern  us.  If 
it  be  held  that  they  are  kept  before  the  mind  by  a  split  of  will, 
this  is  a  theory  of  fixed  ideas,  which  would  have  to  be 
considered  on  its  own  merits.  Our  problem  is  not  involved  in 
it  essentially. 

If,  then,  it  be  admitted  that  these  experiments  satisfactorily 
answer  the  question  raised  at  the  outset,  if  they  really  show  a 
complete  analogy  between  the  performances  of  the  second  per- 
sonality and  the  automatic  acts  of  normal  persons,  what  general 
view  of  hysteria  do  they  suggest? 

The  answer  is  fairly  obvious.  It  will  be  remembered  that 
these  phenomena  occurred  in  us  whenever  the  attention  was  re- 


HARVARD  PSYCHOLOGICAL  LABORATORY.  511 

moved  from  certain  classes  of  sensations.  Our  problem  was  to 
get  sufficient  control  of  the  attention  to  effect  this  removal  of 
attention.  In  hysteria  this  removal  of  attention  is  effected  by 
the  anaesthesias  of  the  subject.  We  -would  not,  the  histerique 
can  not,  attend  to  these  sensations.  Whatever  else  hysteria 
may  be  then,  this,  at  least,  seems  most  probable.  It  is  a  dis- 
ease of  the  attention.  An  hysterical  anaesthesia  or  paralysis  is 
simply  an  inability  to  attend  to  sensations  from  this  part.  The 
second  personality  is  simply  the  natural  correlate  of  the  anaes- 
thesias, when  these  have  become  fixed.  When  they  are  vari- 
able, irregular  subconscious  acts  form  their  correlate. 

In  closing  it  may  be  well  to  sum  up  a  few  of  the  more  im- 
portant generalizations  from  the  work. 

There  are  two  kinds  of  attention,  or  two  manifestations  of  it. 
One  is  -physiological  in  its  distribution,  and  determining  what 
classes  of  sensations  shall  be  brought  into  consciousness.  Its 
failure  means  the  dropping  out  of  consciousness,  for  the  time, 
of  the  particular  group  of  sensations  with  regard  to  which  it  has 
failed.  The  other  is  distributed  according  to  logical  and  asso- 
ciational  elements.  Its  function  is  to  establish  associations 
among  the  different  elements  of  consciousness,  and  to  bring  out 
the  full  meaning  of  sensations,  etc.  Its  failure  means  loss  of 
memory  and  failure  of  judgment,  will,  etc.,  but  not  loss  of  con- 
sciousness. 

In  all  habitual  acts,  and  acts  involving  nothing  but  simple 
memory,  the  function  of  the  higher  powers  of  the  mind  is  in- 
hibitive  and  controlling  only,  and  not  productive,  for  whenever, 
by  failure  of  attention,  the  acts  are  removed  from  the  influence 
of  these  controlling  and  inhibitory  powers  they  go  on  just  the 
same.  Consciousness  itself  here  appears  to  play  a  purely  cog- 
nitive part. 

The  feeling  of  personality — that  a  given  act  is  done  by  us — 
always  disappears  whenever  our  knowledge  of  the  act  is  ac- 
quired purely  by  return  sensations.  Mere  fore-knowledge  alone 
is  not  enough  to  make  the  act  seem  personal ;  it  must  be  the 
fore-knowledge  or  expectation  represented  by  the  group  of  feel- 
ings we  have  called,  for  convenience,  the  motor  impulse.  This 
motor  impulse  seems  to  introspection  to  be  much  more  than  a 


512          LEON  M.  SOLOMONS  AND    GERTRUDE   STEIN. 

mere  expectation  in  sensory  terms.  It  seems  to  have  a  feeling 
background  in  it,  entirely  indescribable,  in  other  terms,  and 
perhaps  representing  a  direct  consciousness  of  a  motor  current 
from  the  higher  centers  to  the  lower. 

The  feeling  of  effort  is  not  essential  to  self-consciousness. 
Its  function  seems  to  be  to  bring  a  center  into  a  more  responsive 
condition.  It  accompanies  movements  of  voluntary  attention 
apparently. 

Hysteria  is,  at  least,  a  disease  of  the  attention.  Its  anaesthe- 
sias, etc.,  and  their  correlated  subconscious  acts  represent  the 
failure  of  the  first  kind  of  attention.  The  weakened  memory 
and  intellect,  when  it  occurs,  represents  the  failure  of  the 
second  type. 


ON  THE  CONDITIONS   OF  FATIGUE  IN  READING.1 

BY  HAROLD  GRIFFING  AND  SHEPHERD  IVORY  FRANZ. 

The  increasing  part  played  by  reading  in  the  life  of  civilized 
man  is  a  striking  characteristic  of  modern  culture.  In  fact,  the 
man  of  to-day  might  be  defined  as  a  reading  animal.  The  re- 
sult of  this  strain  upon  the  eye  has  been  the  wide  prevalence  of 
myopia,  astigmatism  and  kindred  disorders.  But  the  functions 
which  the  optic  mechanism  is  called  upon  to  perform  are  not 
abnormal ;  the  work  of  the  eye  differs  only  in  degree  from  that 
for  which  it  is  fitted.  If  the  eye  were  never  fatigued,  myopia 
would  be  rare. 

Yet  great  as  is  their  importance,  we  have  little  exact  knowl- 
edge of  the  conditions  of  minimum  visual  fatigue.  Cohn2,  Ja- 
val3  and  Weber4  have  treated  the  subject  with  great  fulness, 
but  their  work  was  largely  theoretical.  Cattell5  and  Sanford8 
have,  however,  investigated  the  subject  experimentally,  with 
special  reference  to  the  relative  legibility  of  letters. 

The  conditions  of  visual  fatigue  are  obviously  highly  com- 
plex. They  may  be  divided  into  two  classes.  On  the  one  hand, 
we  have  all  those  conditions  which  pertain  to  the  individual 
reader ;  for  example,  the  time  of  reading,  the  position  of  head 
and  eyes,  and  personal  peculiarities,  anatomical  and  physiologi- 
cal. Opposed  to  these  are  certain  purely  physical  conditions. 
Such  are  the  size  and  quality  of  the  type,  the  intensity  and 
quality  of  the  illumination,  the  color  and  quality  of  the  paper, 

lFrom  the  Psychological  Laboratory  of  Columbia  University.  Read  in 
condensed  form  before  the  International  Congress  of  Psychology,  Munich, 
August,  1896. 

2  Cohn,   The  Hygiene  of  the  Eye  in  Schools,  Eng.  tr.,  London,  1886. 

3Javal,  Annales  cTOculiste,  79-82;  Revue  Scientifique,  1881. 

4  Weber,  Ueber  die  Augenuntersuchungen  in  den  hoheren  Schulen  zu  Darm- 
stadt, Referat  erstattetd.  grossherz.  Ministerial,  Mdrz,  1881. 

5  Cattell,  Philosophische  Studien,  III. 

6  Sanford,  American  Journal  of  Psychology,  I. 

513 


5H       HAROLD    GRIPPING  AND   SHEPHERD   7.  FRANZ. 

the  clearness  of  the  printing,  the  length  of  the  lines,  and  the 
spacing  between  the  letters  and  lines.  It  is  this  latter  group  of 
conditions  with  which  we  are  now  concerned. 

(i)  THE  SIZE  OF  THE  TYPE. 

Weber  investigated  the  relation  of  the  size  of  type  to  legi- 
bility by  finding  the  maximum  rate  of  reading.  He  arrived  at 
the  paradoxical  result  that  although  the  rate  of  reading  de- 
creased for  very  small  type  it  also  decreased  when  the  height 
of  letters  was  over  2  mm1.  By  determining  the  time  of  ex- 
posure required  for  perception  Cattell1  studied  the  legibility  of 
small  Latin  letters  of  different  sizes,  .7,  i.i,  1.8,  2.5  and  5.8 
mm.2  The  times  found  were  3,  1.4,  i.i,  .7  and  .6  for  one 
observer,  and  4,  1.7,  1.3,  .9  and  .7  for  the  other.  The  rela- 
tion is  approximately  expressed  by  an  hyperbolic  curve. 

The  investigations  of  Cattell  we  have  extended  and  supple- 
mented by  different  methods.  By  the  first  method,  which  we 
will  call  the  method  of  rapid  reading,  we  found  the  rates  at 
which  an  observer  could  read  printed  matter  in  large  and  small 
type.  Two  passages  of  the  Bible,  each  containing  622  words, 
were  used.  One  observer  read  one  passage  A,  in  large  type, 
and  another  passage  B,  in  small  type,  and  the  next  observer 
read  the  same  passages,  reversing  the  order  of  the  type,  read- 
ing A  in  small  type  and  B  in  large  type.  The  order  in  which 
the  experiments  were  made  was  also  reversed  for  alternate  ob- 
servers. The  time  was  taken  by  the  observer  with  a  stop 
watch,  but  recorded  without  his  knowing  the  result  by  one  of 
the  writers.  The  observers  were  mostly  students,  five  being 
familiar  with  experimental  psychology.  The  type  was  Roman, 
i.  e.,  the  ordinary  type  used  in  English  books.  The  large  type, 
of  which  we  here  give  examples,  was  Pica,  1.8  mm.  in  height, 
the  small,  Peari,  .9  mm.  in  height.  In  addition  to  these  experi- 
ments we  made  some  in  which  the  time  of  reading  was  con- 
stant, i  minute,  the  number  of  words  read  being  determined. 

Below  will  be  found  the  ratios  of  the  times  and  of  the  num- 
ber of  words  read. 

1  op.  cit. 

2  Not  given  by  the  writer,  but  calculated  by  us  from  other  data  given. 


CONDITIONS   OF  FATIGUE  IN  READING.  S15 

TABLE  I. — RELATIVE  TIMES  FOR  LARGE  AND  SMALL  TYPE. 


OBSERVER. 

K 

A 

D, 

B 

s 

r, 

F, 

F, 

G 

H, 

H2 

D, 

Av. 

TV 

•77 

1.04 

.82 

.61 

.90 

.88 

.72 



1.08 

.96 

I.OI 

.92 

.90 

Wa 

.88 

I.OO 

~ 

" 

.91 

.42 

•65 

•94 

.80 

~ 

^"^ 

~^ 

rp 

=r~  =  ratio  of  time  required  to  read  large  type  to  that  required  to  read  small  type. 
Ts 

W8  _  ratio  of  number  of  words  read  in  one  minute  in  small  type  to  the  number 
WL  ~~  read  in  large  type. 

In  a  few  additional  experiments  the  observers  read  at  their 

T 
natural  rates.    The  resulting  ratios  -rp—  for  4  observers  were  .87, 

•*•  s 

i.oo,  .86  and  .81,  the  average  .89,  being  the  same  practically 
as  that  obtained  by  the  other  method. 

Thus  it  takes  on  the  average  about  -£$  as  much  time  to  read 
large  type,  1.8  mm.,  as  to  read  small  type,  .9  mm.  The  dif- 
ference in  legibility  would  probably  be  much  greater  were 
it  not  that  when  the  small  type  is  read  more  words  can  be 
seen  simultaneously.  In  this  way  we  may  explain  Weber's 
paradoxical  result.  As  the  size  of  the  letters  increases  be- 
yond a  certain  limit  the  rate  of  reading  will  necessarily  de- 
crease ;  but  this  does  not  involve  an  increase  of  fatigue,  as 
Weber  assumed. 

By  a  second  method  we  found  the  relative  number  of  words 
seen  when  exposed  for  ^  sec.  by  Cattell's  gravity  chronometer.1 
Phrases  of  three  and  four  words  were  pasted  on  white  strips  of 
cardboard  and  were  shown  for  the  time  desired  by  a  falling 
screen.  The  greater  part  of  the  screen  was  hidden  from  the 
view  of  the  observer  by  a  black  sheet  of  paper  with  an  opening 
where  the  letters  were  to  appear.  The  phrases  were  cut  from 
the  books  mentioned,  the  letters  being  1.8  and  .9  mm.  high. 
None  of  the  words  were  of  more  that  two  syllables.  The  same 
phrases  were  used  for  large  and  small  type.  There  were  54 
phrases  of  3  words  and  54  of  4  words,  half  in  large  type  and 
half  in  small.  Thus  there  were  216  +  162  words  in  all. 

1  For  description  of  the  instrument  see  op.  cit. 


516       HAROLD    GRIPPING  AND   SHEPHERD   I.  FRANZ. 


The  experiment  was  conducted  as  follows  :  The  observer 
took  his  seat  in  a  comfortable  chair  opposite  the  instrument  and 
placed  his  chin  upon  a  rest  suitably  adjusted,  so  that  his  eyes 
were  slightly  above  the  level  of  the  letters  exposed,  and  30  cm. 
distant  from  them.  The  experimenter  (one  of  the  writers) 
stood  behind  the  instrument  so  as  to  adjust  the  cards  with  the 
phrases.  When  the  card  was  placed  the  observer  fixated  a 
gray  cross  on  the  black  background  of  the  movable  screen 
directly  in  front  of  the  letters,  and  let  the  screen  fall  by  break- 
ing the  current  with  a  Morse  key.  He  then  wrote  down  what  he 
thought  he  had  seen.  A  dozen  or  more  practice  trials  were 
made  before  beginning  the  experiments  proper.  The  observer 
was,  of  course,  ignorant  of  the  phrases  that  were  to  be  given. 
Care  was  taken  not  to  have  a  phrase  already  given  in  one  type 
repeated  immediately  in  another.  Of  eleven  observers  six  com- 
pleted only  half  of  the  series.  We  give  below  the  results  for 
the  different  observers. 

TABLE  II. — PERCENTAGES  OF  WORDS  SEEN  ;  LARGE  AND 
SMALL  TYPE. 


THREE-WORD  PHRASES. 

FOUR-WORD  PHRASES. 

OBSERVER. 

S. 

L. 

**A 

S. 

L. 

t"* 

H. 

.22 

•56 

•39 

•13 

.44 

•29 

C. 

.46 

•75 

.61 

•59 

•75 

T.  G. 

.29 

•75 

•39 

•23 

.60 

•38 

I.  F. 

.60 

•63 

.80 

.88 

88 

H.  G. 

•46 

.81 

•56 

.66 

.96 

.69 

P. 
L. 

•46 
.10 

•54 

•50 
.18 

•  45 
.18 

•85 
•32 

$ 

R.  G. 

.76 

•79 

.96 

.48 

.68 

.70 

S. 

.12 

•47 

.12 

•39 

•31 

A. 

.68 

•78 

•87 

•55 

.69 

•79 

S.  F. 

•43 

•85 

•51    . 

•59 

.81 

•73 

Average 

•53 

.60 

Vertical  columns   S  and  L  give  percentages  of  words  seen  for  small  and 

large  type  (.9  and  1.8  mm.  high). 

c 

Vertical  column  —  give  ratios   in  per  cent,  or  the  relative  legibility  /I  of 
JL 

small  and  large  type. 

With  the  observers  whose  initials  are  given  in  block  type  the  full  set  of  ex- 
periments (108)  were  made,  only  39  being  made  on  the  others. 

In  taking  the  average  the  values  of  A  for  these  five  might  be  weighted.  This 
would  change  the  averages  somewhat. 


CONDITIONS   OF  FATIGUE  IN  READING.  517 

From  the  above  table  we  see  that  on  the  average  but  little 
more  than  one  half  as  many  words  were  seen  in  small  type  as 
in  large  type.  Individual  variations  are  great,  but  these  vari- 
ations are  probably  not  due  to  an  appreciable  extent  to  individ- 
ual differences  in  the  relative  legibility  of  large  and  small  type. 
For  good  observers  the  same  difference  in  legibility  would  give 
different  values  of  ^. 

This  theoretical  conclusion  is  verified  by  the  experiments. 
By  arranging  the  observers  in  two  groups  according  to  the  per- 
centages seen,  the  values  of  A  is  for  the  better  observers  in  all 
cases  lower  than  that  of  any  of  the  four  poorest  observers. 

A  few  experiments  were  made  with  21  two-word  phrases 
printed  in  very  large  type  (4+  mm).  The  percentages  of 
words  seen  correctly  by  three  observers,  together  with  the 
averages  of  the  same  observers  for  1.8  mm.  type  as  found  from 
the  table  above  given  are  as  follows  : 

Large  Very  large 
P.                                     .88  .93 

L.  .43  .64 

S.  .43  .70 

Thus  the  legibility  as  shown  by  this  method  appears  to  in- 
crease regularly  with  the  size.  But  since  the  number  of  words 
brought  within  the  field  of  distinct  vision  decrease  with  the  size, 
the  relation  is  quite  complex. 

A  few  phrases  (15)  of  two  words  each  were  used  with  the 
others.  The  percentages  for  two,  three  and  four- word  combi- 
nations were  found  to  vary  but  little  with  the  number  of  words. 

From  the  table  it  will  be  seen  that  the  values  of  ^  were  about 
the  same  for  phrases  of  three  words  as  for  those  of  four  words, 
the  averages  for  phrases  of  2,  3  and  4  words  in  small  type  be- 
ing .42,  .41  and  .43. 

In  the  above  experiments  the  paper  was  not  exactly  the 
same  for  large  and  small  type,  being  slightly  grayish  for  the 
small  type  and  of  a  more  yellowish  tint  for  the  large.  To 
eliminate  this  source  of  error,  phrases  of  four  words  in  large 
and  small  type  were  printed  on  the  same  white  paper.  From 
200  experiments  (800  words),  100  on  S.  F.  and  100  on  H.,  we 
found  the  following  percentages  of  words  seen : 


518       HAROLD    GRIPPING  AND   SHEPHERD  I.   FRANZ. 


H. 
S.  F. 


S 

.12 


•32 
.90 


•37 
.92 


The  values  of  A  correspond  quite  closely  with  those  pre- 
viously found  for  the  same  observers,  .88  for  F.  and  .29  for  H. 

A  modification  of  the  preceding  method  was  used  by  deter- 
mining the  time  words  composed  of  letters  of  different  sizes  had 
to  be  exposed  in  order  to  be  seen.  This  we  will  call  the  time 
of  exposure  method.  The  same  apparatus  was  used  as  before, 
the  time  of  exposure  varying  with  the  extent  of  opening  of  the 
screen.  This  time  can  be  determined  to  about  .i5<r,  a  being 
.001  sec.  The  words  were  of  not  less  than  5  letters,  nor  over  2 
syllables,  on  white  paper.  The  type,  as  here  shown,  was 
six  point  and  *  eleven  point,'  .8  and  1.6  mm.  high.  On  ac- 
count of  the  preliminary  practice  necessary  there  were  but  three 
observers,  two  being  the  writers.  The  experiments  were  con- 
ducted in  the  same  general  way  as  those  just  described.  The 
experimenter  tried  first  very  small  times,  increasing  the  time 
until  the  stimulus  was  perceived  approximately  50%  of  the 
time.  Then  other  words  were  shown  which  the  observer  had 
not  seen.  As  the  percentage  seen  tends  to  increase  very 
rapidly  from  o  to  100  (theoretically  99+  )>  it  was  generally 
easy  to  determine  at  one  sitting  the  time  required  either  directly 
or  by  estimation  from  the  percentage  seen.  The  times  of  ex- 
posure found  thus  are  now  given  in  thousandths  of  a  second. 

TABLE  III. — TIMES  OF  EXPOSURE  FOR  DIFFERENT  SIZES  OF 
TYPE  TO  BE  SEEN. 


OBSERVER. 

L. 

S. 

L^ 

S 

G. 

1.6 

i-9 

.84 

F 

i.i 
1-3 

1*7 

$ 

H 

2.O 

2.8 

•7i 

ft 

1.6 

2.5 

•64 

AV. 

•73 

L  and  S  denote  the  times  of  exposure  necessary  for  large  and  small  type  re- 
spectively, .8  and  1.6  mm. 

—  or  %  is  the  relative  legibilty  measured  by  this  method. 


The  two  values  of  L  and  S  for  F  and  H   are  for  different  days. 
of  exposure  seems  to  vary  in  the  same  individual. 


The  time 


CONDITIONS  OF  FATIGUE  IN  READING.  519 

From  the  above  results  it  appears  that  the  large  type,  1.6 
mm.,  requires  about  ^  as  great  a  time  of  exposure  as  the  small 
type  of  half  the  height,  .8  mm. 

In  the  last  two  sets  of  experiments  a  few  observations  were 
made,  which  though  not  bearing  on  the  special  problems  under 
investigation  are  yet  of  psychological  interest.  Observers  gen- 
erally failed  to  see  any  of  the  letters  making  up  a  word  when 
they  failed  to  perceive  the  whole  word.  There  were,  however, 
individual  differences,  some  persons  often  seeing  one  or  two 
letters  only.  At  times  an  observer  saw  combinations  without 
sense,  though  he  knew  such  combinations  were  not  given.  In 
the  time-of-exposure  experiments  the  observer  was  at  times  con- 
scious of  perceiving  letters  without  knowing  what  they  were. 
Occasionally  the  observer  had  an  impression  that  a  given  word 
was  present,  when  the  letters  had  not  appeared  distinctly.  More 
often  some  letters  were  distinct,  and  he  guessed  the  word,  or 
else  the  whole  word  was  distinct.  One  of  the  writers  had  a 
marked  tendency  to  see  again  what  had  been  given  before,  even 
when  he  knew  that  the  word  was  not  repeated.  One  of  the  ob- 
servers, H.,  seemed  to  be  an  exception  to  the  rule  that  one  sees 
all  letters  exposed  or  none  at  all  except  within  very  small  range 
of  time.  Some  days  it  was  very  difficult  to  find  the  time  re- 
quired for  this  reason.  But  perhaps  the  most  important  phe- 
nomenon observed  was  the  illusory  perception  of  a  word,  the 
letters  appearing  distinct  when  not  present.  This  has  been  al- 
ready noted  by  Cattell  and  also  by  Miinsterberg.  The  theo- 
retical importance  of  this  lies  in  the  support  which  it  gives  to 
the  hallucination  theory  of  perception.  The  representative  pro- 
cesses in  perception  seem  to  attain  to  the  sensory  vividness  of 
true  hallucinations.  This  does  not,  however,  appear  to  take 
place  in  every  instance,  for  F.  seemed  at  times  to  see  some  of 
the  letters  and  to  infer  by  ordinary  processes  of  association  that 
a  certain  word  was  present. 

To  obtain  more  extended  results  and  confirm  those  obtained 
by  Cattell,  by  the  time-of-exposure  method,  we  determined  the 
intensity  of  illumination  necessary  for  the  reading  of  letters  of 
different  sizes.  The  letters  were  printed  in  the  simplest  kind 
of  type,  commonly  called  Block.  Two  cards  were,  how- 


520       HAROLD    GRIPPING  AND   SHEPHERD   I.  FRANZ. 

ever,  covered  with  words  in  Roman  type,  .8  and  1.6  mm.  in 
height. 

The  observer  sat  in  front  of  a  stand  from  a  projecting  piece 
of  which  was  suspended  a  small  pendulum  making  a  vibration 
in  y2  sec.  The  pendulum  swung  in  front  of  a  screen  having 
an  opening  where  the  letters  to  be  seen  appeared.  The  letters 
were,  of  course,  shown  y2  sec.  The  letters  were  posted  on  card- 
board strips  and  these  were  placed  in  slits.  The  paper  was  the 
same  for  the  different  sizes,  pure  white.  The  slits  were  ar- 
ranged so  that  the  length  of  the  cardboard  exposed  was  either 
15  or  3  mm.,  according  to  the  size  of  the  letters.  For  the  two 
largest  sizes,  and  also  for  the  cards  on  which  the  words  in  Ro- 
man type  were  shown,  the  large  area  was  used.  The  object 
was  to  show  only  one  or  two  letters  at  a  time,  except  when  the 
Roman  type  was  used,  when  a  larger  number  was  seen.  A 
black  screen  in  front  of  the  pendulum  with  the  necessary  open- 
ing served  to  prevent  distraction  of  the  observer  by  the  move- 
ment of  the  pendulum. 

The  observer's  eyes  were  kept  at  a  constant  distance  (30  cm.) 
from  the  stimulus  by  means  of  a  chin  rest.  The  light  was  that 
of  a  hooded  petroleum  lamp  found  to  be  fairly  constant,  shin- 
ing through  a  square  of  ground  glass  5x5  mm.  The  light 
emitted  was  approximately  .02  candle  power.  The  lamp  was 
in  a  movable  box  sliding  on  wheels  in  iron  grooves.  Precau- 
tions were  taken  to  avoid  errors  from  reflected  or  diffused  light. 
The  letters  used  were  in  combinations  of  one  to  four  words  in 
one  horizontal  line.  They  were  taken  from  a  printer's  sample 
book.  The  median  plane  of  the  observer  was  approximately 
perpendicular  to  the  plane  of  the  cardboard  to  be  seen,  and  the 
lamp  could  be  moved  only  in  a  straight  line,  making  an  angle 
of  45°  with  the  plane  of  the  cardboard. 

With  this  apparatus  after  the  observer  had  remained  in  the 
dark  room  long  enough  to  avoid  errors  from  adaptation  (20  to 
30  min.),  the  experiment  was  made  as  follows:  A  card  with 
letters  to  be  exposed  was  placed  in  the  slit  by  the  experimenter 
(one  of  the  writers) .  The  observer  pushed  back  the  pendulum 
to  a  fixed  support  with  his  hand,  fixated  a  pencil  cross  on  the 
cardboard  piece  fastened  to  the  pendulum  directly  in  front  of 


CONDITIONS   OF  FATIGUE   IN  READING. 


52I 


the  letters  to  be  seen,  and  then  let  the  pendulum  swing  forward, 
observing  the  letters  as  they  were  shown.  As  the  pendulum 
swung  back  it  was  caught  by  the  observer  with  the  left  hand 
and  fixed  with  a  catch.  He  then  moved  the  lamp  nearer  with 
the  right  hand.  At  first  this  was  done  by  the  experimenter, 
but  with  less  convenience  and  economy  of  time.  This  was  re- 
peated until  the  observer  was  quite  certain  he  could  perceive  the 
letters  correctly  when  exposed  but  once.  The  distance  of  the 
light  from  the  letters  was  then  read  off  on  a  scale.  The  square 
of  the  reciprocal  of  this  distance  represents  the  relative  intensity 
of  the  illumination.  The  readings  were,  of  course,  taken  by  the 
experimenter.  For  this  purpose  we  used  the  light  from  a  small 
candle  inside  a  blackened  box  shining  through  a  cylindrical 
tube.  Two  or  three  determinations  were  generally  made  at  one 
sitting  for  each  of  the  variables  under  investigation,  including 
several  in  addition  to  the  type.  Variations  in  the  results  made 
it  necessary  to  average  the  records  of  some  days  separately,  as 
given  in  the  second  horizontal  columns  for  F  and  H. 

We  give  below  the  average  values  of  T,  the  illumination 
threshold1  for  reading  in  terms  of  one  candle-meter  (C.M. ) ,  or  the 
light  of  a  standard  candle  at  a  perpendicular  distance  of  one  meter. 

TABLE  IV. — ILLUMINATION  THRESHOLDS  FOR  DIFFERENT 
SIZES  OF  TYPE. 


OBSERVER. 

N 

H=.9 

H=  1.6 

H=3.l 

H  =6.0 

h=  .8 

h  =  1.6 

Av 

MV 

Av 

MV 

Av 

MV 

Av 

MV 

Av 

MV 

Av 

MV 

G 

10 

27 

.02 

.12 

.01 

.042 

.003 

.014 

.001 

.36 

.04 

.14 

.01 

F 

6 

.24 

.02 

.08 

.01 

.028 

.007 

.010 

.001 

.22 

.02 

.12 

.02 

14 

3 

•17 

•03 

.045 

.004 

.018 

.002 

.008 

.001 

•13 

.OI 

•05 

.00 

H 

5 

.077 

.014 

.035 

.007 

.014 

.001 

.003 

.000 

.19 

.OI 

.07 

.OO 

" 

3 

•19 

.02 

.09 

.003 

•043 

•003 

.009 

.001 

•35 

•03 

•13 

.02 

H  =height  of  Gothic  letters  in  mm. 

h=height  of  Roman  letters  in  mm. 

N=  number  of  determinations  upon  which  average  is  based. 

A  v=  average. 

MV=mean  variation. 

1  Calculated  by  the  formula  T=    ^S    where  A  is  the  candle  power  of  the 

light,  d  the  distance  of  the  light  from  the  object,  and  6  the  angle  made  by  the 
normal  to  the  surface. 


522       HAROLD    GRIPPING  AND   SHEPHERD   /.  FRANZ. 

A  graphical  representation  of  the  results  is  shown  in  the  ac- 
companying figure.  The  ordinates  give  the  intensity  of  illumi- 
nation in  candle-meters,  and  the  abscissas  the  height  of  the 
letters  in  tenths  of  millimeters. 


Ib 


B/ 

FIG.  i. 


The  curves  resemble  rectangular  hyperbolas,  the  values  of 
the  variables  corresponding  roughly  to  the  equation, 

(s-k)  i=k15 

k  and  k1?  being  constants  depending  upon  the  individual.  As- 
suming such  an  equation  we  may  infer  that  after  the  size  of  the 
type  has  reached  a  certain  limit  the  increase  of  size  is  in  direct 
proportion  to  the  decrease  of  illumination.  The  fatigue  coeffi- 
cient increases  slowly  until  the  size  of  the  type  decreases  to 
about  2-3  mm.,  after  which  its  increase  is  more  and  more  rapid. 
The  lowest  limit  to  the  size  of  type  in  common  use  should  be 
1.5  mm.  The  same  conclusion  may  be  drawn  from  the  experi- 
ments of  Cattell  already  mentioned. 

(2)  THK  QUALITY  OF  THE  TYPE. 

On  theoretical  grounds  it  may  be  assumed  that  the  legibility 
of  letters  decreases  with  increasing  complexity  of  structure. 
From  this  point  of  view  German  type  is  open  to  serious  criti- 


CONDITIONS   OF   FATIGUE  IN  READING.  523 

cism,  and  even  our  Roman  type  might  evidently  be  much  im- 
proved. Some  of  our  letters  have  unnecessary  features  and 
they  are  as  a  rule  much  more  complex  in  structure  than  those 
printed  in  the  so-called  Block  type.  Many  letters,  such  as  c 
and  e,  are  easily  confused,  and  there  are  decided  differences  ol 
legibility.  These  differences  are,  indeed,  slight  and  difficult  to 
determine.  By  finding  the  percentage  of  times  each  letter  was 
seen  when  exposed  for  I<T,  more  or  less,  Cattell1  found  the  order 
of  legibility  of  the  small  letters  to  be:  dkmqhbpwulj 
tvzrof  naxyeigcs.  There  seemed  to  be,  however, 
individual  differences.  Sanford1  by  a  different  method  found 
a  somewhat  different  order  of  legibility. 

In  the  writers'  experiments,  which  were  made  only  by  the 
most  delicate  method,  that  of  the  illumination  threshold,  the 
following  styles  of  type  were  used :  Roman  ( small  letters) , 
that  used  universally  in  England,  America  and  southern 
Europe  for  books  and  newspapers ;  German,  or  that  used  in 
Germany ;  Block,  in  which  the  letters  are  of  uniform  thickness 
and  of  the  simplest  shape,  much  like  Roman  capitals.  Two 
styles  of  Block  were  used,  as  here  shown ;  in  one  the  letters 
being  quite  THICK,  .5  mm.,  whereas  in  the  OTHER  they  were  .15 
mm.  Besides  the  ordinary  Roman  letters  there  were  two  other 
sets  in  semi-Roman  type  ;  one,  Roman  II.,  having  very  thick  and 
very  thin  lines,  .05  to  .5  mm. ;  the  other,  Roman  III.,  being  some- 
what like  the  plainer  Block  and  of  uniform  thickness,  about  .2 
mm.  The  size  of  the  letters  was  practically  constant  for  the 
different  groups,  1.5  mm.  in  height,  there  being,  however, 
slight  variations,  to  .1  mm.  in  the  individual  letters. 

We  give  now  the  results  in  tabular  form.  The  figures  mean 
the  same  as  in  Table  IV.  The  results  for  F.  and  H.  are  given 
in  2  columns  on  account  of  a  variation  in  sensibility  which 
made  it  necessary  to  average  the  results  of  the  earlier  experi- 
ments separately. 

1  Op.  cit. 


524       HAROLD   GRIPPING   AND   SHEPHERD  I.  FRANZ. 

TABLE  V. — ILLUMINATION  THRESHOLD  FOR  DIFFERENT 
KINDS  OF  TYPE. 


ROMAN 
I. 

ROMAN 
II. 

ROMAN 
III. 

GERMAN 

BLOCK 

THIN. 

BLOCK 

THICK. 

OBSERVER. 

N 

AV 

MV 

AV 

MV 

AV 

MV 

AV 

MV 

AV 

MV 

AV 

MV 

G. 

10 

.22 

.02 

.12 

.02 

.18 

.02 

.21 

•03 

.20 

.02 

•09 

.01 

F. 

6 

.14 

.01 

.12 

.02 

.13 

.01 

.15 

.02 

.13 

.01 

.07 

.01 

ii 

3 

.11 

.OI 

.06 

.OOI 

.08 

.00 

.12 

.01 

.10 

.OO 

.06 

.00 

H. 

5 

.10 

.OI 

.06 

.OI 

.12 

.02 

.12 

.02 

.10 

.02 

.04 

.00 

(i 

3 

.22 

•03 

•15 

•03 

.22 

.02 

.24 

.02 

.22 

.OI 

.10 

.00 

From  the  above  table  we  may  calculate  the  relative  legibility 
A  of  the  different  styles  of  type ;  X  of  course  being  the  reciprocal 
of  the  illumination  threshhold  given  above. 

The  values  of  A  are  now  given. 


TABLE  VI. — RELATIVE  LEGIBILITY  OF  TYPE,  THAT  OF  RO- 
MAN BEING  I. 


OBSERVER. 

ROMAN  II. 

ROMAN  III. 

GERMAN. 

BLOCK 

THIN. 

BLOCK 

THICK. 

G. 

1.8 

.2 

I.O 

i 

2.4 

F. 

i.i 

,i 

•9 

i 

2.0 

« 

1.8 

•4 

.9 

i 

1.8 

H. 

i-7 

.8 

.8 

o 

2.5 

1C 

1-5 

.0 

•9 

o 

2.2 

Av 

1.6 

.1 

•9 

I 

2.2 

From  the  above  we  see  that,  contrary  to  our  expectation,  the 
difference  in  legibility  between  Roman  and  German  type  is  rela- 
tively slight.  Thin  hair  lines,  if  accompanied  by  thick  lines,  do 
not  seem  to  diminish  the  legibility,  Roman  II.  requiring  nearly 
half  as  much  light  as  Roman  I.  The  complexity  of  the  letters, 
within  the  limits  here  studied,  does  not  seem  to  have  decided 
effect  on  the  legibility,  for  the  value  of  A  for  thin  Block  is  about 
the  same  as  for  Roman.  The  greater  legibility  of  Block  type 
is  due  almost  entirely  to  the  thickness  of  the  letters,  as  shown 
by  these  experiments.  On  the  other  hand,  if  a  part  of  the  letter 
is  thick  it  is  quite  legible,  even  though  thin  hair  lines  are  fre- 
quent. It  is,  however,  probable  that  type  such  as  Roman  II.  is 


CONDITIONS    OF  FATIGUE  IN  READING. 


525 


more  fatiguing  than  the  results  indicate.  It  may  be  possible 
for  the  mind  to  perceive  certain  objects  with  fatigue  when  other 
objects  are  either  perceived  without  appreciable  fatigue,  or  not 
perceived  at  all. 

(3)  THE  DISTANCE  BETWEEN  THE  LETTERS  AND  LINES. 

The  horizontal  distance  between  the  letters  has  been  said  by 
Javal  to  be  of  great  importance.  Certainly  a  word  printed  so 
that  these  distances  is  increased  .8  to  1.3  mm.  appears  to  be 
much  more  distinct.  The  effect  of  an  increase  in  this  spacing 
is  here  shown.  But  twelve  experiments  on  three  observers  by 
the  illumination  threshold  method  gave  negative  results.  We 
must  conclude  then  that  the  spacing  commonly  used  is  quite 
sufficient.  Greater  spacing  would,  of  course,  be  more  expensive, 
and  the  decrease  of  fatigue  not  as  great  as  might  be  brought 
about  in  other  ways. 

As  regards  the  vertical  space  between  the  lines,  technically 
called  '  leading,'  a  slight  effect  on  legibility  was  found  when 
the  distance  with  Pearl  type,  .8  mm.  high,  was  increased  from 
.8  to  1.3  mm.  The  illumination  threshold  method  was  used, 
and  the  experiments  carried  on  simultaneously  with  the  preced- 
ing. The  following  results  were  obtained  : 


TABLE  VII. — ILLUMINATION  THRESHOLD  FOR  TYPE  LEADED 
AND  NOT  LEADED. 


.8  mm. 

1.3  mm. 

a 

Av 

MV 

Av 

MV 

G. 

.40 

•03 

•36 

.04 

.90 

F. 

•25 

.01 

.22 

.02 

.88 

" 

.12 

.01 

.12 

.00 

I.OO 

H 

.12 

.01 

.09 

.01 

•  75 

•35 

.02 

.27 

.01 

•77 

Av 

.86 

Thus  the  average  relative  legibility   of  unleaded  type  to 
leaded  type,  as  measured  in  this  way,  is  about  .9. 


526       HAROLD    GRIPPING  AND   SHEPHERD   I.  FRANZ. 

(4)  THE  INTENSITY  OF  ILLUMINATION. 

Although  the  variation  in  the  intensity  of  diffused  daylight 
in  a  well  lighted  room  is  known  to  be  very  great,  even  when  the 
other  conditions  such  as  time  and  place  are  constant,  being 
roughly  from  50  to  1500  candle-meters,1  no  results  were  ob- 
tained for  variations  in  legibility  due  to  this  variation  by  the  two 
gravity  chronometer  methods  and  the  method  of  rapid  reading. 
The  problem  is,  however,  difficult  to  investigate  in  this  way  by 
reason  of  the  marked  daily  variations  in  individual  sensibility. 
It  was  necessary,  therefore,  to  use  artificial  light  of  low  intensity. 
The  relation  of  the  intensity  and  the  legibility  under  these  con- 
ditions has  already  been  studied  by  Cattell  by  the  time  of  expo- 
sure method.  Using  the  light  of  a  petroleum  lamp  (about  10 
candle  power)  18  cm.  distant  at  an  angle  of  55°  as  the  unit  of 
illumination,  i.  e.,  about  260  c.  m.,  the  times  of  exposure  for 
the  intensities  i,  -J,  y1^,  ^,  ^g-,  were  1.4*7,  1.7,  2.5,  6.  and  20. 
In  order  to  supplement  the  work  of  Cattell  we  determined 
the  maximum  rate  of  reading  for  different  intensities  of  illumina- 
tion. It  had  already  been  found  by  Weber2  that  for  low  intensi- 
ties the  rate  of  reading  varies  with  the  illumination.  Our  ex- 
periments were  made  in  the  following  manner  :  The  book  to  be 
read,  the  Pearl  type  Bible  already  mentioned,  was  fastened  on 
a  wooden  stand  so  as  to  be  in  front  of  the  observer,  and  making 
an  angle  of  45°  with  the  rays  of  light.  The  light  used  was  a 
standard  candle  placed  inside  a  blackened  box.  The  conditions 
were  such  that  the  light  came  from  behind  the  observer  and  to 
his  left.  The  observer  read  one  column  as  fast  as  possible,  re- 
cording the  time  with  the  stop  watch.  With  the  lowest  inten- 
sity, however,  on  account  of  fatigue,  but  half  a  column 
was  read,  the  time  being  doubled  for  the  whole  column, 
The  observer,  it  should  be  added,  .remained  in  a  dark  room 
long  enough  to  avoid  errors  from  adaptation.  The  experi- 
ments were  made  on  one  day  by  each  observer.  Below  are 
given  the  results  in  seconds  for  the  different  distances  in  meters 
and  the  relative  intensities  in  candle-meters. 


1  Cohn,  op.  cit. 

2  Weber,  op.  cit. 


CONDITIONS   OF  FATIGUE  IN  READING.  527 

TABLE  VIII. — TIME  OF  READING  AT  DIFFERENT  INTENSITIES. 


OBSERVER. 

DAY- 
LIGHT. 

#*. 

II.  2  C.  M. 

^M. 
2.8  C.  M. 

I  M. 
.7  C.  M. 

1%  M. 
.35  C.  M. 

2  M. 

.17  C.  M. 

HG 
K 
F 
G 

S 

35 
45 
47 
47 
29 

36 

44 
5i 
49 
29 

36 

39 
52 
59 
35 

46 

i39 
11 

63 
83 
100 

130 

1  10 
120 
170 

In  these  experiments  the  rate  of  reading  does  not  appear  to 
be  appreciably  affected  by  a  decrease  of  illumination  within 
a  very  wide  range,  the  intensity  of  good  daylight  being  about 
500  times  as  bright  as  the  lowest  intensity  here  used,  with  which 
the  rate  of  reading  was  not  appreciably  increased.  We  con- 
clude then  that  within  wide  limits  such  as  those  of  ordinary 
daylight  variation  in  the  intensity  of  illumination  is  not  attended 
by  great  fatigue.  But  when  the  illumination  decreases  to  a  cer- 
tain point,  not  far  from  3  C.  M.,  the  fatigue  becomes  excessive. 
This  is  shown  by  the  fact  that  very  slight  differences  in  the  rate 
of  reading  are  caused  by  conditions  of  great  fatigue,  an  increase 
of  about  ^  in  the  time  of  reading  corresponding  to  decrease  in 
the  illumination  threshold  of  70  per  cent. 

The  above  experiments  correspond  quite  well  with  those  of 
Cattell  by  the  time-of-exposure  method.  His  results  show  that 
the  fatigue  coefficient  increases  very  rapidly  as  the  illumination  de- 
creases below  approximately  4  C.  M.  His  experiments  also 
show  that  the  fatigue  coefficient  is  appreciably  greater  for  the 
lamp  light,  about  250  C.  M.,  than  for  daylight,  and  that  it  in- 
creases as  the  illumination  is  further  decreased. 

(5)  THE  QUALITY  OF  THE  ILLUMINATION. 

The  use  of  artificial  light  has  long  been  recognized  as  an 
important  cause  of  visual  fatigue.  This  fatigue  may  be  partly 
ascribed  to  the  conditions  of  intensity,  the  light  of  a  good 
petroleum  lamp  at  convenient  reading  distance  being  less  than 
that  of  good  daylight.  We,  therefore,  tested  the  effect  of  artifi- 
cial light  of  high  intensity  by  using  the  light  from  an  incan- 
descent Welsbach  gas  burner  giving  clear,  white  light,  35  can- 
dle power  at  25  C.  M.  and  45°,  about  400  C.  M.  The  times  of 


528       HAROLD    GRIPPING  AND   SHEPHERD   I.  FRANZ. 

exposure  required  for  perception  by  the  writers  were  found  to 
be  as  given  below. 

Small  Type.  Large  Type. 

Welsbach.     Daylight.  Welsbach.     Daylight. 

G  1.8  1.9 

3  -8         ::; 

These  values  are  thus  smaller,  rather  than  larger,  than  those 
already  found  for  daylight.  We  must  suppose  the  decrease  in 
time  to  be  due  to  daily  variations.  The  above  measurements 
were  made  on  one  day,  and  the  perceptive  and  retinal  processes 
of  F  were  more  than  usually  delicate.  The  smallest  time  found 
.8<r,  is  about  as  small  as  any  found  by  Cattell  in  all  his  experi- 
ments. It  is  evident,  therefore,  that  with  sufficient  intensity  of 
white  artificial  light  the  legibility  of  printed  matter  may  be  as 
great  as  in  good  daylight. 

Gas  light  and  lamplight  have,  in  addition  to  their  frequent 
unsteadiness,  the  disadvantage  of  a  yellow  color.  Since,  as 
will  be  seen  later,  yellow  paper  is  unfavorable  for  reading,  yel- 
low light  causing  the  paper  to  appear  yellow  must  also  be  a 
source  of  fatigue. 

(6)  THE  QUALITY  OF  THE  PAPER. 

If  the  paper  used  reflects  very  little  light  and  is  of  such  a 
quality  that  letters  can  be  well  printed,  the  exact  hue  is  probably 
of  little  importance,  provided  a  large  quantity  of  light  be  dif- 
fused. But  if  the  absorption  be  so  great  that  the  paper  appears 
grayish,  letters  printed  on  it  will  not  be  so  legible  by  reason  of 
the  lessening  of  the  contrast  between  the  letters  and  the  back- 
ground. 

In  experiments  made  by  the  different  methods  already  de- 
scribed we  used  non-reflecting  clear  white  paper  and  gray  paper, 
technically  called  news-paper,  the  same  as  that  used  by  many 
newspapers,  only  slightly  darker.  By  the  color-wheel  method 
it  was  found  that  the  white  paper  used  had  to  have  30  per  cent, 
black  mixed  with  it  to  give  a  gray  corresponding  to  this.  Its  rel- 
ative luminosity  was  therefore  about  .70.  Specimens  of  red  and 
yellow  paper  were  also  used,  the  red  corresponding  to  the  spec- 


CONDITIONS  OF  FATIGUE  IN  READING. 


529 


trum  color  just  to  the  left  of  Frauenhofer's  line  C,  and  the  yel- 
low that  to  the  right  of  line  D  (^  of  the  distance  to  line  E) . 

Experiments  by  the  method  of  the  percentage  of  words  seen 
on  one  observer  with  u-point  type  gave  negative  results,  the 
percentages  of  words  seen  out  of  150  being  32  per  cent,  and 
and  31  per  cent.,  the  same  for  white  paper  as  for  the  newspaper. 
Of  small  type  words,  6-point,  given  at  the  same  time,  the  same 
observer,  H.,  saw  but  12  per  cent. 

By  the  time-of-exposure  method,  however,  different  results 
were  obtained.  Below  are  the  times  found  for  two  observers. 


G. 

F. 


White. 
2.8 

1.2 


News. 
4.0 


Yellow. 
4.0 
2-5 


Red. 


4.0 


Thus  the  time  of  exposure  is  considerably  longer  for  gray 
tinted  paper,  as  well  as  red  and  yellow  paper,  than  for  white. 
The  explanation  of  the  greater  legibility  of  the  letters  on  white 
paper  over  those  on  the  red  and  yellow  is  the  same  as  for  the 
gray.  Color  quality  is  not  independent  of  intensity,  white 
being  essentially  brighter  than  yellow,  which  in  turn  is  brighter 
than  red. 

The  illumination  method  was  also  applied  to  the  study  of 
the  fatigue  effect  of  white  paper  and  gray  newspaper.  The 
letters  were  not  read  independently  in  these  experiments,  but  in 
words.  Upon  the  paper  exposed  were  10  to  12  words  in  3 
lines. 

The  values  of  the  illumination  threshold  were  as  follows : 

TABLE   IX. — ILLUMINATION   THRESHOLDS    FOR  WHITE    AND 

GRAY  PAPER. 


OBSERVER. 

G 

F 

FX 

TT 

H! 

Av 

MV 

Av 

MV 

Av 

MV 

Av 

MV 

Av 

MV 

W  =  White 

.10 

.01 

.10 

.01 

.06 

.01 

.04 

.00 

.10 

.02 

N  =  News 

.20 

.02 

.16 

.02 

.08 

.01 

.07 

.00 

•23 

.01 

W 

l 

"N- 

•50 

.62 

•75 

•57 

•43 

According  to  these   results  the  gray  tinted  newspaper  re- 
quired about  twice  as  much  illumination  as  the  white.     This  is 


53°       HAROLD    GRIPPING  AND   SHEPHERD  I.  FRANZ. 

somewhat  more  than  might  be  expected  from  the  relative  ab- 
sorption powers  of  the  papers,  but  the  quality  of  the  printing 
varies  with  the  paper,  not  being  quite  so  clear  on  the  news- 
paper. 

Summarizing  briefly  our  results  we  conclude  that  the  size  of 
type  is  the  all  important  condition  of  visual  fatigue.  No  type 
less  than  1.5  mm.  in  height,  that  in  which  this  article  is  printed 
(eleven  point),  should  ever  be  used,  the  fatigue  increasing  rap- 
idly even  before  the  size  becomes  as  small  as  this.  The  intensity 
of  illumination  is  apparently  of  little  consequence  within  the  lim- 
its of  daylight  in  well  lighted  rooms.  Very  low  intensities, 
less  than  from  3  to  10  candle-meters,  are  sources  of  even  greater 
fatigue  than  small  type,  and  100  C.  M.  may  be  considered  a  safe 
limit.  Yet  the  illumination  in  German  school  rooms  has  been 
found  to  be  frequently  less  than  2  C.  M.  White  light  rather  than 
yellow  light  should  be  used  for  artificial  illumination.  The  form 
of  the  type  is  of  less  importance  than  the  thickness  of  the  letters. 
White  paper  should  be  used,  though  it  is  possible  that  the 
greater  amount  of  light  reflected  from  pure  white  paper  may 
cause  some  fatigue.  Additional  '  leading '  or  spacing  between 
the  lines,  is  also  desirable. 


THE  ACCURACY  OF  OBSERVATION  AND  OF 
RECOLLECTION  IN  SCHOOL  CHILDREN.1 

BY  SHEPHERD  IVORY  FRANZ  AND  HENRY  E.  HOUSTON. 

Whether  accuracy  of  observation  and  of  recollection  differs 
at  different  periods  of  our  lives  is  a  problem  suggested  by  Prof. 
Cattell's  paper  on  this  subject.2  In  order  to  study  this  subject, 
questions  similar  to  those  used  by  Prof.  Cattell  and  by  Mr. 
Bolton,  with  the  changes  necessary  for  time  and  place  and  for 
the  age  of  the  scholars,  were  asked  the  pupils  of  the  Horace 
Mann  School,  New  York  City,  and  of  the  Paterson,  N.  J., 
High  School. 

The  following  were  the  questions  used  :  (i)  What  was  the 
weather  a  week  ago  to-day?  (2)  Two  weeks  ago?  (3) 
Which  way  do  the  seeds  in  an  apple  point?  (4)  How  many 
years  ago  did  George  Washington  die?  (5)  How  many  feet 
is  it  from  the  schoolhouse  door  to  the  corner  of  the  street? 

(6)  How  many  seconds  does  it  take  you  to  walk  this  distance? 

(7)  How  many  times  have  you  entered  the  schoolhouse  gate 
(or  door)   since  vacation?     (8)   How  many  ounces  does  this 
book   (showing  a  text-book  used  by  the  class)   weigh?     (9) 
Draw  on  a  scale  of  one  inch  to  twenty  feet,  a  ground  plan  of 
the  lower  hall. 

The  accompanying  Table3  gives  the  percentages  of  correct 
answers  or  the  average  estimation  together  with  the  average 
residual  for  the  two  schools. 

1  From  the  Psychological  Laboratory  of  Columbia  University. 

2The  Accuracy  of  Recollection,  J.  McKeen  Cattell,  Science,  N.  S.,  II.,  761- 
766,  1895.  See  also  The  Accuracy  of  Recollection  and  Observation,  F.  E. 
Bolton,  PSYCHOL.  REV.,  III.,  286-295,  l896- 

3  Owing  to  the  fewness  of  answers  in  some  grades  it  was  thought  best  to 
combine  the  several  grades  of  the  H.  M.  S.  as  follows  :  I.,  II.,  III.,  IV.,  V.,  VI., 
VII.,  VIII.,  High,  thus  making  about  forty  or  fifty  answers  in  each  group. 

The  figures  in  the  Table  marked  with  a  cross  (t)  denote  the  actual  magni- 
tude as  used  for  the  Columbia  and  Wisconsin  Students. 

As  the  books  used  as  standards  of  weight  were  of  different  weights,  we 

53 1 


532      SHEPHERD   /.  FRANZ  AND  HENRY  E.  HOUSTON. 

TABLE  I. 


i 

ACTUAL 

H.M.S. 

H.M.S. 

H.M.S. 

H.M.S. 

H.M.S. 

P.H.S. 

COLUM- 

WISCON- 

M'GN'T'DE. 

I.II.III. 

IV.V.VI. 

Vii.  VIII 

HIGH. 

TOTAL. 

i  II.  in. 

BIA. 

SIN. 

Age. 

7-9- 

IO-I2 

13-14 

14-17 

7-17 

14-17 

— 



No.  of  Answers. 

56 

63 

48 

34 

2OI 

325 

56 

92 

H.  M.S. 

IT0/ 

Weather, 
i  wk.  previous. 

clear. 
P.  H.  S. 

40% 

81% 

95% 

85% 

78% 

4% 

11/0 

stormy 
clear-" 

32%(  ?) 
stormy. 

cloudy. 

ing. 

H.M.  S. 

Weather. 
2  wks.  previous. 

clear. 
P.  H.  S. 

34% 

49% 

65% 

65% 

53% 

29% 





stormy. 

Direction  of 
Apple  Seeds. 

H.M.  S. 
P.  H.  S. 

5i% 

52% 

26% 

5i% 

45% 

49% 

41% 

49% 

Yrs.    Av.Est. 

H.M.  S. 

97 

87 

97 

99 

95 

102 





since  W's 

P.  H.  S. 

death.  Av.  Res. 

96. 

54 

33 

12 

8 

26 

13 

— 

— 

Av.  Est. 
Distance 

H.M.  S. 
400 

160 

183 

l67 

226 

181 

197 

356 

276 

in  feet. 
Av.  Res. 

P.  H.  S. 
260 

1  20 

150 

74 

93 

118 

97 

179 
[3io] 

[450] 

Av.  Est. 
Time 

H.  M.  S. 
80 

65 

82 

97 

97 

84 

70 

66 

182 

in  seconds. 
Av.  Res. 

P.  H.  S. 

55 

45 

52 

61 

49 

54 

45 

36 
[35] 

[160] 

Av.  Est. 
Frequency. 
Av.  Res. 

H.M.  S. 

100* 

P.  H.  S. 

180 

179 
162 

252 

185 

122 

38 

152 
76 

183 
131 

452 
314 

4022 
2669 
[?] 



Av.  Est. 
Weight 

H.M.  S. 
10 

7-8 

7-6 

6-5 

6.0 

7-1 

12 

17 

20.5 

in  Ounces. 
Av.  Res. 

P.  H.  S. 

14 

4-5 

4.1 

2.4 

2.4 

3-5 

5-5 

[24] 

[24] 

Av.  Est. 
Proportion, 

H.M.  S. 

10.2 



8-7 

7-8 

8-5 

8-3 

I.I4 



1.7 

Width,  Length. 
Av.  Res. 

P.  H.  S. 
1.74 

— 

3-9 

2.5 

3-6 

3- 

•SO 

— 

[2.0] 

Av.  Est. 
Length 

H.M.  S. 

211. 



116 

145 

158 

141 

105 



6. 

in  mm. 
Av.  Res. 

P.  H.  S. 

118 

— 

39 

35 

29 

37 

— 

— 

[9-6  in] 

Av.  Est. 
Width 
in  mm. 
Av.  Res. 

H.M.  S. 

P.  H.'s. 
16 



15 
6 

21 

8 

23 

8.7 

19 

7-8 

87 



3-5  in. 
[4.7  in] 

OBSERVATION  AND  RECOLLECTION. 


533 


Taking  the  figures  more  in  detail,  it  will  first  be  noted 
that  the  H.  M.  S.  has  a  much  larger  percentage  of  correct  an- 
swers to  the  two  weather  questions  than  any  of  the  other  schools. 
This  is  no  doubt  due  to  the  fact  that  the  weather  on  the  two 
days  about  which  the  pupils  were  asked  was  '  clear,'  and  as  we 
have  more  clear  days  than  other  kinds  we  should  expect  an  in- 
crease according  to  the  probability.  Not  knowing  the  proba- 
bility of  this  and  the  other  kinds  of  weather,  we  cannot  compare 
the  other  schools,  but  considering  the  H.  M.  S,  alone  it  seems 
likely  that  accuracy  of  recollection  increased  with  age. 

In  the  next  question,  however,  this  is  not  the  case,  for  the 
younger  scholars  in  the  H.  M.  S.  had  the  same  percentage  cor- 
rect as  the  older,  and  a  trifle  greater  percentage  than  the 
College  students.  Some  chance  variation  caused  a  decrease 
to  5  per  cent,  in  the  seventh  grade,  whence  the  total  for  that 
group  (VII.,  VIII.)  was  reduced  to  26  per  cent. 

In  the  quantitative  estimations  it  will  be  noticed  that,  like  the 
College  students,  the  younger  children  underestimate  weight  and 
size  (proportion)  and  overestimate  time.  They  also  overesti- 
mate frequency  and  with  the  Wisconsin  students  underestimate 
distance  and  size  (length  of  building).  The  H.  M.  S.  and  the 
P.  H.  S.  overestimated  the  breadth  of  the  hall  or  building,  while 
the  Wisconsin  students  underestimated  the  corresponding  mag- 
nitude. In  these  estimations,  however,  there  seems  to  be  no 
regular  increase  or  decrease  in  accuracy,  except  in  the  cases  of 
'  weight, '  *  length, '  *  width, '  and  « time.'  Taken  as  a  whole, 
however,  the  older  scholars  are  more  accurate  than  the  younger. 
This  is  shown,  also  by  the  average  residuals,  which  for  the 

have  here  reduced  the  estimations,  taking  ten  ounces  as  a  standard.  The  valid- 
ity of  this  procedure  is  somewhat  doubtful,  but  it  was  necessary  in  order  to 
make  any  comparison  of  the  grades.  We,  however,  give  here  the  actual  mag- 
nitudes, the  average  estimations,  and  the  residuals  for  the  several  grades. 

TABLE  IA. 


I. 

II. 

III. 

IV. 

V. 

VI. 

VII. 

VIII. 

High. 

Magnitude. 

— 

12.5 

10.5 

10.5 

13-5 

10.5 

14. 

19-5 

18. 
I.      II. 

Av.  Est. 
Av.  Res. 

— 

12.5 
5- 

6. 
4-5 

8.7 
5-4 

8-7 

5- 

7.8 
3-7 

10. 

4- 

ii. 
3-4 

10.4 
3-7 

12. 
3-6 

534      SHEPHERD   I.  FRANZ  AND  HENRY  E.  HOUSTON. 


older  scholars  are  considerably  smaller  than  for  the  younger. 
The  questions  are  so  complex  in  themselves,  all  including  ob- 
servation, with  errors  of  judgment,  and  memory  with  its  errors, 
that  no  general  conclusion  can  be  drawn. 

Accuracy   according  to   Sex.     From   the   following  Table 
showing  the  percentage  of  right  answers  and  the  average  esti- 

TABLE  II. 


H.  M.  S. 
BOYS.       GIRLS. 

P.  H.  S. 
BOYS.      GIRLS. 

WISCONSIN. 
BOYS.      GIRLS. 

^Weather,  ist  wk 

74%               8l°/n 

IQo/           cAp/ 

Weather,  2d  wk  

49%        57% 

Apple  seed    

48                  AT, 

50%          46% 

[only  part] 

Yrs.  since  W.'s  death    .    .    . 

95           9i 
(96) 

89.           102. 
(96) 

—            — 

Distance    

231            151 

l8q              IQ6 

296           261 

(400) 

(260) 

(450) 

Time  

72               QO 

46.              67 

177            187 

(80) 

(55) 

/    /-   \ 
(160) 

Frequency  .  . 

191                 178 

505            468 

(100*) 

(180) 

Weight  ... 

78         67 

II.                  12 

22.8          19.8 

(10) 

(14) 

(24) 

Proportion    

Q.7            7.O 

1.26        i.  08 

/                    \ 

(10.2) 

d.74) 

N.  B. — The  actual  magnitudes  are  shown  in  parentheses. 

mations  for  the  H.  M.  S.,  the  P.  H.  S.  and  the  Wisconsin 
students.  One  sees  that  the  girls  remember  the  weather  bet- 
ter than  the  boys,  but  that  the  estimations  of  the  boys  for  dis- 
tance, time  and  proportion  are  nearer  the  standard.  The  boys 
in  the  H.  M.  S.  came  nearer  to  the  date  of  Washington's  death, 
while  the  boys  and  girls  of  the  P.  H.  S.  were  about  equally 
correct.  With  weight  the  H.  M.  S.  boys  again  came  nearer, 
while  the  girls  of  the  P.  H.  S.  were  more  exact.  With  fre- 
quency the  girls  in  both  cases  were  more  correct.  The  general 


OBSERVATION  AND  RECOLLECTION. 


535 


conclusion  to  be  drawn  is  that  in  quantitative  measurements 
the  boys  are  more  exact.  This  is  also  what  Mr.  Bolton  found 
with  the  Wisconsin  students. 

Relation  of  Confidence  to  Accuracy.  When  the  students 
were  asked  the  questions  they  were  told  to  denote  by  the  letters 
A,  B,  C  or  D,  respectively,  whether  they  were  sure  their  an- 
swers were  correct,  fairly  confident,  doubtful,  or  if  their  answers 
were  only  a  guess.  The  following  table  gives  the  average  esti- 
mation when  the  students  were  confident  (A  and  B),  and  when 
they  were  doubtful  (C  and  D). 

TABLE  III. 


YRS.  SINCE 
W'S  DEATH. 

WEIGHT 
IN  Oz. 

DISTANCE 
IN  FT. 

OCCUR- 
RENCE. 

TIME  IN 
SECONDS. 

A.  and  B. 
H.M.  S. 
C.  and  D. 

88.5 

138. 
(96) 

(10) 

152 

285 
(400) 

205 
213 

(IOO) 

91 
101 

(75) 

A.  and  B. 
P.  H.  S. 
C.  and  D. 

IOO 

104 
(96) 

12 
II-5 

(14) 

203 

214 
(160) 

386 
475  (.80) 

(55) 

Here,  too,  the  evidence  is  conflicting  and  no  general  con- 
clusion can  be  drawn.  In  the  estimation  for  years  since  W's 
death,  and  for  number  of  occurrences  the  more  confident  answers 
are  nearer  the  truth.  When  we  look  at  the  estimation  for  dis- 
tance, however,  we  see  that  the  two  schools  disagree.  The 
small  difference,  too,  between  the  estimates  in  some  cases 
(e-  £"•>  years  P.  H.  S.,  distance  P.  H.  S.,  occurrence  H.  M. 
S.)  together  with  a  large  variation  (in  most  cases  one- third  of 
the  average  estimation)  makes  it  unwise  to  hazard  any  con- 
clusion. 

It  was  found  that  scholarships  did  not  at  all  influence  the 
results.  Those  classed  as  the  best  students  estimated  as  wildly 
as  those  considered  the  worst ;  those  considered  as  of  medium 
ability  were  a  little  more  accurate  than  the  two  extremes. 


DISCUSSION  AND   REPORTS. 

REMARKS  ON  PROFESSOR  LLOYD  MORGAN'S  METHOD 
IN  ANIMAL  PSYCHOLOGY. 

The  method  of  animal  psychology  has  generally  been  so  indefinite 
and  uncritical,  and  the  results  so  unsatisfactory,  that  many  psychologists 
must  often  have  felt  that  it  is  quite  premature  to  enter  the  field  at  all 
till  we  have  some  clearer  basis  in  a  knowledge  of  what  lies  nearer  us — 
human  psychology.  However  this  may  be,  there  are  certainly  now  a 
number  of  able  investigators  in  this  province,  and  not  the  least  of  these 
is  Professor  Lloyd  Morgan.  In  these  remarks  I  wish  to  take  up  cer- 
tain points  made  by  him  in  the  suggestive  book  entitled  '  An  Intro- 
dution  to  Comparative  Psychology.' 

In  the  first  place  it  is  an  obvious  remark  that  the  proper  method  of 
experimenting  on  animal  intelligence  should  not  be  an  exciting  one,  as 
disturbing  to  cool  deliberate  action.  It  is  curious  that  Professor 
Morgan  acknowledges  this  (p.  260)  and  yet  brings  up  the  instance 
there  cited,  the  bone-swinging  experiment,  as  evidence  against  percep- 
tion of  relations.  We  may  criticise  in  the  same  way  those  experiments 
upon  which  he  lays  great  stress  as  evidence  against  the  perception  of 
relations,  namely,  the  fox  terrier  pup  carrying  a  stick  through  railings, 
that  here  the  activity  is  of  too  exciting  a  nature  to  be  favorable  to  in- 
telligent adaptation.  Yet  it  may  be  urged  that  even  herein  that 
the  dog  is  constantly  changing  his  grip,  there  is  evidence  that  he  per- 
ceives the  necessity  of  another  way  than  the  present.  An  unchanging 
stubborn  bull  dog  hold  would  be  less  intelligent.  The  method  of  trial 
and  error  is  a  real  method  and  is  learned  to  be  such,  and  with  a  con- 
sciousness that  his  present  hold  is  a  bad  one  he  shifts  his  grip.  There 
is  for  him  a  how  but  it  is  any  how.  We  would  suggest  that  young 
children  be  tested  with  the  stick- railing  experiment.  But  for  the  test- 
ing perception  of  space  relation  we  think  the  spectacle  of  a  cat  on  a 
wet  day,  looking  down  from  a  high  point  before  it  jumps  and  makes 
its  way  to  the  house  is  more  suggestive.  Here  is  an  opportunity  for 
cool  deliberate  inspection  and  comparison,  and  the  cat  appears  to  do 
this.  It  seems  to  pause  and  judge  distance  with  reference  to  its  ability 
at  jumping,  to  estimate  the  shortest  path  to  its  destination,  and  the  rela- 

536 


DISCUSSION  AND  REPORTS.  537 

tive  wetness  of  different  ways.  It  passes  its  eye  from  point  to  point, 
and  picks  its  way ;  and  it  gives  the  signs  of  perception  of  space  rela- 
tions so  plainly  that  if  we  saw  similar  action  in  a  man  we  should  un- 
hesitatingly ascribe  such  consciousness  to  him. 

With  respect  to  the  perception  of  relations,  Professor  Morgan  ad- 
duces on  the  negative  side  an  observation  which  illustrates  to  a  certain 
degree  an  exciting  method,  but  also  the  most  common  fault,  an  incom- 
plete study  of  facts.  I  allude  to  the  story  (p.  301)  of  a  dog  which 
after  repeatedly  chasing  a  rabbit  in  vain,  the  rabbit  escaping  in  a  drain, 
at  length  made  straight  for  the  drain  and  headed  off  the  rabbit.  Upon 
this  brief  account  two  theories  of  action  at  once  suggest  themselves, 
first  (Wilson) ,  the  dog  may  have  consciously  taken  the  shortest  cut  to 
head  off  the  rabbit,  second  (Morgan) ,  the  dog  in  following  the  rabbit, 
fast  disappearing  toward  the  well-known  drain,  has  the  association  of 
rabbit  and  drain  at  length  so  predominant  that  he  follows  this  line  of 
vision — straight  line — at  once  to  the  drain.  In  this  last  case  the  idea 
of  rabbit  entering  drain  becomes  stronger  motor  impulse  than  the 
sight  of  rabbit  running.  One  objection  to  this  second  interpretation 
is  that  this  mere  ready  made  association  of  rabbit  and  drain  could 
only  send  the  dog  along  the  usual  path  to  the  drain,  and  this  usual 
path  is  the  rabbit's.  However,  and  we  wish  to  lay  special  emphasis 
on  this,  both  the  above  interpretations  are  speculations  which  are, 
perhaps,  worth  making,  but  only  as  helping  to  scientific  study  of  the 
facts.  Such  a  study  would  mean  this:  that  the  master  of  the  dog 
is  a  competent  dog  psychologist,  thoroughly  acquainted  with  dogs  in 
general,  and  this  dog  in  particular,  in  all  his  ways  and  expressions, 
and  yet  not  biased  for  the  dog — masters  like  parents  are  liable  to  be 
prejudiced  in  favor  of  their  charges — and  that  he  sees  the  dog  clearly 
when  the  making  for  the  drain  wasjfirst  accomplished ;  then,  judging 
from  the  method  of  expression  of  the  dog  at  that  instant  whether  there 
was  evidence  of  hesitation  or  deliberation,  attain  a  competent  judg- 
ment of  the  case,  which  would  to  a  certain  extent  be  verifiable  for 
other  psychologists  if  a  photograph  of  the  dog  had  been  taken  in  the 
act.  From  a  similar  study  of  a  large  number  of  such  cases  by  trained 
observers,  we  would  have  the  only  scientific  evidence  obtainable  as  to 
whether  dogs  in  general  show  that  they  can  on  occasion  compare  dis- 
tances to  a  destination,  and  consciously  choose  what  is  thought  to  be 
the  shorter.  That  is,  the  main  evidence  must  always  be  from  a  com- 
plete record  of  expression,  and  that  interpreted  most  cautiously. 

Right  here  we  wish  to  remark  that  Professor  Morgan  does  not 
make  clear  to  us  how  a  perception  of  relations  is  confined  in  its  ser- 


538  ANIMAL  PSYCHOLOGY. 

viceability  only  to  human  '  descriptive  intercommunication '  (pp. 
239,  243,  293).  This  assumption  is  quite  too  readily  made,  and  used 
quite  too  much  in  an  a  priori  fashion.  In  fact  we  may  ask  if  percep- 
tion of  relations  does  not  arise  at  first,  not  for  communication,  but  by 
its  immediate  serviceability  to  the  individual.  Thus  in  the  case  of  the 
dog  and  rabbit  a  definite  understanding  of  space  relations  accomplishes 
more  quickly  and  surely  the  catching  of  the  rabbit ;  the  dog  profits  by 
it  quite  as  obviously  as  the  human  hunter  who  plans  a  short  cut  to  head 
off  a  rabbit. 

Again  in  explaining  the  apparent  perceptions,  e.  g.,  of  distance,  by 
animals,  Professor  Morgan  insists  that  the  relations,  if  perceived  at  all, 
are  not  focally  but  only  marginally  perceived,  to  use  his  optical  terms. 
But  this  theory,  which  is  fundamental  with  him,  that  consciousness  in 
the  development  of  its  forms  is  first  marginal  merely,  a  side  part  in 
the  total  body  of  consciousness,  and  only  gradually  becomes  focal  or 
central,  as  in  man  perceiving  a  relation,  seems  quite  contrary  to  the  first 
assumption  of  evolutionary  psychology,  namely,  that  new  modes  origi- 
nate in  severest  effort,  and  are  thus  in  all  their  earlier  developments 
preeminently  focal.  But  when  a  body  of  consciousness,  i.  e.,  a  mind, 
is  once  formed  and  becomes  hereditary,  then  much  that  has  been  focal 
in  the  long  past  becomes  marginal.  Thus  vision  in  its  origin  was  cer- 
tainly not  focal  marginal,  but  a  single  focal  point,  and  the  highly  de- 
veloped vision  that  holds  a  considerable  field  of  vision  outside  the  sin- 
gle focus  is  really  reflex  of  myriad  ancestral  focalizings.  Hence, 
what  is  marginal  to  my  vision  is  not  the  pin  head  on  the  cushion  to 
my  left,  but  the  cushion  itself,  which  is  of  such  a  size  as  to  have  been 
attentively  perceived  by  numberless  ancestral  generations ;  but  if  for 
thousands  of  years  my  ancestors  had  exercised  themselves  in  looking 
at  single  pin  heads,  I  have  no  doubt  that  the  pin  head  would  be  as 
plainly  marginal  as  the  cushion.  So  also  we  conceive  that  the  pres- 
ent order  of  evolution  indicates  that  the  perception  of  relation  was 
first  realized,  but  faintly  to  be  sure,  in  an  intense  focalizing  effort.  It 
is  certainly  a  misuse  of  terms  to  make  focal  equal  all  clear  and  distinct 
consciousness ;  that  which  we  are  straining  the  eye  to  see  is  often  far 
more  faint  than  the  marginal.  We  should  say  then  that  the  develop- 
ment of  perception  was,  like  all  other  consciousness,  from  dim  focal 
states  to  clear  focal  states,  and  then  to  marginal  states. 

The  over  use  of  hypothesis,  and  that  often  doubtful  hypothesis, 
mars  much  of  Professor  Morgan's  writing  on  animal  psychology,  but 
when  he  makes  a  survey  of  all  the  facts,  his  interpretations  are  in 
general  just.  However,  since  we  are  on  negative  criticism,  let  us 


DISCUSSION  AND  REPORTS.  539 

note  an  instance  of  experiment  where  the  interpretation  is  very 
obviously  defective ;  I  refer  to  the  throwing  red  currants  to  his  chicks 
(p.  298).  Though  he  calls  this  a  'parable,'  I  understand  it  has  basis 
in  fact.  The  chicks,  seeing  the  strange  objects,  utter  the  'what 
sound,'  or  note  of  interrogation.  But  having  gained  experience  of 
taste  of  currents,  what  kind  of  sound  will  they  utter  upon  coming  upon 
them  again  ?  Mr.  Morgan  says,  if  they  could  attain  to  make  '  currant 
sound,'  this  would  mean  absolutely  nothing  to  the  chick  who  had  never 
experienced  currants.  *  It  is  a  sound  indicative  of  certain  experiences 
that  it  has  never  had,'  and  hence  'of  no  indicative  value,'  and  hence 
as  '  value '  or  serviceability  is  the  rationale  of  existence  of  psychosis 
and  its  expression  there  being  no  rationale  here,  the  existence  of  a 
real  '  what  sound '  and  responsive  answer  may  be  denied. 

To  this  we  must  suggest  that  while  there  is  no  '  currant  sound ' 
(Mr.  Morgan  here  really  falls  into  the  language  fallacy  he  elsewhere 
so  justly  condemns) ,  there  may  be  a  sound  indicative  of  edible  object. 
Suppose  a  group  of  chicks  before  some  currants,  piping  the  interroga- 
tive, and  the  mother  hen  comes  along  with  wide  experience  of  those 
things  we  class  and  call  currants,  will  she  not  give  at  once  the  food 
note?  Just  as  when  I  come  upon  a  comrade  eating  some  strange 
thing,  and  to  my  interrogation  he  grunts  'yum  !  yum  !,'  and  I  know  it 
is  an  edible.  I  take  it  that  the  food  signal,  which  is  certainly  widely 
developed  and  widely  useful  among  animals,  is  really  no  more  than  a 
kind  of  'yum  !  yum !,'  or  a  wholly  indefinite  pleasure  sign  of  the  edi- 
ble. Every  chick  has  food  experience  and  so  can  appreciate  food  sig- 
nal, though  currant  signal,  if  possible,  would  be  of  no  use.  I  may 
suggest  further  with  reference  to  the  nature  of  the  psychosis,  of  chick 
which  has  experiences  of  black  caterpillar  and  learns  to  let  it  alone 
(p.  301)  or  red  currant  and  learns  to  appropriate  it,  that  we  are  not 
confined  to  the  alternate  hypothesis  of  mechanical  association  and  full 
formal  reason.  Suppose  a  chick  has  seen  and  swallowed  several  cur- 
rants with  satisfaction,  and  running  a  little  farther  sees  another  cur- 
rant, what  is  then  its  real  psychosis !  I  am  inclined  to  think,  if  the 
chick  is  yet  in  the  active  investigating  stage,  /.  £.,  beyond  where  it 
pecks  at  everything,  but  is  becoming  actively  discriminatory,  we  may 
interpret  the  psychosis  as  identification.  It  recognizes  that  red  object 
before  it  as  the  very  identical  object  it  has  just  experienced  with  such 
lively  satisfaction,  and  it  eats  it  (again) .  There  is  for  it  simply  the 
single  identical  thing  constantly  reappearing,  and  so  no  things  or 
classes  of  things.  It  eats  its  cake,  and  has  it  too.  To  the  chick  there 
is  one  worm  and  one  only,  which  to  its  great  joy  it  is  continually  re- 


54°  ANIMAL  PSYCHOLOGY. 

finding.  (On  this  phase  of  psychosis  I  have  made  some  fuller  remarks 
in  'Evolutionary  Psychology  of  Feeling,'  p.  2,  85  ff.)  And  this  does 
not  deny  that  the  identifying  act  is  largely  instinctive,  i.  e.,  impelled 
by  heredity  force.  Most  of  the  apparently  intelligent  activities  of 
young  animals  are  doubtless  fully  three  parts  instinct  to  one  part  indi- 
vidual intelligence. 

We  have  emphasized  the  need  for  an  unexciting  method  in  animal 
psychology,  and  for  one  which  shall  make  it  a  point  to  secure  in  every 
case  all  the  facts  of  expression.  But  while  we  can  judge  with  some 
aptness  what  psychosis  our  fellow  men  are  experiencing,  we  are  so 
distantly  related  to  most  animals  that  their  mentalities  must  be  quite  di- 
verse in  tone,  degree,  and  quantity  from  our  own,  the  only  basis  for  our 
judgment.  Hence  animal  psychology  should  begin  with  those  animals 
most  akin  to  us,  as  the  simians,  and  the  psychologist  should  seek  the 
most  constant  and  intimate  acquaintance  with  his  charges,  should  prac- 
tically live  with  monkeys  till  he  becomes  thoroughly  conversant  with 
their  modes  of  expression.  Further,  in  observing  and  experimenting 
for  intelligence,  mature  animals  should  be  chosen,  those  who  have  run 
through  all  the  stages  of  hereditary  mind.  But  they  should  not  be 
old,  the  most  favorable  age  being  for  a  year  or  two  following  full 
development,  when  there  is  plasticity,  and  yet  recapitulation  is  fully 
done,  all  the  forms  of  mere  instinctive  adaptability  being  fulfilled. 
Professor  Morgan's  experiments  were  mainly  if  not  entirely  with  young 
animals,  as  chicks  and  pups. 

Further,  the  motive  to  the  creative  activity  of  real  intelligence  must 
be  an  adequate  and  favorable  one.  The  hunger  method  is  perhaps 
the  most  efficient  in  nature,  and  it  is  proverbial  that  hunger  sharpens 
wit.  In  nature  most  of  the  progressive  intelligence  has  been  achieved 
by  animals  confronted  by  new  circumstances  in  their  search  for  food. 
Hence  the  test  which  would  most  likely  to  give  definite  positive  results 
for  initiative  intelligence  of  animals  would  be  to  confine  a  just  matured 
chimpanzee  in  a  cage,  and,  having  well  starved  him,  put  food  nearby 
under  conditions  which  neither  his  nor  his  ancestors  could  have  experi- 
enced, but  conditions  which  might  be  overcome  by  some  simple  per- 
ception of  relations  and  application  thereof.  This  gives  opportunity 
for  cool  deliberative  action ;  and  the  monkey  should  be  carefully  studied 
and  photographed  and  phonographed  throughout  the  whole  test.  Of 
course  such  tests,  if  pursued  too  far,  might  well  call  for  the  interfer- 
ence of  the  Humane  Society.  In  fact  to  reproduce  the  conditions 
which  under  natural  selection  stimulate  creative  intelligence  may  always 
mean  cruelty.  The  successful  mind  has  generally  made  its  achieve- 


DISCUSSION  AND   REPORTS.  541 

ment  at  the  critical  life  and  death  point.  Yet  it  may  be  that  with 
monkeys  seeking  food  or  liberty,  there  can  be  provided  sufficient  in- 
citement to  obtain  positive  results  without  cruelty. 

We  must  add  that  wild  animals,  as  being  distinctly  more  alert 
than  domesticated,  are  the  most  desirable  subjects  in  seeking  positive 
results  as  to  the  intellectual  powers  of  animals.  Adaptiveness  not  being 
forced  by  the  conditions  of  existence  on  tame  animals,  they  become 
little  more  than  machines.  Compare  thus  the  wild  sheep  and  the  tame. 
The  dog  in  being  '  well  trained '  to  be  routinely  obedient  to  his  master 
is  made  a  mechanical  slave ;  he  loses  very  largely  that  free  initiative 
and  strong  intelligent  individuality  and  independence  which  was  his, 
when,  in  state  of  nature,  he  was  his  own  master  and  had  to  provide 
for  himself  or  starve.  The  dogs  at  our  bench  shows  are  mostly  very 
stupid  and  helpless  beasts.  As  domesticated  animals  are  bred  in  the 
main  not  for  psychical  but  for  physical  points,  man  has  as  a  whole 
degraded  and  brutalized  the  brute.  Certain  passive  and  emotional 
states  are  indeed  generally  favored  by  man,  as  lack  of  temper,  but  it 
is  only  exceptionally,  as  in  the  collie  dog,  that  the  animal  is  bred  dis- 
tinctly for  intellectual  qualities.  Even  the  collie  fanciers  look  chiefly 
to  the  coat  of  the  animal,  form  of  the  head,  tail,  etc.  This  ten- 
dency with  breeders  is,  in  truth,  much  to  be  regretted  both  from  a  sen- 
timental and  scientific  point  of  view.  If  selection  and  breeding  were 
definitely  carried  on  with  dogs  wholly  in  psychical  lines  for  a  number 
of  generations,  we  should  have  some  far  more  interesting  companions 
than  the  present  prize  beasts,  and  some  far  more  suggestive  material 
for  the  comparative  psychologist. 

While  our  remarks  have  been  directed  to  some  questionable  points 
in  Professor  Morgan's  animal  psychology,  we  are  thoroughly  con- 
vinced that  he  has  accomplished  much  that  is  suggestive,  and  that  his 
basis  of  introspection  is  the  only  true  basis.  His  caution  is  also  ad- 
mirable, but  we  do  not  think  the  law  of  parsimony  is  positive  proof, 
as  he  seems  to  urge.  Thus,  as  applied  in  the  dog-and-drain  case,  the 
question  is  not  what  might  be,  but  what  are  the  actual  psychic  facts 
as  interpreted  from  actual  expression.  The  golden  rule  of  science  is 
that  theory  is  good  only  as  leading  to  facts  and  facts  only  as  leading 
to  theory,  but  animal  psychology  is  yet  far  from  attaining  this  full 
correlation. 

HIRAM  M.  STANLEY. 
LAKE  FOREST,  ILL. 


542  RECOGNITION. 

RECOGNITION. 

In  Miss  Mary  W.  Calkins'  full,  able  and,  if  I  may  be  permitted  to 
say  so,  sympathetic  review  of  my  two  articles  on  the  '  Recognition 
Theory '  of  Perception  of  Hoffding,  Spencer,  Ward  and  others,  and 
on  Recognition,  there  is  an  important  misunderstanding.  By  the  omis- 
sion of  two  words,  indicated  of  course  by  asterisks,  I  am  understood 
and  quoted  as  saying  that  there  is  in  recognition  no  identification  of 
the  past  with  the  present.  It  is,  I  believe,  a  misunderstanding  which 
has  very  important  bearings  on  a  right  understanding  of  recognition. 

The  remark  I  made  was :  "  There  is  in  recognition  no  '  identifica- 
tion of  the  past  impression  with  the  present  one.' "  The  '  past  im- 
pression '  I  hold  to  be  gone  forever,  to  be  no  longer  existent  and  hence 
not  a  participant  in  any  comparison  or  identification  which  may  possibly 
take  place  in  recognition.  Former  theories  of  recognition  have,  I  be- 
lieve, misrepresented  the  facts  by  asserting  that  in  recognition  and 
memory  the  '  former  impression '  is  present  and  that  it  is  known  as 
past  or  known  again.  Then  by  some  special  actus  of  the  '  mind '  this 
'  past  impression '  is  compared  and  identified  with  some  '  present '  ob- 
ject and  we  know  that  this  object  is  known  again.  Again,  there  is  a 
further  actus  supposed  in  the  '  mind's '  capacity  of  preserving,  retain- 
ing and  bringing  to  light  again  the  former  impression  or  object.  The 
'  Retentive  Faculty '  is  still  abroad  if  not  openly,  still  covertly. 

Now  I  hold  that  in  recognition  it  is  not  the  old  or  former  impres- 
sion or  *  way  in  which  consciousness  looks  at  a  thing '  (call  it  what 
name  you  will)  which  is  present.  It  is  gone  and  gone  forever.  It  is 
the  object  (I  speak  simply  of  '  things  '  as  they  appear  in  consciousness 
and  with  no  metaphysical  theory  in  view)  which  is  known  as  past  or 
known  again  and  not  the  former  impression.  Upon  the  basis  of  cer- 
tain characteristics,  as  I  explain  later,  I  classify  some  objects  as  '  past,' 
some  'present'  and  others  as  'future.'  The  former  impression  is  not 
present,  for  it  no  longer  exists. 

Fastness  or  the  known-again-ness  of  objects  cannot  therefore  be  ex- 
plained, as  is  usually  done,  by  a  comparison  and  identification  of  the 
object  of  perception  with  the  'past  impression.'  Even  if  it  did  now 
exist  the  comparison  would  be  between  two  objects,  and  whence  then 
the  pastness?  How  in  the  meanwhile  has  the  object,  as  then  per- 
ceived, become  '  past '  ?  If  simply  resurrected  it  ought  to  be  the  same 
as  before.  Furthermore,  it  is  a  definition  in  a  circle  to  explain  past- 
ness  by  bringing  in  this  '  past  impression '  as  an  explanatory  term  of 
pastness.  That  is  the  point  to  be  more  precisely  elucidated  by  the 


DISCUSSION  AND  REPORTS.  543 

definition.  Why  is  an  object  regarded  as  past  or  known  again  ?  Is 
that  *  past  impression '  which  is  used  to  explain  pastness  or  known- 
againness  to  be  explained  in  its  turn  again  by  a  comparison  or  identi- 
fication with  other  l  past  impressions '  and  so  on  ad  infinitum  ?  We 
know  of  no  such  process  surely  in  consciousness.  Or  again,  if  an 
object  is  known  as  past  in  itself,  i.  e.,  inherently  or  ultimately,  there 
appears  to  be  no  need  of  a  process  of  comparison  and  identification 
and  if  such  be  the  case,  how  is  it  that  we  regard  the  same  object  or 
event  at  one  time  as  past,  and  at  another  as  present,  or  future  ? 

This  leads  to  the  second  point.  Miss  Calkins  believes  '  the  cen- 
tral error  of  the  theory '  to  be  '  the  assertion  that  recognition  does  not 
imply  identification  or  comparison.'  It  is  further  remarked  that  'im- 
mediate recognition  does,  nevertheless,  include  comparison  with  the 
past  experience  of  the  subject,  only  the  comparison  is  wavering  and 
restless,  and  the  identification  is  incomplete.'  As  above  stated,  I  did 
not  assert  that  identification  and  comparison  in  recognition  were  im- 
possibilities or  absent  in  the  process.  I  merely  said,  "  there  is  in  rec- 
ognition no  '  identification  of  the  past  impression  with  the  present 
one.'"  (p.  269.)  The  process  of  comparison  and  identification  may 
enter  into  some  cases  of  memory  and  recognition,  but  is  not  an  in- 
tegral and  necessary  part  of  every  case  of  recognition.  After  an  idea- 
object  (centrally  excited)  has  arisen  it  may  be  classified  upon  certain 
characteristics  as  'past;'  then  the  perceptual  object  (peripherally 
excited)  may  be  compared  and  possibly  identified  with  the  primary 
object.  The  perceptual  object  may  then  be  classified  as  known  again. 
In  such  a  case  comparison  may  be  present,  but  it  was  not  necessary  for 
the  classification  of  the  idea-object  as  past.  So  it  is  with  most  cases  of 
sudden  recognition  or  of  strange  familiarity  where  we  could  not  pos- 
sibly have  seen  the  object  in  question  beforehand.  Some  character- 
istic, usually  appertaining  to  objects  we  call  past,  associates  itself  un- 
wontedly  with  the  object  perceived  and  the  classification  naturally  en- 
sues. No  '  past  impression  '  or  even  idea-object  is  apparently  present 
or  necessary  for  the  recognition  in  question.  In  the  classification  of 
an  idea-object  as  past,  is  it  necessary  that  still  another  idea-object  (past 
or  former,  or  what  you  will)  should  be  present,  compared  and  identi- 
fied and  so  on  ad  libitum? 

Objects  as  they  appear  in  consciousness  are  in  themselves  neither 
past  nor  present.  So-called  idea-presentations  stand,  in  this  respect, 
equally  on  a  par  with  the  sense-presentations.  Comparison  or  identi- 
fication of  a  sense-object  A  with  the  centrally  excited  or  idea-object  a 
will  give  us  no  recognition,  simply  object  A  or  a.  The  pastness  or 


544  RECOGNITION. 

known  againness  of  either  has  still  to  be  ascertained.  Equally  so, 
and  this  is  a  point  little  regarded,  does  the  presentness,  the  nowness 
of  certain  objects  require  to  be  explained. 

An  object  may  be  regarded  at  one  time  as  past  and  at  another  as 
present.  Why  should  it  be  thus  classified  differently  at  different  times  ? 
Upon  a  consideration  of  these  points  I  was  led  to  note  the  character- 
istics of  the  objects  (and  their  possible  accompaniments)  in  each  case. 
It  then  became  evident  that  when  objects  were  possessed  of  certain 
characteristics  as  e.  g.,  lack  of  freshness  and  vividness,  absence  of  de- 
tails, unsteady,  easily  changeable  localization,  lack  of  persistency,  air 
of  freedom,  absence  of  certain  muscle,  joint  and  other  sensations,  the 
sudden  introduction  into  consciousness  of  an  object  by  association  of 
ideas,  which  object  does  not  in  the  case  in  question  properly  belong  to 
the  object  perceived,  the  great  rapidity  and  often  surprising  ease  and 
quickness  of  the  act  of  perceiving  often  accompanied  by  a  second  idea- 
presentation  of  the  same  object  immediately  following,  or  often  a  feel- 
ing of  pleasure  upon  perception  of  an  object,  say  a  stranger  in  the 
street,  when  the  cause  of  the  pleasure  is  unknown,  etc.,  then,  I  say,  we 
have  a  consciousness  of  these  characteristics  and  classify  these  objects 
as  past  or  known-again.  If,  on  the  other  hand,  they  possess  vividness, 
full  details,  persistence  or  obstinacy  of  spatialization,  persistency  in 
abiding  under  certain  conditions,  etc.,  then  we  have  a  consciousness  of 
these  characteristics  and  put  them  in  the  other  great  class  of  objects 
which  we  name  present.  The  former  we  call  memories,  the  latter 
perceptions.  Thus  it  happens  that  upon  an  object  centrally  excited,  pos- 
sessing great  vividness,  persistency,  etc.,  arising, there  may  ensue  the 
classification  of  it  as  belonging  to  i  objects  present ; '  later  it  proves  to 
be  an  hallucination.  It  may  also  be  added  that  objects  may  be  possessed 
of  these  characteristics,  but  they  may  not  be  noticed  and  there  may  be 
no  ensuing  classification.  In  such  a  case,  there  is  simply  what  I  may 
term  l  object  consciousness  '  passing  on  to  another  *  object  conscious- 
ness.' Neither  the  characteristics  nor  the  classification,  taken  alone, 
make  up  recognition,  but  both  together.  Moreover  the  characteristics 
may  be  variable,  now  one,  now  many,  now  this,  now  that ;  the  clas- 
sification into  either  present  or  past  objects  remains,  however,  the  same. 
The  characteristics  are,  however,  obviously  not  the  same  for  each 
great  group  or  class. 

It  is  thus  clear  that  I  do  not,  as  Miss  Calkins  affirms,  '  treat  the 
past  as  the  known-again- with-its-associates,'  nor  do  I  exclude  com- 
parison or  identification  from  all  cases  of  recognition.  In  my  own  ex- 
perience in  the  majority  of  those  cases  of  strange  familiarity  which  are 


DISCUSSION  AND  REPORTS.  545 

noted  by  so  many,  the  process  appears  to  me  to  be  in  most  cases  a 
surprising  acceleration  or  ease  in  perception  of  the  object  which  is  un- 
doubtedly hitherto  unknown  by  me,  and  immediately  following  there- 
upon a  second  presentation  of  the  same  object.  Now  this  acceleration 
and  this  consequent  easy  presentation  of  an  object  frequently  given  in 
experience,  are  characteristics  upon  which  I  base  the  immediately  fol- 
lowing classification  as  known  again  or  past.  There  may  be  thus  pres- 
ent comparison  and  classification,  but  it  is  evident  from  some  of  the 
other  characteristics  that  they  are  not  necessarily  always  present.  It 
is  said  "when  a  face  'seems  familiar,'  I  am  eagerly  comparing  it  with 
faces  I  have  already  seen,  trying  to  identify  the  present  with  the  past." 
It  is  quite  obvious  in  such  cases,  however,  that  the  comparison  and 
identification  comes  after  the  strange  feeling  of  familiarity  which  may 
be  based  on  other  characteristics  than  the  presence  of  accompanying 
idea-presentations.  Moreover  as  above  stated,  it  does  not  seem  correct 
to  use  the  explanatory  phrases  'past  experience,'  'identifying  the 
present  with  the  past '  etc.,  in  explaining  pastness. 

ARTHUR  ALLIN. 

The  points  of  disagreement  between  Dr.  Allin  and  myself  seem  to 
me  to  be  mainly  metaphysical,  and  should  perhaps  have  been  un- 
touched in  my  notice  of  his  intentionally  psychological  articles.  As 
I  have  there  said,  the  "definition  of  the  recognized  as  the  'known 
again'  is  psychologically  quite  satisfactory,  for  psychology  avowedly 
adopts  the  matter-of-fact  standpoint,"  that  is,  psychology  deals  with 
facts  of  consciousness,  or  relatively  isolated,  single  realities,  immedi- 
ate and  temporally  located.1  Now  these  facts  of  consciousness  or  im- 
pressions as  Dr.  Allin  might  call  them,  never  recur  and  never  rise 
from  a  buried  past  into  a  present.  Under  these  circumstances  the  dif- 
ficulty is  to  show  why  we  do  actually  have  an  experience  of  what  we 
call  identity ;  why,  in  spite  of  the  evanescence  of  the  facts  or  events 
of  consciousness,  we  do  predicate  sameness.  The  solution  to  this 
problem  seems  to  me  to  be  suggested  by  the  following  line  of  thought : 
besides  the  factual  sort  of  consciousness,  the  series  of  conscious  states 
which  truly  does  form  the  proper  object  of  psychological  investiga- 
tion, I  believe  myself  to  possess,  actually  and  immediately,  another 
sort  of  experience  which  is  what  I  mean  by  the  term  '  self-conscious- 
ness;' and  it  is  the  characteristic  of  this  sort  of  experience  to  be  non- 
temporal  and  incapable  of  being  split  up  into  facts. 

lCf.  F.  H.  Bradley,  Appearance  and  Reality,  p.  317,  fora  similar  defini- 
tion. 


546  RECOGNITION. 

Now  this  self-consciousness  evidently  conflicts  with  the  psychologi- 
cal or  fact-way  of  regarding  consciousness  precisely  where  questions 
of  time  are  involved,  but  the  self -consciousness  is  the  immediate  expe- 
rience, while  the  'facts'  are  really  artificial  abstractions,  necessarily 
hypothesized  for  the  scientific  study  of  consciousness,  yet  in  no  sense 
concrete  realities.  Moreover,  in  defining  a  'fact'  as  temporarily  re- 
lated, it  is  easy  to  assume  the  fundamental  validity  of  time  distinctions, 
whereas  from  the  strictly  psychological  point  of  view  they  are  mere 
conscious  elements.  To  say,  therefore,  'the  past  impression  is  gone 
forever' — a  statement  to  which  I  cordially  subscribe — means:  "As- 
suming, by  use  of  the  word  '  impression,'  the  temporal  way  of  regard- 
ing consciousness  as  a  series  of  '  events,'  then  it  follows  that  one 
'  event '  is  not  temporally  identical  with  another."  This  does  not, 
however,  affect  the  reality  of  the  experience  of  '  identifying,'  which  is 
really  a  transcendance,  not  a  comparison,  of  past  and  present. 

Dr.  Allin's  close  parallel  of  the  'known  again'  with  the  sensation1 
seems  to  me  also  to  threaten  the  obliteration  of  an  obvious  distinc- 
tion among  '  facts  of  consciousness.'  On  the  one  hand,  we  have  the 
admitted  sensations,  the  '  red,'  the  '  shrill,'  the  '  hard ' — what  Dr. 
James  calls  '  substantive  parts  '2  of  consciousness.  It  is  their  character- 
istic to  be  independent,  to  stand  alone  as  it  were,  or  (adopting  Dr. 
James's  figure)  to  provide  perchings  and  landing  places  to  thought. 
Besides  these,  however,  there  are  the  'transitive  parts'2  or  'fringes,'3 
the  relations  or  links,  themselves  facts  of  consciousness,  and  facts  only, 
from  the  psychological  standpoint,  yet  lacking  the  independence  and 
self-sufficiency  of  the  substantive  elements.  Such  '  transitive  parts '  are 
'sameness,'  '  agreeableness '  and  '  disagreeableness ' — not  to  mention 
others  which  might  lead  us  far  afield ;  these  seem  to  me  to  be  distin- 
guished from  the  substantive  elements  or  sensations,  just  in  this,  that 
they  inevitably  suggest  the  immediate  self-consciousness  which,  how- 
ever, unlike  the  'facts,'  is  untemporal ;  the  puzzle  of  assumed  identity 
and  temporal  diversity  is  thus  an  opposition  of  the  two  points  of  view. 

Though  I  agree,  therefore,  with  Dr.  Allin,  in  the  belief  that, 
psychologically  speaking,  present  and  past  are  simple  elements  of  con- 
sciousness, I  nevertheless  do  not  regard  his  analysis  of  these  contents 
as  psychologically  sufficient.  He  seems  to  me  himself  to  suggest  the 
inadequacy  by  the  statement,  in  the  preceding  '  discussion,'  that  recog- 
nition requires  both  the  enumerated  '  characteristics '  (lack  of  vivid- 

lAmer.Journ.  of  Psy.,  op.  cit.,  p.  267. 
2  Principles  of  Psychology,  I.,  243,  et.  alt. 
*Ib.,  p..  258. 


DISCUSSION  AND  REPORTS.  547 

ness,  rapidity  and  the  rest),  and  an  'ensuing  classification.'  Since 
these  characteristics  'may  be  variable,  now  one,  now  many,  now 
this,  now  that,'  it  seems  to  me  likely  that  they  are  mere  accompani- 
ments, not  constituents,  of  pastness  which  apparently  remains  virtually 
'  what-is-classified-as-past.' 

According  to  my  view,  which  I  can  here  barely  suggest,  the  con- 
sciousness of  time-distinctions  is  relatively  late,  and  is  one  form  of 
consciousness  of  multiplicity.  It  presupposes  self-consciousness,  for 
the  past  is  primarily  one's  own  past,  and  only  later  do  mere  objects  of 
imagination  unconnected  with  one's  own  experience,  like  the  reforms 
of  kleisthenes  or  the  battle  of  Waterloo,  become  also  *  past.'  The 
essence  of  temporal  multiplicity  is,  however,  the  consciousness  of 
necessary  connection.  The  '  past '  is  the  '  irrevocable,'  or  'irreversible ;' 
the  future  is  the  '  supposedly  reversible  or  unconnected;'  the  present  is 
a  later  distinction  and  is  negatively  defined  with  reference  to  the  other 
two.  Further  we  surely  can  not  go  on  any  pretext  of  keeping  within  psy- 
chological bounds ;  it  may  indeed  be  questioned  whether  we  have  not 
already  transgressed  these  in  attempting  any  account  of  'pastness.' 

Two  points  in  Dr.  Allin's  criticism  of  my  review  may  be  briefly 
mentioned.  The  word  '  past '  which  occurs  in  the  statement,  quoted 
by  Dr.  Allin,  about  '  immediate  recognition,'  he  regards  as  a  case  of 
'  definition  in  a  circle.'  The  word  was  not  used,  however,  as  an  ex- 
planation, but  as  a  partial  analysis — though  a  superficial  one — of  the 
'  known  again,'  which  is  not  in  my  opinion  equivalent  with  the  '  past.' 
The  sentence  in  which  this  word  occurs  is  properly  criticised,  since  it 
treats  the  subject  rather  popularly  and  inexactly,  but  I  still  hold,  with 
reference  to  the  main  point  at  issue,  that  mediate  and  immediate  recog- 
nition differ  only  in  degree. 

It  remains  to  question  two  of  Dr.  Allin's  explanations.  He  does 
not  seem  to  me  greatly  to  advance  the  discussion  by  insisting  that  recog- 
nition is  of  '  objects '  not  of  '  impressions,'  since  he  does  not  clearly  define 
the  former  word.  If  he  means  frankly  '  common-sense  object,'  then, 
indeed,  he  has  an  honest  psychology,  but  it  merely  substitutes  an 
every-day  philosophical  assumption  for  a  more  subtle  one.  I  object 
also  to  the  recourse  (as  by  the  expression,  '  object  centrally  excited') 
to  cortical  conditions  as  explanation  of  psychological  phenomena,  for 
here  again  one  has  on  one's  hands  a  whole  series  of  metaphysical  as- 
sumptions— dualism,  physical  causality  and  so  on — intermingling 
with  one's  psychology. 

MARY  WHITON  CALKINS. 

WELLESLEY  COLLEGE,  May,  1896. 


548  COMMUNITY  OF  IDEAS. 

THE   COMMUNITY   OF    IDEAS    OF    MEN   AND   WOMEN. 

In  following  the  discussion  between  Dr.  Jastrow  and  Miss  Calkins 
on  the  Community  of  Ideas  of  Men  and  Women,  I  have  been  struck 
most  forcibly  by  their  not  distinguishing  the  two  problems  which  Miss 
Calkins  finally  states  at  the  end  of  her  article  in  the  PSYCHOLOGICAL 
REVIEW  for  July.  These  problems,  put  in  terms  of  the  two  principal 
points  at  issue  between  Dr.  Jastrow  and  Miss  Calkins,  are : 

1.  Do  women  naturally  tend  more  to  repetition  and  to  the  use  of 
concrete  terms  than  men  ? 

2.  Do  women  tend  more  than  men  to  repetition  and  the  use  of  con- 
crete terms,  on  account  of  education  and  social  traditions? 

The  first  problem  deals  with  genuine  mental  differences  of  sex ; 
the  second  with  differences  due  to  association,  not  therefore  differences 
of  sex,  but  differences  which  will  change  with  changes  in  education 
and  psychical  environment. 

Which  problem  are  Dr.  Jastrow  and  Miss  Calkins  discussing  ?  I 
find  it  nowhere  explicitly  stated,  but  the  fact  that  the  two  sexes  as 
such  are  experimented  upon  to  find  their  differences  leads  me  to  sup- 
pose that  the  first  problem  is  the  one  under  consideration.  From  that 
point  of  view  it  seems  to  me  that  some  criticisms  may  fairly  be  made 
upon  their  method  of  collecting  data. 

If  the  problem  is  to  determine  inherent  psychical  sex  differences 
the  first  essential  to  scientific  experiment  is  to  eliminate,  as  far  as  pos- 
sible, or  to  allow  for  differences  due  to  habit.  This  can  be  done  to  a 
large  extent :  (a)  by  selecting  men  and  women  who  have  had  from 
childhood  essentially  the  same  physical  and  psychical  training;  (b) 
by  a  detailed  account  of  the  differences  in  training  which  do  exist ;  (c) 
by  a  large  number  of  cases  chosen  from  different  professions  and  dif- 
ferent social  strata ;  (d)  by  making  a  record,  at  the  time  when  the 
lists  are  written,  of  the  studies  which  the  subjects  are  pursuing  and 
of  their  occupations  outside  of  their  university  work ;  (e)  by  having 
the  subjects  under  the  same  conditions  when  making  out  the  lists.  I 
am  even  inclined  to  say  that  they  should  be  given  the  same  word  to 
start  with.  After  the  lists  are  written  it  would  also  be  an  advantage 
to  have  the  subjects  write  out  the  association  between  the  words,  in 
order  to  help  in  the  classification.  In  this  way,  probably  some  appar- 
ently abstract  terms  would  turn  out  to  be  concrete  in  meaning. 

As  nearly  as  I  can  judge  from  the  articles,  none  of  these  conditions 
were  observed  by  Dr.  Jastrow  and  Miss  Calkins.  No  measures  were 
taken  to  eliminate  or  to  allow  for  the  influence  of  habitual  associations. 


DISCUSSION  AND  REPORTS.  549 

To  my  mind,  therefore,  the  experiments  simply  resolve  themselves  into 
a  further  illustration  of  the  very  well-known  fact  that  habit  determines 
the  association  of  ideas — a  fact  which  it  is  entirely  unnecessary  to  prove 
and  which  is  quite  as  strikingly  illustrated  by  the  different  associations 
among  men  of  different  professions  as  by  those  between  men  and  women. 
It  is  probable  that  the  most  striking  differences  between  the  Welles- 
ley  lists  of  '94  and  '96,  and  between  the  Wellesley  and  Wisconsin  lists, 
might  be  entirely  explained  by  a  few  inquiries  into  the  studies  taken  by 
the  different  students  at  the  time  when  the  lists  were  made.  For  in- 
stance, the  lists  of  abstract  terms  stand  thus : 

Wis.  Men.     Wis.  Women.     Wellesley,  '96.     Wellesley,  '94. 
131.  97.  101.  280. 

We  are  told  that  in  the  Wellesley  list  for  '94  one  paper  alone  con- 
tained fifty  abstract  terms  out  of  a  hundred.  Until  it  is  positively  dis- 
proved, we  could  hardly  escape  the  inference  that  this  subject,  for  some 
unusual  reason,  had  been  much  occupied  in  abstract  thought.  May  it 
not  be  true  that  inquiries  about  the  Wisconsin  men  and  women  would 
give  the  same  kind  of  explanation?  Take,  for  instance,  the  lists  on 
the  animal  kingdom : 

Wis.  Men.     Wis.  Women.     Wellesley,  '96.     Wellesley,  '94. 
254.  178.  146.  223. 

The  discrepancies  here  might  be  doubly  explained.  Some  of  the 
subjects  might  have  been  taking  zoology  or  biology,  in  the  first  place. 
In  the  second  place,  the  care  of  animals  always  falls  to  the  boys;  very 
seldom  to  the  girls. 

So  I  might  go  through  with  the  entire  list,  but  these  suffice  to  show 
my  point. 

We  may  grant  and  declare  that  women's  associations  differ  from 
men's,  because  their  habits  of  life  are  different.  We  may  admit  the 
certainty  of  there  being  some  psychical  differences  between  men  and 
women  on  account  of  the  physical  differences  of  sex ;  but  generaliza- 
tions as  to  inherent  psychical  sex  differences  which  are  made  on  the  basis 
of  variations  due  to  individual  habits  can  have  no  validity. 

It  may  be  objected  that  the  very  fact  that  women  do  follow  certain 
occupations  to  the  almost  entire  exclusion  of  men,  and  vice  versa, 
proves  certain  particular  differences.  This  may  be  so,  but  it  can  not 
be  demonstrated  until  men  and  women  are  not  only  nominally  but 
actually  free  to  enter  any  profession.  At  present  some  occupations  are 


55°  COMMUNITY  OF  IDEAS. 

both  nominally  and  actually,  and  many  others  are  actually,  closed  to 
women,  especially  to  married  women.  The  same  is  true  of  men, 
although  to  a  much  smaller  degree.  In  view  of  the  recent  enlarge- 
ments of  4  woman's  sphere,'  he  would  be  a  bold  mathematician  who 
would  attempt  to  give  its  radius.  The  real  tendencies  of  women  can 
not  be  known  until  they  are  free  to  choose,  any  more  than  those  of  a 
tied-up  dog  can  be. 

Such  generalizations  as  those  of  Dr.  Jastrow  and  Miss  Calkins, 
serve  only  to  confuse  the  point  at  issue.  Whether  the  experiments 
were  to  prove  inborn  psychical  variations  between  men  and  women  or 
differences  in  association  due  to  differences  in  the  modes  of  life,  they 
fail  equally  because  they  do  not  consider  the  effect  of  habit ;  and  in 
the  latter  case  they  have  even  less  raison  d'etre  than  in  the  former, 
because  the  fact  is  already  generally  admitted. 

AMY  TANNER. 

UNIVERSITY  OF  CHICAGO. 


PSYCHOLOGICAL  LITERATURE. 

RECENT   FRENCH   WORKS. 

Dufondement  de  V induction,  suivi  de  psychologic  et  metaphysique. 
T.  LACHELIER.  Paris,  Alcan,  1896.  Pp.  176. 

This  little  book  is  a  republication  of  a  doctor's  thesis  which  dates 
from  1871  and  has  been  long  out  of  print.  Lachelier  undertakes  the 
investigation  of  the  principle  on  which  is  based  the  operation  by 
which  we  pass  from  knowledge  of  facts  to  knowledge  of  laws,  or, 
in  other  words,  by  which  we  add  to  perceived  facts  the  elements  of 
universality  and  necessity,  which  characterize  laws. 

According  to  the  author,  "there  are  only  three  ways  to  account 
for  principles,  because  there  are  only  three  ways  to  conceive  of  reality 
and  the  act  by  which  the  mind  enters  into  relation  with  it.  In  the  first 
place,  one  could  admit,  following  Hume  and  Mill,  that  all  knowledge 
is  sensation  and  that  principles  are  only  the  most  general  results  of  ex- 
perience. Secondly,  one  might  assume,  following  the  school  of 
Cousin,  that  these  phenomena  are  but  the  manifestation  of  a  world  of 
reality  inaccessible  to  our  senses,  and  in  this  case  the  chief  source  of 
knowledge  would  be  a  kind  of  intellectual  intuition,  which  discloses 
the  nature  of  these  realities  and  the  action  that  they  exert  on  the  sen- 
sible world.  Finally,  according  to  a  third  hypothesis,  that  of  Kant, 
our  highest  knowledge  is  neither  a  sensation  nor  an  intellectual  intui- 
tion, but  an  operation  by  which  thought  perceives  immediately  its  own 
nature  and  its  relation  to  phenomena." 

Without  stopping  to  discuss  Cousin's  theory,  we  may  adopt  on  this 
point  Lachelier's  conclusion:  "  Substances  and  causes  are  only  a  de- 
sideratum of  science,  a  name  given  to  the  unknown  basis  that  main- 
tains the  order  of  the  world,  the  statement  of  a  problem  transformed 
to  a  solution  by  a  verbal  artifice." 

But  attention  should  be  called  to  the  interpretation,  quite  incorrect 
in  my  opinion,  which  Lachelier  gives  to  Mill's  theory,  for  I  think 
there  is  no  radical  difference  between  the  points  of  view  of  Mill 
and  of  Kant.  Lachelier  has  fallen  into  the  error  of  believing  that 
Mill  takes  sensation  and  experience,  not  as  the  point  of  departure  of 
knowledge,  but  as  themselves  constituting  knowledge;  this  is  evi- 


55 2  RECENT  FRENCH    WORKS. 

dently  what  he  regards  as  empiricism,  and  I  do  not  say  that  Mill  is 
not  responsible  for  the  mistake,  as  his  language  is  often  equivocal. 
But  let  us  take  first  Mill's  argument  and  see  what  Lachelier  answers. 
It  appears  to  him  that  Mill  is  in  difficulties  between  the  needs  of 
science  and  the  logic  of  empiricism.  But  I  feel  sure  that  Mill's  argu- 
ment does  not  beg  the  question  when  his  meaning  is  thoroughly 
understood.  This  is  summarized  as  follows:  "  The  spontaneous 
induction  that  first  suggested  to  men  the  regularity  of  the  most  com- 
mon phenomena  inspired  them  with  only  moderate  confidence,  but 
their  confidence  gradually  increased  as  experience  confirmed  the 
results  of  their  early  inductions,  and  each  fact  that  confirmed  a  special 
law  spoke  in  favor  of  the  law  of  causality,  which  thus  collected  for 
itself  as  much  favorable  testimony  as  all  the  others  taken  together. 
It  is  consequently  not  surprising  that  this  law  became  finally  invested 
with  absolute  certainty,  while  the  others  only  attained  a  greater  or  less 
degree  of  probability,"  (p.  20).  Lachelier  does  not  accept  this  argu- 
ment, but  he  does  not  indicate  clearly  his  reasons.  The  only  objection 
to  be  made  to  Mill,  in  my  opinion,  is  that  he  has  not  been  sufficiently 
explicit  and  has  not  said  that  the  principle  of  induction  is  psychologi- 
cal, that  it  depends  on  our  mental  constitution  and  that  all  reasoning, 
even  deduction,  is  based  on  the  mechanism  of  our  ideas  and  representa- 
tions. 

Let  us  now  examine  Lachelier's  arguments,  which  are  curious; 
the  chief  ones  are  as  follows :  What  is  spontaneous  induction,  and 
what  place  does  it  occupy  in  a  system  in  which  experience  is  re- 
garded as  the  only  source  of  knowledge  ?  Is  it  the  same  thing  to  ob- 
serve the  occurrence  of  phenomena  and  to  conclude  that  the  same  phe- 
nomena will  recur  under  the  same  conditions  ?  The  author  amplifies 
these  curious  statements  in  another  place  in  the  same  book  to  refute 
the  view  of  Royer-Collard,  according  to  which  the  belief  in  the  sta- 
bility of  natural  laws  depends  on  our  own  nature.  "It  is  difficult  to 
imagine  a  more  complete  confusion  of  ideas.  Our  nature  is  not  able 
to  teach  us  a  priori  regarding  a  fact  of  experience,  but  beyond 
experience  and  facts  there  is  nothing  but  the  truths  of  reason,  which 
do  not  admit  of  contradiction.  A  judgment  which  is  not  empirical 
and  yet  is  not  necessary,  is  an  absurdity  which  has  no  place  in  human 
intelligence."  It  would  take  too  much  space  to  answer  point  by  point, 
but  let  us  note  some  of  the  arguments.  Lechelier  admits  a  few  lines 
further  on  that  we  are  able  to  foresee  certain  events  as  probable.  He 
admits  that  this  foresight  is  accompanied  by  a  strong  and  even  irresist- 
ible tendency  of  the  imagination,  but  then  expressions  of  contempt 


PSYCHOLOGICAL   LITERATURE.  553 

follow,  .  .  .  "to  seek  the  secret  of  the  future  in  what  is  only  the 
vague  image  of  the  past  is  to  undertake  to  guess  during  a  dream  what 
will  happen  when  we  are  awake."  What  a  curious  idea  to  compare 
with  a  dream  the  regular  course  of  mental  life !  It  is  much  to  be 
wished  that  this  question  of  the  basis  of  induction,  which  is  in  the  first 
instance  psychological,  should  be  taken  up  by  psychologists  and  studied 
by  means  of  exact  observations. 

Le  mouvement  idealist  et  la  reaction  contre  la  science  positive.  A. 
FOUILLEE.  Paris,  Alcan,  1896.  Pp.  351. 

This  work,  from  the  fluent  pen  of  one  of  the  best  known  of  French 
philosophers,  aims  to  bring  to  a  focus  the  discussion  on  the  fallibility 
of  science  so  brilliantly  opened  byM.  Brunetiere.  It  will  be  remem- 
bered that  M.  Brunetiere,  in  reviewing  the  questions  which  modern 
science  is  unable  to  answer,  confined  himself  chiefly  to  the  physical 
and  natural  sciences.  It  is  in  the  name  of  the  moral  sciences  that 
Fouille"e  speaks,  and  he  thus  changes  somewhat  the  question  at  issue. 
He  treats  as  the  principal  adversaries  of  science,  or,  to  speak  more  ex- 
actly, as  the  teachings  which  limit  the  field  of  science,  the  agnosti- 
cism of  Spencer,  the  idealism  of  Kant,  and  the  philosophy  of  contin- 
gency, represented  by  Renouvier  and  Boutroux.  These  are  the  teach- 
ings he  discusses  and  seeks  to  refute.  It  does  not  seem  to  the  present 
writer  that  the  intellectual  unrest  and  the  reaction  against  science 
which  have  arisen  in  recent  years  have  anything  in  common  with  the 
discussion  of  these  philosophical  problems,  and  I  think  it  would  have 
been  preferable  to  have  written  a  natural  history  of  the  moral  anarchy 
of  our  society,  its  causes  and  consequences,  remaining  as  far  as  pos- 
sible within  the  limits  of  observed  facts. 

The  work  has  an  appendix  containing  four  short  papers,  (i) 
'Adolophe  Franck  and  the  Philosophic  Movement  of  the  Past  Fifteen 
Years,'  (2)  'Descartes  and  Contemporary  Teachings,'  (3)  'Philo- 
sophic Instruction  and  the  French  Democracy,'  (4)  '  Philosophy  in 
Examinations  (les  concours  aggregation}'  The  author  regrets  the 
exaggerated  place  given  to  metaphysics  and  the  history  of  philosophy. 

Les  principes  du  positivisme  contemporain,  expose  et  critique.     T. 

HALLEUX.     Paris,  Alcan,  1896.     Pp.  351. 

This  little  book  written  from  the  point  of  view  of  Catholicism  and 
inspired  by  M.  Mercier,  of  Louvain,  contains  many  ready-made 
formulas  and  purely  verbal  arguments,  such  as  are  usual  in  a  catechism, 
The  principal  objection  made  to  positivism  contains  a  great  deal  of 


554  RECENT  FRENCH    WORKS. 

truth.  It  is  that  the  positivists  are  mistaken  in  holding  that  all  experi- 
mental knowledge  can  be  reduced  to  the  consciousness  of  a  subjective 
being ;  in  the  most  minute  and  exact  observations  the  mind  always 
controls  the  senses. 


Les  types  Intellectuels :  Esprits  logiques  et  esprits  faux.  FR. 
PAULHAN.  Paris,  Alcan,  1896.  Pp.  362. 

In  this  book,  with  this  curious  and  suggestive  title,  the  author  pro- 
poses a  classification  of  intellectual  types.  The  study  is  a  continuation 
of  his  previous  work,  Sur  les  characteres,  the  two  works  being  the 
development  and  application  of  the  author's  peculiar  theories  regard- 
ing systematic  association.  It  may  be  briefly  called  to  mind  that 
systematic  association  consists  in  the  property  that  all  kinds  of  psycho- 
logical elements  possess  of  associating  themselves  together  to  form 
syntheses,  not  in  obeying  the  laws  of  resemblance,  of  contrast  and  of 
contiguity,  which  are  secondary  laws,  but  in  realizing  a  law  of  tele- 
ology. In  intellectual  phenomena  systematic  association  takes  the 
form  of  knowledge,  whence  a  division  of  intellectual  types  into  such 
as  are  logical  and  such  as  are  illogical. 

Logical  minds  are  of  various  kinds :  well-balanced,  in  which  sys- 
tematic association  follows  without  effort  from  innate  tendencies; 
thinkers,  in  whom  equilibrium  is  sought  after  and  attained  with 
effort ;  extremists,  in  whom  equilibrium  is  obtained  by  the  subordi- 
nation of  the  intelligence  to  certain  elements ;  specialists,  in  whom 
systematization  takes  place  only  in  a  small  field.  Then  there  are  the 
intellectual  types  dominated  by  phenomena  of  conflict,  of  inhibition 
and  of  contrast,  the  combatants,  the  critics,  the  dreamers,  the  sceptics, 
etc.  The  exaggeration  of  association  by  contiguity  gives  a  limited  and 
halting  memory ;  the  excess  of  association  by  resemblance,  in  the  case 
of  words,  gives  rise  to  rhyming  .poets ;  in  the  case  of  ideas,  to  the 
abuse  of  metaphor. 

The  author  also  subdivides  illogical  types.  He  distinguishes 
minds  illogical  through  the  excessive  predominance  of  leading  ideas ; 
those  illogical  through  conflicting  adaptations;  then,  finally,  those 
naturally  incoherent.  This  last  type  is  confined  to  children  and 
hysterics. 

All  these  distinctions  are  interesting,  but  we  should  not  forget  that 
the  study  of  intellectual  types  should  be  made  by  observations  of  in- 
dividuals, ratner  than  by  a  treatise  written  in  the  library. 


PSYCHOLOGICAL  LITERATURE.  555 

De   Vaphasie  sensorielle.     CH.   MIRALLIE.     Paris,  Steinheil,  1896. 

Pp.  220. 

This  book  is  a  thesis  for  the  M.  D.  degree,  in  which  the  author 
chiefly  presents  the  views  of  Dejerine,  his  teacher.  It  is  well  known 
that  Dejerine,  the  eminent  professor  at  the  Saltpetriere,  has  made 
numerous  researches  on  aphasia  which  have  opened  a  new  phase  of 
the  subject.  Charcot's  celebrated  scheme  of  the  four  images  and  the 
four  centers  has  received  a  serious  attack;  briefly,  the  chief  points 
brought  out  are  as  follows : 

(1)  Charcot  held,  following  Hartley,  that  we  can  use  in   inner 
speech  four  kinds  of  images,  visual,  auditory,  articulatory  motor  and 
graphic  motor,  and  that  consequently  language  depends  on  the  use  of 
four  distinct  nervous  centers,  and,  further,  that  each  individual  uses 
preferably  a  certain  kind  of  images,  some  being  visualizers,  some  be- 
ing audiles,  etc.     Dejerine  holds,  on  the  other  hand,  that  this  distinc- 
tion of  mental  types  is  not  founded  in  fact,  but  results  in  a  confusion 
between  memory  for  words  and  memory  for  things.     As  far  as  mem- 
ory for  objects  is  concerned,  it  is  quite  true  that  there  is  a  visual 
memory,  an  auditory  memory  and  a  motor  memory,  and  that  some 
kinds  of  memory  may  be  more  developed  in  the  case  of  certain  individ- 
uals and  serve  to  characterize  them ;  but  in  regard  to  words  and  think- 
ing in  words  matters  are  quite  different.     In  studying  inner  speech  we 
must  return  to  the  point  of  view  of  Egger.     We  are  all  auditory,  or, 
more  exactly,  auditory-motor,  and  those  who  '  read  the  words  of  their 
thought'  or  'write  them'  are  extremely  rare  exceptions.     The  whole 
discussion  should  be  read  in  Mirallie's  monograph,  which,  though  pre- 
sented in  a  somewhat  schematic  form,  is  highly  instructive. 

(2)  The  second  part  of  Charcot's  work,  which  has  been  refuted  by 
Dejerine,  is  the  explanation  of  agraphia.     According  to  Charcot  the 
act  of  writing  depends  on  the  calling  up  of  graphic    images,   and 
agraphia  is  explained  by  the  loss  of  graphic  memory.     Dejerine  has 
brought  forward  many  cases  to  show  that  the  process  of  writing  is  en- 
tirely different  from  this  ;  we  use  a  visual  copy,  and  it  is  the  visual  image 
which  is  lost  in  agraphia  and  prevents  writing.     This  is  proved  by  the 
fact  that  those  suffering  from  agraphia  can  write  when  they  copy  a 
model   placed   before  their  eyes,  whereas  they  are  unable  to  make 
words  from  blocks  containing  the  letters. 

Mirallie's  book  includes  further  an  exposition  of  the  two  forms  of 
verbal  blindness  distinguished  by  Dejerine,  and  a  plea  in  favor  of 
sensorial  aphasia  which  Wernicke  defined,  but  which  Kussmaul  and 
Charcot  have  denied.  There  are  in  the  book  numerous  anatomical 


556  .BUCKEN'S  DER  KAMPF. 

drawings  and  specimens  of  handwriting,  clinical  observations  given  in 
detail,  and  a  very  complete  bibliography  of  aphasia.  It  is  impossible 
to  recommend  too  highly  the  reading  of  this  book  to  those  who  wish 
to  understand  the  most  recent  studies  of  aphasia,  a  subject  of  the 
greatest  possible  interest  to  the  psychologist. 

A.  BINET. 
PARIS. 


Der  Kampf  um  einen  geistigen  Lebensinhalt :  neue  Grundle- 
gung  einer  Weltanschauung.  RUDOLF  EUCKEN.  Leipzig,  Veit 
&  Comp,  1896.  Pp.  viii-f  400. 

The  significance  of  this  work  is  indicated  by  the  chief  words  in  the 
title.  The  present  age  is  held  to  be  one  in  which  man  is  threatened 
with  the  loss  of  all  sure  foundation  for  the  life  of  the  spirit,  or  even 
actually  dispossessed  of  a  basis  and  a  content  for  his  spiritual  existence. 
Thus  our  time  is  one  of  conflict.  First  of  all,  conflict  between  the 
opposing  tendencies  of  thought,  which  distract  us  no  more  surely  when 
considered  in  their  manifold  variety  than  they  fail  to  satisfy  the  mind  if 
taken  in  the  form  of  the  movements — e.  g.,  naturalism,  idealism — that 
most  have  gained  the  suffrages  of  the  modern  world.  Hence  begins  a 
deeper  struggle,  or  rather  the  conflicting  systems  of  the  day  include  an 
element  of  which  the  leaders  are  often  but  dimly  conscious,  a  contest 
for  the  realization  of  the  life  of  spirit  and  for  the  satisfaction  of  the 
needs  native  to  man  in  virtue  of  his  relation  to  the  universal  spirit  or 
reason  of  the  world.  This  battle  and  this  yearning  unrest,  moreover, 
are  real,  however  much  they  may  be  denied  or  disguised  by  the  com- 
placent naturalism  of  the  time,  by  our  shallow  culture  and  our  lifeless 
art,  by  a  social  utilitarianism  at  bottom  essentially  selfish,  or  by  a 
weakened  church  which  fails  to  accomplish  its  high  mission  because 
of  its  insistence  on  the  outworn  traditions  of  the  past.  The  age,  there- 
fore, must  be  summoned  to  continue  its  warfare;  only  with  an  adequate 
comprehension  of  the  issues  at  stake  and  of  the  true  objective  point  of 
the  conflict.  For  the  Geisteswelt  and  the  Geistesleben  are  fun- 
damental realities,  not  mere  imaginings  crystallized  into  words.  Yet 
their  reality  is  to  be  understood  in  a  sense  other  than  that  which  is  com- 
monly associated  with  the  term ;  they  exist  not  as  fixed  and  finished 
products,  but  ever  depend  on  the  work  of  free  creative  activity.  Es- 
pecially for  us,  a  constantly  repeated  deed,  which  implies  freedom 
and  is  in  its  nature  essentially  ethical,  is  necessary,  if  we  are  to  realize 
the  spiritual  life-process  in  ourselves.  In  this  way  only  is  the  genera- 
tion of  a  true  spiritual  actuality  possible ;  and  possible,  the  overcom- 


PSYCHOLOGICAL  LITERATURE.  557 

ing  of  the  contradictions  whose  existence  and  whose  power  it  is  idle 
to  attempt  to  ignore.  Das  Ansichwahre  und  Ansichgute  Platos, 
es  wird  zu  einer  lebendigen  Wirklichkeit  fur  uns  nur  in  Verbin- 
dung  mit  jener  Selbstthatigkeit  Fichtes  (p.  33). 

In  tracing  the  conditions  and  the  course  of  spiritual  advance 
through  conflict  Professor  Eucken  divides  his  work  into  two  main  parts. 
The  aim  of  the  first  or  Aufsteigender  Tei'tis  the  defense  and  elabora- 
tion of  his  chief  thesis ;  that  of  the  second  or  Absteigender  Teil,  the 
application  of  his  results  to  the  concrete  conditions  and  institutions  of 
to-day.  Part  I.  subdivides  again  into  three  discussions  of  as  many 
stages  of  the  movement :  A,  Der  Kampf  um  die  Selbstandigkeit 
des  Geisteslebens ;  B,  Der  Kampf  um  den  Charakter  des  Geistes- 
lebens'}  C,  Der  Kampf  um  die  Weltmacht  des  Geisteslebens.  In 
these,  besides  the  principles  of  the  spiritual  life  already  noted,  two 
others  may  be  mentioned  as  essential  to  the  author's  doctrine  and  con- 
stantly kept  by  him  in  view :  the  existence  of  a  universal  spirit  or 
reason,  to  whom  man  is  fundamentally  related  and  whose  ultimate 
victory  is  absolutely  sure ;  and  the  development  of  the  new  world  of 
spiritual  activity  with  ever-increasing  richness  and  complexity  as  one 
by  one  the  various  forms  of  opposition  are  overcome.  In  fact,  though 
the  contradictions  and  the  conflict  are  painfully  real,  they  contribute 
in  their  turn  to  the  development  of  the  spiritual  life-process  as  it  con- 
quers the  opposing  forces  by  transforming  and  conserving  them. 
Part  II.  brings  the  general  view  of  the  life  of  spirit  thus  gained  into 
normative  connection  with  the  present  status  of  affairs.  Here,  as 
throughout  his  treatise,  Professor  Eucken  finds  much  to  criticise  in 
the  organization  and  institutions  of  the  age  and  sees  hope  only  in  the 
correction  of  present  tendencies  by  resolute  devotion  to  the  spiritual 
ideals.  This  adherence,  however,  must  not  be  partial,  but  inclusive. 
Even  religion,  with  its  clearest  intimation  of  the  world  beyond,  may 
exert  a  pernicious  influence  if  it  assume  to  be  the  whole  of  the  spirit- 
ual process  instead  of  finding  its  complements  in  morals,  art  and 
philosophy.  It  is  only  when  all  these  several  agencies,  purified  of  their 
one-sided  tendencies  as  well  as  of  their  direction  to  that  which  is  em- 
pirical and  lower,  are  combined  into  one  collective  movement  that 
an  age  (or  a  man)  can  rise  to  the  measure  of  its  spiritual  possibilities. 

For  the  purposes  of  this  REVIEW  detailed  criticism  is  not  in 
place.  It  maybe  remarked,  however,  that  Prof essor Eucken  furnishes 
one  more  interesting  proof  of  the  dissatisfaction  of  earnest  thinkers 
with  the  outcome  of  recent  speculation.  Happily  his  criticism  is  more 
temperate  than  that  of  many  other  judges  of  the  age.  With  all  his 


558  ETHNOLOGY  AND  ANTHROPOLOGY. 

directness  of  censure,  his  historical  sense  is  too  sure  and  his  apprecia- 
tion of  modern  culture  too  real  for  him  to  overwhelm  us  with  an  un- 
relieved jeremiad,  even  were  his  belief  in  the  final  triumph  of  spirit  less 
absolute.  Therefore  his  collateral  discussions  are  often  illuminating 
even  for  the  adherents  of  principles  which  he  rejects.  And,  as  has 
been  suggested  by  a  critic  of  one  of  his  earlier  works  in  which  among 
others,  positions  similar  to  those  of  the  volume  undei  review  have  been 
foreshadowed,  his  general  view  of  the  world  and  of  the  age  may  prove 
acceptable  to  many  who  can  not  fully  share  in  his  positive  philosophi- 
cal doctrine. 

A.  C.  ARMSTRONG,  JR. 
WESLEYAN  UNIVERSITY. 


ETHNOLOGY  AND  ANTHROPOLOGY. 

Ethnology.     A.  H.  KEANE,  F.  R.  G.  S.      Cambridge  Geographical 

Series.  Cambridge  University  Press,  1896.  Pp.  xxx -f  442. 
One  takes  up  with  interest  any  professedly  synthetic  work  on  a  sub- 
ject as  disordered  in  its  material  as  anthropology  or  ethnology,  and 
while  any  book  with  as  ambitious  a  field  as  the  title  of  the  one  before 
us  would  indicate  must  be  almost  immediately  superseded  it  is  worth 
while  every  now  and  then  to  pause  and  take  our  bearings.  Of  Mr. 
Keane's  book,  in  the  first  place,  it  must  be  admitted  that  the  title  is  mis- 
leading, although  he  partially  guards  himself  by  the  definitions  with 
which  he  very  properly  opens.  Whatever  may  be  said  of  other  anthro- 
pological terms  which  are  at  present  in  such  active  dispute,  '  ethnology ' 
has  come  to  be  pretty  generally  regarded  as  including  the  comparative 
study  of  the  varieties  of  man  in  their  social  aspects,  and  while  the  term 
'  ethnography '  is,  of  course,  a  necessary  one  to  denote  the  purely  descrip- 
tive side  of  the  subject  it  is  always  subsidiary  to  the  larger,  and  an  eth- 
nology without  an  ethnography  is  an  absurdity  which  apparently  does 
not  bother  Mr.  Keane  in  the  least,  since  he  hands  over  what  we  have 
all  come  to  regard  as  among  the  main  questions  of  ethnology  to  ethnog- 
raphy, and  restricts  his  own  work  to  a  field  which  he  divides  into  two 
parts,  treating  in  the  first  place,  under  fundamental  problems,  such 
questions  as  the  '  Physical  Evolution  of  Man,'  '  Mental  Evolution  of 
Man,'  '  Antiquity  of  Man,'  '  Specific  Unity  of  Man,'  and  *  Varietal 
Diversity  of  Man,'  and  in  the  second  part  taking  up  the  primary 
ethnical  groups  which  he  divides  into  four,  '  homo  yEthiopicus,'  '  homo 
Mongolicus,'  '  homo  Americanus,' and  'homo  Caucasicus.'  If  we  ac- 
cept this  contracted  field  of  ethnology,  Mr.  Keane's  work  is,  on  the 


PSYCHOLOGICAL  LITERATURE.  559 

whole,  well  done.  One  cannot  expect  too  much  from  a  general  work 
of  small  compass,  yet  serious  exception  must  be  taken  to  such  chapters 
as  that  on  'Mental  Evolution  of  Man,'  which  is  most  inadequate 
from  the  point  of  view  of  comparative  psychology,  the  chapter  being 
a  short  one  of  nine  pages  treating  chiefly  of  craniology,  and  similarly 
to  the  one  on  '  Mental  Criteria  of  Race,'  which  confines  itself  almost 
wholly  to  a  discussion  of  language,  a  comparative  feature  of  prime  im- 
portance, of  course,  but  in  the  light  of  such  researches  as  those  of 
Tylor,  Bastian,  Lippert,  Steinmetz  and  others  no  longer  to  be  regarded 
as  the  only  field  of  comparative  value. 

Yet  with  all  its  shortcomings  the  book  satisfies  a  genuine  need, 
especially  of  the  general  public.  Mr.  Keane's  reading  is  wide,  his 
presentation  of  arguments  fairly  complete  and  the  arrangement  of 
material  logical,  and  his  book  is  temporarily  at  least  perhaps  the  best 
resume  at  hand  of  our  knowledge  in  the  limited  field  of  which  it  treats, 
which  is  unfortunately  rather  faint  praise. 

The  Child  and  Childhood  in  Folk-thought.  A.  F.  CHAMBERLAIN, 
M.  A.,  Ph.  D.  New  York,  Macmillan  &  Co.,  1896.  Pp. 
x+464. 

Dr.  Chamberlain  has  produced  a  very  useful,  painstaking  and  dis- 
appointing work.  It  is  useful  in  the  number  of  items  he  has  collected 
from  all  sorts  of  comparatively  inaccessible  sources ;  it  is  disappoint- 
ing in  the  almost  total  lack  of  logical  arrangement  of  the  facts.  He 
has  strung  his  beads  of  quotation  upon  a  thread  of  thirty-three  rather 
sentimentally  headed  chapters  from  which  even  the  excellent  index 
does  not  suffice  to  bring  order,  and  the  result  is  rather  a  concordance 
to  the  literature  of  the  primitive  child  than  a  systematic  treatise  on  the 
subject.  His  method,  if  there  be  one,  is  undiscoverable,  and  the  book 
seems  to  fail  to  fulfill  either  of  its  possible  aims,  for  it  is  an  impossible 
work  for  the  layman  to  read  consecutively  and  emerge  with  any  tangi- 
ble results,  and  it  is  exasperating  to  the  anthropologist  who  seeks  ma- 
terial on  any  one  of  the  really  innumerable  subjects  connected  with 
the  position  and  treatment  of  the  child  among  primitive  people.  The 
latter  will  with  some  difficulty  find  scattered  through  the  book  excerpts 
to  his  purpose  introduced  possibly  by  a  gem  from  the  pen  of  Henry 
Ward  Beecher  or  Joaquin  Miller,  but  a  discussion  by  the  author 
rarely.  Take,  for  example,  the  chapter  on  '  Child-life  and  Education 
in  General,'  one  of  the  best  in  the  book,  by  the  way,  and  such  ques- 
tions as  the  first  moral  training,  first  punishable  offences,  methods  of 
punishment,  etc.,  are  hardly  touched  upon,  much  less  discussed,  not- 


560  ETHNOLOGY  AND  ANTHROPOLOGY. 

withstanding  their  immense  significance.  Facts  as  facts  are  always 
desirable  however  presented,  but  it  seems  a  pity  that  one  as  fitted  for 
the  task  as  the  author  of  this  work  should  have  failed  so  signally  to 
utilize  the  extensive  material  he  has  recorded.  Possibly  this  is  re- 
served for  further  efforts.  Let  us  hope  that  Dr.  Chamberlain  will  see 
his  way  clear  to  bring  future  order  out  of  present  chaos.  Of  his  book 
as  it  stands  one  can  only  say  that  as  an  example  of  industry  it  is  re- 
markable ;  as  science  it  is  bad. 

Die  Anf tinge  der  Kunst.  ERNST  GROSSE,  Dr.  Phil.  Freiburg  i. 
B.  and  Leipzig,  J.  C.  B.  Mohr,  1894.  Pp.  vii.-f  301. 

This  book  is  a  little  masterpiece.  It  is,  so  far  as  the  writer  is 
aware,  the  first  attempt,  certainly  the  first  successful  attempt,  to  estab- 
lish a  science  of  art,  as  distinguished  from  history  and  philosophy  of 
art,  upon  a  scientific  basis  by  legitimate  methods.  The  first  task  of 
any  science  is  not  practical  utility  but  theoretical  insight,  and  the  first 
task  of  a  science  of  art  is  not  the  application  but  the  recognition  of  the 
laws  which  govern  the  life  and  development  of  art.  This  end  is  for 
the  present  an  ideal,  but  an  ideal  in  the  struggle  toward  which  the 
conformity  of  art  phenomena  to  developmental  law  may  at  least  be 
shown,  even  though  the  details  of  the  laws  themselves  be  not  demon- 
strable, and  it  is  as  a  pioneer  in  this  field  that  Herr  Grosse  deserves 
the  highest  praise.  He  has  grappled  boldly  with  great  obstacles, 
recognizes  his  failures,  does  not  over-estimate  his  successes,  and  has 
finally  'blazed'  a  path  which  must  be  followed  in  the  future  and  fol- 
lowed with  most  significant  results.  He  recognizes  two  aspects  to  the 
task  of  describing  and  explaining  the  phenomena  of  art,  an  individual 
and  a  social,  and  turning  his  attention  to  the  social  confines  his  re- 
searches very  wisely  to  the  most  fundamental  and  at  the  same  time 
most  neglected  field,  viz.  :  the  primitive  art  of  primitive  peoples,  and 
applies  the  method  of  comparative  ethnology. 

Without  discussing  the  gaps  and  faults  of  that  method  as  at  present 
in  use,  we  can  turn  directly  to  the  author's  treatment  of  his  material. 
He  follows  the  old  division  of  the  arts  into  arts  of  rest  and  arts  of 
movement,  quoting  Fechner's  description  "  dass  die  Kiinste  der  einen 
Art  durch  ruhende,  die  der  anderen  durch  bewegte  oder  zeitlich  ablau- 
fende  Formen  zu  gefallen  streben ;  jene  demgemass  ruhende  Massen 
so  umgestalten  oder  combiniren — diese  solche  korperliche  Bewegungen 
oder  zeitliche  Aenderungen  erzeugen  das  der  Kunstzweck  erfiillt 
wird."  Taking  up  the  arts  of  rest,  commonly  known  as  '  pictorial,' 
the  author  considers  as  the  probable  original  form  that  of  ornament, 


PSYCHOLOGICAL   LITERATURE.  561 

and  as  the  original  object  to  be  ornamented,  the  human  body,  which 
is,  therefore,  discussed  first,  followed  by  the  decorations  of  utensils 
and  weapons ;  thirdly,  he  treats  of  drawings,  paintings  and  sculptures 
which  do  not  primarily  serve  decorative  ends  but  have  an  independent 
meaning.  The  transition  from  the  arts  of  rest  to  the  arts  of  move- 
ment is  represented  by  the  dance,  to  which  especial  attention  is  given 
as  being  of  extreme  sociological  importance,  and  which  leads  natu- 
rally to  the  consideration  of  poetry,  since  among  primitive  peoples  the 
dance  and  song  are  always  associated,  and  finally,  primitive  music  is 
discussed. 

One  may  choose  for  particular  notice  the  chapters  on  ornaments  of 
the  body  or  '  die  Kosmetik,'  and  on  the  dance  as  being  perhaps  the 
most  valuable  and  suggestive.  Regarding  the  former,  after  a  con- 
sideration of  the  various  forms  of  clothing  and  ornament  among 
primitive  people,  Grosse  goes  on  to  discuss  their  practical  meaning. 
One  can  divide  all  primitive  ornaments  of  the  body  into  two  classes, 
those  tending  to  attract  and  those  tending  to  affright,  not  that 
any  given  decoration  will  fall  under  one  of  these  heads  to  the 
exclusion  of  the  other;  on  the  contrary,  it  is  usually  both,  for 
among  primitive  men  as  in  our  own  level  of  civilization  what 
makes  a  man  terrible  to  his  enemies  or  to  other  men  makes  him  attrac- 
tive to  women.  Undoubtedly  the  first  and  strongest  incentive  to  orna- 
mentation of  the  body  is  the  desire  to  please,  and  in  savage  life  it  is 
one  of  the  most  powerful  and  indispensable  factors  in  sexual  selec- 
tion. At  that  level  the  men  are  much  more  given  to  decoration  than 
the  women,  contrary  to  the  condition  of  affairs  among  civilized  peo- 
ple. They  resemble  the  higher  animals  in  this  respect.  It  is  the  primi- 
tive man  who  is  the  suitor,  just  as  it  is  the  male  animal  who  woos  the 
female.  A  primitive  old  maid  is  a  thing  unknown ;  the  woman  is 
always  sure  of  marriage,  while  the  man  must  often  obtain  a  wife  against 
great  obstacles,  and  often  remain  in  a  state  of  forced  and  hated  bach- 
elordom  for  years.  This  sexual  value  explains  the  fact  that  decora- 
tion of  the  body  is  often  first  begun  after  the  rites  of  puberty  which 
mark  the  entrance  of  the  boy  to  man's  estate.  But  the  man  is  warrior 
as  well  as  potential  husband,  and  has  therefore  a  double  object  in  be- 
decking his  person,  and  as  has  been  said,  most  ornament  serves  this 
double  purpose.  Red  is  not  only  the  color  for  festivals,  but  the  color 
for  war ;  the  headdress  of  feathers  which  increases  the  height  is  as- 
sumed in  the  dance  as  well  as  in  battle,  and  the  scars  on  the  breast  of 
the  Australian,  which  excite  the  admiration  of  the  women,  arouse  the 
fear  of  the  enemy.  It  is  hard  to  find  an  exclusively  repellent  orna- 


562  U  AN  NEE  PSYCHOLOGIZE. 

mentation.  Only  certain  patterns  of  painting  the  body  seem  to  serve 
that  end  alone.  As  badges  of  authority,  class  and  rank,  ornament  is 
little  used  among  primitive  men,  for  such  distinctions  do  not  exist 
there  as  they  do  among  us,  yet  even  there  are  seen  the  beginnings  from 
which  have  developed  the  uniforms,  gowns  and  accoutrements  of  our 
own  military,  academic  and  other  degrees. 

Space  does  not  permit  a  discussion  of  the  questions  involved  in  the 
forms  and  development  of  the  savage  dance,  though  its  role  is  all  im- 
portant in  savage  life.  The  pleasure  in  active  and  rhythmical  movement, 
the  pleasure  in  imitation  and  the  relief  in  the  expression  of  pressing 
emotion  are  a  sufficient  explanation  of  the  passion  with  which  primi- 
tive man  cultivates  this  art.  The  significance  of  the  primitive  dance 
is  striking.  It  fulfills  not  only  a  sexual  end,  but  to  a  greater  degree 
even  a  social  one.  The  uniting  of  a  body  of  men  under  the  influence 
of  a  single  emotion  as  seen  in  war  dances,  the  union  of  heterogeneous 
tribal  elements  in  certain  dances  of  peace,  suggest  sociological  bear- 
ings of  the  highest  importance,  and  the  field  is  one  richly  deserving 
the  attention  of  the  ethnologist. 

It  is  one  of  the  merits  of  Grosse's  book  that  it  does  not  attempt  too 
many  conclusions  from  rather  scanty  material.  One  point  at  least  be- 
comes evident ;  primitive  art  in  most  of  its  phases  does  not  serve  pri- 
marily an  aesthetic  end ;  it  is  first  of  all  practical,  and  the  purely 
aesthetic  result  is,  so  to  speak,  a  by  product.  In  music  alone  as  a  rule 
does  the  aesthetic  appear  as  the  single  end  in  view.  For  the  rest  of  the 
numberless  questions  suggested  one  can  only  refer  to  the  book  itself. 

Herr  Grosse  is  entitled  to  the  greatest  credit  for  what  is  in  the  opin- 
ion of  the  writer  the  most  important  contribution  to  this  subject  in  many 

years. 

LIVINGSTON  FARRAND. 
COLUMBIA  UNIVERSITY. 


L?  Annee  $sychologique.     2e  annee,  1895.     H.  BEAUNIS  and  A.  Bi- 

NET.     Paris,  Alcan,  1896.     Pp.  1010. 

The  second  volume  of  the  Annee  presents  a  decided  advance  over 
its  predecessor.  The  plan  adopted  at  the  outset  included  three  dis- 
tinct parts :  original  articles,  summaries  of  important  books  and  arti- 
cles appearing  during  the  year,  and  an  annual  bibliography  of  all 
publications  of  interest  to  psychologists.  The  same  general  scheme  is 
adhered  to  in  the  present  volume,  but  we  find  several  noticeable 
changes  in  details.  A  larger  number  of  articles  are  summarized,  and 
the  summaries  themselves  are  more  in  keeping,  as  regards  length,  with 


PSYCHOLOGICAL  LITERATURE.  563 

the  value  and  interest  of  the  works.  Under  the  head  of  original  arti- 
cles are  included  a  number  of  '  general  reviews,'  which  add  greatly  to 
the  value  of  the  Annee.  In  the  same  section,  too,  the  work  of  the  in- 
dependent contributors  is  now  separated  from  the  more  specialized 
studies  of  the  Paris  Laboratory.  The  fact  that  the  volume  has  in- 
creased in  a  year  from  six  hundred  pages  to  over  a  thousand  is  in  itself 
an  indication  of  the  proportions  which  the  enterprise  has  assumed. 

To  the  outsider  this  rapid  expansion  cannot  appear  as  an  unmixed 
blessing.  A  volume  of  the  present  size  is  not  over  easy  to  handle ;  if 
the  number  of  original  contributions  should  be  further  increased  (they 
are  still  comparatively  few),  it  might  actually  become  unwieldy.  We 
may  ask  whether,  after  all,  the  plan  laid  down  is  not  too  complex  to 
be  carried  out  as  a  single  undertaking.  Examination  shows  that  the 
volume  includes  two  distinct  lines  of  work,  which  might  readily  be 
separated.  The  first  is  a  general  r£sum6  and  bibliography  of  the  past 
year's  work  in  psychology  (Parts  II.  and  III.)  ;  the  second  is  the  col- 
lection of  original  contributions  (Part  I.) .  Are  these  two  departments 
equally  well  carried  out?  We  think  not.  The  '  Jahresbericht '  is  con- 
ceived and  carried  out  on  a  magnificent  scale.  To  compare  favorably 
with  it  the  original  portion  should  consist  of  some  of  the  very  best  work 
of  the  best  French  writers  on  psychology.  Without  wishing  to  cast  a 
shade  of  disparagement  upon  the  writers  who  have  contributed  to  the 
volume,  we  are  forced  to  say  that  the  contents  fall  considerably  be- 
low this  standard.  Aside  from  the  general  reviews — which  are  only 
'  original '  in  a  limited  sense — but  two  or  three  of  the  papers  are  com- 
plete or  of  permanent  separate  value.  As  a  rule,  they  are  rather 
studies,  very  good  in  their  place,  but  scarcely  in  keeping  with  the 
broad  purposes  of  the  Annee.  If  the  writers  would  contribute  their 
best  work  it  might  be  well  to  retain  this  feature,  but  as  matters  stand 
at  present  it  would  seem  wiser  either  to  dispense  with  it  or  else  to 
transform  its  character  completely. 

Another  side  of  the  same  question  appears  when  we  come  to  the 
Studies  of  the  Paris  Laboratory.  Does  the  Annee  aim  to  be  the  or- 
gan of  that  institution?  If  so,  it  ought,  we  think,  to  gather  in  a 
larger  proportion  of  the  Studies  that  are  at  present  scattered  about  in 
various  periodicals.  If  not,  why  fill  its  pages  with  material  of  an  ob- 
viously fragmentary  character  ?  At  present  the  Annee  is  neither  fish 
nor  fowl — or  better,  it  may  be  likened  to  a  splendid  fowl,  hampered 
and  made  less  beautiful  by  the  presence  of  a  fish's  tail ! 

If  we  may  venture  a  word  of  advice,  then,  it  is  as  follows :  The 
Annee  should  be  divided  into  two  volumes,  one  of  which,  under 


564  L:  ANNEE  PSYCHOLOGIZE. 

another  name,  might  be  made  the  organ  of  the  Paris  Laboratory, 
with  other  contributions  if  desired.  The  Annee  proper  could  then 
be  restricted  to  an  oversight  of  the  year's  work  in  the  various  branches 
of  psychology,  with  greater  latitude  in  the  case  of  '  general  reviews.' 
The  introduction  of  the  latter  into  the  present  volume  is  a  step  in  the 
right  direction ;  with  other  matter  cut  out,  their  number  and  scope 
might  gradually  be  enlarged.  These  changes  would  give  to  the  Annee 
a  unity  of  purpose  which  it  now  sadly  lacks,  and  would  transform  it 
at  once  into  an  encyclopedic  work  of  classic  importance. 

What  has  been  said  above  has  reference  to  the  appropriateness  of 
a  certain  class  of  writings  to  the  Annee,  and  is  not  intended  to  reflect 
in  any  way  upon  the  value  of  the  articles  that  appear  in  this  particular 
number.  We  shall  now  proceed  to  examine  the  contents  of  the  pres- 
ent volume. 

Of  foremost  importance  is  Dr.  A.  Forel's  paper  on  the  methods  of 
comparative  psychology.1  The  author  frankly  acknowledges  his 
scepticism  regarding  the  value  of  the  results  obtained  by  direct  psy- 
chological induction.  The  human  mind  differs  too  radically,  he 
thinks,  from  that  of  the  lower  orders,  to  admit  of  carrying  over  to 
the  latter  with  any  degree  of  assurance  the  results  obtained  in  the 
former.  When  we  consider  the  difficulty  in  mankind  itself  of  under- 
standing the  psychological  constitution  of  individuals  differing  from 
ourselves  in  social  grade,  intellectual  status,  or  sex,  how  much  more 
reluctant  should  we  be  to  assume  mental  analogies  in  the  case  of  be- 
ings wholly  different  from  mankind  in  physiological  structure! 

The  author  cites  in  support  of  his  position  the  case  of  the  social 
insects — in  particular,  ants.  There  is  a  marked  tendency  among 
all  writers  to  describe  the  mental  processes  of  these  insects  in 
terms  of  our  own.  But  is  this  comparison  warranted?  Take  the 
sphere  of  sensation,  for  example :  the  data  of  the  various  senses 
differ  not  only  directly,  but  also  indirectly ;  the  eye  gives  us  accurate 
notions  of  space  relations,  the  ear  furnishes  us  with  those  of  time. 
Both  of  these  senses  are  well  developed  in  man ;  in  insects  the  most 
highly  developed  sense  is  that  of  smell.  In  man  this  latter  sense 
gives  (explicitly)  neither  spatial  nor  temporal  data ;  but  in  insects  it 
is  evidently  capable  of  furnishing  i  distinct  and  rational  perceptions ' 
of  some  sort  (p.  44) .  The  sense  of  smell  must  then  be  radically  dif- 
ferent in  insects  from  what  it  is  in  man.  Thus  we  meet,  at  the  very 
outset,  an  insuperable  obstacle  to  the  direct  use  of  induction  in  com- 
parative psychology. 

lUn  aper$u  de psychologic  comparee. 


PSYCHOLOGICAL   LITERATURE.  565 

Passing  to  the  biological  problem,  which  he  believes  to  lie  at  the 
root  of  comparative  psychology,  M.  Forel  traces  the  phylogenetic 
growth  of  the  nervous  system  from  the  original  neuron.  For  the  wave 
of  nerve  activity,  whether  chemical  or  physical  in  character,  the  author 
proposes  the  name  neurocyme.  The  action  of  neurocyme  is  com- 
paratively simple  within  the  compass  of  a  single  neuron ;  but  when  it 
is  called  upon  to  pass  from  one  neuron  to  another  the  method  of  trans- 
mission changes :  there  is  now  a  mass  of  terminal  fibers  instead  of  a 
single  line  of  conduction.  Such  an  alteration  in  the  mode  of  trans- 
mission, the  author  argues,  must  entail  a  modification  in  the  form  of 
activity — inhibiting  it,  strengthening  it,  or  causing  it  to  be  acted  upon 
by  other  waves.  In  this  '  interneuronary  action  of  neurocyme,'  at 
present  so  incomprehensible,  is  contained,  says  the  author,  '  the  secret 
of  our  mental  mechanism'  (p.  27). 

Up  to  this  point  the  nerve  phenomena  are  alike  for  all  biological 
species ;  but  as  we  proceed  further  we  meet  with  a  distinction.  In- 
stinct and  reason  denote  a  fundamental  antithesis  in  the  realm  of  men- 
tal action.  To  these  correspond,  in  the  physiological  sphere,  two 
distinct  modes  of  activity,  which  the  author  terms  the  automatic  and 
plastic  activity  of  neurocyme,  respectively.  These  are  constantly  in 
conflict  with  each  other,  and  the  type  of  an  organism  depends  upon 
which  has  gained  the  mastery  in  its  race  history.  Among  social  in- 
sects the  automatic  activity  is  well  developed,  and  the  neural  coordi- 
nations are  maintained  by  a  long  heredity  strictly  within  the  same  lines, 
so  that  the  adaptive,  or  plastic,  activity  is  crushed  out.  Plastic  activ- 
ity requires  far  greater  complexity  of  structure  than  automatic ;  and 
hence  the  brain  of  the  ant,  remarkable  though  it  must  be  considered, 
is  far  less  wonderful  in  its  complexity  than  that  of  a  human  being. 
The  distinction  between  automatic  and  plastic  activity,  then,  is  really 
the  key  to  the  situation,  and  it  is  only  through  studying  the  facts  con- 
nected with  these  physiological  phenomena  that  we  can  reach  a  proper 
basis  for  comparative  psychology. 

We  give  M.  Forel's  views  somewhat  at  length,  because  they  seem 
deserving  rather  of  attention  than  of  criticism.  It  is  an  undoubted  fact 
that  psychology  is  to-day  leaning  for  support  more  than  ever  on  physi- 
ology. Whether  psychologists  will  go  so  far  as  wholly  to  subordinate 
comparative  psychology  to  comparative  physiology,  in  the  way  he  pro- 
poses, we  very  much  doubt.  At  the  same  time  there  is  no  question 
but  that  their  own  inductions  have  been  too  hasty,  and  that  considera- 
ble reconstruction  of  the  bases  of  comparative  psychology  is  necessary. 
The  fact  that  the  critic  is  a  student  of  biology  as  well  as  a  psycholo- 
gist certainly  lends  additional  weight  to  his  conclusions. 


566  VAN  NEE  PSYCHOLOGIES. 

A  fitting  companion-piece  to  Forel's  article  is  Dr.  Azoulay's  review 
of  recent  theories  on  the  mode  of  function  of  the  central  nervous  sys- 
tem.1 Those  who  are  not  familiar  with  the  recent  work  in  the  his- 
tology of  the  nervous  system  will  find  here  a  compact  resume  of  the 
present  status  of  that  branch.  In  a  few  pages  the  writer  details  briefly 
the  state  of  our  knowledge  regarding  the  anatomy  of  the  neuron  since 
the  late  discoveries  of  Ramon  y  Cajal  and  others.  He  then  proceeds 
to  explain  the  theories  of  nerve  action  which  have  been  founded  on 
these  facts.  Though  fair  in  his  exposition  of  all,  the  writer  shows 
apparently  no  leaning  toward  any  of  the  theories ;  he  seems  personally 
to  prefer  a  modification  of  the  older  view,  which  held  to  the  activity 
of  the  entire  nerve — now  expressed  in  terms  of  the  individual  neuron. 
The  style  of  this  article  is  remarkably  clear,  and  it  is  easily  within  the 
grasp  of  those  whose  biological  knowledge  is  extremely  limited. 

Individual,  abnormal  and  child  psychology  are  each  represented  in 
the  Annee  by  a  single  article.  La  psychologic  individuelle,  by 
MM.  Binet  and  Henri,  is  an  original  contribution  placed  (rather  inap- 
propriately) among  the  general  reviews.  It  is  a  plea  for  the  wider  de- 
velopment of  anthropological  tests,  which  have  hitherto  been  confined 
almost  exclusively  to  sensation.  Citing  the  results  of  Lombroso, 
Galton  and  others,  the  authors  conclude  that  the  differences  existing 
among  normal  individuals  in  the  sphere  of  the  senses  '  are  very  feeble 
and  insignificant  compared  with  the  differences  in  the  higher  faculties  ' 
(p.  416).  In  all  such  tests  of  normal  individuals  there  are  two  princi- 
pal objects  in  view :  first,  to  compare  individuals  and  discover  what 
elements  vary  and  how  far ;  and  second,  to  trace  the  relations  that  ex- 
ist between  the  different  faculties  of  each  individual.  Both  ends  can 
be  attained  by  a  single  series  of  representative  tests,  if  the  same  series 
be  applied  everywhere.  The  authors  examine  the  series  proposed  by 
various  writers,  and  find  them  all  incomplete  and  more  or  less  imprac- 
ticable ;  moreover,  they  are  not  fairly  representative,  since  all  neglect 
too  much  the  higher  intellectual  processes.  The  real  object  of  these 
inquiries  being  to  determine  not  all,  but  merely  the  most  important  in- 
dividual differences,  the  writers  propose  a  series  of  ten  tests,  from  which 
sensation  measurements  are  omitted  entirely.  They  include  memory, 
the  nature  of  mental  images,  imagination,  attention,  understanding, 
suggestibility,  aesthetic  sensibility,  moral  sense,  muscular  power  and 
will  power,  and  quickness  of  movement  and  of  glance.  These  tests 
are  described  fully  in  the  latter  part  of  the  article. 

^Psychologie  histologique  et  texture  du  systtme  nerveux :  les  rtcentes  theories 
du  fonctionnement  du  systeme  nerveux  central. 


PSYCHOLOGICAL  LITERATURE.  567 

M.  Th.  Ribot's  memoire  on  abnormal  and  morbid  character1  is 
suggestive  rather  than  complete.  The  author  discards  the  historic  four- 
fold division  of  temperament,  and  adopts  the  three-fold  classification 
proposed  by  Seeland — into  strong  or  positive,  neutral,  and  weak  or 
negative,  each  including  some  sub-types.  Abnormality  of  character 
consists  in  the  union  of  two  or  more  of  these  in  the  same  individual. 
There  are  three  cases.  The  first  consists  in  the  complete  transforma- 
tion of  the  individual  at  some  period  of  his  life.  This  type  approaches 
most  nearly  to  the  normal.  Paul,  Augustine,  Diocletian  and  others 
are  given  as  examples.  In  the  second  we  find  two  opposite  tenden- 
cies present  at  once  in  the  same  person.  The  third  is  represented  by 
great  instability  of  character  and  a  rapid  alternation  between  conflict- 
ing tendencies.  This  is  the  true  pathological  type. 

In  an  article  on  Fear  among  Children*,  Prof.  Binet  gives  the  results 
of  a  series  of  questions  circulated  among  some  100  school  teachers  and 
others.  He  finds  five  principal  classes  of  phenomena  with  which  fear  is 
associated:  i .  Night,  solitude  and  mystery.  2.  Loud  noises.  3.  Objects 
which  inspire  repugnance.  4.  A  possible  danger  exaggerated  by  the 
imagination.  5.  A  past  experience  whose  recurrence  is  dreaded.  The 
state  of  the  child's  health  is  always  an  important  factor  in  determining 
his  liability  to  fear ;  on  the  other  hand,  there  appears  to  be  no  relation 
between  fear  and  the  degree  of  the  child's  intelligence,  except  in  so  far 
as  a  highly  developed  imagination  is  more  liable  to  furnish  objects  for 
fear.  Prof.  Binet  notices  further  the  effect  of  heredity  and  ill-treat- 
ment, and  alludes  to  the  well-known  fact  that  fear  is  contagious. 
The  signs  of  fear  begin  to  be  manifest  at  the  age  of  two  or  three,  and 
increase  till  the  ninth  year,  when  they  begin  to  come  under  control, 
and  the  emotion  itself  tends  in  normal  cases  to  be  suppressed.  Some 
of  the  replies  are  conflicting :  the  proportion  of  children  susceptible  to 
fear  is  variously  estimated,  and  M.  Binet's  own  deduction  (10%)  is 
admittedly  a  mere  assumption.  It  is  scarcely  within  our  province  to 
speak  of  the  author's  remarks  on  the  pedagogic  treatment  of  fear  in 
children,  but  what  he  says  may  be  recommended  to  those  interested  in 
that  subject  as  both  timely  and  instructive. 

Along  the  line  of  experimental  psychology  a  number  of  contribu- 
tions appear  in  the  Annee.  Prof.  Th.  Flournoy  describes  a  new 
treatment  of  association  time.  In  a  list  of  24  words,  12  belonged  to 
some  well-defined  class,  while  the  remainder  had  no  conceptual  rela- 
tion with  one  another.  Given  two  such  lists,  the  subject  was  asked  to 

lLes  caractdres  anormaux  et  morbides. 
2La  peur  chez  les  enfants. 


568  UANNEE  PSYCHOLOGIQUE. 

read  in  the  one  case  all  the  A's,  in  the  other  all  the  non-A's.  The 
time  of  the  latter  reading  was  considerably  longer.  M.  Bourdon 
gives  a  variation  of  an  old  experiment  on  the  comparative  frequency 
of  various  kinds  of  association,  and  M.  Xilliez  brings  forward  a 
method  for  calculating  the  influence  of  the  ordinary  serial  association 
of  numbers  upon  our  memory  of  a  list  of  figures  chosen  at  random. 
Prof.  Van  Biervliet  adds  a  chapter  to  the  recently  developed  literature 
on  illusions  of  weight. 

M.  Victor  Henri's  two  articles  on  tactile  localization  may  be 
classed  together  as  a  single  monograph.  In  an  original  contribution, 
the  author  describes  a  series  of  experiments  which  substantiate  his  view 
that  the  exactness  of  localization  on  the  skin  is  independent  of  the 
exactness  of  two-point  discrimination.  Taking  a  number  of  normal 
subjects,  he  finds  that  the  errors  of  localization  are  large  out  of  all 
proportion  with  the  sensory  circles ;  in  many  cases  an  impact  on  one 
finger  was  assigned  to  a  closely  symmetrical  position  on  another.  The 
paper  on  the  Sense  of  Locality  on  the  Skin  ( Sur  le  sens  du  lieu  de 
la  peau)  is  a  review  of  the  work  along  the  same  line  from  Weber 
down.  Though  its  outline  is  somewhat  influenced  by  the  author's 
position,  just  referred  to,  it  is  in  every  respect  typical  of  what  a  gen- 
eral review  in  a  work  like  the  Annee  should  be.  M.  Henri  repro- 
duces tables  of  figures  from  the  more  important  authorities,  which 
enable  us  to  compare  the  results  obtained  by  different  methods  of  re- 
search. At  the  close  of  the  article  is  a  bibliography  of  156  titles. 
The  author  promises  next  year  a  review  of  the  theoretical  side  of  tac- 
tile localization. 

Owing  to  the  poverty  of  the  data,  M.  Passy's  review  of  investiga- 
tions on  the  olfactory  sense  is  necessarily  less  extensive.  He  takes  up 
successively  the  physiology  of  smell,  olfactometry,  the  properties  of 
odors,  their  compounds,  and  the  reaction  time  for  smell,  giving  in  each 
case  a  resume  of  the  principal  results  so  far  obtained.  He  neglects 
to  furnish  a  bibliography  of  the  subject ;  but  the  works  actually  cited 
are  put  in  reference  form  in  the  footnotes.  In  an  appendix,  M.  Passy 
sums  up  the  results  of  an  experimental  investigation  by  Prof.  Binet  and 
himself  on  the  comparative  psychology  of  smell. 

In  the  department  of  physiology,  MM.  Binet  and  Courtier  con- 
tribute an  article  entitled  Circulation  capillaire  de  la  main.  They 
use  the  graphic  method  to  investigate  the  relation  of  respiration,  etc., 
to  circulation.  The  work  includes  experiments  on  a  number  of  prob- 
lems ;  the  tracings,  many  of  which  are  given,  show  the  changes  in 
form  of  the  respiration  and  pulse  curves  due  to  different  positions  of 


PSYCHOLOGICAL  LITERATURE.  569 

the  hand  and  to  various  physiological  and  mental  disturbances.  The 
writers  discuss  at  some  length  the  errors  incident  to  different  kinds  of 
apparatus,  and  the  best  means  of  avoiding  them.  The  study  is  long 
and  exhaustive,  and  the  authors  promise  further  researches  on  several 
additional  points  necessary  to  render  it  complete.  The  principal  con- 
clusion reached  is  that  « there  exist,  in  respect  to  the  excitability  of  the 
vaso-motor  system,  important  individual  differences'  (p.  164);  these 
differences  are  too  great  to  be  attributed  to  the  apparatus,  and  too  con- 
stant to  be  due  to  the  disturbing  effect  of  such  an  experiment  upon 
the  emotions  of  untried  subjects. 

Our  space  will  permit  only  a  passing  reference  to  the  remaining 
contents.  M.  Henri  gives  a  resume  of  the  well-known  mathemetical 
methods  employed  in  the  calculation  of  probability  and  error.  MM. 
Binet  and  Courtier  describe  an  apparatus  for  recording  the  intensity 
of  impact  with  one  or  more  fingers  in  piano  playing.  M.  E.  Gley 
compares  the  physiology  of  hypnotism  with  the  action  of  stimulants 
and  narcotics,  and  concludes  that  all  these  effects  are  attributable  to  a 
paralysis  of  the  higher  centers,  rather  than  to  exhaustion  of  the  entire 
nervous  system. 

In  the  analytic  portion  of  the  volume  the  summaries  are  generally 
limited  to  two  or  three  pages.  More  extended  notices  (of  ten  pages  or 
more)  are  allotted  to  Delage's  book :  La  structure  duprotoplasma,  Ex- 
ner's  Entivurf,  Merkel's  articles  in  the  Philosophische  Studien  on  Reiz 
und  Empfindung,  and  Baldwin's  book  on  Mental  Development. 

The  general  bibliography  at  the  end  of  the  volume  is  this  year,  by 
arrangement,  identical  with  that  compiled  for  THE  PSYCHOLOGICAL 
REVIEW. 

H.  C.  WARREN. 
PRINCETON  UNIVERSITY. 


A  Study  in  the  Psychology  of  Religious  Phenomena.     Parts  I.  and 
II.     JAMES  H.  LEUBA,  Fellow  in  Psychology,  Clark  University. 
The  American  Journal  of  Psychology,  Vol.  VII.     Pp.  309-385. 
Mr.   Leuba  happily  avoids  the  common  blunder  of  attempting  to 
frame  a  definition  of  religion  which  will  cover  all  that  the  word  con- 
notes.    He  recognizes  that  it  was  '  in  early  societies  a  complex  product 
made  up  of  all  the  fundamental  needs  and  aspirations  of  man,'  many 
of  which  are  now  clearly  differentiated  and  are  known  by  their  several 
names.     The  noetic  impulse  was  one  of  these,  but  not  the  chief  one 
and  consequently  the  essence  of  religion  survives  many  changes  of 
creed.     Even  the  belief  in  a  supersensible  world  and  personal  immor- 


57°  RELIGIOUS  PHENOMENA. 

tality  may  pass  away  without  affecting  it,  for  they  are  not  of  its 
essence.  It  is  not  based  upon  a  theory  of  life  of  any  sort,  but  upon 
one  of  the  most  universal  facts  of  human  experience  :  "  the  feeling  of 
unwholeness,  of  moral  imperfection,  of  sin,  accompanied  by  the 

yearning  after  the  peace  of  unity The  reality  of  this  subjective 

treasure  transcends  all  possible  belief  concerning  the  origin  and  end 
of  things,  because  it  is  the  psychic  correspondent  of  a  physiological 
growth,  and  consequently  can  in  no  wise  fail  except  with  that  growth. 
.......  It  may  be  defined  in  the  favorite  terms  of  Herbert  Spencer  as 

the  unification  by  coordination  of  the  parts  segregated  by  differentia- 
tion of  the  homogeneous." 

This  sense  of  inner  discord  is  the  fundamental  postulate  of  the  re- 
ligious consciousness  and  its  resolution  into  harmony  is  its  end.  In 
the  popular  religions  of  our  day  we  find  these  truths  crystallized  in 
the  doctrines  of  sin,  conversion,  justification,  regeneration  and  recon- 
ciliation with  God.  But  our  popular  religious  faiths  are  declining  to 
their  fall,  and  these  are  facts  of  the  inner  life ;  it  is  then  high  time  for 
psychology  '  to  accept  the  succession  which  falls  to  it  by  right.'  If  it 
would,  "a  new  creed  would  be  born;  the  wings  of  youth  would  no 
longer  be  clipped  in  the  spring  of  life  by  a  scholastic  dogmatism  and 
the  soul  midwifery  now  extensively  but  ignorantly  practised  by  our 
revivalists  and  pastors  could  be  based  upon  a  positive  knowledge  of 
the  psychology  of  regeneration.'  This,  Mr.  Leuba  thinks,  '  is  the 
sure  conquest  of  a  near  future.'  May  it  come  within  the  days  of  the 
present  writer's  life !  He  would  journey  many  miles  to  see  '  soul- 
midwifery  '  practiced  in  the  well  appointed  laboratories  at  Worcester, 
and  souls  regenerated  in  accordance  with  the  sound  principles  of  the 
new  psychology,  without  reference  to  the  conceptions  of  God  and  im- 
mortality ! 

Mr.  Leuba's  hope  that  the  psychologist  will  assume  the  function 
of  the  spiritual  teacher  will  seem,  as  he  admits,  '  a  fantastic  dream ' 
to  many  besides  myself,  but  that  does  not  affect  the  solid  worth  of  his 
inquiry  into  the  phenomena  of  conversion.  He  has  collected  and 
published  in  an  appendix  seventeen  new  cases  at  first  hand,  and  has 
searched  religious  literature  for  others.  Upon  this  material  he  bases 
his  analysis :  the  leading  stages  of  conversion  are  conviction  of  sin, 
self  surrender,  faith,  joy  and  appearance  of  newness,  especially  in  ex- 
ternal nature.  The  phenomena  are  nearly  constant  in  all  ages  and 
countries  and  among  men  of  all  creeds.  The  Christian  doctrines  of 
Justification,  Faith,  Grace  and  Depravity  are  attempts  to  formulate 
some  intelligible  theory  of  the  basal  facts  of  the  religious  conscious- 


PSYCHOLOGICAL  LITERATURE.  57 1 

ness.  The  most  interesting  outcome  of  this  analysis  is  the  exhibition 
of  the  passive  attitude  of  the  convert.  The  guerilla  warfare  which 
his  fundamental  instincts  and  tendencies  constantly  wage  with  one 
another  has  developed  into  a  formal  battle  between  two  groups  for 
final  supremacy  over  his  life,  while  his  will  is  in  abeyance  and  his 
accredited  beliefs  stand  in  the  background. 

Mr.  Leuba's  analysis  stops  short  at  a  most  interesting  point.  One 
wishes  to  see  these  facts  brought  under  more  general  conceptions  and 
that  he  has  promised  to  do  in  Part  III.  of  his  monograph,  shortly  to 
be  published.  It  will  include  '  a  genetic  theory  of  sin,  of  moral  re- 
sistance, of  consent,  of  self -surrender,'  and  will  especially  endeavor 
to  bring  to  view  their  possible  physiological  correlates. 

WILLIAM  ROMAINE  NEWBOLD. 
UNIVERSITY  OF  PENNSYLVANIA. 


A  New  Factor  in  Evolution.  J.  MARK  BALDWIN.  American 
Naturalist,  XXX.,  441-457,  536-554,  June  and  July,  1896. 

Professor  Baldwin  has  here  summarized,  enlarged  and  unified 
several  of  his  recent  papers,  especially  those  printed  in  Sci- 
ence (August  23,  1895,  March  20,  April  10,  1896).  It  appears 
that  when  Professor  Lloyd  Morgan  was  in  America  last  winter 
he,  Professor  Baldwin  and  Professor  Osborn  found  that  they  had 
independently  reached  somewhat  similar  conclusions  regarding 
certain  relations  of  ontogeny  and  phylogeny  or  to  use  Huxley's 
distinction  and  avoid  technical  words — between  development  (of  the 
individual)  and  evolution  (of  the  animal  series) .  As  we  all  know, 
the  biological  questions  most  eagerly  discussed  at  present  are  those 
concerned  with  the  inheritance  of  acquired  characters  and  the  causes  of 
the  variations  which  have  resulted  in  evolution.  Professor  Baldwin 
has  approached  the  problem  from  a  new  standpoint,  and  has,  I  think, 
formulated  ideas  which  have  hitherto  had  somewhat  shadowy  con- 
tours. 

An  individual  can  adapt  itself  to  new  conditions.  For  example, 
a  carnivorous  animal,  such  as  a  dog,  can  live  on  cereals.  It  learns  new 
habits,  and  certain  adaptations  take  place  in  its  digestive  mechanism. 
Now  if  flesh  were  permanently  withheld  from  the  race  of  dogs  those 
individuals  would  get  on  best  whose  congenital  variations  fitted  them 
to  live  on  cereals,  and  these  variations  being  hereditary  we  might  get 
ultimately  a  race  of  graniverous  dogs.  It  would  look  as  though  the 
effect  of  use  in  the  individual  had  been  inherited,  whereas  this  need 


572  A   NEW  FACTOR  IN  EVOLUTION. 

not  really  be  the  case.  We  only  have  individual  adaptations  preceding 
in  time  race  adaptations.  It  is  thus  possible  that  many  of  the  cases 
quoted  by  Neo-Lamarckians  as  examples  of  use-inheritance  are  invalid. 

Professor  Baldwin  applies  this  principle,  which  he  calls  '  organic 
selection,'  especially  to  adaptations  in  which  consciousness  is  con- 
cerned. If  conscious  guidance  can  produce  useful  adaptations  in  the 
individual  organism,  these  adaptations  may  become  hereditary  in  the 
manner  described  above,  and  we  have  the  course  of  evolution  directed 
by  consciousness,  but  without  the  need  of  assuming  the  hereditary 
transmission  of  acquired  characters. 

The  clear  statement  of  the  fact  that  new  traits  may  appear  first  as 
individual  adaptations,  and  later  through  the  occurrence  of  suitable 
congenital  variations  as  hereditary  modifications,  is  important.  I  am 
not  quite  sure  how  far  it  may  be  found  in  earlier  writers.  Darwin 
holds  that  the  taste  of  the  female,  an  individual  trait,  modifies  organic 
evolution,  and  it  is  the  essence  of  natural  selection  that  under  changed 
environment  those  individuals  will  survive  who  can  best  adapt  them- 
selves to  it.  If  organic  selection  is  itself  a  congenital  variation,  as 
Professor  Baldwin  indicates,  we  are  still  in  the  status  quo  of  chance 
variations  and  natural  selection.  We  have  not  found  '  a  new  factor 
in  evolution,'  still  less  as  Professor  Osborn  claims  (cf .  Science  April  3, 
1896)  '  a  mode  of  evolution  requiring  neither  natural  selection  nor  the 
inheritance  of  acquired  characters.'  We  remain  ignorant  as  to  why 
the  individual  makes  suitable  adaptations,  why  congenital  variations 
occur  in  the  line  of  evolution  and  why  they  are  hereditary. 

Professor  Baldwin's  paper  is  by  no  means  confined  to  this  one  point, 
4  organic  selection,'  'social  heredity,'  'circular  reactions,'  etc.,  are 
commingled  in  a  manner  that  will  prove  confusing  to  many  readers. 
Indeed,  I  venture  to  say  that  I  find  the  author's  vigorous  thinking  too 
often  obscure  to  an  unfortunate  degree.  For  example,  I  am  not  sure 
whether  or  not  Professor  Baldwin  claims  in  this  paper  that  the  prin- 
ciple of  '  organic  selection '  is  set  forth  in  his  book  on  Mental  Devel- 
opment, nor  does  my  memory  after  a  careful  reading  of  the  book 
enable  me  to  decide  the  question.  Or  to  take  a  more  serious  problem, 
I  do  not  understand  whether  or  not  Professor  Baldwin  wishes  to  use 
consciousness — pleasure,  pain,  intelligence,  etc. — as  a  vera  causa  in 
individual  adaptations.  The  average  reader  will  take  it  for  granted 
that  he  does,  and  I  admit  that  it  seems  to  me  that  he  runs  with  the 
hare  and  hunts  with  the  hounds. 

J.  McKEEN  CATTELL. 
COLUMBIA  UNIVERSITY. 


PSYCHOLOGICAL   LITERATURE.  573 

VISION. 

Oscillations    retiniennes    consecutives   a    Vimpression    luminense. 

AUG.  CHARPENTIER.     Comptes  Rendus.     13  Jan.  1891. 
Nouvelle  forme  de  reaction  negative  sur  la  retine.     id.     27  Jan. 
La  reaction  negative  et  la  centre  de  la  retine.     id.     3  Fev. 
Strosboscopie  retinienne.     id.      10  FeV. 
Irradiation  ondulatoire  de  V impression  luminense.     id.     17  Fev. 

M.  Charpentier  pointed  out,  some  five  years  ago,  that  the  starting 
up  of  a  light-process  in  the  retina  is  followed  at  a  very  brief  interval 
by  a  process  of  the  opposite  character,  that  is,  by  something  which 
causes  an  instantaneous  sensation  of  extreme  blackness.  Under  favor- 
able conditions  there  are  several  alternations,  less  striking  than  the  first 
one,  of  light  and  dark,  before  the  continuous  sensation  of  a  bright  sur- 
face establishes  itself.  So  marked  is  the  first  sensation  of  blackness 
that  it  has  been  named  the  black  band,  when  it  is  formed  just  after 
the  advancing  border  of  a  white  sector  upon  a  rotating  wheel.  The 
whole  penomenon  is  referred  to  as  retinal  oscillations.  In  the  series 
of  papers  in  the  Comptes  Rendus  whose  titles  are  given  above,  M. 
Charpentier  discusses  both  this  subject  and  the  '  recurrent  image.' 
The  latter  was  first  noticed  by  C.  A.  Young,  and  has  been  best  studied 
by  Shelford  Bidwell.  According  to  Charpentier,  it  is  not  well  named ; 
it  is  not  properly  called  an  image,  for  it  does  not  always  reproduce  the 
shape  and  size  of  the  luminous  object  which  it  follows;  if  that  is 
feeble  in  intensity,  its  ghost  is  smaller;  if  that  is  very  bright,  the  ghost 
may  be  five  or  six  times  as  large  as  its  original.  Moreover,  what  has 
been  seen  by  many  observers  as  a  definite  recurrent  image  is  in  fact 
merely  a  maximum  phase  of  a  sensation  which,  in  its  waxing  and  wan- 
ing, lasts  for  a  considerable  time.  But  as  M.  Charpentier  does  not 
propose  another  name,  we  shall  continue  to  use  the  one  which  has  be- 
come somewhat  familiar. 

His  method  for  producing  the  phenomenon  consists  in  a  rotating 
black  disc  with  a  window  in  it  which  constitutes  the  moving  luminous 
object.  This  window  is  lighted  up  by  a  piece  of  ground  glass  which 
is  itself  illuminated  by  rays  which  have  passed  through  a  plano-con- 
vex lens  and  which  come  from  a  source  of  light  the  intensity  of  which 
can  be  regulated.  Thus  the  rapidity  of  the  moving  object,  its  intensity 
and  its  size  can  all  be  varied  at  pleasure.  When  these  conditions  are 
all  happily  chosen  (the  author  does  not  state  what  they  should  be,  ex- 
cept that  a  single  revolution  of  the  disc  should  take  place  in  from  one 
to  three  seconds)  the  bright  object  is  followed  first  by  a  very  black  in- 


574  VISION. 

terval  and  then  by  a  re-vivescence  of  itself,  usually  of  no  definite  color, 
but  bluish  when  the  preceding  light  is  very  feeble,  and  of  a  greenish- 
yellow  color  after  blue.  Some  have  seen  it  only  after  blue,  in  which 
case  it  is  in  fact  always  most  distinct.  Charpentier  finds  it  after  all 
colors;  others  have  failed  to  find  it  after  red,  but  Charpentier  used  red 
glass  and  Shelford  Bidwell  succeeded,  with  an  ingenious  arrangement, 
in  using  spectral  light.  Red  glass,  while  it  is  red  in  a  very  different 
sense  from  that  in  which  any  other  colored  glass  is  of  its  color,  is 
usually  rather  more  yellowish  than  the  extreme  limit  of  the  spectrum. 
The  black  interval  may  have  a  duration  of  one-fourth  of  a  second  if 
it  follows  a  feeble  and  short  excitation ;  otherwise  it  lasts  one  thirty- 
sixth  of  a  second.  Here  also  an  oscillation  may  be  seen  under  favor- 
able circumstances.  These  oscillations  in  sensation  at  the  beginning 
and  at  the  end  of  an  excitation  by  light  are  very  suggestive  of  the 
oscillations  in  the  direction  of  the  electrical  current  which  are  the  ob- 
jective effect  of  the  action  of  light  upon  the  retina. 

There  is  an  additional  observation  upon  the  black  band  to  the  effect 
that  it  may  still  be  detected  when  the  preliminary  excitation  is  so  short 
that  there  is  no  white  surface  for  it  to  appear  upon ;  it  may  then  be 
seen  as  a  band  of  extreme  blackness  upon  the  recurrent  image. 
This  would  seem  to  be  equivalent  to  saying  that  the  negative  reaction 
of  the  shock  of  the  impinging  light  is  so  strong  as  to  mask  the  nega- 
tive reaction  of  the  shock  caused  by  sudden  darkness.  To  show  this 
it  is  only  necessary  to  make  a  very  narrow  window  in  the  revolving 
disk ;  one  degree  is  a  convenient  width. 

Since  there  is  a  negative  reaction  at  the  beginning  and  at  the  end 
of  an  excitation,  it  seemed  possible  that  a  sudden  change  of  intensity 
would  produce  the  same  effect,  and  this  was  found  to  be  the  case. 

The  black  band  had  been  found  to  propagate  itself  beyond  the  place 
on  the  retina  which  had  been  effected  by  the  original  excitation,  in  two 
directions  and  with  a  definite  velocity,  which  had  been  calculated. 
With  the  arrangement  just  described  it  is  very  easy  to  exhibit  this 
phenomenon  ;  the  persistent  image  has  attached  to  it  a  larger  or  smaller 
luminous  zone  of  diffuse  light,  and  (after  a  very  short  preliminary 
excitation)  two  black  streamers  may  be  seen  upon  this,  one  proceed- 
ing towards  the  fixation  point  and  the  other  in  the  opposite  direction, 
the  latter  resembling  the  tail  of  a  comet,  with  its  convexity  turned  in 
the  direction  of  the  movement,  the  other  being  perhaps  slightly  con- 
cave in  the  same  direction.  They  both  begin  to  appear  at  the  same 
moment  with  the  black  band,  and  on  either  side  of  it ;  they  consist, 
therefore,  of  a  propagation  of  this  negative  reaction  in  a  definite  direc- 


PSYCHOLOGICAL   LITERATURE.  575 

tion  and  with  a  definite  velocity,  a  velocity  of  about  77  mm.  a  second 
upon  the  retina.  It  is  believed  that  these  streamers  also  exhibit  oscil- 
lations. 

By  a  stroboscopic  method,  the  oscillations  are  found  to  take  place 
at  the  constant  rate  of  36  or  37  a  second,  for  a  mean  intensity  of  the 
illumination ;  if  the  intensity  is  much  greater  or  much  less,  the  rate 
may  be  from  40  to  34  per  second.  Another  circumstance  brought  out 
is  that  the  diffuse  spot  surrounding  the  recurrent  image  changes  its 
shape,  becoming  sometimes  more  circular  and  sometimes  more  ellip- 
tical, and  that  this  change  of  shape  has  also  a  rhythm  corresponding 
to  that  of  the  successive  black  bands.  The  subject  is  extremely  inter- 
esting. It  is  to  be  hoped  that  these  new  observations  will  be  con- 
firmed and  extended. 

C.  L.  FRANKLIN. 

BALTIMORE,  MD. 

Light  Intensity  and  Depth  Perception.  T.  R.  ROBINSON.  Am. 
Jour,  of  Psych.,  VII.,  518-532.  1895. 

Admit  to  one  eye  less  light  than  is  admitted  to  the  other;  then 

La:  If  but  little  light  is  excluded  from  the  second  eye,  to  close 
that  eye  will  darken  the  total  field,  to  increase  its  light  will  brighten  it; 

b :  If  more  light  is  initially  excluded,  an  '  indifference  point '  (re- 
ferred to  below  as  limit  A)  is  reached  where  increase  or  decrease  of 
the  light  admitted  to  the  second  eye  produces  no  effect  on  the  bright- 
ness of  the  combined  field  (Robinson,  in  a  previous  article)  ; 

c :  Starting  with  the  initial  proportion  below  the  indifference 
point,  to  close  the  second  eye  produces  the  same  effect  as  to  increase 
its  light;  i.  e.,  a  decrease  of  intensity  of  physical  stimulus  results  in 
an  increase  of  intensity  of  sensation  (Fechner's  paradox) .  This  effect 
increases  from  the  indifference  point  downward,  until  at  a  certain  de- 
gree of  obscuration  of  the  second  eye  occurs  the  maximum  darkening 
of  the  common  visual  field,  hence  a  maximum  brightening  upon  clos- 
ing it  or  increasing  its  light  (Aubert's  minimum  point ;  referred  to 
below  as  limit  B) . 

II.  a :  If  the  eyes  are  directed  by  lenses  to  separate  fields,  upon 
which  are  drawn  figures  for  stereoscopic  combination,  complete  stereo- 
scopic combination  occurs  down  to  a  certain  degree  of  obscuration  of 
the  second  eye  (called  limit  C  below)  ; 

b :  With  greater  obscuration,  the  combination  is  only  partial,  or 
confused,  down  to  a  certain  second  limit  (limit  D)  ; 

c :  Below  this  second  limit  no  stereoscopic  combination  occurs, 
but  only  a  binocular  combination  of  the  two  fields,  where  the  objects 


576  VISION. 

combine  as  a  single  surface,  the  lines  of  each  being  distinct,  with  no 
depth  effect  perceptible. 

Robinson  points  out  the  facts  under  II.,  and  attempts  to  determine, 
for  different  intensities  of  the  total  light  admitted  to  the  free  eye,  the 
proportion  of  this  which  must  be  admitted  to  the  second  eye  at  limits 
A,  C  and  D ;  the  relation  of  C  and  D  to  A  and  B  ;  and  the  causes  of 
the  results  found. 

He  establishes  the  following  facts  :  The  amount  of  light  required 
for  the  second  eye  to  produce  the  stereoscopic  effect  is,  especially  with 
high  intensities,  very  small,  and  it  varies  with  the  absolute  intensity. 
There  is  a  considerable  range  between  the  lowest  point  where  the  ob- 
jects combine  (limit  D),  and  the  point  where  the  complete  stereo- 
scopic effect  is  obtained  ( limit  C) .  At  high  intensities,  C  is  y-^  or 
less,  D  is  too  small  for  measurement ;  at  lowest  intensities,  C  is  about 
#,  Dis^to^. 

The  amount  of  light  for  the  second  eye  inefficient  for  the  total 
brightness  (limit  A)  corresponds  to  the  amount  required  for  the  stereo- 
scopic effect  (C)  only  at  a  very  low  intensities ;  at  higher  intensities  it 
is  much  greater.  It  varies  with  the  intensity  and  the  observer  from  -J- 
to  #. 

The  minimum  point  of  Aubert  (established  by  him  as  .122  of  the 
full  light)  corresponds  to  the  limit  D  only  at  lowest  intensities.  The 
coincidence  here  may  be  accidental,  or  it  may  be  that  Aubert's  meas- 
urement of  B  cannot  be  relied  on  as  applicable  for  all  intensities,  and 
that  the  apparent  non-coincidence  at  higher  intensities  may  be  thus 
explained. 

To  account  for  these  facts,  Robinson  supposes  an  intimate  cooper- 
ation of  the  two  retinas,  such  that  where  one  retina  is  not  stimulated 
sufficiently  to  enable  it  to  play  its  part  in  bringing  about  the  binocular 
combination  its  energy  may  be  supplemented  by  that  of  the  other. 
Then  the  greater  the  amount  of  light  admitted  to  the  free  eye,  the 
greater  will  be  the  energy  which  can  be  spared  by  it  to  supplement 
that  of  the  partially  darkened  eye,  and  consequently  the  smaller  the 
proportion  of  light  required  in  the  second  eye  for  the  binocular  combi- 
nation. For  complete  stereoscopic  combination,  however,  the  free 
eye  cannot  aid  the  other,  hence  much  more  light  must  be  admitted  to 
the  second  eye  to  produce  stereoscopic  than  to  produce  binocular  com- 
bination. When  part  of  the  energy  is  subtracted  from  the  free  eye  to 
aid  in  the  binocular  combination  the  common  visual  field  is  darkened 
and  the  paradox  produced ;  and  this  is  true,  both  at  low  intensities, 
where  the  free  eye  cannot  give  enough  energy  to  produce  the  complete 


PSYCHOLOGICAL  LITERATURE.  577 

stereoscopic  effect,  and  where  A  and  C  coincide,  and  also  at  higher 
intensities,  where  complete  stereoscopic  effect  is  produced  while  yet 
the  paradox  remains,  C  being  much  below  A,  because  the  free  eye  still 
supplies  some  of  the  energy  for  the  binocular  combination,  and  the 
common  field  is  darkened. 

BROWN  UNIVERSITY.  E.  B.  DELABARRE. 


LOCALIZATION   OF  TOUCH. 

Ueber  Raumwahrnehmungen  im  Gebiete  des  Tastsinnes.  CHARLES 
HUBBARD  JUDD.  Philos.  Studien.  XII  Band,  3  Heft,  p.  409. 

These  experiments  investigate  our  threshold  judgments  of  the  sepa- 
rateness  of  points,  of  direction  and  of  continuous  lines.  They  comprise 
four  series.  In  the  first  a  pointed  bone  needle  (diameter  not  given) 
was  set  upon  the  skin  for  three  seconds,  then  raised  and  placed  upon 
the  same  or  a  neighboring  point.  The  results  show  the  minimal  dis- 
tance at  which  correct  judgments  were  given  of  the  direction  of  the 
second  from  the  first  point — /.  <?.,  whether  up,  down,  left  or  right. 
The  second  series  was  like  the  first,  save  that  two  needles  were  used ; 
the  first  was  applied,  then  after  three  seconds  the  other  needle  was  ap- 
plied to  a  neighboring  point  without  the  first  being  removed  from  its 
place.  In  the  third  series  tests  were  made  with  lines,  from  i  to  50 
mm.  long,  cut  from  thin  cardboard  and  set  on  the  skin  in  four  direc- 
tions— vertical,  horizontal  and  the  two  diagonals  at  45° — the  subject  to 
say  if  he  felt  a  line  or  a  point.  For  the  fourth  series  solid  card-edges 
like  the  above  were  used,  together  with  others  from  which  the  card 
was  cut  away  so  as  to  give  two  end  points  (i  mm.  long),  thus  leaving 
an  '  empty'  distance  to  be  compared  with  the  4  filled'  distances  of  the 
other  cards ;  the  subject  to  say  if  he  felt  a  point  (below  threshold  for 
twoness),  a  line,  or  tivo  points. 

The  results  of  the  fourth  series,  when  compared  with  each  other, 
show  :  ( i )  That  the  threshold  distance  for  judging  the  direction  of  two 
points  is  less  when  the  needles  are  applied  successively  (0.70  cm.) 
than  when  simultaneously  (2. 64  cm.)  (2)  Unfortunately  the  distance 
is  not  given  at  which  the  points  appeared  merely  separate ;  yet  it  is 
declared — apparently  a  pure  assumption,  although  probably  correct — 
that  the  threshold  for  separateness  is  also  less  for  successive  than  for 
simultaneous  applications.  (3)  The  thresholds  obtained  by  the  second 
series  were  greater  than  those  by  the  first,  but  less  than  those  for  wholly 
simultaneous  application.  (4)  The  threshold  distance  for  judging 
a  line  not  to  be  a  point  (0.88  cm.)  is  greater  than  that  for  '  direction' 


578  MEMORY. 

by  successive  stimulation,  and  less  than  '  direction '  by  simultaneous 
points.  (5)  Threshold  for  '  lines'  is  same  for  vertical  as  for  horizon- 
tal, but  greater  for  diagonals  than  for  either.  Only  one  locality  was 
investigated  throughout  the  four  series — the  volar  side  of  arm  between 
wrist  and  elbow.  Five  subjects.  Method,  that  of  Minimal  Change. 

Theoretically  the  author  claims  to  show  that  Weber  made  a  funda- 
mental error  in  not  distinguishing  between  judgments  of  '  Distanz'  and 
of  «  Grosse'.  Precisely  what  is  meant  by  the  last  term  is  not  made  very 
plain,  but  perhaps  the  two  could  be  translated  as  judgments  of  '  twoness ' 
and  of  'extension,'  or  of  'number,'  and  of  'space.'  He  inclines  to 
found  both  upon  Lotze's  '  local  signs',  but  is  as  classically  vague  as 
Lotze  himself  regarding  what  this  definitely  means. 

The  work  is  not  without  technical  faults  (for  example,  the  tests 
upon  each  person  were  :far  to  few),  the  results  can  scarcely  be  called 
new,  and  the  paper  is  not  weighty — save  in  bulk.  It  fills  55  pages 
and  should  have  been  put  in  5. 

CAMBRIDGE,  MASS.  HERBERT  NICHOLS. 

MEMORY. 

Memoir e  et  Reconnaissance.     H.  BERGSON.     Revue  Philosophique. 

XLI,  225 — 248;  380 — 399.  March,  April,  1896. 
M.  Bergson  begins  by  distinguishing  memory  as  habit,  the  organ- 
ized mechanism  by  which  we  repeat,  for  instance,  something  learned 
by  rote,  and  pure  memory,  the  memory  of  a  particular  event,  say  the 
third  reading.  The  latter  he  regards  as  an  independent  function,  and 
the  sharpness  of  this  dissociation  and  the  insistance  on  this  independ- 
ence are  the  characteristic  features  of  his  discussion.  Memory,  as 
ordinarily  treated,  is  a  compound,  habit  illumined  by  memory ;  in  real- 
ity, the  past  is  retained  not  only  in  the  form  of  a  sensori-motor  habit 
but  also  in  the  form  of  particular  images  with  all  its  details  localized  in 
time.  In  the  present  articles,  which  are  part  of  a  forthcoming  work  in 
which  a  full  treatment  is  promised,  an  attempt  is  made  to  illustrate  the 
independence  of  the  memory  function  by  showing  the  part  it  plays  in  the 
phenomena  of  recognition.  The  sense  of  familiarity  is  held,  with  great 
probability  (see  especially  p.  241),  to  rest  primarily,  not  on  associa- 
tion of  the  perception  with  an  image,  but  on  an  organized  motor  re- 
action. Where  the  recognition  is  inattentive,  it  completes  itself  in 
useful  movements  which,  though  inhibiting  the  play  of  the  imagina- 
tion, may  nevertheless  be  accompanied  by  the  appropriate  images 
selected  by  means  of  the  nascent  movements  habitually  connected  with 
them.  But  in  active  attention  the  recognition  is  completed,  not  by 


PSYCHOLOGICAL   LITERATURE.  579 

useful  movements,  but  by  a  further  defining  of  the  object.  Here  the 
intervention  of  images  is  more  pronounced.  M.  Bergson  represents 
the  process  as  follows :  In  the  first  place,  attention,  commonly  re- 
garded as  an  attitude  of  consciousness,  is,  as  recent  discussion  has 
shown,  consciousness  of  a  bodily  attitude.  The  general  features  of  the 
perception  are  determined  by  movements  set  up  by  the  perception,  its 
special  features  by  images  from  past  experience.  The  selection  of 
these  images  is  due  to  successive  movements  of  imitation.  The  pro- 
cess is  compared  to  that  of  a  telegraph  operator  who  controls  a  mess- 
age by  re-transmitting  it.  The  successive  attempts  at  analysis  of  the 
object  are  thus  at  the  same  time  attempts  at  the  synthesis  with  it  of 
images  resembling  it.  These  movements  serve  as  the  common  cadre 
both  for  the  perception  and  the  images.  Looked  at  in  this  way,  the 
essential  element  in  recognitive  perception  is  held  to  be  a  centrifugal 
process.  It  is  thus — by  movements  from  within  outwards — that  the 
images  are  incorporated  in  the  perception.  There  are  no  special  centres 
for  images :  what  are  regarded  as  such  are  merely  centres  for  grouping 
sensorial  impressions;  but  there  are  in  the  brain  substance  'organs  of 
virtual  perception  influenced  by  the  intention  of  the  reminiscence  (V in- 
tention du  souvenir} ,  just  as  at  the  periphery  there  are  organs  of  real 
perception  influenced  by  the  action  of  the  object'  (397  n).  M.  Berg- 
son  devotes  the  whole  of  his  second  article  to  illustrating  this  theory 
from  the  perception  of  language  and  parti cuarly  from  the  facts  of  sen- 
sorial aphasia.  He  shows  thorough  familiarity  with  the  literature  of 
the  subject  and  makes  skilful  use  of  it,  drawing  from  the  very  sources 
which  have  been  held  to  furnish  the  strongest  evidence  that  the  memory 
has  no  existence,  except  as  a  cerebral  trace,  independently  of  the  act 
in  which  it  is  localized,  precisely  the  opposite  conclusion.  The  dis- 
cussion contains  valuable  matter,  and  is  certainly  convincing  in  two 
points :  the  difficulty  of  localizing  the  images  and  the  importance  for 
the  recognition  of  words  of  their  motor  accompaniments.  Also  to  be 
commended  is  the  attempt  to  be  true  to  the  dynamic  quality  of  conscious- 
ness by  exhibiting  the  elements  in  the  process  of  recognitive  perception 
as  connected  by  imperceptible  transitions  and  as  supporting  one  another 
in  a  function ;  the  process  is  compared  to  an  electric  circuit,  in  which 
all  the  elements  are  in  mutual  tension.  On  the  other  hand,  the  con- 
ception of  the  memory  itself,  influencing  by  its  '  intention '  (whatever 
that  may  mean) ,  the  centres  of  virtual  perception,  is  obscure ;  the  as- 
sumption of  a  sensory  efferent  process  transmitting  the  images  to  the 
periphery  (245)  is  a  very  questionable  mode  of  interpreting  the  value 
of  the  motor  side  of  the  process ;  and  quite  unproved  by  any  of  the 


5  So  MEMORY. 

facts  here  adduced — though  something  more  may  be  expected  from  the 
volume — is  the  assertion  (239)  of  the  actual  existence  of  a  memory 
containing  every  detail  of  the  past  life  in  all  the  particularity  of  its 
temporal  setting,  a  conception  which  strongly  savors  of  the  4  sublimi- 
nal consciousness '  of  so-called  psychical  research. 

SMITH  COLLEGE.  H.  N.  GARDINER. 

On  Muscular  Memory.  THEODATE  L.  SMITH.  American  Journal 
of  Psychology,  Vol.  VII.,  pp.  453-490. 

This  paper  is  divided  into  two  parts,  to  the  second  of  which  the  title 
more  particularly  applies.  In  the  first  part  the  motor  element  present 
in  the  process  of  memorizing  of  nonsense  series  syllables  is  studied ; 
in  the  second  'muscle  memory  proper,  i.  <?.,  memory  of  movements.' 

In  the  first  set  of  experiments  series  of  ten  syllables  were  presented 
to  the  subject  by  means  of  an  automatic  shutter,  the  time  of  exposure 
of  each  series  being  20  seconds ;  at  the  close  of  the  exposure  the  sub- 
ject repeated  aloud  as  many  of  the  syllables  as  he  could  remember. 
The  experimental  conditions  were  kept  as  uniform  as  possible  and 
observations  were  made  in  all  the  experiments  of  the  physical  and 
mental  condition  of  the  subject.  In  order  to  bring  to  light  the  muscular 
element  involved  in  memory  of  this  kind,  the  results  gained  where 
the  subject  was  undisturbed  in  memorizing  were  compared  with 
those  gained  when  the  subject  had  to  repeat  c  one,  two,  three '  con- 
tinuously during  the  experiment.  The  value  of  the  memory  under  the 
two  sets  of  conditions  was  tested  by  enumerating  the  number  of  errors 
committed  by  the  subject  in  the  process  of  reproducing  the  syllables, 
the  errors  being  classified  under  three  heads,  as  (i)  displaced,  (2) 
wrong,  (3)  forgotten  syllables. 

The  general  result  was  that  there  were  more  errors  when  the  sub- 
ject counted  '  one,  two,  three '  than  when  he  read  undisturbed,  the  in 
crease  of  error  varying  from  12.6  per  cent,  with  one  reagent  to  17- 7 
with  another ;  there  were  no  marked  differences  in  the  proportion  of 
the  three  classes  of  error  under  the  two  different  sets  of  conditions. 
That  the  increase  of  error  was  due  to  disturbance  of  the  motor  processes, 
which  are  present  when  memorizing  is  undisturbed,  and  not  to  dis- 
traction of  the  attention,  was  rendered  highly  probable  by  another  set 
of  experiments.  It  was  found  that  the  memory  of  all  the  five  subjects 
was  improved  when  they  read  the  syllables  aloud  during  the  act  of 
memorizing. 

In  the  second  part  of  the  research  the  printed  characters  of  the 
manual  alphabet  were  employed,  the  characters  being  formed  into 


PSYCHOLOGICAL  LITERATURE.  581 

series  of  five  and  ten,  and  presented  to  the  subjects  in  the  way  de- 
scribed above.  In  the  first  group  of  experiments  the  subject  merely  saw 
the  characters ;  in  the  second  he  imitated  the  characters  muscularly  in 
addition ;  in  both  cases  he  was  required  at  the  close  of  the  memoriz- 
ing to  reproduce  the  characters  muscularly.  The  addition  of  the 
motor  imitation  was  found  with  all  the  seven  subjects  to  cause  a 
diminution  of  the  number  of  errors  (classified  as  in  the  first  group) , 
the  diminution  varying  from  10.5  per  cent,  to  20.7  per  cent.1  In  a 
third  group  the  subject  was  required  to  count  4  one,  two,  three,'  while 
learning  visually  as  in  the  first  group.  The  result  of  this  modifica- 
tion was,  in  general,  to  diminish  the  errors  and  to  make  the  numerical 
values  more  constant. 

As  the  author  remarks  at  the  close  of  the  paper,  the  experiments 
give  no  exact  measurement  of  motor  memory;  the  investigation  in 
fact  consists  in  the  comparison  of  the  memory  in  cases  where  the 
motor  element  is  more  prominent  with  the  memory  where  it  is  less 
prominent.  But  this  admission  does  not  deprive  such  experiments 
of  their  value.  Every  attempt  to  give  a  more  definite  statement  of 
the  nature  and  extent  of  the  motor  function  in  mental  life  is  to  be 
welcomed. 

SMITH  COLLEGE.  W.   G.   SMITH. 

SYNOPSIA. 

Entstehung  und  Bedeutung  der  Synopsien.  RICHARD  HENNIG. 
Zeitsch.  f.  Psychol.,  X.,  183-222. 

One  will  search  in  vain  for  anything  new  in  Hennig's  discussion  of 
synopsia.  The  paper  contains  definition  and  classification,  following 
closely  upon  the  lines  of  Flournoy,  who  is  frequently  quoted.  Refer- 
ences to  the  work  of  other  writers  are  very  incomplete,  but  the  illus- 
trated descriptions  of  the  writer's  forms  are  given  with  elaborate  detail 
which  is  sometimes  wearisome  and  which  seems  unnecessary  in  the 
present  state  of  our  acquaintance  with  the  subject.  The  most  valua- 
ble part  of  the  paper  consists  in  the  facts  which  it  brings  to  bear  upon 
the  disputed  question  of  the  '  psychological  origin '  of  synopsia.  Hennig 
believes  that  many  instances  of  '  colored  hearing,'  and  that  all  '  forms' 
occur  through  personal  experiences  of  their  possessors,  dating  back  so 
far  in  childhood  that  they  are  naturally  often  forgotten.  A  possible 
source  of  such  forms  is  suggested  by  Hennig's  account  of  his  own 
number  form  which  follows  the  line  of  the  houses  on  a  very  irregular 
street  of  his  childhood  acquaintance ;  these  houses  had  interested  him 

irrhe  percentage  for  the  subject  J.  P.  H.  should  be  ii.i  instead  of  22.2. 


5 82  PSYCHICAL  RESEARCH. 

chiefly  through  their  numbers.  His  form  reproduces  not  only  the  line 
of  the  houses,  but  the  characteristic  lights  and  shades  of  the  street. 
Hennig  also  expresses  very  unequivocally  his  belief  that  forms  are  of 
great  utility,  giving  at  length  an  account  of  the  experience  of  a  friend 
who  consciously  refers  his  unusual  memory  for  dates  to  elaborate 
mental  forms. 

WELLESLEY  COLLEGE.  MARY  WHITON  CALKINS. 


PSYCHICAL  RESEARCH. 

Address  by  the  President  before  the  Society  for  Psychical  Re- 
search. WILLIAM  JAMES.  Proc.  Soc.  for  Psych.  Research, 
XII.,  2-10,  June,  1896.  Science,  III.,  882-888,  June  19,1896. 

The  Society  for  the  Psychical  Research  is  fortunate  in  its  leaders. 
The  strongest  argument  it  can  offer  in  behalf  of  the  phenomena  it 
investigates  seems  to  me  not  the  anecdotes  and  other  evidence  it  has 
been  able  to  collect,  but  the  fact  that  mpn  such  as  Professor  James 
and  Professor  Sidgwick  take  an  interest  in  these  things  and  are  partly 
or  wholly  convinced  of  their  importance. 

The  presidential  address  of  Professor  James,  admirably  written  as 
a  matter  of  course,  reviews  the  work  and  claims  of  the  Society  with 
skill  and  moderation.  He  finds  that  the  hypnotic  wave  has  subsided 
and  that  experimental  thought  transference  has  yielded  a  less  abundant 
return  than  at  first  seemed  likely.  But  he  thinks  that  solid  progress 
has  been  made  by  the  report  on  the  Census  of  Hallucinations  and  in 
the  investigation  of  clairvoyance.  Ghosts  also  should  not  be  ignored. 
u  Though  the  evidence  be  flimsy  in  spots,  collectively  it  may  neverthe- 
less carry  heavy  weight."  It  is  'a  faggot  not  a  chain.'  This,  how- 
ever, is  an  argument  that  can  be  turned  both  ways.  When  we  have 
an  enormous  number  of  cases,  and  cannot  find  among  them  all  a  single 
one  that  is  quite  conclusive,  the  very  number  of  cases  may  be  inter- 
preted as  an  index  of  the  weakness  of  the  evidence.  The  discovery  of 
a  great  many  gray  crows  would  not  prove  that  any  crows  are  white, 
rather  the  more  crows  we  examine  and  find  to  be  black  or  gray,  the 
less  expectation  have  we  of  finding  one  that  is  white. 

The  '  faggot '  argument,  intended  for  the  '  rigorously  scientific '  dis- 
believer, will  not  be  so  likely  to  affect  him  as  the  fact  that  Professor 
James  has  found  in  Mrs.  Piper  his  '  own  white  crow.'  This  is  an 
argument  difficult  to  answer  except  by  referring  to  the  continuity  of 
history,  which,  as  the  author  says,  is  maintained  by  the  Society.  The 
ablest  of  men  have  followed  alchemy  and  astrology,  have  worshiped 


PSYCHOLOGICAL  LITERATURE.  583 

strange  gods,  have  consulted  witches  and  burned  them.  Geese  have 
before  now  been  mistaken  for  swans,  and  often  to  the  honor  of  those 
who  made  the  mistake.  One  white  crow  is  enough,  but  its  skin 
should  be  deposited  in  a  museum. 

COLUMBIA  UNIVERSITY  J.  McKEEN  CATTELL. 

THE  EMOTIONS. 

Character  and  the  Emotions.  ALEXANDER  F.  SHAND.  Mind,  N. 
S.,  V,  203-226.  April,  1896. 

The  first  part  of  Mr.  Shand's  article  deals  with  the  method  and 
problem  of  Ethology,  the  idea  of  which,  as  a  science,  seems  first  to 
have  been  formulated  by  Mill,  but  the  beginnings  of  which  have  per- 
haps only  recently  been  made  by  psychologists  in  France.  Ethology 
is  regarded  by  Mr.  Shand  as  a  special  psychological  science,  the 
statical  part  of  which  is  concerned  with  the  classification  of  types  and 
circumstances  and  the  dynamical  part  with  the  more  difficult  'deduc- 
tion' of  types — their  genesis  and  development  and  the  changes  pro- 
duced in  them  by  circumstances.  A  '  type '  is  broadly  conceived,  not 
merely  as  a  dominant  tendency,  but  as  a  complex  of  qualities  possess- 
ing inner  psychical  connection :  which  connection  it  is  the  business  of 
the  science  to  show.  And  the  classification  of  types  must  take  account 
not  only  of  the  strength  of  tendencies,  but  also  of  the  degree  of  their 
association,  of  the  rapidity  and  relative  persistence  of  the  mental  pro- 
cesses and  of  the  intensity  of  the  feelings  of  pleasure  and  pain  con- 
nected with  the  emotions  and  sentiments :  all  which  determinations  the 
analysis  has  to  render  precise.  The  classification  of  circumstances, 
which,  relative  to  character,  are,  strictly,  an  abstraction,  must  follow 
their  'objective  and  universal  meaning'.  This  is  insisted  on  as  a 
principle,  but  no  suggestions  are  given  as  to  how  the  principle  would 
be  carried  out.  It  may  be  said,  however,  that  a  complete  inventory 
of  circumstances,  in  the  sense  required  by  a  science  of  types,  as 
distinct  from  the  biography  of  individuals,  is  not,  theoretically,  im- 
possible. 

The  remainder  of  the  essay  is  an  interesting  contribution  to  the 
theory  and  classification  of  the  feelings.  The  point  of  cardinal  impor- 
tance is  the  distinction  between  the  emotions  and  the  sentiments. 
Emotions  and  sentiments  differ,  not  primarily  in  respect  of  intensity,  but 
in  regard  to  growth  of  organization.  The  sentiments  are  highly  or- 
ganized habits  ;  the  emotions  are  relatively  isolated  and  simple.  The  lat- 
ter, however,  tend  to  develop  into  more  stable  and  complex  feelings  and 
to  build  themselves,  into  modifying  and  modified  by,  the  sentiments. 


5  §4  EPIS  TEMOL  OGY. 

The  sentiments  are  substantival,  the  emotions  adjectival ;  the  sentiments 
relate  to  relatively  permanent  objects,  the  emotions  to  events.  This 
thought  is  skilfully  worked  out,  it  being  shown  how  love  for  an  object 
gives  rise,  under  varying  circumstances,  to  a  large  number  of  emotions ; 
how  the  converse  effects  are  produced  when  the  object  is  one  of  hatred 
or  dislike,  and  how  new  modifications  are  introduced,  new  emotions 
and  sentiments  developed,  where  the  object  of  regard  is  another  human 
being  or  a  lower  animal  or  one's  self.  The  classification  of  the  feel- 
ings follows,  then,  the  degree  or  character  of  their  organization. 
First  come  the  relatively  unorganized  feelings,  including  certain  emo- 
tions, all  the  appetites  and  the  pleasures  and  pains  of  sense.  All  these 
may,  however,  form  one  of  the  two  subdivisions  of  the  organized  feel- 
ings, the  other  being  the  sentiments  and  interests.  The  principle  for 
the  classification  of  an  emotion  is  thus  its  function  in  the  sentiment. 
The  classification  of  the  sentiments  is  a  more  difficult  matter,  and  its 
consideration  is  deferred.  It  is  to  be  hoped  that  Mr.  Shand,  who  shows 
fine  talent  for  psychology  of  the  analytic  sort  and  writes  well,  intends 
by  this  to  develop  the  essay  here  presented  into  a  larger  Prolegomena 
to  Ethology.  The  conception  of  the  organization  of  the  emotions  in 
the  sentiments,  the  matter  of  special  interest  to  the  general  psycholo- 
gist, has  in  it  that  quality  of  pursuasiveness  that,  once  grasped,  it  seems 
to  have  been  one's  own  thought  always. 

SMITH  COLLEGE.  H.  N.  GARDINER. 

EPISTEMOLOGY. 

Wirklichkeitsstandpunkt.     DR.    RUDOLF   WEINMANN.     Verlag  v. 

L.  Voss,  Hamburg  und  Leipzig.  1896.  Pp.  37. 
This  little  book,  which  the  author  calls  an  '  epistemological 
sketch/  is  in  three  parts.  Part  I.  is  entitled  4  Orientierung.'  The 
author  gives  a  brief  statement  of  two  fundamental  ideas  of  Kantism 
which  he  calls  '  subjective  realism.'  Kantism  is  realistic  because  it 
recognizes  a  world  of  objective  reality  independent  of  our  consciousness, 
and  which  lies  at  the  basis  of  our  phenomenal  world.  It  is  subjective 
because  it  makes  an  absolute  cleft  between  this  world  of  c  things  in 
themselves '  and  our  world  of  phenomena.  The  author  next  affirms  a 
realistic  position.  He  says  that  out  of  the  original  psychic  state,  the 
simple  4  da  sind,'  unfolds  the  world  of  objects  independent  of  the  sub- 
ject, and  also  the  world  of  ideas  belonging  to  the  ego.  This  distinction, 
he  says,  is  based  on  the  one  hand,  on  the  immediate  experience  or 
feeling  of  being  compelled  by  objects  in  forming  representations,  and 
on  the  other  hand  on  that  of  the  mastery  over  objects.  This,  he 


PSYCHOLOGICAL  LITERATURE.  585 

claims,  leads  to  a  realistic  position.  Realism  is  next  contrasted  with 
positivism  and  idealism,  but  space  does  not  permit  us  to  give  the  dis- 
cussion of  these  points.  The  conclusion  is  that  we  must  accept  realism, 
and  the  question  is  as  to  whether  or  not  we  are  to  accept  it  in  Kant's 
subjective  form. 

This  leads  to  Part  II.  which  is  entitled  4  Aprioritat  und  Subjectivis- 
mus.'  In  the  first  section,  space,  time,  and  causality  are  discussed, 
and  Kant's  position  stated.  Then  follow  some  arguments  against 
Kantism.  His  doctrine  of  the  *  thing  in  itself  '  is  shown  to  involve  a 
contradiction,  since  if  it  is  a  really  unknown  '  x '  we  cannot  deter- 
mine it  negatively  by  denying  of  it  space,  time,  and  causality.  The 
author  goes  on  to  say  that  the  Kantian  claim  that  the  a  priori  char- 
acter of  these  ideas  involves  also  their  subjectivity,  is  a  mere  assump- 
tion, and  then  he  gives  some  arguments  for  the  objectivity  of  these 
categories.  First,  the  fact  that  we  are  utterly  unable  to  represent  a 
world  without  these  ideas,  shows  that  they  are  most  real  and  in  fact 
the  necessity  attaching  to  them  is  just  as  strong  as  that  of  Kant's  postu- 
lates of  the  practical  reason.  Second,  the  fact  that  our  knowing  con- 
sciousness is  in  the  closest  relation  to  a  part  of  the  objective  world, 
viz.,  our  body,  would  lead  us  to  believe  that  there  is  a  harmony  be- 
tween the  organ  of  knowledge  and  its  object.  Third,  the  doctrine  of 
development  would  indicate  a  close  relation  between  the  subject  and 
the  object  of  knowledge,  and  shows  that  our  psyche  has  arisen  in  depen- 
dence on  the  outer  world,  and  is  therefore  formed  to  know  this  world. 
Weinmann  concludes  that  notwithstanding  all  this,  the  a  priori  char- 
acter of  these  categories  remains  untouched,  only  it  is  merely  a  relative 
a  priori,  and  if  our  representation  of  the  world  is  conditioned  by  our 
organization,  this  in  turn  is  and  has  been  conditioned  by  the  world. 

In  the  second  section  of  this  part  the  author  takes  up  the  secondary 
qualities,  and  criticizes  some  arguments  which  have  been  advanced  for 
their  subjectivity.  It  is  claimed  by  some  that  we  know  only  the  effects 
of  things  on  us  and  not  the  things,  and  that  the  effects  have  no  like- 
ness to  the  things.  Weinmann  says  that  the  upholders  of  this  argu- 
ment have  fallen  into  materialistic  conceptions.  The  argument  could 
have  force  only  if  the  process  in  the  brain  was  that  which  is  given  in 
sensation.  This,  however,  is  not  the  case,  and  the  sensations  which 
supervene  upon  the  nervous  process  are  to  be  regarded  as  ideal  repro- 
ductions of  the  outer  occurrence.  It  is  no  absurdity  then  to  say  that 
this  reproduction  is  adequate,  and  in  fact  the  burden  of  proof  lies  with 
him  who  denies  this.  Further,  the  doctrine  of  4  specific  energies '  has 
been  urged  in  support  of  the  theory  of  the  subjectivity  of  our  sensations. 


586  EPISTEMOLOGY. 

This  doctrine,  however,  is  physiological,  and  proves  nothing  for  epis- 
temology.  Arguments  from  the  a  priori  nature  of  our  various  senses, 
and  from  physics  are  also  discussed,  but  must  be  omitted  here.  The 
author  concludes  that  our  sensations  are  subjective  in  the  sense  that 
they  refer  directly  to  our  own  body  and  indirectly  to  the  outer  world 
of  which  they  are  ideal  reproductions.  Thus,  he  says,  we  get  for  our 
general  epistemological  standpoint,  a  '  dualistic  realism/  in  which 
we  have  the  world  in  space  and  time,  and  subject  to  the  law  of  caus- 
ality, and  on  the  other  hand  the  consciousnesses  which  have  been  de- 
veloped in  dependence  on  these  categories  of  their  environment,  and 
which,  therefore,  bring  them  as  a  priori  forms  for  the  cognition  of 
this  world. 

Part  III  is  entitled  '  Wirklichkeitsstandpunkt.'  In  this  part  the 
author  states  certain  advantages  of  his  position,  which  constitute,  he 
claims,  an  indirect  argument  for  it.  He  says  that  we  escape  the  doc- 
trine of  '  chance '  in  reference  to  the  relation  of  subject  and  object,  and 
also  the  Kantian  '  thing-in-itself .'  We  are  also  in  touch  with  com- 
mon sense  and  physical  science,  while  the  various  philosophical  disci- 
plines, such  as  psychology,  ethics,  etc.,  presuppose  the  realistic  stand- 
point. Even  idealistic  metaphysics  in  its  greatest  representatives  holds 
that  the  given  world  is  real,  while  the  doctrine  of  the  4  thing-in-itself  * 
baffles  all  interpretation.  The  author  closes  by  endeavoring  to  set 
aside  two  methodological  objections. 

PRINCETON.  C.  W.   HODGE. 

Zur  Psychologic  der  Metaphysik.     RUDOLF  LEHMANN.     Archiv  f. 

system.  Philosophic.  Bd.  II.,  38-70.  1896. 
The  origin  of  metaphysics — the  reference  throughout  is  to  dogmatic 
metaphysics — is  to  be  found  in  two  impulses,  one  intellectual,  the  im- 
pulse to  solve  the  problems  left  unsolved  by  the  special  sciences ;  the 
other  emotional,  the  impulse  to  get  rid  of  certain  misgivings  and  to 
justify  the  expression  of  certain  natural  tendencies.  The  first  is  but  a 
special  form  of  the  general  cognitive  impulse  and  takes  characteristically 
its  rise  in  the  contradictions  involved  in  the  fundamental  conceptions 
of  the  empirical  sciences;  the  essentially  aesthetic  impulse  to  system- 
atic totality  also  leads,  when  strong,  to  speculations  which  seek  to 
overcome  the  incompleteness  of  their  systems.  The  emotional  im- 
pulse, however,  is  the  more  primitive  and  controling.  The  phenomena 
by  which  it  is  awakened  are  such  contrasts  as  life  and  death,  natural 
law  and  will,  altruistic  and  egoistic  impulses,  contrasts  which  are  con- 
nected with  the  deepest  interests  of  human  life  and  form  the  really 


NEW  BOOKS.  587 

vital  subjects  of  speculation.  The  conceptions  of  metaphysics  are 
all  constructed  on  analogies  of  experience.  Here,  too,  the  experiences 
which  furnish  the  analogies  are  either  intellectual  or  emotional.  The 
first  supply  the  rationalistic,  the  second  the  mystical  elements.  In  il- 
lustration of  the  first,  the  author  refers  to  the  influence  of  conceptions 
derived  from  the  observation  of  nature  on  the  metaphysics  of  the 
lonians,  Democritus,  the  French  materialists,  Schelling  (magnetism), 
Hartmann  (biological  phenomena) ,  and  Spencer ;  to  the  influence  of 
mathematical  conceptions  on  the  Pythagoreans  and  Spinoza ;  of  log- 
ical on  Plato  and  Hegel;  of  psychological  on  Empedocles,  Fichte, 
Schelling  (theosophical  period)  and  Schopenhauer.  But  of  greater 
influence  than  all  these  scientific  conceptions  are  religious  ideas, 
especially  the  idea  of  a  personal  God  which  supplies  the  analogy 
for  every  system  of  metaphysical  teleology.  From  religion  also 
come  the  mystical  elements,  the  basal  root  of  which  is  the  sexual  in- 
stinct, a  truth  which  Plato  finely  recognized  in  his  doctrine  of  the 
philosophical  Eros. 

SMITH  COLLEGE.  H.  N.   GARDINER. 


NEW    BOOKS. 

An  Outline  of  Psychology.  EDWARD  BRADFORD  TITCHENER,  New 
York  and  London,  The  Macmillan  Co.,  1896.  Pp.  xiv+352. 

Herbarfs  ABC  of  Sense-perception  and  Minor  Pedagogical 
Work.  Translated,  with  introduction,  notes  and  commentary,  by 
WILLIAM  J.  ECKOFF.  New  York,  D.  Appleton  &  Co.,  1896.  Pp. 
xv+288. 

Schopenhauer's  System  in  its  Philosophical  Signijicance.  WIL- 
LIAM CALDWELL.  New  York,  Charles  Scribner's  Sons,  1896. 
Pp.  xviii-f  538.  $3.00. 

The  Child,  Its  Spiritual  Signijicance.  HENRY  KING  LEWIS.  Lon- 
don and  New  York,  The  Macmillan  Co.,  1896.  Pp.  viii  +  222. 
$2.00. 

L  '  Education  intellectuelle  des  le  berceau.  BERNARD  PEREZ. 
Paris,  Alcan,  1896.  Pp.  340.  5  fr. 

Manuel  pratique  des  methodes  d '  enseignement  speciales  aux  en- 
fants  anormaux.  HAMON  DU  FOUGERAY  and  L.  COUETOUX. 
Paris,  Alcan,  1896.  Pp.  xv-f288. 

Recherches  cliniques  et  therapeutiques  sur  I* epilepsie,  /'  hysterie 
etVidiotie.  DR.  BOURNEVILLE.  Paris,  Alcan,  1896.  Pp.  Ixxi-f 
250. 


NOTES. 

NOTES. 

THE  third  International  Congress  of  Psychology  met  in  Munich 
from  the  third  to  the  seventh  of  August.  Of  the  1 74  papers  announced 
in  advance,  the  following  were  presented  before  the  general  sessions, 
in  addition  to  an  address  of  welcome  by  Prof.  C.  Stumpf,  the  Presi- 
dent :  '  Pain/  by  Charles  Richet ;  *  Criminal  Responsibility,'  by  Franz 
von  Liszt ;  '  On  the  Localization  of  the  Emotions,'  by  Guiseppi  Sergi ; 
4  On  the  Association  Centers  of  the  Brain,  with  Anatomical  Demon- 
strations,'by  Paul  Flechsig;  'The  Theory  of  Sensation,'  by  Franz 
Brentano;  4  The  Psychology  of  Genius,' by  Frederic  W.  H.  Myers; 
4  A  Genetic  Study  of  Primitive  Emotion,'  by  G.  Stanley  Hall ;  «  A 
New  Method  of  Testing  Mental  Ability  and  its  Application  to  School 
Children,'  by  Herm.  Ebbinghaus ;  '  Individual  Psychology,'  by  Al- 
fred Binet ;  '  On  Memory  for  Sensations,'  by  W.  von  Tschisch,  '  The 
Conception  of  the  Unconscious  in  Psychology,'  by  Th.  Lipps.  We 
hope  to  give  a  full  account  of  the  Congress  in  the  November  number 
of  this  REVIEW. 

WE  are  glad  to  note  that  experimental  psychology  has  been  in- 
cluded by  the  International  Bibliographical  Conference  in  London 
among  the  fifteen  leading  sciences  to  be  catalogued. 

THE  chair  of  mental  philosophy  and  logic  established  sometime 
since  in  the  University  of  Cambridge  has  never  been  filled,  owing  to 
lack  of  endowment.  JCyoo  annually  has  now  been  appropriated  for 
the  chair,  £200  of  which  is  due  to  generosity  of  Prof.  Sidgwick,  and 
it  is  expected  that  a  professor  will  soon  be  appointed. 

PROF.  E.  B.  TITCHENER,  of  Cornell  University,  will  translate  into 
English  Wundt's  Physiologische  Psychologic  and  in  cooperation  with 
Mr.  W.  B.  Pillsbury  Kulpe's  Einleitung  in  der  Philosophic.  Miss 
Julia  H.  Gulliver,  of  Rockford  College,  will  translate  Wundt's  Ethik. 

THE  University  of  Chicago  has  laid  the  corner  stones  of  four  Bio- 
logical Buildings,  the  cost  of  which  is  to  be  defrayed  by  the  $1,000,- 
ooo  given  by  Miss  Culver  to  the  Biological  Department.  The  Labora- 
tory of  Psychology  will  be  located  in  the  Anatomical  Building,  which 
will  also  include  the  work  in  neurology  under  Professor,  now  Head 
Professor,  Donaldson. 

MR.  G.  F.  STOUT,  Fellow  of  St.  John's  College,  Cambridge,  and 
editor  of  Mind  has  been  appointed  to  the  Anderson  lectureship  on 
comparative  psychology,  recently  founded  at  Aberdeen. 

DR.  C.  v.  EHRENFELS,  of  Munich,  has  been  appointed  assistant 
professor  of  philosophy  in  the  University  of  Prague. 


VOL.  III.     No.  6.  NOVEMBER,  1896. 


THE  PSYCHOLOGICAL  REVIEW. 


THE  THIRD   INTERNATIONAL    CONGRESS   OF 
PSYCHOLOGY. 

BY  DR.  EDWARD   FRANKLIN  BUCHNER. 

Yale  University. 

It  is  very  significant  that  psychology  can  claim  the  attention 
of  an  international  gathering.  Being  a  science,  the  most  sub- 
jective and  individual — at  least  in  its  subject-matter  and  funda- 
mental method — it  is  semi-paradoxical  that  it  should  attain  this 
high  degree  of  objectivity.  One  could  see  ethnologists,  philolo- 
gists, jurists,  sociologists,  epistemologists  and  pedagogues  along 
with  anatomists,  zoologists,  physiologists  and  pathologists, 
mingling  with  Psychologen  von  Fetch,  offering  their  contributions 
towards  the  fuller  knowledge  of  mental  phenomena.  In  the 
words  of  the  genial  and  energetic  president,  "the  apt  title 
'  Congress  of  Psychology,'  signifies  that  there  is  a  welcome  ex- 
tended to  every  one  who  communicates  or  discusses  any  fact, 
whatsoever,  standing  in  relation  to  psychology,  in  a  manner  in- 
structive for  psychological  study." 

The  history  of  psychological  congresses  shows  a  decided 
and  gratifying  growth  in  the  interest  for  this  science.  The 
first  international  congress  in  Paris,  1889,  under  the  presidency 
of  M.  Ribot,  carried  the  title  '  Congress  of  Physiological  Psy- 
chology.' Its  chief  occupation  was  the  study  of  hypnotic 
phenomena  and  telepathic  hallucinations.  The  second  con- 
gress in  London,  1892,  under  the  presidency  of  Professor  Sidg- 
wick,  showed  by  its  title,  *  Congress  of  Experimental  Psychol- 
ogy,' that  a  wider  circle  of  phenomena  was  to  be  regarded 


59°  EDWARD  FRANKLIN  BUCHNER. 

from  the  inductive  method  of  investigation.  The  congresses  of 
4  Rational  Psychology,'  and  of  '  Experimental  Psychology  in 
Education,' under  the  auspices  of  the  'International  Congress 
of  Education  of  the  World's  Columbian  Exposition,'  Chicago, 
1893,  form  a  chapter  in  this  account,  although  the  controlling 
theme  was  chiefly  pedagogical.  The  '  Third  International 
Congress  of  Psychology,'  which  sat  in  Munich,  from  August 
4th  to  7th,  1896,  under  the  presidency  of  Professor  Stumpf,  of 
Berlin,  revealed  a  further  development.  The  wide  interest  in 
things  psychological  is  indicated  by  the  membership  of  over 
five  hundred,  of  whom  more  than  four-fifths  were  present  at  the 
opening  session.  The  value  of  the  sessions,  and  the  contribu- 
tion of  the  congress  for  the  science  of  psychology,  may  be 
richly  found  in  the  one  hundred  and  seventy-four  addresses  an- 
nounced, which  were  arranged  for  three  general  sessions  and 
five  sections,  the  latter  being  as  follows  :  '  Anatomy  and  Phys- 
iology of  the  Brain,  Physiology  and  Psychology  of  the  Senses, 
Psycho-Physics,'  '  Psychology  of  the  Normal  Individual,'  '  Psy- 
cho-Pathology and  Criminal  Psychology,'  *  Psychology  of 
Sleep,  Dreams,  Hypnotic  and  Related  Phenomena,'  and  '  Com- 
parative and  Pedagogical  Psychology.' 

Graced  by  the  presence  of  Dr.  Prince  Ludwig  Ferdinand 
and  Princess  Therese,  of  the  royal  house  of  Bavaria,  the  Con- 
gress opened  with  the  '  Eroffnungsrede '  of  the  president,  Pro- 
fessor Stumpf,  of  Berlin,  in  the  great  aula  of  the  royal  univer- 
sity. In  sketching  the  previous  congresses,  the  speaker  re- 
ferred to  the  new  title  of  the  present  one,  which  was  ascribed  to 
the  suggestions  of  the  Executive  Committee.  "  The  adjective 

*  experimental '  appears  to  me  always  necessary  as  against  cer- 
tain ratiocinative,  abstract,  deductive  tendencies  which  have  not 
entirely  died  out  in  Germany.     While  omitting  the  adjective 

*  experimental,'  the  Committee  do  not  wish  to  deny  its  right. 
We  agree  that  the  necessity  of  experiments  is  almost  universally 
admitted,  and  that  herein  is  dependent  the  avoidance  of  all  ap- 
pearance of  one-sidedness,   and  harmonious   promotion  of   all 
tendencies.     The  disciples  and  friends  of  the  new  psychology 
are  bound  together  by  a  common  conviction  as  to  method :  the 
decisive  importance  which  all  of  us  attribute  to  the  increase  and 


INTERNATIONAL    CONGRESS   OF  PSYCHOLOGY.       591 

refinement  of  our  knowledge  of  facts.  By  refinement,  I  mean 
especially  the  treatment  of  enumeration.  Where  one  has,  here- 
tofore, been  satisfied  with  indefinite  quantitative  designations, 
we  will  now  count  and  measure,  just  as  far  as  it  is  possible." 

Having  expressed  the  most  general  principles  of  the  me- 
thods *  which,  in  spite  of  divergencies,  bind  us  in  unity,'  the 
speaker  gave  "  utterance  also  to  the  most  general  convictions  as 
to  fact ;  and  to  what  other  question  can  these  be  attached  than 
to  the  relation  of  mind  and  body,  of  the  psychical  and  physical  ? 
The  effort  of  every  epoch  concentrates  itself  in  the  attempt  to  win 
a  satisfactory  solution  for  this  question  determining  the  entire 
view  of  the  world.  If  we  all  are  agreed  that  the  relation  to  the 
physical  realm  penetrates  our  entire  mental  life,  and,  as  we 
make  daily  progress  in  the  knowledge  of  the  details  of  this  re- 
lation, then  it  will  be  quite  possible  to  find  a  more  accurate 
formula,  in  which  our  common  views  as  to  the  nature  of  that 
relation  may  be  expressed. 

"  Fechner,  the  founder  of  psycho-physics,  influenced  by  the 
speculative  theories  of  Spinoza  and  Schelling,  defended  the 
monistic  theory,  according  to  which  psychological  and  physio- 
logical processes  are  really  one  and  the  same  process,  body  and 
mind  being  only  the  external  and  internal  modes  of  the  appear- 
ance of  one  being.  Unfortunately,  as  everything  else  in  the 
world,  this  two-sided  theory  has  its  two  sides  ;  it  is  magnificent, 
poetical,  enticing — but  dark.  The  unitary  substance,  which 
should  *  express '  itself  in  both  physical  and  psychical  attri- 
butes, is  nothing  but  a  word,  which  only  expresses  the  neces- 
sity of  escaping  dualism,  without  actually  bridging  the  chasm 
for  our  understanding. 

"At  the  present  time,  it  is  the  custom  to  repel  such  turnings 
and  comparisons,  and  to  regard  the  secret  of  the  relation  as  in- 
extricable, handing  it  over  to  metaphysics  (which  generally 
means  the  same  thing),  while  maintaining,  on  the  contrary, 
that  the  processes  in  both  series  are  parallel  throughout,  with- 
out acting  upon  each  other  or  uniting  themselves  in  reciprocal 
action.  There  are  two  forms  of  the  theory  of  parallelism. 
According  to  one  view,  the  physical  series  is  causally  bound 
together,  while  the  psychical  possesses  no  causality  in  itself, 


592  EDWARD  FRANKLIN  BUCHNER. 

as  little  as  shadows  or  images  act  upon  each  other.  *  Con- 
sciousness in  itself  is  absolutely  nothing  ! '  The  second  view 
regards  the  psychical  series  as  an  unbroken,  causally-con- 
nected development. 

"But  this  doctrine  of  parallelism  is  the  old  dualism  once 
more,  which  has  never  appeared  under  a  coarser  form.  In  op- 
position to  this  we  must  ask  the  question  whether  the  conse- 
quences of  the  investigation  of  nature,  and  especially  the  doc- 
trine of  evolution,  does  not  impel  us  to  conceive  the  world  as  a 
totality,  causally  connected  in  all  its  parts,  in  which  everything 
performs  its  task,  none  being  excluded  from  the  general  recip- 
rocal action.  It  may  be  inquired  still  farther,  whether  the 
grounds  on  which  the  total  psychical  world  should  be  excluded 
from  the  actual,  or  from  the  universal  reciprocity,  are  so  con- 
straining as  they  appear  to  many.  Hume  pointed  out  that 
cause  and  effect  need  not  be  homogeneous.  Experience  can 
only  teach  what  belongs  to  each  other  as  cause  and  effect. 
The  law  of  the  conservation  of  energy  is  in  agreement,  since 
it  is  a  law  of  transformation.  Certain  psychical  functions  are 
united  with  a  continuous  consumption  of  physical  energy, 
others,  likewise,  with  a  continuing  production  (of  such  en- 
ergy) .  So  far  as  I  can  see,  a  psycho-physical  mechanics  is 
conceivable,  which  sets  the  spiritual  processes  in  a  universal, 
lawful,  causal  connection,  and  thereby  establishes  a  monistic 
view  in  the  true  meaning.  For,  it  is  not  so  much  the  similarity 
of  elements  or  processes  as  the  universality  of  the  causal  con- 
nection and  the  unity  of  the  last  and  highest  law  which  we 
must  demand  of  a  unitary  world. 

"  For  those  who  are  thus  not  satisfied,  another  way  remains 
open  in  which  to  set  the  physical  in  the  universal  causal  con- 
nection without  violating  the  law  of  energy.  We  might  say,  a 
definite  nerve  process  in  a  definite  region  of  the  cerebral  cortex 
is  the  indispensable  pre-condition  of  the  rise  of  a  definite  sensa- 
tion. This  follows  out  of  the  neural  process  as  a  necessary 
sequence  along  with  the  physical  effect  (so  much  to  distinguish 
it  from  the  theory  of  parallelism).  But  this  part  of  the  se- 
quence absorbs  no  physical  energy,  and  its  relations  to  the  con- 
ditions cannot  be  expressed  by  mathematical  concepts  and  laws. 


INTERNATIONAL    CONGRESS   OF  PSYCHOLOGY.       593 

"  I  may  briefly  allude  to  a  shifting  of  the  entire  question, 
which  attempts  to  clear  away  the  difficulties  more  radically  by 
pointing  out  the  separation  of  the  two  realms  as  a  mistake  from 
the  very  beginning.  The  physical  may  be  only  the  sum  of 
sensations  or  ideas  of  our  mind,  as,  on  the  other  hand,  the  men- 
tal life  may  arise  out  of  sensuous  representations.  Hence,  one 
can  not  speak  of  a  difference  between  the  two  realms.  I  bow 
respectfully  before  the  epistemological  height  which  here  dis- 
closes itself,  but  refer  to  the  fact  that  even  from  this  point  of 
view  one  group  of  sensuous  representations,  which  possess 
mathematical-physical  properties,  is  distinguished  from  an- 
other group  which  does  not  possess  them.  I  cannot  discover  that 
dualism  is  really  overthrown  by  this  so-called  epistemological 
monism.  It  only  changes  the  position. 

"  In  the  future  we  shall  continue  to  regard  our  sense  percep- 
tions as  the  effects  of  the  external  world,  and  our  wills  as  the 
cause  of  our  actions,  without  being  compelled  to  look  upon  this 
manner  of  expression,  which  obtrudes  itself  upon  the  ordinary 
consciousness,  as  a  figure  of  speech.  Since  the  time  of  Des- 
cartes and  Spinoza  investigations  on  body  and  mind  have  at- 
tained extraordinary  precision.  The  philosophical  analysis  of 
the  concepts  of  substance  and  causality,  the  discovery  of  the  law 
of  energy,  the  rise  of  psycho-physics,  the  victorious  permeation 
of  the  theory  of  evolution,  the  progress  of  the  anatomy  and 
physiology  of  the  central  organs,  especially  the  investigations  on 
the  localization  of  mental  activities — all  has  contributed  to  dis- 
secting the  one  question  which  lay  before  us  in  a  lump.  It  is 
our  one  problem  to  remove  every  tendency  to  dogmatic  stiffness, 
and  not,  as  the  common  man,  speak  most  easily  and  confidently 
about  things  most  difficult." 

This  critical  review  of  the  culminating  psychological  problem 
opened  the  labors  of  the  Congress,  whose  members  were  wel- 
comed, in  the  name  of  the  royal  government  of  Bavaria,  by  his 
Excellency,  Ritter  von  Landmann,  on  behalf  of  the  city  of  Mu- 
nich by  Vice-Mayor  Brunner,  and  to  the  royal  university  by  Pro- 
fessor von  Baur,  Rector  magnificus,  whose  greeting  was  especi- 
ally cordial  towards  the  members  from  America. 

In  the  polished   address,   '  Etude  biologique  sur  la  douleur,' 


594  EDWARD  FRANKLIN  BUCHNER. 

Professor  Richet,  Paris,  presented  views  which  are  quite  dif- 
ferent from  those  which  he  put  forth  in  1877.  "Considering 
pain  as  a  chapter  in  experimental  physiology,  the  first  question 
which  presents  itself  is  this  :  What  are  the  nervous  excitations 
which  produce  pain?  The  electrical  stimulus,  of  which  the 
intensity  can  be  gradually  increased,  is  employed.  From  the 
point  of  view  of  our  sensibility  there  are  three  phases  in  the  ex- 
citation :  the  first  phase,  in  which  the  stimulus  is  too  weak  to  call 
forth  any  sensation ;  the  second  phase,  in  which  there  is  painless 
sensation ;  the  third  phase,  in  which  the  sensation  is  painful. 
With  all  other  kinds  of  stimuli  upon  the  various  senses,  we  find 
exactly  these  three  phases.  The  normal  state  of  the  nerve  is 
in  a  certain  mechanical,  electrical,  chemical,  and  thermic  condi- 
tion. Pain  is  produced  by  all  causes  which  profoundly  modify 
the  state  of  the  nerve.  Not  only  in  the  case  of  peripheral  ex- 
citations, but  internal  stimuli  of  an  organic  or  pathological  sort 
also  produce  pain  when  the  excitation  reaches  a  certain  stage. 
The  local  effect  of  a  strong  excitation  is  always  the  same.  It 
is  a  disorganization  of  the  nerve,  and  the  impossibility  for  this 
organ  to  perform  its  normal  function  during  a  certain  length  of 
time.  As  a  guard  against  disorganizing  and  destructive  excita- 
tion, all  organisms  have  two  kinds  of  defense,  the  immediate 
defense,  which  is  reflex  action,  and  the  subjective  defense,  which 
is  pain.  From  a  first  superficial  examination  it  appears  that 
pain  has  no  utility.  There  is  a  vast  number  of  lower  organisms 
which  defend  themselves  by  reflexes,  without  any  knowledge  of 
pain.  But,  besides  the  defensive  reflexes,  the  higher  organisms 
perform  a  specal  reaction,  absolutely  subjective,  which  is  pain. 
"The  persistence  in  memory  of  a  painful  excitation  is  one 
of  the  fundamental  characteristics  of  pain.  We  wish  to  insist  on 
this  one  of  the  essential  conditions  of  pain,  which  is  its  duration. 
The  scholastic  axiom,  sublata  causa,  tollitur  efectus^  is  abso- 
lutely false.  We  forget  pleasures  much  more  easily  than  pains. 
We  are  organized  in  such  a  way  that  we  fly  from  all  causes  of 
the  destruction  or  perversion  of  our  tissues.  Pain  is  considered 
as  the  supreme  evil,  and  thus  the  function  of  pain  is  that  of 
utility  in  accordance  with  the  end  of  nature.  I  wish  to  make  a 
plain  confession.  It  is  this :  the  principle  of  finality,  which 


INTERNATIONAL    CONGRESS   OF  PSYCHOLOGY.       595 

formerly  appeared  very  ridiculous  to  me,  seems  to  me  to-day, 
after  long  reflection,  absolutely  necessary  in  physiology.  The 
purpose  of  nature  is  to  keep  alive  the  greatest  number  of  be- 
ings, the  longest  time  possible. 

"  Pain  may  well  be  regarded  as  one  of  the  bases  of  intelli- 
gence, since  it  is  the  memory  of  pain  which  rules  the  conduct 
of  beings  which  are  more  than  pure  automata.  In  the  case  of 
man,  each  pain  modifies  his  psychical  structure,  forcing  him  to 
reflect.  It  is  by  pain,  as  much  as  by  sensation  that  we  appre- 
ciate the  external  world ;  our  conduct  is  immediately  modified 
by  the  pain  which  external  objects  have  provoked.  A  single 
perception  does  not  have  an  intimate  influence  on  our  sensi- 
bility, but  a  painful  sensation  provokes  an  emotion  which 
continues  a  long  time,  and  exercises  a  great  influence  on 
us  by  its  force  and  the  vivacity  of  its  persistence." 

An  opportunity,  where  the  scientific  study  of  abnormal 
mental  phenomena  may  be  of  aid  to  the  jurist,  a  field  which  has 
so  far  been  almost  entirely  overlooked  by  psychologists,  was 
shown  by  the  critical  address,  '  Die  Strafrechtliche  Zurech- 
nungsfahigkeit,'  by  Professor  von  Liszt,  Halle  a.  S.  Starting 
with  the  definition :  *  Accountability  is  the  capacity  of  being 
punished  for  past  actions,'  the  speaker  proposed  the  question, 
*  How  must  this  state  of  mind  be  constituted  ? ' 

The  penal  codes  of  the  present  attempt  to  answer  the  prob- 
lem in  various  ways.  While  the  oldest  group  emphasize  the 
freedom  of  the  will,  another  finds  the  accountability  in  the  in- 
tellectual factor,  viz. ,  insight  into  the  consequences  of  the  deed, 
and  a  third  limit  themselves  to  the  enumeration  of  the  circum- 
stances through  whose  presence  responsibility  is  excluded. 
The  German  penal  code  adopts  the  first  position,  against  which 
the  criticism  was  offered  that  the  '  right  of  punishment,  as  every 
other  form  of  right,  must  remain  removed  from  the  unending 
discussion  on  the  freedom  of  the  will.'  The  *  intellectual  mo- 
ment,' also  is  insufficient,  since  the  individual  may,  indeed,  dis- 
tinguish right  from  wrong,  and,  at  the  same  time  be  abnormal 
in  feeling  and  volition.  *  The  mind  of  the  criminal  must  be 
conceived  of  as  a  unity,  a  totality.'  Accountability  can  be  re- 
garded only  as  the  normal  (not  free)  determinableness 


596  EDWARD  FRANKLIN  BUCHNER. 

through  motives,  and  is  conditioned  by  mental  maturity.  While 
insisting,  in  spite  of  this  position,  that  the  irresponsible,  habitual 
criminal  should  be  punished,  the  speaker  only  made  a  conces- 
sion to  the  ruling  ethical  judgments.  Without  giving  a  positive 
determination  of  accountability,  the  lecture  closed  hoping  to 
find  the  agreement  of  psychologists  with  the  view  that  <  a  pun- 
ishable deed  is  not  present  when  the  actor,  at  the  time  of  the 
performance  of  the  action,  was  found  in  a  condition  of  uncon- 
sciousness, of  morbid  checking  or  impairment  of  mental  ac- 
tivity.' 

The  chief  interest  during  the  Congress  was  incited  at  the 
opening  of  the  general  session  on  Wednesday,  by  the  address 
*  Ueber  die  Associationscentren  des  menschlichen  Gehirns,'  in 
which  Professor  Flechsig,  Leipzig,  presented  anew,  with  dem- 
onstration, the  results  of  investigations  which  are  already  some- 
what known. 

After  a  rapid  survey  of  the  development  of  the  theory  of 
localization  of  mental  functions  in  the  cerebral  cortex,  he  de- 
fined his  relations  to  his  predecessors,  especially  Munk  and 
Hitzig,  and,  in  opposition  to  the  clinical,  pathological  method, 
described  his  own  as  the  historical  method  of  anatomical  devel- 
opment, in  so  far  as  it  traces  the  growth  of  the  nerves  succes- 
sively appearing  in  a  normal  way.  "  The  various  kinds  of  tracts 
which  enter  into  relation  with  the  cortex  do  not  arise  simultane- 
ously. But  few  medullary  fibres  are  found  in  the  cerebral 
bundles  of  the  ripe  foetus.  The  first  to  develop  are  the  sense 
tracts,  the  centripetal  nerves,  which  unite  the  peripheral  organs 
and  the  organs  within  the  body,  with  the  cerebral  cortex.  The 
anatomical  method  traces  this  early  development  of  the  sense 
tracts  in  the  foetus  and  newly  born  much  more  clearly  and 
sharply  than  any  other.  The  peripheral  organs  are  not  united 
at  the  same  time  with  the  cortex.  Their  order  is  rather  that  of 
a  series,  which  is  started  by  the  development  of  the  tracts 
which  unite  the  posterior  roots  of  the  cord  and  their  continuing 
nerves.  They  may  be  called  the  *  bodily-feeling' nerves,  and 
contain  fibres  serving  the  organic  functions  of  pain,  hunger, 
thirst,  etc.,  and  those  which  contribute  to  a  feeling  knowledge 
of  the  body.  The  first  impressions  which  the  cortex  receives 


INTERNATIONAL    CONGRESS   OF  PSYCHOLOGY.       597 

are  conducted  by  these  bodily-sense  nerves,  from  which  it  is 
seen  that  the  consciousness  of  the  body  precedes  that  of  the 
external  world. 

"The  olfactory  tract  appears  about  the  same  time.  Con- 
siderably later  the  optic  tract  develops,  and  is  found  already 
sheathed  to  the  cortex  in  the  mature  foetus.  Finally  the  audi- 
tory tract  appears,  but  only  the  portion  of  it  which  is  connected 
with  the  cochlea,  and,  more  particularly,  only  that  part  which 
is  imbedded  in  the  cerebral  lobe. 

"The  following  fundamental  propositions  maybe  formu- 
lated respecting  the  extent  and  arrangement  of  the  cortical 
sense  centers,  the  *  sense  zones'  of  the  cerebrum:  i.  In  man 
these  zones  fill  about  one-third  of  the  cortex.  2.  They  do  not 
present  a  continuum,  but  are  separated  from  each  other  by  cor- 
tical circuits  in  which  neither  sense  nor  motor  tracts  appear.  3. 
They  form  four  distinct  spheres  of  varying  extent ;  bodily-feel- 
ing (which  includes  the  tactile  center),  olfactory,  optical  and 
auditory  centers.  (A  particular  gustatory  center  cannot  be 
pointed  out.  It  unites  with  the  first  or  second.) 

"  The  continuation  of  the  posterior  roots  collects  in  a  region 
which  is  in  the  middle  of  the  total  cerebral  cortex,  particularly 
about  the  central  fissure.  The  olfactory  fibres  enter  the  basal 
region  of  the  brain,  partly  in  the  frontal  lobe  (reaching  to  the 
gyrus  fornicattis) ,  partly  in  the  temporal  lobe.  The  optical 
tracts  end  in  the  region  of  the  occipital  lobe  which  is  especially 
marked  off  by  the  fissure  calarina.  The  auditory  tract  enters 
the  first  temporal  convolution,  especially  its  two  roots,  and  lies 
concealed  in  the  depths  of  the  fissure  of  Sylvius.  These  con- 
clusions, based  entirely  on  the  method  of  anatomical  develop- 
ment, are  brilliantly  confirmed  by  the  evidence  of  cerebral 
pathology. 

"  Comparing  the  finer  structure  of  the  cortical  centers,  it  is 
discovered  that  the  chemical  senses,  at  least,  possess  a  special 
structure,  conditioned  by  the  appearance  of  peculiarly  formed 
cells,  and  a  special  arrangement  of  the  layers  of  ganglion  cells. 

"  All  the  motor  tracts  of  the  cortex  proceed  from  sense  cen- 
ters. By  far  the  greatest  number  take  their  rise  in  the  bodily- 
feeling  center,  while  scarcely  one-fifth  arise  in  the  field  of  audi- 


598  EDWARD  FRANKLIN  BUCHNER. 

tion.  As  respects  the  sensory  functions  of  these  centers,  it  is 
undoubtedly  true  that  the  destruction  of  a  center  in  the  cere- 
brum puts  an  end  to  the  corresponding  peripheral  sensations. 

"  Can  the  newly  born  associate  the  perceptions  of  the  vari- 
ous centers?  In  reference  to  the  anatomical  condition  dis- 
covered in  the  infant's  brain,  this  question  is  to  be  answered 
negatively.  The  cortical  fields  of  the  special  senses  are  almost 
completely  destitute  of  tracts  which  bind  them  together.  There 
are  wide  regions  between  those  fields,  in  which  matured,  medul- 
lated  fibres  are  absolutely  wanting.  Single,  scanty  fibres, 
which  appear  to  be  developed  sufficiently  to  transfer  an  excita- 
tion from  one  sphere  to  another,  run  only  between  the  olfactory 
and  bodily-feeling  centers.  The  infant  has,  presumably,  a 
great  number  of  separated  circles  of  consciousness,  correspond- 
ing to  various  sense  centers. 

"What  is  the  significance  of  this  great  complex  of  unde- 
veloped regions  between  the  centers  of  sense  ?  Following  the 
anatomical  development  of  the  cerebral  tracts,  we  secure  a  sat- 
isfactory explanation  as  to  the  function  of  these  blank,  inter- 
mediate regions.  As  early  as  the  second  month  after  birth,  a 
multitude  of  medullated  fibres  begin  to  appear,  pushing  out 
from  the  sense  centers  into  the  intermediate  regions,  to  be  lost 
in  the  cortex.  With  the  farther  growth  of  the  infant,  millions 
of  such  associational  fibers  stream  into  these  formerly  blank 
regions.  Each  center  is  the  starting  point  of  innumerable  as- 
sociational systems  which  meet,  in  the  convolutions,  like  systems 
springing  from  the  other  centers.  With  reference  to  these 
anatomical  facts,  the  intermediate  regions  may  be  called  '  as- 
sociational centers.'  Rather  than  separating  the  sense  centers 
from  each  other,  they  bind  them  together — to  be  sure,  only 
several  months  after  birth  and  later. 

*  *  There  can  be  scarcely  any  doubt  that  the  fusion  of  the  ac- 
tivity of  the  various  sense  centers  is  a  '  higher '  mental  function 
than  the  formation  of  single  sense  perceptions.  That  which  we 
call  thinking,  first  begins  with  the  association  of  the  several 
sense  activities.  That  neural  condition  which  makes  man  the 
psychical  being  that  he  is,  is  given  chiefly  in  his  «  associational 
centers.'  The  most  convincing  proof  of  their  relation  to  those 


INTERNATIONAL    CONGRESS   OF  PSYCHOLOGY.       599 

psychological  processes,  which  we  designate  collectively  under 
the  term  *  association  of  ideas,'  is  furnished  by  pathological 
evidences  from  the  impairment  of  those  regions  by  disease  and 
the  consequent  mental  disturbance. 

"  Investigations  on  a  basis  of  anatomical  developments  show 
three  groups  of  these  centers,  which  are  completely  separated 
from  each  other.  The  *  posterior  associational  center,' which  is 
the  largest,  lies  in  the  region  between  the  tactile,  visual  and  au- 
ditory fields,  and  partly  between  the  last  two  and  the  gyrus 
kippocampi.  A  considerably  smaller  region  forms  the  point  of 
the  frontal  lobe,  especially  the  base,  and  is  the  *  anterior  center.' 
The  *  central  associational  center '  is  the  smallest  and  lies  be- 
tween the  others,  corresponding  exactly  with  the  island  of  Reil. 
It  is  now  the  problem  of  pathology  to  establish  the  significance 
of  these  single  regions  for  the  mental  processes.  Pure  and 
experimental  psychology  alone  cannot  accomplish  anything 
here.  Many  of  these  functions  are  already  known  from  the 
pathological  cases,  as,  e.  g.,  the  different  forms  of  aphasia,  am- 
nesia,  etc.  Many  clinical  cases  show  that  the  knitting  of  va- 
rious perceptions  and  their  memory  images  takes  place  in  these 
centers.  This  combining  is,  presumably,  a  consequence  of 
specially  extensive  groups  of  cells,  whose  function  consists  ex- 
clusively in  « associating,'  and  this  is  the  point  where  the 
speaker  departs  entirely  from  the  usual  views  as  to  the  mechan- 
ism of  association,  as  they  have  been  formed  by  Meynert, 
Wernicke  and  others. 

"  Since  there  is  no  proof  that  the  injury  of  the  associational 
centers  influences  sense  perceptions,  in  the  restricted  meaning 
of  the  term,  these  centers  can  be  said  to  take  a  part  in  percep- 
tion, in  the  wider  sense,  by  conducting  the  memory  images  to 
the  bare  sense  impressions.  It  is  highly  probable  that  we  are 
to  look  for  the  memory  traces  of  impressions  chiefly  in  the 
ganglion  cells  of  these  centers.  The  single  convolutions  of  the 
associational  centers  are  in  no  wise  similarly  related.  The  re- 
gions bordering  the  sense  center,  which  might  be  called  '  mar- 
ginal zones,'  are  united  with  more  numerable  systems  than  those 
farther  removed.  The  collective  central  regions  are  united  by 
*  long '  associational  systems  (fasciculus  arcuatus)  with  the 


6oo  EDWARD  FRANKLIN  BUCHNER. 

sphere  of  bodily-feeling,  which  may  be  regarded,  from  its  com- 
prehensive combinations,  as  the  truly  central  point  of  the  entire 
cerebrum.  Thus  only  is  there  an  actual  unity  of  psychical  mech- 
anism, and  not  by  extensive  associational  systems  which  unite 
the  great  centers  with  each  other  directly.  The  entire  cortex 
is  a  powerful,  associative  organ,  in  certain  fields  of  which  the 
peripheral  tracts  stream  in,  and  in  which  the  motor  tracts  take 
their  rise. 

"  Is  the  quality  of  consciousness,  mediated  by  the  sense  cen- 
ters, actually  different  from  that  which  is  released  in  the  asso- 
ciational centers?  This  is  a  problem  for  the  future. 

"The  fields  of  sensibility  and  of  association  are  spatially 
separated ;  but  in  the  anatomical  and  functional  elements  they 
are  so  closely  connected  that  a  sharp  separation  between  them, 
in  a  fully  developed  organ,  is  impossible.  Without  the  associa- 
tional centers  it  would  be  absolutely  impossible  for  us  to  fabri- 
cate, into  a  unitary  totality,  the  information  which  the  several 
senses  give  us  of  one  and  the  same  external  object."  The  dis- 
cussion which  followed  was  the  most  lively  and  largely  partici- 
pated in  during  the  entire  congress. 

In  an  address,  *  Dov'  e  la  Sede  della  Emozioni,'  Professor 
Sergi,  Rome,  communicated  the  results  of  investigations  which 
were  published  in  a  large  work,  *  Dolore  e  Piacere,  Storia  na- 
turale  dei  Sentimenti,  Milano,  1894.'  The  location  of  the  feel- 
ings is  not  in  the  brain,  in  the  restricted  meaning  of  the  term, 
where  the  phenomena  of  consciousness  show  themselves,  but  in 
the  medula.  The  location  of  the  emotional  stimulus,  how- 
ever, is  peripheral,  since  these  are  only  changes  in  the  circula- 
tion of  the  blood,  in  the  food  supply  and  respiration,  etc. 

The  light  thrown  by  genetic  psychology  upon  the  hidden 
relations  between  the  somatic  and  psychical  conditions  of  ex- 
perience, and  upon  the  profounder  philosophical  problems  of 
mental  life,  was  traced  in  «  Die  Psychologic  des  Kindes,'  by 
Professor  Preyer,  Wiesbaden. 

The  third  and  last  general  session,  with  which  the  labors  of 
the  congress  were  ended  on  August  yth,  brought  together  the 
following  addresses,  whose  interest  lay  not  alone  in  the  variety 
of  themes  and  treatment :  *  Zur  Lehre  von  der  Empfindung,' 


INTERNATIONAL    CONGRESS   OF  PSYCHOLOGY.       6oi 

by  Dr.  Brentano,  formerly  Professor  of  Philosophy,  Vienna ; 

*  L'influence  somnambulique  et  le  besoin  de  direction,'  by  Pro- 
fessor Pierre  Janet,  Paris ;  '  Ueber  eine  neue  Methode  zur  Prii- 
fung  geistiger  Fahigkeiten  und  ihre  Anwendung  bei  Schulkin 
dern,'  by  Professor  Ebbinghaus,  Breslau ;   *  Ueber  das  Gedacht- 
niss  fur  Sinneswahrnehmungen,'  by  Professor  von  Tschisch, 
Dorpat ;  and,  '  Der  Begriff  des  Unbewussten  in  der  Psychol- 
ogic/ by  Professor  Lipps,  Munich. 

Almost  every  phase  of  theoretical  and  applied  psychology 
was  considered  in  one  or  more  of  the  scores  of  Vortrdge^  which 
were  assigned  to  the  several  comprehensive  sections.  The  pres- 
entation and  discussion  of  this  varied  material  occupied  the 
four  sessions  for  each  section.  Among  many  others  of  interest 
and  importance  was  the  address  by  Dr.  Ehrenfels,  Vienna, 

*  Ueber  ethische  Werthgefiihle,'  which  critically  modified  the 
fundamental  tenets  of  Utilitarianism,  in  its  attempt  to  explain 
the  ethical  feelings  of  approbation  and  disapprobation  from  the 
knowledge  of  utility  or  harm.     Whether  the  social  ethics  of 
Utilitarianism   offers    a    satisfactory  explanation  of   individual 
ethics  is  a  remaining  question.    The  discussion  of  '  Psycho-phys- 
ische  Principienfragen,'  by  Dr.  Cornelius,  Munich,   developed 
a  set  of  propositions  which  do  not  agree  with  Miiller's  *  psycho- 
physical    axioms,'    but    essentially    simplifies   psycho-physical 
theories  by  the  adoption  of  certain  assumptions. 

The  demonstration  by  Professor  Sommer,  Giessen,  of  a 
skillfully  arranged  apparatus  for  registering  the  finer  bodily 
movements,  e.  g.,  of  the  hand,  which  are  three  dimensional, 
upon  a  surface,  excited  no  little  interest.  The  sensitiveness  of 
this  '  micro-motorgraph '  approaches  the  so-called  mind  reading. 
The  members  of  the  congress  highly  appreciated  the  successful 
demonstration  of  the  <  Rontgen  rays '  by  Professor  Graetz.  The 
exhibition  of  psychological  apparatus  showed  that  the  *  new ' 
psychology  is  rapidly  enlarging  its  equipment,  and  increased 
one's  faith  in  the  importance  of  the  dexterous  psychological 
mechanic. 

The  ultimate  value  of  the  congress  for  psychological  science 
remains  to  be  seen.  The  scientific  consciousness  was  intensely 
astir,  but  the  patient  sifting  of  facts  and  theories  can  only  come 


602  EDWARD  FRANKLIN  BUCHNER. 

later.  That  psychology  possesses  such  a  grand  army  of  investi- 
gators is  the  Hauptsache.  Their  coming  together  sends  abroad 
the  inspiration  of  the  elbow-touch.  The  plans  of  the  Executive 
Committee,  in  connection  with  the  labors  of  the  contributors, 
could  not  be  excelled,  either  in  spirit  or  scope.  The  pusilla- 
nimity of  prejudice  was  conspicuously  absent.  More  liberality 
could  not  be  shown  than  that  all  facts  and  every  theory  were 
given  a  hearing.  Struggling  with  the  supreme  psychological 
problem,  with  which  the  president  launched  the  Congress,  it 
might  be  said  that  the  tendency  of  its  labors  was  against  that 
ideal  subjectivism  which  has,  for  the  most  part,  been  the  histori- 
cal product  in  every  philosophical  age.  There  was  a  temper- 
ing mindfulness  that  scientific  psychology  must  bravely  meet 
the  problems  growing  in  its  own  soil,  before  turning  them  over 
either  to  physics  or  philosophy. 

The  magnificent  entertainment  provided  for  the  members  of 
the  Congress  has  endeared  the  city  of  Munich  in  the  psycholog- 
ical hearts  of  many  nations.  The  reception  given  by  the  city  of 
Munich  in  the  hall  of  the  old  Rathhaus^  the  visit  to  the  brewery 
4  Zum  Spaten '  under  the  guidance  of  the  cordial  proprietors, 
Sedlmayr  Brothers,  and  the  special  rendering  of  *  Don  Gio- 
vanni '  in  the  Royal  Theatre,  were  social  fetes  unchecked  by 
the  unfavorable  weather  which  set  aside  other  efforts  to  stimu- 
late pleasurable  psychoses  in  the  psychological  guests.  To 
these  were  added  the  enjoyment  of  the  scientific  and  art  collec- 
tions thrown  open  by  the  state  to  the  members  of  the  Congress. 

The  official  labors  of  the  Committee  modified  the  organiza- 
tion to  a  certain  extent,  the  details  of  which  had  not  been  fully 
completed.  As  officers  of  the  fourth  international  Congress, 
Professor  Ribot  was  elected  President,  Professor  Richet,  Vice- 
President,  and  Professor  Janet,  Secretary,  all  of  Paris,  where 
the  session  will  be  held  in  1900,  during  the  international  ex- 
position. 

[It  is  hoped  that  many  more  of  the  papers  presented  at  the 
Congress  can  be  noted  in  these  pages  when  the  '  Proceedings ' 
of  the  sessions  reach  us. — EDS.] 


RICHARD  AVENARIUS. 

BY  J.   KODIS. 
Chicago. 

On  the  1 8th  of  last  August  Professor  Richard  Avenarius  of 
Zurich  died  after  a  long  and  painful  illness  affecting  both 
heart  and  lungs.  He  was  still  a  middle-aged  man,  but  he 
destroyed  his  health  through  the  enormous  mental  effort  which 
he  made  to  raise  modern  philosophy  from  its  present  passive 
state  to  the  high  rank  of  the  science  of  sciences,  capable  of  di- 
recting, as  of  old,  the  thoughts  and  actions  of  humanity.  In 
Richard  Avenarius  philosophy  loses  one  of  its  most  sincere, 
most  devoted  students,  whose  whole  life  was  a  sacrifice  on  the 
altar  of  science.  For,  having  a  high  ambition,  he  was  one  of 
those  few  men  who  are  capable  of  sacrificing  small  vanities  and 
easy  successes  to  a  far  purpose,  which  they  do  not  expect  to 
see  realized  during  their  own  life.  Thus  he  worked  for  the  fu- 
ture, having  for  his  own  share  nothing  but  disappointments  and 
disillusions. 

To  read  the  works  of  Avenarius,  and  especially  his  chief 
book,  *  Kritik  der  reinen  Erfahrung,'  is  not  an  easy  task.  His' 
terminology  presents  an  almost  insurmountable  difficulty  for 
most  students  of  philosophy.  In  spite  of  this,  Avenarius  formed 
a  school — a  small  one,  but  composed  of  men  devoted  to  his 
ideals.  He  produced  a  complete  system  of  philosophy,  new 
methods  of  investigation  of  the  laws  of  knowledge,  and  conse- 
quently he  grouped  around  him  a  number  of  students,  who  are 
working  in  the  field  which  he  explored.  The  terminology  that 
he  used  was  partly  necessary  for  the  denomination  of  the  new 
phenomena  that  he  pointed  out,  but  partly  resulted  from  the  ex- 
treme care  which  he  took  to  prevent  all  possible  changes  as  well 
in  physiological  as  in  psychological  theories ;  and  in  conse- 
quence of  this  last-named  peculiarity  it  becomes  a  real  burden 

603 


604  j.  KODIS. 

to  read  his  books.  This  was,  perhaps,  the  chief  reason  why 
his  theory  did  not  have  at  once  a  great  success.  His  philoso- 
phy is  not  to  be  read,  but  to  be  studied  like  a  treatise  on  mathe- 
matics or  physics.  But  any  one  who  undertakes  this  hard  work 
will  be  sufficiently  recompensed  by  the  enormous  wealth  of 
ideas,  new  perspectives  and  methods,  which  are  contained  in 
this  work. 

The  first  philosophical  paper  that  Avenarius  published  was 
in  1868.  It  was  an  investigation  of  Spinoza's  system :  '  Uber 
die  beiden  ersten  Phasen  des  SpinosischenPantheismus.'  From 
the  time  of  his  study  of  the  system  of  this  philosopher  he  main- 
tained the  tendency  to  seek  for  one  single  principle  in  the  mul- 
tiplicity of  our  experiences.  This  principle  Avenarius  believed 
was  to  be  found  in  the  laws  of  knowledge.  Therefore,  it  was 
not  an  objective  but  a  subjective  principle  on  which  he  based 
his  monism.  Philosophy  became  for  him  a  means  to  obtain 
*  a  central  position  toward  the  world.'  Therefore  one  strong 
and  closed  system  of  ideas,  subordinate  one  to  another,  must 
necessarily  result  from  this  point  of  view. 

His  next  paper,  which  was  published  in  1876,  *  Philosophic 
als  Denken  der  Welt,  gemass  dem  principe  des  kleinsten 
Kraftmasses,'  shows  three  most  important  developments  : 

1.  Being  brought  up  in  the  psychological  theories  of  Her- 
bart,  he  endeavors  to  give  to  the  facts  discovered  in  psychical 
life  by  Herbart  a  biological  basis.     He  explains  the  laws  of  as- 
similation of  the  new  groups  of   representations  by  the  older 
ones,  the  laws  of  subordination  of  notions  one  to  another,  etc., 
by  the  vital  processes  of  the  organism,  which  processes  consist 
in  the  preservation,  as  far  as  possible,  of  the  state  of  equilibrium, 
or,  in  other  words,  in  the  economy  of  the  organism. 

2.  The  general  notions  being  formed,  according  to  Aven- 
arius on  the  same  biological  principle,  he  considers  them  not  as 
entities,  but  rather  as  means  directed  toward  the  formation  of 
our  knowledge  of  the  world.     In  so  far  as  they  fulfill  this  pur- 
pose, they  are  good ;   when  they  do  not  serve  this  end,  they 
have  to  be  transformed  to  correspond  to  our  experiences.     He 
undertakes  the  analyses  of  some  of  the  notions  considered  as 
most  fundamental  in  modern  philosophy,  such  for  example,  as 


RICHARD  AVENARIUS.  605 

notions  of  substance,  matter,  *  Ding  an  sich,'  etc.,  and  finds 
them  constructed  on  a  false  basis  and  rather  obstructive  than 
helpful  to  the  development  of  knowledge.  The  notion  of 
movement  and  the  notion  of  sensation  are  alone  sufficient  to 
explain  all  phenomena.  This  is  a  kind  of  objective  idealism, 
which  Avenarius  afterwards  abandoned  for  realism,  conserving 
always  his  critical  attitude  toward  the  general  notions  and  try- 
ing to  find  the  laws  of  the  '  natural  history '  of  their  develop- 
ment. 

3.  The  most  important  point  in  this  paper  is  the  subordina- 
tion of  psychical  -phenomena,  as  a  -part  of  life-phenomena,  to 
general  mechanical  rules.  Therefore  it  considers  the  biological 
fact  of  self-preservation  of  living  organisms  within  certain 
limits  as  being  a  case  of  the  law  of  stability  (Beharrungs- 
princip) .  The  whole  psychical  life  is  considered  by  Avenarius 
from  this  point  of  view,  namely,  as  a  function  of  the  self-pres- 
ervation of  the  organism,  or,  in  case  of  its  becoming  disorgan- 
ized, as  the  function  of  the  self-preservation  of  a  partial  sys- 
tem of  the  organism. 

*  Philosophic  als  Denken  der  Welt '  was  announced  to  be 
the  prolegomena  of  a  larger  work  which  followed  twelve  years 
later,  in  1888.  This  was  the  *  Kritik  der  reinen  Erfahrung. 
Avenarius  was  impressed  by  the  helplessness  of  the  modern  ideal- 
ism, which  ends  with  the  affirmation  that  all  we  know  about 
the  world  is  only  our  sensations,  /.  e.,  subjective  states  of  mind. 
On  the  other  hand,  he  saw  that  in  spite  of  those  negative  results 
of  philosophical  investigations  the  sciences  increased  thein  dis- 
coveries and  human  life  went  farther  in  its  development,  based 
on  the  belief  in  the  reality  of  the  objective  world.  Therefore  he 
came  to  form  the  opinion  that  the  theory  of  knowledge  was  on 
the  wrong  path,  and  that  it  was  just  as  capable  of  a  positive  de- 
velopment as  any  other  of  the  sciences,  if  only  it  rejected  its 
speculative  and  rationalistic  methods.  It  had  only  to  limit  itself 
to  the  facts  of  knowledge,  to  investigate  them  in  their  relations  to 
each  other,  their  development  corresponding  to  the  individual 
environment,  and  modifications  depending  upon  processes  of  the 
physiological  states  of  the  organism.  His  critique  of  experi- 
ence is  a  supreme  effort  to  found  such  a  science.  As  it  is  dif- 


606  j.  KODIS. 

ficult  to  characterize  his  methods  in  a  few  words,  it  is  proper  to 
give  here,  as  one  example,  his  theory  of  the  fundamental  problem 
of  philosophy,  namely,  the  theory  of  reality .  In  place  of  throw- 
ing himself  immediately  into  a  discussion  as  to  what  is  reality, 
Avenarius  seeks  for  other  states  of  the  human  mind,  having 
much  in  common  with  this  peculiar  state,  which  induces  us  to  as- 
cribe to  certain  phenomena  the  character  of  reality.  He  finds 
three  groups  of  such  characters,  namely :  the  characters  of  ex- 
istence (which  includes  the  character  of  reality) ,  the  characters  of 
security  and  the  characters  of  the  known  (Bekanntheit).  He 
joins  them  all  under  the  common  name  of  '  Fidencial-charactere,' 
which  characters  he  considers  as  depending  upon  the  exercise 
of  the  corresponding  nervous  processes.  He  explains  this  by 
the  following  examples : 

"The  exercized  value  *  Fatherland*  is  for  individuals  the 
conception  of  something  *  existing'  in  the  full  sense  of  the 
word ;  and  this  is  more  exclusively  the  case  when  they  spend 
their  lives  in  the  same  place ;  the  world  at  large,  of  which  they 
have  only  '  heard*  not  being  in  this  respect  on  the  same  level 
with  their  'fatherland.'  The  *  fatherland'  is  at  the  same  time 
the  *  known '  place  of  the  earth  on  which  the  individual  feels 
himself  '  sure;'  i.  e.,  the  same  complex  of  elements  are  char- 
acterized by  *  security*  and  by  being  *  known. '  Therefore,  the 
'  fatherland,'  which  is  something  *  known,'  is  in  addition  some- 
thing *  sure '  for  its  inhabitants,  even  when  its  situation  was  on 
the  shore  of  the  sea,  like  Halligen,  or  at  the  foot  of  an  unquiet 
mountain,  as  formerly  were  Plurs,  Goldan,  and  now  Elm,  etc. 
What  follows  may  serve  as  an  example  of  the  primordial  unity 
of  the  three  characters  : 

"The  *  known'  path  and  guide,  the  'known'  guide-book 
and  hotel,  the  '  known'  newspaper  and  authority  are  also  char- 
acterized as  '  sure '  ones.  The  money  of  the  fatherland  is  the 
*  sure '  money,  because  it  is  '  known, '  and  the  longer  it  is 
'  known '  the  more  <  sure '  it  is."1 

Then  follows  an  investigation  of  the  transition  of  the  '  Fi- 
dencial-charactere '  from  the  -positive  to  the  negative  direction, 
the  change  from  'familiarity'  into  '  strangeness. '  Each  of  the 

1  P.  30  and  following,  Vol.  II. 


RICHARD  AVENARIUS.  607 

three  characters  of  this  group  can  go  through  a  line  of  dimin- 
ishing values  until  it  passes  into  a  negation. 

"  So  passes  the  character  of  ' existence '  (Sein)  into  '  appear- 
ance '  (Schein),  the  character  of  *  security '  into  a  *  lesser  secur- 
ity,' 'the  known'  (Bekanntheit)  into  a  'lesser  known';  to  end 
in  the  corresponding  negative  characters  of  '  existence,'  '  secur- 
ity' or  'the  known.'  On  the  way  those  characters  must  pass 
through  a  point  of  indifference" 

Among  the  examples,  given  by  Avenarius  in  such  abun- 
dance as  to  form  in  reality  sufficient  material  for  a  scientific  in- 
duction of  the  laws,  are  the  following  :  „**« 

' '  Those  natures  whose  '  habits  of  life '  are  directed  toward 
the  continual  exercise  of  '  realism '  in  the  bad  sense  of  this  word, 
/.  £.,  toward  seeking  for  gain  and  pleasures,  or  in  pursuing  a  vi- 
cious life,  or  in  crawling  and  pushing  (Kricher  und  Strebertum)  ; 
such  individuals  give  the  maximum  '  existential '  values  (maxi- 
male  Existential- Werte)  to  the  corresponding  mental  processes." 
— (E  Werte,  in  the  terminology  of  Avenarius).  "  If  they  are 
brought  to  think  upon  so-called  '  ideal '  values  by  their  experi- 
ences, or  through  some  communication  (Mittheilung),  the  '  exis- 
tential '  difference  appears  proportional  to  the  exercise.  Self- 
forgetfulness,  simple  honesty,  purely  objective  devotion,  appear 
to  them  as  '  less  true,'  '  less  real,'  '  more  apparent,'  and  further 
are  characterized  as  ' untrue,' '  unreal,' '  non-existent.' "  "So 
also  the  type  of  '  present,'  which  is  the  most  exercised  in  life, 
possesses  the  strongest  '  existential '  characteristics ;  while  the 
'  past '  and  the  '  future '  possess,  in  a  degree  corresponding  to 
their  dependence  upon  less  exercised  processes,  smaller  exis- 
tential characteristics  ;  the  '  present '  is  the  '  existent,'  the  '  past ' 
is  the  '  apparent,'  which  has  lost  its  '  existence.'  The  <  future ' 
will  yet  obtain  its  '  existence.'  This  is  why  the  Eleatics  could 
say  of  their  '  being '  (Sein)  that  it  neither  was  nor  will  be,  but 
only  ts,  that  only  the  unmovable  and  eternal  being  is  ;  the  '  dif- 
ferent,' the  «  becoming '  (Werdende)  and  '  passing '  is  '  appa- 
rent.'" 

"As  an  especial  case  we  obtain  the  expression:  This 
color  under  ordinary  conditions  is  dead-black,  but  on  a  white 
background  it  appears  darker." 


6o8  /.  KODIS. 

It  is  impossible  in  this  place  to  deal  with  the  whole  treatise 
on  the  characters  of  reality.  We  will  add,  only  as  an  especi- 
ally interesting  point,  that  Avenarius  considers  the  idea  as 
possessing  a  character  of  reality  which  is  in  its  modifications 
very  near  to  the  zero  point,  but  on  the  positive  side.  This 
plain  statement  explains  in  a  very  simple  way  some  of  the  most 
important  philosophical  misunderstandings. 

The  theory  of  knowledge  given  by  Avenarius  is,  as  we 
can  easily  see  by  the  above  examples,  a  descriptive  one,  but  at 
the  same  time,  and,  perhaps  even  because  of  this  fact,  it  is  a 
general  theory  of  knowledge.  While  formerly  every  theory  of 
knowledge  sought  to  explain  how  our  thoughts  grasp  the  *  ex- 
isting world,'  and  therefore  could  be  considered  as  a  special 
theory ',  deriving  from  the  individual  disposition  of  the  author, 
the  theory  of  Avenarius  gives  a  description  of  all  those  special 
cases  of  the  *  explanation  of  the  world,'  and  tries  to  induce  the 
general  laws  from  these  facts  of  knowledge.  The  whole  work 
is  started  from  this  point  of  view,  that  the  first  things  given  to 
the  human  mind  are  not  abstractions,  such  as  sensations ',  self- 
consciousness,  etc.,  but  simply  things  and  ideas.  Therefore 
things  and  ideas  should  be  the  starting  point  of  every  philo- 
sophical investigation  of  the  basis  of  our  knowledge.  All  that  we 
know  consists  only  of  things  and  ideas  relating  to  them,  and 
modifications  of  the  latter  more  or  less  removed  from  the  facts. 
Consequently  everything  in  human  knowledge  is  in  some  way 
an  experience,  but  possessing  different  degrees  of  purity.  The 
ideal  knowledge  is  the  pure  experience  which  contains  nothing 
but  elements  relative  to  the  facts  given  by  experience.  Science 
possesses  already  some  general  notions  of  this  purely  experi- 
mental character,  as,  for  example,  the  notion  of  energy  in  phys- 
ics. But  it  is  the  tendency  of  the  whole  mass  of  human  knowl- 
edge to  become  pure  experience,  in  other  words,  to  become  in 
the  highest  degree  adapted  to  the  surrounding  world.  Hu- 
manity represents,  in  the  whole,  a  kind  of  ultra-human  organ- 
ism, following  the  same  rules  of  self-preservation,  and  conse- 
quently of  adaptation  as  any  individual  organism. 

This  last  statement  brings  us  into  the  very  heart  of  the  theory 
of  Avenarius.  He  considers  that  every  psychical  state  in  living 


RICHARD  AVENARIUS.  609 

beings  is  a  result  of  the  self-preservative  processes  of  the  or- 
ganism. Psychical  processes  accompany  the  physiological  pro- 
cesses of  the  restoration  of  equilibrium  in  living  organisms.  The 
elementary  physiological  processes,  consisting  of  a  state  of  dis- 
turbance of  the  equilibrium  of  a  partial  central  nervous  system, 
and  in  restoration  of  the  difference,  is  called  by  Avenarius  a 
* Vital-reihe,'  a  'vital  train.'  Psychical  states  correlative  to 
these  physiological  states  are  called  the  *  Abhangige  Vital- 
reihe,'  '  dependent  vital  trains.'  When  the  equilibrium  of  a 
nervous  system  is  disturbed  it  is  always  on  account  of  a  differ- 
ence arising  between  the  nutritive  functions  of  the  system  and 
its  work.  The  whole  first  volume  of  the  theory  of  experience 
is  devoted  to  a  kind  of  general  biology,  describing  the  laws  of 
the  evolution  connections,  changes,  etc.,  of  such  *  vital  trains' 
in  individual  and  social  organisms.  The  second  volume  is  a 
description  of  the  '  dependent  vital  trains '  as  single  '  psychical 
states,'  and  their  especial  characters,  whole  trains  of  thought, 
and  such  social  products  as  sciences,  religions,  ethics,  etc,,  be- 
ing nothing  else  than  socially  developed  '  dependent  vital  trains.' 
It  is  the  first  attempt  in  modern  psychology,  so  far  as  I  know, 
to  discover  the  laws  of  the  origin,  development  and  termination 
of  trains  of  thought  \  the  theory  of  association  explaining  only 
(and  then  not  entirely)  the  origin  of  thought.  It  is  impossible 
to  give  the  whole  contents  of  the  *  Kritik  der  reinen  Erfahrung,' 
which  furnishes  indeed  the  outlines  of  a  new  philosophical 
science.  The  few  ideas  that  we  can  speak  of  here  can  give  only 
a  very  feeble  impression  of  this,  the  most  concise  and  many-sided 
philosophical  work  which  has  appeared  since  the  time  of  the 
great  authors  of  the  past. 

The  little  paper  <  Weltbegriff,'  which  followed  in  1891  con- 
tains most  of  the  things  already  known  to  students  of  the  Cri- 
tique. It  is  a  rather  popular  exposition  of  the  chief  ideas  of 
the  Critique,  namely,  of  the  critical  realism,  which  consists  in  the 
critical  and  conscious  acceptation  of  the  facts  first  given  to  a 
na'ive  mind,  namely,  that  the  world  consists  of  '  things '  and 
'  ideas,'  in  opposition  to  those  idealistic  theories,  which  consider 
the  world  as  '  representation '  or  *  will,'  or  «  will  and  representa- 
tion,' etc.  An  especially  new  point  in  this  paper  is  the  theory 


6lO  j.  KODIS. 

of  '  IntrojectionJ  by  which  Avenarius  explains  the  growth  and 
formation  of  the  theory  that  a  fundamental  difference  exists  be- 
tween the  *  inner '  and  *  outer '  experiences.  Avenarius  does  not 
find  in  these  two  kinds  of  experience  any  *  incomparability '  or 
any  '  fundamental  dualism.'  The  idea  of  their  essential  differ- 
ence has  been  derived,  according  to  his  opinion,  from  a  kind  of 
false  materialism,  which  believed  in  the  enclosure  of  the  soul  in 
the  body  or  in  a  part  of  it,  and  later,  in  the  enclosure  of  the  facul- 
ties of  the  soul  in  the  soul's  substance.  From  this  belief  sprang 
the  notion  that  the  soul  was  something  enclosed  from  the  *  outer 
world,'  into  which  enclosure  every  impression  from  without  could 
come  only  through  a  putting-in,  or  « introjection.'  The  whole 
modern  psychology,  psycho-physics  and  most  of  the  philosophical 
theories,  contain  such  opinions  and  therefore  serve  to  strengthen 
the  artificial  wall  between  the  *  inner '  and  *  outer '  experiences 
which  makes  the  sciences  of  the  *  inner  world '  always  more  in- 
accessible to  exact  methods  of  investigation,  and  consequently 
more  sterile. 

Besides  these  chief  works  and  a  few  short  papers  published 
in  magazines,  Avenarius  was  founder  and  editor,  for  21  years,  of 
a  quarterly  very  well  known  in  the  philosophical  world,  namely, 
'  Vierteljahrschrift  fur  die  Wissenschaftliche  Philosophic.'  This 
magazine  was  founded  by  Avenarius  and  his  friends,  in  order 
to  develop  a  philosophy  which  would  not  be  opposed  in  its 
chief  statements  to  the  final  results  of  science,  but  would  follow 
the  same  way  of  investigation,  and  conform  to  the  growth  of  hu- 
man experience,  as  the  sciences  have  done.  Among  the  best 
known  authors  who  contributed  to  this  journal  are :  Riehl, 
Goring,  Wundt,  Laass,  Heinze,  Windelband,  Paulsen  and 
others. 


SOME    PRELIMINARY    EXPERIMENTS    ON    VISION 
WITHOUT  INVERSION  OF  THE  RETINAL  IMAGE.1 

DR.  GEORGEM  STRATTON. 

University  of  California 

Two  important  theories  of  upright  vision  hold  that  the  in- 
version of  the  retinal  image  is  necessary  for  the  perception  of 
things  as  upright.  According  to  the  first,  which  we  may  call 
the  projection  theory,  objects  are  projected  back  into  space  in 
the  directions  in  which  the  rays  of  light  fall  upon  the  retina. 
And  the  crossing  of  these  lines  of  direction  within  the  eye  re- 
quires that  if  the  object  is  to  be  projected  right  side  up  the  ret- 
inal image  must  be  inverted.  The  second  theory,  which  may 
be  termed  the  eye-movement  theory,  holds  that  the  movements 
of  the  eye  and  our  perception  of  the  direction  of  such  movements 
are  the  means  by  which  we  judge  of  the  spatial  relation  of  ob- 
jects in  the  visual  field.  Upper  and  lower,  according  to  this 
theory,  mean  positions  which  require  an  upward  or  downward 
movement  of  the  eye  to  bring  them  into  clear  vision.  But  an 
upward  movement  of  the  eye  brings  into  clear  vision  only  what 
lies  below  the  fovea  on  the  retina.  So  that  here  too  the  per- 
ception of  objects  as  upright  requires  that  their  retinal  images 
be  inverted. 

The  purpose  of  the  experiments,  of  which  only  the  prelimi- 
nary ones  are  here  reported,  was  to  throw  some  light,  if  possible, 
on  the  correctness  of  this  assumption.  Is  the  inverted  image  a- 
necessary  condition  of  our  seeing  things  in  an  upright  position? 
The  method  of  approaching  the  problem  was  to  substitute  an  up- 
right retinal  image  for  the  normal  inverted  one  and  watch  the 
result. 

This  was  done  by  binding  on  the  eyes  a  simple  optical  con- 

aRead  at  the  Third  International  Congress  for  Psychology,  Munich,  Au- 
gust. 1896. 

611 


GEORGE  M.  STRATTON. 

trivance  constructed  on  the  following  principle  :  If  two  convex 
lenses  of  equal  refractive  power  be  placed  in  a  tube  at  a  distance 
from  each  other  equal  to  the  sum  of  their  focal  distances,  the  eye  in 
looking  through  the  tube  sees  all  things  inverted,  but  in  other 
respects  the  image  remains  unchanged.  The  image  cast  on  the 
retina  is  as  if  the  whole  field  of  view  had  been  revolved  on  the 
line  of  sight  through  an  angle  of  180°.  All  light  other  than 
that  which  comes  through  the  lenses  must,  of  course,  be  carefully 
excluded  by  making  the  instrument  fit  exactly  the  inequalities 
of  the  face  by  means  of  black  linings  and  pads.  For  if  light 
were  permitted  to  enter  the  eyes  otherwise  than  through  the 
lenses,  the  observer  would  be  subjected  to  both  upright  and  in- 
verted images,  and  the  purity  of  the  experiment  would  be  lost. 

The  size  of  the  visual  field  was  a  matter  requiring  some  care. 
The  size  and  refractive  power  of  the  lenses  are  the  determining 
factors  here,  and  in  the  desire  to  obtain  a  reasonably  large 
visual  field  one  is  tempted  to  use  large  thick  lenses.  But  they 
are  soon  found  to  be  too  heavy  to  wear  on  the  head  for  a  con- 
siderable length  of  time.  I  found  it  best,  therefore,  to  modify 
the  instrument  above  described,  by  substituting  two  double  con- 
vex lenses  (placed  close  together  on  the  same  axis  line)  for  each  of 
the  lenses  in  that  description.  I  had  thus  for  each  eye  a  short 
adjustable  tube,  and  at  either  end  of  the  tube  a  pair  of  good 
lenses  of  equal  focal  length.  The  instrument  by  this  means 
gave  a  clear  field  of  vision  with  a  compass  of  45°,  and  at  the 
same  time  was  light  enough  to  be  worn  without  discomfort. 

At  first  I  hoped  to  use  the  two  eyes  together  in  the  experi- 
ment ;  but  without  automatic  convergence  of  the  two  tubes  the 
strain  in  reaching  a  superposition  of  the  two  optic  images  was 
found  to  be  too  severe.  The  distress  in  the  eyes  made  it  seem 
best  to  experiment  on  monocular  vision  alone,  which  could  be 
done  without  interfering  in  the  least  with  the  principle  or  purpose 
of  the  research.  The  lens  for  the  left  eye  was  consequently 
covered  with  dull  black  paper ;  the  eye  could  then  remain  open 
and  the  disadvantage  of  bandaging  be  avoided. 

In  the  preliminary  experiment  here  reported,  I  bound  the 
instrument  on  my  face  at  3  o'clock  in  the  afternoon,  and  wore  it 
without  interruption  until  10  o'clock  in  the  evening.  The  in- 


SOME  PRELIMINARY  EXPERIMENTS  ON  VISION.      613 

strument  was  then  removed,  with  closed  eyes ;  the  latter  were 
thoroughly  blindfolded,  until  with  closed  eyes  again  the  next 
morning  the  apparatus  was  replaced  in  position.  From  9:30 
in  the  morning  until  about  10  o'clock  in  the  evening  of  this  sec- 
ond day,  the  instrument  was  again  worn  continuously,  and  then 
the  eyes  blindfolded  as  before.  The  third  day  the  instrument 
was  worn  from  10  o'clock  in  the  morning  until  noon,  and  then 
removed.  The  time  during  which  the  experience  under  the 
artificial  conditions  actually  lasted — the  total  time  less  that  in 
which  the  eyes  were  blindfolded — was  therefore  about  21^ 
hours — a  time,  of  course,  altogether  too  short  from  which  to  ex- 
pect very  pronounced  results  in  undoing  a  life-long  habit  of  in- 
terpreting visual  signs,  but  which,  nevertheless,  gave  interesting 
indications  of  what  would  result  if  such  an  experience  were  con- 
siderably extended. 

The  time  was  spent  entirely  indoors,  watching  the  scene  on 
the  street  below,  watching  the  movements  of  my  feet  and  hands, 
experimenting  on  the  changes  which  occurred  in  the  visual 
field  in  connection  with  particular  movements  of  the  head  or  of 
the  whole  body,  grasping  and  handling  seen  objects — in  short, 
trying  to  crowd  as  varied  an  experience  as  possible  into  the  brief 
time  at  my  disposal. 

The  course  of  experience  was  something  as  follows :  All 
images  at  first  appeared  to  be  inverted ;  the  room  and  all  in  it 
seemed  upside  down.  The  hands  when  stretched  out  from 
below  into  the  visual  field  seemed  to  enter  from  above.  Yet 
although  all  these  images  were  clear  and  definite,  they  did  not 
at  first  seem  to  be  real  things,  like  the  things  we  see  in  normal 
vision,  but  they  seemed  to  be  misplaced,  false,  or  illusory  im- 
ages between  the  observer  and  the  objects  or  things  themselves. 
For  the  memory-images  brought  over  from  normal  vision  still 
continued  to  be  the  standard  and  criterion  of  reality.  The 
present  perceptions  were  for  some  time  translated  involuntarily 
into  the  language  of  normal  vision ;  the  present  visual  percep- 
tions were  used  simply  as  signs  to  determine  how  and  where 
the  object  would  appear  if  it  could  be  seen  with  restored  normal 
vision.  Things  were  thus  seen  in  one  way  and  thought  of 
in  a  far  different  way.  This  held  true  also  of  my  body.  For 


614  GEORGE  M.  STRATTON. 

the  parts  of  my  body  were  felt  to  lie  where  they  would  have 
appeared  had  the  instrument  been  removed ;  they  were  seen  to 
be  in  another  position.  But  the  older  tactual  and  visual  locali- 
zation was  still  the  real  localization. 

All  movements  of  the  body  at  this  time  were  awkward,  un- 
certain, and  full  of  surprises.  Only  when  the  movement  was 
made  regardless  of  visual  images,  by  aid  of  touch  and  memory 
alone — as  when  one  moves  in  the  dark — could  walking  or  move- 
ments of  the  hand  be  performed  with  reasonable  security  and  di- 
rectness. Otherwise  the  movement  was  a  series  of  errors  and 
attempts  at  correction,  until  the  limb  was  finally  brought  into  the 
desired  position  in  the  visual  field.  The  reason  for  this  seems 
partly  to  have  been  that  the  reconstruction  of  the  visual  field  in 
terms  of  the  normal  visual  experience — the  translation  before 
spoken  of — was  never  carried  out  in  all  the  details  of  the  picture. 
In  general,  or  in  the  main  outlines,  things  might  be  referred  to 
the  positions  they  would  have  in  normal  vision,  but  the  new 
visual  field  was  in  many  of  its  details  accepted  just  as  found, 
and  was  acted  upon  without  any  translation  whatever.  So 
that  when  movements  were  made  as  if  the  visual  signs  meant 
just  what  they  had  meant  in  normal  vision,  the  movements  of 
course  went  astray.  The  limb  usually  started  in  the  opposite 
direction  from  the  one  really  desired.  Or  when  I  saw  an  ob- 
ject near  one  of  my  hands  and  wished  to  grasp  it  with  that  hand, 
the  other  hand  was  the  one  I  moved.  The  mistake  was  then 
seen,  and  by  trial,  observation,  and  correction,  the  desired  move- 
ment was  at  last  brought  about. 

As  I  moved  about  in  the  room,  the  movement  of  the  visual 
images  of  my  hands  or  feet  were  at  first  not  used,  as  in  normal 
vision,  to  decide  what  tactual  sensations  were  to  be  expected. 
Knocks  against  things  in  plain  sight  were  more  or  less  of  a  sur- 
prise. I  felt  my  hand  to  be  in  a  different  position  from  that 
in  which  I  saw  it,  and  could  not,  except  by  cool  deliberation, 
use  its  visual  image  as  a  sign  of  impending  tactual  experience. 
After  a  time,  however,  repeated  experience  made  this  use  of 
the  visual  image  much  less  strange ;  it  began  to  be  the  common 
guide  and  means  of  anticipation.  I  watched  my  feet  in  walking, 
and  saw  what  they  were  approaching,  and  expected  visual  and 


SOME  PRELIMINARY  EXPERIMENTS  ON  VISION.      615 

tactual  contact  to  be  reported  perceptionally  together.  In  this 
way  the  limbs  began  actually  to  feel  in  the  place  where  the 
new  visual  perception  reported  them  to  be.  The  vivid  con- 
nection of  tactual  and  visual  perceptions  began  to  take  away  the 
overpowering  force  of  the  localization  lasting  over  from  normal 
vision.  The  seen  images  thus  became  real  things  just  as  in 
normal  sight.  I  could  at  length  feel  my  feet  strike  against  the 
seen  floor,  although  the  floor  was  seen  on  the  opposite  side  of 
the  field  of  vision  from  that  to  which  at  the  beginning  of  the  ex- 
periment I  had  referred  these  tactual  sensations.  I  could  like- 
wise at  times  feel  that  my  arms  lay  between  my  head  and  this 
new  position  of  the  feet ;  shoulders  and  head,  however,  which 
under  the  circumstances  could  never  be  directly  seen,  kept  the 
old  localization  they  had  had  in  normal  vision,  in  spite  of  the 
logical  difficulty  that  the  shape  of  the  body  and  the  localization 
of  hands  and  feet  just  mentioned  made  such  a  localization  of 
the  shoulders  absurd. 

Objects  lying  at  the  moment  outside  the  visual  field  (things 
at  the  side  of  the  observer,  for  example)  were  at  first  mentally 
represented  as  they  would  have  appeared  in  normal  vision.  As 
soon  as  the  actual  presentation  vanished,  the  new  relations  gave 
way  to  the  old  ones  brought  over  from  the  long  former  expe- 
rience. The  actual  present  perception  remained  in  this  way  en- 
tirely isolated  and  out  of  harmony  with  the  larger  whole  made 
up  by  representation.  But  later  I  found  myself  bringing  the 
representation  of  unseen  objects  into  harmonious  relation  with 
the  present  perception.  They  began  now  to  be  represented  not 
as  they  would  appear  if  normal  vision  were  restored,  but  as 
they  would  appear  if  the  present  field  of  vision  were  widened 
or  moved  so  as  to  include  them.  In  this  way  the  room  began 
to  make  a  whole  once  more,  floor  and  walls  and  the  prominent 
objects  in  the  room  getting  into  a  constant  relation  to  one 
another,  so  that  during  a  movement  of  the  head  I  could  more  or 
less  accurately  anticipate  the  order  in  which  things  would  enter 
the  visual  field.  For  at  first  the  visual  search  for  an  object  out- 
side of  the  immediate  sight  was  quite  haphazard ;  movements 
were  made  at  random  until  the  desired  object  appeared  in  sight 
and  was  recognized.  But  now  the  various  lines  of  visual  direc- 


616  GEORGE  M.  STRATTON. 

tion  and  what  they  would  lead  to  were  more  successfully  held 
in  mind.  By  the  third  day  things  had  thus  been  interconnected 
into  a  whole  by  piecing  together  the  parts  of  the  ever-changing 
visual  fields. 

As  to  the  relation  of  the  visual  field  to  the  observer,  the 
feeling  that  the  field  was  upside  down  remained  in  general 
throughout  the  experiment.  At  times,  however,  there  were  pecu- 
liar variations  in  this  feeling  according  to  the  mental  attitude  of 
the  observer  toward  the  present  scene.  If  the  attention  was 
directed  mainly  inward,  and  things  were  viewed  only  in  indirect 
attention,  they  seemed  clearly  to  be  inverted.  But  when,  on 
the  other  hand,  full  attention  was  given  to  the  outer  objects, 
these  frequently  seemed  to  be  in  normal  position,  and  whatever 
there  was  of  abnormality  seemed  to  lie  in  myself,  as  if  head  and 
shoulders  were  inverted  and  I  were  viewing  objects  from  that 
position,  as  boys  sometimes  do  from  between  their  legs.  At  other 
times  the  inversion  seemed  confined  to  the  face  or  eyes  alone. 

On  removing  the  glasses  on  the  third  day,  there  was  no  pe- 
culiar experience.  Normal  vision  was  restored  instantaneously 
and  without  any  disturbance  in  the  natural  appearance  or  posi- 
tion of  objects. 

The  experiment  was  of  course  not  carried  far  enough  to  see 
the  final  aspect  the  experience  under  these  conditions  would  as- 
sume. But  the  changes  which  actually  occurred,  even  the  tran- 
sitory feelings  the  observer  at  times  had,  give  hints  of  the  course 
a  longer  experiment  of  this  kind  would  take.  I  might  almost 
say  that  the  main  problem — that  of  the  importance  of  the  inver- 
sion of  the  retinal  image  for  upright  vision — had  received  from 
the  experiment  a  full  solution.  For  if  the  inversion  of  the  retinal 
image  were  absolutely  necessary  for  upright  vision,  as  both  the 
projection  theory  and  the  eye-movement  theory  hold,  it  is  cer- 
tainly difficult  to  understand  how  the  scene  as  a  whole  could 
even  temporarily  have  appeared  upright  when  the  retinal  image 
was  not  inverted.  As  was  said,  all  things  which  under  the  con- 
ditions could  be  seen  at  all  repeatedly  appeared  to  be  in  normal 
relation ;  that  is,  they  seemed  to  be  right  side  up.  Only  cer- 
tain parts  of  the  experience  (Y.  <?.,  head  and  shoulders),  upon 
which  under  the  circumstances  vision  could  give  no  report  at  all, 


SOME  PRELIMINARY  EXPERIMENTS  ON  VISION.      617 

because  these  parts  could  not  be  brought  directly  into  the  visual 
field,  seemed  to  be  in  abnormal  relation  to  the  scene.  That 
these  parts  of  the  body  should  have  stubbornly  refused  to  come 
into  harmony  with  the  new  arrangement  is  easy  to  explain.  The 
only  visual  experience  I  had  had  of  them  was  the  normal  visual 
experience,  and  this  remained  firm  in  memory  without  the  pos- 
sibility of  displacing  it  by  repeated  contradictory  visual  percep- 
tion under  the  new  conditions.  But  of  those  parts  of  the  body 
which  could  be  seen,  the  new  appearance  and  localization  was 
able  to  drive  the  old  from  the  field,  because  the  new  localization 
by  sight  showed  a  perfect  and  constant  relation  to  the  reports  by 
muscular  and  tactual  perception.  No  doubt  the  merely  tactual 
experience  of  the  unseen  parts  of  the  body  and  of  their  relation 
to  the  seen  parts  must  inevitably  have  produced  in  time  a  new 
indirect  visual  representation  of  these  unseen  parts  which  would 
displace  the  older  representation  brought  over  from  normal  vis- 
ion. The  gradual  organization  of  the  whole  experience  would 
certainly  produce  this  result,  although  it  would  undoubtedly  re- 
quire more  time  in  the  case  of  the  unseen  parts  of  the  body 
than  in  that  of  the  parts  plainly  visible. 

In  fact,  the  difficulty  of  seeing  things  upright  by  means 
of  upright  retinal  images  seems  to  consist  solely  in  the  resist- 
ance offered  by  the  long-established  previous  experience.  There 
is  certainly  no  peculiar  inherent  difficulty  arising  from  the  new 
conditions  themselves.  If  no  previous  experience  had  been 
stored  up  to  stand  in  opposition  to  the  new  perceptions,  it 
would  be  absurd  to  suppose  that  the  visual  perceptions  in  such 
a  case  would  seem  inverted.  Any  visual  field  in  which  the  re- 
lations of  the  seen  parts  to  one  another  would  always  correspond 
to  the  relations  found  by  touch  and  muscular  movement  would 
give  us  '  upright'  vision,  whether  the  optic  image  lay  upright, 
inverted,  or  at  any  intermediate  angle  whatever  on  the  retina. 
Only  after  a  set  of  relations  and  perceptions  had  become  organ- 
ized into  a  norm  could  something  enter  which  was  in  unusual 
relation  to  this  organized  whole  and  be  (for  instance)  upside 
down.  But  a  person  whose  vision  had  from  the  very  begin- 
ning been  under  the  conditions  we  have  in  the  present  experi- 
ment artificially  produced,  could  never  possibly  feel  that  such 
visual  perceptions  were  inverted. 


PHYSICAL  AND  MENTAL  MEASUREMENTS  OF  THE 
STUDENTS  OF  COLUMBIA  UNIVERSITY. 

BY  PROFESSOR  J.  McKEEN  CATTELL  AND  DR.  LIVINGSTON 

FARRAND. 

Extended  measurements  have  been  published  of  certain  traits 
of  soldiers,  of  school  children  and  of  the  defective  classes, 
more  especially  of  their  height,  weight,  eyesight  and  defects 
of  body.  Single  tests  of  a  psychological  character  have  been 
made  on  school  children  and  on  groups  of  adults,  and  we  have 
the  many  researches  from  our  psychological  laboratories  giving 
the  results  of  experiments  on  a  few  individuals.  As  it  is  not 
our  object  to  give  a  detailed  historical  sketch1  of  the  statistics 
and  experiments  hitherto  published  it  will  suffice  to  refer  espe- 

1  There  have  been  at  least  four  series  of  mental  tests  proposed  in  which 
methods  have  been  discussed  without  the  communication  of  results  :  '  Mental 
Tests  and  Measurements  ' :  J.  McK.  Cattell,  with  an  appendix  by  Francis  Galton, 
Mind,  1890;  '  Zur  Individual  Psychologie  ':  Hugo  Miinsterberg,  Centralblatt 
f.  Nervenheilkunde  und  Psychiatric,  1891 ;  '  Der  Psychologische  Versuch  in  der 
Psychiatric' :  Emil  Kraepelin,  Psychologische  Arbeiten,  1895  ;  and  '  La  Psycho- 
logie Individuelle ' :  A.  Binet  et  V.  Henri,  L'Annee  psychologique,  1896.  One 
of  the  present  writers  was  perhaps  the  first  (1885  and  subsequently)  to  publish 
experiments  on  individual  psychology  made  in  the  laboratory,  its  introduction 
having,  probably,  been  delayed  because  Professor  Wundt  was  not  favorable  to  it. 
Recently  the  individual  variation  in  some  special  psycho-physical  or  mental 
trait  has  been  frequently  investigated.  This  has  been  encouraged  by  Galton  in 
England  (to  whom  we  owe  the  method  of  the  questionnaire},  by  Kraepelin  in 
Germany,  and  by  Binet  in  France,  but  by  far  the  most  numerous  contributions 
to  the  subject  have  come  from  American  Laboratories — Harvard,  Yale,  Clark, 
Columbia,  Princeton,  Pennsylvania,  Chicago,  Cornell,  Wisconsin  and  others. 
Two  papers  which  describe  several  tests  made  on  a  number  of  individuals  deserve 
special  mention  in  connection  with  this  paper  :  '  Experimentelle  Studien  zur  In- 
dividual Psychologie:  A.  Oehrn ;  Dissertation  (under  Kraepelin),  Dorpat,  1889, 
reprinted  with  slight  alterations,  Psychologische  Arbeiten,  1895  ;  and  '  Researches 
on  the  Mental  and  Physical  Development  of  School  Children  ' :  J.  A.  Gilbert, 
Studies  from  th".  Yale  Laboratory,  1895,  reported  also  by  E.  W.  Scripturef 
Zeitschrift  f.  Psychologie,  etc.,  X,  1896,  and  THE  PSYCHOLOGICAL  REVIEW, 
III,  1896. 

618 


PHYSICAL  AND  MENTAL  MEASUREMENTS.  619 

daily  to  the  two  undertakings  most  similar  to  our  own.  Mr. 
Francis  Galton  recommended  in  I8821  the  establishment  of  an- 
thropometric  laboratories,  and  subsequently  carried  his  plan 
into  effect  by  placing  a  laboratory  in  the  South  Kensington 
Museum,  London,  which  was  continued  until  last  year,  when 
the  apparatus  was  removed  to  the  Clarenden  Museum,  at  Ox- 
ford. Visitors  could  there  have  certain  tests  made  on  payment 
of  a  small  fee.  The  tests  included,  in  addition  to  several  purely 
physical  measurements,  keenness  of  eyesight  and  hearing, 
color-sense  and  highest  audible  note,  dynamometer  pressure, 
reaction-time  and  errors  in  dividing  a  line  and  angles.  At  the 
World's  Columbian  Exposition,  Chicago,  1893,  Prof essor  Joseph 
Jastrow  arranged  a  psychological  laboratory  in  which  a  consid- 
erable number  of  tests  strictly  psychological  in  character  were 
undertaken. 

The  early  publication  of  the  results  obtained  by  Mr.  Galton2 
and  by  Prof.  Jastrow  may  be  expected,  but  without  awaiting  these 
we  shall  proceed  with  the  description  of  our  work.  We  are  lead 
to  do  this  at  the  present  time  more  especially  because  at  the 
Philadelphia  meeting  of  the  American  Psychological  Associa- 
tion (December,  1895),  a  committee,  consisting  of  Professors 
Cattell,  Baldwin,  Jastrow,  Sanford  and  Witmer,  was  appointed 
to  consider  the  feasibility  of  cooperation  among  the  various 
psychological  laboratories  in  the  collection  of  mental  and  phys- 
ical statistics.  As  a  report  from  this  committee  is  to  be  expected 
at  the  next  meeting  of  the  Association,  it  is  desirable  that  the 
members  have  before  them  such  tests  as  have  already  been 
made.  It  may  also  be  mentioned  that  at  the  meeting  of  the 
American  Association  for  the  Advancement  of  Science  (Buffalo, 
August,  1896),  a  standing  committee,  consisting  of  Messrs. 
Brinton,  Cattell,  McGee,  Newell  and  Boas,  was  appointed  to 
organize  an  ethnographic  survey  of  the  white  race  in  the  United 
States.  It  is  important  that  psychological  tests  be  included  in 

^Fortnightly  Review  ;  cf.  also  Inquiries  into  Human  Faculty,  London,  1883. 

2  Since  the  above  was  written,  Mr.  Galton  has  informed  one  of  the  writers 
that  the  people  who  came  to  his  laboratory  were  so  mixed  that  no  homogeneous 
group  can  be  extracted  out  of  them  that  is  both  large  and  interesting.  Still  it 
is  to  be  hoped  that  the  large  mass  of  data  collected  under  Mr.  Galton's  direction 
will  be  published. 


620  j.  McK.   CATTELL  AND  L.  FARRAND. 

this  survey,  and  that  the  work  be  coordinated  with  that  proposed 
by  the  Psychological  Association. 

One  of  the  present  writers  began  the  collection  of  physical 
and  mental  measurements  of  students  of  Cambridge  University, 
the  University  of  Pennsylvania  and  Bryn  Mawr  College  in 
1887-8,  and  some  description  of  the  tests  was  published  in  1890 
(op.  cit.).  The  methods  have  been  gradually  revised  and  we 
shall  confine  our  present  account  to  experiments  made  on  stu- 
dents of  Columbia  University  in  1894-5  and  1895-6.  These 
have  been  described  by  Prof.  Cattell  before  the  New  York 
Academy  of  Sciences,  May,  1895,  and  the  American  Associa- 
tion for  the  Advancement  of  Science,  August,  1896,  and  by 
Dr.  Farrand  before  the  American  Psychological  Association, 
December,  1895. 

Our  chief  object  in  the  present  paper  is  the  description  and 
discussion  of  methods  rather  than  the  communication  of  results, 
but  we  give  the  averages  secured  from  100  students.  This  is  a 
comparatively  small  number,  but  it  suffices  for  our  present  pur- 
poses. For  the  study  of  the  distribution  of  variations  extended 
statistics  are  needed,  but  in  that  case  it  would  not  be  necessary  to 
make  a  large  number  of  different  tests.  The  average  of  a  group 
of  100  homogeneous  individuals  has  a  relatively  small  probable 
error,  and  suffices  to  determine  the  place  of  the  individual  in 
the  group  and  for  the  comparison  of  this  group  with  other  groups. 
Differences  that  can  be  established  as  the  result  of  100  meas- 
urements should  be  investigated  before  we  undertake  the  study 
of  minor  or  inconstant  deviations.  The  100  measurements  at 
our  disposal  cannot,  however,  be  subdivided,  and  about  1,000 
measurements  will  be  needed  in  order  to  arrive  at  the  end  we 
have  more  especially  in  view,  namely,  the  study  of  the  develop- 
ment and  correlation  of  mental  and  physical  traits.  We  want 
to  know  how  a  man  who  has,  for  example,  a  large  head,  a  short 
reaction-time  or  a  good  memory,  is  likely  to  vary  from  the  aver- 
age in  other  directions,  and  how'likely  he  is  to  vary  to  a  certain 
extent.  As  in  other  scientific  work  these  tests  have  two  chief 
ends,  the  one  genetic,  the  other  quantitative.  We  wish  to  study 


PHYSICAL  AND  MENTAL   MEASUREMENTS.  621 

growth  as   dependent  on  environment  and  heredity,  and  the 
correlation  of  traits  from  the  point  of  view  of  exact  science. 

Before  proceeding  with  this  difficult  undertaking  it  is  neces- 
sary to  learn  what  tests  are  the  most  typical  and  useful,  and 
what  methods  are  the  best  and  most  feasible.  It  is  important 
that  cooperation  be  secured  in  deciding  what  tests  shall  be  used, 
and  in  studying  and  eliminating  the  numerous  drawbacks  and 
sources  of  error.  We  do  not  regard  it  as  necessary  or  desira- 
ble that  each  laboratory  should  undertake  the  same  tests.  It 
would,  however,  be  useful  to  select  a  few  tests  made  in  exactly 
the  same  manner,  and  for  different  investigators  to  undertake 
to  extend  the  measurements  in  the  direction  in  which  they  are 
most  interested. 

We  give  on  the  following  page  a  reduced  (the  original 
sheet  apart  from  the  margin  is  about  23  x  18  cm.)  fac-simile 
of  the  blank  used  in  recording  our  tests  from  which  their 
general  character  may  be  seen.  The  tests  can  only  be  made 
individually,  one  recorder  having  charge  of  one  student,  and, 
unless  the  apparatus  is  duplicated,  only  three  or  four  records 
can  be  made  simultaneously.  It  is  consequently  essential  that 
the  tests  should  be  such  that  the  records  can  be  taken  quickly. 
Our  series  contains  10  records  and  26  measurements  (several 
consisting  of  from  two  to  five  separate  determinations),  which 
can  be  completed  in  from  40  min.  to  one  hour,  varying  within 
these  limits  according  to  the  skill  of  the  recorder,  the  intelli- 
gence of  the  student  and  the  degree  in  which  the  apparatus  is 
in  order. 

In  selecting  the  tests,  the  time  required  to  make  them  must 
be  especially  considered,  and  some  attention  should  also  be  paid 
to  the  time  taken  in  collating  the  results.  The  student  would, 
in  nearly  all  cases,  be  willing  to  submit  to  a  longer  examination, 
but  this  requires  a  considerable  expenditure  of  time  on  the  part 
of  a  skilled  observer.  Our  object  has  been  to  form  a  series 
that  can  be  made  within  one  hour,  and  but  little  can  be  added 
to  this  series  without  omitting  something  to  make  place  for  it. 
We  suggest  below  several  additional  tests  of  psychological  in- 
terest, for  which  time  might  be  found  when  the  series  is  made 


622  /.  McK.  CATTELL  AND  L.  FAR  RAND. 

Laboratory  of  Psychology  of  Columbia  College, 

PHYSICAL  AND  MENTAL  TESTS. 


Name  .............................................................................  Date  of  Birth  ..................................... 

Birthplace  .........................................  ...of  father  .............................  of  mother  ...................... 

Class  ..........................................................  Profession  of  father  ........................................... 

Color  of  eyes  ............................................................  of  hair.  .................................................. 

Perception  of  size  .............................................  Memory  for  size  ...................................... 

Heieht  Weight 

*%*A^AA4,  .........................  O 

f    I  ________________________ 

Breathing  capacity  \  Size  of  head  .........................  Right  handed  ?  ...... 

1  2  ............  .............. 

fi  .............................................  fi  ...................................... 

Strength  of  hand,  right  \  Left  \ 

(  2  ___________  ...................................  (.  2  ....................................... 


Keenness  of  sight,  right  eye  ...............................................  .Left 

Keenness  of  hearing,  right  ear  .........................................  .Left 

Ii  2  3  4  5  Av. 

After-images  ..................................................................................................................................... 

Color  vision  ....................................................  Perception  of  pitch  ........................................... 

Perception  of  weight  1  .........  2  .........  3  .........  Sensation  areas  i  .........  2  .........  3  ........  4  ........  5  ....... 

right  hand, 

left  hand  ....... 

i  2  3 

Perception  of  time  ........................................................................................................................  _ 

Accuracy  of  movement  ..............  .  .............  Rate  of  perception  and  movement  _____________  ...... 

Memory  .........................................  ....................................................................................................... 

Imagery  ............................................................................................................................................... 

Are  you  willing  to  repeat  these  tests  at  the  end  of  the  Sophomore  and  Senior 
years  ?  .......................  Do  you  wish  to  have  a  copy  of  these  tests  sent  you  ?  ....................... 

Date  of  measurement  .......  .......................................  Recorded  by  ................................................ 


Sensitiveness  to  pain  \  Preference  for  color. 


PHYSICAL  AND  MENTAL   MEASUREMENTS.  623 

under  favorable  conditions.  It  might  be  desirable  to  place  at 
the  end  several  tests  (we  have  done  this  in  the  case  of  mental 
imagery),  which  could  be  made  or  omitted  as  time  might  re- 
quire .  We  give  below  additional  observations  which  can  be  made 
by  the  recorder  without  much  expenditure  of  time,  and  a  series 
of  questions  which  can  be  answered  by  the  student  at  home. 

We  fully  appreciate  the  force  of  the  arguments  urged  by 
Professor  Munsterberg  and  by  MM.  Binet  and  Henri  in  favor 
of  making  tests  of  a  strictly  psychological  character.  For  the 
psychologist  these  are,  of  course,  the  most  interesting  and  im- 
portant. But  we  are  at  present  concerned  with  anthropometric 
work,  and  measurements  of  the  body  and  of  the  senses  come  as 
completely  within  our  scope  as  the  higher  mental  processes. 
We  can  determine  in  thirty  seconds  whether  or  not  a  man  is 
color-blind,  and  thus  secure  a  fact  of  great  personal  interest  to  him, 
and  a  typical  and  sharp  variation  which  can  be  studied  in  rela- 
tion to  other  traits.  If  we  undertake  to  study  attention  or  sug- 
gestibility we  find  it  difficult  to  measure  definitely  a  definite 
thing.  We  have  a  complex  problem  still  requiring  much  re- 
search in  the  laboratory  and  careful  analyses  before  the  results 
can  be  interpreted,  and,  indeed,  before  suitable  tests  can  be  de- 
vised. 

In  addition  to  the  writers  several  graduate  students  acted  as 
recorders.  A  large  number  of  records  were  taken  by  Mr. 
Franz,  fellow  in  psychology,  and  by  Mr.  Houston,  scholar  in 
psychology,  and  some  records  were  taken  by  Mr.  McWhood, 
now  fellow  in  psychology,  by  Mr.  Lay,  lately  fellow  in  philosophy, 
by  Mr.  Schneider,  lately  fellow  in  botany,  and  by  Mr.  Kingham. 
All  the  recorders  had  had  training  in  making  the  tests,  but  it 
must  be  remembered  that  the  results  depend  somewhat  on  the 
methods  used  by  the  recorder,  and  it  would  be  desirable  to  col- 
late the  results  for  the  different  recorders  and  to  have  the  same 
students  tested  by  different  recorders,  in  order  to  learn  what  varia- 
tions may  be  due  to  this  source.  The  methods  should  be,  as  far  as 
possible,  automatic,  and  it  would  perhaps  be  best  to  let  the 
recorder  read  written  instructions  to  the  student.  Still  a  certain 
amount  of  latitude  is  inevitable,  as  students  vary  greatly  in  the 
quickness  with  which  they  understand  what  is  to  be  done. 


624  J-  McK.  CATTELL  AND  L.  FARRAND. 

The  attempt  was  made  to  follow  the  order  given  on  the 
blank  (except  that  memory  for  size  was  tested  at  the  end), 
but  this  could  not  be  done  exactly  when  2  or  3  students  were 
tested  simultaneously.  It  would,  however,  be  desirable  to  test 
all  observers  in  exactly  the  same  order,  as  some  skill  is  acquired 
in  the  course  of  the  experiments.  The  five  rooms  of  the  labora- 
tory were  used,  and  we  tried  to  leave  the  student  alone  with  the 
recorder  in  cases  where  the  test  depended  on  the  attention. 

We  requested  the  Freshmen  of  the  School  of  Arts  and  of 
the  School  of  Mines  to  come  by  appointment.  About  one-half 
of  them  came,  and  all  were  interested  in  the  tests  and  agreed 
without  hesitation  to  repeat  them  at  the  end  of  the  Sophomore 
and  Senior  years.  The  repetition  of  the  tests  will  be  one  of  the 
best  criteria  of  their  validity,  and  we  hope  the  results  will  be 
of  interest  in  showing  the  development  of  the  student  during 
his  college  course,  more  especially  when  taken  in  connection 
with  the  nature  of  his  course,  his  standing  in  his  studies,  etc. 

The  100  records  used  were  taken  alphabetically,  none 
being  omitted.  They  include  60  Freshmen  from  the  School  of 
Arts,  20  Freshmen  from  the  School  of  Mines  and  20  more  ad- 
vanced students.  The  records  were  arranged  for  these  groups 
alphabetically  in  sets  of  ten,  and  the  individual  variation  from 
the  average  of  each  set  calculated.  Then  the  average  variation 
of  the  sets  of  10  from  the  average  of  the  100  records  was  taken. 
We  give  these  two  variations  in  addition  to  the  average,  denot- 
ing them  by  v  and  V,  respectively.  We  have  not  omitted  any 
record  unless  it  seemed  to  contain  an  error  on  the  part  of  the 
recorder.  In  a  few  cases  tests  were  omitted  by  accident,  and 
certain  of  the  tests  were  added  the  second  year,  it  being  found 
that  more  could  be  made  within  the  hour  than  we  had  expected. 
Some  of  the  sets  thus  contain  less  than  ten  records,  the  total 
number  made  in  the  group  being  given. 

We  shall  not  at  present  undertake  to  discuss  in  detail  the  dis- 
tribution of  the  deviations,  or  whether  the  average,  or  the  median, 
or  the  limits  within  which  a  certain  percentage  of  the  records 
fall,  is  the  best  standard.  When  the  records  are  arranged  in 
small  groups  the  average  is  most  convenient.  If  an  individual 
varies  from  the  group  by  an  amount  not  more  than  the  average 


PHYSICAL  AND  MENTAL   MEASUREMENTS.  625 

variation  he  may  be  regarded  as  normal.  This  would  include 
about  one-half  of  the  students.  Those  coming  above  may  be 
regarded  as  hyper-normal  and  those  coming  below  as  sub- 
normal. The  best  method  of  adjusting  the  observations  must 
oe  worked  out  with  a  larger  mass  of  material  than  we  have  as 
yet  at  our  disposal. 

We   shall   now   proceed  to  the  discussion  of  the  separate 

tests. 

PRELIMINARY  DATA. 

The  student  was  required  to  write  his  own  name,  the  date 
of  his  birth,  his  birthplace  and  the  birthplaces  of  his  parents, 
the  profession  of  his  father,  his  class  and  course  in  college. 

Handwriting.  It  is  desirable  to  let  the  student  write  in  ink 
his  own  name  and  the  other  data.  *  Graphology '  has  fallen  into 
disrepute  because  too  much  has  been  asked  of  it.  The  handwrit- 
ing, however,  is  certainly  characteristic  of  the  individual  and 
may  prove  interesting  when  collated  with  the  other  tests.  But 
we  are  not  prepared  to  communicate  any  results  based  upon 
our  present  data. 

Age.  The  average  age  of  the  Freshmen,  School  of  Arts 
(59  cases),  in  their  first  term  was  18.  The  age  of  our  college 
students  has  often  been  discussed  and  our  records  are  of  value 
only  in  connection  with  subsequent  tests.  It  may  be  worth  while 
to  call  the  attention  of  those  who  compare  statistics  of  the  age  of 
students  to  the  fact  that  while  there  are  no  students  whose  age 
is  considerably  below  the  average  there  are  sometimes  a  few  older 
men  in  the  class.  For  most  purposes  it  would  consequently  be 
better  to  use  the  median  than  the  average.  There  were  no 
men  over  23  among  the  Columbia  Freshmen,  and  it  appears  that 
the  average  age  is  younger  than  at  Harvard  or  Yale. 

Birthplace.  The  nationality  was,  in  percentages  (which  are 
also  the  actual  numbers) ,  as  follows  : 


626  /.  McK.  CATTELL  AND  L.  FARRAND. 

Student.  Father.  Mother. 

North  America.  94                       64  81 

New  York  City,  (29)  (10)  (17) 

Foreign,                                       5                        34  17 

German,  (2)                      (20)  (7) 

Irish,  (o)                       (5)  (2) 

English,  (i)                       (5)  (2) 

Not  Given,  122 

As  we  have  already  stated  all  our  data  have  their  chief  in- 
terest in  their  correlations  with  the  others,  and  we  shall  not  be 
able  to  work  out  these  relations  for  some  years.  It  will,  for 
example,  be  of  interest  to  compare  the  physical  and  mental 
traits  of  students  of  American  parentage  with  those  of  German 
or  of  English  parentage  and  to  study  the  effects  of  heredity  and 
environment.  For  this  purpose  it  would  undoubtedly  be  desi- 
rable to  record  the  nationality  of  at  least  the  grandparents  (see 
the  supplementary  set  of  questions  given  below) .  We  may, 
however,  call  attention  to  the  large  percentage  of  foreign  parents, 
especially  of  fathers.  It  is  a  characteristic  sexual  difference 
that  twice  as  many  men  as  women  should  have  emigrated. 

The  profession  of  the  fathers  was  as  follows  : 

Business,  56 

Profession,  26 

Lawyers,  (6) 

Physicians,          (  6  ) 

Clergymen,         (4) 
Farmers,  3 

No  Calling,  i 

Not  Given,  14 

A  majority  of  the  students  of  Columbia  University  come 
from  the  business  classes,  and  the  father  in  most  cases  did  not 
have  a  college  education. 

Supplementary  data.  Further  details  regarding  the  heredity, 
interests,  habits  and  condition  of  the  student,  such  as  he  him- 
self could  give  or  such  as  could  be  secured  from  the  impressions 
of  the  recorder  would  undoubtedly  add  greatly  to  the  value  of 
these  tests.  The  limitations  are  due  to  the  need  of  completing 
the  series  within  one  hour  and  additional  records  should  not 
lengthen  this  time. 


PHYSICAL  AND  MENTAL   MEASUREMENTS.  627 

We  suggest  the  two  following  series  of  records,  the  first  of 
which  should  be  filled  up  by  the  recorder  and  not  seen  by  the 
student,  while  the  second  blank  should  be  given  to  the  student 
to  be  filled  up  at  his  convenience  at  home  and  returned  in  an 
addressed  envelope.  These  series  are  only  provisional,  and 
have  not  as  yet  been  used  by  us.  We  shall,  however,  use  them 
this  year,  and  should  be  glad  to  have  suggestions  regarding  them. 

SUPPLEMENTARY  OBSERVATIONS  BY  THE  RECORDER. 
[To  be  filled  in  while  the  student  is  writing  his  name.]. 

What  is  his  apparent  age  ?(      ),  17  (       ),  i8(      ),  19  (       ),2o(       ),  (      ). 

Is  his  apparent  state  of  health  good  (         ),  medium  (         ),  poor  (         )? 

Is  he  tall  (         ),  medium  (         ),  short  (         )? 

Is  his  head  large  (         ),  medium  (         ),  small  (         )? 

Do  you  think  his  physical  development  good  (  ),  medium  (  ), 
poor(  )? 

Do  vou  think  him  likely  to  be  as  a  student  good  (  ),  medium  (  ), 
poor(  "  )? 

In  these  mental  tests  do  you  think  him  likely  to  be  good  (  ),  medium 
(  ),poor(  )? 

[To  be  filled  in  during  or  after  the  tests.] 

Hair  :  dark  (         ),  medium  (         ),  light  (         )  ? 

Complexion  :  dark  (         ),  medium  (         ),  light  (         )  ? 

Complexion:  clear  (         ),  medium  (         ),  blotched  (         )? 

Eyes  :  dark  (         ),  medium  (         ),  light  (         )  ? 

Hair :  straight  (         ),  wavy  (         ),  curly  (         )  ? 

Nose:  convex  (         ),  straight  (         ),  concave  (         )? 

Elevation  of  nose  :  high  (         ),  medium  (         ),  low  (         )? 

Ears:  large  (         ),  medium  (         ),  small  (         )? 

Ears:  projecting  (         ),  medium  (         ),  close  (         )? 

Mouth:  large  (         ),  medium  (         ),  small  (         )? 

Lips:  thick  (         ),  medium  (         ),  thin  (         )? 

Hands:  (in  relation  to  size  of  body,)  large   (         ),  medium  (         ),  small 

(         )? 

Fingers  :  (in  relation  to  width  of  hand),  long  (         ),  medium  (         ),  short 

(         )? 

Face  and  Head :  note  symmetry  or  asymmetry,  also  any  abnormality  as 
malformation  of  ears,  squint,  etc. 

[To  be  filled  in  after  the  tests  have  been  completed.  The  recorder  is  expected 
to  use  any  suggestions  that  he  may  obtain  from  having  made  the  records,  but 
not  to  examine  these  with  a  view  to  using  the  information.] 

Do  you  think  his  state  of  health  good  (         ),  medium  (         ),  poor  (         )? 


628 


/.  McK.  CATTELL  AND  L.  FARRAND. 


Do  you  think  his  physical  development  good  (  ),  medium  (  ), 
poor  (  )? 

Do  you  think  him  likely  to  be  as  a  student  good  (         ),  medium  (         ),  poor 

(         )? 

Do  you  think  that  in  the  mental  tests  he  has  done  well  (  ),  fairly  (  ), 
poorly  (  )  ? 

In  understanding  what  was  wanted,  was  he  quick  (  ),  medium  (  ), 
slow  (  )  ? 

Was  he  talkative  (         ),  medium  (         ),  quiet  (         )? 

Do  you  judge  him  to  be  accurate  (         ),  medium  (         )  not  accurate  (         )  ? 

Do  you  judge  him  to  be  straightforward  (  ),  medium  (  ),  not  straight- 
forward (  )  ? 

Do  you  judge  him  to  be  intellectual  (         ),  medium  (         ),  not  intellectual 

(         )? 

Do  you  judge  his  will  to  be  strong  (         ),  medium  (         ),  weak  (         )  ? 
Do  you  judge  his  emotions  to  be  strong  (         ),  medium  (         ),  weak  (         )  ? 
Would  you  call  him  well-balanced  (         ),  medium  (         ),  not  well-balanced 

(         )? 

Would  you  call  his  temperament  choleric  (  ),  sanguine  (  ),  melan- 
cholic (  ),  phlegmatic  (  )? 


Name,  

Recorded  by, 
Date,... 


SUPPLEMENTARY  DATA  TO  BE  FILLED  IN  BY  THE  STUDENT. 

[Place  a  check  ( v')  in  the  proper  parenthesis ;  use  a  question  mark  (?)  when 
you  are  unable  to  answer  a  question  or  would  prefer  not  to  do  so.  If  you  can 
only  answer  a  question  approximately  do  so  and  add  ca.] 


£ 

^ 

JH 

h 

^-<   <l> 

. 

• 

"75  _£ 

*ert  -^ 

*cS   ^ 

rt^3 

<D 

4> 

c  -g 

£  o 

G  "S 

§° 

£ 

•5 

<u  ig 

«  S 

5^ 

4->     ti 

£ 

1 

&  « 

^1 

1 

cJ  13 

o 

2 
O 

0 

2 

O 

Living?  (if  so,  give  age),      .        ... 

Deceased?  (if   so,  give  year  of  death 

and  age  at  time  of  death)  

Cause  of  death,  if  deceased 

Most  serious  diseases  from  which  they 

have  suffered.   .    . 

PHYSICAL  AND  MENTAL   MEASUREMENTS. 


629 


i 

2 

3 

4 

5 

6 

etc. 

Your  mother's      \  born  .    .    . 
children.            J    deceased.  . 

[Write  B  for  brother  and  S  for  sister  in  the  order  of  age  and  in  the  proper 
column.  Include  yourself  designated  bjX.  After  B,  S  or  X  write  date  of  birth 
thus,  B.  Feb.  10,  '84.  In  case  any  brothers  or  sisters  have  died,  write  date  of 
death  after  '  deceased.'] 


),  how  many  sisters  ?  (         ), 
),3d(        ),4th(        )>5th 


How  many  brothers  did  your  father  have  ?  ( 
was  your  father  his  mother's  ist  (  ),  2d  ( 
(  ),  6th  (  )  or  what  (  )  child? 

How  many  brothers  did  your  mother  have?  (  ),  how  many  sisters? 
(  ),  was  your  mother  her  mother's  ist  (  ),  2d  (  ),  3d  (  ),  4th 
(  ),  sth  (  ),  6th  (  ),  or  what  (  )  child? 

[In  answering  questions  such  as  this  one,  think  of  the  people  you  know  as  in 
three  classes  equal  in  number  and  decide  to  which  class  you  belong.] 

Do  you  regard  your  general  health  as  good  (         ),  medium  (        ),  not  good 

(         )? 

Do  you  regard  your  present  health  as  better  than  usual  (  ),  same  as 
usual  (  ),  not  as  good  as  usual  (  )  ? 

Indicate  such  of  the  following  diseases  as  you  have  had  by  writing  in  the 
parenthesis  the  approximate  age  at  which  you  had  them  :  convulsions  in  child- 
hood (  ),  measles  (  ),  diphtheria  (  ),  scarlet  fever  (  ),  pneumonia 
(  ),  brain  fever  (meningitis)  (  ),  malaria  (  ),  nervous  prostration 
(neurasthenia)  (  ). 

Do  you  have  headaches  often  (         ),  seldom  (         ),  never  (         )? 

Do  you  have  colds  often  (         ),  seldom  (         ),  never  (         )  ? 

Are  your  teeth  good  (         ),  medium  (         ),  poor  (         )? 

Have  you  consulted  an  oculist?  (  ),  If  so,  at  what  age  for  the  first  time? 
(  ),  Do  you  wear  glasses  ?  (  ),  Give  the  nature  of  the  defect  if  you  know 
it.  (  ). 

How  many  hours  do  you  usually  sleep  (         )  ? 

Do  you  dream  much  (         ),  little  (         ),  never  (         )? 

Are    your   dreams  as   a   rule  pleasant  (         ),  commonplace  (         ),  fearful 

<         )? 

As  a  child  were  you  subject  to  bad  dreams  which  you  have  since  outgrown? 

(         )- 

Is  your  appetite  good  (         ),  medium  (         ),  poor  (         )? 

At  what  time  of  day  do  you  feel  in  the  best  spirits  ?     (  ). 

At  what  time  of  day  can  you  study  best  ?     (  )  • 

Do  you  drink  coffee  (  ),  tea  (  )  ?  If  so,  how  many  cups  daily,  coffee 
(  ),  tea  (  )?  At  what  age  did  you  begin  ?  (  ). 

Do  you  smoke?  (  ).  If  so,  how  many  pipes  (  ),  cigars  (  ), 
cigarettes  daily  (  )  ?  At  what  age  did  you  begin?  (  ). 


63°  /•  McK.  CATTELL  AND    L.  FARRAND. 

Do  you  use  alcoholic  drinks?  (  ).  If  so,  occasionally  (  ),  daily 
(  )?  If  daily,  how  many  glasses  of  beer  (  ),  wine  (  ),  spirits  (  )? 

About  how  many  hours  or  minutes  daily  on  the  average  during  the  month 
of  October  do  you  spend  in  study  (  ),  in  reading  books  other  than  text  and 
reference  books  (  ),  in  playing  sedentary  games  (  ),  in  playing  athletic 
games  (  ),  in  other  physical  exercise,  as  walking,  riding  a  bicycle,  etc.  (  )  ? 

Do  you  play  a  musical  instrument?  (  ),  if  so,  what  one  or  ones? 
(  ),  how  long  daily?  (  ),  what  musical  instrument  do  you 

prefer  to  hear  played  ?  (  ),  which  opera  that  you  have  heard  do 

you  prefer?  (  ). 

What  novelist  do  you  prefer?  (  ),  what  poet?  (  ), 

what  painter?  (  ),  what  play  that  you  have  seen  acted? 

(  )• 

Supposing  the  following  ten  ways  of  spending  an  hour  give  to  you  pleasure, 
write  numbers  after  them  in  the  order  of  amount  of  pleasure  they  give.  Eating 
dinner  (  ),  playing  your  favorite  athletic  game  (  ),  playing  your  favorite 
sedentary  game  (  ),  working  with  tools  as  in  a  garden  (  ),  reading  a 
novel  (  ),  hearing  music  (  ),  talking  to  a  friend  (  ),  daydreaming 
(  ),  learning  something  (  ),  writing  something  (  )? 

What  profession  or  business  do  you  propose  to  follow?  (  ), 

in  what  calling  would  you  prefer  to  succeed  if  you  had  your  choice  ?  (  ). 

Send  with  this,  if  possible,  your  most  recent  photograph  (with  date  at  which 
it  was  taken,)  and  if  you  have  them,  or  can  have  them  taken,  send  photographs 
both  in  full  face  and  in  profile. 


Name,  (in  full) 

Date  of  Birth, Place  of  Birth, 

Class  and  Course  in  College, 


PHYSICAL  CHARACTERS. 

The  colors  of  the  hair  and  of  the  eyes  were  recorded  with  the 
results  given  below.    The  figures  are  both  percentages  and  actual 

numbers. 

Hair.  Eyes. 

Black,  8  Gray,            33 

Dark  brown,  56  Blue,             30 

Light  brown,  34  Brown,          31 

Flaxen,  i  Green,            i 

Red,  o  Not  given,     5 

Not  given,  i 

In  making  these  records  it  would  be  well  to  confine  the  des- 
ignations to  those  given  above,  and  it  would  be   an  advantage 


PHYSICAL  AND  MENTAL  MEASUREMENTS.  631 

to  have  standards  by  which  the  recorder  could  make  the  com- 
parison.1 A  lock  of  the  hair  might  be  preserved  with  the  rec- 
ord. Unless  the  recorder  has  been  carefully  trained  such 
descriptions  do  not  have  great  value.  The  same  eyes  may  be 
called  gray,  blue  and  brown,  respectively,  by  different  recorders. 
In  a  population  so  mixed  as  that  of  New  York  City,  it  is  ques- 
tionable how  far  these  records  are  of  use.  If  taken  at  all  the 
description  should  be  made  more  complete  by  giving  the  traits 
enumerated  in  the  supplementary  blank  printed  above.  The 
finger  prints  could  be  taken  for  purposes  of  identification. 

Height  and  weight  can  be  measured  with  comparative  ease. 
We  had  a  Fairbanks'  scale  with  an  upright  adjustable  measur- 
ing rod  graduated  for  the  metric  system.  The  averages  give : 

Av.          v.          V. 

Height  in  cm.  J75-1        4-9        i«7 

Weight  in  kg.  66.2        6.0        1.7 

Both  height  and  weight  are  above  the  average  of  the  popu- 
lation and  above  the  averages  for  the  freshmen  entering  Yale  Uni- 
versity. 

It  so  happens  that  the  subdivisions  of  the  metric  system  are 
not  well  suited  for  these  measurements.  It  is  not  quite  accurate 
enough  to  measure  to  kilograms  and  centimeters,  whereas  to 
measure  to  tenths  of  these,  especially  in  the  case  of  weight,  is 
needlessly  exact.  In  these  measurements  the  weight  was  taken 
in  ordinary  indoor  clothing,  and  the  height  of  the  heel  was  sub- 
tracted. The  record  should  be  written,  e.  g.9  162.7  cm.  —  1.4 
cm.  =  161.3  cm.  In  some  cases  the  height  of  the  heel  was  not 
subtracted,  and  the  average  given  above  is  slightly  too  large. 

The  size  of  the  head  was  measured  with  the  conformateur 
used  by  hatters.  This  was  placed  horizontally  above  the  tem- 
ples, giving  approximately  the  largest  horizontal  area  of  the 
head.  The  diameters  are  given  below  together  with  the  ratio 
of  length  to  breadth. 

aSuch  standards  are  sold  by  the  Cambridge  Scientific  Instrument  Co.,  but  at 
a  very  high  price. 


^32  /•  McK.  CATTELL  AND  L.  FARRAND. 

Av.          v.          V. 

Length  in  cm.  19.3         0.5         0.2 

Breadth,  14.9         0.4         o.i 

The  measurements  are  not  sufficiently  accurate  to  study 
growth,  but  would  serve  for  comparison  with  the  other  data. 
The  method  has  the  advantage  of  being  easily  carried  out  and 
leaving  a  permanent  record.  It  also  measures  irregularities  in 
the  shape  of  the  head  that  would  not  be  shown  by  the  perimeter. 
There  is  a  slight  inaccuracy  owing  to  the  hair  being  included 
in  the  measurement,  and  a  more  serious  one  in  the  difficulty  of 
placing  the  instrument  in  the  proper  position.  This  latter  diffi- 
culty indeed  holds  for  all  measurements  of  the  head  which  can 
only  be  made  with  exactness  by  a  skillful  observer. 

On  the  whole  we  think  the  conformateur  in  its  present  form 
is  less  accurate  and  (in  the  subsequent  calculations)  more 
troublesome  than  the  perimeter  and  expect  hereafter  to  use  the 
latter  instrument. 

The  breathing  capacity  was  measured  with  a  fluid  spirom- 
eter,  two  tests  being  taken,  the  averages  in  liters  (98  cases) 

Av.          v.          V. 

Capacity  in  liters,  3.73      0.45      0.19 

In  a  determination  such  as  this  it  is  desirable  to  take  two 
records,  as  one,  especially  the  first,  is  sometimes  faulty.  We 
think  it  best  to  record  both  measurements,  but  to  use  not  the 
average,  but  the  maximum.  The  averages  of  the  maxima  are  : 
are : 

Av.          v.          V. 

Capacity  in  liters,  3.83      0.41       0.19 

The  maximum  of  the  two  trials  is  thus  o.i  liter  greater  than 
the  average.  If  time  permit  it  would  be  desirable  to  continue  a 
test  such  as  this  until  the  maximum  has  been  reached.  If  on 
a  sufficient  number  of  observers  a  larger  series  of  trials  were 
made  we  could  determine  how  likely  it  is  that  the  maximum  be 
reached  in  the  first  trial,  the  first  two  trials,  etc. 

In  addition  to  these  measurements  Mr.  Galton  proposes  tak- 
ing the  span  of  the  arms,  the  height  sitting,  the  height  to  the 


PHYSICAL  AND  MENTAL  MEASUREMENTS.  633 

top  of  the  knee,  the  length  from  elbow  to  finger-tip  and  the 
length  of  the  middle  finger  of  the  left  hand.  These  measure- 
ments would  probably  prove  useful  for  purposes  of  identifica- 
tion, but  do  not  seem  otherwise  advisable  unless  a  more  thor- 
ough physical  examination  is  undertaken  than  that  proposed  by 
Mr.  Galton. 

It  would  indeed  be  highly  desirable  to  make  a  thorough 
physical  examination,  but  for  this  purpose  the  recorder  would 
need  some  special  training.  The  most  important  tests  would 
be  of  heart  (including  pulse  tracing),  lungs  (including  rate 
and  tracing  of  breathing) ,  temperature  and  urine  which  could 
be  made  in  a  few  minutes  by  a  practiced  physician.  There 
are  many  other  physical  data,  such  as  deformities,  peculiarities, 
stigmata,  tendon  reflexes,  etc.,  which  it  would  be  desirable  to 
have,  and  we  may  hope  that  cooperation  between  physicians, 
students  of  criminology  and  of  the  defective  classes  and  those 
interested  in  anthropometry  may  be  obtained  to  select  the  most 
important  determinations  and  devise  the  best  means  for  carrying 
them  out. 


VISION. 

Color  blindness  was  tested  by  letting  the  observer  select  the 
four  green  shades  from  the  woolen  skeins  supplied  by  the  Cam- 
bridge Scientific  Instrument  Company  in  accordance  with  Mr. 
Galton's  instructions.  Three  per  cent,  of  those  tested  (71  cases) 
were  color  blind  and  three  per  cent,  appeared  to  have  defective 
color  vision. 

The  method  of  selecting  colors  suffices  to  show  whether  or  not 
color  vision  is  normal,  if  the  recorder  have  sufficient  skill  to  note 
hesitation  on  the  part  of  the  student.  In  the  case  of  those  color 
blind  or  having  defective  color  vision  it  would  of  course  be  desir- 
able to  investigate  more  carefully  the  nature  of  the  defect. 

The  Galton  instrument  is  needlessly  expensive,  as  the  yarns 
could  be  matched  for  a  few  cents.  If  the  instrument  is  used  the 
four  pointers  should  be  removed,  as  the  observer  should  not  know 
that  he  is  expected  to  find  just  four  shades  of  green. 


/•  McK.  CATTELL  AND  L.  FARRAND. 

Keenness  of  sight  was  tested  with  Mr.  Galton's  instrument. 
This  gives  the  distance  in  cm.  at  which  diamond  numerals  can 
be  read  by  each  eye  singly.  We  made  the  test  in  a  room  lit 
only  by  an  electric  lamp  of  100  candles  at  a  distance  of  I  m. 
from  the  type.  We  determined  the  distance  at  which  at  least 
8  letters  out  of  10  could  be  correctly  read,  making  sure  that  all 
letters  could  be  read  on  the  card  one  step  nearer.  The  percent- 
ages (94  cases)  for  the  different  distances  and  for  each  eye  are  : 

Distance  in  cm.          Right  Eye.  Left  Eye. 

72  1. 06  %  2.02  % 

61  29.9  16.00 

52  26.6  29.80 

44  18.09  31-99 

37  10-64  7-49 

31  6.38  7.49 

26  3.19  3.19 

22  1. 06  O. 

19  i. 06  o. 

l6  2.O2  2.O2 

The  right  eye  is  thus  better  than  the  left,  the  '  normal '  for 
the  right  eye  being  a  distance  of  about  52-61  cm.,  and  for  the 
left  eye  of  44—52  cm.,  or  a  little  more. 

It  is  perhaps  a  needless  precaution  to  use  a  dark  room  and 
standard  illumination,  but  we  have  found  great  variations  when 
test-types  are  illuminated  by  ordinary  daylight.  Test-types  of 
varying  size  at  a  distance  of  5  or  6  m.  will  do  as  well  as  small 
type  at  varying  distances,  but  it  is  easier  to  have  a  selection  of 
lines  in  small  type  than  in  large  and  to  expose  them  for  a  fairly 
constant  time  while  the  observer  is  in  ignorance  of  their  nature. 
The  tests  used  by  oculists  are  as  a  rule  defective  from  a  scien- 
tific standpoint.  The  near  as  well  as  the  far  limit  ought  per- 
haps to  be  taken  and  astigmatism  tested. 

The  test  in  any  case  is  not  very  exact,  but  perhaps  as  good 
as  any  that  can  be  made  quickly.  It  would,  however,  be  de- 
sirable to  compare  various  methods,  such  as  counting  dots  placed 
at  a  distance,  or  drawing  a  series  of  figures,  and  determine 
which  gives  the  most  accurate  results  in  the  least  time.  The 
test  requires  atropin  to  be  accurate  and  an  objective  examination 
of  the  eye  such  as  can  only  be  carried  out  by  a  skilled  oculist. 


PHYSICAL  AND  MENTAL  MEASUREMENTS.  635 

It  is,  however,  a  great  advantage  for  the  student  to  know  whether 
his  eyesight  is  normal,  sub-normal  or  abnormal,  and,  if  desired, 
a  more  careful  determination  of  the  nature  and  amount  of  the 
defect  can  be  made  either  in  the  laboratory  or  in  the  office  of 
an  oculist. 

The  least  light  visible  cannot  be  readily  measured  owing  to 
the  variations  accompanying  adaptation ;  and  the  least  notice- 
able difference  in  intensity  cannot  be  measured  quickly.  A 
series  of  shades  of  gray  nearly  alike  can,  however,  be  sorted 
by  the  observer  on  the  plan  recommended  by  Mr.  Galton  for 
weights.  We  must,  however,  admit  that  the  least  noticeable 
difference  in  intensity  cannot  be  determined  in  two  or  three 
minutes,  and  that  vision  is  one  of  the  most  difficult  senses  to  test. 

Preference  for  color  was  tested  by  showing  rectangles  (about 
5x3  cm.,  the  'golden  mean')  of  the  following  colors  in  irreg- 
ular order  on  a  black  field  and  asking  the  student  which  he 
liked  best.  The  preferences  (66  cases)  were  as  follows : 

Blue,  34.9%;     red,  22.7;     violet,  12.1 ;     yellow,  7.5; 
green,  6.1 ;    white,  6.1 ;    no  preference,  10.6. 

The  student  was  asked  to  define  his  degree  of  preference, 
in  four  grades,  but  our  data  are  not  sufficient  to  warrant  a  dis- 
cussion of  the  results. 

HEARING. 

Hearing  was  tested  by  determining  the  distance  at  which 
the  ticking  of  the  laboratory  stop-watch  could  be  heard  with 
each  ear  singly.  The  results  (86  cases)  were  in  percentages : 

Normal     Subnormal     Abnormal 
Right  ear  86  13  i 

Left  ear  84  13  3 

We  did  not  undertake  to  measure  sharpness  of  hearing  ex- 
actly as  the  laboratory  was  too  noisy.  There  is  unfortunately 
no  good  method  for  measuring  the  intensity  of  a  faint  sound, 
and  one  cannot  do  much  more  than  determine  whether  the 
hearing  is  normal,  sub-normal  or  abnormal. 


636  /.  McK.  CATTELL   AND  L.  FARRAND. 

The  accuracy  of  the  perception  of  pitch  was  determined  by 
giving  twice  on  a  monochord  the  f  below  the  middle  c,  the  ob- 
server being  required  to  find  the  sound  by  adjusting  the  bridge 
which  had  been  in  the  meanwhile  shifted  (which  should  have 
been  done  to  about  c').  The  average  variation  (48  cases)  was 
7.5  cm.  (v,  5.9  ;  V,  1.9)  or  nearly  one  whole  tone.  Of  those 
tested  iofo  could  adjust  the  monochord  within  about  ^  tone, 
6\%  came  between  -fa  and  one  tone,  and  29%  had  a  greater 
error. 

The  observer  was  not  allowed  to  hum  the  tone.  Perhaps  a 
simpler  method  would  be  to  strike  a  key  on  the  piano  and  let 
the  observer  find  it.  In  this  case  three  notes  could  be  struck — 
high,  middle  and  low.  The  highest  audible  note  is  probably  a 
good  test  and  one  not  difficult  to  make. 

DERMAL  AND  MUSCULAR  SENSATIONS. 

Sensation  areas  were  determined  by  using  an  aesthesiometer 
in  which  the  points  were  2  cm.  apart,  the  instrument  being  ap- 
plied longitudinally  on  the  back  of  the  left  hand  between  the 
tendons  of  the  fingers.  Five  tests  were  made,  the  subject  being 
touched  with  one  or  two  points  in  the  order,  *  two,  two,  one, 
one,  two'  and  being  required  to  decide  in  each  case  whether  he 
were  touched  with  one  or  with  two  points.  The  percentages  of 
the  men  (49)  who  were  correct  a  given  number  of ,  times  is  as 
follows : 

Correct. 


5  times. 

16  per  cent. 

4      " 

38 

3      " 

20 

2        " 

22 

i      " 

n        " 

2 
t. 

The  answers  were  correct  in  67  %  of  all  the  trials,  and  were 
correct  in  60%  of  the  cases  with  two  points,  and  in  75%  °^  *ne 
cases  with  one  point.  It  is  difficult  to  determine  sensation  areas 
exactly,  as  there  are  many  sources  of  error,  both  in  the  decision 
of  the  student  and  the  way  in  which  the  points  are  applied  by 
the  recorder.  Perhaps  a  method  of  equivalents  in  which,  say, 
the  observer  were  touched  by  points  5  cm.  apart,  and  were  then 
required  to  indicate  the  distance  on  the  skin,  or  were  touched 


PHYSICAL  AND  MENTAL   MEASUREMENTS.  637 

and  required  to  touch  as  nearly  as  possible  the  same  point, 
would  give  more  satisfactory  results.  The  data  given  above 
determine  the  sensitiveness  of  the  group,  but  not  of  the  indi- 
vidual. 


The  perception  of  the  force  of  movement  was  measured  by 
letting  the  observer  make  with  a  dynamometer  two  pulls  in  suc- 
cession as  nearly  as  possible  alike,  and  measuring  his  error. 
He  was  instructed  how  to  make  a  pull  about  4  kg.  in  strength, 
and  then  required  to  make  three  pairs  of  pulls.  The  average 
error,  from  the  average  of  the  differences  in  the  three  pairs  of 
pulls,  was  (48  cases)  : 

Av.  v.  V. 

Error  in  kg.  0.63  0.45  0.12 

The  method  of  average  error  always  gives  results  more 
quickly  than  the  method  of  right  and  wrong  cases,  and  it  is  con- 
sequently an  advantage  to  use  a  dynamometer  rather  than 
weights  for  this  test.  It  is  not  possible  to  determine  the  least 
perceptible  difference  in  weight  by  lifting  two  weights  without 
a  large  number  of  experiments.  A  series  of,  say,  five  weights 
differing  by  small  increments  can  be  arranged  in  order  as  sug- 
gested by  Mr.  Galton.  In  this  case,  however,  it  is  difficult  to 
find  the  series  that  can  be  just  arranged  correctly,  or  to  calculate 
the  probable  error  from  the  mistakes. 

Sensitiveness  to  pain  was  determined  for  the  ball  of  the 
thumb  of  the  right  and  left  hands.  An  algometer  was  used  in 
which  the  surface  applied  was  of  rubber  i  cm.  in  diameter  and 
rounded  at  the  corners.  The  instrument  was  applied  with 
gradually  increasing  pressure  by  the  student  himself  or  by  the 
recorder  (it  should  be  done  always  by  the  recorder  to  secure 
exactly  comparable  results),  and  the  student  was  told  to  say  as 
soon  as  the  pressure  became  disagreeable.  If  he  showed  signs 
of  discomfort  the  pressure  was  stopped.  Two  tests  were  made 
on  each  hand  in  alternation,  beginning  with  the  right  hand.  The 
averages  (95  cases)  are  as  follows : 


638  /.  McK.  CATTELL  AND  L.  FARRAND. 

Pressure  in  Kg. 

Av.  v.  V. 

Right  Hand,  6.90  2.90  0.96 

Left  Hand,  6.70  2.64  0.94 

The  strength  of  the  right  and  left  hands  was  measured  with 
the  ordinary  oval  dynamometer.  Two  tests  were  made  with  each 
hand  in  alternation,  beginning  with  the  right  hand.  The  aver- 
ages (99  cases)  of  the  two  trials  with  each  hand  are  as  follows  : 

Strength  in  Kg. 

Av.  v.  V. 

Right  Hand,              38.8  5.7  2.4 

Left  Hand,                 34.6  5.3  2.6 

In  this  test  it  would  save  time  to  make  two  trials  and  use  the 
maximum.  The  dynamometers  ordinarily  sold  are  not  very  ac- 
curate, and  the  amount  of  pressure  measured  depends  largely 
on  how  the  instrument  is  held.  We  believe  the  maximum  pres- 
sure of  the  thumb  and  forefinger  would  be  a  better  test  if  it  could 
be  generally  introduced. 

Accuracy  of 'movement  and  tremor  were  measured  by  allow- 
ing the  observer  to  join  two  points  distant  10  cm.,  the  line  being 
drawn  as  straight  as  possible  with  the  free  and  unsupported 
hand.  The  observer  was  shown  at  about  what  rate  the  move- 
ment should  be  made,  the  line  being  drawn  in  about  two 
seconds.  A  calculation  of  the  results  quantitatively  would  re- 
quire much  labor,  but  they  could  be  readily  classed  for  com- 
parison with  the  other  data.  Three  or  five  classes  could  be 
used,  say  :  straight,  medium  or  crooked  ;  and  tremor,  much,  me- 
dium or  little. 

We  think  it  desirable  to  add  at  least  one  further  test  of  move- 
ment and  fatigue,  and  expect  this  year  to  try  the  following  :  Let 
the  observer  make  with  a  spring  dynamometer  maximum  con- 
tractions of  the  thumb  and  forefinger  as  rapidly  as  possible  for 
fifteen  seconds.  The  rate  and  force  of  the  movements  must  be 
recorded  on  a  kymograph.  A  dynamogenetic  test  might  be 
added  by  giving,  say,  at  the  end  a  loud  sound  and  determining 
its  effects  on  the  curve.  This  experiment  would  require  expen- 


PHYSICAL  AND  MENTAL   MEASUREMENTS.  639 

sive  and  complicated  apparatus,  but  there  is  no  special  objection 
to  using  such  apparatus  so  long  as  the  test  itself  can  be  easily 
and  quickly  made.  The  trial  should  be  made  with  both  right 
and  left  hands,  and  perhaps  twice,  the  second  record  only  being 
used.  This  determination  would  make  the  ordinary  dynamom- 
eter test  unnecessary,  except  for  purposes  of  comparison. 

Professor  Jastrow  includes  a  number  of  other  tests  on  move- 
ment. The  number  of  movements  that  can  be  made  in  15 
seconds  is  a  good  test,  though  we  think  that  the  one  recom- 
mended above  is  better.  It  can  be  carried  out  by  tapping  a 
telegraph  key  and  recording  the  taps  on  a  kymograph.  The 
counting  instrument  which  records  the  number  of  pressures 
made  could  be  used.  It  is  cheap  and  does  get  out  of  order, 
but  the  amount  of  pressure  is  a  variable  factor. 

The  maximum  rate  of  movement  is  also  a  valuable  test  and 
one  easily  made  after  the  apparatus  is  in  order.  The  accuracy 
with  which  a  movement  of  given  extent  can  be  repeated  may  be 
measured,  as  also  the  accuracy  with  which  movements  can  be 
made  in  different  directions  and  with  the  right  and  left  hands. 
Tremor  and  involuntary  movement  can  be  recorded  with  the 
planchette,  and  the  whole  field  of  dynamogenesis  offers  oppor- 
tunity for  interesting  tests  if  time  permit. 

TIME  MEASUREMENTS. 

The  reaction-time  for  sound  was  measured  5  times  in  suc- 
cession with  the  Hipp  chronoscope  giving  the  following  results 
(97  cases)  : 

Time  in  a. 

Av.  v.  V. 

Reaction-Time.         174(^=29 J)  30  13 

It  is  possible  that  more  regular  and  typical  results  might  be 
secured  if,  in  place  of  a  sound  for  stimulus,  an  electric  shock 
were  applied  to  the  fingers  with  which  the  reaction  is  made. 
Sound  is,  however,  better  than  light.  We  do  not  regard  it  as 
desirable  to  use  several  senses  when  time  is  limited.  We  be- 

!This  variation  is  the  average  of  the  variations  of  the  five  reactions  made  by 
each  observer.  In  several  cases  five  valid  reactions  were  not  recorded. 


640  /.  McK.  CATTELL  AND  L,  FARRAND. 

lieve  that  the  Hipp  chronoscope  is  the  most  convenient  instru- 
ment for  measuring  reaction-times.  When  once  in  order  it  can 
be  used  by  anyone,  and  the  times  are  written  immediately  on 
the  record  blank.  But  the  method  is  immaterial,  as  it  would 
suffice  to  measure  the  times  to  o.oi  sec.  For  the  well  fitted 
laboratory  nothing  more  suitable  than  the  Hipp  chronoscope 
(in  the  form  in  which  we  use  it)  can  be  wanted,  but  there  is 
urgent  need  of  a  simple  and  portable  instrument  that  will  meas- 
ure times  to  o.oi  sec.  In  measuring  the  reaction-times  of  an 
unskilled  subject  it  is  not  desirable  to  place  him  in  a  separate 
room,  as  he  must  be  watched  and  instructed  by  the  recorder, 
but  a  screen  should  be  used  to  hide  the  apparatus. 

The  observer  was  told  to  lift  (not  press,  which  is  a  slower 
and  more  complex  movement)  his  fingers  as  quickly  as  possible 
after  the  occurrence  of  the  noise,  and  was  allowed  to  direct  his 
attention  as  he  found  most  convenient.  It  might  be  desirable  to 
ask  the  observer  after  the  experiments  have  been  completed  as 
to  the  direction  of  attention,  but  it  would  scarcely  be  possible 
to  investigate  *  sensory'  and  *  motor'  reactions. 

As  stated  above,  we  let  each  observer  make  five  reactions. 
When  all  the  first  reactions,  all  the  second  reactions,  etc.,  are 
averaged  together  the  following  results  are  obtained  : 

Times  in  a. 

V. 
16 

19 
16 

19 
19 
18 

The  first  reaction  is  thus  likely  to  be  about  25  a  and  the 
second  about  10  a  longer  than  the  subsequent  ones,  which  show 
only  a  slight  decrease.1  To  get  an  observer's  reaction-time, 
therefore,  it  might  be  well  to  make  five  reactions  and  use  the 
averages  of  the  last  three.  The  variations,  however,  show  that 
the  first  two  reactions,  though  longer,  are  not  more  irregular 

1  The  average  of  the  first  reactions  is  lengthened  by  two  of  over  500  a  which 
were  not  true  reactions  and  have  been  excluded  from  the  averages  given  at  the 
beginning  of  the  section. 


Av. 

V. 

I 

196 

55 

II 

178 

46 

III 

170 

43 

IV 

169 

40 

V 

166 

35 

Av. 

176 

44 

PHYSICAL  AND  MENTAL   MEASUREMENTS.  641 

than  the  subsequent  ones,  and  for  purposes  of  comparison  the 
five  first  reactions  can  be  used. 

The  reaction-time  is  one  of  the  tests  naturally  thought  of 
first  in  a  series  such  as  this,  but  we  do  not  regard  it  as  one  of 
the  most  satisfactory.  To  make  reactions  quickly  and  regularly 
is  something  of  a  '  trick '  and  the  variations  in  time  which  occur 
with  unpracticed  observers  depend  on  complex  causes. 

Both  Prof.  Jastrow  and  Prof.  Miinsterberg  recommend  a 
number  of  psychometric  tests  for  a  limited  series  such  as  this. 
Those  used  by  Prof.  Jastrow,  which  consist  of  discrimination 
and  choice  are  even  more  difficult  to  carry  out  and  interpret 
than  reaction-times.  The  results  vary  greatly  with  the  appa- 
ratus used,  with  the  instructions  of  the  recorder  and  with  the 
attitude  of  the  subject. 

The  plan  first  used  by  one  of  the  present  writers  of  giving 
lists  of  colors,  words,  etc.,  and  measuring  the  total  time  re- 
quired to  name  them,  to  form  associations,  etc.,  is  recommended 
by  Miinsterberg  and  indeed  makes  up  about  one-half  of  his  tests. 
We  have  used  one  test  of  this  character,  and  doubtless  others 
would  be  useful  if  time  permitted.  We  gave  the  observer  a  blank 
containing  500  n-point  capital  letters,  of  which  100  were  A's. 
Each  of  the  other  letters  occurred  16  times,  and  the  whole 
series  was  arranged  in  an  order  drawn  by  lot.  The  observer 
was  required  to  mark  as  quickly  as  possible  all  the  A's.  We 
thus  have  the  time  (93  cases)  required  to  recognize  and  mark 
JOG  letters  and  to  discriminate  cursorily  400  more. 

Time  in  Sees. 
Av.  v.  V. 

Marking  100  letters  95.0  12.8  6.4 

The  average  number  of  A's  omitted  was  2.6.  It  was  but 
seldom  that  a  wrong  letter  was  marked.  It  would  be  desirable 
to  correlate  the  rapidity  with  the  number  of  mistakes.  A  rough 
correction  could  perhaps  be  made  to  the  rate  by  adding  to  the 
total  time  the  time  that  would  be  required  to  discriminate  and 
mark  the  letters  omitted  or  wrongly  marked.  This  would  in- 
crease the  average  time  to  about  97.5  seconds,  which  is  very 
nearly  one  second  per  letter.  The  order  of  the  individuals  would 


642  /.  McK.   CATTELL  AND  L.   FARRAND. 

be  somewhat  changed  by  such  a  correction,  as  there  are  a  few 
who  make  a  great  many  mistakes.  This  itself  is  typical ;  some 
will  do  a  task  quickly  and  well,  some  quickly  and  ill,  some 
slowly  and  well,  and  some  slowly  and  ill. 

If  time  permit  the  making  of  other  psychometric  tests  we 
should  recommend  reading  as  rapidly  as  possible  a  list  of  100 
words,  and  100  similar  words  making  sentences  ;x  naming  100 
(or  20)  colors  (say  red,  yellow,  green,  blue,  violet,  gray  and 
black,  i  cm.  sq.  arranged  in  a  chance  order  on  a  white  ground), 
which  is  useful  in  determining  color-blindness  as  well  as  quick- 
ness of  perception  and  speech,  and  lastly  giving  100  (or  fewer) 
words  and  requiring  the  student  to  write  as  rapidly  as  possible 
the  suggested  ideas. 

This  last  test  would  of  course  be  useful  in  the  study  of  asso- 
ciation of  ideas,  which  has  not  been  included  in  our  series.  We 
regret  that  this  has  been  the  case  and  may  try  to  take  up  some 
study  of  association  in  our  subsequent  work.  The  difficulty  is 
that  this  subject  (like  imagery  and  memory,  which  we  have  in- 
cluded) ,  requires  more  psychological  investigation  before  a  test 
can  be  conveniently  applied  and  properly  interpreted. 

PERCEPTION  OF  SPACE  AND  TIME. 

The  observer  was  given  a  standard  line,  10  cm.  in  length, 
drawn  near  the  top  of  apiece  of  paper,  and  was  required  to  place 
this  on  the  left-hand  side  of  a  sheet  of  letter  paper  of  the  same 
width,  and  draw  in  a  corresponding  position  a  line  of  the  same 
length.  His  line  was  then  folded  under  and  he  repeated  the 
trial.  The  results  (93  cases)  were : 

Error  in  mm. 
Av.  v.  V. 

Average  Error,  6.5  3.4          0.9 

The  constant  error  was  on  the  average  +  0.08  mm.,  that  is, 
there  was  in  the  group  no  appreciable  tendency  to  over-estimate 
or  under-esdmate  the  line. 

1  The  rate  at  which  a  foreign  language  can  be  read  is  a  good  test  of  familiarity 
•with  the  language. 


PHYSICAL  AND  MENTAL   MEASUREMENTS.  643 

As  the  sheet  of  paper  was  only  20  cm.  wide,  the  observer 
may  have  guided  himself  by  the  distance  from  the  edge  of  the 
paper.  It  would  save  time  (especially  in  the  subsequent  cal- 
culations) to  make  only  one  trial.  We  expect  hereafter  to  am- 
plify this  test  as  follows :  Give  the  student  a  sheet  of  letter 
paper  (about  25x20  cm.)  with  a  line  5  cm.  in  length  drawn 
horizontally  20  cm.  from  the  bottom  of  the  sheet.  The  student 
is  required  to  reproduce  this  line  in  the  same  position  on  a  simi- 
lar sheet,  and  afterwards  to  draw  from  the  middle  of  the  line  he 
has  drawn  a  vertical  line  of  the  same  apparent  length,  and  then 
to  bisect  the  left-hand  angle  and,  perhaps,  tri-sect  the  right-hand 
angle  and  divide  the  vertical  line  in  the  middle.  The  test  can 
be  made  quickly,  but  it  would  be  somewhat  tedious  to  measure 
the  errors. 

The  accuracy  with  which  intervals  of  time  can  be  judged 
was  measured  by  giving  the  student  an  interval  of  10  seconds., 
marked  at  the  beginning  and  end  by  taps,  and  letting  him  make 
a  tap  when  an  apparently  equal  interval  had  elapsed.  The 
results  (90  cases)  were  : 

Time  in  Sec. 

Av.  v.  V. 

Average  Errors,  1.57          0.81  0.26 

The  constant  error  for  the  group  was  on  the  average— 0.18 
sec.  The  errors  are  almost  too  small  to  be  measured  by  the 
method  used  (an  ordinary  watch  or  stop  chronoscope) ,  and  it 
would  seem  desirable  either  to  increase  the  time  to  30  seconds 
or  to  use  chronographic  methods  of  giving  the  signals  and 
measuring  the  times.  This  test  is  one  easily  and  quickly  made, 
and  strictly  psychological  in  character.  But  the  interpretation 
of  the  results  is  not  obvious,  and  it  might  perhaps  be  omitted  by 
those  not  specially  concerned  with  psychology  or  amplified  by 
those  who  are. 

MEMORY. 

The  experiment  already  described  in  which  we  required  a 
student  to  draw  twice  a  line  as  nearly  as  he  could  the  same 
length  as  a  standard  line  of  10  cm.  was  made  at  the  beginning 


644  /.  McK.  CATTELL  AND  L.  FARRAND. 

of  the  series.  About  three-quarters  of  an  hour  later  when  all  the 
tests  had  been  completed,  he  was  reminded  of  the  line  he  had 
drawn  and  told  to  draw  from  memory  a  line  of  the  same  length. 
We  have  thus  a  good  test  of  recollection  (the  observer  not 
knowing  at  the  time  that  he  would  be  asked  to  remember)  easily 
made  and  giving  a  quantitative  result.  The  average  error  of 
recollection  was  7.3  mm.  (21  cases  only),  and  the  constant  error 
under  +0.2  mm.,  practically  none.  The  error  is  but  slightly 
larger  than  in  the  case  of  immediate  comparison  of  the  lines, 
but  the  number  of  students  tested  was  small. 

Like  all  tests  of  memory,  the  results  are  somewhat  complex, 
and  cannot  readily  be  compared  with  other  work  not  made  by 
exactly  the  same  method.  But  it  is  desirable  that  a  test  of  or- 
dinary or  casual  memory  be  made  and  the  conditions  fixed  by 
agreement.  As  in  some  of  the  other  experiments  on  our  list, 
the  average  result  of  this  test  gives  the  accuracy  of  the  class 
tested,  but  the  place  of  the  individual  in  the  series  is  very  in- 
adequately determined  by  a  single  trial. 

We  also  tested  immediate  memory  by  reading  aloud  eight 
numerals  and  requiring  the  student  to  repeat  them,  making  the 
determination  three  times  with  different  numerals.  The  average 
number  correctly  given  (without  regard  to  order)  was  6.92. 

The  errors  can  be  counted  in  three  ways,  with  regard  to 
omissions,  substitutions,  and  mistakes  in  order  or  position.  It  is 
tedious  and  difficult  to  count  up  the  mistakes  in  order  or  posi- 
tion, and  we  give  only  the  total  number  of  numerals  remembered. 
This  test  can  be  made  in  various  ways ;  one  can  use  numerals, 
letters,  words  or  nonsense  syllables,  read  them  or  show  them, 
etc.  We  prefer  numerals  in  spite  of  the  elaborate  work  with 
nonsense  syllables  undertaken  by  Ebbinghaus  and  by  Miiller 
and  Schumann.  Jastrow  uses  additional  tests  of  memory,  and 
it  would  certainly  be  desirable  to  compare  auditory  and  visual 
memory.  It  would  also  be  useful  to  test  memory  by  reading 
aloud  a  paragraph  (say  200  words)  and  requiring  the  student 
to  reproduce  it.  The  experiment  is  easily  made,  but  it  is  some- 
what difficult  to  calculate  the  errors.  Perhaps  the  papers 
might  simply  be  graded  on  a  scale  of  10  with  regard  to  verbal 
and  logical  memory. 


PHYSICAL  AND  MENTAL  MEASUREMENTS.  645 

AFTKR-IMAGES  AND  IMAGERY. 

After-images  were  tested  by  allowing  the  observer  to  see  in 
a  dark  room  for  fifteen  seconds  a  white  light  of  determined  area 
and  intensity.  The  area  was  a  cross  with  arms  I  cm.  square, 
30  cm.  distant  from  the  eyes,  and  the  intensity  (light  through 
ground  glass  which  absorbed  about  one-half)  was  from  a  100 
candle  power  incandescent  electric  lamp  at  a  distance  of  30  cm. 
Of  the  75  students  tested  73.3%  saw  an  after-image.  The  aver- 
age total  duration  from  the  disappearance  of  the  light  to  the 
disappearance  of  the  first  image,  and  the  duration  of  the  latent 
period  before  any  image  appeared,  were  as  follows : 

Av.  v.  v. 

Duration  of  image  in  sees.,  44.2          25.2  3.0 

Duration  of  latent  period  (34  cases),          16.2  9,4  0.2 

The  latent  period  is  long  because  the  student  is  not  likely 
to  notice  the  first  positive  image  and  oscillations.  With  61.8% 
of  the  students  the  after-image,  after  disappearing,  reappeared. 
With  29.1%  it  appeared  three  or  more  times;  with  7.3%  four 
or  more  times,  and  with  3.8%  five  times.  The  after-image, 
when  first  seen,  was  sometimes  positive  and  sometimes  negative, 
and  the  colors  varied  greatly,  being  distributed  in  the  first  phase 
noticed  as  follows : 

Negative   or    dark,    33.3%;    light   or  white,  29.4:  blue,   13.7; 
purple,  9.8;  green,  5.9;  yellow,  3.9:  red,  2.0;    miscellaneous,  2.0. 

We  included  after-images  in  our  series  in  part  because  it  was 
a  subject  being  especially  investigated  in  the  laboratory.  We 
think  it  an  advantage  for  each  laboratory  to  undertake,  in  addi- 
tion to  certain  tests  made  everywhere,  some  special  tests,  so  that 
a  larger  field  may  be  covered,  and  the  best  tests  selected  by  sur- 
vival of  the  fittest.  Our  results  with  after-images  seem  to  show 
that  the  test  is  a  good  one.  We  get  definite  results,  combined 
with  great  individual  differences.  The  differences  depend  on 
attention,  power  of  observation,  etc.,  and,  perhaps,  on  inherent 
differences  in  the  nervous  system,  which  may  prove  typical 
when  correlated  with  our  other  determinations. 


646  /.  McK.  CATTELL   AND  L.  FARRAND. 

Imagery  was  tested  by  letting  the  student  fill  in  a  blank 
containing  the  questions  printed  below.  The  answers  are  given 
in  percentages  (95  subjects)  after  the  questions. 

Think  of  your  breakfast  table  as  you  sat  down  to  it  this 
morning ;  call  up  the  appearance  of  the  table,  the  dishes  and 
food  on  it,  the  persons  present,  etc. 

Then  write  answers  to  the  following  questions : 

(1)  Are  the  outlines  of  the  objects  distinct  and  sharp? 

Yes,  86.5%;  No,  6.2%;  miscellaneous,  7.3%. 

(2)  Are  the  colors  bright  and  natural? 

¥68,83.3%;  No,  10.4%;  miscellaneous,  6.3%. 

(3)  Where  does  the  image   seem  to  be   situated  ?      In  the 
head?     Before  the  eyes?     At  a  distance? 

In  the  head,  28.7%;  before  the  eyes,  36.2%;  at  a  distance,  33%; 
miscellaneous,  2.1%. 

(4)  How  does  the  size  of  the  image  compare  with  the  actual 
size  of  the  scene  ? 

Same,  53.7%;  smaller,  45.3%;  miscellaneous,  i%. 

(1)  Can  you  call  to  mind  better  the  face  or  the  voice  of  a 
friend  ? 

Face,  75%;  voice,  14.6%;  miscellaneous,  10.4%. 

(2)  When  « violin'  is  suggested,  do  you  first  think  of  the 
appearance  of  the  instrument  or  the  sounds  made  when  it  is 
played  ? 

Appearance,  76.8%;  sounds,  23.2%; 

(3)  (a)  Can  you  call  to  mind  natural  scenery  so  that  it  gives 
you  pleasure  ?     (b)  Music  ?     (c)  The  taste  of  fruit  ? 

Yes.  No.  Miscellaneous. 

Scenery,                       94.6%  4.3%                    1.1% 

Music,                           89.1%  9-8%                    1.1% 

Taste  of  fruit,             68.1%  28.6%                   3.3% 

(4)  Have  you  ever  mistaken  a  hallucination  for  a  percep- 
tion, e.  g.,  apparently  heard  a  voice  or  seen  a  figure  when  none 
was  present?     If  you  answer  'yes'  describe  the  experience  on 
the  back  of  this  sheet. 

Yes,  74.7%;   No,  25.30/0. 

As  we  have  already  had  occasion  to  state  those  tests  that  are 
of  special  interest  to  the  psychologist  are  often  ones  with  which 


PHYSICAL  AND    MENTAL  MEASUREMENTS.  647 

it  is  difficult  to  get  definite  results.  The  student  has  had  no  prac- 
tice in  introspection  and  even  a  trained  psychologist  may  find 
it  difficult  to  fill  in  such  a  blank.  For  this  reason  we  have 
added  to  several  of  the  questions  proposed  by  Mr.  Galton  others 
admitting  of  more  definite  answers.  On  the  whole  we  think  it 
desirable  to  make  this  test.  A  discussion  of  results  would  lead 
us  beyond  the  limits  of  a  general  article. 

CONCLUSIONS. 

Our  experience  with  these  tests  leads  us  to  recommend  that 
they  be  made  a  part  of  the  work  of  every  psychological  labora- 
tory. When  used  with  freshmen  on  entering  college  the  rec- 
ord is  of  interest  to  the  man  and  may  be  of  real  value  to  him. 
It  is  well  for  him  to  know  how  his  physical  development,  his 
senses,  his  movements  and  his  mental  processes  compare  with 
those  of  his  fellows.  He  may  be  able  to  correct  defects  and 
develop  aptitudes.  Then  when  the  tests  are  repeated  later  in 
the  college  course  and  in  subsequent  life  the  record  of  progress 
or  regression  may  prove  of  substantial  importance  to  the  indi- 
vidual. The  making  of  the  tests  brings  the  psychological 
laboratory  into  relation  with  a  large  number  of  students  and 
with  other  departments  of  the  university,  shows  the  modern 
methods  of  anthropometry  and  experimental  psychology,  and 
may  lead  to  a  more  serious  study  of  these  on  the  part  of  a  larger 
number  of  students. 

The  psychological  laboratory  can  also  be  brought  into  mu- 
tually helpful  relations  with  the  community  by  extending  the 
tests  to  any  who  wish  to  have  them  made.  Children  in  the 
schools  might  be  tested  with  special  advantage.  For  this  purpose 
tests  are  especially  useful  which  can  be  made  simultaneously 
on  a  large  number  of  observers.  Physicians  might  find  it  an 
advantage  to  have  records  made  of  their  patients.  The  tests 
are  well  suited  for  civil  service  examinations.  If  a  small  fee 
were  charged  in  these  cases  it  might  suffice  to  support  an  as- 
sistant, the  larger  part  of  whose  time  would  be  spent  in  scien- 
tific work.  In  any  case  the  making  of  the  tests  is  good  practice 
for  advanced  students  preliminary  to,  or  in  addition  to,  special 


648  /.  McK.  CATTELL  AND  L.  FARRAND. 

research.  By  bringing  the  laboratory  into  relations  with  the 
community  we  add  to  its  influence  and  at  the  same  time  secure 
the  material  needed  for  research. 

We  have  only  studied  100  individuals  and  regard  this  paper 
rather  as  an  investigation  of  methods  than  as  a  summary  of  re- 
sults. We  think  that  an  hour  used  in  tests  should  be  divided 
between  physical,  psycho-physical  and  mental  measurements. 
We  regard  it  as  important  that  work  in  physical  anthropology, 
which  is  a  subject  sure  to  be  recognized  before  long  by  all  our 
universities,  should  be  intimately  associated  with  the  work  in 
experimental  psychology.  We  are  not  able  to  suggest  any 
radical  improvement  in  the  tests  selected  or  in  the  methods  of 
making  them ;  but  in  reviewing  the  individual  tests  we  have 
called  attention  to  difficulties  and  suggested  improvements.  The 
work  is  one  now  only  begun,  but  likely  to  develop  and  requiring 
investigation  and  discussion  from  diverse  points  of  view. 

We  do  not  at  present  wish  to  draw  any  definite  conclusions 
from  the  results  of  the  tests  so  far  made.  It  is  of  some  scien- 
tific interest  to  know  that  students  entering  college  have  heads 
on  the  average  19.3  cm.  long,  that  15  %  have  defective  hearing, 
that  they  have  an  average  reaction-time  of  0.174  sec., that  they 
can  remember  seven  numerals  heard  once,  and  so  on  with  other 
records  and  measurements.  These  are  mere  facts,  but  they  are 
quantitative  facts  and  the  basis  of  science.  Our  own  future  work 
and  that  of  others  must  proceed  in  two  directions.  On  the  one 
hand  we  must  study  the  interrelations  of  the  traits  which  we  de- 
fine and  measure.  To  what  extent  are  the  several  traits  of  body, 
of  the  senses  and  of  mind  interdependent?  How  far  can  we 
predict  one  thing  from  our  knowledge  of  another  ?  What  can  we 
learn  from  the  tests  of  elementary  traits  regarding  the  higher  in- 
tellectual and  emotional  life  ?  On  the  other  hand  we  must  use  our 
measurements  to  study  the  development  of  the  individual  and 
of  the  race,  to  disentangle  the  complex  factors  of  heredity  and 
environment.  There  is  no  scientific  problem  more  important 
than  the  study  of  the  development  of  man,  and  no  practical 
problem  more  urgent  than  the  application  of  our  knowledge  to 
guide  this  development. 


DISCUSSION  AND  REPORTS. 


PSYCHICAL   RESEARCH. 

4  Psychical  Research*  has  so  many  enemies,  fair  and  foul,  to  elude 
before  she  gets  her  scientific  position  recognized,  and  is  moreover  so 
easily  vulnerable  in  her  present  stage  of  development,  that  I  may  be 
excused,  as  one  of  her  foster-fathers,  for  uttering  a  word  that  may 
turn  the  edge  of  Prof.  Cattell's  amiable  persiflage  in  the  last  number 
(p.  582)  of  this  REVIEW.  He  seems  not  quite  to  have  caught  the 
argument  of  my  presidential  address.  The  inquiry,  I  said  in  sub- 
stance, still  remains  baffling  over  a  large  part  of  its  surface,  for  the 
evidence  in  innumerable  cases  can  neither  be  made  more  perfect,  nor^ 
on  the  other  hand,  be  positively  explained  away.  It  may  be  mal- 
observation,  illusion,  fraud  or  accidental  coincidence ;  it  may  be  good 
and  true  report.  One  can  only  go  by  its  probabilities  and  improba- 
bilities ;  and  the  scientist,  who  goes  by  the  presumption  that  the  usual 
laws  of  nature  are  superabundantly  proved,  feels  the  improbability  of 
1  occult '  phenomena  to  be  so  infinitely  great  that  he  is  practically  cer- 
tain that  the  evidence  in  their  favor  must  be  bad,  even  though  he  can't 
show  in  the  particular  case  where  the  badness  comes  in.  The  issue  be- 
tween Prof.  Cattell  and  myself  is  as  to  the  general  logic  of  presump- 
tion here.  I  urged  that  the  force  of  the  scientist's  presumption,  qua 
presumption,  might  some  day  be  worn  out  by  the  accumulation  of 
1  psychic'  cases,  long  before  his  doctrine  of  nature  was  radically  over- 
thrown, as  it  would  be  were  a  single  case  conclusively  proved.  Prof. 
Cattell  says :  "When  we  have  an  enormous  number  of  cases,  and  can- 
not find  among  them  a  single  one  that  is  quite  conclusive,  the  very 
number  of  cases  may  be  interpreted  as  an  index  of  the  weakness  of 
the  evidence ;"  apparently  holding  the  scientist's  presumption  to  be 
actually  strengthened  by  the  quantity  and  quality,  taken  together,  of 
the  psychical  research  reports.  It  would  indeed  be  strengthened  if, 
paripassu  with  the  accumulation  of  reports,  there  went  for  each  con- 
crete type  of  case  a  parallel  accumulation  of  demonstrations  of  its 
erroneousness.  And  as  this  is  just  what  happened  in  the  '  physical 
mediumship'  type,  the  work  of  the  S.  P.  R.  in  that  field  has  been 

649 


650  PSYCHICAL  RESEARCH. 

mainly  destructive.  But  it  has  happened  practically  nowhere  else. 
In  the  veridical  apparitions,  in  the  chief  thought-transference  experi- 
ments, fallacy  has  been  assumed,  but  not  clearly  demonstrated.  The 
presumption  has  remained  presumption  merely,  the  scientist  saying,  "  I 
can't  believe  you're  right,"  whilst  at  the  same  time  he  has  been  unable 
to  show  how  or  where  we  were  wrong,  or  even  except  in  one  or  two 
cases  to  point  out  what  the  error  most  probably  may  have  been.  In 
such  a  state  of  things  people  trust  their  instincts  merely,  while  wait- 
ing for  a  final  proof.  Many  naturalists,  for  instance,  consider  the 
evidence  for  the  sea-serpent  practically  sufficient.  In  others  it  pro- 
vokes a  smile.  Meanwhile  a  single  sea-serpent  dragged  up  on  the 
beach  would  settle  the  matter  forever.  I  spoke  of  my  own  final  proof 
or  psychical  sea-serpent-corpse,  under  the  name  of  a  'white  crow.' 
Professor  Cattell  says :  Can  the  exhibition  of  any  number  of  gray 
crows  prove  that  any  crows  are  white  ?  But  our  reports  are  not  of 
gray  crows ;  at  the  very  worst  they  are  of  white  crows  without  the 
skins  brought  home,  of  sea  serpents  without  the  corpse  to  show; 
and  where  there  are  such  obvious  reasons  why  it  must  be  easier  to  see 
a  wild  beast  than  to  capture  him,  who  can  seriously  maintain  that 
continued  reports  of  merely  seeing  him  tend  positively  to  decrease  the 
probability  that  he  exists  ?  In  the  case  of  telepathy,  ghosts,  death- 
apparitions,  etc.,  the  reasons  why  the  evidence  is  always  likely  to  be 
imperfect  rather  than  perfect  are  equally  obvious,  and  the  logic  is  the 
same  as  in  the  wild  beast  case.  Continued  reports,  far  from  strength- 
ening the  presumption  that  such  things  cannot  exist,  can  only  detract 
from  its  force. 

Both  here  and  in  my  address  I  have  played  into  the  hands  of  the 
scientist,  and  granted  him  every  conceivable  concession  about  the 
facts  for  the  sake  of  making  my  point  as  to  the  logic  of  presumption 
all  the  more  clear.  But  there  is  such  a  thing  as  being  too  fair-minded, 
so  that  one  wades  in  a  very  bog  of  over-reasonableness.  For,  in  point 
of  fact,  the  concrete  evidence  for  most  of  the  '  psychic '  phenomena 
under  discussion  is  good  enough  to  hang  a  man  twenty  times  over. 
The  scientist's  objections,  on  the  other  hand,  are  either  shallow  on 
their  face  (as  where  apparitions  at  the  time  of  death  are  disposed  of 
as  mere  '  folk-lore,'  or  swept  away  as  a  mass  of  fiction  due  to  illusion 
of  memory),  or  else  they  are  proved  to  be  shallow  by  further  investi- 
gation, as  where  they  are  ascribed  to  chance-coincidence.  May  I  add 
a  word  to  illustrate  this  ? 

On  page  69  of  Vol.  II.  of  this  REVIEW,  I  summarized  the  elabo- 


DISCUSSION  AND  REPORTS.  6<>I 

rate  Sidgwick's  report  on  the  Census  of  Hallucinations.  That  paper 
concluded  that  the  stories  of  apparitions  occurring  on  the  day  of  the 
death  of  the  person  appearing  were  440  times  too  numerous  for  the 
phenomenon  to  be  fairly  ascribed  to  chance.  I  said  that  the  chief  ob- 
jection practically  to  this  conclusion  was  that  the  census,  covering  only 
17,000  cases,  was  still  too  small.  Last  spring  I  wrote  a  letter  to  Pro- 
fessor Sidgwick,  giving,  for  quotation  at  the  Munich  Congress,  the 
results  of  my  American  census  of  7,123  cases.  They  prolong  and 
corroborate  his  own.  The  'yes'  cases  were  1,051  in  number,  or 
14.75%  °^  tf16  whole.  I  cite  part  of  my  letter: 

"  Of  these  yeses  429  were  without  particulars,  and  in  36  the  percipient  had 
not  signed  the  account.  Only  586  subjects  thus  remained  for  statistical  treatment. 

"  Of  these,  eliminating  all  who  had  the  experience  before  they  were  10  years 
old ;  and  all  who  gave  vaguely  plural  experiences,  there  remain  62  subjects 
with  //  cases  of  visual  hallucination  of  some  recognized  living  person.  Of  these, 
12  are  reported  to  have  occurred  on  the  day  of  the  death  of  the  person  seen. 

"These  numbers  are  so  small  that  I  have  not  ventured  to  reduce  by  any 
elimination  of  '  suspicious '  cases,  as  you  did,  but  as  a  correction  for  oblivion 
have  multiplied  the  whole  lot  by  your  figure  6|. 

71  X  6|  =  462     (in  round  number). 

"  Let  this  462  represent  the  probable  •whole  number  of  visual  hallucinations  of 
living  persons  really  seen  by  the  percipients  since  their  tenth  birthday.  The  12 
veridicals  are  in  round  numbers  ^  of  462.  Therefore  -£$  is  the  probability  in- 
duced from  facts,  and  due  to  the  unknown  cause  of  apparitions,  that  if  a  man 
*  appear '  at  all  it  will  be  on  his  death-day. 

"  On  the  other  hand  (the  U.  S.  death  rate  being  practically  the  same  as  that 
of  England)  the  pure  chance  that  if  any  one  appear  on  a  certain  day  it  will  be 
one  who  is  dying  on  that  day  is  only  T7thn7'  But  •£$  =  T^THJ-  X  4§7  >  so  that 
apparitions  on  the  day  of  death  are,  according  to  our  statistics,  487  times  more 
numerous  than  pure  chance  ought  to  make  them. 

"  The  details  will  be  sent  later,  but  I  append  now  a  few  remarks.  Of  the  71 
cases,  all  but  the  12  that  were  death-apparitions  are  treated  as  insignificant  in 
the  statistical  result.  But  this,  though  inevitable,  is  unfair  to  an  occultist 
theory  of  their  origin,  since  16  of  them,  though  not  veridical  of  death,  were 
coincidental  in  other  ways.  E.  g.,  6  were  collective,  2  were  reciprocal,  i  was 
voluntarily  produced  by  the  distant  agent,  2  were  premonitory  and  3  were  verid- 
ical, but  not  of  death.  But  let  this  pass.  There  remains  another  unfairness  to 
occultism  in  our  systematic  rejection  of  all  vaguely  plural  cases.  I  rejected  19 
percipients  in  all  for  this  reason,  but  7  of  these  percipients  gave  u»  coincidental 
cases,  2  of  them  being  apparitions  at  time  of  death. 

"  We  can  afford  to  be  very  generous.  Suppose  we  throw  in  these  19  subjects 
as  if  each  stood  for  one  non-coincidental  case.  Suppose  we  multiply  for  ob- 
livion by  10  instead  of  6%,  making  900  cases  in  all.  Suppose  we  take  only  % 
of  our  12  veridicals.  We  shall  still  get  ^=^=126  times  T^57,  the  chance- 
probability." 


652         PSYCHOLOGY  AND  LOGIC— FURTHER    VIEWS. 

The  objections  to  be  urged  are  : 

"i.  Smallness  of  numbers.  But  the  agreement  of  our  figures  with  yours 
goes  against  this. 

"  2.  The  collectors  packed  their  sheets  'with  veridicals.  As  a  matter  of  fact, 
they  say  they  knew  the  answer  beforehand  in  3,  possibly  in  4  cases.  In  5  cases 
they  state  their  ignorance.  In  3  they  say  nothing.  From  the  warning  against 
packing  with  yeses  and  the  very  large  number  of  veridicals  that  the  collectors 
furnish  separately,  this  objection  is  probably  not  very  important. 

"3.  The  veridical  cases  are  not  strong.  They  are  not.  Only  5  have  any 
corroboration,  and  in  no  case  is  it  first-rate.  Our  best  cases  are  not  among 
these.  But  this  is  an  argument  at  any  rate  in  favor  of  the  sincerity  of  the 
Census ;  and  since  coincidentals  and  non-coincidentals  are  treated  homogene- 
ously (at  least  all  the  deliberate  treatment  going  against  the  statistical  result, 
where  they  are  treated  otherwise  than  similarly),  the  ratio  of  the  surface  figures 
is  perhaps  a  fair  one. 

"  But  I  never  believed  and  do  not  now  believe  that  these  figures  will  ever  con- 
quer disbelief.  They  are  only  useful  to  rebut  the  assurance  of  the  scientists  that 
the  death-warnings,  if  not  lies,  are  chance  coincidences.  Better  call  them  lies 
and  have  done  with  it." 

I  make  this  quotation,  first  because  of  the  facts  themselves,  but 
mainly  because  I  have  above  too  easily  granted  the  ambiguity  of 
the  evidence  for  such  phenomena,  and  I  wish  to  show,  by  a  new 
example,  how,  when  two  interpretations  are  possible,  it  is  not  always 
the  scientist's  which  has  the  greater  numerical  probability  in  its  favor, 
or  which  is  the  more  carefully  or  conscientiously  weighed. 

WILLIAM  JAMES. 


PSYCHOLOGY  AND  LOGIC— FURTHER  VIEWS. 

The  discussion  opened  in  the  May  number  of  the  REVIEW,  by  Dr. 
G.  M.  Stratton,  on  the  proper  statement  of  the  relation  between  psy- 
chology and  logic,  is  one  that  may  profitably  be  followed  up ;  and  let 
us  hope  that  it  will  be.  Dr.  Stratton's  paper  is  marked  by  a  large 
lucidity  that  we  have  now  learned  to  expect  in  what  he  writes ;  and, 
from  the  point  of  view  likely  to  be  held  by  the  majority  of  his  readers, 
it  will  probably  appear  conclusive.  To  some,  however,  and  of  these 
I  confess  myself  one,  it  will  be  thought-provoking  rather  than  satis- 
fying, and  its  value  will  lie  rather  in  the  graver  questions  which  it  sug- 
gests than  in  its  settlement  of  those  nearer  to  the  surface  which  it  di- 
rectly discusses.  In  the  hope  of  leading  to  a  still  fuller  comparison  of 
views,  I  wish  in  the  present  article  to  bring  out  some  of  the  more 
prominent  queries  that  Dr.  Stratton's  paper  has  stirred  in  my  own 
mind.  I  do  this  the  more  willingly,  because  the  view  he  advocates, 


DISCUSSION  AND  REPORTS.  653 

while  strongly  opposed  to  that  which  has  generally  been  current,  is 
one  which  (I  believe)  has  also  been  advocated  by  Professors  Striimpell 
and  Miinsterberg;  very  likely,  therefore,  it  may  be  shared  by  many  of 
the  experts  in  the  new  psychology ;  so  that  Dr.  Stratton's  independent 
defense  of  it,  so  clear  and  forcible,  will  probably  have  the  effect  of 
fixing  in  the  convictions  of  the  younger  psychologists  (and  logicians, 
too)  a  doctrine  of  which  I  am  persuaded  we  ought  at  any  rate  to  say 
that  it  does  not  reach  the  bottom  of  the  question,  however  truly  it  may 
supply  a  needed  advance  from  the  view  earlier  prevalent,  that  logic  is 
adequately  described  as  simply  a  province  of  psychology,  and  of  psy- 
chology regarded  as  a  science  of  observation. 

It  must  seem  plain,  I  think,  that  Dr.  Stratton  has  made  his  propo- 
sitions out  unanswerably,  if  psychology  is  to  be  defined  as  he  evidently 
assumes  that  it  is,  and,  indeed,  expressly  declares  it  to  be — as  the 
science  whose  distinctive  and  ultimate  problem  is  to  explain  mental 
phenomena,  in  the  sense,  solely,  of  determining  their  '  natural  causes;' 
that  is,  the  chain  of  regular  and  systematic  antecedents  that  are  found 
on  critical  observation  and  experiment  to  attend  them  in  conscious- 
ness. Logical  norms,  imperatives  over  thought-values,  Dr.  Stratton 
rightly  says  can  get  no  footing  by  an  observational  science ;  that  is, 
none  as  imperatives.  He  admits,  of  course,  that  psychology  as  an  ob- 
servational science  cannot  avoid  taking  note  of  the  logical  forms,  as 
facts  of  consciousness ;  these  belong,  in  short,  to  descriptive  psychol- 
ogy. His  point  is,  that  they  cannot  properly  belong  to  explanatory 
psychology,  when  explanation  is  defined  as  the  determination  of  merely 
4  natural '  causes ;  and  he  implies  that  explanation,  in  this  sense,  is 
what  constitutes  the  gist  of  psychology — is,  in  fact,  what  makes  psy- 
chology psychology.  To  put  his  case  in  a  different  way :  Logic,  like 
ethics  and  aesthetics,  is  a  normative  or  legislative  science — a  science  of 
mandatory  standards  of  value.  Consequently,  it  cannot  be  made  out 
by  any  inquiries  into  the  natural  causes  of  conscious  facts;  nor,  on  the 
other  hand,  can  it  contribute  at  all  to  the  settlement  of  what  such 
causes  in  any  specific  case  specifically  are.  Logic,  as  a  conscious  fact 
to  be  explained,  must  accept  its  explanation,  so  far  as  any  may  be 
forthcoming,  from  explanatory  psychology;  and,  per  contra,  psy- 
chology must  accept  from  logic  all  the  canons  of  thought-integrity, 
precisely  as  it  must  accept  from  ethics  the  canons  of  moral  integrity, 
and  from  aesthetics  the  canons  of  taste. 

On  this  view,  one  thing  is  noticeable  that  Dr.  Stratton  perhaps 
overlooks,  or  at  any  rate  has  understated.  He  admits  that  logicians 
are  in  the  habit  of  trenching  on  the  ground  which  he  has  reserved  to 


654         PSYCHOLOGY  AND  LOGIC— FURTHER    VIEWS. 

psychology,  and  thinks  this  is  not  seriously  reprehensible,  provided 
the  offenders,  and  others  concerned,  clearly  understand  where  and 
when  the  trespass  is  committed.  The  logic  people,  he  implies,  are  in 
such  cases  dabbling  in  descriptive  psychology,  and  it  would  help 
things  if  they  clearly  knew  and  acknowledged  the  fact.  But  he  omits 
to  say,  and  thus  prevents  us  from  knowing  whether  he  notices,  that  it 
is  beyond  their  power  to  do  otherwise.  Yet  is  it  not  plainly  the 
truth  ?  For  how  in  the  world  is  the  logician  to  make  any  statement 
of  his  science,  without,  for  instance,  drawing  the  distinction  between 
conceptions,  judgments  and  syllogisms,  and  describing  accurately  in 
generalized  definitions  what  these  forms  of  conscious  fact  are?  This 
inevitable  trespass  of  the  logician  upon  the  psychological  preserves, 
even  if  it  be  only  in  their  outer  border  of  description,  and,  because  of 
this  inevitableness  in  the  trespass,  the  reciprocal  participancy  of  psy- 
chology in  an  essential  act  of  the  science  of  logic,  stirs  thoughts  in 
one  which  I  confess  I  do  not  know  how  to  get  rid  of  consistently  with 
stopping  at  Dr.  Stratton's  doctrine;  and  I  find  myself  wondering 
whether  he,  and  those  who  share  his  view  to  the  full,  have  reckoned 
with  it  to  the  bottom.  If  psychology  and  logic  are  really  so  clear  of 
each  other  as  the  new  doctrine  implies,  then  why  can  they  not  be  ex- 
pounded in  entire  separation  ?  Why  must  the  logician  take  a  hand  in 
psychology,  willy-nilly,  and  perforce  sin  against  his  own  canons  of 
division  ?  I  have  my  suspicions  that  the  trouble  comes  from  the  very 
definition  of  psychology  with  which  this  view  sets  out,  and  that  the 
very  conclusiveness  with  which  the  view  follows  from  that  definition 
should  be  a  warning  to  us  that  something  is  wrong  in  the  definition 
itself. 

In  this  brief  discussion  I  shall  not  even  attempt  to  reach  any  final 
solution  of  the  question  here  involved ;  much  less  to  vindicate  it.  I 
shall  be  satisfied  if  I  can  make  it  clearly  apparent  that  a  defect  of 
clarifying  view  exists,  and  give  some  hint  of  the  direction  in  which 
we  are  to  look  for  a  view  that  is  more  comprehensive.  I  must  say, 
too,  that  in  these  suggestions  I  am  aiming  at  a  school  of  views  rather 
than  at  Dr.  Stratton's  own,  and  with  an  eirenical  rather  than  a  polem- 
ical motive.  For  I  suspect  that  the  discussion  of  the  apparently  super- 
ficial question  raised  by  Dr.  Stratton,  if  pushed  to  its  depths,  will 
expose  a  clue  to  the  dispute  between  the  so-called  old  psychology  and 
the  new,  and  indicate  the  way  to  its  reasonable  solution. 

The  view  of  the  relation  between  psychology  and  logic  presented 
by  Dr.  Stratton  admits  that  the  province  of  conscious  fact  covered  by 
logic  is  also  covered  by  descriptive  psychology,  but  excludes  it  from 


DISCUSSION  AND  REPORTS.  655 

explanatory.  But  what  justification  can  there  be  for  this  abrupt  arrest 
of  the  chief  function  in  the  new  psychology?  If  psychology  in  its 
function  of  description  must  take  cognizance  of  our  apprehension 
of  the  logical  norms,  as  a  psychic  fact,  why  must  it  suffer  sudden 
arrest  of  its  function  of  explanation  in  presence  of  that  fact  ?  Is  it 
not,  on  the  contrary,  bound  to  explain  the  norms,  if  they  are  facts 
that  it  can  describe  ?  Or,  is  the  difficulty  this,  that  the  very  descrip- 
tion which  it  gives  of  them  shows  them  to  be  of  such  a  nature  as 
passes  its  powers  of  explanation  ?  The  latter  is  the  manifest  fact ; 
as  Dr.  Stratton  notices,  when  he  says,  correctly,  that  the  contents  of 
logic  supply  us  with  a  canon  of  criticism,  and  that  this  canon  must 
be  accepted  ab  extra  by  observational  psychology.  But,  I  insist, 
why  should  a  science  of  mind  accept  anything,  merely  ab  extra  and 
as  sheer,  dead,  unintelligible  fact?  Dr.  Stratton  would  very  likely 
answer,  that  an  all-embracing  and  entirely  thoroughgoing  science  of 
mind  would  not  do  so,  but  that  psychology,  as  he  understands  that 
term,  and  as  the  new  school  understands  it,  lays  no  claim  to  being  a 
science  of  mind  all-embracing  and  entirely  thoroughgoing.  Rather, 
his  contention  is  that  there  is  no  one  science  of  mind  that  is  thus 
comprehensive  and  profound,  but  that  our  knowledge  of  mind,  such 
as  the  knowledge  is  and  can  be,  is  only  possible  through  several  col- 
laborating sciences ;  and  that  the  exact  discrimination  of  these,  and  in 
general  a  careful  observance  of  their  boundaries,  is  an  important  aid 
in  the  best  performance  of  their  separate  and  their  collective  tasks. 

I  would  not  be  thought  to  deny  the  truth  of  the  last  proposition, 
nor  its  relative  importance.  But  I  incline  to  insist  that  its  importance 
is  only  relative,  and  that  its  truth  is  not  absolute.  Moreover,  what  is  of 
greater  import  is  this :  The  partial  and  relative  truth  brought  out  in 
the  undeniable  proposition  that  a  merely  observational  psychology, 
with  its  explanation  (so-called)  by  means  of  unvarying  antecedents 
accurately  determined,  is  incapable  of  explaining  anything  canonic  in 
consciousness,  forces  us  to  ask :  What,  then,  is  the  source  and  the 
authority  of  such  canonical  forms  ?  To  say  that  nobody  can  possibly 
tell ;  that  they  must  be  accepted  *  from  without,'  absolutely ;  that  there  is 
no  conceivable  psychology  which  can  ever  throw  any  rational  illumi- 
nation on  their  legislative  authority — this  is  the  same  as  saying  that 
they  have  no  rational  worth  at  all ;  that  their  operation  in  our  conscious- 
ness is  just  the  dead  pressure  of  an  impenetrable  necessity,  and  that 
therefore  they  are  no  guide  to  truth,  but  simply  express  the  brute  fact 
that  we  are  as  we  are,  and  are  forever  incapable  of  knowing  what  our 
judgments  are  worth,  or  whether  they  are  worth  anything ;  that,  at  best, 


656          PSYCHOLOGY  AND  LOGIC— FURTHER    VIEWS. 

we  can  only  register  the  processes  of  our  being,  and  describe  the  con- 
nections of  its  mechanism. 

But  if  this  is  so,  let  us  not  forget  to  draw  the  fact  out  to  its  full 
conclusions.  For  if  there  is  within  our  powers  no  capacity  to  warrant 
the  objective  worth  of  our  canons  of  judgment,  then  we  are  not  capa- 
ble of  any  psychology  at  all,  even  in  the  humble  sense  of  description 
and  '  natural '  explanation ;  we  are  not  capable  of  any  science,  how- 
ever modest  in  its  aims ;  nay,  we  are  not  capable  even  of  that  last  ap- 
parently fatal  judgment,  that  we  can  only  register  our  own  mechani- 
cal, meaningless  processes.  For  the  judgments  of  psychology  not 
only  have  to  accept,  as  Dr.  Stratton  says,  the  canons  of  logic  '  from 
without,'  but  they  have  to  submit  to  them  ;  they  depend  on  them,  and 
all  their  results  are  vitiated  by  them  if  once  we  admit  that  they  have 
no  ascertainable  worth.  If  they,  too,  are  only  mechanical  facts,  un- 
transparent  to  intelligence,  then  their  operation  in  us  can  lead  to  no 
real  explanation,  even  of  a  partial  and  relative  sort;  our  psychology 
ceases  to  be  a  science,  in  anything  but  the  name,  and  even  our  pro- 
fessed registration  of  dead  facts  dissolves  into  illusion;  everything  be- 
comes the  seeming  of  a  seeming,  the  dream  of  a  dream. 

But  when  we  seriously  ask  for  the  source  of  logical  canons,  for  the 
source  and  credentials  of  their  authority,  what  possible  answer  can  we 
really  get  but  this :  That  they  rest  on  the  simple  witness  of  the  mind, 
on  the  testimony  of  self-consciousness?  And  what  name  can  we  give 
to  the  account  of  this  last  possible  court  of  appeal,  unless  we  call  it, 
in  some  proper  and  inevitable  sense  of  the  word,  psychology?  It  is  not 
a  merely  observational,  much  less  an  experimental  psychology,  doubt- 
less. But  it  seems  none  the  less  to  be  a  fact  that  can  neither  be  escaped 
nor  evaded.  It  is,  rather,  the  Rational  Psychology,  necessary  and 
unconditional,  free  from  all  contingency,  which,  in  no  way  hostile  to 
the  psychology  of  observation  and  experiment,  but  demanding  this  as 
its  indispensable  aid  and  supplement,  furnishes  the  indispensable  pre- 
suppositions and  conditions  without  which  no  experimental  science, 
and  not  even  experience  itself,  would  be  possible.  It  is  true  enough 
that  logic  is  no  part  of  simply  observational  psychology,  any  more 
than  ethics — I  mean,  of  course,  an  ethics  of  Duty — or  any  more  than 
aesthetics  is.  But  as  an  observational  psychology  is  only  a  partial  psy- 
chology, which  depends  for  its  methods  and  for  the  validity  of  their 
results  on  the  validity  of  logical  laws  as  laws,  and,  like  these  must  fin- 
ally go  back  for  its  warrant  to  the  rational  psychology  of  an  absolutely 
real  self-consciousness,  completely  autonomous,  it  would  appear 
that  the  true  answer  to  the  question  of  the  relation  between  logic 


DISCUSSION  AND  REPORTS.  657 

and  psychology  is  found  by  denying,  indeed,  the  inclusion  of  logic  in 
empirical  or  observational  psychology,  but  by  including  it,  along  with 
all  the  sciences,  normative  or  explanatory,  in  the  comprehensive  whole 
of  rational  psychology.  This  whole  is  organic  and  genetic  (rather 
than  simply  generic)  relatively  to  these  sciences,  and,  among  them,  to 
the  new  or  experimental  psychology.  Rational  psychology,  as  the 
account  of  the  conditions  in  pure  self-consciousness  for  experience  in 
every  form,  is  the  heart  and  real  meaning  of  the  old  psychology ;  and 
the  new  psychology,  while  rightly  correcting  the  error  of  the  old  in 
attempting  to  extend  the  authority  of  direct  self-consciousness  over  the 
details  of  experience,  and  justly  disputing  this  intrusion  into  fields 
where  pure  thought  unsupported  by  perception  would  be  fruitless, 
must  acknowledge  its  reciprocal  dependence  upon  this  heart  of  the  new 
as  well  as  of  the  old — this  soul,  in  fine,  of  all  science  whatever.  With- 
out the  recognition  of  this  organic  psychology,  the  secret  of  truth  in 
the  judgments  of  all  psychology,  there  would  be  no  solution  of  the  ques- 
tion how  logic  is  related  to  psychology  or  to  any  other  science ;  nor, 
above  all,  how  logic  can  be  an  Organon  of  science — a  law  of  physica 
things  as  well  as  a  self-legislated  law  of  mind. 

I  know  how  easy  it  will  be  to  feign  a  discredit  of  all  the  foregoing 
by  affecting  that  it  is  all  a  mere  dispute  about  the  use  of  a  word.  But 
in  the  somewhat  current  employment  of  the  word  Psychology  in  the 
meaning  of  the  new  psychology  only,  there  is  an  ignoring  of  a  real 
fact — the  fact  of  self-consciousness  and  its  pure  constituents  that  are 
the  bases  of  all  science,  as  they  are  likewise  of  all  possible  experience 
— *a  fact  which  must  be  recognized,  by  whatever  name  it  may  be  called. 
In  that  great  fact  lies  the  real  being  and  vigor  of  the  soul ;  and  ifc 
would  be  a  strange  and  irrational  victory  that  should  strip  from  the  au- 
thenticating account  of  that  fact  its  time-honored  and  legitimate  title  of 
Psychology — the  Science  of  the  Soul  in  the  highest  and  most  signifi- 
cant sense  of  the  words. 

G.  H.  HOWISON. 

UNIVERSITY  OF  CALIFORNIA. 


THE  PSYCHO-SENSORY  CLIMACTERIC. 

In  following  the  results  of  recent  studies  in  the  visualizing  powers 
of  various  classes  and  individuals  one  is  struck  by  the  predominance 
of  this  power,  according  to  the  reports,  at  least,  among  naive  classes 
and  conditions.  By  visualization  is  here  meant  the  power  of  actually 
reproducing  the  object  of  memory  with  its  color  and  outlines,  as  con- 


658  THE  PSYCHO-SENSORY  CLIMACTERIC. 

trasted  to  the  remembering  of  something  about  the  object.  It  is  doubt- 
less true  that  the  latter  is  frequently  mistaken  for  the  former  and  is  so 
reported,  and  the  writer  has  been  inclined  to  believe  that  the  difference 
above  referred  to,  as  appearing  in  the  cases  collected  by  Galton  and 
Preyer,  and  particularly  by  American  observers,  is  largely  due  to  the 
greater  discriminating  power  of  those  who  confess  themselves  to  be 
non-visualizers.  The  difficulty  of  properly  interpreting  and  describ- 
ing these  experiences  is  quite  like  that  which  perplexes  the  blind  who 
have  had  no  experience  of  vision. 

Non-visualizers  may  frequently  have  a  strong  visual  memory  in  the 
sense  of  recalling  accurately  the  judgments  based  on  the  perception. 
One  curious  and  important  form  of  such  memory  is  that  which  may 
be  called  dynamic  and  consists  in  the  translation  of  the  data  of  visual 
sensation  into  terms  of  latent  muscular  contraction.  Thus  one  may 
find  himself  able  to  reconstruct  the  outline  or  image  when,  with  pencil 
in  hand,  he  attempts  to  draw  it.  Doubtless  such  minds,  when  atten- 
tion is  directed  to  an  object,  instinctively  go  over  it  dynamically.  The 
writer  when  desiring  to  fix  the  outlines  of  an  object  is  often  obscurely 
conscious  of  a  mental  tracing  of  the  outlines  in  which  the  movements 
of  the  eye  are  associated  with  vestigial  reproductions  of  the  effort  sen- 
sations which  would  have  been  called  out  in  the  manual  tracing.  It 
seems  to  the  writer  that  there  is  a  vast  substrate  of  dynamic  vestiges 
beneath  what  is  called  memory.  '  Trying  to  impress  a  thing  on  one's 
mind'  is  simply  the  revival  of  dynamic  vestiges.  It  would  be  impossi- 
ble to  a  mind  which  should  really  be  a  tabula  rasa  and  reproductive 
power  would  increase  with  the  increase  of  experiences.  The  com- 
monest forms  of  these  dynamic  vestiges  are  connected  with  speech, 
but  we  should  not  fail  to  recognize  that  memory  is  not  dependent  on 
language. 

It  is  a  familiar  fact  that  many  experiences  have  a  fringe  of  spatial 
association.  Thus  it  is  common  to  find  that  one  has  located  the  events 
or  objects  in  a  narrative  (quite  unconsciously  to  himself  at  the  time) 
in  some  part  of  his  spatial  sphere — to  the  right  or  left,  above  or  below 
— or  perhaps  with  reference  to  some  prominent  preexisting  element  in 
spatial  consciousness.  In  attempting  to  recall  the  object  one  finds 
that  the  4  clue'  belonging  to  the  unrecalled  but  not  forgotten  object  is  a 
locality.  u  It  does  seem  as  though,  if  I  could  fix  my  attention  on  the 
upper  left  corner  of  the  visual  field  intensely  enough,  it  would  reap- 
pear!"  Here  again  is  a  dynamic  vestige.  It  is  not  necessary  to  illus- 
trate further,  but  it  will  be  admitted  that  these  and  many  other  elements 
in  reproduction  substitute  in  mature  experience  for  a  visualized  reap- 
pearance of  the  impression. 


DISCUSSION  AND  REPORTS.  659 

It  may  be  safely  assumed  that  the  materials  of  the  visual  image  are 
infra-cortical,  while  the  really  vestigial  elements  are  generated  within 
the  cortex.  If  this  is  correct  there  is  a  very  useful  distinction  to  be 
made  between  the  two  classes  of  elements  in  the  reproduction.  It 
will  be  remembered  that  one  class  is  not  in  consciousness.  When  one 
recalls  the  image  with  its  colors  and  form  objectively  to  mind,  as  good 
visualizers  claim  to  do,  this  objectivity  is  due  to  the  same  cause  which 
gives  to  the  actual  object  its  outwardness.  The  materials  come  to  the 
cortex  and  are  there  construed  exactly  as  in  the  case  of  primary  vision. 
This  may  amount  to  actual  hallucination  or  may  be  so  slight  as  to  but 
faintly  tinge  the  reproduction.  On  the  other  hand,  when  a  poor  vis- 
ualizer,  like  the  writer,  recalls  any  object  it  is  by  a  marshalling  of 
cortical  vestiges  and  judgments  and  thus  the  result  has  none  of  the  ob- 
jectivity just  described. 

The  writer  has  elsewhere  insisted  on  the  necessity  of  discriminating 
sense  content  from  sensation  and  precisely  this  distinction  is  here  re- 
quired. The  good  visualizer  reproduces  the  sense  content  along  with 
the  cortical  vestige,  while  the  non-visualizer  only  requires  to  revive  the 
cortical  or  conscious  equivalents  of  this  content  to  have  what  serves 
for  him  the  purposes  of  a  complete  reproduction.  This  difference  is 
like  that  seen  between  the  sophisticated  and  the  naive  individual  in  the 
act  of  portrayal  to  others.  The  latter  finds  it  necessary  to  reproduce 
by  gestures  and  mimicry  as  many  as  possible  of  the  events  described, 
while  the  former  is  content  to  rely  solely  upon  his  repertory  of  verbal 
sounds.  In  exactly  the  same  way  the  naive  mind  requires  to  repro- 
duce the  actual  pictures  which  called  out  the  conscious  states  of  a  pre- 
vious experience  in  order  to  live  over  the  latter,  while  the  trained 
consciousness  disdains  such  mediation.  The  more  one  is  accustomed 
to  live  in  the  world  of  abstractions  the  more  complete  does  this  inde- 
pendence of  the  sub-conscious  mechanism  become. 

Upon  the  theory  of  consciousness  elsewhere  advanced  some  inter- 
esting suggestions  may  be  hazarded.  If  consciousness  depends  upon 
fluctuations  in  the  equilibrium  of  concentric  forces  in  the  brain,  and  if 
the  anatomical  mechanism  for  the  supposed  complicated  balance  of 
interdependent  forces  is  primarily  within  the  cortex,  it  does  not  follow 
that  reactions  of  other  centres  do  not  affect  the  equilibrium.  On  the 
contrary,  it  is  of  course  chiefly  the  stimuli  from  lower  centres  which 
constitute  the  material  for  consciousness.  Ordinarily  the  impact  is  from 
without,  but  its  form  is  determined  by  the  cortical  intermediary  me- 
chanism. Yet  the  distinction  between  the  force  and  its  form  probably 
does  not  lie  wholly  in  the  cortex.  Even  in  mature  life  these  limits  are 


660  THE  PSYCHO-SENSORY  CLIMACTERIC. 

undoubtedly  more  or  less  shadowy.  In  naive  and  primitive  states  it  may 
be  supposed  that  the  equilibrium  of  consciousness  is  still  less  limited 
and  the  form  of  conscious  reaction  may  be  more  largely  influenced  by 
direct  participation  of  lower  centres  in  the  equilibration  which  deter- 
mines the  nature  or  '  content'  of  consciousness.  The  progressive 
limitation  of  the  sphere  of  consciousness  may  be  part  of  the  evolu- 
tionary process  by  which  a  diffuse  somatic  consciousness  has  been  con- 
centrated and  freed  of  corporeal  limitations,  or,  to  speak  broadly, 
'  spiritualized.' 

However  all  this  may  be,  a  series  of  very  interesting  practical 
problems  in  pedagogy  associate  themselves  with  the  change  in  method 
of  reproduction  which  we  may  call  the  psycho-sensory  climacteric. 
It  will  be  admitted  that  the  undoubted  gain  in  efficiency  and  prompt- 
ness afforded  by  the  habit  of  abstract  reproduction  is  accompanied  by 
a  distinct  sacrifice  in  objective  independence  and  clearness,  just  as  the 
narrative  of  the  savage  is  likely  to  be  more  forcible  and  vivid  than  that 
of  the  '  Cultur-mensch.'  It  becomes  a  serious  question  therefore 
whether  the  premature  attempt  to  hurry  children  into  abstract  topics, 
such  as  may  require  recollection  of  symbols  for  the  effects  experiences 
rather  than  the  simple  data  of  experience,  and  especially  such  as  call 
for  introspective  study,  may  not  deprive  the  child  of  a  precious  store 
of  concrete  data  which  ought  to  form  the  substantial  foundation  for 
later  thinking. 

There  are  also  several  professions  where  the  power  of  objective 
memory  is  of  the  highest  possible  service.  The  artist  and  word  painter 
particularly  must  see  the  object  before  his  mind's  eye  and  it  cannot  be 
doubted  that  the  creations  of  fancy  partake  of  the  same  character  as 
the  actual  reproductions  of  sense. 

It  may  be  urged  that  more  attention  should  be  given  to  symmetrical 
mind  training  in  secondary  schools.  It  is  a  grave  mistake  to  suppose 
that  memorizing  of  a  text  is  an  all-round  training  in  memory.  The 
formation  of  dynamic  vestigial  associations  other  than  speech  are 
necessary.  Thus,  training  in  drawing  and  music  are  of  the  highest 
importance  quite  independently  of  any  interest  or  value  attaching  to 
the  arts  themselves.  They  serve  to  reenforce  the  memory  with 
powerful  dynamic  associational  elements  which  arm  the  thought  with 
vigor  and  persistence.  The  practice  in  composition  and  description, 
especially  the  description  of  objects  and  events  actually  in  experience, 
is  of  the  highest  importance.  Abstract  mathematics  should  come 
later  than  natural  history.  Physics  especially  can  hardly  come  too 
early,  while  chemistry  is  far  less  adapted  to  an  early  stage.  Descrip- 


DISCUSSION  AND  REPORTS.  66 1 

tive  botany  and  zoology  are  among  the  most  important  means  for 
serving  the  end  sought,  provided  the  instructor  have  a  vital  acquaint- 
ance with  the  subjects  to  enable  him  to  discriminate  in  presenting  the 
data  and  to  clothe  them  with  flesh  and  blood.  The  average  *  general 
lesson '  in  natural  science  has  been  a  frank  failure  and  has  done  vast 
harm.  It  was  my  privilege  (?)  to  hear  a  bevy  of  school  teachers 
cramming  for  their  general  work  and  hustling  '  waders,'  *  swimmers,' 
*  scratchers,'  etc.,  into  captivity  in  a  most  heterogeneous  fashion  with 
many  a  groan  and  sigh,  and  it  was  little  surprise  to  discover  that  their 
pupils  a  few  days  later  were  echoing  the  sighs  and  groans,  while  the 
'  waders,'  '  swimmers'  and  fc  scratchers'  reappeared  in  motley  never 
known  to  nature. 

There  is  one  class  of  associations  which  is  of  still  greater  impor- 
tance for  the  fulness  and  happiness  of  life ;  it  is  the  subtile  connection 
between  visual  and  auditory  reactions  and  the  circulatory  centers  and 
their  reflexes.  What  the  association  with  the  motor  reflexes  does  for 
the  life  of  action  and  thought,  that  with  the  vaso-reflexes  does  for  feel- 
ing and  emotion.  A  certain  nuance  or  intensity  or  contrast  of  colors 
produces  in  a  sensitive  nature  a  distinct  circulatory  change.  To  a  much 
greater  extent  is  this  true  of  sounds.  It  is  certain  that  this  change  is 
not  a  secondary  result  of  an  emotion,  but  a  direct  physiological  result, 
though  a  very  important  part  of  the  substructure  of  feeling.  To  one 
who  frequently  yields  himself  to  the  touch  of  these  fairy  fingers  and 
permits  the  fibres  of  his  being  to  pulsate  to  the  preexisting  harmonies 
of  his  own  being  there  comes  a  ripeness  and  richness  of  experience 
casting  a  glamour  over  prosaic  drudgery  and  keeping  fresh  the  springs 
of  thought.  Nor  is  this  in  any  purely  sentimental  sense,  for  when  a 
familiar  psychosis  is  clothed  with  a  pleasing  or  effective  feeling  tone  it 
has  the  cogency  of  a  novel  sensation ;  it  has  the  freshness  which  makes  it 
a  power  in  reproduction  and  dominant  in  association.  Plato's  ideas  of 
the  influence  of  aesthetics  in  education  are  found  to  be  sustained  by  the 
best  results  of  modern  neurology.  No  man  can  afford,  even  from  the 
standpoint  of  intellectual  efficiency,  to  permit  the  premature  advent  of 
the  psychical  climacteric.  C.  L.  HERRICK. 

DENISON  UNIVERSITY. 


PSYCHOLOGICAL  LITERATURE. 

An  Outline  of  Psychology.  EDWARD  BRADFORD  TITCHENER.  New 
York,  The  Macmillan  Co.,  1896.  Pp.  xiv-|-352. 

The  prominence  given  to  quantitative  determinations,  the  division 
of  sensations  into  peripheral  and  central,  and  the  definition  of  con- 
sciousness as  process,  are  some  of  the  features  that  mark  the  present 
work  clearly  as  coming  from  a  disciple  of  Wundt.  Putting  the  ques- 
tion of  standpoint  aside,  Professor  Titchener's  book  is  a  most  valuable 
addition  to  the  literature  of  experimental  psychology.  Indeed,  it  is 
not  too  much  to  say  that  it  is  the  best  digest  of  that  subject  that  has  yet 
appeared  in  English.  The  style  is  clear  and  the  arrangement  of  the 
subject  logical.  The  author  starts  with  a  three-fold  problem :  to 
analyze  mental  experience  into  its  simplest  components ;  to  discover 
how  these  elements  combine,  and  to  bring  them  into  connection  with 
their  physiological  conditions.  The  third  problem  is  brought  up  here 
and  there  throughout  the  work,  while  the  other  two  form  the  basis  of 
the  main  discussion.  The  elementary  processes  of  sensation,  affection 
and  conation  are  first  treated,  in  order ;  then  the  complex  processes  of 
ideation,  feeling  and  voluntary  movement ;  finally  the  higher  syntheses 
— memory,  self-consciousness,  reasoning,  etc.,  on  the  intellectual  side, 
the  sentiments  on  the  affective,  and  the  reaction  problem  on  the  active. 
This  progressive  scheme  is  admirably  worked  out,  though  unfortu- 
nately the  casual  reader  is  not  likely  to  trace  it  through  the  latter  part. 

As  might  be  expected,  considerable  space  (three  chapters)  is  de- 
voted to  sensation,  and  the  treatment  of  this  element  is  most  thorough. 
The  author  emphasizes  quality  as  the  distinctive  mark  of  the  sensa- 
tion, rather  than  its  intensity,  extent  or  duration.  He  spends  some 
time  in  discussing  the  number  of  distinct  qualities  and  the  experimen- 
tal methods  of  testing  them.  It  is  a  great  desideratum  in  a  general 
survey  of  the  field  to  distinguish  clearly  the  various  minor  sensations 
— joint,  tendon,  static,  sexual,  alimentary,  pain,  etc. — and  in  this  Pro- 
fessor Titchener  has  succeeded*  very  well,  considering  the  limitations 
of  our  present  knowledge  and  the  confusion  that  has  prevailed  regard- 
ing some  of  them.  He  classes  physical  pain,  about  which  there  has  been 
so  much  discussion  of  late,  as  a  common  sensation,  due  to  the  exces- 
662 


PSYCHOLOGICAL  LITERATURE.  663 

sive  stimulation  of  any  sense-organ  or  the  injury  of  a  sensory  nerve. 
Weber's  Law  is  discussed  at  some  length ;  he  gives  it  a  purely  physio- 
logical interpretation,  and  believes  that  the  deviations  observed  near 
the  limits  of  sensibility  are  due  to  variations  in  the  excitability  of 
nervous  substance  with  different  degrees  of  stimulation  (p.  89).  The 
treatment  of  affection  is  interesting  because  of  the  prominence  which 
the  author  gives  to  it  as  an  element  of  consciousness  distinct  from  sensa- 
tion. He  ascribes  it  to  the  general  anabolic  and  catabolic  bodily  pro- 
cesses, rather  than  to  the  action  of  special  stimuli,  and  devotes  several 
pages  to  showing  the  difference  between  pleasantness  and  unpleasant- 
ness (as  he  terms  pleasure  and  pain),  and  pleasant  and  unpleasant 
sensations.  Professor  Titchener  comes  out  squarely  against  the  theory 
of  a  third  conscious  element  corresponding  to  activity.  The  two  elemen- 
tary '  active  experiences '  are  conation  and  attention  :  conation  is  *  the 
experience  of  effort  or  endeavor,'  but  its  conscious  elements  are  all 
either  sensation  or  affection ;  and  attention  reduces  to  the  same  terms. 
Yet  although  they  have  no  direct  conscious  equivalent,  the  physiolog- 
ical processes  which  make  up  what  the  author  terms  bodily  tendency 
are  important  factors  (he  thinks)  in  determining  the  direction  of  psy- 
chic life. 

Part  II.  deals  with  the  complex  processes  which  arise  from  the 
union  of  elements,  and  constitute  the  real  elements  of  adult  life.  The 
perception  and  idea  are  treated  as  practically  identical,  although  only 
peripheral  sensations  are  concerned  in  the  formation  of  the  former, 
while  '  central  sensations  '  always  enter  into  the  latter.  A  chapter  is  de- 
voted to  the  association  of  ideas — a  term,  by  the  way,  which  the  author 
regards  as  inaccurate  and  misleading,  and  only  adopts  on  historical 
grounds.  It  is  difficult  to  see  the  force  of  some  of  Professor  Titchener's 
distinctions  between  association  classes.  For  example,  after  distin- 
guishing simultaneous  and  successive  association,  he  divides  the  former 
again  into  associative  supplementing  and  'word-association.  Psy- 
chologically speaking,  these  two  are  quite  similar,  and  neither  of  them 
is  very  different  from  the  primary  idea,  since  the  name,  e.  g.,  often 
forms  as  essential  a  part  of  our  idea  of  an  object  as  its  odor,  or  some 
other  sense  element.  Here,  as  in  one  or  two  other  places,  the  author 
seems  to  leave  the  psychological  standpoint  for  the  metaphysical. 
Under  successive  association  he  re'cognizes  two  forms :  The  train  of 
ideas  and  association  after  disjunction.  The  latter  includes  judg- 
ment, which  is  disposed  of  in  a  single  paragraph  (p.  207).  The  term 
association  after  disjunction  itself  is  open  to  criticism.  It  is  defined 
as  'the  coming  together  again  of  ideas  which  were  originally  together, 


664  TITCHENER' S    OUTLINE   OF  PSYCHOLOGY. 

but  have  somehow  become  separated'  (p.  205).  But  the  judgment: 
'  This  house  is  a  hotel '  (to  use  the  illustration  given,  p.  207) ,  may 
consist  in  adding  to  a  certain  house-idea  elements  which  have  never 
been  associated  with  this  particular  complex  before  ;  and  if  the  author 
simply  means  that  some  elements  in  the  complex  have  been  previously 
associated  with  the  (hotel)  idea,  this  is  equally  true  of  all  kinds  of 
association, — according  to  his  own  formula :  ab—bc, — and  cannot  be 
the  mark  of  any  particular  class. 

Passing  to  the  affective  side,  Professor  Titchener  makes  a  neat  dis- 
tinction between  affection  as  an  element  and  feeling  as  the  complex 
which  we  experience — a  distinction  corresponding  to  that  between  sen- 
sation and  idea.  Emotion  is  a  still  higher  complex  and  '  stands  upon  the 
same  level  of  mental  development  as  the  simultaneous  association  of 
ideas.'  His  classification  of  the  emotions  as  present  and  future  on 
the  one  hand,  and  subjective  and  objective  on  the  other,  will  probably 
meet  with  criticism  from  several  quarters,  the  most  obvious  objection 
being  the  omission  of  the  past.  A  chapter  on  voluntary  movement 
follows,  and  shows  the  change  which  has  come  over  the  treatment  of 
this  phenomenon  in  the  past  five  years.  The  innervation-sense  theory 
is  cast  aside.  Action  is  arranged  in  an  ascending  series  of  classes, 
from  impulse  to  reflex  and  instinct,  thence  to  the  more  complex  forms 
of  selective,  volitional,  and  finally  automatic  action. 

Part  III.  treats  of  still  more  complex  processes.  It  is  not  altogether 
clear  why  memory  should  be  placed  here,  with  self-consciousness  and 
reasoning,  rather  than  with  ideas.  On  the  affective  side,  the  analysis 
and  classification  of  the  intellectual  and  aesthetic  sentiments  is  espec- 
ially able.  The  chapter  on  synthesis  of  action  furnishes  a  good 
summary  of  the  reaction-time  experiments;  unfortunately  Professor 
Titchener  follows  the  Leipzig  view  implicitly,  and  ignores  the  type 
theory  of  reaction  which  has  been  established  independently  by  Bald- 
win, Flournoy  and  Angell. 

The  concluding  chapter  is  on  the  nature  of  mind.  The  author  is 
content  to  assume  the  principle  of  psycho-physical  parallelism  and 
leaves  the  ultimate  question  to  metaphysics.  In  the  final  section  he 
quotes  Lotze,  who  speaks,  of  course,  from  the  metaphysical  standpoint. 
This  quotation  might  better,  perhaps,  have  been  omitted,  as  it  is  rather 
beyond  the  ordinary  reader,  and  may  lead  him  to  believe  that  the  au- 
thor is  endeavoring  to  dodge  the  issue,  while  the  rest  of  the  chapter  is 
an  earnest  attempt  to  show  that  the  question  really  does  not  belong  to 
psychology  to  settle. 

In  estimating  the  value  of  Professor  Titchener's  work,  it  must  be 


PSYCHOLOGICAL  LITERATURE.  665 

borne  in  mind  that  it  is  expressly  designed  to  be  a  re'sume'  of  experi- 
mental psychology  (see  Preface  and  p.  19).  Unless  this  is  clearly 
understood,  we  may  be  apt  to  protest  against  the  summary  way  in 
which  certain  mental  processes  are  dismissed.  Judgment,  e.  g.^  is  a 
highly  developed  and  specialized  process,  and  as  such  deserves,  like 
speech,  some  extended  notice  in  a  work  on  general  psychology ;  in 
experimental  work  it  is  scarcely  distinguishable  from  several  other 
forms  of  association,  and  may  properly  be  treated  under  the  same  head- 
ing as  they.  It  would  have  been  better  if  Professor  Titchener  had 
qualified  his  title  by  inserting  the  word  experimental,  and  avoided 
the  chance  of  misconception. 

An  outline  work  cannot,  of  course,  be  expected  to  take  up  every 
disputed  point;  but  in  order  to  be  reasonably  thorough  it  should  cer- 
tainly mention  the  more  important  differences  of  opinion.  Professor 
Titchener's  book  fails  in  this  respect.  The  author  says  nothing  about 
alternative  theories  of  physical  pain  (p.  65),  or  emotional  expression 
(p.  227)  ;  in  discussing  conation  he  does  not  mention  the  4  innervation- 
feelings,'  so  that  when  the  term  comes  up  later,  in  another  connection 
(p.  237),  it  is  quite  without  explanation.  The  names  of  those  asso- 
ciated with  prominent  theories  are  withheld  in  many  cases.  Thus  the 
three-color  theory  of  color  perception  is  adopted  (p.  49)  without  any 
reference  to  the  names  of  Young  or  Helmholtz,  and  there  is  no  men- 
tion of  Hering's  theory  or  the  retinal  vibration  theory  of  Charpentier. 
The  reader  of  a  scientific  text-book  has  a  right  to  know  the  prevailing 
views  on  important  points,  whether  they  agree  with  the  author's  or 
not ;  if  there  is  no  room  for  discussion,  the  principal  literature  on  the 
subject  should  be  cited,  at  least.  Moreover,  it  is  not  too  much  to  ask 
that  the  sources  be  cited  for  the  experimental  results  that  are  given. 
The  description  of  experiments  is  necessarily  very  condensed  in  the 
present  work,  and  references  to  the  originals  might  prevent  misunder- 
standing in  many  cases ;  or  readers  might  easily  wish  to  pursue  the 
matter  further, — e.  g.,  to  inquire  about  the  various  complications  of 
conditions  in  reaction-time  experiments,  to  which  Professor  Titchener 
refers  (p.  327).  Careful  search  fails  to  reveal  a  single  reference  to 
modern  psychological  literature  in  the  entire  book.  This  is  certainly 
a  most  singular  omission  and  is  much  to  be  regretted.  The  book  is, 
in  a  word,  too  self-complete.  It  lacks  thoroughness,  and  while  it  is 
extremely  suggestive,  it  takes  no  pains  to  direct  into  proper  channels 
the  desire  for  further  reading  which  it  will  undoubtedly  provoke. 
The  failure  in  this  respect  is  apparently  not  due  to  any  real  dogmatism 
on  the  author's  part,  for  the  general  treatment  is  broad,  and  there  is 


666  REHMKE1  S  PSYCHOLOGIE. 

no  attempt  to  slur  an  issue.  It  seems  to  spring,  rather,  from  too  great 
a  desire  for  condensation,  or  an  under-estimation  of  the  reader's 
capacity. 

In  the  way  of  minor  criticism  may  be  mentioned  a  slight  tendency 
to  alter  accepted  terminology,  which  is  scarcely  in  place  in  a  book  of 
this  character:  cognition  is  made  a  special  kind  of  recognition  (p. 
266)  ;  the  terms  pleasantness  and  unpleasantness  are  used  instead  of 
pleasure  and  pain,  etc.  However,  this  is  not  so  marked  as  in  the 
translation  of  Kiilpe's  work.  The  author  occasionally  ventures  upon 
the  '  etymological  argument;'  e. g.,  in  speaking  of  the  principal  colors 
(p.  49),  and  in  discussing  the  origin  of  association,  etc.  (p.  301). 
This  kind  of  argument  is  best  left  to  the  old-school  psychologists. 

In  spite  of  its  omissions  (and  minor  commissions),  Professor 
Titchener's  work  is  an  able  presentation  of  psychology  viewed  from 
the  experimental  standpoint.  The  analysis  is  sharp  and  thorough,  and 
in  this  respect  the  book  will  be  of  value  to  every  '  school.'  As  a  text- 
book it  has  a  wide  field  before  it,  and  we  may  hope,  besides,  that  it 
will  find  its  way  into  the  hands  of  the  *  laity,'  and  help  to  dispel  some 
of  the  grotesque  notions  that  are  prevalent  about  experimental  psy- 
chology. H.  C.  WARREN. 

PRINCETON  UNIVERSITY. 

Lehrbuch  der  allgemeinen  Psychologic.  Dr.  Johannes  Rehmke. 
Hamburg  and  Leipzig.  1894. 

The  work  before  us  represents  a  field  of  labor  of  which  every 
psychologist  must  recognize  the  importance.  In  proportion  as  a 
science  develops,  it  becomes  more  and  more  reflective,  and  the  need 
of  questioning  and  of  restating  its  fundamental  assumptions  becomes 
more  and  more  keenly  felt.  The  appreciation  of  this  need  has  evi- 
dently prompted  our  author  to  his  present  task,  and  the  thoughtful, 
painstaking  tone  of  his  effort  gives  it  a  claim  to  respectful  attention. 

In  a  preface  devoted  to  a  discussion  of  the  nature  ( i )  of  science  in 
general  and  (2)  of  special  science  (Fachwissenschaft)  he  sets  forth 
the  aim  of  the  former  to  be  the  attainment  of  unquestionable  clearness 
(p.  i).  This  ideal  of  science  is  only  to  be  reached  through  a  con- 
tinual questioning  of  given  experience.  But  the  answers  to  the  ques- 
tions that  arise  within  the  science  militant  are  only  to  be  obtained  by 
an  appeal  to  the  object  (p.  4).  We  find  here  the  old  assumption  that 
the  subjective  (pp  i,  2)  clearness  and  objective  truth  must  ultimately 
correspond.  The  discussions  of  the  past,  of  Descartes,  Leibnitz  and 
Spinoza  have  not  demonstrated  the  necessity  of  such  an  assumption, 
and  Rehmke  does  not  appear  to  be  conscious  of  a  problem. 


PSYCHOLOGICAL  LITERATURE.  66f 

Science  then  asks  questions  and  appeals  to  an  object  for  answers. 
This  object  Rehmke  defines  in  his  somewhat  peculiar  terminology  as  a 
'concrete,'/.  *?.,  an  element  of  experience  which  is  a  unit  including  chang- 
ing phases.  A  special  science  has  for  its  problem  the  laws  of  change 
of  its  'concrete'  object  (p.  5).  The  object  of  psychology  is  the 
mind  (Seele)  (p.  10).  In  the  work  following  the  three  parts  are 
devoted  respectively  to  (i)  the  essence  of  mind,  (2)  the  momentary 
state  (Seelenaugenblick) ,  (3)  the  mental  life  (Seelenleben).  The 
first  part  appears  as  a  philosophical  preparation ;  the  second  and  third 
parts  together  fulfill  the  foregoing  definition  of  a  special  science. 

The  philosophical  standpoint  worked  out  in  the  first  part,  stripped 
of  much  that  is  individual  in  Rehmke's  way  of  expressing  it,  may  be 
simply  stated  as  follows :  The  world  of  experience  presents  two  con- 
crete forms  of  being — the  material  thing,  and  the  self  or  mind  (p.  40 
seq.).  These  two  concrete  individuals,  although  completely  different 
from  each  other,  do  not  belong  to  two  worlds  that  are  separable  from 
each  other.  Separateness  (Geschiedenheit — by  which  Rehmke  means 
numerical  distinctness)  (p.  72)  of  concrete  individuals  implies  that  the 
difference  (Verschiedenheit)  between  them  is  not  complete.  Thus 
physical  objects  are  separate  because  they  have  a  common  space 
quality  of  which  they  can  represent  different  particularizations.  But 
between  physical  thing  and  mind  there  can  be  no  generic  connection ; 
they  are  '  schlechthin  verschieden.'  Hence  they  cannot  be  separable. 
On  the  contrary,  in  any  momentary  consciousness  they  are  absolutely 
identical.  "  The  possibility  of  a  concrete  consciousness  existing  at  all 
depends  precisely  upon  the  condition  that  one  and  the  same  element 
of  experience  can  be  at  the  same  time  physical  and  mental"  (p.  70). 

The  discovery  of  the  paradox  that  the  physical  and  the  mental  are 
at  once  totally  different  and  perfectly  identical,  so  far  from  discoura- 
ging Rehmke,  furnishes  him  with  a  ground  for  congratulation.  Thus 
we  find,  as  the  expression  of  his  final  position,  the  following:  "  The 
difference  between  concrete  mind  and  physical  thing  *  *  *  is  so  com- 
plete that  the  physical  can  be  at  the  same  time  the  mental;  the  other- 
ness of  thing  and  mind  is  so  fundamental  that,  just  for  that  reason, 
that  which  belongs  to  the  concrete  thing  can  belong  at  the  same  time 
to  consciousness"  (p.  73).  The  swing  of  the  passage  cited  would 
seem  to  indicate  that  Rehmke  enjoyed  this  paradox,  and  as  accom- 
panying the  statement  of  a  final  position  his  complaisance  suggests  a 
little  the  picture  of  Nero  fiddling  while  Rome  burns.  And  yet  the 
present  reviewer  does  not  wish  in  the  least  to  deny  the  fundamental 
truth  contained  in  the  foregoing  paradox  considered  as  a  stage  in 


668  REHMKE'S  PSYCHOLOGIE. 

the  development  of  an  ultimately  consistent  position.  The  dialectic 
through  which  Rehmke  arrives  at  this  position,  and  convicts  others  of 
errors  in  failing  to  recognize  one  or  the  other  element  of  the  paradox, 
is  quite  skilful  and  on  the  whole  appears  sound.  Still,  as  a  final  po- 
sition, few,  I  suppose  would  remain  satisfied  with  Rehmke's  state- 
ment, and,  indeed,  I  venture  to  think  that  it  rests  upon  a  mis- 
apprehension easily  discoverable,  to  wit:  a  failure  to  distinguish 
between  what  is  immediately  given  in  a  moment  of  consciousness, 
and  the  context  to  which  a  larger  '  reflective '  experience  finds  it 
to  belong.  That  dangerous  abstraction,  the  immediacy  of  the  moment, 
will  contain,  if  the  abstraction  be  complete,  no  distinction  between 
physical  thing  and  mind.  Reflection  may,  to  use  another  dangerous 
phrase,  consider  this  immediate  in  different  relations,  one  of  which 
makes  it  a  part  of  the  history  of  a  concrete  thing,  the  other  a  part  of 
the  history  of  a  concrete  mind.  In  proportion  as  we  perfect  the  ab- 
straction (really  highly  reflective)  of  the  momentarily  immediate  we 
do  not  obtain  two  totally  different  things  that  are  identical  (a  meaning- 
less paradox) ,  but  we  lack  the  material  out  of  which  to  construe  two 
things  at  all. 

We  must  pass  over  two  exceedingly  interesting  discussions  on  the 
origin  of  the  mind  and  on  the  interaction  of  mind  and  body,  to  con- 
sider for  a  moment  the  classification  of  mental  states  to  which 
Rehmke's  general  position  leads  him.  He  regards  mental  life  as  a 
whole  as  made  up  of  a  series  of  momentary  mental  states  (Seelenau- 
genblicken)  following  a  temporal  order ;  but  not  necessarily  continu- 
ous. The  momentary  state  is  made  up  of  subject-content  (Subject- 
moment)  and  mental  attribute  (Bewusstseinsbestimmtheit).  There 
are  three  such  attributes :  the  object-consciousness,  state-consciousness 
and  causal-consciousness  (Gegenstandliches-,  Zustandliches-,  Ur- 
sachliches-Bewusstsein) .  These  elements  are  immediately  given  in 
consciousness,  although  an  extended  experience  is  necessary  before  the 
attributes  can  be  distinguished  in  thought  (gedacht,  p.  489).  The 
above  classification  is  selected  in  place  of  the  old  division  of  mental 
states  into  4  thinking,  feeling  and  willing,'  on  the  ground  that  these 
latter  terms  do  not  imply  immediately  given  mental  characteristics,  but 
process  in  time  and  are  definable  by  relations  to  the  external  world  (pp. 
145,  349).  On  this  ground  also  Rehmke  rejects  the  dual  division  of 
Brentano  and  Miinsterberg.  The  i  relation  of  consciousness  to  an 
object'  is  not  the  basis  of  classification  that  pure  psychology  can  adopt; 
it  belongs  to  physiology,  to  logic,  or  to  ethics  (p.  349). 

It  is  to  be  presumed  then  that  subject,  object,  state  and  causal  con- 


PSYCHOLOGICAL  LITERATURE.  669 

sciousness  are  not  definable,  and  on  the  whole  Rehmke  does  not  at- 
tempt to  define  them.  Yet,  the  object-consciousness  is  defined  as  con- 
sciousness of  an  'other'  (p.  144).  'Other'  namely  than  the  mental 
state  of  the  moment,  a  relation  surely  that  cannot  be  immediately  given 
in  the  momentary-consciousness.  Still  more  striking  is  Rehmke's fur- 
ther subdivision  of  object-consciousness,  presumably  from  the  same 
standpoint  of  '  pure-psychology,' into  perception  (Wahrnehmung)  and 
representation  (Vorstellung) .  One  is  surprised  to  find  that  the  dis- 
tinction rests  on  the  ground  that  the  representation  is  conditioned  only 
by  a  cerebral  state,  the  perception  by  a  peripheral  nerve  excitation  (p. 
158).  But  suppose  Rehmke  were  perfectly  consistent,  it  is  still  true 
that  either  this  subject-consciousness  and  these  mental  attributes  are 
definable  or  are  they  not.  If  they  are  to  be  defined  it  might  well 
'  gravel  a  philosopher '  to  discover  how  this  might  be  done  without 
involving  relations  that  go  beyond  the  moment  and  include  the  *  ex- 
ternal world,'  as  the  psychologist  ordinarily  uses  the  term.  If  they 
are  not  definable  why  call  them  by  different  names?  for  they  have 
become  wholly  inarticulate.  It  is  impossible  to  harmonize  Rehmke's 
later  and  more  able  treatment  of  '  Denken '  (§44)  with  what  he  here 
takes  to  be  the  '  pure  psychology '  standpoint. 

In  his  general  style  Rehmke  shows  himself  to  be  possessed  of  that 
kind  of  courage  (in  which  the  Germans  are  frequently  not  lacking) 
which  does  not  fear  to  be  dry.  Add  to  this  that  he  is  technical  and 
diffuse,  and  his  book  will  be  seen  to  offer  little  charm  to  the  lover  of 
beautiful  style.  But  these  very  faults  speak  in  his  favor  among  those 
who  prefer  consistency  and  clearness  to  beauty  of  form.  The  use  of 
technical  terms  lends  the  author  far-reaching  categories  of  criticism 
and  of  construction.  The  diffuseness  reveals  a  conscientious  struggle 
to  be  clear.  The  utility  of  these  two  faults  goes  far  to  excuse  their 
homeliness.  And  then — if  one  is  to  traverse  a  desert,  why  not  ride  a 
camel  ?  EDGAR  A.  SINGER,  JR. 

UNIVERSITY  OF  PENNSYLVANIA. 

Psychology  and  Psychic    Culture.     BY  REUBEN  POST  HALLECK. 

Instruction  in  Psychology,  Louisville  Male  High  School.     New 

York,  American  Book  Co.,  1896.  Pp.  366. 

In  psychology,  as  in  the  early  development  of  other  sciences,  books 
were  at  first  written  for  other  scientists  rather  than  for  students,  but 
now  the  time  has  come  when  we  may  expect  psychology,  which  is  at 
present  studied  in  so  many  different  grades  of  educational  institutions, 
to  be  presented  in  the  form  known  in  other  sciences  as  « science-made- 


670  PSYCHOLOGY  AND  PSYCHIC   CULTURE. 

easy'  text-books,  a  term  descriptive  of  unwise  attempts  to  make  sub- 
jects artificially  easy.  The  author  of  this  book  has  certainly  thought 
of  students  in  preparing  his  work  and  has  avoided  technicalities  in- 
teresting only  to  specialists,  and  he  has  not  given  what  to  the  student 
are  only  meaningless  classifications  and  empty  generalities,  as  have  so 
many  writers  of  psychological  texts,  but  the  book  is  so  full,  not  only 
of  illustrations  drawn  from  every  day  life  and  from  literature,  but  of 
analogies  and  comparisons,  that  it  is  certainly  open  to  the  charge  of 
belonging  to  the  type  of  text-book  named  above.  The  author  has 
read  considerably  in  recent  psychology  and  usually  states  the  results  of 
research  with  approximate  correctness,  but  he  knows  nothing  of  true 
scientific  method,  and  his  treatment  of  Weber's  law  displays  shallow- 
ness  and  misconceptions  that  would  be  a  disgrace  to  our  ordinary  high 
school  student,  hence  none  of  his  statements  can  be  relied  upon  by 
readers  as  correct  unless  verified  by  reference  to  standard  works. 

The  chief  defect  of  the  work  is  the  prominence  given  to  the  in- 
teresting, in  the  treatment  of  every  topic,  both  in  the  space  devoted  to 
the  different  parts  of  the  topic  and  in  the  character  of  the  illustrations 
used.  For  example  :  the  chapter  upon  consciousness  and  attention  is  a 
very  interesting  introduction  to  the  subject,  but  the  important  part  of 
the  discussion  given  under  the  head  of  4  Laws  of  Attention '  occupies 
only  about  a  half  page,  which  is  only  half  the  space  given  in  another 
chapter  to  the  comparison  of  reflex-action  to  a  barrel  hoop,  and  in  the 
chapter  treating  of  presentation.  Although  many  of  the  important 
truths  of  modern  psychological  research  are  incorporated  into  the  dis- 
cussion, yet  there  is  nothing  to  help  the  student  to  distinguish  between 
the  absurd  exaggerations  of  a  French  rhetorician  to  the  effect  that  it 
is  possible  for  epicures  to  distinguish  by  taste  '  which  leg  a  partridge 
has  been  accustomed  to  sleep  on,'  or  to  tell  *  under  what  latitude  a 
wine  was  produced  as  accurately  as  an  astronomer  can  predict  an 
eclipse,'  and  the  generalizations  made  by  a  scientist  after  thousands 
of  careful  experiments.  It  is  altogether  probable  that  students  in 
this  and  other  cases  will  note  and  remember  the  striking  statements 
and  illustrations  rather  than  the  important  facts  stated  and  truths 
illustrated,  unless  the  teacher  using  the  book  takes  special  pains  to 
emphasize  what  the  author  has  drawn  attention  from  by  his  sen- 
sational treatment  of  less  important  parts. 

The  remarks  thus  far  made  apply  more  particularly  to  the  psycho- 
logical portion  of  the  work.  In  the  discussions  of  '  psychic  culture  ' 
that  follow  each  general  topic  the  author  gives  some  good  practical 
suggestions,  but  the  treatment  is  in  general  shallow,  showing  a  lack  of 


PSYCHOLOGICAL  LITERATURE.  671 

knowledge  of  fundamental  principles  of  the  science  or  philosophy  of 
education.  This  is  indicated  by  his  somewhat  rambling  treatment  and 
by  the  apparent  basing  of  his  directions  upon  such  absurdities  as  that 
practice  in  perceiving  one  set  of  qualities  or  objects  will  educate  one  in 
the  perception  of  all  kinds  of  objects  and  qualities,  and  that  whatever 
association  will  enable  a  person  to  remember  particular  facts  will  be 
good  for  his  memory,  without  reference  to  the  injurious  or  helpful 
effects  upon  the  thinking  powers  resulting  from  the  habits  of  associa- 
tion that  are  thus  formed. 

There  can  be  no  doubt  but  that  the  author  has  consistently  carried 
out  the  views  expressed  in  the  preface.  "  Especial  effort  has  been 
made  to  enliven  the  hard  dry  facts  of  the  science  by  employing  illustra- 
tions and  anecdotes  to  elucidate  them.  No  one  knows  better  than  the 
psychologist  that  it  is  of  little  use  to  present  the  best  of  subjects  in  an 
unattractive  way,  because  facts  devoid  of  interesting  features  will  not 
secure  attention."  If  the  author  were  more  of  a  student  of  education 
he  would  also  know  that  the  only  interest  worth  cultivating  is  a  di- 
rect interest  in  the  subject  itself.  It  is  very  doubtful  whether  the 
method  of  treatment  adopted  in  this  work  will  in  a  very  large  propor- 
tion of  instances  lead  to  such  a  result,  and  it  is  certain  that  no  student 
of  this  book  will  get  any  practice  in  earnest  careful  study,  unless  he 
gets  it  from  study  outside  of  the  text.  Hence,  although  the  book  has 
many  merits,  especially  for  general  readers,  it  cannot  be  recom- 
mended as  a  text  by  those  who  believe  in  making  students  of  their 
pupils. 

E.    A.    KlRKPATRICK. 

WINONA,  MINN. 

New   Essays    Concerning    Human     Understanding.      LEIBNITZ. 

Translated  by  ALFRED  G.  LANGLEY.     The  Macmillan  Co.     Pp. 

xix-f86i. 

The  translator  could  hardly  have  chosen  a  better  work  to  put  into 
the  service  of  English  students  in  the  history  of  philosophy.  Interest 
still  centers  in  the  questions  about  human  knowledge,  scarcely  less  so 
than  in  the  age  of  Locke  and  Kant ;  and  our  age  has  not  outgrown  the 
need  of  a  rediscussion  of  those  problems  that  engaged  the  great  minds 
of  that  period.  To  have,  then,  in  his  own  language,  the  New  Essays 
of  Leibnitz  is  for  the  English  student  an  almost  inestimable  service. 
For  one  can  hardly  appreciate  the  significance  of  Locke's  philosophy, 
its  strength  or  its  weakness,  who  does  not  read  the  Essay  Concerning 
Human  Understanding  in  conjunction  with  these  critical  essays  of 
Locke's  great  contemporary. 


672     ESSA  YS   CONCERNING  HUMAN  UNDERSTANDING. 

Familiar  as  I  had  thought  myself  to  be  with  Locke's  Essay,  my 
reading  of  Leibnitz  not  only  led  me  to  a  profounder  apprehension  of 
the  problems  raised  by  Locke,  but  it  opened  also  to  my  mind  new 
aspects  of  those  questions  with  which  these  men  were  engaged.  The 
Essay  of  Locke  becomes  a  new  book  when  read  along  with  the  New 
Essays  of  Leibnitz. 

Of  the  character  of  this  book  as  a  mere  translation  I  am  not  quali- 
fied to  give  a  critical  judgment;  the  translation  has  every  appearance 
of  being  carefully  and  conscientiously  done ;  the  English  is  certainly 
good,  as  good  as  it  could  be  according  to  the  design  of  the  translator, 
which  was  '  to  represent  as  faithfully  and  as  accurately  as  possible,  and 
in  as  good  English  as  its  form  and  expression  admitted,  Leibnitz's 
exact  thought.' 

Professor  Langley  has,  however,  done  more  than  to  give  us  a  very 
good  translation  of  an  important  part  of  the  philosophy  of  Leibnitz  ; 
he  has  done  a  piece  of  fine,  scholarly  and  most  valuable  editorial  work  ; 
he  has  enriched  his  volume  with  notes  and  annotations  which,  by 
their  comprehensive  character  and  their  judicious  selection,  should  be 
of  the  greatest  help  to  the  student ;  he  has  seemingly  spared  no  effort 
in  putting  this  work  of  Leibnitz  into  its  historical  setting;  passing 
over  no  name  or  circumstance  without  some  note  adapted  to  make 
his  author's  thought  more  intelligible.  To  be  commended  also  is  the 
translator's  incorporation  of  the  selections  which  form  the  appendix  of 
this  volume.  These  pieces  serve  admirably  to  acquaint  the  student 
with  the  position  which  Leibnitz  occupies  in  the  historic  develop- 
ment of  philosophy;  they  constitute  a  good  orientation  in  the  philos- 
ophy of  Leibnitz. 

As  to  contents  and  scope,  the  book  contains  the  following :  Ger- 
hardt's  excellent  introduction  to  his  Edition  of  Leibnitz's  New  Essays ; 
this  is  followed  by  Leibnitz's  earliest  published  thoughts  upon  Locke's 
Essay  in  1696;  then  follow  two  fragments  published  by  Gerhardt  for 
the  first  time ;  a  sketch  of  Locke's  Essay,  published  in  the  Monatliche 
Anzug  in  1700,  with  a  supplement  which  appeared  a  year  later.  Then 
follow  the  New  Essays  entire,  which  occupy  the  body  of  the  volume. 
The  appendix  of  about  ninety  pages  contains  chiefly  essays  which 
exhibit  Leibnitz  relation  to  the  Philosophy  of  Aristotle  and  to  the 
Cartesian  Philosophy. 

The  long  list  of  additions  and  corrections,  fifty  pages  in  all,  is  in- 
serted in  this  place,  owing  to  the  circumstance  that  most  of  the  im- 
portant matter  contained  in  them  was  not  available  until  that  part  of 
the  translation  of  which  this  matter  relates  was  already  in  type. 


PSYCHOLOGICAL  LITERATURE.  673 

An  exhaustive  and  well  constructed  index  of  nearly  one  hundred 
pages  completes  this  rather  massive  book,  but  in  which  there  is  really 
110  superfluous  matter,  when  the  translator's  design  and  the  excellence 
of  his  work  are  taken  into  consideration.  JOHN  E.  RUSSELL. 

WILLIAMS  COLLEGE. 

La  psychologic   des  sentiments.     TH.    RIBOT.     Pp.    444.      Paris, 

Alcan.     1896. 

This  book  is  without  doubt  the  most  important  of  Ribot's  works. 
He  has  summarized  in  it  his  lectures  at  the  College  de  France,  and  it 
is  surprising  to  find  what  a  large  amount  of  material  he  has  been  able 
to  place  in  this  volume  extending  to  not  more  than  450  pages.  The 
work  is  divided  into  two  parts  of  equal  importance,  but  of  very  differ- 
ent character.  The  first  part  is  devoted  to  the  simple  elements  of 
emotional  life,  physical  pleasures  and  pain,  moral  pleasure  and  pain, 
the  inner  conditions  of  emotion,  memory  for  emotions,  and  the  re- 
lation of  the  association  of  ideas  to  emotion.  Throughout  this  part 
the  author  most  frequently  makes  use  of  physiological  observations 
and  experiments,  drawing  especially  from  the  psychological  labora- 
tory. In  the  second  part  he  reviews  the  special  emotions — fear,  anger, 
affection,  love,  the  social,  moral,  religious,  aesthetic  and  other  feel- 
ings, and  here  he  has  made  use  of  anthropology,  the  history  of  cus- 
toms, of  the  arts,  of  religions  and  of  the  sciences.  He  himself  has 
well  described  this  change  of  method.  He  says:  "  Some  have  an 
unshaken  faith  in  laboratory  experiments,  but  the  evolution  of  the 
feelings  in  time  and  space,  through  the  centuries  and  among  the  races, 
is  a  laboratory  whose  operations  have  extended  through  thousands  of 
years  and  on  thousands  of  men,  and  of  which  the  historical  value  is 
very  great.  It  would  be  a  serious  loss  to  psychology  to  neglect  these 
records.  *  *  *  Though  mental  life  has  its  roots  in  biology  it  only 
develops  in  society."  It  seems  to  me  that  this  second  part  is  even 
more  interesting  and  original  than  the  first.  We  find  treated  in  it,  in 
a  manner  to  which  psychologists  are  not  accustomed,  questions  of 
great  importance,  such  as  that  of  the  religious  feelings.  The  chapters 
on  the  instinct  of  cruelty  and  on  the  moral  feelings  are  models  of 
clearness,  conciseness  and  good  sense.  On  the  other  hand,  the  first 
part  suffers  somewhat  from  the  fact  that  systematic  psychological  in- 
vestigation has  not  yet  covered  the  field  of  the  emotions.  The  ac- 
count, for  example,  of  the  physiological  effects  of  joy  and  sorrow,  is 
injured  by  the  confusion  of  the  author,  which  indeed  he  shares  with 
all  his  predecessors,  between  true  and  false  vaso-constriction.  I  be- 


674  LES   SENTIMENTS. 


lieve  that  this  entire  subject  will  soon  be  remodeled,  thanks  to  the 
great  extension  in  the  use  of  the  plethysmograph. 

Let  us  now  review  briefly  the  author's  chief  theses.  He  has  care- 
fully described  the  effects  of  pain  on  the  organism,  holding  that  pain 
is  a  quality  of  sensation  and  not  a  sensation.  He  argues  forcibly  that 
pain  does  not  consist  in  a  state  of  consciousness  ;  all  the  effects  of 
pain  may  be  observed  in  cases  where  consciousness  is  absent.  There 
is  not  only  an  analogy  between  physical  and  moral  pain;  they  are 
identical  and  the  innumerable  modes  under  which  physical  and 
mental  pain  are  presented  depend  on  the  sensory  or  intellectual  ele- 
ments which  accompany  it.  Psychological  states  include  simul- 
taneously elements  of  pleasure  and  of  pain,  and  according  to  circum- 
stances the  one  predominates  over  and  inhibits  the  other.  The  prod- 
uct in  consciousness  is  the  result  of  the  difference.  Pleasure  is  not, 
as  is  often  maintained,  the  opposite  of  pain. 

In  the  following  chapters,  M.  Ribot  studies  the  pathology  of 
pleasure  and  pain,  including  the  enigmatical  case  of  pleasure  taken 
in  suffering.  A  special  discussion  is  given  to  neutral  states,  states  of 
complete  indifference,  which  are  admitted  by  Wundt,  and  given  an 
intermediate  place  between  pleasure  and  pain,  as  transition  states. 
Ribot,  without  expressly  committing  himself  to  one  point  of  view  or 
the  other,  holds  that  individual  differences  should  be  specially  studied. 
Neutral  states  would  seldom  occur  in  nervous  people  who  are  in  a 
state  of  perpetual  excitement,  they  would  doubtless  occur  much  more 
frequently  in  the  case  of  apathetic  characters  of  limited  intelligence. 
In  concluding  this  general  discussion  of  pleasure  and  pain  Ribot 
takes  up  the  two  questions  of  the  how  and  the  'why.  As  regards  the 
former  he  maintains  the  general  formula  that  the  cause  of  pleasure  is 
an  increase  of  activity,  and  of  pain  a  decrease  of  activity,  but  he  also 
points  out  that  this  formula  is  very  vague,  and  that  the  exact  details 
of  Meynert  are  highly  hypothetical.  In  discussing  the  second  ques- 
tion Ribot  is  equally  cautious.  Why  is  there  a  relation  between 
pleasure  and  utility  and  between  pain  and  what  is  injurious  ?  The 
theory  of  evolution  provides  without  doubt  the  best  answer  calling  to 
its  aid  the  theory  of  the  survival  of  the  fittest,  but  there  are  many 
exceptions  to  the  rule  which  are  difficult  to  explain.  The  relation  be- 
tween pleasure  and  utility  and  between  pain  and  the  harmful  is  a  for- 
mula which  owes  its  origin  to  philosophers.  That  is  to  those  who 
always  and  before  all  else  seek  for  unity. 

After  pleasure  and  pain  the  emotions  are  taken  up,  the  general 
characteristics  of  which  are  depicted  with  care.  Ribot  accepts  the 


PSYCHOLOGICAL   LITERATURE.  675 

James-Lange  theory,  but  in  developing  it,  interprets  it  in  a  particular 
way.  "  James  and  Lange,"  he  says,  "  adopt  a  dualistic  point  of 
view,  like  that  of  the  theory  they  seek  to  refute,  the  only  difference 
being  in  the  inversion  of  cause  and  effect.  In  the  one  the  emotion  is  the 
cause  of  which  the  physical  manifestations  are  the  effect,  in  the  other 
the  physical  manifestations  are  the  cause  of  which  the  emotions  are 
the  effect.  In  my  opinion  it  would  be  a  great  gain  to  eliminate  from 
the  question  all  idea  of  cause  and  effect,  all  reference  to  causality,  and 
to  substitute  for  the  dualistic  point  of  view  a  unitary  or  monistic  con- 
ception *  *  *  *  No  state  of  consciousness  should  be  dissociated  from 
its  physical  conditions ;  they  form  a  natural  whole  which  should  be 
studied  as  such.  Each  kind  of  emotion  should  be  considered  from  this 
point  of  view ;  what  movements  of  the  body,  vaso-motor  disturbances, 
respiration,  the  phenomena  of  secretion,  express  objectively,  the  correl- 
ative states  of  the  mind  express  subjectively.  It  is  a  single  event  trans- 
lated into  two  languages."  This  is  not  the  place  to  discuss  this  opinion, 
suffice  it  to  say  that  it  completely  changes  the  conditions  of  the  problem. 

Under  the  name  '  inner  conditions  '  of  emotion  the  author  studies 
their  physiological  processes  and  under  the  name  '  exterior  conditions,' 
their  signs  and  expressions.  Darwin's  theory  is  discussed  but  prefer- 
ence is  given  to  that  of  Wundt.  A  very  interesting  chapter  is  devoted 
to  the  classification  of  the  emotions.  Ribot  has  selected  a  score  of 
classifications  made  during  a  period  of  fifty  years  by  well  known  au- 
thors, and  divides  these  into  three  groups  according  to  their  character. 
The  first  group  is  a  classification  of  the  emotions  as  pleasurable  and 
painful  only ;  under  the  second  group  they  are  classed  according  to 
their  empirical  characters  or  according  to  their  origin.  The  third 
group  is  an  intellectual  classification.  Purely  intellectual  states  are 
classed,  and  thus  the  emotional  states  that  accompany  them.  Ribot  re- 
jects all  the  classifications  because  they  are  purely  hypothetical  and  be- 
cause the  complex  emotions  cannot  be  arrranged  in  a  linear  series. 
Two  chapters  conclude  this  first  part ;  the  one  on  memory  and  the  emo- 
tions had  previously  been  published  in  the  Revue  Philosophique ;  the 
other  is  on  the  role  played  by  the  association  of  ideas  in  the  develop- 
ment of  the  emotions  and  in  the  production  of  complex  emotions. 

With  the  second  part  the  special  analysis  of  a  certain  number  of 
the  more  important  emotions  is  taken  up.  Three  emotions  are  corre- 
lated with  the  instinct  of  preservation:  ist,  the  emotions  and  instincts 
relative  to  nutrition  ;  2d,  fear  and  its  variation,  repugnance  ;  3d,  anger. 
Of  each  of  these  psychological  states  the  author  gives  a  very  complete 
picture.  He  first  indicates  the  physiological  side  of  the  subject,  the 


676  LES   SENTIMENTS. 

possible  localization  and  the  organic  effects ;  he  then  gives  a  descrip- 
tion of  the  emotions  based  on  the  testimony  of  consciousness ;  he  traces 
their  origin  and  development  and  concludes  with  their  pathology.  We 
may  note,  in  passing,  that  the  phobies,  which  constitute  the  pathology 
of  the  emotion  of  fear,  are  of  two  principal  forms,  fear,  properly  so 
called,  and  repugnance.  The  evolution  of  anger  is  traced  with  great 
felicity.  It  is  made  up  of  three  necessary  stages,  a  reflex  of  defense 
and  of  attack ;  anger,  which  is  only  a  differentiation  of  this  reflex ;  and 
hate,  resentment,  in  which  the  same  reflex  is  delayed  and  sometimes 
concealed.  Hate  is  not  the  opposite  of  love,  as  has  been  so  often 
maintained ;  hate  cannot  be  a  primitive  emotion,  because  it  includes 
the  phenomena  of  inhibition,  and  inhibition  is  a  complex  and  a  late 
development. 

The  chapter  on  the  affections  contains  a  number  of  subtle  and  per- 
tinent observations.  The  author  treats  the  affections  and  sympathy 
together ;  he  defines  the  latter  as  the  keen  representation  of  the  emo- 
tional states  of  others  and  shows  that  this  representation,  if  the  affec- 
tions are  not  included,  does  not  suffice  to  constitute  what  in  common 
language  is  called  sympathy,  or  in  other  words,  altruism.  It  is  thus 
the  affections  which,  added  to  the  sexual  instinct,  constitute  the  foun- 
dation of  love.  In  short,  the  greater  part  of  the  emotions  are  com- 
plex, they  are  derived  from  simple  emotions,  by  evolution,  by  arrest 
of  development  and  by  the  combination  of  several  simple  emotions. 

Of  the  complex  emotions  the  author  reviews  first  the  social  and 
moral  feelings.  This  chapter  is  well  worth  reading.  It  contains  a 
classification  of  the  principal  kinds  of  societies,  and  a  sketch  of 
the  feelings  to  which  they  give  rise  and  the  stages  of  their  evolution. 
Ribot  does  not  agree  with  many  authors  that  the  family  is  the  primi- 
tive form  of  social  union  from  which  the  clan  and  the  tribe  have 
arisen.  He  thinks  that  the  tendency  to  live  in  society  is  irreducible 
and  inherent  and  has  developed  independently  of  the  family.  There 
follows  a  complete  exposition  of  moral  feelings  which  do  not  arise, 
as  claimed  by  the  intuitionists,  from  an  idea,  from  a  formula  (the  cate- 
gorical imperative).  It  is  from  the  outset  a  spontaneous  instinct, 
finding  its  expression  in  customs  which  later  become  conscious  and 
reflective  and  are  expressed  in  written  laws  and  in  the  abstract  specu- 
lations of  moral  philosophers.  Further,  this  instinct  of  morality  has 
two  aspects,  the  first  positive,  corresponding  to  feelings  of  benevo- 
lence, the  second  negative,  corresponding  to  those  of  justice. 

The  second  part  of  the  work  closes  with  some  chapters  on  religi- 
ous emotions — treated  with  unusual  wealth  of  detail — on  the  aesthetic 


PSYCHOLOGICAL  LITERATURE.  677 

sense  and  on  intellectual  feelings,  and  lastly,  two  chapters  (which  had 
already  been  published  elsewhere  as  articles)  on  normal  and  morbid 
characters  and  on  the  decay  of  emotions.  A  last  chapter  summarizes 
the  leading  ideas  of  the  book.  These  are  as  follows  :  emotional  mani- 
festations are  neither  qualities  of  sensation  nor  of  a  confused  intelli- 
gence ;  they  are  primitive  facts  prior  to  intellectual  life.  In  the  emo- 
tional life  two  elements  should  be  distinguished,  sensations  of  pleasure 
and  pain,  and  the  tendencies  we  call  desires  when  they  are  accompa- 
nied by  consciousness  and  appetites  when  they  are  unconscious.  These 
are  incipient  movements  prior  to  all  experience  of  pleasure  and  pain. 
It  is  a  blind  force;  "and  this  blind  force,  when  it  attains  its  object, 
experiences  satisfaction  and  seeks  for  it  anew  because  it  is  pleasant." 

In  conclusion  I  may  say  that  in  my  opinion  it  matters  little  whether 
the  reader  can  agree  or  not  with  the  views  of  the  author.  Even  those 
who  dissent  will  find  in  this  book  what,  at  the  present  time,  they  will 
seek  for  vainly  elsewhere,  a  place  where  all  researches  hitherto  made 
on  the  emotions  are  brought  to  a  focus.  It  is  a  fine  testimony  to  the 
activity  of  French  psychology.  A.  BINET. 

PARIS. 

The  Florentine  Painters  of  the  Italian  Renaissance,  'with  an  In- 
dex to  their  Works.  By  BERNHARD  BERENSON.  G.  P. 
Putnam's  Sons.  1896. 

This  little  book  is  a  companion  to  the  author's  Venetian  Painters 
and  forms  the  second  of  a  series  of  handbooks  intended  chiefly  as 
guides  to  travelers  in  their  artistic  pilgrimage  through  Italy.  In  ap- 
proaching the  Florentine  School,  however,  Mr.  Berenson  has  not 
been  able  to  avoid  some  philosophical  discussion  of  the  nature  of  the 
appeal  made  by  these  painters,  and  has  given  us  a  little  sketch  of  an 
aisthetic  theory,  not  without  psychological  interest. 

The  Florentines,  he  tells  us,  were  preeminently  figure-painters, 
and  in  this  figure-painting  they  devoted  their  attention,  not  to  color  or 
sentimental  expression  or  symbolic  meaning,  but  to  pure  form.  Now 
form  has  three  dimensions,  and  to  render  the  third  dimension  upon  a 
flat  surface  is  the  chief  technical  problem  of  this  art.  Until  this  prob- 
blem  is  solved  the  figures  are  merely  decorative  or  symbolical,  and 
painting  remains,  so  to  speak,  a  literary  art.  It  has  the  value  only  of 
an  illustration.  But  when  the  painter,  by  his  rendering  of  values, 
produces  the  illusion  of  bodily  existence,  and  creates  an  imaginary 
space  in  which  his  figures  live,  he  affords  us  a  truly  artistic  pleasure. 
This  pleasure  may  be  greater  than  that  of  perceiving  an  object  in  ac- 


678  PAINTERS   OF  THE  ITALIAN  RENAISSANCE. 

tual  space,  because  the  indications  of  form,  the  values,  may  be  em- 
phasized in  representation.  Instead  of  the  confused  impressions  which 
the  actual  object  would  probably  send  us,  the  painter  strives  to  give 
us  only  the  significant  data,  only  those  sensations  which  will  help  us 
to  conceive  the  form,  in  all  its  complexity,  as  real  and  solid.  The 
painter  thus  gives  us  a  lesson  in  perception,  and  teaches  us  to  appre- 
ciate bodily  form  and  to  enjoy  it. 

In  the  course  of  this  analysis  Mr.  Berenson  advances  two  opinions 
which,  at  least  as  presented  here,  without  evidence  to  support  them, 
must  seem  arbitrary  and  hasty  to  the  psychologist.  One  is  that  the 
third  dimension  is  perceived  by  association  of  the  visual  image  with 
'  tactile '  sensations,  or  4  muscular  sensations  inside  my  palm  and 
fingers.'  The  influence  of  feelings  of  movement,  apparently  in  the 
arms,  is  once  mentioned,  but  the  other  possibilities  in  the  case  are 
ignored.  The  second  opinion  advanced  is  that  aesthetic  pleasure  con- 
sists in  stimulating  to  "an  unwonted  activity  of  psychical  processes  .  .  . 
which  here,  free  from  disturbing  physical  sensations,  never  tend  to 
pass  over  into  pain."  A  work  of  art,  for  those  who  are  capable  of 
enjoying  it,  heightens  the  intensity  of  the  act  of  perception.  It  "over- 
whelms them  with  the  sense  of  having  twice  the  capacity  they  had 
credited  themselves  with ;  their  whole  personality  is  enhanced  "  and 
they  'feel  better  provided  for  life.' 

It  would  be  manifestly  unfair  to  criticise  these  opinions  as  if  they 
represented  the  author's  complete  theory  of  aesthetic  values.  But  his 
views  are  worth  considering  as  indications  of  the  direction  in  which 
an  intelligent  connoisseur  looks  for  an  explanation  of  his  own  judg- 
ments. He  looks  for  it  in  the  act  of  perception  itself,  in  an  accelera- 
tion of  the  process  by  which  the  conception  of  a  physical  reality  is 
gained.  While  we  may  pass  over  the  illustrations  of  this  principle 
which  Mr.  Berenson  comes  upon,  and  which  are  chosen,  perhaps,  some- 
what at  random,  we  must  welcome  the  attempt,  on  the  part  of  a  pro- 
fessional critic  of  art,  to  trace  aesthetic  pleasures  back  into  the  primary 
processes  of  sense  and  imagination.  Such  an  attempt  is  a  proof  of 
directness  and  vitality  in  the  author's  criticism  and  at  the  same  time  it 
is  an  encouragement  to  the  psychologist  who  might  fear  to  miss  the 
essence  of  the  higher  artistic  feelings  while  digging  in  the  psycho- 
physical  field.  It  is  there,  Mr.  Berenson  tells  us,  that  those  feelings 
have  their  roots. 

The  painters  whom  he  reviews  would  generally  have  agreed  with 
him ;  for  it  is  not  the  artists  themselves,  or  those  who  have  a  technical 
appreciation  of  art,  that  repel  an  interpretation  of  its  effects  as  imme- 


PSYCHOLOGICAL  LITERATURE.  679 

diate  and  physical.  The  opposition  comes  rather  from  those  who, 
without  specific  training  or  sensibility,  find  in  art  only  a  general  stim- 
ulus to  their  vague,  heterogeneous  emotions.  To  such  persons  the 
significance  or  use  of  art  lies  in  the  ideas,  moral,  religious  or  senti- 
mental, which  it  suggests  to  them  and  which  alone  they  are  capable 
of  feeling  strongly.  But  the  artist,  in  whom  perception  is  vivid  and 
accurate,  and  who  is  ready  to  understand  its  marvelous  complexity, 
finds  meaning  and  value  in  the  forms  themselves,  apart  from  extrinsic 
associations. 

The  opposition  between  these  two  points  of  view  is,  indeed,  not 
fundamental.  A  man  like  Michael  Angelo  may  well  combine  them, 
since  he  had  capacity  enough  to  feel  to  the  utmost  both  the  beauty  of 
bodily  form  and  the  tragic  and  religious  burden  of  life,  so  that  he 
could  give  his  visions  the  greatest  plastic  reality  while  he  kept  his  soul 
strained  towards  the  highest  moral  ideals.  But  these  interests  are  in- 
dependent, and  it  was  perhaps  the  desire  to  identify  them,  and  the 
despair  of  doing  so,  that  made  the  art  of  Michael  Angelo  in  a  way 
swollen  and  sad.  For,  as  Mr.  Berenson  says,  the  Florentines  were 
not  merely  painters ;  they  were  men  of  varied  gifts  and  general  inter- 
ests who  found  in  painting  only  an  occasional  and  partial  means  of 
expression.  G.  SANTAYANA. 

HARVARD  UNIVERSITY. 

Manuale  della    Semejotica   delle  Malattie  Mentali.      Guida   alia 
diagnosi  della  pazzia,  per  i  medici,  i  medici-legisti  e  gli  stu- 
denti.      Vol.    II.     Esame  psicologico    degli    alienati.      ENRICO 
MORSELLI.     Milano,  Vallardi     [1896].      12°.     Pp.  xviii,  852. 
Of  this  thick  volume  perhaps  five-sixths  of  the  pages  are  in  fine 
print.     It  forms,  consequently,  the  most  thorough  and  minute  analytic 
symptomatology   of    insanity  in  existence.     I  tsay  analytic,  because, 
although  the  author  divides  it  into  *  synthetic '  and  '  analytic '  halves, 
it  yet  deals  solely  with  separate  and  elementary  symptoms,  and  nowhere 
touches  on  those  complex  aggregates  of  symptoms  that  make  up  the 
various  types  of  insane  personality.     The  result  is  a  book  rather  for 
reference  than  reading.     Whoever  wishes  to  find  everything  that  can 
possibly  be  said  about  a  given  function,  such  as  physiognomy,  lan- 
guage,  conduct,  perception,  memory,  will,  etc.,  in  the  insane,   can 
do  no  better  than  consult  its  pages.     At  the  same  time  the  very  com- 
pleteness, largely  brought  about  by  filling  to  their  utmost  all  the  com- 
partments of  an  exhaustive  scheme  marked  out  in  advance,   is  more 
mechanical  than  practical.     We  doubt,  for  example,  whether  such  an 


680  INSANITY. 

experimental  examination  of  '  consciousness  '  as  that  for  which  direc- 
tions are  given  on  pp.  735-765  can  ever  be  applied  by  an  asylum 
physician  to  a  single  patient.  It  includes  determinations  of  the  acute- 
ness  and  range  of  the  various  senses,  and  of  Weber's  law  as  applied  to 
each  of  them;  chronometric  determinations  of  the  rhythmic  oscilla- 
tions of  the  attention;  ditto  of  the  simple  and  the  variously  com- 
plicated reaction-times,  with  their  disturbing  conditions,  again  ap- 
plied to  all  the  senses;  measurements  of  the  area  of  the  conscious 
field  by  the  Wundt-Dietze  method ;  observations  on  automatic  move- 
ments subconsciously  performed  when  the  attention  is  distracted ;  ex- 
ploration of  the  patient's  suggestibility  under  hypnosis ;  and  finally,  of 
his  subjective  consciousness  of  altered  personality,  or  the  reverse. 
First  and  last  we  get  almost  the  whole  of  Wundt's  Physiological 
Psychology,  and  the  author  may  well  speak  in  his  preface  of  the  great 
labor  he  has  thrown  into  his  work.  An  Englishman  or  a  French- 
man would  have  lightened  the  burden  by  throwing  out  much  of  the 
only  hypothetically  practical  matter.  Prof.  Morselli's  book  is,  in  fact, 
only  one  more  instance  to  add  to  the  number  which  prove  the  affinity 
between  the  Italian  and  the  German  turn  of  mind.  His  style  is  better, 
but  his  learning  is  as  ponderous,  and  his  multiplication  of  Greek  terms 
as  great  as  that  of  any  Teuton — e.  ^.,  hyperpraxia  and  hypopraxia 
for  the  over-activity  and  inertia  of  mania  and  melancholy,  and  no  end 
of  afo-es,  such  as  the  various  species  of  disnoesia,  namely,  disesthe- 
sis,  disgnosia,  dismnesia,  disfantasia,  dislogia,  etc.,  etc. 

But  all  this  does  not  detract  from  the  solid  value  of  the  matter 
contained  in  the  volume,  or  from  the  author's  good  judgment  when, 
instead  of  enumerating  facts,  he  pronounces  opinions.  His  pedantry 
entirely  breaks  down,  e.  g.,  when  speaking  of  the  methods  of  the  '  ex- 
act' anthropological  school.  Except  as  a  disease  of  central  organs  in- 
volving the  conscious  self,  insanity  is  unintelligible.  "What  has  so 
far  been  explained  with  respect  to  the  genesis  and  forms  of  mental 
disease  by  all  the  measurements  of  cranium  and  stature,  by  all  the 
sphygmography,  the  urine-analysis,  even  by  the  dynamometry  and 
aesthesiometry,  of  which  so  many  of  the  followers  of  objective  em- 
piricism boast,  and  which  they  confound  with  the  true  experimental 
method  ?  I  have  read  with  the  greatest  serenity  all  the  histories  of 
cases  that  come  coupled  with  this  address.  But,  arrived  at  the  end  of 
the  somatic  and  physiological  inquest,  and  at  the  beginning  of  the 
psychological  examination,  I  have  always  had,  when  it  was  a  question 
of  the  primary  forms  of  mind-disease,  the  impression  of  an  absolute 
cleft  and  utter  lack  of  connexion  between  the  two  examinations  *  * 


PSYCHOLOGICAL  LITERATURE.  68 1 

*  *  I  conclude  that,  whilst  still  granting  to  anthropology  and 
nerve-pathology  the  confidence  they  well  deserve,  we  must  restore 
psychology  proper  to  its  rights"  (p.  21). 

One  of  the  things  that  most  strikes  me  in  Prof.  Morselli  is  his 
contempt  for  the  absoluteness  of  the  accredited  'types'  of  psychosis 
ordinari  ly  named  and  recognized.  Individuals  are  types  by  themselves, 
and  enslavement  to  conventional  names  and  their  associations  is  only 
too  apt  to  blind  the  student  to  the  facts  before  him.  "The  more  I 
study  and  examine  the  insane,  the  profounder  grows  the  conviction  in 
me  that  the  purely  symptomatic  forms  of  our  classifications  are  based 
on  the  expressive  appearances  which  insanity  assumes  according  to 
the  temper  and  pattern  of  the  subject  whom  it  affects.  In  short,  in- 
dividual subjects  operate  like  so  many  lenses,  each  of  which  refracts 
in  a  different  angular  direction  one  and  the  same  ray  of  light"  (p.  143). 
Elsewhere  (p.  53)  Prof.  Morselli  writes :  "  Many  forms  of  insanity 
which  the  nosographs  distinguish  and  circumscribe  within  sharp  limits 
are,  despite  their  apparent  divergence,  only  clinical  varieties  or  differ- 
ent stages  of  a  probably  unique  malady  which  is  modified  diversely 
according  to  the  personality  of  the  individual  'whom  it  affects" 

Unfortunately  we  are  carried  no  farther  by  the  author  along  this 
curiosity-exciting  path.  W.  J. 

/  Sogni  e  il  Sonno  nell  tsterismo  e  nella  epilessia.  DOTT.  SANTE  DE 
SANCTIS.  Roma,  Societa  Dante  Alighieri,  1896.  12°,  Pp.  216. 
An  inquiry  into  the  manner  of  sleeping  and  dreaming  in  98  cases 
of  hysteria,  45  being  of  the  light,  and  53  of  the  grave  variety ;  and  in 
91  cases  of  epilepsy,  of  which  25  were  inveterate  and  showed  intellec- 
tual decay,  whilst  of  the  remaining  66  fresher  cases,  45  had  4  classical ' 
attacks,  whilst  2 1  were  of  petit  mal.  The  amount  and  depth  of  the 
sleep  were  noted,  as  well  as  the  frequency  and  character  of  the  dreams, 
and  their  relation  to  the  phases  and  incidents  of  the  malady.  The  work 
is  carefully  done,  and  contains  a  very  complete  reference  to  the  literature 
of  dreaming  and  sleep.  The  minuter  statistical  details  must  be  seen  in  the 
original.  The  main  results  are  that  hysterics  and  the  lighter  epileptics 
sleep  badly,  but  the  better  the  older  the  case.  In  epilepsy  with  grand 
mal  the  sleep  is  good.  Sleep-walking  (contrary  to  a  common  opinion) 
is  rare  in  both  diseases ;  sleep-talking  is  frequent.  Abrupt  awaken- 
ing, and  hynagogic  hallucinations,  are  common  in  both  diseases. 
Nightmare  (incubus)  also ;  but  the  more  so  in  epilepsy,  in  which  it 
tends  to  disappear  with  age.  As  for  the  dreaming,  age  and  re- 
peated epileptic  attacks  seem  to  make  it  less  frequent  as  well  as  less 


682  SUBLIMINAL    CONSCIOUSNESS,  ETC. 

easily  remembered.  The  dreams  of  epileptics  are  simple,  those  of 
hysterics  complex  and  dramatic,  and  often  '  macrozooscopic.'  One  of 
the  most  interesting  points  connected  with  the  dreams  of  hysterics  is 
their  influence  on  their  waking  life  and  course  of  the  symptoms.  Dr. 
de  Sanctis  found  this  influence ;  but  only  in  6  of  his  cases  did  it  seri- 
ously aggravate  the  disease.  In  more  than  half  the  cases  the  dreams 
of  the  previous  night  influenced  the  humor  and  conduct  of  the  follow- 
ing day.  W.  J. 


SUBLIMINAL  CONSCIOUSNESS,  ETC. 

Subliminal  Self,  or  Unconscious  Cerebration?   ARTHUR  H.  PIERCE. 

Proceedings  of  Soc.  for  Psych.   Research.     Vol.  XL,  pp.  317— 

325.      (1895.) 

Reply  to  the  same.     FRANK  PODMORE.     Ibid.,  pp.  325-332. 
Ueber   Spaltung  der   Personlichkeit    {Sogenanntes   Doppel-ich.} 

DR.  FREIHERR  VON  SCHRENK-NOTZING.     Wien,  Holder,  1896. 

8°.    Pp.  23. 
Die  Mehrheit  geistiger  Personlichkeiten  in  einem  Indimduum. 

Eine  Psychologische  Studie.     DR.  S.  LANDMANN.     Stuttgart, 

Enke,  1894.     8°.    Pp.  186. 

The  well-known  observations  made  on  hypnotic  and  hysteric  sub- 
jects and  automatic  writers  by  Gurney,  Janet,  Binet  and  others,  and 
which  by  their  authors  are  supposed  to  prove  that  mutually  discon- 
nected currents  of  conscious  life  can  simultaneously  coexist  in  the  same 
person,  are  subjected  to  critical  reinterpretation  by  Messrs.  Landmann, 
von  Schrenck  and  Pierce.  All  these  writers  deal  with  theory,  no  one 
of  their  essays  bringing  out  any  new  kinds  of  facts. 

Mr.  Pierce  thinks  that  the  performances,  such  as  the  executing  of 
orders,  answering  of  questions  in  writing,  etc.,  that  may  go  on  whilst 
the  subject's  upper  consciousness  ignores  what  happens  and  is  other- 
wise occupied,  are  all  due  to  unconscious  cerebration.  Educated  to 
certain  aptitudes,  the  brain  is  now  able  to  perform  them  whilst  its  con- 
sciousness is  altogether  engrossed  with  other  conduct  simultaneously 
going  on.  The  notion  of  multiple  consciousness  has  no  limit  if  we 
begin  to  use  it.  There  is  no  direct  proof  of  the  supposed  split-off 
consciousness,  for  by  the  hypothesis,  if  split  off  it  is  never  known  to 
the  '  person,'  and  if  remembered  later  it  was  probably  not  split-off. 

Mr.  Podmore  objects  that  Mr.  Pierce  talks  as  if  consciousness  and 
brain-processes  formed  an  alternative.  He  himself  favors  the  paral- 
lelistic  theory  and  considers  some  consciousness  to  accompany  all  pro- 


PSYCHOLOGICAL   LITERATURE.  683 

cesses,  its  degree  fluctuating ;  he  disbelieves  in  two  disconnected  sys- 
tems of  consciousness  forming  a  definitely  dual  control,  and  thinks 
the  facts  best  covered  by  the  conception  of  a  conscious  field  with  a 
single  bright  center  and  a  margin  stretching  indefinitely  away  into 
twilight. 

Baron  von  Schrenck  holds  somewhat  similar  views.  He  believes 
that  only  those  processes  that  form  the  '  crest  of  the  wave '  of  cerebral 
excitement  give  rise  to  full  consciousness.  But  the  wave-crest  is  al- 
ways shifting  its  place ;  and  a  system  of  cerebral  operations,  A,  started 
with  full  consciousness,  can  run  on  for  a  certain  time,  even  although 
the  wave-crest  may  forthwith  have  proceeded  elsewhere  and  started 
another  system,  B,  which  latter  then  in  its  turn  may  run  on  sub-con- 
sciously, whilst  the  wave-crest  reverts  to  the  now  subsiding  system 
A,  and  with  a  stroke  of  full  consciousness  starts  it  up  to  activity  again. 
We  have  only  to  suppose,  now,  that  the  pulses  of  conscious  attention 
that  accompany  the  A-process  and  the  B-process  severally,  as  the 
wave  crest  oscillates  to  and  fro,  fail  to  combine  into  a  united  memory 
system,  and  we  have,  according  to  von  Schrenck,  all  the  phenomena 
of  simultaneous  double  self,  so-called,  or  split  consciousness,  explained 
on  the  type  of  alternation  of  systems  of  ideas  with  the  memory- 
bridge  between  them  gone.  The  theory  of  simultaneous  coexistence 
of  fully  conscious  systems  thus  falls  to  the  ground. 

Dr.  Landmann  accounts  for  the  facts  by  assuming  three  levels  of 
brain-operation,  only  one  of  which  has  .^//"-consciousness  attached 
to  it.  This  latter  is  the  consciousness  of  psychic  activity  as  such.  It 
is  attached  exclusively  to  certain  (undesignated)  processes  in  the  cor- 
tex, and  only  he  who  has  it  can  say  '  I.'  The  second  level  is  that  of 
ideation  and  association  without  this  self-consciousness  (unselbst- 
be'wusste  Vorstellungeri)  ;  whilst  the  third  level  belongs  to  the  '  sub- 
cortical  centers'  and  is  often  spoken  of  as  *  unconscious'  by  Dr.  L., 
though  he  also  repeatedly  speaks  of  the  Vorstellungen  and  Gefiihle 
that  go  with  the  subcortical  centers.  Whole  groups  of  cortical  cells 
can  fall  into  isolated  activity;  the  subcortical  cells  can  act  by  them- 
selves, and  the  cells  of  self-consciousness  can  either  cooperate  or  not 
cooperate  with  the  rest.  But  the  self-consciousness  is  either  wholly 
where  it  is,  or  else  not  there  at  all ;  so  that  the  ordinary  talk  about 
fractioning  of  the  personality,  upper  and  lower  selves,  etc.,  is  absurd, 
4  personality'  and  '  self  being  indivisible  elements  of  the  mental  life. 
The  only  possible  doubling  of  the  self  is  where  it  acts  in  alternation, 
first  with  one  and  then  with  another  system  of  ideas. 

Where  one  self  appears  to  be  writing  automatically  whilst  another 


684  INTRODUCTION  TO  PHILOSOPHY. 

self  converses  at  the  same  time  through  the  mouth,  the  latter  self  is 
the  sole  real  self  engaged ;  the  automatic  performances  being  the  work 
of  the  '  non-self-conscious'  parts  of  the  cortex,  and  of  the  '  uncon- 
scious' basal  ganglia.  Dr.  L.  applies  these  principles  in  an  intolerably 
rambling  style  and  with  tedious  minuteness  to  the  elucidation  of 
Janet's  and  Binet's  observations,  thinking  (strange  to  say)  that  their 
merely  descriptive  phrases  about  '  dissociation  of  the  personality,'  etc., 
consitute  a  '  theory'  irreconcilable  with  his  own. 

The  really  urgent  problem  in  these  phenomena  of  split  or  uncoupled 
mental  life  is  that  of  the  conditions  of  splitting  and  coupling-again,  be 
they  cerebral  conditions  or  physical  conditions,  or  both.  What  hap- 
pens when  any  one  system  of  ideas  or  of  brain  activities  get  so  thor- 
oughly shunted  off  and  ignored  by  the  consciousness  that  goes  with 
the  rest?  On  this  problem  no  one  of  our  three  authors  can  be  said 
to  throw  any  more  positive  light  than  Mr.  Myers  or  Janet.  Myers 
would  be  the  first  to  say  that  his  phrase  '  subliminal  self '  is  only 
a  temporary  noun  of  designation  for  a  certain  group  of  facts.  Janet 
would  say  the  same  of  his  phrase  4  defective  power  of  conscious  syn- 
thesis.' But  their  three  critics,  each  with  his  own  notion  of  a  unique 
activity  of  self-consciousness  which  cannot  be  split,  seem  to  me  to  carry 
matters  backwards  rather  than  forwards,  and  to  tend,  if  anywhere,  to- 
wards a  somewhat  pre-Lockian  and  non-empirical  point  of  view. 

W.  J. 


Introduction    to    Philosophy.      F.    PAULSEN.       Translated    by   F. 

THILLY.     With   an   Introduction   by  W.   JAMES.     New  York, 

Henry  Holt  &  Co.,  1895.    Pp.  xix+43;. 

Professor  Paulsen's  Introduction  has  been  in  the  hands  of  the  stu- 
dents of  philosophy  in  the  original  long  enough  to  have  become  fa- 
miliar. To  those  who  have  not  known  the  original,  Professor  James' 
preface  will  be  sufficient  recommendation.  The  features  of  the  book 
which  strike  the  present  reviewer  may  be  briefly  indicated.  First,  the 
readable  character  of  the  author's  expositions  is  noteworthy.  Then 
the  comprehensiveness  of  the  book  is  surely  a  great  recommendation 
of  it  for  class-room  work. 

As  to  doctrine,  several  things  are  striking.  Professor  Paulsen's  *  vol- 
untaristic'  psychology  gives  character  to  his  philosophical  views  all  the 
way  through  (see  pp.  313,  320  f.),  and  it  is  this  standpoint,  possibly, 
that  leads  him  to  subordinate  the  problem  of  epistemology,  as  he  does, 
to  that  of  philosophy  in  general  (pp.  349,  353).  But  the  tendency 


PSYCHOLOGICAL  LITERATURE.  685 

of  the  book  which  gives  it  its  most  prominent  character  is  what  may 
be  called  its  'animistic'  view  of  nature  (99 ff.) — in  a  good  sense. 
Paulsen  goes  the  length  of  finding  a  'world-soul'  to  be  more  than  a  figure 
(107  ff.).  His  arguments  for  it  seem  to  be  inconclusive  as  other  argu- 
ments recently  urged  in  the  same  direction  (e.  g.,  the  interesting  the- 
orems of  Professor  Royce) .  The  argument  of  Paulsen,  based,  as  it 
is,  on  analogy,  for  some  sort  of  subjectivity  in  connection  with  the  life 
functions,  has  great  force ;  but  when  a  similar  argument  is  carried 
over  into  the  inanimate  world  it  gives  occasion  for  a  good  deal  of 
stumbling.  Then,  when  Professor  Paulsen  goes  on  to  appropriate  the 
term  'pantheism'  for  his  doctrine,  he  seems  to  open  himself  to  a  sort 
of  criticism  which  Lotze  avoided  by  avoiding  this  term,  although  his 
view  was  perhaps  as  near  traditional  pantheism — or  as  far  from  it — as 
this  of  Paulsen. 

It  is  curious,  but  there  seems  to  be  in  many  a  tendency  to  a 
sort  of  mysticism  in  conceiving  the  sort  of  'world-ground'  which 
modern  philosophy  is  reaching  after.  We  go  the  length  of  a 
'  monism,'  call  it  theism,  hope  the  absolute  is  '  personal,'  and  yet 
shrink  from  an  animistic  view  of  nature.  Perhaps  Professor  Paulsen's 
frank  acceptance,  both  of  the  latter  doctrine  and  of  a  much  abused  name 
for  it,  will  tend  to  convince  some  readers  that  this  course  is  better 
than  the  sort  of  vague  mysticism  in  which  we  have  been  resting. 
But  yet  it  seems  to  me  that  the  final  doctrine  of  the  absolute  will  have 
to  accept  the  distinction  between  consciousness  with  its  experience, 
and  mechanical  nature  with  its  law,  and  find  a  more  profound  way  of 
justifying  an  ultimate  monism  than  the  simple  way  of  reading  into  the 
minerals  a  form  of  experience  which  directly  contravenes  the  dis- 
tinction. In  other  words,  the  final  synthesis  of  metaphysics  would 
seem  to  be  rather  logical,  as  going  beyond  the  distinctions  of  experi- 
ence, than  material,  as  being  justified  by  positive  agreements  in  experi- 
ence. And  just  for  this  reason,  the  older  method,  which  makes  a 
critique  of  experience  a  preliminary  problem,  would  come  in  to  get 
its  justification. 

The  book  is  the  best  thing  we  have  in  English,  its  matter  is  very 
modern,  its  historical  expositions  wonderfully  illuminating,  its  divisions 
flexible,  and  its  style  direct.  The  only  criticism  I  should  make  as  a 
teacher  is  that  foreshadowed  above,  that  for  an  introduction  it  teaches 
a  philosophy  too  directly.  But  then,  that  is  what  the  author  set  out 
to  do.  The  translation  is  accurate  and  idiomatic,  but  possibly  rather 
too  literal. 

J.  MARK  BALDWIN. 


686  SCHOPENHAUER'S   SYSTEM. 

Schopenhauer's   System  in  its  Philosophical  Significance.     WIL- 
LIAM CALDWELL,  M.  A.,  D.  Sc.,  Professor  of  Moral  and  Social 
Philosophy  in  the  Northwestern  University,  U.S.  A.,  etc.     New 
York,  Chas.  Scribner's  Sons,  1896.     Pp.  xviii-f  538. 
If  anything  can  justify  philosophical  scepticism  it  is  the  present 
status  of  Schopenhauer.     To  some  his  thought  represents  the  highest 
flights  of  speculation,  its  nearest  approach  to  that  ultimate  essence  of 
Nature  which  has  been  the  ignis  fatuus  of  philosophy  since  the  days 
of  Thales.     To  others  his  system,  if  system  it  may  be  called,  is  merely 
the  futile  attempt  of  a  brilliant  but  ill-regulated  mind  to  comprehend 
the  world  in  which  it  lived  and  to  evolve  from  its  own  discord  prac- 
tical principles  for  the  guidance  of  more  happily  constituted  souls. 

With  the  latter  position  Professor  Caldwell  has  no  sympathy  and, 
although  in  his  preface  he  says  that  he  has  tried  '  to  strike  a  mean  in 
the  matter  of  the  connection  of  Schopenhauer's  philosophy  with  his 
personality,'  he  seldom  recurs  to  the  topic  in  his  subsequent  chapters, 
and  when  he  does  so  fails  to  call  attention  to  the  most  salient  peculi. 
arities  of  Schopenhauer's  very  peculiar  temperament.  Schopenhauer 
is,  to  him,  a  philosopher  of  profound  significance.  In  shifting  the  ob- 
ject of  philosophic  contemplation  from  thought  to  will,  from  the  log- 
ical necessities  of  the  Hegelian  dialectic  to  the  concrete  sequences  of 
nature  and  the  terrible  realities  of  human  passions  and  ungratified  de- 
sires, he  has  given  philosophy  a  status  in  the  modern  world  which  it 
never  had  before  and  which  it  will  never  lose.  So  deeply  is  Professor 
Caldwell  impressed  with  the  importance  of  this  step  that  he  tacitly 
ranges  himself  in  general  on  Schopenhauer's  side  and  speaks  with  sym- 
pathy of  his  views  even  when  he  feels  compelled  to  differ  with  them. 
Yet  he  is  in  no  sense  a  schoolman.  Thoroughly  as  his  own  thought 
has  been  modified  by  reflection  upon  Schopenhauer's  teaching,  he 
shows  no  tendency  to  adopt  without  careful  criticism  and  appreciation, 
and  this  very  fact,  which  gives  his  book  its  chief  philosophic  value, 
makes  it  difficult  for  one  who,  like  the  present  writer,  possesses  only 
a  general  acquaintance  with  Schopenhauer's  writings,  to  discriminate 
the  elements  which  are  drawn  from  Schopenhauer  from  those  which 
are  due  to  the  author's  own  reflection.  The  form  of  the  book  greatly 
increases  this  difficulty.  Professor  Caldwell  makes  no  attempt  to  give 
a  clear  and  adequate  view  of  Schopenhauer's  doctrines  as  he  himself 
apprehends  them  and  then  to  indicate  the  points  in  which  they  stand 
in  need  of  revision  or  completion.  In  the  opening  chapter,  '  A  Gen- 
eral View  of  Schopenhauer's  Significance,'  he  touches  upon  the  chisf 
points  of  contact  between  Schopenhauer's  thought  and  that  of  his  age  ; 


PSYCHOLOGICAL   LITERATURE.  687 

Chapters  II.  and  III.  deal  respectively  with  his  'Idealism*  and  his 
*  Theory  of  Knowledge;'  Chapter  IV.  with  the  'Bondage  of  Man;' 
Chapters  V.  and  VI.  with  his  *  Philosophy  of  Art ;'  Chapters  VII.  and 
VIII.  with  his  'Moral  Philosophy'  and  'Philosophy  of  Religion;' 
Chapter  IX.  with  his  'Metaphysic;'  Chapter  X.  with  'the  Positive 
Aspects  of  the  System,'  and  these  are  followed  by  a  brief  '  Epilogue/ 
or  resume"  of  the  leading  conceptions  of  the  book.  This  arrange- 
ment gives  rise  to  an  amount  of  repetition  and  an  expansion  of  rela- 
tively few  thoughts  into  scores  of  pages  which  might  have  been 
desirable  in  the  series  of  lectures  upon  which  the  book  is  based  but  is 
most  unfortunate  in  a  book.  Chapters  II.  and  IX.,  Chapters  III.  and 
Chapters  IV.,  VII.  and  VIII.,  deal  with  approximately  the  same 
material  respectively  and  might  have  been  condensed  into  smaller 
space  with  advantage. 

Professor  Caldwell  frankly  adopts  Schopenhauer's  fundamental 
conception  that  the  essence  of  Nature  is  will,  striving,  or  effort,  but, 
instead  of  following  him  in  his  assimilation  of  the  ultimate  Will  to 
the  blind  forces  of  Nature,  he  tends  to  assimilate  it  to  the  highest  mani- 
festations of  self-conscious  will  as  found  in  man,  or  rather  vice  versa, 
man's  will  is,  of  all  that  lies  within  the  range  of  his  experience,  the 
most  faithful  representative  of  the  archetypal  essence.  Man's  thought 
and  discursive  reason  can  be  understood  in  a  teleological  sense  only. 
It  can  serve  to  mirror  his  present  environment  and  to  throw  a  feeble 
and  flickering  light  upon  his  path,  but  it  cannot  portray  to  him  his 
true  being  or  that  of  the  Universe,  nor  can  it  enlighten  him  as  to  the 
ultimate  end  towards  which  the  World  Will,  as  manifested  in  the 
phenomena  of  Nature,  and  in  his  own  blind  longings  and  inner  striv- 
ings as  well  as  in  his  deliberate  volitions,  is  leading  him.  With 
Schopenhauer's  '  illusionism  and  confusionism '  Professor  Caldwell  has 
no  sympathy.  Schopenhauer  had  himself  only  half  learned  the  lesson 
which  it  was  his  mission  to  teach  the  world.  He  had  grasped  the 
familiar  truth  of  idealism  that  there  is  no  ultimate  difference  in  essence 
between  the  subjective  and  objective  sides  of  experience,  but  he  had 
failed  to  see  that  reality  is  not  to  be  sought  outside  experience,  although 
it  is  not  to  be  found  in  all  its  fulness  within  experience.  Since  Will 
is  the  essence  of  reality,  the  most  complete  revelation  of  reality  in  ex- 
perience must  be  sought  in  those  forms  of  experience  which  at  once 
most  fully  satisfy  the  cravings  of  man's  will  and  presage  a  still  fuller 
satisfaction  yet  to  be  found.  Such  are  the  realities  of  Art,  of  Ethics 
and  of  Religion.  With  that  recognition  Schopenhauer's  unwavering 
conviction  of  the  truth  of  those  realities  finds  a  justification  which  he 


688  MORAL  EVOLUTION. 

was  never  able  to  provide,  the  disappointments  inherent  in  human  life 
find  their  place  in  philosophy,  but  philosophy  does  not  thereby  be- 
come a  system  of  pessimism  and  illusionism. 

It  would  seem  therefore  that,  although  Professor  Caldwell  seldom 
or  never  uses  the  word  '  God,'  his  interpretation  of  Schopenhauer 
brings  us  back  to  the  familiar  conceptions  of  philosophical  theism ,. 
save  that  the  Divine  immanent  in  things  is  to  be  conceived  rather  in 
an  active  than  a  passive  aspect.  The  life  of  the  Ultimate  Being  is  not 
a  mere  contemplation  of  its  own  perfection,  as  the  older  philosophers 
thought,  but  a  constant  endeavor  towards  the  perfection  of  its  crea- 
tures. 

If  I  have  failed  to  grasp  the  essence  of  Professor  Caldwell's  thought 
it  is  not  from  any  lack  of  grace  in  its  expression.  Schopenhauer  himself 
never  wrote  more  charming  pages.  Like  him,  Professor  Caldwell  has 
caught  the  secret  of  good  style ;  his  reader's  attention  is  spontaneously 
arrested  by  the  transparent  clearness  of  his  thought  and  is  free  to  fol- 
low and  enjoy  its  development  without  voluntary  effort  and  without 
fatigue. 

Altogether  the  book  is  one  of  the  most  attractive  and  interesting 
that  has  appeared  in  recent  years.  The  author,  it  is  true,  takes  Scho- 
penhauer somewhat  more  seriously  than  some  of  us  are  inclined  to  do, 
but  such  fundamental  differences  of  opinion  as  to  the  relative  value  of 
philosophic  methods,  and  their  probable  fruitfulness  in  the  production 
of  sound  knowledge,  are  not  profitable  subjects  of  discussion  and  should 
not  be  made  grounds  for  criticism. 

WILLIAM  ROMAINE  NEWBOLD. 

UNIVERSITY  OF  PENNSYLVANIA. 

Moral  Evolution.     By  GEORGE   HARRIS.    Boston  and  New  York, 

Houghton,  Mifflin  &  Co.,  1896. 

The  title  of  Mr.  Harris's  book,  '  Moral  Evolution,'  shows  his- 
main  idea,  viz. :  that  there  is  no  conflict  between  evolution  and  ethics. 
Positively,  he  traces  the  harmony  of  the  two  along  three  lines :  ( i ) 
evolution  is  recognized  only  when  its  results  are  known,  and  ethics  is 
essentially  a  science  of  ideals ;  (2)  both  have  the  same  material — self- 
regarding  and  other- regarding  feelings — which  are  equally  natural  and 
are  harmonious  though  not  identical ;  (3)  both  are  alike  in  method, 
there  is  gradual  progress  (Chaps.  I.,  VII.). 

Historically,  this  progress  has  consisted  in  the  development  of  per- 
sonality, that  is,  in  the  increasing  participation  of  the  individual  in 
social  functions.  Pain  and  struggle  lead  to  this ;  perversion  or  wrong 


PSYCHOLOGICAL   LITERATURE.  689 

is  only  an  incident.  Theologically,  the  ideal  is  the  same  as  that  given 
by  history — "  the  person  having  the  powers  with  which  he  is  endowed 
and  cultivating  them  in  their  true  proportion  and  symmetry  into  the 
perfect  character"  (p.  71).  This  ideal  is  not  identical  with  happiness, 
but  in  the  long  run  ensures  it. 

The  ideal  of  the  good  is  the  content  or  dynamic  side,  which  de- 
termines the  right  or  the  ought,  the  formal  or  static  side.  The  sense 
of  obligation  is  what  distinguishes  man  from  animals.  Its  origin, 
Mr.  Harris  does  not  know.  He  has  leanings  towards  some  kind  of 
instantaneous  creation.  But  however  it  got  here  it  will  stay,  he  is 
sure,  as  long  as  man  has  ideals.  But  again,  the  distinguishing  char- 
acteristic of  man  is  said  to  be  his  4  recognition  of  the  relative  worth 
of  the  higher  and  lower  goods  of  persons.'  I  do  not  see  the  relation 
between  these  two  l  distinguishing  characteristics.' 

The  transition  from  morality  to  religion  is  made  by  the  reflection 
that  since  the  outcome  of  evolution  is  rational  man  the  process  must 
be  rational,  and  therefore  implies  God  both  historically  and  ideally. 
Further,  if  God  is  rational,  He  must  be  perfectly  righteous,  for  if  He 
were  not,  and  yet  imposed  good  on  man,  He  would  be  arbitrary,  which 
is  contrary  to  the  assumption. 

The  bearing  of  the  last  half  of  the  book,  on  religion  and  theology, 
is  not  clear  to  me.  The  author  seems  to  have  abandoned  his  starting 
point  of  moral  evolution  and  to  be  engaged  with  the  idea  that  evolu- 
tion having  got  us  on  so  far  it  may  now  be  dispensed  with  (as  a  prin- 
ciple) and  a  fixed  moral  content  substituted. 

The  principal  criticism  to  be  made  on  the  book  is  that  its  funda- 
mental terms  are  either  not  defined  or  the  definition  is  arbitrary. 
Thus,  when  the  personal  ideal  is  defined,  the  crucial  phrase  is  '  cul- 
tivating man's  powers  in  their  true  proportion.'  What  this  true  pro- 
portion is  we  are  left  to  surmise,  until  in  the  last  of  the  book  we  run 
across  the  statement  that  Christianity  alone  gives  the  true  proportions. 
But  Christianity  in  turn  needs  defining.  Is  it  that  of  the  gospels  or  of 
the  churches  of  to-day  ?  And  if  any  special  period  is  taken,  how  do 
we  know  of  its  finality  ? 

Again,  such  terms  as  'higher'  and  «  lower'  goods  are  used,  but 
are  defined  only  by  implication.  I  infer  that  by  * lower '  goods  are 
meant  such  things  as  food,  clothing  and  shelter,  but  in  an  ideal  of 
unified  activities,  such  as  has  been  given  here  previously,  such  distinc- 
tions are  not  valid,  and  if  '  lower '  is  used  in  opposition  to  '  higher' 
it  ought  not  to  be  labelled  good. 

The  use  of  the  terms  good  and  bad  is  also  as  unsatisfactory  as 


690  MORAL   EVOLUTION. 

usual.  In  the  terms  of  evolution,  good  is  the  normal,  and  bad  the 
abnormal.  But  the  question  comes  up,  as  always,  how  in  any  specific 
case  can  we  know  which  act  tends  to  the  normal  ?  As  a  rough  and 
ready  rule  past  experience  may  serve,  but  history  never  repeats  itself. 
Life  is  a  series  of  experiments.  There  is  always  a  new  element  which 
makes  the  outcome  of  each  venture  uncertain,  and  hence  the  judgment 
of  good  or  bad  can  be  passed  only  after  the  act  is  done,  and  no  standard 
is  final  in  advance. 

This  element  of  newness  is  so  characteristic  in  the  idea  of  evolu- 
tion that  questions  again  arise  concerning  the  relations  of  the  moral 
and  religious  parts  of  Mr.  Harris's  teaching.  He  asserts,  for  exam- 
ple, the  finality  of  the  contents  of  the  life  of  Jesus  as  the  moral  ideal, 
as  well  as  of  its  method  or  spirit.  Given  evolution  as  a  moral,  not 
simply  a  physical,  fact  and  it  would  seem  to  follow  that  if  the  spirit 
of  Christ's  life  was  perfect  when  lived,  then  it  would  require  a  differ- 
ent setting  and  content  in  order  to  be  perfect  if  lived  to-day.  Or, 
again,  and  this  is  the  point  which  we  should  expect  Mr.  Harris  to  in- 
sist on  more,  Christ  may  have  been  perfect  in  the  sense  that  He  em- 
bodied the  law  of  all  development.  In  that  case  the  specific  acts  of 
His  life  are  of  no  importance  whatever,  and  would  vary  infinitely  ac- 
cording to  time  and  place.  The  ,unity  of  His  life  with  that  of  the 
'world  constitutes  His  divinity  and  oneness  with  God. 

This  leads  us  to  a  consideration  of  Mr.  Harris's  idea  of  God — an- 
other term  which  is  not  defined.  At  times  the  term  is  used  as  if  God 
were  apart  from  the  world,  molding  it  to  His  will,  perfect  before  it 
existed ;  and,  again,  as  if  God  were  inseparable  from  the  world.  It 
is  argued  that  because  the  outcome  of  evolution  is  rational  man,  there- 
fore the  process  must  be  rational  and  therefore  it  implies  God. 

I  will  merely  point  out  here  that  the  process  might  be  rational 
without  implying  God,  unless  by  God  is  meant  simply  reason  in  the 
world,  without  regard  to  whether  this  reason  is  or  is  not  distinct  from 
matter;  and  further,  that  logically  there  is  no  more  need  of  imagin- 
ing a  creator  of  mind  or  reason  than  of  imagining  a  creator  of  the 
creator  of  reason.  The  category  of  causation  can  not  in  any  case  be 
applied  to  the  totality  of  experience,  because  it  is  a  helpmeet  within 
experience. 

On  the  positive  side,  the  book  is  valuable  for  the  emphasis  which 
it  lays  on  the  inter-action  between  the  individual  and  society  and  their 
mutual  dependence.  The  favorite  illustration  of  the  ellipse  whose 
foci  are  the  individual  and  society,  both  of  which  determine  the  curve 
at  every  point,  is  very  striking.  Another  point  also  worth  mentioning 


PSYCHOLOGICAL   LITERATURE.  691 

is  the  constant  assertion  that  self -regarding  impulses  are  just  as  moral 
as  other-regarding  ones,  and  that  the  two  are  not  antagonistic.  I  can 
not  help  regretting,  from  the  standpoint  of  ethical  science,  that  Mr. 
Harris  did  not  work  out  these  points  more  fully  instead  of  devoting 
his  energies  for  more  than  half  his  book  to  an  exposition  of  the  truth 
of  Christianity  which  is  so  generally  granted  that  it  is  not  needed. 

AMY  TANNER. 

UNIVERSITY  OF  CHICAGO. 


ETHICS. 

The  Relation  of  Intuitionism  to  the  Ethical  Doctrine  of  Self-real- 
ization. HENRY  CALDERWOOD.  Phil.  Review, V.,  4,  pp.  337-351 . 
Intuitionism  claims  that  the  principles  of  conduct  are  given  im- 
mediately by  the  reason,  and  are  not  the  product  of  induction.  Op- 
posed to  it  are  Utilitarianism  and  the  system  of  Self-realization.  Mr. 
Sidgwick,  for  the  former,  while  criticising  it  for  its  lack  of  scientific 
precision,  is  yet  forced  to  admit  that  an  intuitive  operation  of  the 
practical  reason  seems  to  be  somewhere  assumed  in  all  moral  systems. 
Does  the  theory  of  Self-realization  offer  us  a  better  explanation  of  the 
facts?  There  are  two  phases  of  this  theory,  the  high  idealistic  po- 
sition of  Hegel  and  Green,  and  the  more  humble  position  of  the  rational 
psychologists.  They  must  be  tested  with  reference  to  the  knowledge 
of  the  law  and  to  the  end  of  action.  The  former  phase  of  the  theoiy 
is  mainly  metaphysical,  and  according  to  Green's  own  confession  can 
give  us  no  adequate  account  of  what  man's  true  self  should  be.  How 
do  we  know  what  is  right  ?  The  divine  mind  '  reproduces  itself  in  the 
human  soul,'  says  Green.  This  is  really  Intuitionism.  The  rational 
psychologists  give  us  no  clearer  account  of  the  process  by  which  we 
reach  a  knowledge  of  moral  truth.  They  insist  that  Self-realization 
is  the  end  of  action,  but  do  not  tell  us  clearly  how  we  know  what  the 
true  self  is.  We  learn  it,  they  say,  by  considering  the  process  through 
which  the  institutions  and  rules  of  life  have  arisen  out  of  the  effort 
after  an  ideal,  and  have  in  their  several  measures  contributed  to  its 
realization.  But  conscience  is  superior  to  institutions,  and  we  need  a 
philosophy  of  our  knowledge  of  the  inner  law,  without  which,  institu- 
tions and  rules,  and  the  objective  ethical  world  itself,  are  inexplicable. 
Considered  with  reference  to  the  end  of  action  the  theory  of  Self-real- 
ization is  also  inadequate.  Thought  must  be  self-centered  as  belong- 
ing to  our  consciousness,  but  the  law  of  right  conduct,  and  the  motive 
for  well-doing,  and  the  end  for  which  we  live,  all  out-stretch  self-sat- 
isfaction. 


692  VISION. 

Morality  the  Last  of  Dogmas.     ANTONIO  LLANO.     Phil.  Review, 

v-»  4-     PP-  37J-394- 

The  thesis  of  this  article  is  that  "  in  the  course  of  time  all  moral 
feelings  (those,  that  is,  involving  such  ideas  as  obligation  or  compul- 
sion, duty  and  the  like)  will  disappear  from  the  human  mind  and 
cease  to  have  any  influence  upon  the  further  development  of  the  race." 
The  basis  for  this  belief  is  to  be  found  in  a  knowledge  of  the  nature 
and  origin  of  conscience,  and  in  the  modern  scientific  conception  of 
the  world.  Conscience  is  merely  an  abstract  feeling  of  fear  of  pun- 
ishment, and  its  origin  is  to  be  sought  in  the  primitive  conception  of 
nature  as  an  aggregate  of  superhuman  beings,  to  whom  man  was  re- 
sponsible. Morality  arose  from  this  fear  of  external  power.  The 
modern  tendency  is  toward  individual  freedom,  hence  the  idea  of  com- 
pulsion or  obligation  must  pass  away  from  morality.  There  can  be 
no  reason  why  my  individual  feelings  should  form  a  standard  for  any 
one  else.  Moreover,  the  naturalistic  or  deterministic  conception  of 
the  world  must  work  toward  the  same  end.  Man's  conduct  is  only  a 
phase  in  the  transformation  of  an  infinite  and  eternal  energy,  and  is 
no  more  subject  to  praise  or  blame  than  is  the  course  of  the  stars. 
We  cannot  demand  that  a  man  should  be  other  than  his  conditions 
have  made  him.  Moral  good  and  evil  are  meaningless  terms. 

Determinists  have  shrunk  from  these  conclusions,  and  this  has  been 
urged  as  an  argument  against  their  theory,  but  two  psychological  laws 
explain  the  inconsistency  between  their  theory  and  practice.  First, 
action  ultimately  depends  upon  feeling,  not  upon  judgment  alone; 
second,  a  feeling  which  has  become  organic  through  heredity  cannot 
be  suddenly  eliminated,  even  though  reason  has  destroyed  its  basis. 
Hence  we  cannot  expect  the  deterministic  theory  to  change  our  moral 
feelings  even  after  several  generations  have  accepted  it.  Nevertheless, 
the  growing  sentiment  of  tolerance  in  religious  and  political  matters 
is  in  reality  a  sort  of  movement  towards  what  may  be  called  moral 
indifference — toward  the  time  when  no  man  will  condemn  another  for 
thoughts,  feelings  and  conduct  which  are  the  necessary  product  of  his 
organization  and  environment.  NORMAN  WILDE. 

COLUMBIA  UNIVERSITY. 

VISION. 

Ueber  den  Einfluss  von  Lichtstarke  und  Adaptation  auf  das 
Sehen  des  Dichromaten  (  Griinblinderi) .  J.  v.  KRIES  und  W. 
NAGEL.  Ztsch.  f.  Psych,  u.  Phys.  der  Sinnesorgane.  XII.,  1-38. 
1896. 


PSYCHOLOGICAL  LITERATURE.  693 

It  has  long  been  known  that  by  mixing  in  the  proper  proportion 
light  from  the  two  extreme  ends  of  the  spectrum  an  absolute  match 
can  be  obtained,  for  the  eye  of  the  partially  color-blind,  to  every  color 
sensation  which  it  is  capable  of  receiving,  and  in  particular  to  every 
homogeneous  light  throughout  the  spectrum.1  Soon  after  the  obtain- 
ing of  the  first  exact  results  of  this  nature,  it  was  announced  by  Konig 
that  the  equations  in  question  are  not  independent  of  the  absolute  in- 
tensity of  the  lights  employed,  that  an  equation  which  has  been  ob- 
tained at  a  high  intensity  no  longer  holds  when  the  lights  are  turned 
down.  The  same  variations  were  found  to  hold  for  the  color-equa- 
tions of  trichromates  as  well,  and  they  are  summed  up  under  the 
phrase  '  departures  from  Newton's  law  of  color-mixture ; '  the  facts 
were  absolutely  denied  by  Hering,  who  said  that  if  they  were  estab- 
lished it  would  be  equivalent  to  an  entire  upsetting  of  the  constitution 
of  the  universe,  but  they  have  been  fully  confirmed  by  other  observers 
and  are  now  admitted  by  Hering  also. 

The  facts  here  referred  to  have  lately  won  an  additional  interest  on 
account  of  the  present  theory  that  the  cones  are  the  bearers  of  the 
color-sense  and  that  the  rods  convey  the  colorles.8  sensation  only. 
Konig's  observations  have  been  criticised  by  Hering  on  the  ground 
that  he  worked  with  too  large  a  field,  and  hence  that  he  did  not  avoid 
an  irregular  effect  of  the  yellow  pigment  of  the  macula,  and  also  that 
he  did  not  give  sufficient  attention  to  the  adaptation-condition  of  the 
eye.  In  order  to  meet  these  objections,  and  also  for  the  purpose  of 
having  the  observations  confirmed  by  one  more  observer,  Nagel,  who 

aThe  quality  of  the  entire  gamut  of  sensation  throughout  the  spectrum  for 
the  color-blind  is  either  yellow,  or  blue,  or  gray,  and  nothing  more.  It  is  not 
true,  as  is  commonly  supposed,  and  as  is  stated,  for  instance,  in  the  Century 
Dictionary  and  in  Johnson's  Cyclopaedia,  that  there  are  some  who  are  red- 
blind,  but  have  the  sensation  of  green,  and  others  who  are  green-blind,  but 
have  the  sensation  of  red ;  this  erroneous  belief  had  its  origin  purely  as  a  de- 
duction from  the  Young-Helmholtz  theory  of  color-vision  (if  there  were  three 
fundamental  color-processes,  red,  green  and  blue,  a  partial  loss  of  color-sense 
would  naturally  consist  in  a  defect  in  one  of  these  processes),  and  it  is  a  lasting 
monument  to  the  folly  of  making  deductions  from  unproved  hypotheses  and 
then  forgetting  that  the  deduction  has  the  same  hypothetical  character  as  the 
premises  from  which  it  was  deduced.  The  true  state  of  the  case  was  first  dis- 
covered by  William  Pole,  F.  R.  S.,  in  1857,  by  reflections  upon  his  own  sensa- 
tions (he  was  himself  a  dichromate,  who  did  not  discover  his  own  defect  until 
the  age  of  thirty),  and  his  result,  for  which  he  has  never  received  due  credit,  is 
one  of  the  most  brilliant  products  of  the  application  of  pure  reasoning  to  an  ap- 
parently hopelessly  confused  mass  of  facts  that  has  yet  been  witnessed.  His 
conclusion  has  been  abundantly  confirmed  by  the  cases  of  color-blindness  in  one 
eye  only  that  have  since  been  detected,  the  first  being  that  of  Becker,  in  1879. 


694  VISION. 

is  a  dichromate,  has  repeated  the  experiments,  with  various  modifica- 
tions, upon  himself.  The  splendid  color-mixing  instrument,  originally 
designed  by  Helmholtz  and  perfected  by  Konig  (made  by  Schmidt  & 
Hansch,  of  Berlin)  was  employed ;  this  is  the  second  instrument  of  the 
kind,  of  any  value,  that  has  been  constructed.  It  is  of  much  less  com- 
plexity than  that  used  by  Konig  himself,  but  it  was  found  to  answer 
the  purpose  for  these  experiments.  The  field  offered  to  the  eye  of  the 
observer  was  two  degrees  in  diameter  ;  its  middle  point  was  fixated, 
and  the  eye  was  kept  constantly  adapted  for  brightness.  The  prin- 
cipal difference  between  the  yellow  and  the  blue  curve  obtained  by 
these  observers  and  those  given  by  Konig  for  the  same  colors  is  that 
in  the  present  case  the  blue  curve  extends  only  to  A  536  instead  of  to 
A  600  ,that  is,  overlaps  the  yellow  curve  much  less,  which  means,  in 
other  terms,  that  the  yellow  in  the  immediate  vicinity  of  the  gray  line 
of  the  dichromate's  spectrum  was  much  more  fully  saturated  than 
Konig  found  it  to  be.  This  difference  is  readily  explained  by  the 
fact  that  the  field  was  here  small  and  constantly  central.  By  this 
means  the  participation  of  the  rods  in  the  sensation  produced  was  al- 
most wholly  excluded,  and  the  curves  represent  more  exactly  the  visual 
process  as  it  takes  place  in  the  cones  alone.  The  discrepancy  was 
greater  here  than  in  other  parts  of  the  spectrum  because  the  cone- 
sensation  reaches  here  a  maximum  of  intensity.  Another  criticism 
which  Ebbinghaus  has  brought  against  Konig  (that  the  blue  curves  do 
not  show  sufficient  coincidence  for  the  dichromate  and  the  trichromate) 
is  fully  met  by  the  same  consideration.  At  the  same  time  it  should 
be  remembered  that  whether  the  addition  of  a  small  amount  of  blue  is 
or  is  not  necessary  to  effect  equal  saturation  in  the  two  halves  of  the  field 
is  a  difficult  observation  to  make  ;  the  '  equal  amounts'  of  red  and  blue 
which  go  to  make  a  pure  gray  are  not  equal  in  respect  of  brightness, 
but  equal  in  color-quenching  power,  to  use  the  appropriate  phrase  of 
Helmholtz — the  red  unit  is  in  fact  as  bright  as  twenty  times  the  blue 
unit — and  such  small  quantities  of  blue  as  this  are  naturally  difficult 
to  measure. 

The  next  step  was  to  redetermine  the  distribution,  throughout  the 
spectrum,  of  the  colorless  sensation  of  the  dichromate  in  a  faint  light, 
the  twilight  sensation,  as  v.  Kries  has  happily  named  it.  This  was 
found  to  be  sufficiently  in  coincidence  with  the  same  curve  as  found 
by  Konig,  after  making  allowance  for  a  possible  slight  difference  in 
the  quality  of  the  gas  used,  and  Hering's  curve  is  also  the  same,  after 
reduction  from  daylight  to  gas  light.  The  red  end  of  the  spectrum 
was  found  to  be  faintly  visible  as  gray,  if  it  was  looked  at  sufficiently 
at  one  side  of  the  fovea. 


PS  YCHOL  OGICAL  LITER  A  TURE. 


695 


Since  v.  Kries'  results  agree  with  those  of  Konig  as  regards  the  two 
elements  of  the  comparison,  they  naturally  agree  with  them  as  regards 
the  conclusion.  According  to  the  ideas  of  Hering,  two  lights  which 
are  equivalent  at  an  ordinary  intensity  must  have  an  equal  white 
valence,  or,  since  that  is  the  same  thing  as  their  twilight-values,  these 
also  must  coincide.  But  that  is  very  far  from  being  the  case ;  the 
mixture  from  the  two  ends  of  the  spectrum,  which  is  for  the  dichro- 
mate  absolutely  indistinguishable  from  an  homogeneous  light  in  the 
yellow  green  at  an  ordinary  intensity,  needs  to  be  made  more  than  a 
hundred  times  brighter  to  match  it  in  a  faint  light.  And  what  Hering 
has  considered  to  be  possible  sources  of  error  in  the  experiment  have 
here  been  entirely  done  away  with.  It  follows  that  it  is  an  absurdity, 
upon  practical  as  well  as  theoretical  grounds,  to  speak  of  a  brightness 
of  a  color  as  being  due  to  the  brightness  of  its  colorless  component. 

Ueber  die  Wirkung  kurzdauernder  Lichtreize  auf  das  Sehorgan. 
J.  VON  KRIES.  Ztsch.  fur  Psychologic  u.  Physiologic  der  Sin- 
nesorgane,  XII.,  81-101.  1896. 

A  large  number  of  observations  have  been  made  lately  on  the  sub- 
ject of  the  secondary  image  which  follows  a  brief  excitation  of  the  eye 
by  a  rather  strong  light.  The  phenomenon  was  noticed  by  Purkinje, 
who  noticed  everything ;  it  was  rediscovered  by  Professor  C.  A.  Young, 
and  the  most  detailed  experiments  upon  it  have  been  made  by  Hess, 
and  especially  by  Bidwell,  by  whom  it  has  been  called  the  recurrent 
image.  The  observations  upon  it  have  been  of  a  very  conflicting 
nature ;  it  is  usually  stated  to  occur  one-fifth  of  a  second  later  than  the 
primary  image,  but  Exner  found  no  interval  at  all.  In  color  it  has 
been  described  as  complementary,  except  by  Hess,  who  found  it  to  be 
of  the  same  color.  Bidwell  and  v.  Kries  discovered  at  about  the  same 
time  that  it  fails  to  occur  after  excitation  by  red  light,  and  v.  Kries 
has  now  observed  that  it  is  also  altogether  wanting  in  the  fovea ;  these 
two  circumstances  point  strongly  to  the  influence  of  the  now  com- 
monly accepted  difference  of  function  of  the  rods  and  the  cones  of  the 
retina,  and  consequently  a  study  of  the  effect  upon  it  of  adaptation — a 
change  of  condition  which  takes  place  chiefly  in  the  rods  and  which 
is  without  doubt  a  function  of  the  visual  purple — was  very  desirable. 
This  v.  Kries  has  now  carried  out ;  his  method  was  similar  to  that  of 
Bidwell,  and  consisted  in  allowing  a  spot  of  spectral  light  to  fall  upon 
a  mirror  which  rotated  upon  an  axis  not  perpendicular  to  its  surface, 
and  from  that  to  be  reflected  to  the  eyes  of  the  observer,  who  per- 
ceived a  bright  spot  moving  about  a  central  point  of  fixation.  Under 


696  TALBOT'S  LAW. 

these  circumstances  the  ghost  was  very  distinct,  of  complementary 
color  to  the  primary  image,  and  at  a  distance  from  it  which  translated 
into  time  was  equal  to  one-fifth  of  a  second,  so  long  as  the  eye  of  the 
observer  had  not  been  adapted  for  darkness;  the  constant  dark- 
ness adaptation  of  the  eye  was  maintained,  since  the  walls  of  the  room 
were  black,  by  frequently  looking  out  of  the  window.  The  first  image 
is  sharply  defined,  not  quite  circular,  but  rather  cylindrical,  with  a  con- 
cave edge  behind ;  the  second  gradually  fades  off  in  a  faint  trail,  and 
its  head  is  surrounded  by  a  circle  of  more  than  ordinary  blackness. 
But  if  the  light  is  very  intense,  so  much  so,  for  instance,  that  the  trail 
stretches  out  through  the  entire  circle,  then  the  first  image  is  also  much 
longer  (this  is,  no  doubt,  the  ordinary  positive  after  image),  and  be- 
comes joined  on  to  the  secondary  image ;  this  is  the  form  in  which 
Exner  saw  the  phenomenon — without  any  interval. 

If  the  eye  has  first  suffered  complete  darkness  adaptation  (that  is, 
has  been  kept  in  the  dark  for  two  hours,  at  least) ,  the  appearance  pre- 
sented is  very  different ;  the  secondary  image  is  of  a  brilliant  white, 
and  it  appears  almost  immediately  after  the  first  image,  which  is  con- 
sequently in  shape  more  like  a  slender  crescent.  The  secondary  image, 
in  one  or  the  other  of  its  two  forms,  Professor  v.  Kries  very  properly 
takes  to  be  at  least  the  principal  cause  of  the  phenomenon  of  the  flutter- 
ing heart.  Both  forms  alike  vanish  when  the  real  image  goes  through 
the  central  part  of  the  retina.  One  observer  said  that  it  seemed  as  if 
they  slipped  into  a  tunnel.  The  area  of  this  ineffective  space  was 
about  35  by  38  mm.  at  a  distance  of  i  m.  from  the  eye,  which  corres- 
ponds very  exactly  with  the  size  of  the  space  which  is  practically 
free  from  rods. 

From  various  attendant  circumstances,  Professor  v.  Kries  is  forced 
to  assume  that  there  are  two  distinct  reactions  of  the  rods,  not  simply 
one  reaction  which  takes  place  after  adaptation  both  with  greater  force 
and  with  greater  promptness.  He  suggests  that  one  may  be  due  to  vis- 
ual purple  in  the  rods,  and  the  other  to  that  outside  of  the  rods,  as- 
suming in  both  cases  that  the  visual  purple  is  a  true  visual  substance, 
whose  product  of  decomposition  excites  the  nerve  end. 

C.  LADD  FRANKLIN. 
BALTIMORE,  MD. 

Theorie  des  Talbotschen  Gesetzes.     Von  KARL  MARBE.     Wundt's 

Studien,  XII.,  Heft  2,  pp.  279-296. 

The  general  statement  of  Talbot's  Law  is  as  follows:  If  two 
light  stimuli  successively  and  periodically  excite  the  same  point  on 


PSYCHOLOGICAL  LITERATURE.  697 

the  retina  there  will  result  either  a  series  of  separate  sensations  or 
one  single  sensation  of  a  constant  intensity  and  quality.  This  latter 
is  identical  with  that  sensation  which  would  be  excited  if  the  light 
acting  through  one  stimulation  were  distributed  uniformly  over  that 
entire  stimulation  period. 

Under  these  conditions  there  are  four  factors  which  promote  the 
production  of  this  constant  sensation : 

1 .  The  decrease  of  the  stimulation  period. 

2.  The  increase  of  the  difference  of  duration  of  the  two  stimuli. 

3.  The  decrease  of  the  difference  of  the  intensity  of  the  stimuli. 

4.  The  strengthening  of  the  mean  intensity  of  both  stimuli. 

If  the  succession  of  stimuli  be  given  by  means  of  a  rotating  disc, 
then  a  fifth  factor  enters,  viz.,  the  rate  of  movement.  The  slower  the 
movement  the  less  do  the  stimuli  fuse.  That  the  influence  of  these 
five  factors  applies  to  the  fusion  of  colored  light  is  proved  in  an  ex- 
perimental appendix  to  this  paper. 

The  theory  of  Talbot's  Law  must  explain  both  the  general  fact  of 
fusion  and  also  the  influence  of  these  five  factors.  This  is  found  in  a 
general  photo-chemical  principle.  The  photo-chemical  action  in  the 
retina  is  not  a  summation  effect,  for  if  we  fixate  a  white  surface  for 
two  seconds  the  sensation  is  no  more  intense  after  the  second  second 
than  after  the  first.  Nor  can  it  be  limited  to  the  4  elementary  effect ' 
of  the  corresponding  time  element,  for  then  the  series  of  stimuli  would 
never  fuse  into  a  constant  sensation.  There  remains  the  view  that  it 
is  a  function  of  the  elementary  effects  immediately  preceding  and 
simultaneous  with  the  sensation,  these  forming  a  '  characteristic 
effect  group.'  The  excitation  in  the  retina  grows  with  the  duration 
of  the  stimulus  until  the  duration  reaches  a  determined  critical  value. 

We  see,  then,  that  as  the  equality  of  light  dispersion  progresses 
the  '  characteristic  effect  groups '  become  more  similar  not  only  to 
each  other  but  also  to  the  '  effect  group '  produced  when  the  light  is 
uniformly  distributed. 

With  this  theory  the  explanation  of  the  first  four  factors  is  not 
difficult. 

1.  The  shorter  the  stimulation  period  becomes  the  more  evenly  the 
light  is  distributed  over  the  whole  period  and  the  more  nearly  the 
'  effect  groups'  approach  the  *  elementary  effects/ 

2.  By  the  increase  of  the  differences  of  duration  of  the  two  stimuli 
the  mean  variation  of  the  4  elementary  effect*  is  lessened. 

3.  This  also  takes  place  when  the  difference  in  intensity  is  lessened. 

4.  By  increasing  the  intensity  of  the  whole  series,  the  single  '  ele- 


698  MOTOR  PHENOMENA    OF  MENTAL  EFFORT. 

mentary  effects'  will  of  course  be  increased.  But  with  this  there 
must  be  an  increase  of  the  difference  which  'characteristic  effect 
groups'  shall  have  in  order  to  produce  a  notable  difference  in  sensa- 
tion. 

The  fifth  factor,  the  movement  of  contour,  requires  some  further 
explanation.  Suppose  we  fixate  a  black  square  on  a  white  ground. 
One  part  of  the  retina  will  be  affected  by  the  light  coming  from  the 
square  and  another  by  the  neighboring  white  ground,  and  we  see  the 
boundary  of  the  square  sharply  outlined.  Now  let  us  suppose  that 
the  square  moves  very  slowly  while  the  eye  remains  in  absolute  rest. 
Under  these  circumstances  every  4  characteristic  effect  group'  will  be 
determined  by  its  own  time  element.  There  will  no  longer  be  a  sharp 
boundary  between  the  white  surface  and  the  square,  for  each  point  of 
the  retina  here  will  have  a  different  time  element,  thus  giving  rise  to 
sensations  of  proportional  intensity.  This  will  cause  a  gradual  shad- 
ing of  the  two  fields,  as  the  time  elements  gradually  shade  into  each 
other  in  the  direction  of  the  movement.  With  light  of  a  given  in- 
tensity the  width  of  this  shaded  portion  will  be  proportional  to  the 
swiftness  of  the  movement.  If,  instead  of  one  dark  surface,  a  series  of 
them  be  moved  before  the  point  of  fixation,  their  shaded  portions  will 
gradually  widen  with  the  rapidity  of  the  movement  until  finally  they 
overlap  and  fuse  into  a  constant  sensation.  This  is  the  state  of  affairs 
when  the  sections  of  the  color  wheel  finally  fuse.  As  this  fusing  pro- 
cess is  a  function  of  the  movement  of  the  edge  of  the  surface  it  follows 
finally  that  a  surface  a  with  movement  b  is  less  favorable  for  fusion 
than  surface  2 a  with  movement  2b. 

J.  E.  LOUGH. 

HARVARD  UNIVERSITY. 


A  Preliminary  Study  of  some  of  the  Motor  Phenomena  of  Mentai, 
Effort.  ERNEST  H.  LINDLEY.  Am.  Jour.  Psy.,  VII.,  4.,  July, 
1896. 

This  is  an  experimental  study  of  those  peculiar  automatic  move- 
ments which  one  is  apt  to  execute  more  or  less  unconsciously  when 
one's  attention  is  concentrated ;  as,  for  example,  in  reading,  writing, 
conversation,  study,  '  trying  to  remember,'  etc.  The  material  was 
obtained  partly  from  responses  to  President  Hall's  syllabus  on  '  Some 
Common  Automatisms,'  and  partly  from  observations  made  in  the 
kindergarten  and  primary  grades  of  the  Boston  Normal  Training 
School.  Something  over  600  cases  were  observed,  and  the  results 
are  tabulated  so  far  as  may  be.  The  first  table  classifies  automatisms 


PSYCHOLOGICAL   LITERATURE.  699 

according  to  the  part  of  the  body  involved,  and  compares  children 
with  adolescents,  not  only  as  regards  proneness  to  automatisms  in 
general,  but  also  with  respect  to  the  relative  frequency  with  which 
the  different  parts  of  the  body  are  employed  by  each.  In  both 
children  and  adolescents  the  ringers  come  first  in  the  order  of  fre- 
quency, with  the  feet  second.  Children  not  only  manifest  more 
automatisms  than  adolescents  on  the  whole,  but  are  surprisingly  more 
prodigal  in  the  use  of  certain  parts.  For  example,  children  are  ten 
times  as  prone  to  head-automatisms  as  adolescents.  The  latter,  on 
the  other  hand,  are  more  given  to  automatisms  of  the  eyes,  the  jaw 
and  the  forehead.  The  second  table  classifies  automatisms  according 
to  the  activities  which  they  accompany.  In  writing,  automatisms  of 
the  lips  and  tongue ;  in  reading,  those  of  the  body,  head  and  hands ; 
while  in  difficult  recollection,  those  of  the  eyes,  hands  and  lips,  were 
most  frequent. 

The  number  of  these  movements  was  found  to  increase  with  the  age 
of  the  child  in  the  kindergarten,  to  decrease  greatly  in  the  primary 
grades,  and  to  be  more  marked  in  the  execution  of  the  smaller  move- 
ments. The  large  number  of  these  movements  among  young  chil- 
dren is  due  to  their  great  activity,  their  defective  inhibition  and  their 
proneness  to  imitation.  Many  automatisms  are  'sympathetic,'/.  £., 
they  belong  to  muscles  whose  center  lies  near  to  that  of  the  muscle  in 
use  at  the  time.  Those  automatisms  which  persist  among  trained 
thinkers  (e.  g.,  twirling  a  watch  chain  while  speaking),  seem  to  be 
accessory  to  the  concentration  of  attention  or  contributory  to  the 
stimulation  of  the  brain-cells.  Others  again  seem  to  be  due  to  excita- 
tions which  have  been  prevented  by  close  attention  from  entering  the 
higher  centers,  and  must  find  an  outlet  by  lower  channels.  Finally, 
many  automatisms  of  posture,  especially  in  children  (e.  g.,  bending 
the  body  forward,  with  the  head  much  too  low  and  on  one  side  in 
writing,  and  the  feet  turned  in  and  resting  on  their  sides,  or  the  soles 
of  one  foot  pressed  against  the  other  leg) ,  suggest  a  return  to  the  foetal 
posture,  or  even  to  that  of  '  man's  more  remote  ancestors.' 

F.  TRACY. 
UNIVERSITY  OF  TORONTO. 


Das  Gefiihl  und  der  Alter.     S.  OTTOLENGHI.     Zeitsch.  f.  Psychol. 

IX.,  321.     1895. 

In  this  paper  the  writer  gives  the  results  of  electrical  tests  of  sensi- 
bility made  on  321  male  observers  of  different  classes,  and  from  9  to 
75  years  of  age.  The  tests  were  made  with  the  faradic  current,  but  of 


700  TIME-CONSCIOUSNESS. 

the  other  conditions  of  the  test  we  are  left  in  ignorance.  The  tests  of 
what  the  writer  calls  general  sensibility  were,  we  infer,  determinations 
of  the  threshold  of  electrical  sensations,  the  stimulus  being  measured 
in  volts.  The  most  sensitive  on  the  average  were  students  and  univer- 
sity graduates  of  19  to  40  years;  the  least  sensitive  were  the  oldest 
group  tested,  men  of  65  to  75.  There  seemed  to  be  a  decrease  of  sen- 
sibility with  increasing  age  after  middle  life. 

Similar  results  were  found  for  pain  sensibility,  the  percentage  of  sub- 
jects having  the  highest  of  4  grades  of  sensibility  (90  +  volts),  being 
as  follows:  School  children  (9  to  14),  6  per  cent. ;  older  school  chil- 
dren (14  to  1 8),  31  per  cent. ;  students  (19  to  24),  17  per  cent. ;  grad- 
uates (24  to  40),  7  Per  cent. ;  workingmen  (20  to  40),  5  per  cent. ; 
older  workingmen  (40  to  65),  65  per  cent.;  very  old  workingmen 
(65to  75).  45  percent. 

Ottolenghi  concludes  that  the  sensibility  increases  from  childhood 
to  manhood,  and  then  decreases.  His  observations  were  not  sufficient 
to  justify  such  an  induction.  He  tested  but  18  school  children  of  9 
to  14,  and  but  16  of  14  to  18.  Then  the  men  of  18  to  40  were  of  a 
different  class  from  his  other  adult  observers.  The  only  conclusion 
that  the  figures  warrant,  that  sensibility  decreases  in  old  men,  is  there- 
fore not  entirely  acceptable.  The  writer  fails  to  state  the  results  for 
very  young  children,  since,  as  he  says,  they  objected  to  the  comple- 
tion of  the  test.  It  is  not  evident  why  the  stimulus  at  which  the 
children  objected  to  its  continuation  cannot  be  taken  as  a  pain  thresh- 
old. HAROLD  GRIPPING. 

Beitrdge  zur  Psychologic  des  Zeitbeivusstseins.   ERNST  MEUMANN. 

Philosophische  Studien,  Bd.  XII.,  Heft  2,  1896. 
The  author  interrupts  the  systematic  course  of  his  announced  in- 
vestigations in  the  psychology  of  time-consciousness,  to  publish  a 
cyclus  of  experiments  concerning  the  illusions  of  the  same.  Two 
cases  of  time-estimation  are  distinguished :  first,  where  the  interval  of 
time  is  simply  limited  by  comparatively  sudden  sensations  (judgment 
of  the  rapidity  of  succession  of  the  limiting  sensations)  ;  second,  where 
the  problem  is  the  comparative  lengths  of  continuous  stimuli.  The 
apparatus  used  is  the  well  known  » time-sense  apparatus '  of  the  Leip- 
zig Institute.  A  few  details  are  added  by  the  author  to  the  elaborate 
description  of  the  apparatus  in  an  earlier  article.1  The  method  is 
esentially  the  same  as  in  the  earlier  article  on  the  Influence  of  the  In- 
tensity of  Stimuli  on  the  Estimation  of  Small  Time-intervals ;  the  inter- 

^Philos.  Studien.     Bd.  IX.,  p.  270  ff. 


PSYCHOLOGICAL  LITERATURE.  701 

vals,  whether  4  filled'  or  *  empty,'  are  produced  by  the  electric  current, 
the  subject  being  in  a  dark  room  separated  from  the  apparatus,  and 
the  length  of  the  comparison-interval  being  gradually  varied  from 
shorter  to  equal  and  longer  than  the  constant  or  normal  interval,  and 
reversed.  The  subject  adds,  as  he  did  not  in  the  author's  earlier  ex- 
periments, the  degree  of  sureness  of  the  judgment,  as,  e.  g.,  clearly, 
very  clearly,  doubtful,  or  very  doubtful.  In  the  comparison  of  *  filled ' 
with  '  empty '  intervals  it  proved  advantageous  to  let  the  latter  precede 
the  former  and  to  retain  the  '  filled  '  interval  constant  or  normal.  The 
point  is  made  clear  that  the  4  empty '  interval  is,  however,  not  empty,  but 
filled  with  such  sensations  as  the  pressure  of  the  clothing,  of  the  chair 
on  which  the  subject  sits, the  rising  and  fall  of  the  breast  from  breathing, 
etc.  Both  the  4  filled '  and  the  '  empty  '  intervals  are  produced  by  sen- 
sations of  sight,  hearing  and  touch.  The  number  of  sensations  enter- 
ing the  filled  interval  is  also  varied.  Further,  the  author  gives  a  num- 
ber of  experiments  to  show  the  effect  of  artificial  '  aids  '  in  estimating 
intervals,  e.  g.,  tapping  the  finger,  breathing,  nodding  the  head,  etc. ; 
and  another  series  in  which  the  one  interval  is  '  filled '  with  mental 
work,  such  as  reading. 

In  the  first  group  of  experiments  the  stimuli  are  sounds ;  first  with 
the  filled  interval,  and  then  with  the  empty  interval  preceding.  The 
first  two  tables  present  experiments  where  the  '  filled '  interval  includes, 
beside  the  limiting  sparks,  only  one  sensation.  The  scheme  is 

'filled'  interval,  123  . 

.    ,  .  ,    _     ^.     In    Table   I.    the    filled   interval    precedes. 

'  empty    interval,  J — 2 

The  result  may  be  stated  as  follows:  Where  both  are  very  short 
the  '  filled '  interval  is  much  over-estimated ;  as  the  intervals  are 
increased  in  length  the  deception  disappears  in  an  *  indifference- 
zone  ;  '  if  the  intervals  are  still  lengthened,  the  4  empty '  one  be- 
comes much  over-estimated.  The  experiments  show  that  these  trans- 
formations of  the  illusion  occur  with  all  subjects  used,  but  that  they 
occur  at  different  lengths  of  the  constant  interval  with  different  sub- 
jects. "  The  length  of  the  interval  by  which  indifference  enters  is  by 
no  means  constant."  In  the  next  following  experiments  the  'filled' 
interval  follows,  instead  of  preceding,  the  empty  one,  and  remains 
constant.  The  result  is  the  same,  excepting  that  the  indifference-zone 
lies  higher,  i.  £.,  by  a  much  longer  constant  interval  than  in  the  former 
series.  In  the  immediately  following  experiments  the  number  of  sensa- 
tions increases  to  5,  6  and  9,  the  arrangement  of  the  two  intervals 
being  varied  the  same  as  before.  As  a  result  the  over-estimate  of  the 
4  filled '  interval  becomes  more  marked  than  before,  the  indifference- 


702  TIME-CONSCIOUSNESS. 

zone  being  again  raised  ;  but  the  transformation  of  the  deception  from 
over  to  under-estimate  of  the  '  filled  '  interval,  with  the  lengthening  of 
the  constant  interval,  remains  obvious. 

In  the  second  group  of  experiments  the  influence  of  artificial  '  aids' 
in  estimating  time-intervals  is  investigated.  First,  the  beginning  and 
ending  sensations  of  the  filled  time  are  more  strongly  marked  than  the 
intervening  ones.  It  is  comparatively  indifferent  whether  the  former 
are  objectively  strengthened  or  merely  rhythmically  emphasized  by  the 
subject ;  in  either  case,  the  deception,  although  still  manifest,  is  very 
much  reduced.  The  indifference-zone  appears  by  a  much  shorter  in- 
terval than  before.  In  the  next  experiments  the  subject  was  practiced 
before  each  hour  in  accompanying  the  six  impressions  of  the  4  filled' 
interval  with  six  tappings  of  his  finger,  the  tapping  being  continued 
to  the  close  of  the  empty  interval ;  the  latter  is,  in  this  case,  compared 
with  the  former  by  means  of  the  number  of  taps.  As  a  result  the  de- 
ception became  greater  than  in  normal  experiments,  i.  e.,  without  the 
tapping.  It  was  sought  to  investigate  the  effect  of  periodic  breathing ; 
but  only  a  disturbing  influence  appeared,  in  consequence  of  which  the 
difference-threshold  (U  E)  was  very  much  raised.  Finally,  the 
'  filled'  time  was  made  to  follow  the  '  empty'  one,  the  motor  '  aid' 
continuing  through  both.  The  deception  of  the  normal  arrangement 
continued  unreduced.  Experiments  in  the  rhythmical  execution  of 
4  filled'  intervals  were  conducted  as  follows  :  The  subject  made  in  one 
case,  two,  and  in  another,  three  hammer-strokes  within  a  given  inter- 
val ;  the  rhythmical  execution  adopted  in  the  former  case  is  i  2  and 
in  the  latter  123.  The  strokes  are  registered  on  a  kymographian 
cylinder.  The  two  subjects  execute  the  middle  stroke  of  the  triple 
interval  somewhat  quicker  than  either  of  the  other  two,  indicating, 
among  other  things,  that  the  triple  interval  is  shortened  to  make  its 
length  seem  (in  compliance  with  the  deception  of  filled  intervals)  to 
the  executor  the  same  as  that  of  the  double  one. 

In  the  third  group  of  experiments  the  illusions  of  filled  intervals 
in  the  different  senses  are  compared,  viz.,  sight,  hearing  and  touch. 
The  experiments  already  conducted  in  the  domain  of  hearing  are  here 
repeated  in  sight  and  touch,  with  the  same  general  results  as  before. 

The  fourth  group  deals  with  the  illusion  resulting  from  filling  the 
one  interval  with  a  continuous  sound,  the  instruments  being  the  Wag- 
nerian  hammer  and  the  tuning-fork.  The  sound  produced  by  the 
former,  after  being  telephoned  to  the  subject  in  the  dark  room,  is  a 
peculiar  whirring  noise.  Where  the  '  filled '  time  follows  the  '  empty  ' 
one,  the  result  is  in  general  the  same  as  before ;  but  in  this  arrange- 


PSYCHOLOGICAL  LITERATURE.  703 

ment  the  difficulty  involved  in  letting  the  filled  interval  be  varied  and 
placed  before  the  4  empty '  one  is  not  present.  Where  the  sound  is 
discontinuous,  and  the  interval  inconstant,  there  arises  a  momentary  un- 
certainty as  to  the  last  hammer-stroke  or  other  stimulus,  which  disturbs 
the  judgment.  The  result  of  varying  an  interval  filled  with  continu- 
ous sounds,  while  the  4  empty '  one  is  constant  or  normal,  is,  in  general, 
the  same  as  before;  but  the  quantity  of  the  illusion  is  much  less  than 
before,  showing  that  the  two  cases  are  in  fact  very  different. 

In  the  fifth  group  the  effect  of  filling  the  same  interval  differently 
is  investigated.  The  stimuli  are  the  already  mentioned  varieties  of 
light  and  sound  sensations.  The  first  interval  chosen  is  short,  viz. 

0,  4  s,  and  the  result  is  in  every  case  an  over-estimation  of  the  filled 
interval.     When  the  stimulus  of  the  '  filled '  interval  is  continuous,  the 
over-estimate  is  less ;  the  application  of  the  tuning-fork  showing  the 
least  illusion.     The  second  interval  chosen  is  of  medium  length,  viz. 

1 ,  o  s.     Here  the  over-estimation  of  the  4  filled '  interval  is  confined  to 
the  cases  of  discontinuous  stimuli,  the  continuous  stimuli  producing 
here  an  over-estimation  of  the  '  empty '  interval.     When  the  stimulus 
of  the  '  filled '  interval  is  rhythmical,  the  deception  is  reduced  but  not 
eliminated.     The  third  interval   chosen  is  comparatively  long,  viz. 
8,  o  s.     Here  the  empty  interval  is  clearly  over-estimated. 

In  the  sixth  and  last  group  the  one  interval  is  filled  with  mental 
work,  such  as  reading  a  series  of  letters  on  the  revolving  cylinder  of 
the  kymograph  and  combining  the  same  into  a  word,  the  apparatus 
being  so  arranged  that  only  one  letter  at  a  time  was  visible ;  and  again, 
the  counting  of  a  number  of  lines  which  appear  in  successive  groups 
simultaneously  on  the  cylinder.  In  this  case  the  4  filled  '  interval  is 
more  or  less  under-estimated  and  the  '  empty '  one  over-estimated. 

Merely  the  general  tendency  of  the  author's  explanation  of  the  dif- 
ferent illusions  of  time-judgment  can  be  mentioned  here,  viz.,  the  di- 
rection of  the  attention  either  to  the  time-relations  themselves,  or  to 
the  content  of  the  intervals.  In  the  last  group  of  experiments,  e.  g., 
in  reading  letters  and  combining  them  into  a  word,  the  attention  is  at 
first  absorbed  with  the  letters  themselves (z.  £.,  with  the  content  of  the 
interval)  and  the  interval  is  estimated  too  short.  As  the  letters  become 
better  known,  the  attention  is  directed  more  to  the  time  relations  of  the 
two  intervals  which  are  as  a  result  more  correctly  estimated ;  finally, 
the  letters  become  familiar,  the  '  work '  is  pleasant,  and  the  *  filled ' 
interval  seems  shorter,  owing  to  the  feeling  of  pleasure  which  accom- 
panies it.  At  the  close  of  the  article  the  author  gives  about  15  or  20 
short  statements  of  results  of  the  experiments  which  cannot  be  repro- 


7°4  NEW  BOOKS. 

duced  here.     The  article  is  rich  in  detail  which  we  have  not  touched 
upon  and  which  the  student  will  do  well  to  read  in  the  original. 

GUY  TAWNEY. 


NEW   BOOKS. 

Grundriss  der  Geschichte  der  Philosophic  zum  Selbststudium  und 
fur  Vorlesungen.  DR.  JOHANNES  REHMKE.  Berlin,  Carl 
Duncker.  1896.  Pp.  308.  $1.35. 

Toga  Philosophy.  SWAMI  VIVE-KANANDA.  London,  New  York 
and  Bombay.  1896.  Pp.  xi-f-224. 

Infallible  Logic.  A  Visible  and  Automatic  System  of  Reasoning. 
THOMAS  D.  HAWLEY.  Lansing  Smith  Printing  Co.,  Lansing, 
Mich.  1896.  Pp.  xxviii+659. 

Sense  of  Beauty,  being  the  Outlines  of  ^Esthetic  Theory.  GEORGE 
SANTAYANA.  New  York,  Charles  Scribner's  Sons.  Pp.  ix+ 
275.  $1.50. 

Leibnitz's  New  Essays  concerning  Human  Understanding.  Trans- 
lated, with  notes,  by  A.  G.  LANGLEY.  New  York  and  London, 
The  Macmillan  Co.  1896.  Pp.  xix+86i.  $2.25. 

Education  of  the  Central  Nervous  System.  REUBEN  POST  HAL- 
LECK.  New  York,  The  Macmillan  Co.  1896.  Pp.  xii  +  258. 
$1.00. 

The  Power  of  Thought.  JOHN  DOUGLAS  STERRETT.  With  an 
introduction  by  J.  MARK  BALDWIN.  New  York,  Charles  Scrib- 
ner's Sons.  1896.  Pp.  xiv -4-320. 

Elements  of  Psychology.  GEORGE  CROOM  ROBERTSON.  Edited 
from  notes  of  lectures  by  C.  A.  FOLEY  RHYS  DAVIDS.  New 
York,  Charles  Scribner's  Sons.  1896.  Pp.  xiii-f  268. 

The  Life  of  James  Me  Cosh.  Ed.  by  W.  M.  SLOANE.  New  York, 
Charles  Scribner's  Sons.  1896.  Pp.  vi  +  287-  $2.50. 

Grundriss  der  Psychiatric.  C.  WERNICKE.  Th.  II.  Die  paro- 
noischen  Zustdnde.  Leipzig,  Thieme.  1896.  Pp.  178.  M.  1.30. 

Gustav  Theodor  Fechner.  K.  LASSWITZ.  Edited  by  R.  FALCKEN- 
BERG.  Frommann's  Klassiker  der  Philosophic,  I.  Stuttgart, 
Frommann's  Verlag.  1896.  Pp.  viii+2O4.  M.  1.75. 

Hobbes'  Leben  und  Lehre.  F.  TONNIES.  Frommann's  Klassiker,  II. 
Stuttgart,  Frommann's  Verlag.  1896.  Pp.  xiii  +  232.  M.  2. 

S.  Kierkegaard.  H.  HOFFDING.  Frommann's  Klassiker,  III. 
Stuttgart,  Frommann's  Verlag.  1896.  Pp.  x+i7o.  M.  1.50. 


NOTES.  705 

Geschichte  des  Unendlichkeitsproblem.    J.  COHN.    Leipzig,  Engel- 
mann.     1896.     Pp.  vii-f  261.     M.  5. 


NOTES. 

THE  American  Psychological  Association  will  meet  at  Boston  on 
December  29,  30  and  31,  which  are  also  the  place  and  time  of  the 
meeting  of  the  Society  of  American  Naturalists  and  of  the  affiliated 
Societies.  It  is  proposed  to  hold  a  discussion  on  the  morning  of  De- 
cember 30.  In  the  afternoon  President  Fullerton  will  deliver  his  ad- 
dress, and  the  business  of  the  Association  (including  the  reports  of 
committees)  will  be  transacted.  It  is  proposed  to  group  the  papers  of 
an  experimental  and  physiological  character  on  December  29,  and 
those  of  a  philosophical  character  on  December  31,  so  that  members 
wishing  to  attend  two  days  only  can  do  so.  An  effort  will  be  made 
to  keep  the  sessions  short  and  to  allow  ample  time  and  opportunity  for 
social  intercourse.  The  program  promises  to  be  of  special  importance, 
and  part  of  the  proceedings  of  the  other  Societies  are  such  as  to  be  of 
interest  to  psychologists. 

A  PRIZE  of  .£50,  to  be  called  the  *  Welby  Prize/  is  offered  for  the 
best  treatise  upon  the  following  subject :  The  causes  of  the  present 
obscurity  and  confusion  in  psychological  and  philosophical  termi- 
nology, and  the  directions  in  'which  we  may  hope  for  efficient  practi- 
cal remedy.  Competition  is  open  to  those  who,  previously  to  October 
i,  1896,  have  passed  the  examinations  qualifying  for  a  degree  at  some 
European  or  American  University.  The  donor  of  the  prize  desires 
that  general  regard  be  had  to  the  classification  of  the  various  modes  in 
which  a  word  or  other  sign  may  be  said  to  possess  '  meaning,'  and  to 
corresponding  differences  in  the  conveyance  or  interpretation  of  *  mean- 
ing.' The  committee  of  award  will  consider  the  practical  utility  of 
the  work  submitted  to  them  as  of  primary  importance.  The  essays, 
which  may  be  written  in  English,  French  or  German,  must  be  type 
written  and  extend  at  least  to  25,000  words.  Each  should  be  headed 
by  a  motto,  and  accompanied  by  a  sealed  envelope  containing  the 
name  of  the  writer.  Manuscript  from  America  should  be  sent  to 
ProfessorE.  B.  Titchener,  Cornell  University,  Ithaca,  N.  Y.,  and  must 
reach  its  address  not  later  than  October  i,  1897.  Other  members 
of  the  committee  are  Prof.  James  Sully,  London;  Mr.  G.  F.  Stout, 
Aberdeen ;  and  Prof.  O.  Kiilpe,  Wiirzburg.  A  French  member  will 
be  added. 


7o  NOTES. 

A  COMPLETE  edition  of  the  works  of  Descartes,  in  honor  of  the  third 
centenary  of  his  birth,  will  be  published  under  the  auspices  of  the 
French  Ministry  of  Public  Instruction.  It  will  contain  not  only  his 
philosophical  and  scientific  publications,  but  also  five  volumes  of  corres- 
pondence. The  scientific  works  will  be  edited  by  Prof.  Ch.  Adams, 
of  Dijon,  and  the  scientific  works  by  M.  P.  Tannery,  of  the  College 
de  France.  The  edition  has  been  planned  by  the  editors  of  the  Revue 
de  Metaphysique  et  de  Morale,  5  Rue  de  Meziers,  Paris,  and  sub- 
scriptions sent  in  their  care  will  be  filled  at  a  large  reduction  in  price. 

THE  Paris  Academy  of  Moral  and  Political  Sciences  has  awarded 
the  Bordin  prize  of  2,000  fr.,  the  subject  for  which  was  this  year 
Kant's  Ethics,  to  M.  Cresson,  professor  at  Besan9on. 

A  NEW  life  of  Kant  by  Dr.  M.  Kronenberg  is  about  to  be  pub- 
lished by  Beck,  of  Munich,  and  Prof.  Fr.  Paulsen  has  also  in  prepara- 
tion a  volume  on  Kant  for  Frommann's  Klassiker  der  Philosophic. 
Volumes  in  this  series  on  Fechner  by  Prof.  K.  Lasswitz,  on  Hobbes 
by  Prof.  F.  Tonnies,  and  on  Kierkegaard  by  Prof.  H.  Hoffding,  have 
already  been  published. 

DR.  H.  T.  LUKENS,  of  Clark  University,  has  been  appointed  pro- 
fessor of  education  at  Bryn  Mawr  College,  and  Dr.  Colin  A.  Scott  to 
the  chair  of  experimental  psychology  and  child  study  at  the  Chicago 
Normal  School.  Mr.  J.  H.  MacCracken  has  been  made  instructor  in 
philosophy  in  New  York  University.  Prof.  W.  M.  Warren  has  been 
promoted  to  a  full  professorship  of  philosophy  in  Boston  University. 
Dr.  Guy  Tawney  (Leipsig)  has  been  appointed  demonstrator  of  ex- 
perimental psychology  in  Princeton  University. 

WE  record  with  regret  the  death  of  Dr.  M.  W.  Drobisch,  professor 
of  philosophy  in  the  University  of  Leipzig,  who  died  on  September 
30,  at  the  advanced  age  of  94  years. 


ALL  communications  for  the  editors  of  THE  PSYCHOLOGICAL  RE- 
VIEW, together  with  books,  reprints,  etc.,  intended  for  review,  should 
be  sent  during  the  year  beginning  November  i,  1896,  to  Professor 
J.  Mark  Baldwin,  Princeton,  New  Jersey. 


INDEX   OF   NAMES. 


The  page  numbers  are  italicised  in  the  case  of  contributors  ;   they  are  in  heavy  Roman  type  in  the 
case  of  authors  reviewed ;   they  are  in  thin  Roman  type  in  the  case  of  mention  in  the  notes. 


Abelsdorff,  G.,  106 

Allin,  A.,  344,  468,  342,  545 

Anderson,  K.,  378 

Angell,  J.  R.,  108,  196,  243,  371 

Armstrong  Jr.,  A.  C.  536 

Aschaffenburg,  G.,  456 

Aschkinass,  E.,  451 

Avenarius,  R.,  603 

Bakewell,  C.  M.,  356 

Baldwin,  J.  M.  73,  201,  211,  300,  356, 

467.  57i,  684 
Barnes,  E.,  356 
Barthel,  P.  O.,  348 
Beaunis,  H.,  562 
Bekhteret,  Dr.,  244 
Berenson,  B.,  677 
Bergmann,  J.  462 
Bergson,  H.,  578 
Berkley,  H.  J.,  222 
Biervliet,  T.  T.  van,  96 
Binet,  A.,  96,  112,  113,  557,  562,  673 
Boas,  F.,  468 
Bolton,  F.  E.,  286 
Bolton,  T.  L.,  253 
Bourdon,  B.,  no 
Bryan,  W.  L.,  432 
Bryant,  S.,  218 
Buchner,  E.  F.,  389 
Buck,  G.,  237 

Calderwood,  H.,  691 

Caldwell,  W.,  686 

Calkins,  M.  W.,  32,  68,  344,  426,  542, 

545,  548,  581 
Cattell,  J.  McK.,  no,   123,   134,  437, 

571,  382,  650,  618 
Carlile,  W.  W.,  114 
Chamberlain,  A.  F.,  559 
Charpentier,  A.,  573 
Chrysostom,  Brother,  129 
Conant,  L.  L.,  326 
Cope,  E.  D.,300,  437 
Cornman,  O.,  126 
Courtier,  J.,  112,  568 

D'Arcy,  180 
Dehio,  H.,  222 


Delabarre,  E.  B.,  349,  356,  375 
Dewey,  J.,  /<?/,  218,  326,  357,  434 
Donaldson,  H.  H.,  198 
Dufour,  107 
Dumas,  G.,  113 

Egger,  V.,  236 
Ehrenfels,  C.  v.,  588 
Einthoven,  W.,  108 
Ellis,  H.,  453 
Ermacora,  G.  B.,  99 
Eucken,  R.,  556 

Farrand  L.,  124,  222,538,  618 

Ferrero,  G.,  237 

Ferri,  L.,  355 

Fite,  W.,  443 

Flechsig,  P.,  596 

Flournoy,  T.,  in,  567 

Forel,  A.,  105,  564,  568 

Fouillee,  A.,  335,  463,  553 

Franklin,  C.  L.,  71,  106,  229,  338,  450 

573,  692 

Franz,  S.  I.,  356,  313,  331 
Fullerton,  G.  S.,  /,  123 

Gad,  J.,  1 20 

Gardiner,    H.    N.,  233,  331,  434,  57$, 

&,  386 

Griffing,  H.,  253,  412,  513,  699 
Gilbert,  J.  A.,  469 
Groos,  K.,  329 
Grosse,  E.,  560 
Gulliver,  J.  H.,  588 

Haddon,  A.  C.,  447 
Halleck,  R.  P.,  669 
Halleux,  T.,  553 
Hansen,  F.  C.  C.,  98 
Harris,  G.,  688 
Head,  H.,  309 
Heinrich,  W.,  337,  457 
Hennig,  R.,  581 
Henri,  V.,  100,  566 
Hering  E.,  108,  120 
Herrick,  C.  L.,  797,  320,  637 
Hibben,J.  G.,  114,  448 
Hirsch,  M.,  226 


708 


INDEX  OF  NAMES. 


Hodge,  C.^.,  342,584 
Houston  H.  E.,5J/ 
Howison,  G.  H.,  652 
Hume,  J.  G.,  195 
Hylan,J.  P.,  56,  457 
Hyslop,  J.  H.,  89,  131,  448 

ames,  W.,  98,  113,  582,  650,  679 

astrow,  J.,  68,  426,  470,  548 

ones,  H.,  115 

udd,  C.  H.,  112,  232,  349,  356,  468, 

577 

Kauffmann,  M.  R.,  120 
Keane,  A%  H.,  558 
Keller,  A.,  454 
Kiesow,  F.,  103, 188,  226,347,  351,  35^, 

450 

Kirkpatrick,  E.  A.,  669 
Kirschmann,  A.,  451 
Kodis,J.,j&jf,  603 
Koster,  W.,  107,  229 
Kottgen,  E.,  106 
Krause,  F.,  347 
Kries,  v.,  71,  692,  695 
Kiilpe,  O.,  323 
Kurella,  193 


Lachelier,  T.,  55* 

Ladd,  G.  T.,  126,  .296,  356 

Landmann,  S.,  682 

Langley,  A.  G.,  671 

Lay,  W.,  92,  433 

Le  Bon,  G.,  97 

Lehman,  A.,  98 

Lehmann,  R.,  586 

Leibnitz,  671 

Leuba,  J.  H.,  569 

Liepman,  H.,  455 

Lindley,  E.  H.,  698 

Lipps,  T.,  113 

Llano,  A.,  692 

Lloyd,  A.  H.,  422 

Loeb,  J.,  452 

Lough,  J.  E.,  282,  356,  484,  692 

Lie"bault,  A.  A.,  227 

v.  Liszt,  595 

MacDonald,  A.,  125 
MacDougall,  R.,  138 
Mclntyre,  J.  L.,  118 
McLellanJ.  A.,  434 
McLennan,  S.  F.,  118,371 
McWhood,  L.  B.,  356 
Marbe,  K.,  692 
Marshall,  H.  R.,  64,  447 
Martius,  G.,  355 
Mayer,  A.  M.,  229 
Meumann,  E.,  700 
Meyer,  A.,  224 
Maxwell,  S.  S.,  452 
Meinong,  A.,  352 
Mentz,  P.,  350 


Mills,  W.T.,  130,^9 
Mirallie1,  C.,  555 
Monrad,  M.  J.,  33* 
Moore,  A.  W.,  243 
Morselli,  E.,  679 
Mosso,  A.,  445 
Moulin,  A.,  454 
Munsterberg,  H.,  21,  138 
Muller,  G.  E.,  338 

Nagel,  W.,  692 

Natorp,  P.,  460 

Newbold,  W.  R.,  132,  332,  569,  686 

Nicati,  W.,  229 

Nichols,  H.,  64,  120,309,  445*517 

Noetzli,  J.,  224 

Ottolenghi,  S.,  699 

Patrick,  G.  T.  W.,  130,  323,  469 

Paulhan,  F.,  554 

Paulsen,  F.,  684 

Perry,  B.,  237 

Philippe,  }.,335 

Pierce,  A.  H.,  682 

Pierce,  E.,  120,  270 

Pillsbury,  W.B.,588 

Podmore,  F.,  682 

Putnam,  J.  J.,  198 

Rehmke,  J.,  666 
Ribot,  T.,  567,  673 
Richet,  C.,594 
Rivers,  W.  H.  R.,  349 
Robinson,  C.  R.,  575 
Romanes,  G.  J.,  437 
Royce,  J.,  201 
Russell,  J.  E.,  671 

de  Sanctis,  681 

Sanford,  E.  C.,  121 

Santayana,  G.,  677 

Schappe,  W.,  120 

Schrenk-Notzing,  682 

Schubert-Soldern,  R.  v.,  120 

Scott,  C.  A.,  332 

Scripture,  E.  W.,  196,  416 

Sergi,  G.,  600 

Seth,  J.,  356 

Shand,  A.  F.,  583 

Shaw,  W.  J.,  //J 

Sherman,  L.  A.,  238 

Simmel,  G.,  353 

Singer,  Jr.,  E.  A.,  356,  463,  666 

Smith,  T.  L.,  580 

Smith,  W.  G.,  21,  337,  580 

Sollier,  P.,  454 

Solomons,  L.  M.,  30,  492 

Stanley,  H.  M.,  211,5^6 

Stein,  G.,  492 

Stern,  R.,  347 

Stetson,  R.  H.,  398 

Stevens,  W.  L.,  229 


INDEX  OF  NAMES.  709 

Stout,  G.  F.,  588  Vaihinger,  H.,  468 

Stratton,  G.  M.,  j/j,  611,  652  Vann^rus,  A.,  235,  559 
Strong,  C.  A.,  64,  127,  149,  244,  309 
Stumpf,  C.,  590  3  ,44, 


3S3,  «9,  700  ,  M  P.. 


v,er 
Tyler,    ..,  Wundt,  W.,  355,  356 

Urban,  W.  M.,  73  Ziwet,  A.,  434 


INDEX   OF    SUBJECTS. 


Acoustics,  350 

./Esthetics,  of  Words,  238;  of  Simple 

Forms,  270 
Alcoholism,  455,  222 
Apperception,  384 
Aphasia,  555 

Art,  The  Beginnings  of,  560 
Association,  32,  no,  456,  567,  596 
Attention,   457;    Fluctuations  in,  56; 

Physical  Characteristics  of,  158 
Automatism,  Normal  Motor,  492 
Avenarius,  Richard,  603 

Brain,  Growth  of,  198 
Belief,  462 

Character,  218,  335,  583 

Child  Psychology,  432,  559,  567 

Color,  Saturation,  451 ;  Sense  in  Lit- 
erature, 453 

Colors,  Saturation  of,  50 

Conscience,  114 

Consciousness,  235  ;  Suspension  of  the 
Spatial,  191 ;  Focal  and  Marginal, 
193 ;  and  Time,  127,  149;  and  Evolu- 
tion, 129,  296  ;  Subliminal,  682  ; 
Time,  700. 

Criminal,  Natural  History  of  the,  195  ; 
Suggestion,  227  ;  Responsibility,  595 

Cutaneous  Sensibility,  188 

Discrimination,  no 
Dream  Reasoning,  132 
Duration  and  Intensity,  484 

Emotions,  113,  583,  600;  Testimony 
of  Heart  Disease  to  Sensory  Facies 
of  the,  320 

Epistemology,  459,  584. 

Ethics,  352,  691 ;  Metaphysical  Study 
of,  181 

Ethnology  and  Anthropology,  558 

Evolution,  437,  443,  571 ;  and  Con- 
sciousness, 129,  296;  in  Art,  447; 
Moral,  688 

Experimental  Psychology,  100,  no, 
232,  349,  456 

Fatigue  in  Reading,  On  the  Condi- 
tions of,  513 


Fear,  445,  567 
Feelings,  113 
Florentine  Painters,  677 

Galvanotropism,  452 

Hallucinations,  131 
Hedonistic  Theories,  218 
Hypnotism,  105,  226 

Ideas,    Community  of,    in   Men   and 

Women,  68,  426,  548 
Imagination,  Types  of,  398 
Induction,  551 
Innervation,  in 
Intensity  and  Duration,  Relation  of,  in 

our  Sensations  of  Light,  484 
Insanity,  679 

Laboratory  Studies,  Harvard,  21,  158, 
270, 484;  Chicago,  245,  371 ;  Wiscon- 
sin, 286;  Columbia,  412,  513,  531; 
Iowa,  469 

Leibnitz,  New  Essays,  671 

Light  Sensations,  484;  Intensity  and 
Depth  Perception,  575 

Localization,  in  Space,  89;  Tactile, 
568  ;  of  Touch,  577 

Logic,  Formal,  422  ;  Inductive,  448 ; 
and  Psychology,  313,  652 

Measurements,  Physical  and  Mental, 
618 

Memory,  109,  348,  578 ;  Place  of  Repe- 
tition in,  21  ;  Visual  and  Aural  Mem- 
ory Processes,  258 ;  Muscular,  580 

Mental  Development,  201 

Motor,  Automatism,  492;  Phenomena 
of  Mental  Effort,  698 

Music,  112 

Neuro-Social  Data,  125 

New   Books,    119,  239,  334,  466,  587, 

704 

Notes,  119,  239,  355,  467,  588,  704 
Number  Concept,  326 

Observation,  Accuracy  of  Recollection 

and,  286,  531 
Olfactory  Sense,  568 


INDEX  OF  SUBJECTS. 


711 


Pain,  Physical,  and  Pain  Nerves,  64 ; 
Nerves,  309;  Individual  Sensibility 
to,  412 ;  Biological  Study  of,  593 

Pathological,  347,  454 

Perception,  Tactual,  232  ;  Visual,  233 

Perimeter,  a  New,  282 

Philosophy,  Lotze,  115;  Introduction 
to,  684 ;  Schopenhauer's  System  of, 
686 

Positivism,  553 

President's  Address,  Psychological  As- 
sociation, 123,  134  ;  International 
Congress  of  Psychology,  589 

'Prospective  Reference'  of  Mind,  73 

Psychical  Research,  582,  650 

Psychological  Association,  121 

Psychology,  Biervliet's,  96 ;  of  Crowds 
Le  Bon,  97;  Experimental,  100,  no, 
232.  349. 456  5  and  Physiology,  i,  123 ; 
Comparative,  130,  329,  536,  564 ;  of 
Feeling,  211 ;  of  Rhetoric,  237;  and 
Logic,  313,  652  ;  Kiilpe's,  323  ;  of  Art, 
331 ;  of  Temperament  and  Charac- 
ter, 335  ;  Physiological,  337;  of  Sen- 
sation, 338;  Reflex  Arc  Concept  in, 
357;  Child,  432,  559,  567;  of  Num- 
ber 434;  Remarks  on  Professor 
Lloyd  Morgan's  Method  in  Animal, 
536 ;  of  Religious  Phenomena,  569 ; 
Individual,  566  ;  Abnormal,  675 ; 
Titchener's,  662  ;  Rehmke's,666 ;  and 
Psychic  Culture,  669;  des  senti- 
ments, 673  ;  The  Third  International 
Congress  of,  589 

Psycho-sensory  Climacteric,  657 

Reaction-Time,  245 


Recognition,  344,  542 

Recollection,  Accuracy  of  Observation 

and,  286,  531 
Reflex  Arc  Concept   in    Psychology, 

357 
Retina,  Functions  of  the  Rods  of  the, 

Retinal,  Light,  126;  Image,  Inversion 
of,  6n 

Science  and  Philosophy,  Fallibility  of, 

553 

Senile  Dementia,  224 
Sensibility  and  Age,  699 
Size,  Apparent,  349 
Sleep,  130,  226;  Effects  of  the  Loss 

of,  469 ;  and  Dreams,  681 
Stimulations,  Simultaneous,  378 
Stimuli,  Organic  Effects  of  Agreeable 

and  Disagreeable,  371 
Specific  Energies,  342 
Synsesthesia,  73 
Synopsia,  581 

Talbot's  Law,  696 
Telepathy,  98,  99 
Temperature  Sensation,  351 
Tests,  Physical  and  Mental,  124 
Thinking,  Feeling,  Doing,  196 
Time,  118;  Consciousness,  700 
Types,  Intellectual,  554 

Vision,  106,  229,  450,  573,  692 

Will,  129,  353,  460 

Yale  Laboratory,  Third  Year  at,  416 


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